>> it is so great to talk with you on your book, "the impossible state: north korea, past and future. i thought it was a very interestingly structured book. it has a part on war and part on history, and depart on what i would call international relations sketchbook on north korea. what were you hoping to accomplish by writing this book and what kind of impact do hope to have? >> i am glad that you didn't say punditry. the reason i wanted to write this book, you know, when i left the government in 2007, i really had no desire to write a book about north korea. the cocoa

ticket look to every time that the question bulbs cannot with austria. so it's not -- i would call it a scholarly book, the victims of footnotes. it was written to a more general audience that might be interested in trying to learn something about this country. >> host: the book also has a

point of view. your experience in the persian ministration -- bush administration. how did you decide to infuse it with that kind of point of view, set of arguments really about the future of north korea that is a little bit different from the street history and would say? >> guest: well, i think any history has an opinion in it. in this case, particularly the parts but u.s. policy -- i mean, certainly the board formed by my own experiences dealing with north korea in the bush administration, but i also tried to give it an objective assessment in terms of the overall view that every u.s. administration going back or reagan has tried to do. reagan has hit a home initiative

, george h. w. bush, bill clinton, george w. bush, barack obama. while there are some of my own personal views about how i thought president bush handled the situation that readers might disagree with, there are also things that readers would be surprised about in terms of what president bush fought in terms of diplomacy with north korea, which is not normally something that would associate. that was a natural thing where i can add something that perhaps other authors who have written on the topic would not be able to. >> host: and you don't necessarily taken a logical perspective in your evaluation of the other administrations. you do those kind of critical reviews of successes and failures of other administrations. one of the -- i guess the basic

pieces of the book is that north korea is the impossible state because no one inside is empowered to overturn it and no one on the outside cares enough to risk the cost of changing it. i want to ask about bulk of those. in particular starting with the one is in power to overthrow. what you think that has been the case in north korea? especially from a comparative politick perspective this really makes north korea and a liar compared to what we saw. >> guest: i think that observation is quite accurate when the cut the soviet union, the machines in the air bearing all of which have had leaders in power longer than the former recently deceased north korean leader. they have all collapsed and north korea continues to survive that alone is the evidence that no one within the system is empowered to overturn.

it's also just because, as you know, the very strict controls that exist, the society -- to use the term strong state would be an understatement. this is about the strongest state in terms of the control it has in the society and political freedoms and even thought, the way people think. for those reasons it's great difficult to imagine that there could be a group within the society that could speak out, that could challenge the view that a party congress, these sorts of things just don't happen in north korea. that is why it has lasted this long. in spite of a lot of the problems, economic problems, human rights problems, few -- food problems it has lasted this long because no one within the system is capable of changing it >> host: there are potential forces for change when you talk

about market position, impression flow. post to touch her and, but we're obviously not to the place where there is an organized opposition . helen d. think it will take for us to see the evolution of politics in north korea to apply or its possible. >> it's a good question. as political scientists we're supposed to deal determine when these things happen, when you reach a critical to pinpoint, but i don't think we can. i don't think we can say with any degree of accuracy with the tipping point in terms of one society is ready to act of and follow the rules of the current political system. in the case of north korea, as you say, in the book and talk a lot about the element that i

think is new and this picture which is a growing market in the country really starting from the famine of the 1990's in which people basically had to sell whenever they could find for food. that was the start of a market in the system that never really had markets before and has been going on now for 15 years. we can say is there is this element that has created more of an independence of mind by the people and not being solely reliant on handouts from the government. when exactly double b to point where the system will tell, you know, it's very hard to say you want the state of adapting to changes? >> guest: part of the way there are adapting is trying to crack down on the unofficial markets. there have been efforts at

reform, what you might call reform and north korea, the economic cooperation projects with the influence south korea. these have largely been aimed at putting hard currency in to help regime, not so much to create real market reform. i think what we're seeing now, if we do see efforts at economic gate with the outside world, the north korean leaders to do it is because they seek hard currency, not because they are seeking necessarily to create a better life for the people. >> host: in what ways do you think pockets a protest could emerge or do you think it will be a case where the thing that happens is just going to be stamped out? do you see any possibility for tolerance?

