thank you. >> thank you, folks, for being here. i am not going to direct this question, i am going to start with mr. beers and then perhaps both or one of the other two can add something to this. the flaws in the program according to some information you submitted to was in preparation for today which i commend you in the way it was put together did not appear overnight. how did it happen that the information in the leaked memo made it to the media before being shared with congress or this committee. >> what happened with the arrival of the report from director anderson and deputy

director wulf was that we had not done a thorough review to ensure that there weren't more issues and questions and work proposals the associated with that and we were caught in a process before we were able to come to you and discuss this. >> how many individuals had access to this information? >> to this information? >> the report that was leaked. >> within the office of the undersecretary, i believe that number is three. myself, my deputy and the chief of staff. i have to ask miss anderson how many people had access in her office. my understanding is only two people in the office of the assistant secretary had it but i am not sure about that.

maybe she can shed more light on that. >> thank you for the question. there were seven hard copies made of a final report, two belonging to deputy director wulf and myself and the remainder moving forward to our leadership. there were other individuals that were involved in transfer of those documents will be seven hard copies were made. >> i use angle seven individuals had access or they passed on to someone else? seven hard copies? >> i can't speak to whether or not others receive copies. >> anywhere from five to 13 or 14 people had access to this. were any of these people interviewed subsequent to the release of the newspaper? >> there is an ongoing review of that. >> then i will not question any

further on this but perhaps we can get more of an in-depth explanation from law enforcement. i understand that clearly. ms. anderson, probably at least inferred the response incorrectly. one of my colleagues asked where we were headed with the process and you referred to there were cultural challenges. can you explain to me what you meant by cultural challenges and did it have anything to do with the leak of the memo to the media? >> thank you for the question. when i answered the question about where we were headed i believe i was answering a question that was the severe redirect it towards our cultural and the word ethical was used. we are headed in a lot of

directions. >> let me narrow my question. there is a cultural challenge as far as information being leaked more information can be shared or what information can be contained because in my experience in the nine years i have been with the government as u.s. attorney in congress, you understand what information stays within the agency and actually i am sure you will agree with me that no one other than designated individuals should be speaking with the media. some one wants to make a name for themselves or at least read an article or hear of an article they were associated with. can you elaborate? >> i share your disappointment in the leak of the report. i can't speak to the motivations of the person who leaked it because we don't know who did leave it. >> we know what the motivations

are when something like this occurred. i am not holding you folks responsible. i am concerned about as you say the cultural aspect of this. what has to take place before someone gets to the point that this should not be done? >> i don't believe the cultural challenges that identified in the memorandum can be attributed to the motivations of the person leading the report. >> my time has run out. i yield. >> we will do a quick second round since we only have four of us here. this is both ms. anderson and mr. wulf. you get a pass today. we will hear from you a little bit. in the memorandum there is a section which talks about inadequate training capability

and due to restrictions placed upon our hiring, the division has not been able to hire personnel with necessary skills and abilities to appropriately achieve our mission. one example is training. what restrictions placed upon hiring are you referring to? >> that passage of the report referred to a policy and the undersecretary may be in a better position to speak about it but a policy that is no longer in existence that i believe was in place to try to centralized training function within the directorate. that was a policy that at the time precluded our division from hiring into the division

specifically, individuals with training expertise, curriculum development and that sort of expertise. that policy is no longer in existence moving forward to hire folks with appropriate expertise. >> you weren't able to hire people who knew how to train people? >> we did not have individuals who had experience in the training discipline. we had folks -- [talking over each other] >> that policy is no longer a policy and i am told -- >> mr. beers, according to the appropriations that you had a $29 million budget carry over from this and even with your fiscal year 2013 cut of $14 million that is still $11 million that needs to be spent. yet in the memo there is a citation of budget constraints as an obstacle to hiring and

training personnel. >> the budget constraints to hiring and training personnel are in part what mr. wulf was alluding to. that we couldn't use the money because policy which was a centralizing policies for dhs didn't allow that to happen. some other carry overs are a result of program wasn't moving as evidenced by the slowness of the authorization to the security plan as rapidly as we anticipated when we requested money. let me turn to director anderson to elaborate further. >> a $25 million budget carry over that is still $11 million.

you are not saying they are constraints for those funds for this purpose. >> at this time i don't believe so. >> mr. beers, the internal memorandum says challenges involve human capital management procurement and program administration outside i s c. d control. rather than such things as dhs hirings and procuring and budgetary policies and procedures and practices. to what extent are the management problems outlined in the internal memorandum attributed to barriers associated with policies, procedures and practices aside from what you already said about the hiring?

