but a personal story about somebody about how we fell in love with someone who also fell in love with him. they were a very unlikely pair, and from what i understand she died and he was devastated, but then they make tapes which is something i did for years and years and years of all my exes. he basically writes a book that is essentially a mixed tape to her in her honor because he loved her. it sounds like it was his final mix tape for her, and i cannot wait to read that one. that is what i'm hoping to read this summer. ..

>> it is what i would call a sketchbook on north korea. what were you hoping to accomplish by writing this book in one kind of impact people that will have?

>> the reason i wanted to buy this book, one of the government in 2007, i really had no desire to write a book about north korea. i have been dealing with the issue for three years. and i just didn't have a desire to write in them. five years later, given the situation that north korea was and, it seems like a good opportunity to write a little bit about my experiences there, about about the history and about the policy. especially to a more general audience. this is the sort of issue where the educated reader doesn't know a lot about north korea. they don't know a lot about its history. they seek headlines about missile tests and irrational leaders in all the sorts of things. and i just thought it would be good to write a book that people could look to as a comprehensive

assessment, you know, a history the history, the family comedy economics, politics. the human rights situation, the nuclear problem. that way they could look to it every time they had a question about what was going on with north korea. i would not call it a scholarly book. though it does have footnotes. it was written to a more general audience. a general audience that might be interested in learning something about this country on the far side of the planet. >> the book also has a point of view, and i think by your experience, with the bush administration. how did you designed to infuse it with that kind of point of view instead of arguments about north korea's future. it is a little bit different than a straight history, i would

say. >> i think any history has an opinion and it's good i think in this case, specifically the parts about u.s. policy, certainly they were informed by my own experiences dealing with the north koreans in the bush administration. but i also try to look at it from an objectivist same point. every u.s. administration going back to ronald reagan has tried to deal with this problem. ronald reagan had his own initiative, george h. w. bush did. bill clinton did. george w. bush and barack obama all day. there are some of my own personal views about how i thought president bush handled the situation, and there are probably some things that leaders might disagree with. but there are also some things that readers will be surprised

about, in terms of what the u.s. sought with diplomacy's first north korea is concerned. that is a natural thing where i could add something on this that perhaps other authors who have written would not be able to. >> and you don't necessarily take an ideological perspective in your evaluation of the other administrations, but you give a critical review of successes and failures of other administrations in dealing with the issue. >> i guess the basic thesis of the book is that north korea is to be impossible state, because no one inside is empowered to overthrow it, and the one on the outside anyone on the outside doesn't care enough about risking the costs to change it. i want to ask you in particular, starting with no one has the power to overthrow, why do you think that has been the case in north korea? especially from a comparative

politics perspective. this really makes north korea interesting compared to what we saw with the former soviet union. >> that observation is quite accurate, i think. we look at the soviet union and the regimes in the arab spring, all of which have had leaders in power longer than the former recently deceased north korean leader. they have all collapsed, and north korea continues to survive. that alone is evidence that nobody within the system is empowered to overthrow it. and i think it is also just because, as you know well, the very strict controls that exist in this country. it is a society in which, the use of the term strong state would be an understatement. this is about the controller control it has on the society and on political freedoms, even

the way people think. for that reason it is very difficult to imagine that there could be a group within the society that could speak out, that could challenge a view that a party has. these things don't happen in north korea. that is why it has lasted for this long, i think. in spite of a lot of its problems, economic problems coming human rights problems, food problems, it has lasted this long. it is because no one within the system is capable of changing it. >> there our forces for change going on in south korea. information flows, you know, we are not the place where there is an organized opposition. how long do you think it will take for us to see the evolution of politics in north korea to a point where it's possible for it

to be expressed? >> it is a good question. political activists are supposed to be able to determine these types of things, but i don't think we can. i don't think that we can say with any degree of accuracy what the tipping point, in terms of when society is ready to act. in the case of north korea come, as you say, in the book i talk about the element that i think is new, in this picture, which is growing markets in the country. really starting from the famine of the 1990s in which people basically had to sell whatever they could find. a cup, a pen, those kinds of things for food. that was the start of the market system that never really had markets before. i think that what we can say is

