>> this administration refused to stand up for them. one of the great mistakes of the 21st century, in my view. so why worry about iran that is

dedicated to the radical islamist agenda that -- what's wrong with that? if it means destroying quote wiping israel off the map, then that's what's wrong with the, in my view. now, there's some who may not find that, may just find out to be an idle threat. i don't. when a country dedicates itself to the proposition of wiping a neighbor, wiping a neighbor off of the map. so i guess you and i have a very different view of the threat that iran poses to peace and stability in the world. i respect your obvious views, and i hope you will respect my views on that issue. can i say, i think csis again for not only giving me the opportunity to make remarks, but most importantly to be able to have an exchange with some of the smartest people that i know. and so thanks again, and remember that the words of chairman mao who once said it's

always darkest before it's totally black. thank you very much. [applause] >> [inaudible conversations] >> nato countries will meet in chicago next week over a summit meeting. up next, the conversation of some of the challenges facing nato. the senate is in at 10 eastern and continues debate on export-import bank reauthorization. amendment votes are expected. live senate coverage here on c-span2. >> when people are saying to him, don't take the vice presidency, right now you are a

powerful majority leader. don't take the vice presidency. you won't have any power. johnson says, power is where power goes. i mean, i can make power in any situation. his life, nothing in his life previously makes that seem like he's posting this that's exactly what he had done all his life. >> sunday night the conclusion of our conversation with robert caro on the passage of power, volume four in the use of lyndon johnson, is multivolume biography of the 36th president sunday night on c-span's q&a. >> next, a discussion on some of the challenges facing nato including anticipated budget cuts. the british american security information council, george washington university, and nato watch hosted this event.

>> thank you all. -- can you hear me better? it's just after lunch so we will try to keep this lively. thank you for coming this afternoon. this session is about emergency could be challenges, and made a specific response to cyberattacks. is increasing familiar terrain of nontraditional threats and threats that require different responses, responses of resilience, and new understandings of how nations cooperate and get along. i wanted to ask this audience, has anybody in this audience read the mr. y. article? it's really important. i suggest going online and having a look at it. it was written by two officers, a marine officer and a naval officer, last year on the choice to in the pentagon where they were assigned to come up with a new grand strategy for the united states.

and for those who are not into the long lexicon, it is a plot and the movie and it takes you to the happy ending. one of the problems at the end of the cold war in the united states is that we don't really have a coherent grand strategy. we have a lot of ad hoc short stories, what happened in the '90s. it hadn't come together at the big picture overall moving towards something. i think what's hopeful about that document and for this session here today is that it tells a story of going from a world where things like national security are looked at, where nations are ranked rather than linked, or that power is something over instead of with. and that we need to move from these concepts of deterrence to resilience from borders to relationships, to coercion to persuasion as a lot of concepts and we need to start filling out

in the security realm, which is anybody in this room knows is sort of one of the most stodgy priesthoods of policymaking is national security. i know one of them. although i did work in congress for quite a number of years and got a lot of that eat out of me, but i'm hoping that we can open this conversation up to be more a discussion how we can fundamentally try to create the framing, the language and the ideas where we can shift the conversation from power over to power with. my name is lorelei kelly. i have been in washington for more than a decade working on this issue of how do we reframe security, since the cold war of making an wonder and presley at the new america foundation where i'm exploring a new possibility, i'll just put it, simply crowd sourcing congress in two states and districts, special on the issue of global public interest where we are working with these

old stodgy institutions who still see the world like it's 1948, it's still the way they refer information, store information, filter information and talk to itself so it can't compete with the 24 hour news cycle, nor can it compete with other information sources out there that have lots of control over the fate and destiny of people and nations and how we move forward. so what we're going to be here today is just moved from left to right, and start with the big picture about emergency could be challenges and our first speaker is philip worre. i'm not going to go on and on with a bias because you have been all right in front of you. you can also look it up online. so i'll go ahead and we'll start there and just move down. >> thank you. good afternoon. i have a powerpoint presentati presentation.

>> my apologies for the delay. all try to start perhaps in and catch up with a few slides later on. first of all, good afternoon. my name is philip worre and the executive director of the international security information center -- service. based in brussels. i am proud to brought a little brussels weather with me today.

i'm very glad and honored to have been invited to speak in front of such distinguished audience. i've been told to limit my presentation to 10 to 12 minutes so i will keep it brief. my presentation to is how about how the e.u. and nato response to the rise of security challenges focusing mainly on the e.u. but all seize nato as an element of comparison at the institutional and instructional level. again i want to thank a program associate at isis, i did a lot of research on this topic and helps me out a lot. this presentation will be divided into four parts. first, a few comments on emerging security challenges. sadly, a very short summary of nato's response to pscs, instructional level and then the users bonds which will be the main part of this presentation. and, finally, it a few words about e.u. nato corporation. the last decade has seen an

evolution and the understanding and definition of global threats. user no longer limited by state borders, many uninitiated like nonstate actors operating internationally. these threats can have one or more dimensions in political, economic social and environmental. there are hybrid threats, which never defines as quote unquote according to the allied command transformation, posed by adversaries with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and nonconventional means, adaptively in pursuit of their objectives. generally speaking, these merging security challenges include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyberattacks, cyber terrorism, piracy and attacks on maritime security including the security of global shipping routes, energy and environmental security, and state failure. to respond to these threats nato created an emergency could be challenges division, within the nato international staff in

august 2010 to this was nato structural response to hybrid and related cost-cutting threats and was the fruit of several years of discussion, consulting debates and analysis. it brought together passionate what brings together various existing fields of expertise and two divisions nato as integrated approach was also echoed in its 2010 strategic concept. here we have a military organization that could adjust its structure to take into account other factors, for example, the civilian dimension. tools would be rather ineffective against court naked cyber and biological attack. according to nato, and nato link is from the new division focuses notably on terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber defense and energy security. so the bulk of the ecss mentioned in the list recovered. the the division provides quote strategic analysis capability to monitor and it does for international development. that could affect allied security. in summary it adheres to the new

approach as the new assistant secretary-general for ecss coins. going to get access to the approach that nader took to respond to the ecss. i'm not assessing the degree of success nato has had. it probably is too early to reach a conclusion in any case. the powerpoint presentation is back. the european union's response, however, is different. it is fragmented and much less court naked. the e.u. has developed action programs, drafted resolutions and strategies. but it has adapted a structure to the ecss. why? there are many factors including certain hurdles but i will mention shortly. date the use general security and defense strategy is based on certain key documents. these are the 2003 european security strategy, the 2000 a report on the implementation of the strategy and finally more

recently the 2010 in total security strategy. as you can see on this like him these documents mentioned the bulk of the ecss identified by nato as well so there was a certain degree of conversion of common understanding of emerging search through the e.u. and nato. however, if the e.u. doesn't prioritize these threats or develop a concrete responses that are needed on an operational level. and then there's the issue of timing is to quit a different understanding of global security threats today compared to the situation in 2003. since 2003 the situation has it all. piracy, the security of global shipping routes, inches one subject has become topics as important as weapons of mass destruction. over the main strategic document for the e.u. security in 2008 it is still and comprehensive in the 2010 internal strategy is more timely. we can run into i believe is the main obstacle preventing the e.u. from optimally tackling the

ecss. that is institutional complexity. the 2003 and 2008 documents, for example, were drafted in the framework of the common security and defense policy which focuses on the external e.u. and remained the competence of the essays. the 2010 strategy was not focusing that use field of justice, freedom and security framework of the e.u.'s over our king foreign policy. there's a very complicated institutional structure. many ecss are mentioned in all three documents but the decision-making process to tackle each issue is different. so if you look at the e.u.'s structure for crisis management you will see a dozen or so committee groups, sorry, committees, chris, and agencies and other institutional bodies. each one works with others but how they work varies from threat

to threat. in other words, a tailored approach has to be developed for each threat from civilian to military or both, and internal, external or both. numerous other factors come into play but we end up with a very complex jigsaw puzzle that even involves native because of the institutional level of organizations as mentioned in the lisbon treaty. so the role of the e.u. isn't clear when addressing it also. opportunity institutional complexity, the e.u. sometimes acts as an enabler and sometimes only follows. the general of the e.u. and global security also isn't clear. recently, the u.s. tried to establish itself as a credible international actor in the field of crisis management. but it was born as an economic organization, economic and trade. within csdp roads are fairly clear which of the competence of approach today. wilson you take into account human rights, humanitarian issues, gender perspectives,

financial regulations, et cetera. where as nato has evolved from them one night -- demanding military organization or trying other dimensions for the e.u. it was the opposite. what started as an economic and trade corporation now has a security and defense dimension covered until the early 1990s by the western european union. we had to reinvent the wheel several times. what can be done? first of all political leadership is needed to e.u. decision-makers and member states must clergy find the e.u. objectives and priorities in terms of emerging security challenges. e.u. decision-makers must be given the ability and mandate to develop proposals and implement them. that is a challenge because it involves member states, national sovereignty. many experts have mentioned the new conference of european strategy is needed, detailing the use of judges and parties as adapted to the current