>> with respect to procurement in the administrative issues, those are areas where the alignment between i s c. d and the office of infrastructure protection and the office of the undersecretary needed to be better aligned with one another and the information flow needed to get from the bottom to the top so we were aware of those problems and could fix them. and this is, from my perspective, the most disappointing thing about this discovery which was he epitomized by the failure of the office to report the problem we described before. a consistent policy, that i want to hear bad news first from people who work for me and not

from people outside and i was extraordinarily disappointed by this and use it as a teaching moment both with respect to i s c. d -- was not that i said it before but this problem, i needed to reiterate as strong as possible that this kind of behavior was unacceptable and didn't do justice to the people who work for me and didn't allow us to fix the problems that they had. >> i appreciate that but let's hope we don't have too more teaching moments. miss clark. >> thank you. i want to go back to a little bit of what congressman marino was trying to get at and the want to ask a couple questions about the status of the investigation regarding who

leaked the memo to the news media. who was conducting the investigation and can you explain the process? was it within dhs? >> the office of compliance and security which is an office within m p pd run by certified law-enforcement officer is conducting the investigation. it was begun in the league. the process is to go around to determine who had possession of the report at one point in time. as director anderson indicated. who then prepares the report? i don't believe there's anybody below them who had access to the report. i will let them speak to that. and it went up to me. and to my deputy and chief of staff. that is where the report appears

to have been until the leak to the press. to determine who had custody and interview all of them and look for corroborating information that might suggest who was responsible. jeter -- these are never easy kinds of investigations. but because of the nature of the disclosure, while not classified information in the sense of our classification system it was extraordinarily sensitive information and we would like to find out who was responsible. >> the process began shortly after the leak was stated? >> yes. >> it is on going. >> it is ongoing. it is not one interview necessarily. it might interview this same person over and over again in order to try to get stories

straight. >> thank you very much. i yield back the balance of my time. >> the chair recognizes miss richardson for the second round. >> thank you, mr. chairman. if i understand you correctly you completed 55 with tier one and expect to be done at some point in the next couple months and then you will start tier 2. wendy expect here 2? >> the expectation is sometime in fiscal year 13 but let me ask director anderson if she can be more specific than that? >> thank you for the question. when we talk about completion we have to talk about what we mean by completion in the context of the process. what we have completed so far is authorized or conditionally authorized 55 security plans. of those 55, ten have an authorization inspected. the remaining 45 are in the

queue to be conducted. we expect very soon to have completed the review of the actionable tier 1. we have some facilities that are not being actively reviewed because they had a determination requests we receive from the facility or reasons like that. we haven't continued to review it because they asked us to reevaluate. we began reviewing and we expect to have completed the review in the coming your note later than 2013 but hopefully well before. >> but the actual inspections would not take place. >> probably in this year. >> i do not believe we will have begun the authorization inspections of the tier 2 in f y 12. >> i have a facility and i will

forward the information but we have been patiently waiting. my next question has to do with your labor work force. according to the notes from our prior briefing we had there has been a high reliance of contractors in this particular department and the question is whether there has been an overreliance on external folks. to what degree do we think it is appropriate for them to be performing critical core functions such as training and development, reviews and technical writing. would you agree there still is -- what is the reliance of contractors versus internal employees? >> let me start the answer to this question. this is an issue in the nature of the organization of the department of homeland security.

there are seven components which come as legacy organizations to the department. these did not pre exist in most cases. the stand-up so the initials stand up, very contractor heavy. so too where we having one. the work force of am ppb was 60% contractors. we have gotten down to 40% contractors in the last several years. we also have a balanced workforce initiative which requires all contractor hires to be reviewed not just by us but the office of general counsel

who were not inherently government work. that is work we are in so let me let director anderson speak to the rest. >> the undersecretary captured my thoughts exactly. when we talk about the use of contractors although we are evaluating whether or not any are doing inherently governmental work my greater concern as expressed in the memorandum to the undersecretary is the need to stabilize the program and create a sustainable program fan with contractors coming and going it is difficult to do that. >> in light of the limited amount of inspections you have been able to complete and have approximately 108 inspectors, if you are to do new hires the intention to do those from contractors for federal positions? or do you intend to increase

that at all? >> increasing the number of inspectors? as i mentioned we are currently evaluating what we will accomplish in terms of compliance activities and projecting what additional resources we will be able to accomplish with additional resources. >> could i ask the follow-up question? my question -- my question now is, to hire more. is it your intention to hire those war to internal training governmental positions. >> we have not developed a plan after an inspector position. the decision to move in a