that there is this element there that was not there in the past that has created more of than independence of mind by the people in north korea and not be solely reliant on handouts from the government. but when that's exactly will reach a point where the system will tip, it's very hard to stay. >> how do you think the state is adapting some of those changes? >> part of the way they are adapting is they are trying to crack down. certainly on the unofficial markets that existed. there have been efforts that were referred to as reform, economic cooperation projects with the affluent south korea, but these have largely been aimed at bringing hard-currency and to help the regime. not so much to create real market reform in the country. i think that what we are seeing

now, if we do see economic engagement with the outside world, the north korean leadership is doing this because they see currency, not necessarily to create a better life for the people. >> in what ways do you think pockets of protest can emerge? or do you think it'll be a case where anything that happens is this going to be stamped out? dc any possibility for the elites tolerating certain forms of dissent? >> well, right now it is hard to imagine that. the question is at what point we will see toleration of dissent or the emergence of dissent. as social scientists, we can't predict that. but we can point to certain preconditions that exist. that could lead to that. i think that certainly, the

market mentality is certainly one of these things. you know, it is very hard to say. there's not a lot of evidence that this regime is tolerant with any sort of dissent. there's not a lot of evidence that they have tried to listen to what the content of whatever protests have taken place in north korea. it goes without saying that this is a country that it's very hard to get any information on what is happening inside the country. when we talk about the site of protest, we hear anecdotes and stories of things that might've happened in this military unit or in that city, but we really don't we really don't know. it is such a sealed country. yet, when the day comes when it opens up or however it opens up, if it collapses, if it falls ndc

unification like germany, we will learn a lot about what sort of political dissent existed within the country. but it is very hard to find that inside that today. >> do you see the regime is really rigid, and therefore more likely to crack? or do you think it is flexible in the sense that despite incredible global changes in the international environment, -- how should we evaluate the character of the regime in a sense to predict what might happen later on? >> i think it is more on the brittle end of the spectrum and a regime that will crack rather than one that has been mountable and has managed. i think the reason it has been able to muddle through is because the second factor that we talked about at the outside of the conversation. it has managed to muddle through not because of anything

internal, but because of what is happening outside of north korea. and also the dynamic where nobody really wants to put in the effort to change it or to solve the problem, and there is one country in particular that wants to ensure it that there are no big changes or unstable occurrences within the country. >> well, i guess, that's the second part of your observation about north korea as an impossible state. no one cares enough to risk the cost of change. really, that is quite striking when we look at the history, especially of how human rights concerns have motivated desires for international intervention in many parts of the world. you think of rwanda, kosovo, bosnia, and yet somehow, north korea hasn't been subject to the same international activism, despite the fact that ardley the

human rights conditions are just as bad, certainly for a large portion of the population. how is it that this is the case? what makes north korea immune to that sort of focus of the national community? >> i think when we say international community, we have to be clear what we mean. and we need to develop the west. there are certain issues that the developed west has taken up in terms of human rights. yet, you mentioned some of them. very clearly it very clearly they have taken of these causes. there are others, sudan, tibet, others who have been taken up to a great extent by the international community, but north korea is just not -- they are just ignoring the issues. the first is very successful efforts to make sure that this

remains a nameless and faceless policy issue and not a personal story, a personification of a story, that the average american will be influenced by or take up a cause for. many of the north koreans who defect are sent back by the chinese on buses with the curtains drawn, so that there is nobody that could associate a name or face with this terrible human rights situation in north korea. by example, south korea, during its military dictatorships had this person in the name of [inaudible name] who eventually won the nobel peace prize, he became lionized as a voice interface for democratic activism in south korea.

you have -- personalities that you can identify with the problem, and the north koreans have been very good at not allowing that to happen. i think that is certainly one of the reasons why it hasn't been taken up. the other, i think, is it just hasn't captured the imagination of some major personality in the west. i know this may sound a bit catty, but practically, i think it is true. it is true when somebody like richard gere takes up tibet or mia farrow takes up there are four issues. these are things that north korea would not normally see. in the case of north korea, we just haven't had that. we haven't had an individual that does that. now, i think one of the things

we are seeing more of, and there are stories of this in the book as well, americans are learning more about the stories about some of these defectors that are getting out of north korea. there have been several books written recently about defectives who have managed to escape and they are telling their stories. and i think that certainly helps. but still, compared to other cases of human rights, we just don't see the same sort of residents with regard to the issue. >> and other distinctive feature of north korea that could have an impact on this human rights observations by the international community is, north korea has wanted to start to become a nuclear weapons state. that is particularly interesting when we look at iraq. you are in the bush administration for part of the time that this issue was playing