situation. i mentioned proposals to be unlimited. that may be a good idea for the current ess isn't adequate as we've seen. a new strategy could underline the need for integrated or competence of approach that would, internal and external action. it would reinforce the necessity for ms. -- and provide clear avenues for corporations between e.u. and you perhaps would be extremely difficult to realistically adopt native structural we shuffle. more effort is needed if the e.u. wants to remain a credible actor in a field of international security over the next few decades. so where can e.u. start? the chicago summit could provide us for things to move forward. the e.u. and nato are crucial part of the historically there has been strong e.u. and nato cooperation. for example, the 2002 agreements. 21 e.u. member states are also nato members. so generally speaking apart from some political tension that i

won't go into, everyone is aware of them, both organizations work well together at least at the operational level. the e.u. operation of the horn of africa and its cooperation with ocean shield as an example in terms of combating piracy. i know that is the topic of the next session this afternoon. tackling ecss requires technological information at this who industry comes into play. at the e.u.'s defense budget is fragmented and the financial crisis is taking a toll on e.u. research and technology investment, the e.u.'s future capabilities are threatened. the e.u. council has invited me to strengthen research and technology which is led to the launch of their pooling and sharing initiative. meant to bridge the e.u.'s capability gaps by coordinated defense budgets. this is also in the spirit of native smart defensive initiative, doing more with

less. the financial crisis could provide the impetus needed to move ahead with issues involving national sovereignty, one major hurdle to its closest security and defense corporation for the e.u. the former has started rolling. so, in conclusion i would summarize the key points of my presentation to the e.u. in ayrshire some reviews regarding ecss. whereas nader has adapted the situation can be faces complex and institutional hurdles. the e.u. political leadership are needed to face off, as was clergy to find strategy, objectives and priorities. one starting point could be the defense industry using the financial crisis. disco for increased cooperation between e.u. and nato to tackle ecss, starting with the combined elements of the e.u.'s

pooling and sharing initiative and it is smart defensive initiative. e. u.s. dickinson good steps to tackle such ecss. not everything is doom and gloom. operation atlanta was successful, relatively. and e.u. is doing its part to combat piracy. two months ago, in march a european cyber crime center great within europe all at the hate. what i wanted to underline was the lack of a comprehensive and coordinated approach. despite the existence of expertise within the e.u. covering most threats and challenges, even in a wider framework of our human rights and internal justice. it will be very difficult for the e.u. ended to incorporate addressing challenges if each organization has been gently. that is why the e.u. needs to move forward. they can include using the e.u.'s nationbuilding and institutional reform expertise, soft power. common e.u.-nato response strategies can be developed and handled cyber attacks but without the required degree of

preparedness and without e.u. structural response, in the spirit of mystical, these tassel prove to be very difficult to carry out. i think you for your attention. i apologize if i take it a little longer. thank you. >> we are going to move right along. to jean loup-samaan, who is here from the native defense college him and he's going to look at another big picture issue, and then narrow in on specifically on iran, in iran policy. thank you. >> thank you, and good afternoon. it's working? good afternoon to everyone, and thank you to the organizers for giving me the opportunity to be here for this conference. i will talk about nuclear proliferation and in particular

the current issue of iranian nuclear program. just a word of caution before i start, as you can see, although i work for nato i'm not giving you here an official statement on what nato thinks about the iranian issue at the moment. only a responsible researcher at the native defense college. so this is first point before i start. just to have a note about nader and nuclear proliferation but if you go back to the tragic concept of 2010, nuclear proliferation was expressly mentioned as the biggest challenge for the next 10 years with his general paragraph that you can find on page 10 of the strategy constant. this is the only common ground that the 28 allies down at the

lisbon summit. when he came to the issue of iran, it was impossible to find a common ground, to find consensus among the country members to assess whether iran is a threat or not for nato. and this is the reason why i thought it was worth talking about, what happens if iran became, becomes a nuclear armed country. this assumption does not induce in the fatalism, does not discount the current diplomatic forces, the effectiveness or not of the economic sanctions. but i think the consequences of nuclear-armed iran make it worth analyzing and planning for. and to start with, here are five reasons i think nato should

consider surgery this kind of contingencies, a nuclear-armed iran. five reasons why it would challenge nato. first, and this is the most obvious one, iran borders the territory of the atlantic alliance. it is bordering turkey, so it would have close and immediate consequences and the territory covered by article v of the treaty. second reason, some nato's passionate some nato members are in the region. that could be the target of -- [inaudible] we can talk about u.s.-centric a man but also the british and french forces which are in the gulf. third point, nato partners in the middle east and the gulf, whether talk about military and dialogue partners over istanbul

will operation partners, have been expressing growing concern to nato, we were talking about formal dialogues in nato h. or informal conversation attracted to meet her fourth book, the regional chain reaction, and i will go back on this element. that senator presents, could endanger middle east tragedies, eventually would have indications on how nato implement the region. finally, this point i put up in it's not a shorter issue. it's a long-term issue. i would say that might be an issue. a nuclear iran would have the capable to strike targets in continental europe. we can go back to this issue of capabilities, because it relates to the balancing program as well. now let's talk about some

potential features of what would be the strategy situation with a nuclear-armed iran. and the first thing i wanted to talk with you here is the regional chain reaction, as mentioned before. it is the exception that policy ration, this is the statement originally from george shultz. it's true that starting in 2006 about a thousand country in the middle these have started expressing their interest for nuclear energy. but although yet to take into consideration these nutrients nuclear program i don't think we can so far talk about the proliferation. these countries engaging in new nuclear programs i would say are trying to hedge the iranian

program. not trying to launch a new cycle of proliferation. that's in my assessment, again, we can talk about it in the q&a session. but i think that actually the most challenging element, scenario where we are nuclear-armed iran would be the conflict situation in the middle east. and with clear implication for nato. a nuclear-armed iran would be a miscalculation fire for lots of flashpoints, whether we talk about naval confrontation in mr. bermudez under the nuclear threshold. iran has expressed a rising assertiveness in the area the last years, and i'm not only talking about last threats in january, but talking about

skirmishes with the u.s. navy back in 2008. we can imagine how difficult this would be for the policy planning process if we had to add this kind of element of a nuclear iran. of its -- other flashpoint, the escalation ladders have blurred is the flashpoint of the new israeli hezbollah conflict under the nuclear threat. what would be the kind of escalation, military escalation that you could imagine under these circumstances. but moreover, in these two cases i think the one thing nato should consider is nuclear capacity. usually end up on conflict to say iran deterrent should work because it has been working

other country, other reasons -- region so why shouldn't work here. the problem is if iran is likely to get nuclear weapons, we can imagine that it would not be fully declaring its capabilities and implementing with these arsenals. and we have in that situation a kind of nuclear patsy way of israel and iran, both arsenals without declaring any policy, any doctrine about that. and this has implications in terms of how the deterrent system can work. finally, and this leads to my conclusion on the application for nato, nato as an alliance has partnerships with the countries of the middle east and the gulf, but it has been acknowledged by the two parts, from nato and the partners, that

these partnerships are very modest. although we have nice paragraphs about the need to improve the partnerships and the strategy concepts, so far this scope is very modest. this is for several reasons. first, the fact that a big competition for nato is actually coming from its own members, which has privilege relation, bilateral relations with some of the countries in the middle east, which are relying more on their bilateral relations than on nato relations. but another element, the content of the partnership has always, we called soft security issues, defense planning, that is not key issues for the partners which are always trying to

discuss security guarantees. and although i'm not one of the defense believers that we should talk about security guarantees, in the end if we have contingency, nuclear-armed iran, nato will have a dilemma. whether we talk about extended, or security guarantees, all these partners will look for other ways, for other alternatives. and this leads to the issue which is controversial of deterrence. and about that i don't think the european model is a good model. it is in this leading analogy. i think that the best, if we're talking about nuclear sharing arrangement, we should talk about conceptual sharing arrangements with the countries,

new consultations,common planning sharing, information. there is no likelihood i would say that we could imagine extended deterrence, the same way that was implemented in europe. and again, another element, i think it would talk about the extent of deterrence and that scenario, the missile defense sources have to be also discussed in the context. not only the missile defense which is designed for nato but the missile defense system that these countries in the gulf in israel are portraying. so these are just some elements which will be my conclusion. i hope i wasn't too long, and i believe maybe some elements for the conversation after that. thank you.

