is it getting better, is it getting worse, who's responsible? and that's not as quantifiable as saying the unemployment -- >> this past week, the national journal focused on the 2012 presidential election. watch the discussions online at the c-span video library. >> now, a commencement address by google executive chairman eric schmidt. he spoke last month at the university of california at berkeley which he attended and earned both a master's degree and ph.d. in computer engineering. he told graduates why they're a part of the so-called high-tech generation and how innovation and entrepreneurship are being used to help solve some of the world's problems. he speaks for about 15 minutes. [applause] >> thank you, edward, and the best thing about greeting probably approximately half of the class is the woman who came

in on her phone saying, mom, i've got to go, i've got to go now. [laughter] this is the new cal graduate, always talking to her mother. now, it's great to be back here on campus, it's an honor to have been invited, and it's an honor to hold a degree from berkeley. and it's an honor to look out on this next generation of golden bears. now, when you return to a place of intense memories, you think it's a place that's changed so much. but in truth, you're the one who has changed more. your memories will be vivid, things will look a little different, but you will feel very much the same. when you return to berkeley, you will have changed, and in turn you will have changed the world. now, before i begin, i want to remind you tomorrow is mother's day, right? so for all the mothers out there, and the graduates might

be the stars today, but just know that they would not shine as brightly if you were not here. and i say to all you graduates, if you first don't succeed, do it like your mom told you to do it. [laughter] and that may be the most important advice i could give you today. so time is money, most of all, time is dreams and computers give you time for dreams. i walked across the stage in 1982 for my ph.d., and that year the computer was "time" magazine's person of the year. that quote is from that article. computers were just entering the mainstream, big, blocky contraptions lugged into houses and plunged down on desks. most of america had no idea the power of those machines. but most americans started to find they suddenly had more time for dreams. even their wildest dreams, though, there's no way that 30

years ago, later, that children, grandchildren would carry something exponentially more powerful with them everywhere they go, on their laps, on their pockets, digital ekgs formed throughout millions of people around the world tethered together at all times to form a worldwide community. computers, obviously, gave me time to dream too. when i was like you, going to the greek theater and stanford games, it felt like a new world was being imagined right here on campus in all the different has beens, workshops and dorms. there was something in the air that made you think, something that made you dream, and today i feel that again being here with you. just the other day i saw a video of a berkeley student who'd totally automated his dorm room, his lights, his refrigerator, his television and everything powered from his mobile device. [laughter] now, the romantic mode mirror was a particularly nice touch, i thought. [laughter] showing we berkeley creativity.

but this is just one small scale example, obviously, but the energy here is similar to the energy that i felt 30 years ago and 30 years before that, i suspect, and before that going back generations. that's what's so special about berkeley. a place committed to personal liberty and free expression, a place where humanism and science can still exist, and they can feed off each other in service of a better day. and as the chancellor said, 22 nobel laureates, olympic gold medalist, a secretary of defense, writers, artists, business pioneers, oscar winners, even the reigning nfl mvp. they all roamed, right? this is pretty exciting. they left to make their mark on society, on culture and on the world. and now you follow them. yes, you. sitting right there, baking in the sun after two hours -- [laughter] possibly nursing a hangover. don't tell your parents, right? [cheers and applause]

don't tell your parents. my god, that's a lot of pressure. what can i do? okay? well, what can i dream? well, that's your question to answer. i can't do it for you. but here's what i know. i know one thing is for certain, no graduating class gets to choose the world that they graduate into. just like you don't get to choose your parents and your siblings. every class has its own unique challenges. every class enters a history that up to this point is being written for it. this is no different. what is different, though, is the chance each generation has to make that history and write it larger, or in my business, to program it better. and on that score, your generation's opportunities are greater than any generations in modern history. you could actually write the code for all of us as a society. you're connected to each other in ways those who came before you can only dream of. and you're using those connections to strengthen the

invisible ties that hold humanity together and to allow us to sort of deepen our understanding of the world around us. you are the emblems of the sense of possibility that will define our new age. now, in the past it's always older generations standing up on high, trying to teach the next generation the ways of the world, trying to make sure that they follow in their footsteps. well, graduates, i'll admit, i think it's different today. you're quite simply teaching us. interesting. this generation, your generation s the first fully-connected generation the world has ever known. what's the first thing you do when you get up? check your phone? your laptop? read some e-mails? comb through your social networks? update your status? i'm awake. [laughter] right? as opposed to i'm not awake. [laughter] if you are awake, you are online. you are connected.

some of you are probably texting to your friends right now, tweeting this speech be, changing your status, smile, you're on camera, right? welcome to our new world. there's a joke about a college kid being mugged who says, hold on, stop, let me update my status letting my friends know that i'm getting mugged, and then you can have my phone. [laughter] and i suspect that if somebody from berkeley would actually have the chutzpah to do that. now, this is obviously a joke, but it's also telling. it's a depiction of how essential our technology has become to your generation's ability and and your ability to connect with them. now, identity and connection concepts are as old as humanity itself, defined -- they define so much of who we are now. they shape our times, they define the human condition. identity and connection, it's your task to make those time-worn concepts, spin them around, reimagine them, make them fresh and think and exciting. -- and new and exciting. berkeley helps build the

platform that you have based that on. they built it for all of us. now, i know it's daunting. i know it's not a great economy to be walking off the stage into. i know all of this. but i also know that you have advantages. you have a competitive edge. you have an innate mastery of technology. you have an ability to build and foster connections that no generation before you has ever possessed. people bemoan a generation who grew up living life in front of screens, always connected to something or someone. those people are wrong. they're absolutely wrong. the fact is that we're all connected now, it's a blessing, not a curse. and we can solve many problems in the world as a result of this. it's not only an advantage that you have, it's a responsibility that you carry. i mean, today there are 54 wars and conflicts raging around the world, one and a half billion people live onless than a dollar a day, hundreds of millions of children go to bed hungry

tonight. we need to fix that. you know, half the world's people don't live under democratic governments and rights we all enjoy are a rarity, not a norm. i'm proud to be an american. and when it comes to the internet, we think everyone is online, but only one billion people have smartphones, and only two billion have access to the web. for most of the world, internet cafés are like digital oases in technological deserts. but in this century there is a chance for change on this horizon. the spread of mobile phones, the new forms of connectivity offer us the prospect of connecting every community in this our lifetime. when that happens, connectivity can revolutionize every aspect of society politically, socially, economically. to connect the world is to free the world, i say, and so if we get this right so we can fix all the other problems at the same time. and again, no pressure on our graduates today.

it's true, we have all the knowledge literally at our finger trips, but just because we know much more than we used to doesn't mean that our problems go away. the future doesn't just happen, it's not etched or written or coded anywhere. there's no algorithm or form ha that says technology will do x or y is sure to happen. technology doesn't work on its own, but it's a tool, and you are the ones to harness that power, and that requires innovation and entrepreneurship. innovation is disruptive. one thing i'll tell you, you know you're innovating when people are worried about you. graduates, make people worry. try something new. entrepreneurship is the life blood of a new economy, the engine that keeps communities growing. two-thirds of the jobs created are in small businesses, and you all should now try to create a small business or join one or be part of one and, of course, i would recommend you use all of google's products to help set

that up. [laughter] in any case, you all have a chance to have an original contribution. don't just be a shepherd following somebody else's vision. new models, new forms of thinking. that's what we need now. you don't need to be from an aid worker or a teacher, although i obviously applaud those. you don't need to be an ec near, although -- engineer, although i obviously support that too. everyone here can create new standards of brilliance and innovation. and those standards can spread and scale in ways that are unimaginable. the collective intelligence of our society, our version of the borg, the you will, is really quite different. think of it as a new society with mostly american norms and values that crosses continents and countries and unites all of us. the distinctive feature of our new world is that you can be unique while you're also being completely connected. that's what's so different. and that, to me, more than anything else is the american

dream. now, don't get me wrong, i believe fully this the power of technology to change the world for the better, and i believe even more fully in the ability of your generation to use that power to great effect, to rule technology. but you can't let technology rule you. remember to take at least one hour -- and i know this is going to be very, very hard -- and turn off your device. one hour. shut it down. learn where the off button is. in my case, the android phone, it's right here. [laughter] take your eyes off the screen and look into the eyes of a person that you love. have a conversation -- [applause] a real conversation. not a texting -- actually talk to them. i know this is a new skill -- [laughter] okay? talk. speak and look. with friends who make you think and to family who make you

laugh. engage with the world around you. feel and taste the smell and hug what's there right in front of you and not what's a click away. experience it as a human. and and then turn the machine right back on, of course. [laughter] but life, the point i'm trying to make here is that life is not live inside the glow of a monitor. life is not a series of status updates. life about who you love, how you live, who you travel with through the world, your family, your collaborators, your friends. life is a social experience first. the best acts of experience are not lonely ones, they're spent in the company of others. our landscape has changed, yes, but our humanity has always and will remain what makes us who we are. and who you are is a proud and talented group of golden bears. at berkeley you've come to know extraordinary people. look around, take a minute. think about this group, your closest friends, the experiences that you've had.

a few years ago you started off on the road to adventure with these people knowing them as boys and girls wabledderring around -- wanterring around campus dazed and overwhelmed. now you're extraordinary men and women in total control of your destiny, ready to make your own mark not on history, but on the future. and that's what's so interesting. now, it may have seemed so difficult along the road, an impossible slog. i remember that. but today you have made it, and the friendships that you've forged here when the times were good and the times were bad and so forth, when you realized you just overslept your lecture -- which i'm sure all of you did at least once -- those are the friendships that will matter for life. the people you have met at berkeley will be some of the strongest friends and closest allies you meet in your lives. it's been that way, certainly, for me. when you leave here, don't leave them behind. stay close and stay strong. take them with you, and go and change the world together. i ask of you, find a way to say

yes to things. say yes to invitations to a new country. say yes to meet new friends. to learning a new language. picking up a new sport. yes is how you get your first job and how you get your next job. yes is how you find your spouse and even your kids. and even if it's a bit edgy, a bit out of your comfort zone, saying yes means that you will do something new, meet someone new and make a difference in your life and likely others as well. yes lets you stand out in a crowd, to be an optimist, to stay positive, to be the one everyone comes to for help, for advice or just for fun. yes is what keeps us all young. yes is a very tiny word, yet it allows you to do very, very big things. say it often. don't be afraid to fail, and do not be afraid to succeed. for those of you who are

thinking too big, be smart enough not to listen. for those of you who say the odds are too small, be dumb enough to give it a shot. for those of you who can ask, how can you do that? look at them in the eyes and say, i will find a way. i, for one, am happy to have you join us as adults, and the quicker we can have you lead, the better. time to throw out all those aging baby boomers and replace those with the best equipped to lead in the new age. [cheers and applause] march us off to a better day. now, that "time" article that i was telling you about was called "a new day begins." that day has long since faded into dusk. we need a new day to dawn now today. the power and possibility, the intellectual energy, the human electricity seated in this stadium, the sum of all of the people, the families, the mothers, the fathers, the siblings, the graduates and all of the faculty not just here, but in stadiums around the country, your generation will

break a new day. your vast knowledge, things that were inconceivable to me when i was here, will see the new era. your bold ideas will shape a new reality. your agile minds will inspire a new dawn as i see it. you've got this thing in your pocket. with all this power. exponentially more than in 1982. you have time to dream, so i ask you, class of 2012, what are you going to dream for all of us to enjoy? thank you so much. you have my greatest congratulations and thank you. [cheers and applause] >> thank you. >> the ftc is primarily an enforcement agency, and it's brought many, many good cases in the consumer privacy area and has reached settlements with a lot of companies, google,

facebook, about some of the privacy promises that they made to consumers. i think -- >> i think self-regulation is a tool that can be much more, um, responsive to changes in the marketplace in a quicker way than regulation or certainly than passing laws can be. >> tonight, a look at the federal trade commission's enforcement role in dealing with privacy on the internet with republican commissioner maureen ole hawz season and democrat julie brill. "the communicators" at 8 eastern on c-span2. >> now, another commencement address. xerox chairman and ceo ursula burns. she began working at the company in 1980 as a summer intern and is now its ceo. last month she addressed the graduating class of xavier university in new orleans. she talked about her life growing up in new york city housing projects and her rise to become the first african-american woman to head a fortune 500 company.