out. it turns out that you know, we decided to attack iraq and saddam hussein did not have nuclear weapons. the north koreans arguably had a regime, but we decided not to pursue that course of action with north korea. how do you see the difference between the two? >> you know, it's a tough question to answer. without recounting the whole history of why the bush administration went into iraq. that was not my area of responsibility. i am not really capable of commenting on that. but i think in the case of north korea, i think there are two issues. the question is if in iraq, why not also north korea? there are two answers, i think. the first is that you have

china. china sits right on the border with north korea. the last thing the united states or china wants is some sort of confrontation or something that causes them to butt heads as they did in 1953. anytime there is serious thought into some sort of military action, this is constantly at the top -- but even halfway up the escalation ladder. this is constantly concerned that every u.s. president, i think, has had to think about seriously. i think that is certainly one of the reasons. the china factor. the other is that we went into afghanistan because they became the top foreign-policy issue on which the administration sought

a revolution. a final resolution. now, we can debate whether that was the right or wrong thing. many americans think it was the wrong thing. many americans think that nothing was resolved there. you know, that is a completely different question. the point for korea is that i don't really think that the north korea issue has risen to that level of priority for the administration. it has been a crisis, but you want to sort of saw, at least in the sense of preventing it from becoming a bigger problem within diplomacy. but the united states has been willing to use both force and diplomacy to really try to solve the problem. i think in the case of north korea, that that -- it's just not registered like that. that is not specific to any administration. we have had crises with north korea and every administration has made the same calculation.

when we reach a crisis with north korea, are we willing to go all-out to the end to solve this thing, or do we want a solution that will park it momentarily, put him diplomatic tracks, present and kevin and want move on to the other issues that most concern us, whether it is the domestic and economic situation or iraq or afghanistan or syria or the middle east peace process. these tend to be the more it important issues in u.s. foreign policy. >> the other issue that makes iraq different is the u.s. korea alliance. have you see the dynamics of the alliance playing into our ability to adjust the top concerns that the u.s. has related to north korea's nuclear program? >> undeniably, and when we look at the situation, south korea is more important than any policy we have towards north korea

south korea is a key ally for the united states today. it is a major partner in a lot of international issues around the world. they are a trading partner, all of these things make south korea extremely important to the united states in terms of position in asia. and i think there has always been a tension in the u.s. south korean relationship when it comes to north korea because we have different governments and a democracy in south korea. some of it tends to be more progressive. we see some that tend to be more conservative, which are willing to follow a tougher path with regard to the north. for the united states, you know, it is a question of sinking of whichever government is there at the time as they deal with the latest north korean crisis. for example, when i was in government during the bush administration, we have a progressive government in south korea that was quite engaging.

all we did with north korea is pretty north korean behavior in order to try to seek long-term reconciliation with the country in the north. the bush administration was not as enamored with that particular strategy. i think currently you have been in vomit once you -- i think you currently have in the obama administration, the desire to hold tight and hold firm and we have another round of diplomacy. so, you know, 75% of our north korean policy is her south korea policy. in the sense that we need to say

-- we need to stay synced up with our allies in asia when we are dealing with the north korean problem. in other aspects of the book that you talk about are president bush's interest in north korea. and you mentioned kim jong-il on being an influence of his thinking. you have white house people and other refugees of the white house, he took an interesting approach, actually, my impression was the human rights envoy that was appointed was not a major part of the picture in terms of the policy. now we have the obama administration. we haven't seen any refugees in

the oval office, but we have seen a human rights envoy that actually makes north korea and, you know, talk with the north koreans, raised human rights with the north koreans, even though that was a probably relatively short conversation. what do you see as the merits and demerits in pressure situations? >> i think it is great that the obama administration and for instance come up robert king has been able to make two trips or more to north korea. i think that is great. the more that we can open the dialogue with these issues with the north, the better. literally part of what he was doing, as you know, was to try to negotiate a humanitarian assistance package for north korea in terms of food, more than it was to talk about human rights abuses. the fact that he was there was very important.