>> i think everybody can move back up your -- up here. our next speaker is geneve mantri. is here from amnesty international and he will talk about counterterrorism and terrorism policy in general but also focus on drones. >> thank you very much. also, if i had a powerpoint you would see a help wanted. i am currently working with amnesty international, that none of my views represent amnesty position but if you do have lots of notes, please have variation between my views and amnesty gives. i would also like to do on a personal note i've seen this little banner here, there are many people i've met many different views. editors issues you would not find anybody in this city that cares more about these issues in the global disarmament one,

transit and security, then this soon-to-be former center. many people of different views on his career but it is with a great deal of sadness i think we all look back upon that career and the gap that he will leave in washington and across nato in terms of how many people you could actually work with on both sides of the aisle. if you forgive my little intervention on his behalf. i would have the task to talk about terrorism and to measure how much i can really say in terms that you in 10 of 12 is i have question to some of try to answer myself, so i'll kindly doctor. some of the points will not seek to answer anything definitely. a lot of things don't have definitive answers. if trend ones position could be what's looking on the horizon, look at terrorism in the 1960s or '70s and to listen to people like brian jenkins who studied is far longer than i have come you'll think wow, or something quite amazing.

we have forgotten what we knew 10 years ago, 20, 50 years ago. i was struck because this banner -- put out about the search for bin laden and i'm eagerly looking at this for all the lessons that there are, and i'm struck by how many things that are there if you look at the work on algeria are many writers on northern island and you see the same thing. the same things over and over again. a lot of the things, especially in d.c., people think are new and different and radical, if you look back are not that different at all. action by the best things ever read read on terrorism was a piece in the economist about the turn-of-the-century and radical violent and most having been in 2005. so my first point would be is this really all about 9/11? i think it's very easy to forget if you're european just have searing 9/11 is and was, and how many people from so that different countries were action

affected. whether uk citizens, turks, people all over the world. and again on a personal note i had a lot of friends who worked in and around those buildings, and they were from everywhere. i mean, the idea that this is just an american phenomenon is quite wrong. but at the same time, i went to a political conference in oslo in 2004 to talk about political violence and to listen to people from a room and the middle east, who ever would've thought we would have thought that oslo would be the victim of a horrific act of medical violence. and so in some ways we have the same backdrop in other ways we're really looking at different problems. when 77 people were killed last year and you're looking at a threat, they would see this thread is evolving and changing. the second point is, and it may seem silly, are we talking about a war? if the answer is if you're looking at d.c. from the bush

administration or an obama admission is what did you, the answer is definitely yes. these people are out to kill us. we need every single tool at our disposal. we need to harness the power of the state in a very different kind of way. if you're a european the answer is almost certainly know. this is really a policing action that takes place within the context of a domestic frame, which again from a new perspective become problematic because you have countries working together and pulling apart in very different directions. and its fundamental but its fundamental in d.c. what do you see it as a war and lots of senators and representatives, this is the defining thing. they don't want to go back to a pre-9/11 world wabc the biggest enemy of the fbi is the cia and vice versa. that they give any is overseas and you have to see the and have to work together if you're a european, you look at in a completely different framework. even if you come from additional kind of half security institution you're going to see it very differently. and most of all d.c. and

existential threat odc a threat that is fundamentally there to be managed? most traditional scholars here in d.c. as well would say the concept of a war where you have a victory, where you have an enemy you can label, and it ended and a victory position is kind of nonsensical. terrorism is a tactic. it's not something you can say we are on war against terrorism. i tried to do my homework and try to look at all the things that nato said about terrorism, and counterterrorism, and, of course, afghanistan at the first thing you would say, afghanistan is not a counterterrorism mission. which it is not. and i said it's not a counterterrorism organization but it sort of looking at a jigsaw and say i only do the blue parts. frankly, if you are not working for data but if you're working for the initial committee of the red cross and work in pakistan last week at a debate about whether to pull out of pakistan cities because of ask of terror

against the if you're working for ngos are working for an initial, you're working in afghanistan. the very famous well-known correspondent would tell me about acts of terror that she was confronted with. she doesn't really work for hardnose counters and, soft power, whatever kind of organization. she is to be trying to get something done for an ngo but you are confronted by terry. your confronted by by things that are designed to get an effective design for political violence to send a message, what you're trying to get our working, whether you're try to get anything done to any single level of things in afghanistan and nato are involved in, you're certainly confronted by terror. and whether your work is your work is the center the center of counterterror mission taking down the door on that, you're certainly involved in the same frame. and so i would urge, i can understand how do what everyone says we don't do terrorism, we're not involved in terrorism, not doing anything dangerous, we

are just in afghanistan. i caution, why are we in afghanistan, or what is the point? what would happen if we would choose to leave? certainly two young women, certainly to people trying to vote, certainly people trying to work in certain places, those are the acts of terror to what he defined as acts of terrorism or not, it's all connected in that kind what i what i think definitionally it is hard. it simple for us to recognize those limits. if it is a war, if it isn't a war, do we have rules? that all rules even for the u.s. under the bush administration. also any country go to, you engage in conflict, you have to follow rules of engagement the i am often reminded of one of my old favorite movies, butch cassidy and sundance kid would challenge into a fight. there has to be rules are. and then have a long discussion about rules but the same is true in terrorism. it's a point of pride as well as a little bit misnomer that at the height of not see power, the

uk is facing down the might of the german army, and the uk decides not to employ torture but it doesn't torture because it knows ultimately that will be unsuccessful but and even then we have existential threat the uk does not do that. on the flipside if you said the uk behavior and ireland bargains a mau mau tribe one else, certainly a lot abuse and torture to go around, and in some. on the flipside the u.s., there's lots of people are very proud of the fact we face down after 9/11, different age, we're willing to do all kinds of things. they only waterboarded three people. only three. and not for very long because they found it was a very effective. for all those who say interrogation works in the future everything, why do only two to three people? if it's that good. we're facing this existential threat. to those people said u.s. would go to the end of your to hunt down terrorist, it's nowhere near the ends of the spectrum. those of you from london, you can walk around and buy a pack

of cigarettes anywhere and with a 132nd everyone will see because they're so me cameras and ago. it's like the brave new world. why were these cameras put there? to fight the ira. what is the ira now and the cameras are still there? good luck to your privacy because it went out the window a long time ago. for those who are fond of james bond and covert action, forget the uk but look to france. those guys are really the original provided shopping fast driving car guys who are willing to get to the end of the spectrum. on counterinsurgency, not only because it's so detailed that it is so sad. is a country that faced nazi terror make him important many others lessons of indochina, then import many of those lessons of north africa, and fought many people who have fought france, not once but twice, and the french army, in 1940, and then escaped and fought again in 1943 in italy.

that's what makes it so sad. but if you want to see how effective torture is or is not to urge you to read the previous everything we think we are learning has already been done. so to our rules and there are limits. if i could -- what is nato doing, a lot of it is like an 80. the show is basically of operation on homeland security, intel sharing, being the, tim aitman nato, a lot of the things are being done on national group because there are things again within a domestic -- a lot of information and expand is being shared, insured within those pillars. for each country brings assets which it can take to those things. unlike a lot of things that the most interesting things being talked about are often by folks who are not doing anything and the guys are doing things are not going to say anything. because it's about intelligence sharing. a lot of those walls have come

to a post-9/11 where people are working together in a new and dramatic way. and they are trying to build some resilience. again, that would resilience, and managing problems about homeland security. working together to try to great more exercise to try to say what we have another oslo, what if we have an attack similar to the russians faced, how do we react to it, how do we deploy those resources, how do we deploy resources on chemical bio issues? those are things that not only help at a national revel and i've been pooled and shared. but some of the most interesting stuff is frankly if you're not going to either here or in other places because the lifeblood counterterrorism has to be intelligence. if you don't have intelligence, got milk, to have intelligence, have you got any intel, you are going to be able to do anything. and a fascinating about those interesting things from algeria or kenya or israel or the uk, when they were facing quite big

ways terrorism, was have a look at intelligence and how they gathered that intelligence. now it's even more fascinated i urge anybody out there is a credit card to go by, i should get a kind of commission for saying that i love the book the power of habit. because contained within the book is a chapter on target, and how much of a signature you leave every time you leave this building, pick up a telephone, use a credit card that i can't go anywhere without someone saying what is my zip code? why do what my zip code? why do what my e-mail? what happens to this information? and what kind of the trail we leave behind for intelligence people to collect and look at and then track people. how they do come out to analyze that information and how they suck it up and, frankly, all that leaves a trail. that trip is collected by private companies again, many european, many u.s. what happens with information, how you protected. and how you contracted and

again, in manhunt and in other books that the producers of lessons on how you collect this data that is reduce from phones, from e-mail come from everything else. whether you turn the phone on the not frankly are sitting a message when you turn your phone off. when the cia ran, other folks ran a famous rendition, a lot of people on turns the phone uncertain place. they left a signature all the same. they did when it went through a tollbooth. every time they bought a ticket or they bought, put money in the parking meter. so in terms of the signature, what are we looking at in terms of the brave new world? one day and still could be played by nato as seen in terms of its operations in north africa. the other answer is drones. the drones have become the new big topic of the day, and for good reason because a lot of the challenges that we are facing a terms of intelligence gathering, in terms of gathering information and operating are ones which people have felt can

