historians want to make much of the dueling between them, but if there's a problem, why doesn't grant ever fire the guy? the only bad thing does to mead is he doesn't hold up the surrendered map for mead to get there. mead's not president of the actual surrender ceremony, but he's quite a ways away. we're wrapping up. ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much. [applause] >> every weekend booktv offers 48 hours of programming focused on nonfiction authors and books. watch it here on c-span2. >> our coverage of the 2012 colby military writers' symposium in northfield, vermont, concludes with james hornfischer. mr. hornfischer discusses his book, "neptune's inferno," and takes audience questions for a little under an hour.

>> good afternoon. it is my distinct pleasure to present to you today at our colby symposium writer and speaker james hornfischer. hornfischer quickly is establishing himself as doing for the navy what popular historian steven ambrose did for the army. this quote is from "the rocky mountain news," and i feel it fits hornfischer very aptly and describes him very went mr. hornfischer is the author of three works of naval history; the last stand of the tin can sailors published in 2004, won the samuel elliott morrison award for naval literature and was recently named by naval history magazine as one of a dozen all-time naval classics. his second book, "ship of ghosts," about the cruiser uss houston was the main selection of the history book club and the

military book club and the winner in 2007 of the united states' maritime literature award. his most recent book, "neptune's inferno," published by bantam in 2011, is a major new account of the guadalcanal naval campaign. a former editor at hard per collins and now -- harpercollins, he has handled a number of nonfiction bestsellers including the number one new york times bestseller and colby award winner, "flags of our fathers." he will serve as the moderator for this 2012 colby public session. today he will be speaking about his most recent book, "neptune's inferno: the u.s. navy at guadalcanal." it is the untold story of the u.s. navy's bloodiest fight of world war ii. considered, and i quote, vivid and engaging, extremely readable, comprehensive and thoroughly researched by ronald

specter of "the wall street journal" and brilliant, a compelling narrative of naval combat, simply superb by the washington times. it is a new york times, publishers' weekly and boston globe bestseller. so once again, it is my very great pleasure to welcome mr. james hornfischer. [applause] >> thank you very much. i appreciate everybody coming out. i think this is my fifth colby symposium. it's truly unique, in my experience, in terms of a publishing conference that focuses on the craft of military history, that celebrates the achievement of servicemen and women and that hopefully will guide policymakers through the experience of digesting our past. in this case, our recent past as we discuss afghanistan. today, however, we're going back a little bit deep. i've written three books about

the navy, three books about the navy in world war ii. you immediately turn to the pacific because that's really where the action was if you were a naval officer or an enlisted man in 1942. neptune's inferno takes on a six-month-long campaign that i think most people, i think the consensus has emerged that guadalcanal was truly the turning point in the pacific. midway, of course, was crucial. the battle of midway fought two minutes before the marines went ashore on guadalcanal, blunted the japanese offensive push toward hawaii. four japanese fleet carriers were sunk, a number of pilots and air crew. and with those losses japan lost the ability really to undertake new offensive operations and to expand its massive pacific perimeter. what it did, though, for us, for america is it opened the way for

the first time to go on the offensive. now, the joint chiefs of staff, in fact, the combined chiefs of staff, the british and the american high command, faced a number of options about where to take the offensive against the axis. and, you know, all through 1942 there was much talk about the strategy of the so-called worldwide strategy of europe first. president roosevelt committed himself to, i think, maintain the confidence of russia, to continue its fight against nazi germany. but what's going on in back channels in the combined chief of staff meetings, especially the meetings on the american side is, um, general marshall and admiral king and the be other american leadership confer is that there's a consensus that we've got to do something somewhere. there's also a driving force in the discussion known as the will, the ego and mind of one admiral ernest j. king,

commander and chief of the u.s. fleet, the chief of naval operations. he was a very willful individual. he was said never to have met anybody he considered his intellectual ego, and to stand in his presence was to feel that ego coming at you. so he was a very difficult character. but it was his achievement in 1942 to recognize that with a victory at midway and with the japanese seizure of this remote island in the south pacific known as guadalcanal where they were in may reported to be building an airfield, he had the means and also the necessity to take offensive operations against empiral japan. -- imperial japan. he was able to convince general marshall, and the two of them together were able to convince president roosevelt that the navy and the marine corps would strike in the pacific. this went against everything president roosevelt was saying about europe first.