she speaks for about 15 minutes. >> president francis, distinguished faculty, alumni, students, graduates, family and friends and my two fellow doctors, thank you, i'm so proud to be with you today, and i'm so proud to be a part of your vibrant community if it's only for, even only for a day. you are unique in all of american higher education. there are more than 250 catholic colleges in our nation. there are more than 100 historically-black colleges in the our nation, but there is only one college that is both black and catholic, and that's the gold rush and the gold nuggets of xavier. [cheers and applause] what a special tradition.

it's hard for me to be here without reflecting a little bit on my graduation in 1980. it was a dream come true for me and for my family. i grew up in a single-parent household on the lower east side of manhattan. my mother's highest income in any year, her highest income, was $4,400. yet she managed to send me and my brother and my sister to private be catholic schools from kindergarten all the way through to high school. i didn't fully appreciate it then -- [applause] but it was a gift of immeasurable value. that was followed by a scholarship to a polytechnic institute of new york, now nyu poly, and on to a master's degree in mechanical engineering at columbia university. my mother saw education as a way up and out of the projects. she made whatever sacrifices were necessary to see to it that we had an opportunity to a good education, and then she insisted

that we take advantage of that opportunity. all of the graduates here today have that same opportunity. don't even, don't take it for granted. don't take it for granted. all of you will have immense challenges. you will immerse yourself in a world full of opportunities. i've given some thought about what my advice to you would be today, especially since i have you, and you must listen to me, and i've boiled it down to five things, so here they go. first, i would encourage all of you to follow the example of xavier and embrace change and learning willingly and with a sense of excitement and and wonder. the university is approaching its centennial anniversary. think about that. almost 100 years. it has survived and excelled and reinvented itself for nearly 100 years because this has evolved, and it has changed. the only thing that i can predict with any certainty is

that change will be a constant in your lives as well. back in 1980 when i sat in the seats that you're sitting in today, there were no cell phones. imagine this. there were no cell phones, the internet -- let alone the ipad -- was not even the stuff of dreams, the fax machine was considered close to a miracle, chinese capitalism and the fall of the soviet union were unimaginable, genetics was in its infancy, the word "terror i'm" -- which is what we hear about all day all the time -- was not a part of our vocabulary. even as recently as a few years ago the thought of a global economic downturn was beyond comprehension. i can't pretend to know how your world will change, but i do know that it will, and at a pace that will continue to increase exponentially. you can't stop it. in many ways, you guys are the cause of this change, so i say learn to love it, make it your

ally, stay relevant by devoting yourself to a lifetime of learning. you are being given a wonderful academic talk foundation, an invitation to begin a journey of learning, exploration and growth, so please treasure it. second, have fun. enjoy life, choose a career that gives you fulfillment and pleasure, surround yourselves with people who make you laugh. don't fall into this trap of letting someone else define your success or your happiness. some of your parents here won't like what i'm about to say. when they left school, which was about the same time that i left school, their immediate future was pretty well prescribed. the vast majority of college graduates got a job, they settled down, they bought a house, they had a family, and all that was done by the time they were 30 years old. that has changed dramatically. now the decade after college is spent trying a few different jobs, getting a graduate degree,

traveling, living and then settling down. i, for one, think this is a very good development. that's because people are more likely to be successful if they have a passion for what they do. finding it takes some time. make yourself a promise today, if down the road you find that your career is not fun, revert to my earlier piece of advice; change. third, very importantly, be true to yours and to your values -- to yourself and to your values. your families, xavier, your church, your synagogue, your mountaintop has given you a set of core values, a moral compass. hang on to it. a predecessor of mine at xerox used to say he tried to live his life as though any piece of it might end up on his obituary. and if that happened, would he be proud? and that's not a bad test, i don't think. i have an even better one, and it hangs on the wall in my

office. it goes like this: don't do anything that won't make your mom proud. don't do anything that won't make your mom proud. [applause] fourth, do good in the world. our planet is in trouble. we need your help. when your life's journey ends, i promise that you won't -- that you won't care very much about how much money you've made or the status that you've achieved if you haven't made the world a better place. money and status, i can tell you this for sure -- i have both -- don't bring happiness. [laughter] they do not bring happiness. [applause] doing good, doing good is not an add-on. it's not what you do after the end of your life. it's not what you've done after you've done living. but it's central to leading a rewarding life.

as my mother used to tell me, as you can hear my mother told me lots and lots of things. she died a long time ago. as my mother used to tell me, anyone -- and tell me and anyone who would listen, we all have an obligation to put back more than we take away. she'd say to me all the time, max, you have to leave behind more than you take away. leave more than you take away. not a bad formula for true success. at the risk of getting a little preachy, i'd ladies and gentlemen to ask you to d i'd like to ask you to reflect for a minute how privileged you are compared to the world's population at large. think about this. one-fifth of the world's people go to bed hungry every night, and they wake up every morning without hope. one-fifth of the world's population. four billion people, two-thirds of the world's population, lives on less than $2 a day. more than one billion people in the world can't read or write. more than 40% of the world goes

without basic sanitation. more than a billion people drink water that is unsafe, and that leads to the deaths of over two million people, two million children a year. a lot of this is happening right down the street. you don't have to go to rwanda or angola, you can look right down the street in louisiana and see this, right down the street in new york city and do this. our brothers and our sisters are in desperate need of a helping hand. who will help them if not us? who? if not now, when? as scripture tells us, to those to whom much is given, much is expected. be you -- you have to live youre so that at the end of your journey, you will know that your time here was well spent, that you left behind more than you take away. [applause] fifth, do xavier proud. you have a rich position to

uphold. st. catherine direct el created a special place here in louisiana. the mission of this university has remained constant, i love this mission: to contribute to the motion of a more just and humane society by preparing students to assume roles of leadership and service in a global society. let me repeat that so you can think about that and let it sink in. to contribute to the promotion of a more just and humane society by preparing its students to assume roles of leadership and service in a global society. what a tradition to follow, what an opportunity that you have been given, what a respondent you have not just to contribute, but to lead. not just to succeed, but to serve. you are entering a world full of challenge. you will search for jobs in an economy that is still struggling to emerge from the harshest downturn since the great depression. you will enter a work force in

which careers and entire industries disappear or move around the world with breathtaking speed. you will raise a family in which words like terrorism and climate change are a part of our everyday vocabulary. you will live on a planet that is overcrowded and struggling to find ways to sustain itself. as our world grows flatter and smaller, you will live and work with people who neither look like you, nor share the same values as you do. at the same time, you will have an extraordinary opportunity to live out the aspirations that xavier intends for you. you will -- you are well on your way to becoming part of what w.e.b. duboise called the talented ten. i've heard about this my entire life, the talented ten. the men and women he believed would emerge as the leaders of black america. he coined the term the talented ten a decade before xavier was founded. imagine if he were here today,

beholding the sight that i am privileged to see from this podium. he would be proud and pleased beyond all belief. due boys would be -- duboise would be proud, too, of the great strides america has head in the past century. some of us have gained great political power and amassed great economic wealth. we have succeeded in every facet of american life, sports and the arts, government, religion, business, academia, the military. we even have a black president. yet the work of the talented ten is far from done. as we sit here, there are more black men in prison than there are in college. more than 80% of black and hispanic children cannot read or do math at grade level. you can add to the list of disparities that lead to an unmistakeable conclusion as my friend and mentor, vernon jordan, likes to say, you cannot concentrate on the best of what we have done, you must focus on the worst of what we need to do.

that is your charge, to define your success at least in some measure by what we do for our brothers and our sisters. you cannot enter the ranks of the elite and close the ranks behind you. you cannot enter the ranks of the elite and close the ranks behind you. you are part of a chain of those men and women who have gone before us, those who broke the shackles of slavery, they fought for freedom and for justice, they took to the streets and demanded civil rights and voting rights. giants like martin luther king and folk like your teachers, your parents who now pass the baton of justice off to you to take care of. it is, at once, a sobering and an exhilarating responsibility. to all of the graduates, allow yourself just a moment to bask in the glory of what you've accomplished, but not for too long. and pledge to yourself that you will cherish what you have learned here and use it as a foundation for good. my congratulations to all of

you. you've worked long and hard the to arrive at this place, and my congratulations also to all of the participants in the room, to the grand parents, the significant others, the faculty, the staff, anyone who helped along the way. all of you should feel very, very proud. may you live up to the mantle that you inherit, and may all of your dreams come true. thank you. [cheers and applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> and live now to the carnegie endowment for international peace here in washington. for a conference on nuclear non-proliferation. discussions will range from the next phase of nuclear weapons reductions between the u.s. and russia to negotiations over iran's nuclear program, participants include former ambassador thomas pickering and a former nuclear talks end soy. this is hosted by the arms control association. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> good morning, everyone. if you could, please, find your, your seats, please. we're about to get started. good morning, everyone. i'm daryl kimball, executive director of the independent nongovernmental arms control association, and i want to welcome everyone to our 2012 annual meeting. i also want to thank and welcome those of you watching online and on c-span. and before we get started, i'd like to remind everybody to turn off your cellular devices so

we're not interrupted. as the arms control association enters its fifth decade, we've remained committed to providing information and ideas to address the security challenges posed by the world's most dangerous weapons, nuclear, biological, chemical and certain conventional weapons. as our many members here today know, our monthly journal arms control today is the key resource for be ideas and news and analysis and interviews with key policymakers on a range of issues, and our staff churn out on a regular basis issue briefs, opinion pieces, background papers and reports on a range of topics, and they're all available at armscontrol.org. and our ability to do this depends on our individual members and our strivers to arms control today, and if you're not a member or a subscriber, i

would encourage you to consider doing so. today's events on meetings and next challenges on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is one of the me events we host each year on arms control issues. with support and assistance from the heinrich bole foundation, we've brought together a very distinguished set of speakers from all around the world. our panels this morning will address two of the most pressing arms control challenges that we face today. our first advancing further progress to reduce the role, the number of the world's global stockpiles of nuclear weapons and second and perhaps more urgently, advancing effect bive dip romatic -- diplomatic solutions to prevent the spread of weapons to states such as iran. to close out the conference over lunch, we're honored to have undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, rose cut muller -- cut

miller. she'll bius the obama administration's view on recent progress and the next steps ahead. and then let me also just note you'll see in your program members of the arms control association are welcome to join us at 3:45 in the afternoon for an informal discussion of program priorities. and then at 5 p.m. we invite friends and colleagues of the late stanley -- [inaudible] to join us in honoring the former army secretary, arms control negotiator and former aca board chairman who passed away this past april. so to our first panel today which will focus on the next phase of u.s./russian nuclear reductions after the nato summit in chicago. we're at a very important juncture on this issue. you'll recall that back in 2009 president obama pledged to, and i quote, put an end to outdated

cold war thinking by reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. unquote. and then in 2010 the u.s. and russia completed the negotiations on the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty and then also in 2010 the administration completed the congressionally-mandated nuclear posture review that determined that, and i quote, the fundamental role of u.s. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attacks against the u.s. and can our allies and our partners, unquote. the president then directed a study on how to implement that strategy, and that study is due to be completed very soon. back in march in south korea president obama said, quote, that study is still underway, but even as we have more to do, we can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need, unquote. so the nuclear review implementation study will have

far-reaching ramifications for the future path of nuclear reductions and how we can reduce the costs of the arsenal which according to a study published in this month's eshoo of arm -- issue of arms control today is at least $33 billion a year. so to explore these and other issues, we're very pleased to have three distinguished speakers. we have with us lieutenant general dirk jamison who served as deputy commander and chief of staff of u.s. strategic command before retiring in 1996 after more than three decades of active service. he's currently an active member of the consensus for american security of the american security project. and he will give us his thoughts on these issues that i've just introduced. [inaudible] 2009 to 2010 on the national security staff and with the office of vice president biden. lee now deputy -- he's now deputy director aft the --