certain direction. new inspector positions would be federal employees. >> what about 40% by last session? >> i don't know the specifics of individual work. >> if you could supply it to the committee, the workers that you have, where they're located. >> i believe the gentlelady wants to recapture this. >> just a minute of it. i appreciate your indulgence. we have had a lot of discussion about what went wrong. i want to focus on the employees because certainly with investigations going on with all

that has been uncovered there has to be some level of destruction, some level of not knowing where they stand. what is the relation with the employees? how are the employees getting through this? what types of things do they put in place to give some level of reassurance to people that they are valued but secondly that things work out in the end and have there been conversations with their unions? share that with us. thank you. >> thank you for the question. really a question about the work force because there seems to be a perception that there's a question about the capabilities of the team. is true that i have identified instances where we don't have a

good position but i cannot leslie say never worked with more talented, hard working group of folks. i think they are the key to our success and i am concerned about the impact of recent activities on their morale and the confidence they have in our program and the way forward. you are correct in suggesting there's a certain amount of thanks to --angst. it is the distraction. we are doing as much as we can to reassure them. we are being as transparent as we can with them at every stage of the process. when the fox news article came out as a result i sat down with all my folks and talked through it and talked about it and linked it to previous discussions we had about our challenges and been very open

about that. we set up routine communications and shared with them the action plan and involve them in implementation of the action plan and engaged them at every level and certainly our engagements has involved the union. we met with mr. wright and we have to the extent we can involve the inspectors in all these discussions and have been sharing this information with them, reassuring them very important part of the team. they are key to the success of this program and we need to move forward with them. they involved in that process and -- >> not edible testimony and

members, the additional questions. respond to these in writing. and what smooth on to battpanel. panel 2. [silence] >> we have a distinguished

panel, mr. bill homan is vice president of public relations for the society of chemical manufacturers. position he held since 2007. the society is the united states's leading trade organization representing chemical manufacturing and prior to joining the society mr. allmond served ten years as director of regulatory public affairs and chemical distributors. timothy scott is corporate director of emergency services and chemical company he served. sins 1979 in the current roll. he lead to a house global emergency service and security operation organizations and 200 locations around the world. and the federation of government employees, mr. a wright's career

as federal protective service officer in 1986. he has held the rank of sergeant and served as president of local -- local 918 since 2006. we will include your been testimony in their entirety in the record and ask that you confine your statements to a summary of five minutes and we will proceed from my left to my right with mr. allmond first. >> that afternoon, members of the subcommittee. i am bill allmond and i am president of chemical manufacturers and affiliates. i'm pleased to provide the problems and progress made by chemical facility anti-terrorist standards. six years ago there was a

comprehensive program--well down the road in implementing this program. this implements the mandate implemented by congress in 2006 but dhs failed to put in place among other things basic management practices or effective leadership. 2011 internal memorandum from the infrastructure combined division is sobering. demonstrates the government agency without proper management can take an effective regulatory framework and mess it up. as the subcommittee assess the department failure with the cfats program we must bear in mind the personnel needed dressing, not the program itself. in regards to the a cfats program as his success despite the internal management challenges, this demanding program is requiring 4,000 chemical facilities nationwide to develop and deploy the security enhancement. covered facilities have invested billions of dollars in upgrades.

members alone, majority are small manufacturers with $40 million in sales and invested in estimated five fifteen million in security measures. hundreds of facilities that have not done so made proactive investment in security measures in anticipation of their compliance obligations. 2,000 facilities voluntarily take steps to reduce their risk profile that they no longer work regulation and is driving -- in their expert judgment doing so is the not transfer risks to another supply chain. to impose security performance that more demanding in facilities. this performance based approach without impairing the ability to

remain innovative in the nation's highest paying manufacturing. and for non compliance, and it is fundamentally sound and did not require replacement. the regulatory program is not inherently impossible for an agency to implement but does require knowledgeable people to review and inspect facilities and encouraged to make decisions based on judgments. the memorandum indicated the staff largely does not have adequate skills in part because higher levels of dhs prevented them from hiring sufficiently. staff have been discouraged from using their judgment. on the other hand no one should dispute the fact that despite the challenges of limitations the two main alternatives would be far worse. the absence of chemical security regulations and prescriptive program that would drive chemical operations overseas due