in fact, it was going to be the pacific first because the navy was, indeed, with the construction of an airfield in guadalcanal was going to find itself unable to send cargo shipping to australia, that southern island stood astride our sea lanes in the pacific. you can see here's hawaii, here's daddal canal, and here's -- guadalcanal, and here's sydney. now the shipping coming down through fiji to refuel maybe or around -- this is all within bomber radius of guadalcanal. were the japanese permits to establish a working military airfield? it would really split the alliance in two. australia would be cut off, and a strategic position would be seriously threatened. so this was the impetus on august 7th, 1942, for 14,000 marines under general arch

vandegrift to land in gad guadalcanal, from pearl harbor up from new zealand they converged at fiji, held rehearsals and plants those marines on guadalcanal field. and the story is what followed d from this. what followed was a six-month campaign of attrition where japan kind of slowly came to grips with the magnitude of the situation. the imperial high command didn't attach much importance by our marine corps until they realized the larger ambitions of the south pacific intervention. they realized they were seriously threatened by a u.s. position in the southern solomons, and through august, september, october and november the japanese eventually, their main base -- a truck in the central pacific -- the carolina islands through a series of --

threw a series of hammer blows down on our foothold that produced seven major naval battles. five of them were midnight surface slug fests fought between destroyers, cruisers and battleships, often we're talking about horrific affairs with heavy casualties on both sides. five surface actions of that nature plus two sort of battle of midway style engagements fought in the waters around guadalcanal. the campaign lasted six months, and by the end of it in those seven naval battles, nearly 5,000 u.s. sailors were killed, an approximate number of -- about the same number of japanese as well. those 5,000 killed in action were three times the number of men who died in the fighting on the itself. so especially if you know something about the pacific war, we come to the question of why didn't i know that?

and i think it's constantly obscured, the extent of the navy sacrifice in this campaign is constantly obscured by the injury we have. we think of marines fight anything the jungle, and deservedly so. they fought bravely for those six months outnumbered, certainly not, you know, undersupplied, underarmed. they held a perimeter arnold that airfield and saved the day. but let's also observe that if navy did not support them adequately, no amount of gallantry on the part of clifton case or vandegrift or any of their men would have saved them from the fate of their brothers. they would have been rolled up -- if navy had failed to supply them and protect them from nighttime reinforcements by the jalapeno -- japanese, there's really no chance for them. so the campaign needs to be understood in its full context

which is a desperate struggle to refly the garrison undertaken by both sides which was really run by sea, so sea control as well as control of the skies around guadalcanal. this was a new mode of war far that america had never practiced before. one of the themes of the daddal canal campaign is one of underpreparation, rushed schedules that constantly got in the way of planning, forces being asked to do things they've never trained to do, new technologies coming into the field that were untested and, indeed, unrehearsed. nobody had the first idea really how to use radar. there might have been one man, we'll get to him in a moment. but guadalcanal was this crucible where the u.s. navy learned to fight. the japanese navy had a pretty good idea how to fight, actually, and that was indicated within hours of the marines going ashore. the japanese send down a cruiser

squadron, and the battle of salvo island was the result of this engagement the two squadrons of u.s. cruisers defending the waters north of guadalcanal. that tiny island here is salvo island. it was the defeat of the first order, the japanese showed their mastery of the craft of busting holes with torpedoes and night mire. we lost four cruisers. vincennes, quincy and astoria went down with about a thousand men. you really could say the battle of salvo island was a disaster. the so-called defeat at pearl harbor, if you will, was simply the natural result of a with the

l-force defending on a sleeping naval station. there's really nothing you can say about the failure of u.s. combat arms when they're rolling out of their bunks at 7:00. salvo, you had a combat-ready screen. competent command. we had a couple of captains and four-stripers in command. but they, essentially, patrolled this position. ie, they're sitting ducks. and here comes the crews rigorously trained for combat. this laid bare a number of deficiencies in the u.s. navy's fighting spirit and their doctrine all across the board.