as you know well, the dialogue on human rights is an interesting dialogue. you can tell them that they need to improve their human right situation and the response will be, and we have had this conversation at the official level, the responses you in the united states have human rights problems, too. that is not a comparable discussion. i think what president bush wanted to do was, he wanted to make this an issue that people knew about. and he wanted to, as he put it, he wanted to do something to help measurably improve the lines of north korean people there are two things. the first was he helped to create the first resettlement program for north korean refugees in the united states.

of course there was a big program in south korea that exists, and that would be expected, but for another country outside of south korea for a country like the united states to say we are going to take north korean defectors who want to settle in the united states, it was a big step the administration didn't try to toot the horn publicly come and say hey, look at us. but it was a very big and important step that set an example out there and put a marker in the ground saying the united states is not just talking about human rights improvements come it's time to do something. the second thing, as you mentioned, he brought attention to the issue by bringing in defectives, people whose books he's read, stories he has known, in intimate details that he has

known very well about the spokesman talked about the situation. and then there were press statement saying that he met with these people and he wanted to see the human rights situation improved in north korea. again, giving names and faces to this sort of problem helps to give it a broader reference. in the book, i go through some of the experiences of one these defectives came into the oval office, walking them into the oval office, watching them respond, watching president bush respond. it was a really truly memorable collection of expenses. in the end, these things obviously did not stop the problems in north korea. they're not opening up the prison camps. they are not allowing the u.n. commission for refugees into the country. all of these sorts of things are not happening. but when you are limited in terms of what you can do, i mean everybody respects sovereignty, so you're not going to go crashing into the country.

these i think were very tangible and concrete steps that try to put this on the radar screen and create more international attention, because creating that sort of knowledge base and that sort of advocacy environment is the first step to try to address a problem like this. >> now, the book goes through and illustrates some of the wrong decision for that north korea made in terms of trying to build its own economy. this is quite striking. as you noted in the book, north korea was the more powerful economic part of the points are compared to south korea for a long time until the 1970s. then you talk about north korea's illicit activities. this was also an area of focus during the bush administration that we don't really care that much about these days.

i am wondering if you think these activities are still continuing, are we succeeding in squeezing north korea in terms of customers some of its military equipment and missile -- missiles? do we see north korea trying to counterfeit cigarettes or u.s. money? where do you think that stands at this point? >> this is sort of a fascinating story. the notion that here is a country that basically one third of its economy is based on illicit activities. as you mention, counterfeiting drugs, counterfeiting cigarettes, counterfeiting u.s. currency. the north koreans counterfeit the u.s. 100-dollar bill -- that is known in the profession, as you will, as the supernode, because the north koreans manage somehow to acquire the printing press, to ink, and the paper

that is used for the production of 100-dollar bills. the difference is that what they manage to require our brand-new, and the ones that the treasury uses are the rather old. process is rather old. this is a part of their economy. during the bush administration, efforts were taken to try to stop this. to try to stop this through a series of sanctions that were aimed at trying to target companies that were known to be involved in illicit activities. i think the reason we don't hear more about it today is because these people have been fairly successful, and the north koreans probably do not feel that they can do the same sorts of things that they used to do

for many years when it came to making money through this sort of activity. >> okay. so it is actually that the international community and the u.s. are getting better at eliminating those markets for north korea for those kinds of activities? >> i think so. i think that is why we are not hearing much more about it today. i also think that for many of the financial institutions, they have been much more wary in handling north korean accounts and north korean money, and so that has also caused the north koreans themselves to think about whether they want to be seen as being this financially viable asset that every bank regulator doesn't want to see in their institution. >> one of the other cases that is related to that that you had direct experience with was the bank of delta asia, situation,

where the u.s. treasury issued an advisory and they were possibly engaging in money laundering and handling some of these counterfeit notes. that occurred at a point in time when it looked like they were going to be some progress in negotiations, and then it looked like everything stalled out. do you think about was the case? that it stole the diplomacy? as we look today at more satellite launches, possibly a third nuclear test by north korea, it seems like a lot of people are calling for the re-examination of the financial area. basically, you know, did it work from your your perspective, and

visit replicable today? >> well, the first thing i would point out is the irony in the description you just gave, which is on one hand, when the u.s. government pursued this financial sanction in 2005, and 2000 and six, it was widely criticized as something that was both ineffective and hurting the diplomacy, and yet today, as you said, there are people who are clamoring for it as a way to sanction north korea, because they see it as a powerful tool in terms of trying to influence north korean behaviors. in 2005, this particular action was, as you said, it was a treasury department advisory for u.s. institutions to beware of. accounts and it related to north korea and the need to be involved in money laundering.