be served and solved by nonhuman technology. this is a program that grew out of the agency, cia. because it had a challenge agenda getting people on the ground in pakistan and afghanistan, before 9/11 when the air force did want have anything to do with the military didn't care about the it's only in their early years of the obama administration and the dying days of the british administration there's been an explosion. there's been over 300 strikes in pakistan alone. think about that. we are not even at war in pakistan and we've had 300 strikes in pakistan using drones. what's interesting about it is that we silly there's been a debate where there are strikes aimed at people but now you have situation strikes. you don't even have to be a named person to be a target simply by behavior. in some ways that make sense to if you're acting in a strange way and we can't collect necessary a different idea of who we are but we know you're a

bad guy doing bad things that shouldn't we be allowed to follow you? the administration, this one, thinks yes. and doesn't care where you are. you could be in yemen, you could be in somoza, you could be anywhere soon, and you could be the subject of these strikes. in libya where there was no congressional mandate, no congressional debate, no resolution, there were 146 strikes in libya. and yet you have to think, well, where is the conversation? where's the candidates and to check on this? the drones are working. at one level yes. information is the lifeblood of operations and yet more information. you can have a constant 24 hour presence but it's not limited to human workday. the information you're getting as much more precise. you don't have to be there physically. you get high great info. it will cost you fewer lives, less money, the maintenance cost compared to a machine to people

in theater is much lower. is more efficient and any pilot will tell you of a high-performance plan, the biggest limitation of a high performance plan is the human factor. you take the human factor out, that thing is going to fly much more effectively with a lower chance you have an accident or any other issue. and franklin a lot of these guys can live in nevada, or wherever else, not even leave home. they can fly the homes on a should and can go back to their homes but you don't have the rotational issues in and out of fear. we have a concern, as i'm sure you would know. who decides it is the only game in town. john brennan and said there was no civilian casualties in terms of drone strikes would you find an extraordinary thing for him to say. where's the debate? who decides as it was targeted, who gets on that list, who gets off that list, and who signs off? it's amazing how little information is coming from a

democratic administration on any of these issues. and where is the oversight? who decides whether we have done the right thing or the right plans are done the right kind of stuff? and in command-and-control, if there's a problem how do we know? we don't know anything. we are never told anything. this from very interesting laws that arise. ignored drawn from -- if you're in uniform and you go home on your lunch break when your uniform, you get in your car and in yukon database and somebody in uniform jobs out of a bush and fires at you, is that an act of war? is that a legitimate act of were? it doesn't matter where is the injury combat and come to a combatant. and one of the rules of war as you're allowed to kill people. fair is the. if you were to gather a bunch of law professors, three people to yes, that's allowed entry people to know it's a. there's no debate. no understanding as to what this means what it is where supposed

begin. so for all intents and purposes, the u.s. is running a fascinating program. no debate and no oversight. the biggest challenges are going to be on the civil liberties front. it's interesting for your because europe does and there does this differ problems. if you're together each country they would have a different version as to what the threat looks like. if we were to pull those resources and how we would employ them, but as you could see from the uk or other countries, if you do have that intensity a door you can only walk through once. you don't come back again. long after the ira disappeared, all the scammers are still a. all those institutions are still there. all those problems that civil liberties are still that excellence in i think it's a great thing that in data you could have a kind of common denominator approach to in some ways it's a real concern that individual countries when i don't have a different tradition or have different assets to allocate to those traditions. and it would be good to see a debate. in the wake of what happened in

oslo and what is happening in uk by the entrance of the olympic the now they're going to address those threats is important to look at it. and for those of you think terrorism is kind of an abstract thing that you can't get your hands around, as the father of a small child, i was is a daily occurrence we do with the you only have to do with somebody -- blackmailed and hijacked and with that i will leave and take questions. >> thank you, geneve pic will go ahead and move right along to sean lawson. is going to bring shoppers could issues into this conversation. then we can open it up for two and a so get your questions ready. >> so minor sean lawson. i'm a professor in the department of communication at the university of utah. and so, really my goal for this presentation will be to provide a broad overview of cyber

conflict with an eye towards the challenges that nato faces in trying to address it. so i will begin because i said that not everyone here focuses all of their attention all of the time on issues of cyber conflict. i'll begin with some definitions. and by laying out cyber conflict homicide oh provide a brief historic overview of for instances in which nato has experienced cyber conflict in one form or another. third, i'll provide a brief overview of nato's current policy stance in relation to cyber conflict, including relevant organizations, principles and activities that nato is carrying out. and, finally, i'll end by highlighting just a few of the challenges that nato faces in its attempt to respond to the advent of cyber conflicts. so let's begin with that cyber conflict and some definition. so i'll present these in the order of least to most damaging which also happens to be the order of most common to least

common. so the first is simply cyber activism. so cyberspace of course has become a domain for a little activity. it allows activists to collect and publish information to engage in dialogue and to courtney of their actions, and to lobby those in power. so we've seen this most recently in the important use of the occupy wall street activists have made of the internet, for all of those purposes. though the anonymous hacker collective has engaged in actions only half of the occupy movement, the vast majority of occupy use of the internet has not involve hacking. but the relationship between anonymous and occupied does remind us that the lines between these categories of cyber conflict and going to talk about remain quite blurry. next in the list is what has been activism. door the day has defined activism as the convergence of hacking with activism. so hacktivist methods include

denial of service or the dos attacks and website defacement and breaking into websites, stealing personal information. and the use of malware like viruses and trojan -- anonymous and low sack hacker group biggies groups are generally against the state of course the weather also patriotic hackers and while we hear a lot about so-called russian and chinese patriotic hacktivist and, a simple web patriotic hacktivist and as well. he calls himself digester. he uses various techniques to take down jihadists web form to council has used targeted malware against mobile phones of those that he believes pathetic -- sympathetic which he sees as both being anti-american. next is cyber it's been as witches abuse of many of the same techniques mentioned above, especially website break-ins, targeted phishing attacks called spear phishing.

social engineering, targeted use of malware et cetera to collect information there are really two types of cyber espionage. economic and political military. and economic as nice we see competing corporation from different countries and engaging espionage so is billy for example, that countries like china and russia and courage of their own patriotic hackers to engage in this kind of activity. next is political military espionage which is more like the traditional state versus state espionage that we carefully think about what would think of espionage. postlude attempts to steal national security information. again, the boundaries are blurred here between these categories. states like china and russia will enlist the help of cyber crime syndicates and patriotic activists for the purpose of engaging in cyber espionage. next is cyber crime which is of course the use of this hacking tools and techniques for criminal purposes including

theft and extortion such as one example is the use of the dos attacks which can be used by organized crime groups to carry out what is essentially the equivalent of an online protection racket against e-commerce website. another way to which the boundaries between these categories are quite blurry. next in the list is cyber terrorism. door beginning to find cyber terrorism as quote attacks against computers, networks and the information stored there in wind and to intimidate or coerce a government. further, to qualify cyber terrorism and attacks result in violence against persons or property, or at least causing the farm to generate fear. attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions complaint crashes, and contamination or severe economic loss would be examples. series of attacks against

critical infrastructures could be acts of cyber terrorism depend on the impact the attacks that disrupt nonessential services or through many a costly nuisance would not, end quote. cyber terrorism is typically carried out by nonstate actors. however, most observers including gaining can see that we have not seen any real world examples of the cyber terrorism that made her definition. finally, in this list is cyber war, which we've heard a lot of talk about lately, and oftentimes a lot of these other types of cyber conflict that i just defined get alarmed under this term cyberwar. but for the purposes of this discussion i would like to to find cyber something, you know, different and removed from all of these other types of conflict. and that is cyberwar is the use of computer network attack techniques by one state against another which caused damage to military capabilities or civilian critical infrastructure, like cyber terrorism to be considered a

standalone attack. such attacks should result in injury, death, damage or destruction. again, like cyber terrorism we have seen few, if any, ask of standalone cyberwar to date. the stuxnet worm however that damage iranian nuclear facilities might be an exception which is part of why stuxnet is so significant. so how does nato fit into all of this? nato's for sixpence with cyber conflict came during the 1999 kosovo operation. during the conflict activist and belligerence of both sides use the web to spread and/or counterpropaganda. they're also a number of notable website break-ins, defacement and the use of virus laden e-mail attachments by some hacktivists. beyond the immediate parties to the conflict, hackers from china became involved after the accident u.s. bombing of the chinese embassy in belgrade. the most well-known nato related incident of cyber conflict was the 2007 cyber attacks against estonia. after a soviet era war memorial

was moved from ethnic russians in estonia to to the streets in protest bigger protests spread online, news media and banking websites. nato's cooperative cyber defense center of excellence reports that for the immediate effects of people in estonia were minimal and in many cases nonexistent. and that no critical services were permanently affected, and go. nonetheless, the attack served as a wakeup call for both estonia and nato leading to changes in policy for both including the creation of the employment of otis. in april 2011, the cybersecurity initiative which provides cyberwar information and advice to the is antenatal published its project cyber don leiby report that assist libyan own abilities to cyber attacks. ironically the report came to light as a result of the hacktivists group reach of a defense contractor served.