[inaudible] and john is going to give us his thoughts and views on the paths and the options for pursuing further reductions and the challenges we must overcome -- [audio difficulty] we're also very pleased to have with us trine flockhart who's a researcher at the danish center for international studies who will provide us with a european vision of the recent nato summit. and also her thoughts on possible steps for dealing with the leftover tactical nuclear arsenals of the united states and europe as well as russia. and after each of their opening remarks, we'll take your questions, and we'll have a discussion, and so i welcome general jam ericsson to open us up -- jamericsson, the floor is

yours -- >> i note that most of you have lived through a good portion of the cold war, and some of you probably are saying what was the cold war? it's also very reassuring to me to know that among all of you i'm probably the least expert in many of the things that go on inside the beltway. i call myself an operator by some strange occurrence of events, i ended up going through the cold war in positions that gave me, i think, a unique window onto the operational side of things, and in that sense the urgency of finding a new way in in this 23st century. 21st century. i know it's not lost on any of us here that we're, in spite of what i saw on occasion up close

and personal, close calls during the cold war, we are here this morning, and we have somehow escaped as a human race a nuclear exchange. and there were close calls. and so i think something that the citizenry needs to keep in mind is that these things, um, are an ongoing -- these issues are an ongoing struggle to control the dangers of nuclear weapons. as a young lieutenant sitting nuclear alert, i stared at ten green lights. each one of those lights representing an enormous amount of destruction. and practiced hundreds and hundreds of times the execution

and release of those nuclear weapons. we did that all the time. and my neighbors were flying nuclear airborne alert in b-52s on occasion. i mean, that wasn't a constant thing in those days, but it was, it was frequent. and the nuclear subs were at sea. we had an enormous destructive capability. and i think i was not unique among those men in those days. they were men, now that's a generic term. but those people that were controlling those in contemplating as we, as we inventoried the execution plans, the consequences of actually executing, i thought about that many, many times.

and, of course, it was heightened by movies such as "seven days in may" and dr. strangelove. and as i say, many of you lived through every bit of that. and the fact is, we are extremely fortunate. later as a commander in the 1980s my units were is receiving new platforms, platforms that were capable of carrying more nuclear weapons at such a rapid rate that we often thought of it in terms of the cat in the caster oil. you had to have one searching, one covering and, i mean, and one going and one covering up. it was, it was really an accelerated period. and the dialogue of deterrence in those days was, there is no escape for the enemy. and if we go to war, they will

suffer. and people did talk about winning a nuclear war in spite of the fact that the consequences would be so extreme as to make winning kind of a ludicrous term. i did know in those days that i and my crew members, all of the people that i just described would follow orders. and if the president said go you should the extremely tight constraints -- under the extremely tight constraints that a president would have to make a decision like that, they would, they would carry out the orders, there was no doubt in my mind. but the enemy of those days is gone. it no longer exists. this is a new, this is a new time. the, the soviet union with its massive capabilities no longer exists. the deterrence calculus that has been with us maybe as long as

pointless are some of the art periods in those days have been with us, no longer applies. or it shouldn't. it should be rethought. we don't have that massive offensive capability of the soviet union and an ideology which was to dominate and to dominate us. and if people argue that that exists, they're wrong. we need to, we need to convince them that it's not the same. so 21st century deterrence, in my mind, has much to do with our conventional capabilities, we merging technologies -- with emerging technologies and a russia that is bound with us in a, in a carefully-negotiateed treaty to reduce and verify these weapons. and i remember when we were

concerned with new s.t.a.r.t. ratification that my growing concern and that of many of my fellow retired, my grandson says retarded general officers, flag officers -- [laughter] was that it, the period of time that we no longer had very capable inspectors on the ground in russia was extending, that the ability to gather data was extend -- was being extended to the point where it didn't make sense. this process of arms control that i give such credit to people way back, you know, who when we were doing things that seemed to make sense under that theory of deterrence had the courage to say, wait a minute, we -- making the robo balance is no exaggeration. none whatsoever. we view people, but i include

myself as one of them, have had the opportunity to review the war plan all the way and to look at individual targets and to see what we were doing with the production of our development capabilities. so it's a new time, but the u.s. and russia do hold 90% of the world's nuclear weapons. i think with my experience with the russians, and i have had a considerable amount, that we and they really understand how much the utility, the operational utility of nuclear weapons has been overstated. and we need to somehow preserve this arms control process, the good work that's been done in verification and data exchange that i'm sure that secretary

gottemoeller will talk about today. so, again, it's our good fortune that we made it to june 2012, in my mind. the revised calculus of deterrence that i talk about needs to be fleshed out. it's not really, i don't think, going to be a civilian audience that does this. but there is, there is much to highlight in dialogue with the american people and with our elected officials. i hope that it can be nonpartisan. i'm still hopeful that the political process will allow this preservation of a long-developed arms control approach to continue. and that, clearly, a new deterrent calculus will allow us and the russians to posture, to

secure and posture our nuclear weapons with further be reductions -- with further reductions and heads danger. i'm -- and less danger. i'm confident we can do that. i would say as we update our thinking that i don't at all go away from what ronald reagan said about trust but verify. and i think we continue to put big emphasis on verify as we expand not only the discussion of our nuclear enterprise, but the other issues that others on the panel will discuss and including, i hope, all of the, all of the nuclear holders in the world and the issue of proliferation. thank you very much. >> thank you, general. now we'll turn to jon wolfsthat

for your perspectives on nuclear weapons and deterrence in a changed world. jon, thank you for being here. >> thank you, daryl, very much for inviting me. of course, i would have been happy to is end the invitation having been locked inside the white house for the last three years, just getting out in the daylight is nice, but i got my real start at the arms control association. i attended the annual meeting as a young member in 990 when spurgeon announced they would be creating a non-proliferation position which i got because i was the least expensive candidate. [laughter] and it's been downhill ever since. as daryl said, i spent the last three years in the white house woking as the vice president's adviser on nuclear issues and really am fortunate not only for that experience, but for a nuclear wonk like myself to basically be given that access and to understand for the first time really what goes into all of these different questions that we're dealing with. and as the general knows very, very well, the minutiae really

can overwhelm you, but you have to understand it before tackling the larger questions of deterrence calculus and stability. not to worry about single-shot kill probability and exchange ratios, but to really understand the thinking of the different services and the different constituents before you then go ahead and pick a number at, say, where, you know, you feel you should come out. and i think one thing i would like people to take away is that the administration's been very careful to take the advice many of us were given years ago which is don't tell the operators how to operate. don't come in and say we really only need four submarines at sea. really what we wanted to work through and we had the opportunity to do with a tremendously open process involving the state department, defense department, services, intelligence, department of energy for the production, uniform military is to think through the big questions that were laid out in the president's strategy documents. the nuclear posture review, the prague speech. where do we want to go? what are the threats that we're

trying to address globally, and then to figure out what are the questions that nuclear weapons are necessary for, hoping then to move the other questions out of the nuclear arena. because as the president has said sometimes -- many times, and i would argue correctly, believes that it is very much in the security interests to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons and to reduce the roles of nuclear weapons as we pursue an an expanded and aggressive non-proliferation policy. one that we recognize has as much, probably even more of a bearing on our security position than some outdated cold war mentality of nuclear parity with russia or any other country. i'm sure many of you are steeped in those documents of the npr. but i would encourage you to go back and look at those and particularly the five criteria because those are very much the criteria that we put against how many icbms do you think you need to have in order to insure

that they're survivable, or submarines? or which countries need to be on the targeting list, and which countries can be dropped off? do you need to cross targets in order to achieve these goals? those five questions were the ones that really got to us. and then, of course, throughout this process, and the vice president, um, was very much involved in this, is to understand that regardless of what number you come out at, after that strategy work is done and you've determined what the numbers might be, if that is one or it's a million and one, you're still going to need a nuclear complex that is capable of supporting the maintenance of that capability. if it's one, you still need a bunch of scientists and engineers that can take it apart and understand how it works, you're still going to need production facilities that can remake it or at the very least dismantle the thousands of weapons we're still dealing with, and that's another issue i'll touch briefly on, about needing to get to this bipartisan consensus -- although

i don't think anybody guess going to -- anybody's going to get consensus on anything in washington. there's a certain amount of investment that's necessary for the nuclear complex. and i don't mean every bell and whistle. and having gone through this in detail, everybody throughout the process from the head of nsa to omb to the nuclear weapons council understand that there's the perfect and then there's the necessary and then there's a whole bunch of cutting that's going to go on at the top, but you're still going to need some level of investment in order to maintain any type of nuclear activity. so for many of the people in this room that are concerned about these issues, several of whom called me over the past three years to tell me, hey, make sure you do this and have you thought about that? i now tell you, you should take heart in the sense that we were wrestling with the same questions that you all talk about and we all talk about on a regular basis. one of the threats that we face that absolutely require some sort of nuclear capability to address, how many nuke weapons

are really necessary to deter enemies and reassure friends, and what does deterrence mean in the 21st century? and how does that compare to 20, 30 years ago? because the nuclear guidance is still pretty much a reflection of deterrence policy in the late parts of the cold war. stan norris and hans and others have written about this in arms control today talking about the different category sets, and i'm not going to get into that, but a lot has changed, and as the general said, we need to change our thinking on deterrence calculus. we wrestled with how can we reduce nuclear weapons in ways that insure our security but actually advance it. for those that watched this, new s.t.a.r.t. was about a lot of things. it was about getting the verification capabilities back on the ground in russia and providing that insight into what's going on, but it was also about the review conference coming up, also very much about needing to reharness and refocus the international community's attention on iran and not to allow this gap in u.s./russian

arms control to become a distraction from what everybody recognizes is the next set of security challenges. we also dealt very, very steadily with the question of how to we deal with the aging of the nuclear triad? what do we need for the future in terms of strategic delivery vehicles and, quite frankly, how much is that going to cost us? um, we didn't let numbers, either the level of nuclear weaponry we thought might be useful or how much money we have available drive the system, but we had to be aware of what it was going to cost to try and implement these things in a budget-constrained environment. but as we got true this process -- through this process and only after we looked at what the strategy needed to be, then we talked about numbers. and i know people have read a lot of the reporting that said the president sent out to the pentagon requests for numbers at a very low level, and write me a strategy on this, i can tell you plainly it's not true. i helped write that part of the guidance, so don't believe it.

and if there are reporters in the room, i'd be happy to talk with you afterwards. so, um, in terms of what's going to come out and my expectation is that this is going to be rolled out in some way, shape or form in the next several weeks, if not a month or two, i actually am not sure how it's going to be rolled out. in terms of the way this is going to impact on the future of arms control negotiations, i'll tell you plainly that i argued against a rollout that included a number because i do favor a new set of negotiated reductions with russia and think that if you come out with the number, you're basically opening yourself up to giving away your negotiating position. so i argued very strongly inside that we should talk about what the framework is, what the strategy is, how we're reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons, but leave the numbers for the negotiation in the hopes that we could actually get russia to come with us down to a lower number. now, i'll tell you plainly that, um, i am a pessimist when it comes to what's going to tom over the next your -- come over

the next year or two. i think the thinking in russia is not the same as the thinking in the united states. and quite frankly on this issue senator kyl and i agree. i don't want to give the russians a veto over what we can do, and knowing that we don't need to be spending money in the nuclear complex that we, quite frankly, need to be spending in other areas, i don't want to delay that process of going down to lower numbers. because as the general, i think, was alluding to, it's clear that unlike the cold war when it was the soviet union, the conventional capability and the risk of conflict that was the threat, today the threat is the weapons themselves. nobody, very few people reasonably believe that we're going to have a nuclear conflict because of some deliberate decision to try and preempt or disarm the united states of their nuclear capability or vice versa. whereas during the cold war, very reasonable people -- senior government officials, other governments -- actually worried day

day-to-day, well, this might be a real risk. today i think most people recognize that if there's a nuclear exchange, it's going to be because of miscalculation or accident, and that's the threat we have to address. and if we can go to lower numbers through negotiations, then great. that's a much better world. but, quite frankly, i don't want to delay that day where we're addressing this challenge. and, um, so in large part because i don't think russia's prepared to go to much lower numbers, they might be prepared to come down incrementally because, quite frankly, they're already below the new s.t.a.r.t. number be, so they might be willing to have some adjustment, but if we really want to break the back on cold war thinking, we have to go to much lower numbers, and i think this will probably with my second to last point. ..