>> well, right now it's hard to imagine that. the question as to whether you can, in know, at what point wednesday it it toleration of dissent or the emergence of dissent, we can't predict that, but with the can do is point to certain preconditions that exist that can lead to that. i think certainly the market mentality is one of these things you know, it's very hard to say. at least there is not a lot of evidence that this regime is tolerant of any sort of dissent. they're is not a lot of evidence that they have tried to listen to what the content of whenever protest has taken place in north korea. of course it goes without saying that this is a country that it is very hard to get any information on-happening inside the country. when we talk about dissent we

hear stories of things that might have happened in this military unit on that city, but we really don't know. it's such a hermetically sealed country. in a think when the day comes when it opens up or however it opens up, if it collapses and you see unification, we will learn a lot about what sort of political dissent existed within the country. it's very hard to find that today. >> host: deasy the regime has really rigid and therefore more likely to crack or do you think that it is flexible in the sense that it has modeled her now despite a credible global changes? how should we evaluate the character of the regime in order to have a sense of what might come later on?

>> guest: i think if you oppose that spectrum it's more on the brutal and of the spectrum, a regime that would crack rather than one that has been valuable the reason it has been able to muddle through is because the second factor that we talked about at the outset of the conversation. it has managed not because of anything internal, but because of what is happening outside and that is this dynamic where no one really want to put in the effort to change it or solve the problem. there's one country in particular the ones to ensure there are no big changes or unstable occurrences within the country. >> host: i guess that's the second part of your observation about the north korea as an impossible state, no one cares to risk the cost of changing it. really that is quite striking when we look at the history,

especially of health and human rights concerns of motivated desires for international intervention in the other parts of the world, rwanda, co-ceo, bosnia. yet somehow north korea has not been subject to that same international activism despite the talk that arguably the human rights conditions are just as bad certainly for large portions of the population. how is it that this is the case? what makes taqueria indian to that sort of focus? >> guest: well, we say international community. we have to be clear. the developed west. there are certain issues that the developed west has taken up in terms of human-rights.

you mentioned some of them. very clearly taken up causes. there are others, sudan, tibet, others that have been taken up to a great extent by the international community. north korea hedges not been an issue. for two reasons. the first is through very successful efforts by the north korean a regime to insure this remains a nameless and faceless policy issue and not a personal story, a personification of the story that the average american will somehow be influenced by or take up the cost for. many of the north koreans to defect through the border with china are sent back by the chinese on buses so that there is nobody that can associate in name or face with this terrible human rights situation in north

korea. by example, south. during its military dictatorship had this person who eventually won the nobel peace prize who became lionized as a voice, as a face for democratic activism. so you have these personalities that can be identified with the problem. at the north koreans have been very good about not allowing that to happen and the chinese have been complex of. that's one of the reasons why. the other is that it just hasn't captured the imagination of some major personality in the west. and know this may sound a bit can be, but practically is true

with somebody like richard gere takes up to bed or chinese policies and are for , this gives a residence to the issue that you would not normally see in the case of north korea we really haven't had that. we have not had an individual the test at. i think one of the things you're seeing more of and the stories of this, americans are learning more about the stories of some of these defectors. there have been several books written recently about defectors and left, managed to escape telling of stories. that certainly helps, but compared to other cases we just don't see the same sort of residents. >> host: another distinctive feature of north korea that

could have an impact on the human rights observations but international community, north korea has been on the strive to become a nuclear weapons state. that's interesting look at a rock. you were in the bush of ministration for part of the time that this issue is planning a. it turns out that we decided to attack and overthrow saddam hussein. he did not have nuclear weapons. the north koreans arguably have just as oppressive regime, but we decided not to pursue the action. heady see the difference between the two? >> guest: it's a tough question to answer without recounting the whole history of why the bush of ministration went into iraq. that was not my area of

responsibility, so i'm not really capable of commenting on that. in the case of north korea, there are two issues. why iraq -- not why iraq instead of but career, but if in iraq then why not also in north korea? the two answers. first a year after ana. so china sits right on the border. the last thing the united states or china wants is some sort of confrontation or conflagration that would somehow cause it to but heads as they did in 1953. i think any time there is serious about given to some sort of military action, this is constantly at the top, not even top, but halfway up the escalation ladder this is constantly a concern that every