all the way to the shores of japan itself, launching airstrikes. but the surface navy, the black shoe fleet had yet to see its day. so the battle on in the potential loss, four cruisers, a thousand sailors, scarcely a scratch on the japanese showed us how far we had to go. so the theme of the campaign becomes from that point forward, how is this kind of high-bound institution that's being torn apart by, you know, the evolving way of war, you've got the aviators over here, the battleship sailors over here. nobody really has a handle on how we're going to conduct fleet operations as such. how are we going to get our feet under ourselves and fight the reigning masters in the world as of 1942? well, the answer is through trial and error and through the emergence of a particular type

of combat leader, a type of commander who has that forward-leaning approach and knows that combat is nothing really fancy, it's about putting ordnance on paper first especially at sea, especially at night. because when things get hit, they burn. that's how the japanese won, and it's how the meshes eventually learn today win in the battles that forward. the brilliant rear admiral willis lee. so the book traces this curriculum that the navy faces in the south pacific. the japanese in the early days and the role as master and teacher. um, and the first figure who really comes to the fore and shows the american fleet how to fight. again, in the context of service action, was a man who was kind of sidelined that night, rear admirable norman scott.

he had a cruiser group that was patrolling away from the place the fighting was taking place. but as september rolled around and realized how important it was to have a competent cruiser squadron, norman scott was quickly seen as the guy who was the man of the moment to make that happen. he was given command of task force 64, flagship uss san francisco, and their job was to intercept the japanese, the so-called tokyo express, these nighttime runs the japanese were launching from their forward base, again, running resupply what was known as the slot, this little chain of islands. the resupply runs would go at night. why? because the americans had the airfield on guadalcanal. we had a nascent, forward air base here. it really wasn't ready for action for a few weeks, but by august 20th when the uss comes

in with fighter squadron, they're ready for action x. by day those aviators have a radius of control that reaches, really, up to the, you know, really all the way up the slot. japanese ships will come down in daylight at their peril. they'll be hit by torpedo bombers, no fun. the japanese operate, therefore, at night. and so what happens is we have this kind of changing of the after as it will. when the sun goes down. the japanese aren't preeminent. and the japanese come down to reinforce their beleaguered garrison. when the sun comes up, the pilots fly, and the situation changes 180 degrees. so this is the peculiar dynamic.

and so what admiral scott comes to realize in this situation is the japanese are in a operational straitjacket. to bring down ships that are suitably fast, to get in and out, you know, after dark/before sun rises, they've got to leave their base at a very predictable time. they've got to arrive at guadalcanal pretty much shortly after midnight to high tail it and be 200 miles north of henderson field before the pilots fly. so scott realized, okay, my mission is to defend guadalcanal, but we have seen what happens when cruisers stand by on a patrol course, you know, steaming in a box at 13 knots. and the japanese' them first and open fire and register the hits. we're going to do it differently. admirable scott pulls together his commanders and captains and

say we're going to play defense in an offensive mode. we know when the japanese are going to arrive. therefore, we're going to be at battle speeld n column, ready for action when they come. so that's this new approach. battle-minded approach to the task of defending against the tokyo express. and on the night of october 11th, the japanese come down again attempting to bombard the airfield and land troops, and mill scott's ready for them with a squadron of destroyers. the battle was by no means a rousing victory. scott executes his plan. just as he wrote it up, there's some inevitable fog-of-war situations develop in terms of how the ships maneuver. by the end of it, by the close of the battle the japanese had lost a heavy cruiser, i think it

was their first rave cruiser lost at war. what does it now do with this victory it has under its belt? naturally, you'd think admirable scott would be, would stay in command and acquire more ships and stronger task forces and expand his operations. but as we move through october, we find changes up the line from his mere -- i'm sorry, he's a rear admiral, but up the line from his level have a very powerful impact on how the campaign develops. there was a change of command at the highest level because, well, the commander of the south pacific forces, u.s. naval forces in the south pacific,