this, in the end, that's it was something the u.s. government had to do. if a country is counterfeiting your currency, that is technically an act of war. they were obligated to take action with regard to protection of u.s. financial institutions. now, as many people who follow this know, the effect of that -- it had a ripple effect. this was against a very small bank in china that then cause every other bank regulator and bank president and financial institution around the world to say, wait a second. if the u.s. is not dealing with this because they are concerned about north korean accounts, maybe we should look at the north korean accounts in our bank. so you have this major impact. it had a very big impact on north korea. was this meant as an action to

summary and the diplomacy that was taking place? i really don't think so. like i said, it was a law enforcement action. it was something that was happening on a parallel track with the diplomacy. all of us those participating in the diplomacy where also participating in the decision-making process in this particular action. in the end it was something that had to be done, and it did cause a delay in the negotiations. as we saw later, the negotiations eventually came back online. and it led to two very important agreements. one in which we have froze the nuclear program, and the second led to the dismantlement of important pieces of the nuclear program. it is pretty safe to say today that the plutonium program, the

leapt on him -- plutonium program in pyongyang is no longer going on today. now, we have a whole new, as you know, a whole new program or programs that there is concern about, not just the plutonium program, but the uranium program. but in terms of the accomplishments that were made through these sanctions at the time, these sanctions were quite effective at getting north korea to give up pieces of their program. >> has let time pass? >> it's a hard question to answer. i am obviously not as close as i have been in the past. so i don't know. i don't know, for example, if the north koreans have adjusted. i presume they have to what they

saw in the action in 2005. i think on the one hand, the north koreans are probably adjusting and trying to find a work around so that they are not subject to the same sorts of sanctions. on the other hand, when the united states pursued this, it wasn't something that was supported at by the u.n. and supported by the u.n. security council resolution. on the other hand, today, after the first nuclear test against the obama administration in may 2009, you now have security council resolutions to give authority for pursuing these sorts of financial sanctions. i think on the one hand, the north koreans have probably tried hard to find workarounds where they could avoid being subject to the same sorts of sanctions. on the other hand from the united states now has the international authority to pursue these things in a way that they do not under the bush

administration. >> one other question on this. you talk about the renunciation of diplomacy. as part of that, we give back the money that was being held under the law enforcement action that had occurred. i am sure the north koreans probably looked at that as exoneration. exoneration for what they had done. how do you view that the fact that the north koreans got their money back? >> it is evident that we don't hear much about these sorts of activities that they are undertaking. the main lesson they learned from that whole episode is they can't continue to do business this way. they can't counterfeit currencies or sell fake drugs or cigarettes. they just can't do that anymore.

i think that was the main lesson to be learned. the fact that they came back to the diplomacy and back to negotiations in earnest, to freeze their programs and dismantle them, to me it was a function of this sort of coercive diplomacy. i think there was a concern about the financial reputation and everything that came with that brought them back to the table and let them to make these agreements. now, they certainly got things in return. they got energy systems, they got fuel, they got new sets of discussions with the united states. they got a variety of things from south korea and assistance -- of course, that is the nature of diplomacy. but i think the driving force behind it, and i know that there were some who would disagree, the driving force behind what

were these sanctions that really put a bite on them, they really get. >> of course, despite the apparent agreement that had been made that was designed to deal with the plutonium part of the program, let me go back and ask about the north korean prospects for reform. they are still cash hungry. maybe we don't see any immediate evidence that the leadership is committed to reform, but of course, the chinese are always there, suggesting that the north koreans follow their path. what really is the way to cultivate an environment where north korea can use and do so in a reformed direction? and discovers they are still looking for cash, but if they are a way of drawing them in to a positive rather than pursuing