u.s. president has had to think about seriously. so i think that's certainly one of the reasons. the other is that the united states went into it iraq or afghanistan because it became the top foreign policy issue on which the demonstration saw a revolution. we can debate whether that was the right or wrong thing. many americans think it was the wrong thing. many think that nothing was resolved. that's a completely different question. i think the point for korea, i don't really think that the north korean issue has arisen to that level of priority for an administration. it has been a crisis that you want to solve at least in the sense of preventing it from becoming a bigger crisis to diplomacy, but the united states

is directly when it has sought to solve a problem it has been willing to use both force and diplomacy to try to solve the problem. in the case of north korea that is just -- it is just not registering like that. we have had crises with north korea with success of the ministrations, and every demonstration has made the same calculation. i we willing to go all-out to the end to solve this or do we want a solution freeze it, cap d then move on to the other issues that most concerns whether it's the domestic economic situation or iraq or afghanistan are syria or the middle east peace process. these tend to be the more important issues traditionally. >> host: the other issue that makes iraq different from north korea is the u.s. correa alliance.

how do you see the dynamics of the alliance playing into our ability to address the top concerns that the u.s. has related to the north korean nuclear program? >> guest: undeniably will we look at the situation south korea is certainly more import. south korea is a key ally for the united states today, a major partner in a lot of international initiatives around the world. a big trading partner, all these sorts of things make south korea extremely important in terms of its position in asia. there has always been a tension in u.s. south korean relationship when it comes to north korea because we have different governments and democracy in south korea, some of which tend to be more progressive, more engagement and the tend to be more conservative

watcher willing to follow a tougher path. and so for the united states is a question of sinking up with whichever government is there at the time as they deal with the latest order increases. for example, when i was in government during the bush of ministration we have oppressive government in south korea that was really quite engaged in oriented with north korea. a good deal of bad not korean behavior in order to fulfil its vision of trying to seek long-term reconciliation with the country in the north. the bush administration was not as enamored with the particular strategy. i think currently you have an obama administration and the conservative government in south korea that tends to the very much in the same page and it comes to north korea because both of them after having been burned by north korean really

aliment to hold tight and require that the north meet certain preconditions before we have another round of diplomacy. analysts said that 75 percent of our north korean policy is our south korea policy. in the sense that we need to stay in synch up with our allies and japan also whenever rid dealing with the north korean problem. >> host: and other aspects of the book about president bush personal interest in the situation. you mentioned a major influence. of course he had the author of that book in the white house and head of the refugees and the white house, the appearance of the japanese ability.

and so he took that approach, but actually my impression was that the human rights on four that was appointed really was not a major part of the picture in terms of the policy. now we have the obama administration. we have not seen any graffiti in the oval office the we have seen the human rights envoy then went to north korea to my talk with north koreans, raised human-rights even though that was probably a relatively short conversation. with the ec as the merits and demerits of each of those approaches? >> guest: at think it's great that the obama administration has been able to make a trip to north korea, two trips are more. i think that's great.

the more we can open a dialogue on these sorts of issues the better. admittedly part of what he was doing was to try to negotiate a humanitarian assistance package in terms of food more than it was to talk about human rights abuses. the fact that he was there i think is very important. the dialogue with the north koreans on human rights this kind of ridiculous. you can tell them you need to improve your human rights situation, and their response will be -- and we have had this conversation. their response will be, well, you, the united states, have human rights problems to. that is not a comparable position. so i think what president bush wants to do was he wanted to make this an issue that people knew about. he wanted to, as he put it, do

something. he wanted his presidency by a time in that the oval office, do something that could help to immeasurably improved the lives of both. people. so there are two things. the first was that he helped to create the first defector resettlement program for north korean refugees. none had existed prior to this. of course their is a big program in south korea, and that would be to an extent expected. for another country outside of south korea to say, we're going to take north korean defectors who want to settle in the united states was a big step. the administration did not try to too tough on publicly, but it was a very big and important stuff that set an example and put a marker in the ground.