vice admiral robert comely, was found wanting for a number of reasons. he'd been brought in to lead the charge in the south pacific having been stationed in london. he was a special naval observer as the blitz was going on reporting directly to president roosevelt. so he was a natural choice to serve as commander of sopac. but as the campaign began unfolding, it really became clear that he wasn't the kind of leader that fired up the troops. in fact, he liked to complain a lot, and he might have been a bit of a panicker. a marvelous diplomat and a planner, but when the fighting started, he found himself obsessed with the detail. he never left his headquarters, he never went forward to see the marines, never conferred with the generals, never saw the forward naval base where the cruisers and destroyers were refueling. he was very aloof from the

fighting front. and it quickly became clear to admiral nimitz that he was in a very tough position. the staff eventually concluded that admiral comely was actually having a nervous breakdown in command of this crucial operation. they were old friends from, you know, for years, very close friends, and this was a conclusion that admiral nimitz reached very reluctantly, but he knew what was necessary. he knew in october that a change of, you know, it was going to be necessary to relieve his old friend from command, and he arranged to have admiral halsey who'd been sidelined with the shingles, basically, since prior to midway, thanksgiving where bull -- this is where bull halsey makes his return. if ever you wonder about the effective leadership, i think the case of halsey's relief of gormley illustrates its power. the simple fact, the simple frank mission of the word from

one man to another produced an effect that was just simply astounding. it changed the spirit of men, you know, from the lowliest a marine grunt on guadalcanal to captains of ships. they felt like they were going to get their chance, they felt like a new fighting spirit was coming into the south pacific. this may sound like rhetoric, but the word that halsey was come changed everything. he took command from gormley on october 25th in time to confront what was up to that point the largest concentrated effort by japanese naval forces to retake guadalcanal. you can say he got there in the nick of time. he got there in time to order his task forces to intercept japanese forces coming down -- talking about transports, battleship squadrons, cruiser squadrons and carriers. and what develops on october

25th-26th is known as the battle of santa cruz. it was a naval -- it was a carrier battle really to rival the battle of midway in terms of the numbers of pilots and planes involved. and halsey, ever the riverboat gambler, throws all of his carrier forces into the fray. the enterprise and hornet are his two carriers, and they both intercepted the japanese, and we lost the hornet, and the enterprise was badly damaged. now, that left the south pacific forces with a single aircraft carrier. so you could say, you know -- and even she, the enterprise, was badly damaged. you could say this was a reckless gamble on the part of halsey. but that was his style. and, in fact, at a time when you could say japanese had generally held the initiative and had for the most part material superiority, i think you can make the case that a leader who was given to gambling was the kind of leader that you needed to turn the tide, to launch the bold stroke that changes the vector, if you will.

and halsey was that kind of man. he immediately visited guadalcanal. he sat down with the general, he said what do you need from me? i think the fact that he was in the physical presence asking him a question was the most important demonstration he could have made to his commitment to the marine position. and so general vandegrift said i need you to give me everything you've got, and halsey looked him in the eye and said, you've got it. and it really bears fruit. you have the trust between commanders. you have a felt obligation that effects the decisions that commanders make. halsey, from that point forward, never hesitated to send carriers to intercept japanese forces coming south, and he committed himself to a very regular and rigorous resupply effort up from knew mania to bring crucially-needed supplies.

i should say from the outset, the supply situation was very grave for the marines on guadalcanal. this is backing up somewhat, but there was a terrible sort of prior to halsey's arrival in theater, there was a terrible, terrible state of relations between the marines and the navy. in fact, it's really one of the first things somebody will often say when i say i've written a book about the navy at guadalcanal, they'll say, ow, you've written about how they dumped the marines off and high tailed it, ran. and that seems to be the perception. i mentioned earlier 5,000 say doors cleared in action, clearly, that's not the -- killed in action. the perception arose from the fact that at the very beginning of the campaign the navy only agreed to stand by with its carriers for two days. when the carriers hauled out on d day plus two, there goes the air cover. admiral turner, who's in charge of the landing area, realized his car gomen -- cargomen would

be vulnerable. still with half the marines' food and storage and ammunition. so there's bad blood going on. so halsey really repairs a lot of that ill will that existed between the navy and the marine corps. and i think, you know, from that point forward it's very much the case that the two services fought side by side and threw everything they had against the japanese. so i hope i'm not losing you with all these subthemes and shifts of gears and jumping back andford in time. -- forward in time. guadalcanal's a complex campaign. telling the story in one book was a trick because we had to account for the changing of the guard, for the comings and goings of ships and officers and men of every rank. every battle had a different order of battle, the different commanders on different sides. so the story is really one of the institution of the navy learning how to fight. so i've established, i told you