the negatives that we've been talking about? >> i think that the positive path that has been on the table really, i think, is a successive administration. i know there are always discussions about the current administration being different from the bush administration and different from the obama administration in terms of how they dealt with north korea. in the book, i go through the history of these. in the end, the paths may have been different, but there is a positive path. which is that in return for giving up their nuclear program, the united states international community would provide security guarantees, we would provide economic assistance, we would provide energy assistance, we would provide political normalization. it would provide money, it would provide a regional security environment in which people could feel safe and secure. all of these kinds of things in return for giving up nuclear

weapons. but that has not worked. it has failed. it has failed for every administration going back to george h. w. bush. and i think with the obama administration, we have reached the end of the rope in terms of this. many would argue that the obama administration, at least in terms of its initial intentions, was probably the most forward u.s. administration when he dealt with that korean -- north korean problem. even the clinton administration over two terms was a little softer. that is the positive path. and they don't seem to want to take it. what can be done in the interim? i think the most important thing that could be done is to try to get more information into north korea. more information in terms of what is going on in the outside

world. in terms of marketization and the internet and cell phones. i think this is the only way, really, to make inroads into seeing any change in the country. from the perspective of leadership, economic reform is a double edged sword. on one the one hand, they need economic reform and the need money and food in the sorts of things. on the other hand, when regimes like this open up, it releases all sorts of political forces that inevitably lead to a loss of political control. and even possibly the collapse of the regime. that is not a bargain that leadership, particularly with new leadership, the price is political control, that's the last thing that they really want to consider at this moment. i am not very optimistic on the

process -- prospects of reform at this time. >> the way you framed it is very much a u.s. way of framing basically a deal at which the nuclear issue is resolved in exchange for foreign policy. the chinese may have a different idea about what would be necessary that is not about quid pro quo. it is about the question of essentially, you call us and you can find a sustainable path. i think that is basically the argument. the question i have is based on what we have seen in china. north korea has not even been willing to dip its toes in the water. how would we know if we begin to see the north korean leadership that was moving in that direction, and, then north korea

known -- could they succeed? >> i have many friends that are scholars. when i talk to them, they are always optimistic about north korea and the prospects for north korea. i never understood why. when you ask them, they say it is very clear why they are optimistic because they have we have studied china. and they have seen china come from where it came in the cultural revolution and they came from a long distance to get to where they are today. certainly, north korea can do that. again, there are two big differences here. the first is that china had [inaudible name].

that is the first problem. the second problem is, the chinese said making money was okay. even if it meant giving up a degree of political control. for the current north korean leadership, and at least for the foreseeable future, there is nothing more important right now than political control. that looks to be the case for the current leadership. i think there are hopes that this young fellow, kim jong-un, he spent part of his life in switzerland in military school, but again, given the recent crisis and the missile tests and failed deal that the obama administration tried to reach with north korea, i don't think

there is a lot of hope right now that he's showing signs of being a future. maybe there's someone there that is unhappy with the leadership that is making that decision. it has a different view on things. maybe there is a leader like that of south -- north korea. right now, the prospects don't look good for that sort of reform and that sort of charismatic leadership. >> some point to [inaudible name] is one principle former. it is hard to see if he moved in the direction of reform. but let's say that somebody, someone else emerge to play a role, but within the same

system. how do you think that the u.s. government would be able to respond to that circumstance? >> well, i think they would certainly welcome someone like that. the obvious problem, first, i think the u.s. would certainly welcome someone like that. welcome someone who is interested in reform and taking north korea to a better place. if there was someone like that looking to make a big term in terms of their own system in the way they view the world, but the 800-pound gorilla in the world unshed room, it still remains the nuclear issue. when it comes down to its core, this is where the chinese and the u.s. really differ.

they are also willing to say in order to try to root promote reform, we should do things like a peace treaty and normalize the relationship as pre-steps, if you will, to try to promote reform. i think the problem for the united states is that that is not possible. and every administration going back to george h. w. bush has made it clear that the number one priority is the nuclear program. and reform is welcomed. but it must come with a nuclear station. alliances in the region, i don't think any of them are allies to south korea, let alone the united states. normalizing relations, full

relations, with a country that remains a nuclear weapon state, completely outside of the regime. it would basically destroy the nonproliferation treaty regime. and it would have a dramatic effect on our alliances in the region. this is the rubik's cubes. it is very difficult to match up the basic problem anytime we talk about getting a big deal with north korea. >> let me go back and ask you about that. in the book come you spend a lot of time talking about this. a lot of people thought that north korea conducting a nuclear test would conduct a paradigm shift in the region. was there something about china's reaction, in particular, that surprise you? how did you see the response to that playing out, and how did --