the united states is not just talking about human rights improvements, it's trying to do something. the second thing, as you mentioned, he brought attention to the issue by bringing in defectors, people whose books he read, stories he's known and it to the details about all of these folks and talk to them about the situation and then give a press statement saying he met with these people and wanted to see the human rights situation improve. again, giving names and faces to this sort of problem helped to give it a broader residents. in the book i go through some of the experiences of when these defectors came into the oval office, walking them and, watching them respond, watching president bush respond . truly memorable experiences. and so in the end i think these

things i obviously did not solve the human rights problem in north korea. they're not opening up the prison camps, not allowing the u.n. commissioner for refugees into the country. but when you're limited in terms of what you can do, everybody respects sovereignty, so you're not going to go crashing into the country. very tangible and concrete steps that tried to put this on the raiders' cream and create more international attention. that is -- creating that sort of knowledge base and that sort of advocacy environment is the first step to try to address the problem but this. >> host: of the book also i guess goes through and illustrates some of the wrong decisions that north korea made in terms of trying to build its own economy. this is quite striking because

as you know, north korea was the more powerful economic part of the peninsula for a long time until a 70's. and you also talk a little bit about the illicit activities. this was also an area of focus during the bush of ministration to of we don't really hear that much about these days. i'm wondering, do you think that these activities are continuing? and reid succeeding in squeezing north korea in terms of customers ? do we see activity by north korea in terms of trying to counterfeit cigarettes were u.s. money or sell drugs abroad? >> this is sort of a fascinating story. the notion that here's a country is basically one-third of the economy is based on an illicit activity. as you mentioned, counterfeiting

trucks, cigarettes, the u.s. currency. the north korean counterfeit the u.s. $100 bill. it is known in the profession as the super node because the north koreans managed somehow to acquire the printing press, the ink and paper that is used for the production of $100 bills. the difference is that the printing plates they managed to acquire a brand new, where is the one the u.s. treasury uses are fairly old. as of the imperfections that you see in the treasury note you don't see in the north korean no that's why it's called the super node. this is a part of the economy. so during the bush administration efforts were taken to try to stop this through a series of sanctions that were aimed at trying to

target the accounts of companies that were known to be involved in illicit activities. i think the reason we don't hear more about it today is because these activities have been for the successful and that the north koreans probably can not feel that they can do the same sort of things they used to do when it comes to making money through this sort of activity. >> host: okay. so it is actually that the international community and the u.s. are getting better at eliminating those markets for those kinds of activities? >> guest: i think so. that's why we aren't hearing much more about it today. i also think that for many in the financial industry, they have just become much more wary of handling north korean accounts and money. said that has also caused north

korea itself to think about whether there what to be seen as being financially liable asset that every bank regulator and president doesn't want to see in the institution. >> host: one of the other cases related to that the you had direct experience with was the bank until to asia situation with the u.s. treasury issued an advisory about that bank and the possibility that it was engaging in money laundering or handling some of these counterfeit notes. how easy -- and of course that occurred at a point in time when it looked like there would be some progress in negotiations and then everything stalled out. how did you see -- do you think that was the case? installed the diplomacy.

as we look today at more cephalon launches, possibly a third of the test by north korea , as seems like a lot people are calling for re-examination of the financial area. is being replicable? and did it work in is a replica will? >> the first thing i would point out is the irony in the description you just gave which is on the one hand with the u.s. government pursued this financial sanction in 2005-6 it was widely criticized as something that was both an effective and hurting the diplomacy. yet today, as you said, there are people clamoring for it as a way to sanction north korea because they see it as a powerful tool in terms of trying

to influence mockery in day care . in 2005 this particular action was the treasury department advisory. u.s. financial aestheticians should be aware of doing business with a particular bank in macau because accounts in it related to north korea were believed to be involved in money-laundering. this in the end was a law enforcement action. it was something the u.s. government had to do. if a country is counterfeiting your currency, that is technically an act of war. they were obligated to take action with regard to the protection of the u.s. financial ostentations. as many people who follow this know, the effect of that -- its have a ripple effect. a very small bank in china that can cost every other bank regulator and president and the

angeles station around the world to say, wait a second, if the u.s. is not dealing with this bank because they are concerned about north korean accounts, maybe we should look at the north korean accounts and non-bank. you had this major ripple effect that had a real impact on north korea. now, was this meant as an action to submarine the diplomacy that was taking place? i really don't think so. it was a law enforcement action, something that happened on a parallel track. all of us who are participating were also participating in the decisionmaking process. so in the and it was something had to be done , and it did cause a delay in the negotiations, but as we saw later they eventually came back on line.