to burdens like mandatory corporations. the internal problem holding back implementation was not insurmountable. the new leadership of penny j. anderson and david wulf will implement the program. thanks to the internal investment they have a greater understanding of the challenges facing them in a robust action plan. the following are the recommendations for limitations back on track. congress should collaborate more with industry where the greatest security expertise lies. we can be more transparent about operations and simplifying federal programs need to be a top priority. mandating the technology into the cfats program is the last thing they should or could try to implement. i s c. d needs to retrain much of its staff. congress needs to provide

certainty for the regulator and regulated alight by improving the authorization. it may appear counterintuitive to do this with the program troubled by agency mismanagement but the key to fixing cfats's biggest oversight, not budget cuts or complete recess. we appreciate this opportunity to testify. >> thank you. mr. scott. >> chairman lundgren, ranking member clark, i am chief security officer for the dow chemical co.. i am speaking on behalf of the doubt and american chemistry focus on four points today. there are clearly concerned on all sides about the lack of significant progress on implementation of the physical standards. we see these as management issues and not issues with the

cfats concept. companies implement responsible care cote for security. in 2002 and voluntarily and significantly improved security over the past decade spending $10 billion on security enhancements. third cfats has achieved some progress toward improving security of the chemical sector. the design is good. we have an excellent opportunity to direct the board to complete the critical path before us. the lack of significant progress along with apparent internal issues are disheartening but not a cause for altering our course for nullifying the efforts and progress have been made. the open and collaborative partnerships that were successful in the beginning have declined and lack of mission clarion leadership is the parent. this is not a condemnation of everyone and everything in dhs. it is management, making a

straightforward program complex and burdensome. this is a wake-up call. we have the catalyst for change and an excellent opportunity to achieve success. the concept and basic design of cfats are solid. has potential improvements in security. it can be developed in an efficient process to improve the security of our nation's industry. industry is dedicated billions of dollars and thousands of hours working with dhs at every level. that has been $250 million on security. we completed vulnerability assessments and security upgrades at facilities worldwide. not just those regulated under cfats in the u.s.. from the beginning until this day there has been a leadership position on this issue and now is the only chemical company to achieve designation of safety from dhs and logging site security and distribution security process.

the cfats concept is good. risk-based and focused on the right priorities. the cfats design is the allowing regulated companies to apply customized security systems and processes each unique site in situations to comply with dhs performance standards and subject to dhs approval. the issue is in the details and those can be fixed if we work as a collaborative team with a common goal. we need to fix what is wrong, not start over from square one and we don't need to make the process more complex. there are many efficient operations to achieve successful implementation of cfats and the goal of reducing vulnerability of the chemical industry and our communities and our country. we can get security plans approved. we can get the highest risk sites audited. we can get plans in place to reduce vulnerability than comply with the rest based in torrance -- performance standards. included in my statement are

solutions to some issues of concern. site security plan approval, transparency on risk assessment process and reasonable alternatives that would expedite the process. this will be a difficult task but not an impossible mission. cfats can work as conceived. it will take leadership, communication and communication beyond what we have seen recently. dhs and this subcommittee can make this work. we have taken a proactive approach to security and we are working with dhs from the beginning. remembers aggressively sat down to make significant investments in security. industry does not want to waste this effort by starting over. a accis ready to take on the challenge as an equal stake holder and fully implement. we need dhs to meet this challenge with a common mission and goal. we ask that you separately address internal issues in dhs

and reauthorize the cfats legislation to continue the efforts. thank you. >> thank you. now mr. wright is recognized. >> chairman lundgren, ranking member clark, my name is david wright, president of afge local 918 and i'm an inspector with the federal protective service, component, i am here to talk about this critical homeland security mission and work with and tp as i expressed to senior agency leaders. i have not been given the opportunity to review the internal report written by director anderson that generated this hearing. my knowledge of the content of the internal report is mostly limited to what i have read in a fox news article in december of 2011. my perception is these other types of issues that can be addressed and good made -- labor

relationship. policies and procedures can only be addressed by taking into account perspective of the field level work force that accomplishes to work on a daily basis. afge local 918 labor-management relationship with nppd is cooperative and direct conflict with what has been reported in the media has resulted in late internal report. the conflict ranges from outright exaggeration of the vehicle mileage issue to the implied agency in ability to implement policy procedure due to a union work force. i have consistently pledge the union's cooperation at many nppd national level meetings to include one meeting with director anderson in september of 2011. at all meetings i indicated the union's readiness for perceived roadblocks in support of the