>> what we need is a force that fundamentally his size and based on deterrence. that number is much, much lower than what it takes to blow up a lot of stuff in foreign countries. i would argue that lease from the united states perspective and increasingly in russia and china, that number is very, very low. just my personal point of view i would say the number is probably more than one but less than 20 that the trend aid is deterred by the regional threat that 20 nuclear weapons or less can land on u.s. soil. and, therefore, the numbers need to come way down because anything about that is unnecessary, as long is secure and reliable and technically we know it will work, then i think we are still able to pursued a

very stable set of deterrence calculations. and quite frankly the idea that we need to go down in some sort of parity or semantic reduction i think is outdated. during the cold war, reasonable minds could argue there was a 40% buildup in what russia had and what we had or what we had, and china had or what the europeans had and what -- then you could argue that somebody might get in ahead that now is the time. but does anybody think a 40% difference will lead present put me say now is our opportunity? right? it's hard to imagine any scenario where -- again, that's my personal view but i think it is one set of arguments that went very much into the debate over what the nuclear guidance review will come from. so last point, and that's again on the nuclear complex. the general said hopefully that we can try at least establish

some areas of nonpartisan agreement on this. if you look back at the strategic posture review, the commission before the administration came into office, if you look at what was discussed very early on in the nuclear posture review, one area where we really didn't have much of a disagreement, and actually we are very conservative planners on nuclear forces and very progressive voices on nuclear issues came to some agreement during the new s.t.a.r.t. process was to understand that regardless of what size nuclear weapon or arsenal we need we'll have to have some reinvested in the nuclear complex. people, the delivery vehicle and science and technological and intellectual basis support us. we can debate all you want about whether we need to facility in new mexico to do plutonium for the facility in tennessee to do uranium, but we recognize we will need some level of that. this budget cycle has shown us we're very far away from getting that type of agreement. and if we want to any set of reductions will have to work very carefully on what that set

of investments will be. but the flipside is also true, if we intend to get in me real sustainable investment plan, we'll have to of reductions to support that. because you're not going to be able to convince the broad partisan of the congress to spend money on this and less usually some of them that is the path down. so if we don't of both pieces of that puzzle i worry will end up with a very underfunded complex, very unreliable nuclear arsenal and much larger nuclear arsenal do we need to support our security. that is i think a loser for all. sorry i went on overlong. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much, jon. now we will turn to another facet of nuclear weapons question focusing on some of the issues related to nato policy and europe and the tactical nuclear weapons problem. trine flockhart. thanks for being with us. the floor is yours. >> thank you.

first of all thank you for inviting me. i'm really honored to speak to such distinguished audience, and so pleased to be in washington. it's always a treat to come to washington. in my studies over the years of nato and nuclear weapons, it always seems to me that nato is nuclear addicted. so the questions i've asked myself after the terms must review is, is nato still nuclear addicted? i'm afraid that the simple question or the simple answer to that question is yes. although now with a promise that nato is now willing to consider not whether any of the drones flying around in europe as long as it's codependent fellow addict rush is willing to do the same. unfortunately i suspect this is not a position with great prospects. okay, so darrell has asked me to give a brief assessment of apostrophe which is also known for sure as -- now, perhaps i

should say even though i know this is a very knowledgeable audience, if the ddpr some eyes slit your attention, then don't blame yourself because you could actually say that since the announcement of the ddpr at the lisbon summit about 18 months ago in november 2010, it has turned into a secret process. it started out being something that was agreed to say the strategic concept, because germany had launched the question of nuclear weapons and no one could agree to that, to get into the strategic concept. the agreement was then a major review of nato's overall deterrence and defense posture. that was then going to be presented at the chicago summit just a few weeks ago. well, what happened after that was that it started out being quite a public affair, but after a few months, i think nato realize that they had bitten off

more they could chew, and the process turned into being an enormous secret process. it has been referred to in public a few months into the process no one in nato would go to gatherings like these i talk about ddpr. and is published of the chicago summit without even as much as a press briefing. so not surprising, therefore, the department so had sporadic public interest, and i think the knowledge of the ddpr is quite limited within gatherings like these. now, when the ddpr was announced that lisbon, many including myself welcome the process as an opportunity to get a proper discussion about nato's deterrence and defense posture. and particularly the future of the forward deployed american nonproliferation weapons that are still base inside european countries. perhaps naïvely, i also hope that the dpr in light of changes in a national context, in light

of nato's redefined role in this new strategic concept, and in light of the additional new capability in the form of missile defense might also discuss alternative ways of showing commitments of reassurance and sharing of this burdens within the alliance. unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case, and i have to agree with former u.s. senator sam nunn that the trenton at best deserves a of incomplete. okay, so within a document? i think you are already getting what i'm going to say. there's not a lot in the. it's mostly hot air. despite the really complicated and conceptual issues, the documents 3000 words long which includes long prose about the issues that the allies could actually agree on. moreover, the document is written in a complex and convoluted language that seemed to be designed to detract from a rather than to add to clear see

about this are complex and hugely important issues. most importantly the document affects and dodges the main issue. it failed to answer the most essential answers. how has that purpose change since the end of the cold war, what is the effect of the new missile defense capability for the overall defense and deterrence posture puts it doesn't really address these questions, at least not in depth. in addition to the document never as with the obligations are, to of a cooperative security and crisis management to core tasks along with the original collective decision. despite the significant changes, the ddpr reads as if none of these changes now. so this is puzzling and it is disappointing.

because -- the new missile defense capability clearly opens up the new possibilities how to show commitment and cohesion in the alliance. yet the ddpr has been completely unable to suggest new ways of ensuring nuclear sharing, and possible alternatives to nuclear sharing. and the valley of burden sharing to practical participation in the other two core tasks that imagine, crisis management and security. so sadly, over all the document constitutes a victory for france and the central and eastern european allies who have been saying russia as the main security concern, and to basically joined at nato in 1990, rather than a nato that is ready for the security challenges of the 21st century. if i was to draw the scoresheet, list pros and cons, then i would

suggest the following positive aspects. first of all, it's positive for the document to be made public. this was by no means a certainty that is only agreed shortly before chicago. secondly it's positive that the document makes rhetorical reference to the possibility at least of producing for withdrawing nonstrategic -- thirdly, and this may be stretching it here as positive, but it's positive that the weapons of mass destruction controlled, which was established as part of the process, will be replaced with a new committee that can function as a consultative and advisory forum because nato really needs to have that. however, this may turn out to be a victory as the committee's mandates a greek which could take a very, very long time because it's basically against this committee. it's also positive that the ddpr contains a commitment to developing confidence and

transparency measures, vis-à-vis russia. and, finally, i think it's positive that the review does not close the process but rather appears to be open for continuation of the internal debate about the issues raised. in fact, i to say that i think this is the most positive aspect of ddpr. now unfortunately it seems on the negative scoresheet that are much more substantial and ironically, although substantial issues, and ironically although the document endorses the status quo, the reality is that status quo simply cannot be maintained. and i list five problems in addition to the ones that i've already talked about. the first problem is that even if no agreement can be reached on changing nato's nonstrategic nuclear weapons posture, it will change. however, without an agreement to change can come through as disorderly, internal nato purpose of national nuclear disarmament. when some countries are going,

will decide to not replace the aircraft with nuclear capabilities. germany certainly seems certain to do that, and once the german decision to withdraw all of its -- in holland and belgium are likely to fall. so in other words, without an overall negative station, the likely outcome would be by default. the other invisible change that is in the document is modernization of the gravity bombs. the ddpr states that it will ensure that all components of nato's nuclear deterrence remains safe, secure and effective. what this basically means is that existing b-61 gravity bomb will undergo programs which will upgrade the capabilities considerably by changing the bombs precision guided weapon. so in parallel with the disorderly nuclear disarmament is hidden in nuclear escalation also by default. the overall effect of the

modernization of the aircraft to include joint strike fighter with modernize position guided weapons on the b-61. what will constitute a considerable upgrade which will certainly not go unnoticed in russia. firstly another huge mistake in the ddpr is the future of nato's forward deployed nuclear deterrent is made contingent on reciprocal russian measures. that russia has made it clear that it will not -- until all forward deployed weapons have been removed from europe. however, as nato has already removed 90% of the weapons unilaterally, the 180 or so remaining be 60 ones hardly constitute a good bargaining position against the more than 2000 russian weapons. i think nato is about to repeat the mistake of the 1980s when nato deployment -- nato simply

asked, do we need these weapons or not, and not make it contingent on what russia does. another problem is that the deep ddpr is completely unclear where nato stance on the issue of negative security guarantees. it sounds like nato has dodged the policy of nato's security guarantees document, but when reading the document closely it appears that nato simply as acknowledging different national positions between native countries, the u.s. and uk to the guarantees, friends did not. such a policy is clearly not a good foundation for coherent nato nuclear posture. and, finally, the ddpr completely fails to ask a crucial question about the role of nuclear weapons, especially what nonstrategic nuclear weapons are for. as it does, it cannot possibly provide the answer to what constitutes an appropriate mix of conventional nuclear and missile defense forces. native still needs to ask

appropriate for what? thirdly, this was exactly what the ddpr said, to fail on that account is a real indictment i think of 18 months work. have i got time for -- >> a couple spent a couple of the next steps. this is the really difficult question, because one of the aspects, or one of the effects of the way the ddpr has been conducted is that the alliance is basically painted itself into a corner. it's not a very good corner. i don't actually see any constructive next steps within the parameters left by the ddpr. it's especially problematic that the ddpr has restricted nato's maneuver by making the withdrawal contention on russia's reciprocal moves. this is unlikely to happen so we have a stalemate situation. it's also problematic to identify a next step because

although the official line from it is that the ddpr shows nato unity, in my opinion the ddpr is basically divided the alliance into to count, for and against withdrawal, and bad russia-russia. i think i'm doing this, which is been consolidated in decisions has been consulted over the last 18 months, it's actually going to be the first next step that nato needs to address. within the parameters of ddpr, i think nato's best option seems to be to return to recommendations of the papers of their last april. as a first detonator should see transparency with rush on numbers, operational spaces, and the level of storage security. these are questions that could usually be addressed in the nato-russia council, and hopefully lead to the better adversary and a more constructive working environment within the council.

moreover, following the american elections this year, a renewed effort of reaching an understanding with russia on a expense would come if it could be successful, provide an environment that would be more conducive for further discussions within nato on nonstrategic matters. but for the time being, as i said the best thing about the ddpr is that he didn't close the process. so now that the restricted process of the ddpr process is over, nato should start a real dialogue and proper analysis might be able to apply a holistic approach to the overarching question, he turned whom, how, and from what? and what is the role of nato's nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and why exactly does nato need them? after suitable break, not too long i hope, nato simply needs to get back into the process of talking about these issues with an educational focus.

that is why the new committee that he spoke about is really important. and speaking as a european, and this is my very last point, that i can say this, it's also time for the u.s. to take the lead and to seek to influence position of the central europeans on nonstrategic nuclear weapons. the united states has had a background decision in this and is basically left it for the europeans to sort out the issues on these matters. but european allies will never grant everything unless there is a crisis, nothing at the have coalesced there is some very clear leadership exercised by the united states. so, there you have it. i can say i'm european. so, so nato needs to get back to its traditional way of dialogue and persuasion under american leadership in the committees and in the nuclear group, and in the committees, and hopefully we'll get an name and hopefully we'll get a mandate. thank you spent thank you very

much, trine. i think we have a clear message from our speakers that more needs to be done. there's reason to change our thinking about nuclear weapons, find ways to reduce the risks but the path ahead is complex. it's not clear, and it's going to take leadership and creativity. and now it is your turn to stimulate the discussion with your questions. we have a couple of microphones that will arrive, if you raise your hand. if you state your name and ask a question, and address it to one of the speakers. why don't we start over here? with edward. >> edward, georgetown university. to ms. flockhart, one of the roadblocks to transparency regarding tactical nuclear weapons has been the reluctance of nato itself to acknowledge

where they are and the numbers. and as a result the u.s. government cannot confirm or deny, except for germany, those facts, even though everybody knows of course where they are. so, can we conclude from what you said that nato is now willing to acknowledge where the tactical nuclear weapons are? or will nato only do it if russia adopts a certain amount of transparency as well? thank you. >> trine, go ahead. >> well, obvious a precondition would be that nato would be willing to give the transparency as well. rush is on a one way street that everyone knows whether nuclear weapons or. everyone knows how many are there, i think by now. so there's not really that much on those issues. where i think the issues would be, would be much more on the storage and the site security

that would be issues that would be interesting to both sides. and russia would have an interest in getting to know some of those issues. particularly also on the issue of the old storage sites in what has happened to the old soviet storage sites in central and eastern europe. i think they would be some room for maneuver there. but clearly nato will also have to move on the transparency issue as well. >> i mean, i think the challenge in this, as you know, russia is not concerned about our tackled -- tactical nuclear weapons in russia. we can't leverage whatever wet weather against what the russians have because it's not a threat perception for them. very early on in the administration, i think there was a willingness the pace of the so we don't need the purpose make decisions and we'll deal with them on our own. then very quickly i think some of the institutional biases came to bear both in the pentagon and in the state department. fortunately. so i'm sort of an outlier here were my approach is pull them out and force the russians to

justify to themselves, to their own people and to the europeans why they need thousands of tactical nuclear weapons themselves spent and just to be clear what the independent experts estimate is that there are some 180 u.s. gravity bombs, nuclear bombs in five european nato countries, and russia is estimate by independent experts to have some 2000 tactical nuclear weapons in their territory. we have another question here in the middle. >> david cole with the committee on national legislation, question for mr. wellstone. went administration budget was released a number of members of congress said that the money for the national security ministration was inadequate, and said that you were basically walking away from the agreement you made in the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty. someone drank if you can go through with us the thinking on budget you presented, and is

this administration living up to its commitments under s.t.a.r.t. treaty? >> i'm just please refer to me as mr. will stall from time to time, david. thank you. david was a great help as were a number of people here on the new s.t.a.r.t. process, so we got to work very closely together. i think it's a very partisan gain that is being played on the administration to you. i unfortunate the criticism by people who know in fact the details but think it's good optics to argue the country. the facts are this. that in the context of new s.t.a.r.t., the president submitted a plan as requested by congress the 1251 plan which said it was our intention to pursue programs and capabilities necessary to maintain safe secure and effectiveness -- nuclear arsenal. our estimate was those get those would cost about $85 billion over the next 10 years. s. is for the nuclear complex part that was separate from strategic launch vehicles, icbms and so forth.