it led to a two very important agreements, one of which pros of the north korean nuclear program and the second of which led to the dismantlement of important pieces of the nuclear program such that it's pretty safe to say today that the plutonium program, the plutonium based nuclear program is no longer functional. i think that was one of the account since of the united states in terms of diplomacy when it came to stopping the north korean nuclear program. we have all been, as you know, program or programs, not just the plutonium but iranian. -- uranium. in terms of the accomplishments that were made through these new sanctions, at the time these new

sanctions were quite effective in getting north korea to give up at least pieces of the program. >> host: to you think it's replicable today or at that time passed? >> guest: it's a hard question to answer. i'm obviously not as close to it as i have been. i don't know if the north koreans have adjusted. & and a half -- i presume they have. i think on the one hand they are probably adjusting and trying to find work around so they're not subject to the same sort of sanctions. on the other hand, the united states pursued this it was an advisory to u.s. financial institutions. it wasn't something supported by the u.n. on the other hand, today after the first nuclear test against the obama administration in may,

you know have the security council resolutions that give authority for pursuing peace with the financial sanctions. on the one hand the north koreans probably try hard to find work around so that they can avoid being subject to the same sort of sanctions. and the other hand, the united states now has the international authority to pursue these things in a way that they did not and the bush administration. >> host: one of the question. you talked about the resumption of diplomacy, but as part of that we get back the money that was being held under the law enforcement action that had occurred. i'm sure the north koreans probably looked at that as an exoneration. al de the fact that the north koreans get their money back >> the main lesson that they

learned. and it's evident in the fact that we don't hear much about these sorts of activities, the main lesson they learned from that whole episode was, they can't continue to do business this way. they can't continue to counterfeit other countries' currencies are so fake drugs or fake cigarettes. they just can't do that anymore. i think there was the main lesson. the fact that they came back to diplomacy and negotiations in earnest, to freeze programs in dismantle them to me was a function of -- was a function of this sort of course of diplomacy it was the concern about the financial reputation and everything that came with that that brought them back to the table and that led them to make these agreements. they certainly got things in return.

the get energy assistance, a new set of political discussions , of rye 80 of assistance from south korea. that is the nature of diplomacy, but the driving force behind it -- another some who would disagree with this. the driving force behind that with these sanctions. >> host: and of course there's still a driving force for nuclear status even despite the apparent agreements that have been made or designed to deal with plutonium. let me go back and asked about north korean prospects for reform. still cash hungry. maybe we don't see any immediate evidence that the leaders are committed to reform. of course the chinese are always they're suggesting that the

north koreans should follow their path. what really is the way to cultivate an environment where north korea can move in a reform direction? it's so obvious that they're looking for cash. is there a way of drawing to fund drawing them into a positive path rather in pursuing the negative activity? >> the positive path that has been on the table really for success -- successive administrations, always discussions about the extent to which the current administration differs from the bush a ministration, the obama administration in terms of how they deal with north korea, but i go through the history. in the end, it may have been different, but they're is a positive path. in return for giving up their

nuclear program the united states and the international community would provide security guarantees, economic assistance, energy assistance, political normalization, money, a regional security environment in which north korea could feel safe and secure. all these sorts of things in return for giving out there nuclear-weapons that has not worked. it has failed. it has failed for every administration going back to george h. w. bush. acting with the obama administration we have really reached the end of the road. many would argue that the obama administration at least in terms of its initial intentions was probably the most forward leaning u.s. and ministration to come into office. it is now in a position in distinguishable from the hard

line that the bush administration took. said that's the positive path, and they don't seem to want to take it what can be done in the interim, the most important thing is to try to get more information. more information in terms of what's going on in the outside world, market position, the internet, cell phones. this is the only way to really make inroads into seeing any change in the country. from the perspective of, economic reform is a double-edged sword. on the one hand they need economic reform, money, food. on the other hand when regimes like this opened up it releases all sorts of political forces