cfats program. on january 9th, 2012, after the negative news article, i met with director anderson in the presence of assistant secretary todd kyle and senior union leadership. i reiterate that successful accomplishment of the cfats mission is the union's first priority and we would expect an opportunity to get meaningful input there would be no union roadblock to implementation of critical homeland security policy and procedures. i reject the assertion the workforce is on qualified. most have extensive background in law enforcement, military, regulatory authority and academics. the chemical security work force is dedicated and all came on board with the progress of building a new agency dedicated closing a potential gap in the nation's homeland security network stored with massive

amounts of hazardous chemicals. i have been asked to advise you and the american public that the nppd inspector work force is qualified and ready after critical task of assessing security of the nation's chemical facilities. and moving forward, before and after the internal report. we are making that commitment to you. it is incumbent on congress and dhs leadership to mark that have forward. thank you for paying attention to this critical issue. i am available for questions. >> i think the panel members for the discussion. we go into a round of questioning. mr. wright, you have seen the entire report, you have been

responding with respect to the report you have seen and discussions that you had. and what is described by the members, they have a desire to work for this program or you still think this program is worthy and workable? >> you are ready to move forward. with that being said there was an aspect of insults to the report. there was an aspect of calling into question capabilities, education, training and so forth. there was and still is an aspect of being disrespect. >> since the leak memo came out, how has that the 12 engage you

on the issues outlined in the memo and has there been any suggestion how you work together to solve any of the issues detailed in the memo or is that viewed more as internal problems that has not affected the relationship of the industry with the department? >> dhs discusses these issues as the chemical sector coordinating issue that mr. scott has been involved in. we haven't had many discussions as of yet but we had some preliminary discussions about some of the things that have been holding a program we identified for well over a year now. >> mr. scott. he said this report for that which came out of this is a wake-up call, not a death knell for the program. i hope that is the case. could you out wine why the

program as articulated or as legislatively drawn and the response by the private sector to that is worthy of being maintained and what are the advantages as you see it in the context of as you say the industry having spent billions of dollars in terms of security? >> the primary reason we agree cfats is a good approach is the risk-based approach they take. it is really focused on the risk of each individual's right, different scenarios. it takes a risk in to question and you apply the appropriate risk rating and tier level to the site. a strong positive. we want to be sure we are focusing on risk and focusing on reducing the risk. the second piece of the puzzle is it gives you -- cfats gives

you a broad array of opportunities to reduce that risk. it doesn't dictate any one method or means of reducing risk so each site could be different. each situation whether it is assessments or attack scenario, the site has the opportunity to pick the right answer, the right solution, what makes sense at that time. the risk-based approach and the opportunity to apply or customize security pa is really the-bato mid s imizcsms-bvs w. k.in

though >> there is uncertainty. some observers say that is overstated. why would your members not continue to go forward with capital investment necessary to secure their own assets? i would like to know how you would respond to that. >> regulations in general are disproportionately impact small business and when there's a delay in implementation that compounds the impact the delays have seized up compliance costs budgeted when companies do their own annual budgets.

there might be compliance costs built-in and that money could have settled things like manufacturing, innovation, more jobs. it should have been sent. >> you indicated in your written testimony that 80% of your membership is small business. >> that is correct. >> i thank the witnesses for providing their insights as well. many problems identified in the memorandum appeared to be related hiring and developing staff including the lack of procedures to guide efforts to do their jobs. please discuss with the problems related to hiring related policies and procedures are the challenge to implementing the cfats program and if so why?

give us your experience for how the employees were hired for the cfats program, what is the history from your point of view? >> i will start with the second part of your question first. i have been around longer than any of the nppd leadership at the inception of the cfats program in hiring the inspectors. we were originally detailed from the cfats work force so i did attend the initial class one day of a week-long course for the initial group of inspectors. that was what can now be looked at as a setback.

it is ultimately law enforcement, and inspectors were lured away from federal law enforcement for readers with the promise of building a new agency. unregulated chemical facilities and unfortunately for those inspectors the program was misguided or labeled as misguided and changes occur. and the loss of federal law enforcement career, stayed and then there is the aspect of the management culture. it seems to have changed several times.