the report describes several possibilities for cyber attacks against libya. "the new york times" and "washington post" reported the u.s. did consider cyber attacks against libyan air defense systems to clear the way for the nato mission to protect civilians from gadhafi's forces, but the u.s. rejected the use of this capability because of that's about the ability to deploy them in a timely and effective manner. ..

own actions in this area includes identifying critical dependencies on national networks and systems of member states and developing minimum cyber defense standards for these national systems especially where they intersect with nato networks. while recognizing the inevitability of cyber attacks, nato policy emphasizes the need to prevent attacks where possible and build resilience to rapidly recover from attacks when they do occur. finally, nato retains the option to assist member nations that ask for assistance in the face of a cyber attack. to maintain flexibility, however, nato cyber defense policy states that response will not be automatic in terms of its actions or scope. the policy seeks to maintain what it calls strategic

ambiguity. implementing these principles and achieving these goals involve a number of activities that are being addressed by several organizations within nato, so the north atlantic council provides political oversight to the development and implementation of policy and also plays a crucial role in decision making about responses to cyber attacks on nato and its members. the defense policy and planning committee provides advice to member nations in their efforts to develop their own strategies as well as to meet those minimum nato standards that are being developed. the cyber defense board works to coordinate initiatives within the nato organization, and finally, the computer response capability works to respond to cyber incidents effecting nato networks and systems. because nato is partly dependent, as i mentioned earlier, upon the networks of its members, it has created rapid reaction teams that can be dispatched to assist members who are the victim of cyber attacks.

and finally, the cooperative cyber defense center of excellence was established in 2008 for research and training. to that end, the center has hosted several international conferences and published a number of reports that examine the challenges of strategy and law and other issues related to implementing cyber defense strategy. so i'll just end by talking about some of the challenges that nato faces going forward. nato faces a number of challenges in its attempt to implement cyber defense strategy, and these challenges are really not unique to nato, but its members face a lot of the same challenges. so the first and most important is whether or not cyber attack should be identified as attacks that will trigger article v commitments. so far nato has not taken this step, but there are those who have arked that it should -- argued that it should. however, i argue there are good reasons not to deal with cyber attacks under article v. any deterrent benefit that could be gained by making cyber attack

an arm v issue -- article v issue would be limited at best. what's more, nato would be stretched thin if it were to respond in each instance of cyber attack on a member state with an article v response be. finally, the most potentially devastating cyber attacks, ones approximating traditional attack, would already fall under article v, so no new sort of provision for putting cyber attacks under article v is really necessary. so the temptation to define all cyber attacks as falling under article v is a tendency we should continue to resist. second, developing and implementing a cyber defense strategy will be made more difficult by the fact that not all member states share the same perceptions of cyber threats, though most of the states agree that cyber threats are on the rise and are of great concern, there is variation in the details of these threat per tsengs including an --

perceptions including an identification of potential impacts of these threats. these differences will inevitably pose a challenge and could limit the possible scope of nato response actions. third, as mentioned above, aggregating all types of cyber attack into a generic category of cyber threat especially under the term "cyber war" not only risks militarization of the issue, but also nato's ability to stretch to respond to these. these are daily occurrences. they cannot all be dealt with in the same exact way, and certainly, not all as article v issues. but on the flip side, disaggregating these threats raises the challenges of which organizations are best to respond to the various types of threats that are faced in and through cyberspace. most critical infrastructure systems are owned by private actors within individual member states. it's often difficult enough for

the member states themselves to effectively deal with cybersecurity within their own borders, and this difficulty combine with the the prominent role of private actors and differing threat perceptions all come together to combine to make it difficult for nato. finally, the case of u.s. reluctance to use offensive cyber attacks points to the challenge of deploying offensive cyber capabilities in a timely manner and with certainty of their effects, and in turn, this points to potential legal challenges for, legal challenges for deploying offensive cyber capabilities during a time of conflict, in particular challenges of using these cyber capabilities in accord with the principles of discrimination and proportionality. okay. thank you. >> thank you very much. um, i think we'll go ahead and open it up for q&a.

if i might just exercise the prerogative, i'm just going to try to wrap it up and reframe it so we can get a comment on, i think, something that geneve said that was really important about integrating this substantive conversation we're having here with the political realities, where we need to copse vince a lot of people -- convince a lot of people with power to think about things and put it in different kinds of priorities. so what i heard from my panelists here is that we're in a world now where we haven't quite defined what is security, much less national security in an age of globalization, of instant connection and instant information. we're in a world where distributed power has brought a wide-ranging understanding of distributed threats, and the most central response to that so far has been drones which makes sense in a way, but it's pleatly inadequate -- completely

inadequate really when you look at the problems we're facing at the intersection of civil-military issues. having worked in congress for many years, watching the u.s. military struggle with defining the problems and coming up with solutions in our engagements throughout the '90s, we really haven't had a forthright conversation about the division of labor for security in a world where we've really reached the limits of force in so many different ways. and nato, it seems to me, is making institutional attempts to move forward just reading the literature, saying instead of an exit strategy for afghanistan in the region, we need a commitment strategy. i heard somebody else the other day define development and nation building as expeditionary economics. you've got this kind of interesting many language of words coming together, and over the 12 years i've looked at this

issue it started as military missions other than war and now is called stability operations. there's probably 12 different terms in there including peace enforcement, peacekeeping, all of them have sort of -- it's an identity politics of national security geeks' problem because if you call it one thing, then it's sort of branded. and i think it ended up, certainly in afghanistan, calling these provisional reconstruction teams which were basically doing well-armed social work, so we've moved into this world where the military itself -- at least in this country -- is looking at moving from containment to what they call sustainment. and sustainment is when you move from a military deterrent to having credible influence so other countries want to be involved with you, trust you, will go into partnerships with you. and what's, again, watching the budget debates in this town, it's taken the guns v. butter discussion to another whole

level where our own credibility is defined by the level of domestic investments we make in ourselves. and if anybody's looking at what's going on in congress right now, certainly, you had senator lugar who wasn't defeated on the substance, he was defeated because he was substantive. that was a big issue in his race. and we have a budget crisis coming up in december where we're going to have this sequestration, you've got the usual suspects and the usual chorus of voices trying to fence off defense p spending in the very most traditional terms; hardware, military. and the military itself continually testifying to the fact that the problem we're sending them into have no military solution. and it seems to me that this kind of a gathering can at least start to be more discreet and categorical about the division of labor and actually how cowe

get the -- do we get the political will to move forward on this. and geneve and i worked on the hill for a number of years, we've never had better cover to have this conversation because you've got some of the greatest spot leadership coming from the defense department and military alliances like nato. nato's been a political military alliance as much as a military political alliance for almost two decades now. so are we going to finally have an honest, forthright conversation about what this means? that's what i'd like to, i'd like to know. you, how about let's go from here down and then -- >> executive director of basic. jean loup, i wanted to focus particularly on comments that lorelei's just made about nato being a political-military

alliance rather than a military-political alliance, and my question really revolves around how relevant that is to the non-proliferation agenda. let me take you through a thought experiment. what would happen if you picked up nato's defense college and planted it in tehran? what kind of a world would it look like? what would you be advising the leadership of tehran today? how would they respond to a situation where there are american forces in 11 neighboring countries, two battle carrier groups in the gulf at any time, nuclear forces on diego garcia, etc., etc. weapon states in pakistan and israel within striking distance? what would we be advising? because that is the relevant question when it comes to nato's response to non-proliferation. because as with our relationship with russia, deterrence is not in our capabilities. it is in what is in the minds of the russians or as it was the

soviets. and if we can influence what is in the minds of the iranians, that is the real goal when it comes to non-proliferati. if we surround them with more hardware, that will only encourage them to seek so lace in other forms of hardware that they don't already have. if we try to engage them in a conversation that could happen seeing that it's in their interest to engage in non-proliferation, then we have a hope. so my question really is do you see the linkage, the classic linkage between disarmament and nonprolive eight that in -- non-proliferation that many analysts do, and if there is a link, is et between the policy and its decisions over the next few years over the deployment of forward-based, tactical nuclear weapons in the europe or, indeed, its engagement in the

debates in the ftp review cycle we'll conclude in 2015? >> actually, if people could direct their questions to one person, then i think we'll move along faster. >> okay. i'll try to answer. i'm till struggling to imagine -- [laughter] if i was working in tehran for the nato defense college. i will ask my boss when i go back to rome what he thinks about it. but about the issue of how tehran perceives its regional environment, and in the end if we reinforce nato military posture toward tehran, is it going to be, actually, the best way to lead to an arms race, i think nato is one part of the