after the budget control act into force, there were new restrictions on how much the president would be able to request, and so people wanted the president to basically break the law and say we're going to ask for money that legally we can't ask for. and the president when i going to do that. and, in fact, we went to work very quickly saying all right, this is the money that is available, if this is what we need, how do we ensure we get what we need? that was a very open process with nnsa, pentagon, the nuclear weapons council, and the lab directors as well as owning be who said over the next 10 years as a reasonable estimate that we could provide from what this will cost us. congress chose not to fund that number. the house in particular controlled by republicans who pushed for the 1251 report chose not to fund administration's request and shorted it by roughly 800 million tons but the lab directors came to the nnsa and said we don't think you're

going to get the money that we all agree we need to build all of these facilities. and we think we can save you, this is the lab directors coming to nnsa saying we think we can save you money, perhaps an unprecedented step, and saying we think we can do plutonium work without building the cmrr in new mexico. it's a big facility that's estimate to cost about $5 billion. what they are worried about is we will build facilities and not be able to fund the people who do the real work in those facilities. so they came to us with an alternative plan. the administration says, asked the council representatives from stratcom, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, nnsa, will this work. and they suggest. so we went to congress with that and said this is the new plant and all of a sudden congress is screaming you broke your promise. i think it's partisan damage. i think is largely designed to detract from the president's

pretty impressive accomplishment on investing in the nuclear complex in a reasonable way, and my hope is that the congress will finally come to consensus and do what is right for the nuclear deterrent that we need. >> i wanted to ask a question from the chairs place your to general jameson and to jon about how we move forward the next 22 years, regardless of who's in the white house, with russia the next steps in reducing u.s. and russian stockpiles below the new s.t.a.r.t. levels, which are 1550 deployed strategic warheads, and the ceiling needs to be met by the year 2018. new s.t.a.r.t. creates a verification system that will be in place until 2021. and given the difficulty of a formal negotiations with russia, and given the challenge that will have the next round of negotiations, because we need to

deal with not just deployed strategic weapons, but also to treat you go -- the nondeployed weapons, are there alternatives approaches? in other words, mike bibby away just as george w. bush did in 2001-2002 period, to use existing treaty framework, to provide the transparency and the verification necessary to assure both sides, but to reduce the two countries not to deploy strategic arsenals below the start levels. is that a path that is considering giving the very difficult relationship between the u.s. and russia on various issues, missile defense, syria, other types of things? >> well, i think at our 100 people in the room, after 100 people in utah have wondered if the plans for how this would work. but i think there couple prerequisites. the first is i would argue we

need to have a decision, preferably by a bilateral decision, which quite frankly just means us, to go down to the new s.t.a.r.t. numbers. these are big reduction. i forget the number released new s.t.a.r.t. was but i think we're roughly at 1750, we will go to 50/50, you could pull 200 weapons off alert and put them out in a few days. not a few weeks. so i think we should just quickly go there. i think we need new guidance in place the president has, directed support from strategic command and the chairman of the joint chiefs saying yes, we look at the plant, we can go lower to give them the flexibility, and order reductions. and then i think you have the new s.t.a.r.t. verification framework in place to say to russia, let's go down to lower numbers, more quickly. you can go below 1550, and you could reach a political agreement with russia to do that and then you have the verification in place to show in fact those numbers have been

reached. of course, the challenges you don't have in place for the nonstrategic nuclear weapons and that's where think trine's these are very valuable here. that the conference the entrance designations are what's needed. i would argue as i just did that the u.s. should do that up front. we need to find a way to manage the aligned correctly, and so that the withdrawal of those weapons don't lead to a new schism. but i argue we should give russia a year private individual moves in the type you say we're going alone and then push them. >> any thoughts, general jameson? >> the only thing i would add is i think until the election, anything that even a hint of doing something unilaterally is just not going to be on the table. on the other hand, the process, and i certainly agree with jon, grinds along the pentagon, inside the beltway. things are going to happen the way the u.s. military, the pentagon, and coordination with

the interagency wants it to happen. and some of those things are budget driven. they're going to try to save as much as they can't, realistically. but it's not going to be, it's not going to be a private agree with russia or anything. that's just my opinion. >> all right, thank you. other questions? yes, sir, in the middle. bruce. >> thank you. high. i'm bruce macdonald with the u.s. institute of peace. i think it's safe to say that when they this room there's a broad consensus in support of further reductions. and yet, and today our nato allies have been extraordinarily supportive of the new s.t.a.r.t. process. my question is, comes to the fact, i imagine going forward and seeing levels go down substantially more, i guess i want to ask particularly, dr. flockhart, but, of course, other distinguished panelists as well, is there a point at which

the u.s. extended deterrent, which are recognized of course is more than just nuclear weapons, our substantial conventional capability, a very important to mention of it, but is there a point at which our nato allies, obviously something than others, begin to get a little bit nervous about how though, how far down we go? because we are taken almost a given that our allies, again, they have been wonderful in their support, but is there a point where with the perceived benefits of extended nuclear deterrence begin to outweigh the value of further reductions? and how might we address that? >> well, i think, i think the point is very low. and realistically speaking we are going to have to face up to a deployment country number of two, within quite a short period of time. i don't think there's any doubt that germany will not continue,

and once that is on the table then i think holland, belgium are pretty certain to withdraw as well. the question then is whether the weapons that are placed in those three countries will then be transferred to turkey and italy, or whether they would be withdrawn back to the united states. either i think would still mean that could be an extended deterrence, and i think you could argue that within the aligns. i think it would be understand for the procedure, could go down to browse, you mention 20, perhaps you could go down to five, 10 weapons and jeff and still say that they are extended deterrence. so i don't think it's the numbers. i think it is much more to do with nato not being able to let go of the symbolic values that is attached to those weapons. i think most nato allies, including central and european, realize they have no strategic importance and that a strategic nuclear weapons back in the united states will provide just as much protection, if i can

call that, as those that are basing your. i don't think it's the numbers that's the issue. i think it is zero or more than zero that is the issue. >> just one point of clarification. the defense and deterrence posture review that was just released by nato in chicago states that the supreme guarantee of allied security are the strategic nuclear weapons of the three countries in nato with strategic nuclear weapons. the uk, u.s. and france. that deterrent capability and the last i notice our european allies are very supportive of further u.s.-russian reductions relating to strategic nuclear weapons. jon, any other points of? >> i think, you know, when i was really young, jack used to come in his office and explained the way the world had developed, and

so of course i remember his lecture on why we had tactical and nuclear weapons in the first place, which is going back really outdated thinking that the europeans were worried that somehow we're going to decouple our defense from their defense, and that we need to have in addition to the long-range strike capabilities we need to give those on the ground so that when we had a nuclear exchange to block the tanks in coming to the cat, russia, they would have to launch at us and it wouldn't just be a nuclear where in your. all of that is just out the window and useless in terms of american strategic thought. does anybody believe that somehow a tactical nuclear weapons from europe on russian territory would not be seen as a strategic threat to russia? so i mean, if we think we need to challenge russia in a strategically, we have lots of summaries, lots of icbms and a tactical nuclear weapons don't have a nuclear -- a nuclear war. [inaudible] >> the question that overall strategic love, there's a level

of 300, 700, is there some level of u.s. -- warheads they begin to make some allies and probably some sooner than others nervous? maybe poland or turkey get nervous before germany and denmark to. >> i think of all we were doing were maintaining everything that we have the status quo, started drastically reducing our nuclear weapons, there might be an argument that countries get nervous the the concern is they might develop new click of those other own or the alliance would fall apart. blow country and however what we need to think about is how you supplement your extended reassurance capabilities to these countries. and that is a political process, and gets to how often engage with these country, gets to the question of where american troops are deployed, how you in opera, what capabilities are being purchased on conventional side. there's a whole list of things they are we could do and should have done that we didn't that

within make it much easier for the united states to go too much issue number to even if that were to adequate a long way to go before these countries start to get nervous. >> i think with time for one or two more questions, even though we have lots of fancy. why don't we go over here to nancy green him and then we'll come over here. >> nancy from the university of maryland. ms. flockhart, one of things you mentioned that ddpr did not look at was what the effects of the european missile defense capability are, but i'm wondering whether you think that the nato allies agree on what the actual missile defense capability is, now into the new future, vis-à-vis the threats we face? and whether you see it as performing primarily a military role or a political role. and if it's really the latter, what are the effects of building up a missile defense capability to perform the same kind of political role that tactical

nuclear weapons have in the past, our which is replicating the same problems that we currently have with russia over an issue that is primarily politically symbolic? >> okay, i think you can look at the role of missile defense in two ways. i think it does have a military role, but it's not a military role that is directed at russia. it is inevitable that is directed at iran. and that's why they're there, but they could gain a missile defense capability could gain a very important political role in the alliance if it was to become the push, for example, for changing the current posture from one that is based completely on punishment to one that is based on denial. and it's going back to the very old-fashioned debate that i thought i had been in the back of in 1990, but nevertheless those of the kind of things that

are being talked about. but if you have a different deterrent posture divestment from deterrence by denial, from punishment to you now, including you have a completely different position within the alliance to discuss what is going to be a deterrent posture in the alliance pics that's the first thing that wasn't discussed in the ddpr which is a great shame but i think it was not discussed in the ddpr because of the way the whole process was run. that it was divided into three different committees. it was not an overall discussion that was looking at the conceptual understanding of what a deterrent and posture of the alliance should be. now, the other role of the missile defense would be much more political, because they would be a possibility to say all right, we don't have enough strategic nuclear weapons anymore. they were not needed anyway within this new deterrent posture, but we can use missile defense as another form of showing commitment in the

alliance. that is, completely the same as what has been happening in on strategic to the weapons, despite the wedding ring you show your commitment. you can do the same with the missile defense. so that is what i meant about the missile defense share. >> all right. any others on this? all right. we have a question over here, here thank you. >> thank you to continue on the missile defense question. there was this great feeling of friendship with russia, and russia was not even present in chicago, so what's happening in between? and the next question deals with economic, or the plan -- [inaudible] european economic difficult is to we are talking about sharing, and actually no countries is increasing its defense budget at this time. so how, how do you plan to find that in your?