the focus has changed. >> the lack of program guidance, in the progress if at all. >> i can only go back to what i have seen in the fox news article. apparently director anderson thinks that the mission is in impeded by law enforcement officers that, quote, want to carry a badge and gun. it goes back to a cultural issue. it goes back to the authorization and let's do -- form the nppd culture as opposed to different cultures that have occurred throughout the time

period. by bringing -- by losing the focus on the law enforcement and compliance and seeking to focus seemingly every year >> i see in the memo there are insinuations the union is causing friction in the workplace. would you give us a viewpoint of employees in the union on this matter of workplace positions or relationships with management and also in efforts to give feedback to dhs management would you characterize them as putting themselves in the position of being subjected to intimidation? >> the union culture is a new. we have been in place since march of 2,011. i was absolutely blindsided by the allegations in the news

article. are worked with secretary pierce, senior management for years now. that myth of working with the union, the union creating roadblocks to implementing policies and procedures is exactly that. it is a myth. >> my pleasure to recognize mr. richmond for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. eyewall not use my entire five minute. my question is for mr stock. i will just say in my new congressional district, chemical

facilities in places that fall on cfats in the country. my goal is to make sure it as efficient and least burdensome to the businesses that are there. any recommendations that you mentioned one way, and by recognizing -- is it one of the recommendations? >> my personal opinion is that would make the program alive easier to manage. the people at the site you are talking about the brazilian will see both of those sites have security upgrades. that is what we like to do. have those two sites you have a

requirement for entry. when somebody comes to work it is easy to look at those that have been vetted by the federal government that meets all the environment. >> how many of your facilities were covered by cfats? >> i am not sure i can answer that. about 3 dozen. in the united states we have 3 dozen sites covered by one or the other. all of these sites are covered by the acc response security code. >> i yield back. >> this person recognized for five minutes. >> my first question is for mr. scott. have you presented these

recommendations? >> some recommendations have been discussed through individual companies, through the acc and various associations and we talked about each and every one of the recommendations but most of those have been some discussions. >> are you aware of any responses that might have been received by dhs? >> dhs has always been willing to talk with us. we are having ongoing discussions. >> have there been any specific responses to the recommendations you provided to your knowledge? >> not at this time. >> is dow or acc an advisory group to dhs in light of this memorandum? where you provide feedback on this process? >> we are not working directly with dhs on that responds. >> does acc have any advisory

role working with this department? >> the acc offered in put on several recommendations. i don't know that they are having any direct response to those recommendations as yet. >> if i am hearing what you are saying there is no formal body advisory body to your knowledge that you are participating in on a regular basis? >> not on a regular basis. >> the same question for mr wright. is there regular advisory group working with the department to provide feedback on an ongoing basis? >> not to my knowledge. >> how about you? >> there is the chemical sector coordinating council but not a government advisory board but industry advisory and that is where we have periodic discussions about chemical security issues. >> is it a formal process once a

year? >> more like four or five times the year. it is an industry led group discussing chemical security by dhs. we do exchange information. >> it is your meeting, not theirs. >> yes. >> in your testimony you referenced you supplied dhs with a proposal and thing they could consider. have you gotten any responses to your proposal? >> there has been discussion about the issue that mr. scott talked about and we had some back-and-forth with the department for many months now and we hope to have some resolution on that because that is one of the areas with performance standards will up implementation. >> mr. wright, i want -- share

the comments available from mr. allmond in his system money where we strongly urge dhs to rely on half a dozen federal issue prudentials. union to express the concern about the proposal. they supported even that and also noted additionally relying upon contractors who typically have turnover, whenever. struggling on that word. delete last night. the need for constant retraining, institutional knowledge is the key conducted primarily with contract support. really providing a lot of support unlike what you have to testify about and strongly commended the work is so important to share that with

them. filing my question for you, have you found there to be a transparent and open process among the work force positions that are open and available? sins so many of them are contracted positions currently? >> i don't have much experience with contractors. i am concerned with the statements by director anderson about the openness and transparency of the action plan because it has not been brought to me. i have not been notified. i do know that there are a town hall meetings. i will also say my work force at this point is intimidated and unwilling to share that information with the union.

also director anderson is unwilling -- despite my efforts. >> hopefully through this committee looking at it. >> precipitate. got it. >> i think the gentle lady for that and the witnesses for the testimony and members for their questions. members of the panel the committee may have additional -- and the hearing record will be held open for ten days. with that this subcommittee stands adjourned.

[inaudible conversations] >> here we go. a beautiful downtown oklahoma city. i am captain rick. >> the weekend of may 5th and sixth, local content vehicle exports the history of literary including the works of galileo at the history of science university. >> the most important part of the book was on motion. when this was published the pope was angry. galileo's enemies joined together and the result was his trial. this also is a copy that contains his own handwriting. this is like being able to look over his shoulder in months leading to his trial.