solution, but if we look in a comprehensive way at the iranian issue, i would say the course of diplomacy works only when we have the diplomatic, the economic and the military credibility meaning that economic sanctions, i think, are necessary if we want to get some effective reactions from tehran. but in the meantime, i think it's a positive sign that we have a new diplomat you -- diplomatic process like the next summit in baghdad. but if we withdrew the economic sanctions without having any diplomatic outcomes, it would be in effect -- so that's one thing. and nato here, i think, is also part of the equation because in

the end if we don't have a clear idea of how nato position itself against one issue which has been defined by most of the nato countries' decision makers, most of the presidents, the chiefs of state of nato members as the most important issue in the coming years, if we don't have any idea of how nato should act against that, i think this means that we are almost acknowledging that nato is no longer relevant for the modern security challenges. regarding the nonproliferation engagement, i actually think that -- and, obviously, the panel be tomorrow on the nonstrategic nuclear weapons --

i would say that it's still possible to have a credible deterrence posture against any country outside of the nato area, for instance, in the middle east without the nonstrategic nuclear weapons in europe. and that's the reason why by the end of my presentation i wanted to be specific about the fact that when i talk about the option, the possibility in coming years that's extended deterrence, we should not try to imagine physical stationing of nuclear weapons. i don't think that this is the key to solve the issue. i think it's more credible if we start working on exercises, joint planning with the partners. for instance, we have a nato

exercise in the gulf area where we use multicapital aircraft, well, that's, i think, a credible sign that nato has some resolve. if iran was to cross the rubicon. in the meantime, i think the nonproliferation engagement can be -- sorry. >> that's okay. i'm going to move ahead because we only have a few be minutes left. do you want to ask one of the panelists a specific question? >> yes, indeed, i've got a question for mr. worrr sex. i was assigned --worre. i need, i'm afraid, to challenge the characterization of cooperation which took place between nato and the e.u.. as of august 2008 there were nato allies who insisted that

nato not stand up a counterpiracy operation, and the reason that this took place became apart over the next several week -- apparent over the next several weeks through september into october. it became obvious that the e.u. was incapable of mounting a counterpiracy operation itself in a timely fashion. in fact, it was not able to do so until december of that year, and all of a sudden the prohibition of nato doing counterpiracy became a demand that nato do counterpiracy. and then we go forward to december of 2008, atlanta finally stands up, and now all of a sudden there's a prohibition again. >> can we just get to in one sentence what's the question? >> the question is how do we prevent this kind of economically irresponsible duplication of capabilities and operations in the future? >> thank you for your question. it's a fascinating question, and i think if if i had an answer to

the question, i'd solve a lot of problems within the european union. um, i mean, regarding the counterpiracy operations, it is very clear that you could not do it alone. what i was trying to say is that the e.u. is doing its part, trying to develop capabilities in order to, you know, take part in such operations. the e.u. as an international security actor is still an infant, still trying different possibilities, launching missions within specific frameworks. no large-scale operation, no large-scale mission. for the moment the number of ships involved in atlanta, as you may know, the -- is fairly limited. but i think it's developing its capacity, developing its capabilities. in terms of, you know, trying to avoid the cost of duplication of

efforts, i think that's, you know, what i was trying to underline, the institutional complexity as such that when you start with a good idea, you could have a good idea at the beginning, but then you run into very complicated hurdles in order to, you know, achieve what you're trying to achieve. the launch of atlanta could be one example. libya, the aborted operation of the e.u. in libya could be another example where it became so complicated with so many diverging point of views that the ball has been handed over to nato, to some extent. >> thank you. i just can't be the only woman who speaks on this panel today, so i'm going to go ahead and say you can wrap it up. >> thank you. in response to issues of terrorism, cybersecurity and

emerging threats, surprise is a large element. and -- of all of these. and you've all, or several of you, i should say, have suggested building resiliency, i guess, into the system. resilience is a term that's used fairly frequently, and i would, um, i'm interested in your clarification, your sense of it. it might mean flexibility, adaptation, each redundancy, it might require a lot more money, and i'm interested in how you build resiliency into a system which already seems to be built on fairly rigid command structures and fiscal constraints, and i'd just be interest inside what your vision of resiliency might be in order to deal with these new emerging threats. thank you. >> do you want to take that? >> sure, i'll be happy to take part of it. you know, when i was growing up, i was always interested in the

british civil service attitude to a nuclear attack on britain and people saying, well, we should have bomb shelters, the same as -- [inaudible] the swiss have bomb shelters everywhere, and it's such a tiny little country, why don't we have that? civil service was, don't be ridiculous. there's no point to it. and i was always quite annoy by the answer. and, frankly, there was some real truth in that, and part of what i think applies in a sense to terrorism is that, again, you could draw parallels to different things, but it was commented on quite favorably here that after the 7-7 attacks, again, the day after the u.k. got the olympics how most british people went to work because they had been confronted by terrorism, and partly because it wasn't so conservative stating it stair -- devastating it scared everybody, but a lot of that is in the attitude

towards where do you rate that in terms of the threats that you're confronted by. and that is something that the u.s. didn't, isn't in the same place and partly because it fractured a sense of how vulnerable people are or should or shouldn't be. but in terms of the threats that you're faced with, should the most serious thing you should be confronted by every single day in the u.s. be a fear of getting on a plane? no, it shouldn't be. and, actually, i thought that president bush did a very good thing after 9/11 in not trying to scare everybody, don't attack anybody in a turban, and he was very heavily criticized for saying you should go shopping. what he was trying to say was don't be terrified. and i think that while these issues should be taken very seriously, and we should apply our rigid sense of how many civil liberties we give up, how much we pay for the it, whether we should really do it, how serious the threat is, we shouldn't be so terrified that we don't leave the building because, frankly, a lot of this

stuff that we talked about isn't really based on a law. again, people will say that after 9/11 al-qaeda was trying to develop a nuclear problem with suitcase bombs. never had anything close to suitcase bombs. i don't know if russians ever had suit candidate bombs. but -- suitcase bombs. that doesn't mean we don't take real, practical things to keel with them, but brian jenkins is the gold standard saying you can't just put guns in gates around every single build anything the world and say that will keep you safe. people have to have their own sense of how their threats line up. and, frankly, if you live on the other side of d.c., it's not terrorism you should be scared of. there are many other things we should be concerned about every day. but again, relating to the previous question and to yours, i think this terms of nuclear proliferation, a lot of it is about being informed and being a citizen that is concerned about the cost benefit analysis of

nuclear proliferation which, frankly, are not proliferation efforts which, frankly, may not be that popular going into the next elections when people will say no. a lot of the efforts, whether senator lugar or senator nunn are not worth it and, frankly, those are many of the most tangible, practical things we can do. the same with buying up scientific knowledge. you don't want that knowledge on any of these issues simply floating around the either. you want to make sure those people are paid, are employed and can find some sense of employment. and if i talk about resilience in that limited way, that's probably where i would focus my attention. if that makes sense. >> thank you. david? yeah, go ahead. >> okay. david eisenberg, a bit of a devil's advocate question for mr. worre, also on piracy. given that in the past year you've seen explicit guidance

put out by groups like international maritime organization, baltic international marine council and major insurers, lloyd's of london all of which advocate using private sector security contractors for defense of maritime shipping who seem to have at least as good a track record in terms of defending shipping as anything done by nato flotillas, my question is simply do you see a way where they toe -- nato would ever conceivably outsource to the private sector the job of defending the industry? because even major partner states such as great britain and the united states in the past year have given their official and premature approval to this concept. hillary clinton in the last year, the foreign office issuing a general license for security service providers. and it would seem that to date they've done, as i said, at

least as good a job as the flotillas. so do you see that as being conceivable? all things aside, what it says about the usefulness of nato, etc., which i understand would be impolitic to discuss. >> thank you very much. that's a very good question. first of all, regarding the private companies used for security purposes, anti-piracy operations, i remember initially when piracy tarted being anish -- started being an issue on the radar of global maritime trade off the coast of somalia. there was much debate about whether or not a private ship should hire private contractors to defend itself. i mean, it was the whole issue of how would the pirates respond, would they then start shooting first in order to capture a ship and put in danger the lives of the crew? so, i mean, that's an ethical

question, but there has been, definitely, i would say a proliferation of private companies aboard ships in the air. in the area. whether or not nato would use such private companies, i very much doubt. maybe the other members of the panel could respond from the nato point of view. i don't see nato itself doing it, but i can definitely at least see the member states of both nato and the european union do that because it's actually happening, um, already whether you're looking at the example of iraq or afghanistan or other conflicts. i mean, private security companies are in many conflict areas. so the answer to your question regarding the organization itself -- although i'm not an expert on nato per se -- i very much doubt it, but i'm sure that