thank you spent jon, trine? >> well, the relationship with russia, as i'm sure you know, is worse than it was at lisbon but it is better than it was in 2008. so i think it's a string. it's difficult to say with relationship with russia is but i think we also have to take into account that all the negative developments are not completely without reason. i think that the offer that was given at lisbon for missile defense cooperation sounded much better than what it actually is but i have great difficulty in seeing what rush can actually gain from what is being offered from nato. so perhaps it's not surprising that there has been a downturn in the relationship, and then on top of that a russian presidential election, which is also being important for that relationship, because nato is perceived in russia as the enemy, in the public it's very

difficult to go out and say well, now we are france with nato. nato has been painted as the big devil and it will continue to be the big devil in russian public for a long time to come. so there are some quite severe restrictions. so the relationship with russia i think we'll probably get better. that's my, my hope anyway. on the cost of missile defense, i think the europeans think that the americans are going to pay most of it. and that is -- [laughter] that is the main benefit of it. and then there's the option for different europeans to contribute, but that is only an option and this is where my argument is that the option is to show commitment by actually buying into the missile defense. it may be a complete waste of money. i can't judge the technical details of it, but i think that is the thinking that is going on. >> i would just say, i think trine is exactly what a missile

defense. we place it within in the context at a time which we did as a step forward eric since this is a missile defense program to protect europe more than it is to protect the united states versus the old plan. but i think where the economics commanders on as trine said, on the delivery capability. the idea that multiple european countries are going to spend a lot of money on the most expensive fighter plane system ever developed, in this time is not since the. the fact that united states will be in a position where we are the one integer economies in order, but on the advancing know, you have to buy this plan, i think it is unsustainable. so our f-16s will wear out in about 2017. will not have a too capable capability and i think trine is right, regardless of what we written in ddpr, these problems will solve themselves and in the midterm, we need to start thinking critically about how we put that to our advantage. >> well, thank you all. we are out of time for this bill. we'll be returning to many of

these subjects, missile defense tactical nuclear weapons. nuclear weapons strategy, deeper reduction in u.s.-russian arsenals at future arms control association defense. i want, as, before ask you to join in thank our panelists, i want to invite the next panel to get ready to hop a. no, because we're going to resume without a break. so if you do need a break you're welcome to do so during the course of the next session. but please join me in thanking general dirk jameson, jon wolfsthal and trina lockhart -- trina flockhart. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> [inaudible conversations] >> [inaudible conversations]

>> [inaudible conversations] >> as we continue with our coverage of the arms control association conference on nuclear nonproliferation issues, they will start up in a couple of minutes, we'll hear about the ongoing international negotiations of iran's nuclear program. among the participants, thomas pickering and the former iranian nuclear envoy. and then coming up at about noon eastern we expected from the event keynote speaker, the acting undersecretary of date for arms control and international security and the new s.t.a.r.t. make a shooter. is all getting underway and a couple couple minutes you on c-span2. [inaudible conversations]

>> as we wait for the next nextel to convene the u.s. senate will return to work today after a weeklong memorial day break. the chamber will gavel in at qb and -- at 2 p.m. eastern this afternoon. also making it illegal for employers to retaliate against employees for sharing salary information. votes on that measure are not expected until tomorrow. also on the scheduled today at 5:30 p.m. each and senators will take up the nomination of timothy hillman to be a federal district court judge in massachusetts. a vote expected at about 5:30 p.m. eastern. >> [inaudible conversations]

>> [inaudible conversations] >> [inaudible conversations]

>> [inaudible conversations] >> [inaudible conversations]

>> if everyone could please take their seats, we'll move to our second panel. [inaudible conversations] >> as those in this room know, we are now at another critical juncture in efforts to negotiate

a resolution to issues surrounding iran's nuclear program. after a long interval, the six powers reengage with the rent on april 14 in istanbul, on may 23 and 24th in baghdad, the parties discuss specific proposals. the six powers call for iran to end its enrichment of uranium to 20% and shift its stockpile of metro out of the country in exchange for providing 20% enriched uranium in the form of fuel plates for the iran research reactor nuclear security assistance and critical spare parts for civilian aircraft. iranian's presented their own five-point plan offering greater international access to its nuclear facilities in exchange for easing of sanctions and recognition of its right to enrich uranium. iran's chief negotiators voiced disappointment about the lack of

sanctions in the six powers offer, and complained that their proposal was unbalanced. the head of the six power delegation, europe's catherine ashton, was more positive hoping for a tangible progress that the next round of talks in moscow on june 18-19th. meanwhile, the head of the international atomic energy agency went to to run to discuss a framework or structural approach for addressing specific concerns about past iranian activities. i the end of june, the united states is scheduled to tighten existing sanctions by beginning to sanction all foreign banks in the process of iranian oil transactions through iran's central bank, your teams are scheduled to ban all imports of iranian oil starting july 1. and the centrifuge keeps spinning, and suspicions about

possible military -- of iran's nuclear program linger. as was the israeli-palestinian dispute, it's easier to sketch out the shape of a realistic solution than it is to figure out exactly how to get there. so to help us sort out this most difficult task, we have a panel of three eminent experts. by graphic highlights have been provided by you in writing to let me introduce each to you in a few words. ambassador thomas pickering, has headed more u.s. embassies in many diplomats at have a chance to work in their entire career. he has led the u.s. mission of the united nations and served as undersecretary of state for political terrorists. it's also been very active in track to discussions on iranian nuclear issues. ambassador hossein mousavian has served as iran's ambassador for germany for seven years.

as head of the foreign relations committee of iran's national security council and as spokesman for iran's delegation talks, the european union 2003-2005. now a scholar at princeton university and the author of a new book, iranian nuclear crisis, a memoir, which would be launched here in this building tomorrow. tarja cronberg as a member of the european parliament and shares the relations with iran. an engineer by training, she -- business administration, served as mr. of labor, and speaks six lane which is, most difficult which is french. without further ado, let me turn to our speakers for brief remarks on where we are in the wake of baghdad and what we need to accomplish in moscow.

ambassador pickering, if i could ask you to go first. >> thank you, greg, very much for the kind introduction. it's a pleasure to be on the panel. hussein and i have done shows together. we are, if it won't really destroy his reputation at home, quite together on a lot of ideas, and i just met and have pledged out briefly with doctor tarja cronberg. let me also can't limit the arms control association. i'm a new in recent memory having emerged. i believe you have made and continue to make a major contribution. notches in thanking but indeed constructive examination i think and the way that's a policy in this critically important area. i'm honored and pleased to be here, and see old france in the audits and intellect of a chance to address this critically important issue. i was asked to address two

questions. one, what is my judgment about baghdad, and secondly what is my feel about the process ahead. i will do that against the drawback of a third issue, the question of the overall situation as i see them at the present time. i used to fatally tell the story about an inch on the out of the empire state building going past the 24, everything was simply splendid. i have to modify the a little bit, take it to the west coast. the guy jumped off the golden gate bridge. he survives in the water and the currents sweep them away. we are sort of more in that mode of the moment don't are the empire state building where even with the new york police holding the safety net, the chances are that 99.9% have. we struggled very hard, so i the parties to get us to the negotiating table. it's very important obviously to maximum use be made of this. against that backdrop, it is

extremely hard to see how and in what way this process will move ahead. there are 32 years of mistrust between the united states and iran, supplemented by galloping misunderstanding, and, indeed, the lack of communications has been a thoroughly and i think completely deleterious experience for both countries. the idea of being able to examine the problem of the worst case on both sides has become an artform, and, indeed, is more of a controlling peace than the ability to begin to talk. and i think that is very significant. p5+1, or the european three plus three, depending on which side the atlantic we prefer, is a process that has now begun and holds a safe crack open for the future. my sense is that in every serious commitment of this sort, that crack must be capped open.

and estimation of istanbul and baghdad is pretty much the golden gate bridge of faith storing. the good news is that both have tended to produce continuation talks, whereas the old pattern was have a one night stand meaning go away with complete disagreement, to spend the next eight months trying to negotiate the next meeting. i hope we're past that stage, but we could slide back. then is simple has some good news in a sense i think the iranian side suggested some thoughts that the nine in rating site agree to. including proceeding with stage by stage of examination and perhaps resolution based on the notion that there would be balance and reciprocity at each stage, and while there was a kind of disagreement i have tht iran would like to make the guidepost for this particular set of arrangements pretty exclusively the nonproliferation

treaty, and while the non-iranians could agree, they also had other side post, including the security council resolution to ask for cessation of iranian enrichment to be double the problem further. i have a sense that coming out of the baghdad meeting, there could've been three results. minimal, better, and slightly better. minimal was to have another meeting, and they didn't with the benefit of a sandstorm keeping them another day. agreed have a meeting in moscow on the 18th and 19th of june. i remember as ambassador to moscow, there used to be an old soviet story that there was a contest, and first prize was a week in moscow. and second prize was two weeks in moscow. so let's hope we go for second prize. there is a strong, and i think, important piece that the new president of russian was really the old president of russia has been president of russia despite the fact he's been prime

minister for some time. has not gotten himself booked on this particular issue as i think he has become hooked on syria because of his veto. .. >> here, i believe, an estimate of the situation has to very much take into account some of the domestic imperatives that influence both sides. in that regard, my summation is that for the united states smaller is better, particularly to begin with, and for iran

bigger is better, and that's certainly where the two sides are coming at this. smaller is better for the united states because in an election year i speak quite frankly, the president takes great risks in making big compromises because the points of attack are multiplied and, indeed, explaining why he went so far particularly very early in the game is a very difficult situation. on the other hand, the president has a national interest imperative in the finding a diplomatic solution. in the effort to continue to find a diplomatic solution is a small but not conclusive make weight against a precipitous action to attack iran. but keeping the process going until after the elections with no movement also has a kind of conclusion of sterility and fecklessness that will arrive sooner or later to greet something if property isn't

achieved. -- if the process isn't achieved. on the iranian side, there is very definitely a significant degree of mistrust over the united states and has been for a year and, indeed, over the western side in the sense that the real policy is regime change. and while we have, perhaps, tried more or less to avoid conveying that notion, from the iranian optic it is possible to see through whatever prism they're looking at that almost everything we do one way or another is examined in that context and is looked at them as a very serious challenge in that regard. to escape from that and, indeed, to make some progress and, indeed, to deal with what their preoccupation is, the notion of two peaches or two features on the landscape make a certain amount of sense. friends and i, along with many be others, proposed some years ago that the essential trade-off would be some permitted enrichment, perhaps limited to civil purposes, it certainly should be, in return for much

greater transparency about the iranian program. and while this was not a sovereign answer, it provided the best that we could think of at the time and seems continually now to swim in to the picture. and i'm quite pleased that iran is in favor of that. i think underlying this particular crisis is the notion that something that large so soon from the u.s. perspective would be very difficult. and something too small from the iranian perspective keeps in mind the lurking shadow, the 900-pound gorilla, of regime change which is not as dispelled as the notion that the real purpose continues to be to take iran totally out of the nuclear business. now, iran is in the nuclear business for reasons that are difficult to fathom, and my friend hussein has been challenged but has tried in his own way to make it clear. why the hell would you spend billions of dollars and build 10,000 centrifuges for a program for which you have no apparent

use? and that worries us. there is, from time to time, talk to going back to the shah's reactor program. but at the moment the large accumulation of enriched material and the large accumulation of enrichment technology is concerning, and that's one of the reasons why there is a western preoccupation about enrichment per se. even though it could be limited. underneath this and, obviously, affecting negotiations -- and i'm getting to my final points -- there is a continuing problem about what i would call different interpretations of the npt. hussein and his friends, and i agree with them quite rightly, believe the npt provides the right to enrich. but in my view, it doesn't provide a right to enrich for purposes that are unrelated to civil programs and may be related to military programs. and this is one of the

difficulties. my sense is that a reasonable interpretation of the npt is you can do what you need to do in a nuclear sense in order to try to get a sufficient amount of material for your civilian programs. but going beyond is difficult. and on the iranian sense, i think it is anything that doesn't represent truth of diversion is permitted by the treaty. and can getting ready to make a decision or putting yourself in a position to make a decision to go for nuclear weapons is, in a sense, the underlying deep difficulty here, or one of them that we have to look at. where to go. my sense is that the next stage ought to be within the p5 plus 1 an effort to get an agreement around the trr and some cessation of 20%. don't embellish it, don't foul it up with much more. maybe it could be slightly enhanced by some willingness not

to institute some of the sanctions that have been approved, some of which may be small but not insignificant, some, as someone suggested, sanctions perhaps on insuring petroleum cargoes from iran could be a way of beginning to indicate that the u.s. is ready to move on sanctions. the second piece is much more difficult, but i think very important from the iranian side. and it goes to my deep concern about mistrust. i think that there ought to be a serious effort, and so far i have to say iran has stood in the way of this, of opening bilateral conversations in the context of the p53 talks between the united states and iran at a senate level to convey assurance -- at a significant level to convey assurance that the real decision of country x and country y is being obeyed. including some of the things that kissinger first did when things opened with china, but it could begin to talk about an end game, an end game in which

weapons were prohibited in accordance with the fatwa with no uncertainty about the npt. a set of relationships which included much more transparency, i hope designed and carried out by the iaea. a set of relationships in many which we accepted iranian right to enrich for civil purposes and perhaps sequestration of excess material if the iranians have produced until they're ready to use it, and then finally a gradual but senate removal of -- significant removal of the nuclear sanctions as this process proceeds, and some serious effort to deal with the problem that has now arisen that there are sanctions on things other than nuclear which very much also impact iran. they're there for purposes that people consider legitimate and right including human rights issues, but somehow need to be factored into the discussion in a painful but, i think, useful way. if these two tracts could proceed as a result of moscow and beyond, i think there is a

slight way that we could thread the needle if you want to call it that into a position where perhaps after the american elections bigger and more useful things from the iranian perspective can be done, and my own view is that we have to get there. but giving the iranians some notion of the end game even on a private basis would be an important aspect of the second tract within the p5 +1 of u.s./iranian discussions. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you, ambassador pickering. and now ambassador mousavi. >> thank you very much. always talking after tom for me is difficult and easy both. it is easy because we have our mindsets are very close. is difficult because normally he leaves nothing for you to discuss. [laughter] first of all, i would like to thank arms control association for managing this event.