about norman scott and about how he wins the battle of cape's prance. the japanese don't quit. in fact, two days after that battle was won, the effect, you could say, was almost negligible. the japanese are able to work over the cactus air force for about two hours on the night of october 15th. and the marines on that island, i don't believe in the annals of military history there's a ground force that ever endured a heavier bombardment than the first marine division took from those two japanese battleships. the japanese left, i think, after their handy work was done, there were five working aircraft left on guadalcanal. and so this sets up the battle of santa cruz which was blunted by halsey's aggressiveness, blunted nearly at a catastrophic cost. after santa cruz at the end of october, we've got one carrier left in the south pacific. fortunately, the japanese, you

know, it takes a tremendous amount of planning and a tremendous amount of resource management to make a push such as the japanese are making against the southern solomons. they've got to martial the troops and the transports and the fuel. they've got to get their combat shipping together, the air support. so basically, what emerges is the japanese are able to make a push against guadalcanal really once every three to four weeks. and so there's this period of regrouping and regathering as both sides lick their wounds and plan for the next thing. um, santa cruz, long story short, blunts the first major japanese attempt to take guadalcanal back from the american side. the next one comes in november. now, admiral scott, because of the cascading effects of gormley's relief, the brilliant and aggressive admiral scott is no longer in command of the cruiser force when the japanese come knocking again in november.

command of task force 64, soon to become task force 67, devolves to gormley's chief of staff, captain -- now rare admiral -- daniel jay callahan wasn't about to see his career go down with his boss' he says, please, give me sea duty, i'm a fighting sailor, give me a command. so halsey goes along with it, gives him command of task force 67. he comes in and because callahan has 15 days' seniority and rank over scott, scott effectively is removed from command because of the operation of the rules of seniority. ..

these are 42,000-ton monsters. the americans have nothing like it to oppose the. callahan has three -- 28--inch gun heavy cruisers, but 12,000 tons apiece, a couple of light cruisers and a squadron destroyer. callahan knows from research reports what is coming and he realizes that there is only one way of this, and that is straight through it. because if he fails to engage the japanese will overwhelm the air force, led their troops in the party's over. as kelli and engages all his chips will be lost. cruisers verses battleships at

point-blank range at night is not a happy order of battle. but one of the men i interviewed callahan is -- really wants this battle begins there is no evidence of any sense a tactical command, as if there ever could have been. but he comes in because he did not leave behind and if the battle plant that admiral staff had prepared for historians to read and admired. the last half of the order callahan gave was straight out of lord nelson. as they are engaging in his last command, on ships fire started cleavages fired support, as if that's going to do anything. suppose you are engaging the captain peabody had just restricted to fire start. five new targets. so the loss of blood, the debt

that falls on both sides is really to the credit data commander. what was the alternative to net he knew he had but one alternative. one of the great interviews that i give, the opportunists interview, veterans of these battles is diminishing rapidly. this was a last grab on some of the history. a 92 year-old men in berkeley california. african-american men which meant he was never going to go farther than captain stuck in 1942. captain cook in debt u.s.s. sentences go. he recanted to be help morongo bagram he hears officers talking here is the admiral saying something like i know we have no choice but we have to do it. there is a resigned sense of fatalism. we also have these words from a yoghurt officer who is in this conversation, clearly from the

somewhat evidence, callahan is a smart man. he knew it was his job in essentially to go intercept and to do what he could with what he had. the only way that the cruiser beat the is to get in close. most ships are designed to beat their equal, a cleveland counterpart, so they are armored to protect against its of battery. in a is battery that is dated 15,000 derange. about us it has similar protection schemes to defend against the 14 or 16 its battery . what is a cruising right to do? well, if you do all these you realize there is no way that an aide in cruiser takes them of as standard range. this is exactly what happened, the brilliance of callaghan's -- is frustrated that he had ships

in this call that had a very latest radar at to see through the night in a test of their little microwaves and find contacts through smoke and fog and darkness . their precise rages and bearings. here you have admiral callaghan in santa scope. the old radar. good for brought surging. these so-called sec -- sc radar. brand new microwave radar. transmitting too admiral callaghan. contact bearing 325. 22,000 yards. every 30 seconds their is a new report. callahan is hearing none of it. he is an old school fighting naval officer on the radio. single channel radio. if you're talking, you're not hearing. so he is clearing his destroyers . what do you see out? what do you see them? one of the best in the fleet.