we'll see some of those private entities in conflict areas when nato is also present. >> thank you. thanks very much. um, i'd just say one great web site on the privatization of security sector is topsecretamerica, a big research program that was undertaken over the last three years, and it's pretty comprehensive, and this is yet another discussion we need to have out in the open about who's supposed to do what and whose responsibility it is to provide security. so thank you for that. thank you, everybody. i think we're running other time, so i'm going to wrap it up, and we'll move on to the next panel be. thanks. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> okay, welcome back to the final panel of the day on smart dependence. smart defense. for those of you here from the very beginning this morning, you'll know that my name is ian davis, and i'm the director of nato watch. the, in chicago the heads of state and governments are likely to approve, so we're led to believe, more than 20 joint projects to share costs of military hardware and to promote what is being defined as a new mindset in weapons buy being known as smart defense. they're also expected to

announce a collect i have forces -- collective forces initiative with measures designed to sustain and increase the links between the armed forces of different nato nations, and together these two initiatives are expected to lay the foundations for nato's future forces to 2020. now, most of this has been, you know, quite heavily signposted in advance over the last 12 months, and i think someone mentioned in the previous session regarding counterterrorism much of it is not new. for those of us that have worked on some of these issues for the last 20 years, attempts at increasing the interoperability and common procurement within europe go back at least to the 1980s and the work of the now-defunct western european union. clearly, there's a new impetus to this debate brought about by rising defense costs and falling defense budgets, but what really

fascinates me on this particular issue really is the dominant, underlying narrative in which this debate takes lace. in sum -- takes place. in sum, it's about europe does not pull its weight, and european nato is haley subsidized by the united states. in my view, this is a simplify t and distorted view of how the public good of security is shared, funded and measured in an alliance. nonetheless, having said that over the years, there have been many colorful warnings to prescribe this capabilities gap and the unequal burden sharing, and the number speaks last year, robert gates probably did more than most to revive this debate. for me, there was -- i rather like one of the latest comments which robert kaplan referred to in an article last week. he cited a u.s. air force

planner who was, obviously, clearly exasperated by the shortfalls in key european capabilities during the libya intervention. and he described nato as like snow white and the 27 dwarfs. [laughter] so the billion dollar question is this: can the smart defense approach receive a pooling of integration in transatlantic but special european military procurement to insure the alliance maintains capabilities each at a time when the allies are making deep defense cuts? or to put it into the language of that u.s. air force officer, will those european dwarfs be whistling while they work, will they be doing so in tune and on the same song sheetses? will they be taking on a larger share of the burden of keeping snow white safe from the clutches of her mean

al-qaeda-affiliated stepmother, and will we all be ensured a fairy tale ending which, essentially, means more security for smaller defense budgets? to answer these tricky questions, we have a very talented panel. for the benefit, because we're on c-span, i'm going to just give a brief resumé of the four speakers we have. we have julia -- juliet: yeap smith -- julianne smith. prior to joining the administration she was director of the european program at the center for strategic and ancestral studies. and i have to say that before that she was with basic. so there's still time for me to invite you to the ball, i hope.

um, next to me on my left is andras simonyi, managing director for transatlantic relations at johns hopkins university, previously hungarian ambassador to the united states. he was a negotiator on the delegation preparing hungary's membership of nato. to my immediate right is john feffer who is co-director of foreign policy and focus at the institute for foreign policy studies, also a 2012 open society fellow looking at the transformations across eastern europe. he has also been a writing fellow at the provision's library in d.c. and a pan-tech fellow in korean studies at stanford university. marios efthymiopoulos is

president of strategy international based in greece, a nato specialist who is a former visiting scholar at the center for transatlantic relations, visiting research fellow at the george washington business school. he has a book coming out on nato's security future in greece, so i think just from those resumés, you can see they've each got a lot to offer on this particular topic. i'll be asking them to speak for 10-12 minutes, and i shall be playing the role of the wicked witch be they look like they're going over time -- if they look like they're going over time. julie, start with you, please. >> great, thank you very much. thank you for the invitation, and it's good to see some old friends and faces, particularly those from basic. so we all know that, um, the defense budgets of allies inside the nato alliance have been an ongoing challenge for the alliance and not just in terms of what allies spend, um, i think it's also been a question of how allies spend the budgets

that they have in hand. and this has become increasingly worse over the last couple of years for a couple of reasons, most notably the financial crisis which all of the 28 members of the alliance are grappling with and turning to their defense budgets for some possible relief. including cuts that are coming here in the united states. but what's changed about the cuts that we've seen over the last, um, months and recent years is two things. um, one, the actual size of the cuts that we've been witnessing has changed quite dramatically. um, in years past, in decades past we've seen allies cut, you know, somewhere around five, six, seven, eight, let's say between 5-10% of their defense budgets, and this has had an impact on the alliance, but it wasn't really what i would describe as a crushing blow in any way, shape or form. but what's changed is now we're seeing cups cutting upwards of

20, 25%. and, um, that's where, i think, some really tough choices have to be made by nato member states. and they really are forced to prioritize. sometimes that's very helpful and useful because there's no question that there are instances where one can easily find inefficiencies and waste. but i think when you're talking about a 25% cut in most defense budgets, particularly those that have already seen cuts in recent years, you really start to feel that collectively inside the alliance in terms of new capability gaps that have been appearing. the second thing that's been happening that's changed a little bit in recent years vis-a-vis defense budgets has been the actual type of the cuts that we've seen unfolded on the european continent. traditionally, what would happen when a country was faced with cutting their defense budget is they kind of skim across the top and take little bits, um, from all the different areas whether

it's r&d or acquisition, personnel. everybody would be affected one way or another. but what's happened now is that countries have been forced to move forward with what we call not horizontal, but vertical cuts, and that's where whole capability elements are eliminated entirely. one example that's cited quite frequently is the dutch decision to eliminate all of their tanks, all of their armor. and one could argue that, you know, from a dutch national security perspective, maybe that was a decision that was wise and long overdue, but one has to also ask the question had this been a conversation in nato among all of the allies to determine whether or not that actual capability might be needed in years ahead, say, looking autoover the next -- out over the next decade, and that type of conversation is not happening. so that's another problem that i would point out, is that inside

capitals in nato member states, individual members are taking these rather radical decisions in some cases and, again, might seem perfectly reasonable and rational for each of the member states to take those specific decisions like the dutch eliminating armor or the danes many years ago eliminating all of their submarines. but what's not occurring is there's not a wider conversation inside the alliance right now about what should we be ring fencing, what do we think the future missions could look like, where do we think we should be spending our very limited resources, and what guidance could we offer to capitals to say, look, if you have a choice between x and y, we'd prefer you lean toward x instead of y or vice versa. and this is, again, something that's not occurring, and i think will have a long-term impact on the alliance collectively. um, the other bit of bad nudes i would say in terms -- news in terms of sketching out the

nature of the problem before i get to what's happening at the summit is that it doesn't seem like the cuts we're seeing right now whether they're vertical or horizontal or 5% or 20% show any signs of stopping. so while the u.k. does, technically, have kind of -- when it looks at its defense planning out into the next decade, it has a bit of a reverse bell-shaped curve where cuts will occur now, but they're planning for kind of a brighter day when there'll be an uptick. but one is not entirely sure whether or not that will actually occur, but one could give credit to london for at least thinking that that might be a possibility. unfortunately, most capitals at this point are just kind of on the dramatic downward spiral with no anticipation that that may actually level out at some point or maybe begin to tick upward. um, i think the last thing i would say in terms of the nature of the problem is it's not all bad news when it comes to defense budgets and defense

spending inside the nato alliance. one thing i would point out is despite the fact we've seen these quite dramatic cuts and the financial crisis is putting quite a squeeze on many member states, um, we are not seeing nations pull out of current operations due to the financial crisis. we have not had any country step forward and say we are leaving afghanistan tomorrow simply because we can't afford it. there are countries that are going to be accelerating their departure possibly from afghanistan, some have already opted to leave afghanistan from a combat perspective, but the reasons for that have not been laid out explicitly tied to the financial crisis. is so generally speaking, i think with few exceptions, we could say despite the gloomy news on defense spending and defense budges, we have seen an environment where operations have not been impacted in a dramatic way.