i would like to touch some points out of my experience which i believe would be helpful for reaching a face-saving solution for iranian nuclear issue. the first issue is to depoliticize the case. i think it too much politicized. and the two parties, they need to take steps to depoliticize the issue. the second issue is what tom raised about the rights on their n npt. definitely, there is rights under npt because many other countries, they have enrichment and processing. if it is illegal, everybody should stop. why they are talking about only iran now? therefore, the rights is there. the argument is the western side is emphasizing maintaining that

responsibilities come first and then rights. iran maintains the rights come first and responsibility come after. i think in moscow they can, already they have agreed in istanbul on step-by-step plan. in one step they can agree on a simultaneous approach. i mean, the p5 plus 1 respects the rights of iran for peaceful technology including enrichment under npt, and iran also immediately at the same time accepts to sign the tentative draft agreement already agreed in tehran during last visit of her man know. this is a war plan which if iran signs, this would address the whole ambiguities and technical

questions of the iaea including the possible military dimensions. this can be parallel in order to end the game, this chicken and be egg game. the third one is the focal point of the p5 +1 during last nine, ten years, always they have been focusing on suggestion pension. i believe -- suspension. i believe in the future they should focus on transparency measures. if they're looking for a sustainable solution, suspension would not work, and the last ten years of negotiation proves it has not worked. the fourth point is proportion and reciprocation. they agreed in reciprocation in istanbul, but they fail in baghdad because i believe the p5 +1 was asking too much, giving the minimum.

they were asking iran to stop -- [inaudible] to address possible military dimension, to implement additional protocol, everything. the maximum iran can do in reward to give some state powers. this would never be successful. the fifth point i have, i think there are 14 countries, either they are operating or building enrichment. any solution on iran should have the capacity to be a model for other countries. because iran will never be ready to be singled out and demonized as a member of the npt. therefore, they should have a broader vision in order to create out of iran issue, to create the model to be acceptable for others. number six is to have a broader

vision on negotiation. i think a face-saving solution can accommodate broader cooperation between iran and the west, iran and the p5 +1 on bigger issues, security and energy, regional stability. if they have such a region, i think they would not have staged everything to the nuclear issue. and number seven is iran/u.s. relations. i believe this issue plays a very, very important role on the nuclear issue. that's why i believe always i have mentioned iran and the be u.s., they need to have a direct talk in parallel with nuclear talks between iran and the p5 mrs. 1. p5 +1. and issue number eight is the impartiality of the iaea. after eight, nine years working on iranian nuclear case, at the end he said during my time at

the agency we have not seen a shred of evidence that iran has been weaponizing. just right after that, the u.s. revealed by wikileaks that ermano is in the u.s. court specifically on the iranian issue and alleged nuclear studies of iranian nuclear issue, but the ermano focused on the possible military dimension. and iranians, they have a feeling that more cooperation they have had with the iaea, more sabotage, more covert action, assassination of the nuclear scientists. this is a big issue for the iranian side. and my ninth point, the last point also tom mentioned, for iran it is extremely important to see the end of state. the u.s., the p5 +1, not the p5

+1 because russia and china, they have other vision. the western powers are always looking for a piecemeal approach, but iranians, they want to see the end state, the end game. that's why a step-by-step plan, a broad package to be implemented in step-by-step plan is extremely important. but for moscow i think the stockpile, 20% stockpile initiative would be the best achievement for both parties if they can agree in moscow. the p5 +1 is they are asking iran to stop 20%. this would not be a sustainable solution. because maybe for a short time at the end iran would never accept to be devim niced. why iran should not have? as a confidence-building measure

for a short period, maybe. but they should think about a long-term solution. my idea is zero stockpile for 20%. what do i mean? a joint committee can be established between iran and the p5 +1 to determine the percentage of the stockpile of 20% which iran needs domestically to convert it to fuel rod. the rest either can be exported or converted to 3.5%. therefore, iran would accept zero stockpile forever. this is the best objective guarantee for nondiversion. rather than pushing iran to close fadu or to stop 20%, this -- even if it works which i don't believe it would work, even if they accept this would be a short-time solution.

the second issue as i mentioned on transparency, the maximum question on iranian nuclear dossier is possible military dimensions issues raised by the iaea. what iaea expect and the p5 +1, they can expect. the maximum level of transparency. they can define for iran the maximum level of transparency. whether this is additional protocol, if iran accepts to address the possible military position, pmd, it means iran would have to implement additional protocol and would have to give access to the iaea beyond additional protocol. if iran is ready to sign such agreement, then the p5 +1 also should be ready for at least the upcoming sanctions on central

bank 1st of july and the oil, ray yang oil even -- iranian oil, even if not by americans. thank you. [applause] >> now, doctor. >> thank you. yes, i am the last speaker. i'll speak from my chair and my notes with the others, so i'm trying to fill in as much as i can. first of all, i am a member of the european parliament, member of the -- a member of the foreign relations committee and a member of the defense committee. and also the chair of the parliament's delegation with relations to iran. this doesn't mean that the delegation even if it's called a delegation is located in iran. on the other hand, we are in the parliament. it consists of different politicians from different groups into parliament, and our goal is to understand what's

going on in iran. we follow the nuclear negotiations, we try to follow, also, the human rights situation and many other aspects of the iranian society. we try to have contact with the parliament and also with the civil society as well as people outside of iran. so i am not a part of the negotiations, but following the negotiations closely. as you know, the negotiations are led by ashton, the high representative of foreign policy in the european union, and i think this is why we in the european union are on the other side of the atlantic as ambassador pickering said. we would like to talk about the e.u. 3 +3 rather than the p5 +1, but i don't think it does make a big difference. i'll first comment on the current situation and then try to look at what i feel is too narrow focus on uranium

enrichment in the negotiations and then go on to the european, what could with the next step the european union could do? first of all, we sent a letter to the iranians and mr.y hallly saying that there would be respect for the peaceful uses, iranian interests in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. and this, i think, created the hope among the iranians that, actually, uranium enrichment could be discussed, it was a negotiable thing, and it would be on the table. they were willing, i think, to reduce their 20% requirement, but no such proposition was on the table. actually, the question was that the p5 +1 insisted on suspension of uranium enrichment.

and i think the second thing that there was this question of, that the iranians needed guarantees of being able to access 20% uranium because of their one million cancer patients, and no such guarantees were provided. i think there's a history, i presume, that the iranians have had a hard time in getting 20% enriched uranium for these medical purposes. on the other hand, of course, giving up maybe the 20% enrichment, then the iranians would expect a relaxation on sanctions. no such proposal was on the table. i think there was a proposal of airplane parts and maybe minor things like that. so there was this clash, and the question is how to proceed. the iranian approach has been that the chief of the iranian

nuclear establishment has said that they will not give up 20% enrichment. maybe what was just proposed, the idea of not stockpiling 20% enriched uranium would be a solution on this questionment but the, the stance is toughening, and the language is a different one. now, why do i feel that the focus on uranium enrichment is too narrow? i think the goal is to prevent a nuclear-armed iran, and nuclear -- the military aspects of nuclear weapons, it's much more than uranium enrichment. this is only one of the aspects. and i think the other aspects have to be taken into account, design and implementation of nuclear weapons and how far is iran from this aspect. i think we're talking about longer time than just one year

or the sort of the one year free time before we have a nuclear weapon-dominated iran. so much more than uranium enrichment and this aspect should be included also in the negotiations. the second question is the sanctions. the iranians expect some signs of relaxing sanctions. and the west, at least the western powers, are not willing to give this indication. this may be a step-by be-step procedure. i don't know what it means end game on end result of all the sanctions, but the question is, of course, that in -- i understand that in the u.s. that situation is such that since it's the congress that is legislating on the sanctions, it will be required more time, and it will be more difficult to relax any sanctions. in the year pube -- european

union, it's the foreign minister that can decide on this question of sanctions. so maybe there should be some discussion of 1st of july the european sanctions would go into full effect, and in moscow there should be a dug of this deadline -- a discussion of this deadline. the third point is on the uranium enrichment is the npt context. i think what the iranian case shows is that it's very difficult to define the limits of the peaceful uses as opposed to the military uses. so we have, actually, a treaty where there's no clear divide on these two aspects. and i think this is very detrimental for the negotiations there one way or the other. iran feels they have the right, on the other hand, the p5 +1 feel that iran has not respected its obligations. and the question is maybe what

comes first, obligations or rights. i think they should be in balance. but the iranian argument is, of course, that there are double standards in the npt, and nuclear powers have not respected their obligations to disarm, that there are double standards in terms of other countries which have nuclear weapons outside the npt are not pressured equally as iran. and finally, the right to fuel cycle, what does it mean and how will it be defined. so in this case the npt, i think there's a fundamental question of the future over the npt in this case. and we should consider that as well. if there's a military strike, which i hope will not be the case, it is a question of a country outside the npt with nuclear weapons attacking a country within the npt and at

least as far as we know without the decision to produce nuclear weapons. so the question is, how important is the npt for us in the future? the fourth dimension i would like to take up is the question of regional security before going to the next step for the european union. i think the question is there are some security concerns in the wider middle east, we all know this, and and i think it's interesting to note that when the continuation of the npt was agreed in 1995, there was an agreement of a conference on the wider middle east on nuclear weapons in the middle east. at the conference 2010, it was agreed that this conference would cover the whole scope of weapons of mass destruction, and the conference would take place in 2012. we have the situation where this

conference is going to take place. the countries that sponsor this issue -- u.k., russia and the u.s -- actually propose that this conference will take place in finland and the facilitator who's now traveling world around actually trying to discuss the question of mass destruction weapons-free middle east. the question is difficult, i know, and no practical steps will probably be taken for a long time. but it's important that all these parties will meet at the same table and that will be able to at least start the process. so i think these negotiations in baghdad and next time in moscow should also be seen in the context of this regional security and this u.n. conference that's coming up. they should not be isolateed, and at least there's a timeline, probably this conference will take place in december.

so if the negotiations break up before that time -- which also coincides with the new u.s. president -- then it would be very, very unfortunate. so i would actually like to, like to appeal to the arms control association that you observe that this conference is taking place and that it's important that, actually, this question of the negotiations will be related into the wider scope of security, regional security in the middle east. now a few words of -- how many minutes do i have? two? is. >> about two. >> okay, fine. the european aspect, what are the next steps, i think, i'll try to concentrate on those. the european union has accepted the u.s. dual-track approach. so, actually, sanctions were approved in the end of january, and the intention was to send two messages. first of all, a message to iran

that the european union is serious and, secondly, send a message to israel not to strike and not to provide a military solution. the -- i think this decision was unique in the sense that it was, actually, the first time the european-member countries supported the common foreign defense policy. this was the first time the europeans actually agreed. i mean, this was historic. this was an agreement on the surface. there were different positions in the european union. i think one could describe them that the french president, sarkozy, was on the other extreme supporting sanctions, very tough sanctions, even tougher maybe than obama and keeping, also, president obama on the sanctions line. and then on the other hand, sweden was actually, went along with the sanctions rather reluctantly.

so there was an agreement. the european parliament has support bed -- supported sanctions and has a longstanding position that no military solution is possible. so, actually, the european parliament stands on diplomatic solutions with or without sanctions. now, the problem is that the e.u. is leading the negotiations, but it lacks a long-term strategy on iran. contrary to the u.s. position which actually sees iran as an enemy, the e.u. does not see iran as an enemy. there's no enemy picture related to the question of diplomatic contacts with iran. so this is a different position. so i think the european union should actually design a long-term strategy which implies cautious engagement rather than containment of iran.