that inevitably lead to a loss of political control and even possibly the collapse of the machine. that's not a bargain that particularly these new leaders, inexperienced and just come and power and prizes political control, that the last thing they really want to consider. on not optimistic on the prospects for reform >> host: the way you friend it is very much a u.s. way of framing basically it deal which the clear assurance result in exchange for a foreign path. the chinese, i think, may have a different idea about what would be necessary that is not about quid pro quo but the question of essentially you follow us and you can find a sustainable path. i think that basically the argument. the question i have is based on

what we have seen in china. north korea hasn't necessarily seem to be willing to dip its toe in the water, what would a north korean dam shopping with like if we began to see leaders moving in that direction? and could that succeed? >> guest: well, you know, i have many friends who or scholars. when i talk to those friends there always optimistic about the prospects for north korea. i never understood why. when you ask them they say it's very clear because they steady china and have seen china come from where it came in the cultural revolution to being a country mike yesterday. and they think if a big country like china can do that, certain

of. can. they're too big differences. the first is that china had a leader. he was a charismatic leader, larger-than-life figure. there is an inexperienced 29 year-old who is running the country now. that is the first problem. the second problem, the chinese said to get rich is glorious. making money was okay. even if it meant giving up a degree of political control. for the current north korean leaders for the foreseeable future there is nothing more important right now the political control. that looks to be the case for the last leader and the current. i think there are hopes that

this young fellow who spent part of his life in switzerland, that people are hopeful but he might be. again, given the recent crisis and the missile test and the failed deal with the obama administration tried to reach, don't think there's a lot of hope right now that he shows signs of being a future. maybe it is a military generals somewhere that is unhappy with the current situation, and happy with the yen leaders making bad decisions and has a different view on things. maybe there is one in north korea, but we don't know. right now the prospects don't look very good for that sort of reform or that sort of charismatic leader. >> host: some people would

point to the uncle of kim jong-un as one possible reformer certainly he has had some international experience. it's hard to judge necessarily whether he moves in the direction of reform, but said then somebody emerged to play of will up within the same system, how do you think that the u.s. command would be able to respond to that? >> guest: well, i think they would welcome somebody like that the obvious problem -- i mean, first, the u.s. government would welcome someone like that. someone like a senior figure who was interested in reform and taking the north. to a better place. if there was someone like the general lee see in burma today

that are looking to make a big turn in terms of their own system in the way we deal with it, i think the united states the workout that. the 800-pound a gorilla and the room still remains the nuclear issue. when it comes to its core us where they're really differ. for the chinese they certainly want reform or want to promote reform, but they also want to say in order to try to promote reform we should do things like and the korean war and normalize relations with the united states and the prk as pre steps to try to promote reform . the problem for the united states is that that is just not possible. every administration going back to george h. w. bush has made pretty clear that the number one

priority is the nuclear program. the united states welcomes reform, absolutely, but it must come with the nuclear station. i don't think any of our allies would be able to normalize relations with the country that remains unclear weapons state, completely outside of the regime . it would basically destroyed the non-proliferation treaty regime and would have a dramatic effect on our alliances in the region. this is the rule excuse and is very difficult to match up and has been the basic problem every time we talk about a big deal, getting a big deal with taqueria >> host: i want to ask you about that. he's been a lot of time talking about issues related to deterrent.

a lot of people thought that if north korea conducted a nuclear test that would constitute a paradigm shift. you were there for the first one. was there something about the chinese reaction that surprise to? how did you see their response to that plan now and how did the response that you were involved with and the bush administration, and you know, what should we draw from that in the context of a possible additional nuclear test by north korea in the coming weeks? >> guest: in the short term it was a game changer in the sense that we moved it to a new level of international unity and terms of punishing the north for the sorts of actions.