in fact, nato undertook libya, and no one came to the table and said we simply can't afford this right now. what is happening, though, is while countries are trying to maintain their commitments in current nato operations, they have not been able to maintain their commitments to modernization or transformation, whatever you want to call it. so that's the part of the defense budget that has probably taken the greatest hit, not the actual operations per se. the question on the table is, as countries come out of afghanistan and we work our way through the transition, what will happen to the resources that were dedicated to those corporations? one would hope that they might be funneled back in to develop capabilities that are lacking or to draw lessons learned, to insure that those resources are reinvest inside a way that helps the alliance long term address some of these capability gaps. but, in fact, i think, i fear that we will continue to see modernization efforts stalled, and i don't expect we'll see a

major uptick in those efforts in the years ahead. so that gets us, that's kind of a quick burst on the nature of the problem, how we're looking at it, and the question is, what can this summit possibly do to alleviate that situation or help this capabilities challenge that the alliance is facing. and the alliance has come up with, as ian mentioned, this nato forces 2020 construct which mirrors a little bit the u.s. joint forces 2020 construct as the u.s. was undergoing its recent defense review and m cooing up -- and coming up with a defense strategy. and the concept is that, you know, the united states as an individual nation and nato collectively as an alliance have to do some long-term thinking about where it wants to be in ten years' time or, let's say, eight years' time and outline the types of missions it envisions undertaking in the future and then what capabilities will be required to

undertake those missions and try and set kind of some -- identify some kind of priority areas for the alliance knowing that most allies simply aren't going to be able to do everything all the time. not every ally in the alliance will be able to be a full-spectrum ally, an ally that can do everything from peacekeeping up to high-intensity combat. and we already have a number of allies that have reached that point and are starting to specialize and develop niche capabilities. but again, if it's not coordinated, it's like a pot luck dinner. everybody brings salad, and you don't have any brownies or main course, and so the question is, how can we better coordinate these efforts. so the summit's going to try and start the alliance on a more healthier course to identify some of those priority areas. but it's also going to start, first and foremost, with delivering on some of the commitments that were made in lisbon. you might remember at the last summit in lisbon the alliance launched this lisbon

capabilities, critical capabilities commitment where the alliance identified ten priority areas, where the alliance would commit itself to enhancing its capabilities in these core areas. and it ranged from everything from counter-ied to ags to missile defense. it was a list of longstanding capability gaps, new capability gaps that were highlighted in afghanistan and capability gaps that were tied to future challenges like cyber. and so what we wanted to do in this upcoming summit in chicago is to move forward with that list and insure that the commitments that were made in lisbon are now, we're following through on those. and two of the key milestones there will, obviously, be missile defense, and we can talk about this in the q&a if you'd like, that the alliance will be declaring it has met interim capability, and secondly, it will be moving forward finally after ian points out this is nothing new, but it's a miracle

that we finally closed the deal on ags which for those of us who have been tracking ags, it's been a long, tragic tale and a very difficult effort to get all the 13 nations not only to agree to procure this particular capability, five global hawk, but also to get the alliance writ large to support it and maintain it at 28, not just the 13 that are procuring that particular capability. so that's part of the capabilities package in chicago. oh, i know i'm running out of time. let me just go through a couple of other things quickly, and we can coffer over -- cover other things in the q&a. smart alliance, a group of 20 pooling and sharing initiatives. here smart defense is essentially trying to do more with less, and this is a concept that's been tried by groups of allies either who have opted because they're in the same geographic area or they're in the same climb of weight class from -- kind of weight class to

join hands and develop a capability that could be utilized by the alliance. there are some very positive success stories, but this has been tried in the past. some have not been as successful, but i think the point of this summit is to try and get more of those to take root and push countries to step forward and offer to lead specific capability initiatives in areas that have been identified as critical such as helicopter maintenance, maritime patrol aircraft. there's a very long list, um, munitions, storage of munition, a gap that was highlighted, in fact, in the libya operation as well. here the u.s. is going to step forward and lead three of these initiatives that's going to participate in sick of them, we believe -- in six of them, we believe, and on top of it one of the other smart defense initiatives rolled out in chicago is baltic air policing which has been ongoing, but there's a new commitment to extend that beyond 2018, and on top of it we expect the baltic

nations to come forward with additional offers for host nation support. the last thing i'll mention is training. i think in this era of defense cuts and where we're seeing allies eliminate entire capability elements, it's absolutely critical that the alliance put a very heavy emphasis on training to keep skill sets alive assuming that there may be brighter days ahead. an example of this would be the u.s. and the u.k. coming together to sign a carrier cooperation agreement most recently because the u.s., the u.k. will not have access and will not have carriers at its disposal, but it will continue to insure that its military is trained and will be working with the united states in that particular area. many other examples of this exist, and i think the hope is that as we identify this brigade in the united states that'll be rotating battalions to europe, possibly twice annually although we're still working on the

frequency of that, that will also be a way to enhance training in the alliance, and, again, we can get into some of those details in the q&a. i fear i've spoken too long already. i'm going to leave it at that and turn it over to the next person on the panel. thank you. >> julie, thank you very much for very rapidly going through what is quite a packed agenda when you start to look at these issues, and it's very difficult to in the time i've allotted. you were very generous, i think, as well to describe britain's future defense struggles as a bell curve. i think in the u.k. they've been described, it's been described as kind of a black hole -- [laughter] around $35 billion worth of defense expenditures which has been pushed into the future because the country can't afford to pay for it now, and we're looking at the kind of carrier programs and trying to replace them. but these are challenges for the future. i'm going the pass the

microphone on to the second speaker, andrak. >> thank you. thank you, julie. this was really very, very good. first, i'd like to say that in real life snow white would be dead without the dwarves. [laughter] and i'd also like to say that in the real story i don't remember grimm threatening with snow white in that the dwarves are supposed to be scared of what snow white said. and i say this in a not-so-cynical way. i think it's, we europeans, we get the message, we got it, we understand. i think we should, we should move on from the gates messaging politically. i don't think it's helpful any

longer. i think we're past that. i think it's important that we understand that both sides got it. there is a basic issue here, and i think that really is the roots of the problem. it's not just about the financial situation of europe, it's not just about the economy, it's not just about the willingness. there's a deep division between europeans and the united states in the per tseng of threat. -- perception of threat. what the real threat is. what is the threat of the 21st century, what is it that we are really building our capabilities for? and i, i seriously hope that sooner or later -- i, look, this summit will be important, it will be an important milestone, but it will not be historic in the sense that this will be the big summit that solves everything, and that's okay. not all summits have to be like that. i think there are summits that

just have to push the bar, kick the ball further, and i think this is -- it's great. i also would like to say that while smart defense, i think it's a great idea, but one should be very careful. it's not the magic stick. it really is, a mindset. it's a great mindset which says, look, we've got a problem. europeans have a serious problem in financing their militaries. we have a problem keeping to the agreed percentage of spending. but honestly, that's only, that's not the whole point. i think it's also important that we are very clear about the other circumstances like, for example, the losing of appetite

by our societies to go to war or take up military actions. now, the good news is so far when it was really necessary the solidarity with the united states was there. so let's face it, more countries are part of the coalition, were part of the coalition of the willing and are part of isaf than countries that seriously believe that afghanistan is a major threat. we're supposed to be there. we do it, many do it because it's so important for the transatlantic solidarity. that should not be forgotten, which is the good news because it's, the message is that, yes, the transatlantic relationship still matters. now, i wish snow white had not pivoted to the kingdom, the other kingdom. i just want to say this because it has caused, caused a lot of

confusion among the dwarves. [laughter] and i think we're over that, we're past that, we get it now. it's not as bad and it's not as serious as we first thought, and we europeans should stop whining about, you know, what is, you know, the u.s. pivot to asia. it's fine be, you know? it's probably more asia, not less europe, and if i could recommend to my friends in the united states the way to present it in the future is more asia, not less europe. what i'd also just like to say is that i guess libya was good news. lib libya was good news because, first, the europeans really took action. second, of course there is a lot of discussion about, you know, how good were the europeans. well, look at it this way: the europeans could have done it without the united states, not as easily, not as fast, not

as -- not with the losses that we suffered, but it would have been much more difficult. so the good, it was great the united states stepped in. it, of course, points to a lot of the shortages and shortcomings that we have in our capabilities. but there was something, there was another element that you should not, you know, you should clearly see. some of the partners of nato took greater responsibility than some of the actual members. now, that's an interesting new development. i guess the participation of sweden which was seamless, which was important is a very, very important point many case. and i would also -- point in case. and i would also like to say that there are oh partners suddenly who we see who are

actually able to contribute more than the actual members, like finland. so what i'd like to hope is that at the summit there will be some discussion about the future of the partnership which is a new element, if you want, reinforced pillar of what the alliance can stand for and can look like in the future. there is one question here, you know, the question, you know, wi it help close the gap, should nato move towards a human security approach contributing to the protection of every individual human being and not just focus merely on the defense of territorial borders? honestly, i think it's the wrong question to ask. i don't think nato will take upon itself responsibilities that are, basically, the responsibilities of the civilian forces. this brings me to my final point, don't underestimate the

reserves and the possibilities and the opportunities we have in enhancing e.u./nato cooperation. e.u., more and more civilian crisis management issues will be the task of the transatlantic community. and the european union has these capabilities. i just hope we get some of the internal obstacles that we have in nato and the internal obstacles we have within the e.u. politically to get this out of the way so that the e.u./nato cooperation can move ahead. and in conclusion i'd like to just say that i do believe that a renewed, um, nato, a reinvented nato can still be the institution of choice of the transatlantic relationship for the 21st century. ..