a veteran of the asiatic campaign ad had trusted him. literally i interviewed a radar officer of one of these destroyers. all i was before, we were not trained in its use, but it was a black box behind the pilot house it had a flat surface and it got pretty hot when it was working, so we put our coffee on it, and that is really all we greuel to use a fork. the vat was it not been written yet, so is distributed to the fleet and train done. so radar is really for the average naval officer for useless. historians have a field day. he had to getting close to the eight ends cruisers to beat the 14 its battle ship, and that is exactly what he did. the brilliance late in

recognizing this simple fact of the six. at the crucial moment callaghan's column, the san francisco and the stern fell about 2,000 jobs apart. these two battleships. the eviscerate them. the japanese flag ship is mortally wounded. this was the moment of truth. this was the moment of truth. cruisers were not supposed to be battles ships like this. americans were never supposed to fight like this. they did not think we had this kind of savagery in this. and it certainly appears, you know -- and that talk to a number of people, including richard frank who is probably the preeminent historian. it really seems like the japanese were stunned by this exhibition of american fighting well. they did not think they had it -- that did not think we had it in us. at raquel and is drug death of

his bridge. norman scott was on another ship. he was killed by friendly fire. both admirals' -- animals are killed in action. kind of thing that ever happen again. i think that might have been a first and last. so we have this incredible battle which once again stops a japanese bachmann force from hitting henderson field, therefore it stops there convoy from coming down and striking and landing troops on the beach. therefore it saved a lot of canal yet again. the significance is that the following day they're able to flight having despaired another bomb barbet. they fly out, fight the japanese transport and are circling in the northern part. four out of six large japanese transports.

by his sacrifice that night quadalcanal is saved. two nights later the japanese and gather up the remnants of this massive multitask force order of battle in trying again. they circled back. the one that survived the encounter. they come back with a number of cruisers. they are determined to put andersen field of business. callaghan's force has been rendered combat ineffective. and so now the riverboat gambler again, all he has no is the battleships that he has been that jealously holding with his carrier, the u.s.s. enterprise , two battleships, the washington and the south dakota,

magnificent, fest battleships. the reason the old pearl harbor battle ships are not here, they have been prepared and modernized. fuel. emerald is to not have the takers or fuel storage operate carriers simultaneously. the old battleships state of the west coast. this was the cruises, destroyers, and carriers until the new more fuel-efficient models ships come in. backrub there. two battleships holding close to the enterprise. as the japanese come back the night of the 15th his only choice is to oppose this really attack which he is detecting, to release these two magnificent ships and send them into these confined waters. about '06 are not supposed to fight in a confined island shoal waters. these are massive ships with huge her attorney radius. but it is the only choice that he has.

he releases of washington and the south dakota under command of the one naval officer in the entire south pacific goes out to use radar control gunfire. he comes from the naval training center, helped install the hardware of the ships. he wrote the first manuel that had not yet been distributed to the fleet. the kentucky riflemen, champion pistol shooter an olympic medalist with the pistol and rifle, master of every gun from a 45 caliber to a 16 ages of 81 in command for a fight like this , for a man to take these two ships into harm's way. and so that night, november 14th at 58 those fourth with the washington end makes short work of the last japanese. and with this, with this the japanese psychological route, if the material route entirely, the

psychological route that was quadalcanal is complete from the japanese point of view. they lost to battle said sen action in close range against an american squadron. never again picks up rubber, this is 1942. it will be until 1944, almost two years, that japanese battleships, for engaging american forces in a meaningful way. the psychological effect of the campaign was crushing for the japanese. one final battle that is bought before the japanese essentially cease major combat operations to reinforce quadalcanal. one final battle. covered briefly in the book. part of me wondered if i could sustain interest it yet another bid that slugfest. five and a row, but frustrating because him after willis leaves, exhibition of his mastery of the