how did the response that you were involved with, you know, in the bush administration -- what should we draw from that, for instance, in the context of a possible additional nuclear test a nuke korea in the coming weeks and months? >> it was again change in the sense that we moved towards a new level of international unity in terms of punishing the north were these sorts of actions. china sanctions north korea for their actions. in the short term, that was a game changer. since then, every time the north koreans have done something accretions, the chinese and

russians have come along, especially when it comes to nuclear power. in retrospect, that is about the only real change. it did not change the game change mentality in the way that the chinese do with north korea. especially when it comes to dropping this ally, dropping this legacy of the cold war, and really help to end this regime that clearly that the chinese have drawn closer to north korea , especially in terms of supporting the new leadership. in the the end, it can create a major change that people thought it would. part of it, i think, is the fact that the status quo bias, if you will, in terms of dealing with the north koreans and the crisis, is to try to just bring it back down. to try to lower the temperature.

it is not to try to solve the problem. that is a political choice, i think. demonstrations in washington and in seoul and tokyo and beijing and moscow, these are the choices that they make. at least for now, stability equates to peace and prosperity in asia. the status quo equates to peace and prosperity in the most vibrant region in the world. do people want back, or do they want to go down this violent path with north korea where you try to solve the problem? it's very clear that every government wants to do -- they want to maintain the status quo. >> that really brings us to the question of korean unification, where it seems that there is a big gap between the u.s. mission in the chinese vision. and also, it involves what south koreans want in the future.

my impression was that they you were pretty bullish about the prospects of achieving unification. you also dealt to some degree with the challenges that would emerge. you know, at this point, how likely do you think it is that korea will actually be able to achieve unification? and how do you see that process playing out in terms of, basically in a context where china's influence continues to write? >> your question is right. i don't think the united states and south korea on the one hand and china on the other hand have the same view of unification. the united states has said explicitly in joint statements of the past two presidents with their south korean counterparts, aspirations are for a single korea at peace.

that is the natural order of things. a unified korean peninsula. the chinese don't. the chinese don't want to see unification. they just don't. i think that has become clearer and clearer in the past couple of years. it really is a conflict of interest between the two sides when it comes to that. >> in terms of the future in unification, it is impossible to say how it would happen if no one could predict how are the conditions in which german unification would happen, but i think what we can focus on is the question of whether countries in the region are ready and willing to take on the task of unification. and i think that 10 years ago that was not the case. ten years ago, i think the general consensus was unification is too difficult. much harder than that to germany's. too dangerous and should be

something that should be pushed off for as far as you can into the future, two or three generations, if you will. basically not my problem. no one wanted it to be their problem. as i talked about in the book, i think the attitude on that is slowly changing now. in part because the situation with north korea is getting worse and worse. the human rights situation is getting worse and worse. no one wants to try to push north korea over the edge. there is a growing feeling that it is coming, and that we must be prepared, and i think you are seeing that sort of change of attitude in south korea. i think you are even seeing it in places like japan, where the north koreans have the biggest in existential threat. and in terms of nationalism in

one career, they see the current situation as being quite dangerous, potentially very unstable. and i think their attitudes are changing on this, too. we look and we talk about those are the things that we need to watch, because no one can predict unification. no one can say when it's going to happen. but the question is are you prepared for? that is the question for the societies or governments in the region, where as before, no one wanted to talk about it at all. and it is much more open and willing attitudes to talk about it now. >> i also want to ask you just to close. a piece in "the new york times" said that north korea as we know it is over. so far, we see a fair amount of continuity. i guess the question is, how terrible is impossible state?

>> well, you know, it all depends on how you define north korea. i think north korea as we know it is over in the sense that, as i talk about in the book, i think we are entering a new phase where you have a young untested leadership with immense challenges in terms of maintaining its own position in the system, but is also dealing with a crumbling economy and an acute food problem. at the same time, society is increasingly influenced by a market mentality. the last time you had a leadership transition in 1994, when the first leader died in the second leader came into place. in that sense, the north korea today is not like the north korea of the past. sure, it has not collapsed or it has not changed. it has not