in the sense that we had you and security council resolutions for the first time in which china and russia were signing on to these and unanimously condemning north korea for their actions. in the short term that was a game changer. since then every time the north koreans have done something egregious, for the most part the chinese and russians have gone along, certainly when it comes to nuclear test. in the longer term, in retrospect, that was about the only real change. it didn't create this sort of came change in mentality in the way that chinese dealt. i think it was a lot of debate as to whether they should simply dropped this ally, drop this legacy of the cold war and really helped to end this regime that clearly did not happen. if anything the attorneys have

drawn closer and the past few years. economically in terms of political is supporting the new leaders. in the and it did not create a major change the people fought and would. again, part of it is the fact that the status quo bias in terms of dealing with the north korean crisis is to try to just bring it back down, to try to lower the temperature. it's not to try to solve the problem. that is a political choice that administrations in washington, tokyo, beijing, and moscow, these are choices that make it is in the end at least for now, stability equates to peace and prosperity. status quo equates to peace and prosperity. to people want that but did they want to go down this very violent path

, a potentially very violent path we try to solve the problem. it is very clear. they want to maintain the status quo. >> host: and that many brings us to the question of reunification. there is a big gap between the u.s. vision and a chinese version and it involves what south koreans want in the future my impression was that you were pretty bullish about the prospects for achieving unification. you also dealt to some degree with some of the challenges that would emerge. at this point how likely do you think it is that correa will actually be able to achieve unification? how do you see that process playing out and turns of -- basically a context where the chinese influence continues to rise?

>> guest: your question is right. i don't think the united states and south korea and china on the other and have the same view. the united states has said explicitly in joint statements of the past two presidents with the south korean counterpart that the u.s. aspiration is for a single career at peace. that is the natural order of things and the international relations, unified korean peninsula. the chinese don't want to see unification. it just don't, and i think that has become clearer and clearer in the past couple of years. there really is a conflict of interest between the two sides when it comes to that. >> host: in terms of the future in unification, it's impossible to say how would happen to us like no one could predict how german

unification would happen, but we can focus on is the question of whether countries in the region are ready and willing to take on the task of unification. ten years ago that wasn't the case. the general consensus was unification is too difficult, much harder than the two germanys, too dangerous, and should be something pushed off as far as you can into the future, to which remunerations, basically not my problem no one wanted to be a problem. as i talk about and the boat, the attitude and that is slowly changing , in part because the weapons situation with both. is getting worse and worse. the human rights situation is getting wars. while no one wants to try to push north korea over the edge, their is a growing feeling that it is coming.

i think you're seeing that change of attitude. you're even seeing it in places like japan with the north korean threat is the biggest existential threat. while on the one hand japanese are always concerned about reunifying resurgent nationalism . they see the current situation as being quite dangerous and potentially very unstable. their attitude changing on this. so i think -- will look and talk about things we need to watch because no one can predict unification. no one can say exactly when it will happen, but the question is are you prepared for it. that is the operative question for the societies and governments in the region. before no one wanted to think or talk about it and all. a much more openness and willingness.

>> host: i also want to ask you, just to close, your recipes and the new york times and says north korea as we know it is over. so far we have seen a fair amount of. i guess the question is, how adorable -- how durable is the impossible state? >> it all depends on how you define north korea . north korea as we know it is over in the sense that as i talked about in the book, we're entering a new phase where you have a young and untested leader with an immense challenges in terms of maintaining his own position. also dealing with a crumbling economy and an acute food problem.

at the same time, the society is increasingly influenced by market mentality, like it was not the last time you have the transition. in that sense north korea today is now like north korea of the past. sure, it has not collapsed or changed since the death of kim jong-il, but, you know, we're only talking a few months. this new regime has always been in power for a few months. in the broader scope of history there have been buried -- many transitional regime's that lasted years before something major has happened. i think the verdict is still out i don't think we can simply assume everything will go smoothly and that there will be able to muddle through forever. prattle to the death of kim jong-il if you

ask any expert, including you, what would be the most important variable that can create major change, i think everyone would have agreed, the sudden death of the north korean leader. we have to respect what we thought before. i think we all have to watch very carefully what is going to happen. i think the future of this regime is not an all certain. the ramifications if something happens will be huge for the united states and for others in the region in a way that won't matter for the average american. that's why i wanted to write this book. >> host: thanks. i think we have a very good conversation and appreciate the chance to further explore some of the issues in the book. >> guest: thanks very much.