night of the 15th, you wanted to be an exclamation point on his performance, but we don't get that. we get another abcaeight u.s. defeat. we have u.s. cruisers under command of a naval officer. he has the playbook, the example of callahan. he does have to use his radar. he has all the advantages. his text are loaded with supplies. coming down to dump the water weight. so here comes admiral to baca. here comes amorite. of surprises that opens fire. all of its ships, to check on one ship. the blow out of the water. the japanese, mastery of nighttime torpedo warfare pays a huge dividend. the commanders reacts, fired torpedoes, reversed course. they eviscerate three of the

heavy cruisers. conflicting a shameful defeat. the virtue of the american point of view of the situation is that this did he simply doesn't matter. the trains are running. the supplies are coming in. the logistical epic structure to bring material a short, all of it is in place. there is really no unseating the americans from quadalcanal by the time this last victory on a superior american force. the pacific force can observe the defeat. and by february the japanese are attempting their own dunkirk. they're able to evacuate the last of their start bedraggle garrison of quadalcanal. guzman, you talk to lustration

victims. that was the state of the japanese infantry in quadalcanal because of the destructive force of our naval forces, its net of three said. the six month campaign of attrition is frankly ghastly. what happens to his ship but it is set like this and the men aboard that ship. it was necessary. only one way to beat the japanese was to step up and smacked in the mouth. midway with our naval air force and we did the old-fashioned way it is a story that i try to bring together comprehensively. said lee after writing -- my first book was about a single naval engagement that lasted two hours. it doesn't close for one battle. the extraordinary victory little warp. my second book was a story of one ship, the uss houston lost

earlier the war. but i have tried to tackle an entire campaign that i have never understood like this. the last book to attempt "neptune's inferno" does was to take the whole they will experience. it's really crucial, i think, to illustrate the success here because it says something about how america fights the losses and the sacrifices they're willing to take to win when it knows that there is only one way through, and that is to wait. all these questions will be on the table tomorrow. a new era, a new day. things sure seem clear 70 years ago. in the men who won the south pacific, there are still a few of them around, and they have my

undying gratitude and admiration has been a privilege to interview some of the men from the san francisco and the u.s.s. and let the. capture their story. and so i appreciate your interest in coming to hear about it. if you have time would be happy to take any questions you might have. thank you. [applause] >> of take a couple of questions. i have to run up to the north. kinetoscopes -- can you manage? >> take as many questions as you want. >> sounds good. thank you very much. thank you.

>> of the 80 ships. i think you mentioned that there were eight ships at the beginning of the campaign. how many were made? >> well, the 80 ships, the initial landing force which would have included the carrier task forces and their supporting chips. both sides, the americans and japanese sustained about the colossus. each side lost 24 major warships and so the losses were so great that they eventually acquired the nickname, the body of water north of quadalcanal, iron bottom sound. in fact, robert -- discoverer of the titanic covered up that feed by taking one of his submersibles and ecru a camera and went down and found a number of the wrecks from the

quadalcanal campaign it is a wonderful book called the ghost ships of quadalcanal. very well written. some stunning photography of the wrecks. and they're still down there. and they will be with us forever. major is reclaiming all that metal. so grab history like that, i think it soluble. >> close watchers all down giving us some advance warning? >> we did. the question about the coast watchers. these were brave souls. if you look at this chain of islands to lead georgia, they were easily road -- rogue agents equipped with radios. australians, menu had been working. they might have had the administrative role.

this was basically a british protectorate. and so you had agents of the crown. you had people who are attached to one or another business such as the pineapple trader or what have you. some kind of a government role. with the japanese invaded the headed to the hills and supplied a crucial function of observing movements of japanese ships of the double water waste. with their radios signaling the, usually signaling that eventually the forces in a very quick way with the japanese were coming. with that warning usually allowed limit of the air force to get into a combat altitude by the time the japanese ships finally came within striking range. so without those we would have been relying on our own air search which was fraught with all kinds of an anticipated problems.

whether, miscommunication, that kind of thing. coast watchers were crucially important. >> in your book verses with john keegan says in the admiralty? >> about what? >> just the course of combat. >> low, i think i @booktv not sure what are you referring to. >> it can be almost, like you're saying, fatalistic. bella shipley. >> there is certainly a sense of fatalism. it seems to be most evident on the japanese side. a kind of felt like somehow there was going to materialize this decisive battle with the spirit would carry them to victory in the war would be over because they were this big battle. they had this faith that such a

thing would come to them. >> with the japanese forces -- >> low, the losses were about equal, 24 ships. the losses and battleships were 2-0 in our favor. cruisers were a little bit skewed in the japanese side, by the end of the day they are about even. the japanese were slow to realize that. ♪ was done in fact, the decisive battle. they had always -- the japanese have a command had a certain idea drawn from world war one that they would slowly will await american naval forces as they lured us across the pacific . at a moment of their choosing, say of the philippines are somewhere they would finally commit their battles to force and beat us in a majestic engagement of the light is on the high seas. quadalcanal did not look like that. quadalcanal was not quite that dramatic. it was a lousy, disgusting place, the island itself.

the waters around it were confined and hazardous. let themselves to use by smaller ships. none of that told the japanese this was the decisive battle. i think they realized it too late. all through the campaign i . out earlier, the great was anchored in the track but never sent into the combat area for lack of fuel. but i think the japanese never saw the urgency of a. a number of the other major naval elements never committed to the battle. our good fortune ultimately. it's also important, both sides were fighting so far from home. like how far quadalcanal is from tokyo and pearl harbor. the logistics' trading, stable operations, it was far more than anyone kinase easily. these constraints of fuel and supplied.

in the japanese suffered as much as we did. it deals to back well, i think you for your attention. you have been a great audience. i am proud to be with you. we look forward to hearing what some other offers have to say. dickey. [applause] >> is there a nonfiction author a book you would like to see to it? send us an e-mail at booktv.org. tweet us. it twitter.com/booktv. >> my connection to this foundation goes back quite some years. with great honor and boasting i used a lot of the work in my own research and in writing.

his work has been particularly helpful for me in terms of my own attempts to think differently about both political and economic liberation for african-americans.g7 the united states is an incredible place. it stands out among other nations and in the world. i've recently had an opportunity to be reminded of how great this places that my family reunion it does give the county alabama in the city of at more. the county that my family's plantation was. and so i stand here before you as a descendant of slaves from the broadway plantation in alabama.

reconstruction, the jim-crow, the civil-rights movement, this is my family's story of the struggling end fighting for humanity and freedom in a context and culture that was saturated with invested some and dehumanization. now, what is so amazing about this narrative, the story, not only does my family know where the plantation is, we noted to. and there are members of my family currently living on it as free people who have property rights to it codified and protected by the rule of law. how many countries in the world is it possible to have a group

of people who were once slaves of a piece of property a few generations later actually own the property that they were living of -- they were be enslaved on. as of this makes this place absolutely amazing. yes, of course, we notice the progress in our country by having a black family in the oval office. there are not too many countries around the world where you would see this of dominick culture rice to that level, that status. a few generations after a movement like the civil-rights movement. it is amazing to me, and i personally am delighted to think about what it is about this country, this funding principle

that allows someone like myself to be a descendant of slaves, to be standing in front of a group of people, having earned a ph.d. sitting in front of this heritage foundation backdrop speaking to you about my second book. to be is just an amazing narrative about the potential of freedom and liberty and economic empowerment of this country that is offered to those who have the opportunity to take advantage of it. so i name my book "black and tired" on purpose. one because i am black, as you can tell. and so i want to remain connected to the history of my own family, the story of rising to success in spite of incredibly dramatic and wounding and painful experiences in this country.

the hopes and dreams and aspirations, and institutions, values, principles that created the conditions that put me here today are being seven tost and eroded by those who have good intentions but often did not think of the consequences of public policy decisions because they have different views of the human person dead human dignity that the suit actually structured our government in the first place. >> you can watch this and other programs online at it booktv.org. >> with the sudden outbreak we are featuring some of book tv weekend programs of prime-time. get a glimpse into the lives of former and current u.s. senators starting at 8:30 p.m. eastern with former pennsylvania senator arlen specter life among the cannibals. at 925 john shaw of the senator from indiana