and as a first step in this long-term engagement, there's a proposal by the european parliament to establish presence in the iran actually in the form of a permanent delegation. secondly, it is important to note that the nuclear issue, nuclear dossier is only part of e.u.'s relationships with iran and that these should be balanced with economic incentives as well as the question of human rights. which is very important for the european union and particularly to the parliament. so the nuclear non-proliferation issues would be combined with these incentives. and certainly there's a question of the regional security which is important for the europeans, and here i think we should at least support the conference that i mentioned before and see turkey as a very important bridge building for us.

finally, i hope that the negotiations will continue, that there's no breakdown, and i think for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and for nuclear non-proliferation, a military strike would be a fundamental mistake. thank you. >> thank you. [applause] >> we have about 25 minutes for questions. we're going to move quickly through them. i just want today use my prerogative to -- wanted to use my prerogative to ask one follow-up question to ambassador knew salve yang. we often hear cited as a model for future negotiation of nuclear cooperation agreements the one we negotiated with the united arab emirates as the gold standard. we, in the united states, obviously prefer a model which does not involve the full fuel cycle, does not spread the number of countries that have a

full infrastructure for uranium enrichment. i gather from what you said you would be in favor of encouraging countries like the uae, like jordan, like turkey to use iran as the model for nuclear development? >> no. >> no. okay. >> should i explain? >> yes. [laughter] >> yeah. i think the enrichment today is just because of the u.s. policy. right after revolution when iran decided to shrink nuclear activities, the u.s. position was no nuclear power plant for iran. the u.s. was not ready to recognize even the rights of iran for power plant. and this was the reason the room yangs, they could not do anything in order to complete the unfinished projects of --

[inaudible] the western countries, they left iran with billions of dollars of unfinished projects, and they were not ready -- iran had no plan, no program for enrichment. and the revolutionaries, they decided even to decrease to minimum the ambitious projects of bushehr. but even when the west challenged the rights for nuclear power plants, you left no other options for iranians to go for self-sufficiency. then after iran mastered enrichment, then the u.s. said, okay, now we recognize the rights of iran for nuclear power plants. after iran mastered the enrichment. this was the best way in order to convince the u.s. that you should respect the rights of members under npt for at least civilian power plants. and then that time again the

u.s. position was zero enrichment. when iran mastered 10,000 centrifuges, now and u.s. and the europeans they are thinking, okay, not 20%, maybe 3.5%. i mean, the mistake is from the beginning, greg. iran was never going to have enrichment from the beginning. you just pushed iran to this situation. if at the beginning of revolution, the early years of revolution, the germans they have completed the bushehr power plant, iran had no program to have the second power plant, it was the u.s. proposal to have 23 power plants a after the revolution. a after the revolution, the iranians said we don't want 23 power plants. now after 30 years which iran has paid hundreds of billions of dollars of costs because of your pressures, now you're expecting

iran to give up everything. it doesn't work. it's very different with united emirates. you cannot compare iran with united emirates. >> thank you. we'll take questions from the floor, please. wait for the mic, give your name and be brief. francois? >> this there's a microphone co. >> i'm francois -- [inaudible] deputy head of the european union here, and i've been also working on nuclear relations in iran in 2005, taking part in the talks with iran, and i'm also adviser to the secretary general, ban ki-moon. and that's why we reflect a lot about this issue of npt and u.n. security council resolutions, and i have to say doesn't it -- [inaudible] the presentation has been made about two interpretations of npt. i think there is a very central

interpretation which is shared by almost everybody and which is that when you have the right to enrich, every country under npt has the right to enrich, this is sure. this is clear in article iv. but at the same time you have to have a use for that. and i agree that it's ambiguous, the distinction between civilian and military ill because even military use is admitted for brazil for building possibly nuclear subha lean of which -- submarine which has been disputed by canada. but at least it's not building nuclear weapons. because -- >> [inaudible] >> the question is very simple. we have today no use for -- [inaudible] very small thing. so if there is a solution, we have to have to imaging civilian use for iranian program which today has none. and my question to you both is, do you see the possibility of

having to use commensurate to the site of program, and if not, can you reduce a program to a size of uses which you could have? because the present civilian uses are so little compared to the size of the program, you know? but there is an absolute presumption that it is not for civilian or even military-authorized uses. thank you. >> so how to make commensurate, i guess, ambassador pickering, do you want to field that? >> i think francois raises a very interesting and important be question. there are disagreements about the fundamental and broader accepted determination about absolute equality here is the military goes beyond the civilian is suspect. my own feeling is that in the course of a negotiation at some point we're going to have to sit down and define the question. otherwise we continue to propagate the misunderstanding or at least the differences and the difficulty.

and i think that's very important. i think that doing that early rather than later is significant. one of the reasons i proposed u.s./iranian bilaterals is that that question among many others might be explored privately. it wouldn't be to the exclusion of the p5 +1, but it would begin to give a sense of confidence for people who have had much less contact with iran than the e.u.3 have had. and i think that that along with the questions of difference of interpretation make a lot of sense. i also think it's very important for us to comet to think about how -- continue to think about how to plug the loopholes of the npt. one of those is interpretation, one of those is, obviously, definition of what's civilian and isn't is everything that's not civilian excluded, or is everything allowed unless it's diversion? i mean, these are broad questions, and they have to be, i think, put into shape. i think finally we need to think about the end state.

if you asked me, i would say there is no palpable reason, apologies to france, for the use of plutonium in any fuel proposition unless it can be conclusively demonstrated that there is an economic imperative. and if there is, then that -- and i would then ask for for enrichment to be totally multilaterallized and be done on a basis where there is competition, but done on a basis where there is absolute transparency. and the greatest safeguards against diversion rather than as hussein would say, forcing people to go independently on the one hand, ortively failing to persuade people there is a reliable international system with competition that cannot be used as a way to bring political pressure on countries for questions that go beyond proliferation, and my hope is that it would support

non-proliferation in an important way. but that's my hobby horse, and i'm sticking to it. >> dr. cromberg, you wanted to say something? >> yes, i agree with the ambassador that we have to define the question and reach a situation where the civil and military uses are defined in a way where political pressure is as little as possible. but what i want to make a point is that there's a third dimension between the civil and the military, and that's the prestige dimension. and i think we are seeing all over the world that the nuclear technology carries with it prestige which probably has nothing to do with military uses or civilian uses, but actually provides the country with a self-esteem about being on the level of other countries. this was the case in china when it acquired nuclear weapons. this is at least to some extent the case in iran today.

so i think the question of delegitimizing this prestige question is very important because otherwise we'll see the proliferation of nuclear technology which is proliferating. we see that the thong is the same -- the knowledge is the same, and countries were to acquire this knowledge. so how you see the question of getting rid of the prestige aspect, the iranians need at least one centrifuge to remain sort of on the nuclear technology program. >> ambassador mousavian, did you have a response? >> i think, again, after revolution it was france declined the contract iran had already with france on enrichment. if you had not declined, if you have accepted the -- it was supposed to, the enrichment, to be done in your land, not iran. but you didn't want. okay. the second issue is that if the

problem is nuclear bomb, 100% confident the iranian side they would accept all measures, all shipments to insure -- all commitments to insure the international committee that iran would remain forever a nonnuclear weapon state. this is not an issue for iran. on transparency measures, openness, cooperation with iaea, up to the end they would be 100% open. if their rights are respected. ultimately, the sanctions also should be lifted. and we remember, francois, again in 2003-2004 the e.u.3, they were asking us objective guarantees for nondiversion. for a year we were asking them, okay, define for us what is

objective guarantees. they were not able to define what do they want. [laughter] yeah. and then we had the meeting with president chirac in early 2005. we agreed with him that we would leaf to the iaea -- leave to the iaea to define objective guarantees for nondiversion. we left paris. when we arrived in germany, we were told that london has discussed with washington, and washington has rejected. even though they were not ready to leave to the iaea to define the objective guarantees for nondiversion, and in the spring 2005 i have explained in my book, when i met privately the three, e.u.3 interlocutors, i told them let's agree -- it was before presidential election. i told them, let's agree for iran to have a pilot.

we would export 100% of production, even the production of the pilot. and then we would negotiate for a longer period in order to reach some kind of compromise to give more time to you europeans to define objective guarantees. and this, even this proposal when we were ready to have one pilot, this was rejected, again, by the u.s. i mean, iran was not really very much eager to accelerate the program. even that time this proposal was concerned by the leader. but europeans, they were not ready to cooperate with iran. >> next brief question. bill? is -- >> thank you, greg. thank you, panelists. daryl kimball, i have a question

for ambassador pickering and ambassador mousavian. news reports say there will be yet another round of discussions between the iaaea and iran regarding the framework concept for dealing with the possible military activities that iran is suspected of being involved in in the past. so my question is, what do you see as being possible in these discussions which come just a week before the iaea board of governors meeting? what needs to be done in order to move forward to resolve these questions, and if that could be achieved, how might that effect the dynamics of the p5 +1 and iran discussions in if moscow? is. >> maybe, daryl, i could take a shot at it. i think it's an important issue. for me, the possible military dimensions issue lodged before

mainly 2003, there's some continuing disputes, but the intelligence community is basically cometting to reassure -- continuing to reassure us the judgments they made in 2007 remain, the u.s. intelligence committee. that, therefore, the pnd question in my view is of most sail crept importance to, in effect, provide the iaea with the fullest possible information to guard against problems in the future. i would be willing to adopt what i would call the south african model, a no-fault process. you tell the truth, and the whole truth, there are no consequences. if you don't tell the truth, there are all conceivable consequences. in part, it's a test of good faith. in part, it's a way to determine the answer, and in part it's to take the burden of the guilt trip off the back of iran. which, in my view, is not

necessary if, in fact, we're proceeding in a reasonable basis for the future. now, this may be totally thigh eve and starry-eyed. -- naive and starry-eyed. but in my sense, the notion that we're going to start worrying about the past when the big bang problem is in the future is not a useful enterprise. and i think what the south africans did with respect to their own terrible record on apartheid and how they handled that awful, devisive and difficult problem for the future -- not in any way perfect, but those who didn't tell the truth, suffered the consequences. those who did tell the truth, emerged, and they had a record and, indeed, there was closure. in my sense, we need some closure, but we need more importantly to have the iaea as fully and as possibly widely informed as it can to design for the future, and i just heard hossein say, i mean, we don't represent any governments. that was our problem. we could agree, probably, tomorrow. [laughter] but the problem is the

governments aren't there, and it's like the middle east peace, as greg said. if that were the case, then i think there could be an answer. so i think clearing up possible military developments is important, but do i think it should stand in the way of future progress? probably not. i think the uncertainties with respect to possible military developments are not all that salient, that the end result is going to be bent or skewed if they remain in semiobscurity. what is bent or skewed in this is iranian good faith. and i think iran needs an opportunity under conditions that are not punitive to demonstrate that it has, is prepared to approach the negotiations in good faith. i think that there are other tests of good faith on the other side, and i don't exclude them, but now's not the time to explore them. >> the iaea's questions, they have two technical questions. one relates to after 2003 which

i think 80-90% of technical ambiguities are already removed, 10, 15% are left. this has been already discussed in the previous visit of amano to tehran, and tehran agreed to give required access to the iaea to cooperate in order to remove these remaining issues. possible military dimension, as tom said relates to 1980s, the early 1990s. this is not to the current program of iranian nuclear issue which needs iran to implement additional protocol and even to give access to the iaea beyond additional protocol. again, this has been already agreed in tehran. i mean, in the previous visit of amano, 90%, 95% of the issues

how to cooperate and giving access, this happenses was resolved, they agreed. 5%, 10% are left. i'm sure iran would agree this is not an issue. let's say if iran agrees to give all access, inspections, cooperations with the iaea, then the p5 +1 in moscow they would be ready to respect the rights of iran or not? if not, this would fail. >> just have a few minutes, let's just take two questions and give our speakers a chance to respond. um, barbara? >> barbara slain from the -- slavin from the atlantic council. with all due respect, we understand that iran is cleansing and be has been working assiduously to clean the site. so when we talk about establishing trust, ambassador, this is not something that

engenders much trust among the p5 +1. um, it seems that what you're saying is that iran is going to trade an agreement with the iaea for something at moscow, but obviously we have a disconnect because what the p5 +1 is saying is that they want on action on 20% in return for some action at moscow. so if you could address this disconnect, do you see that there's any possibility that perhaps your proposal or something like it could be agreed to on the 20%, or are they just going to go round and round on circle on the right to enrich? thanks. >> we'll treat that as one question. in the middle. oh? >> [inaudible] milton hoenig, i want to follow up on daryl's question and ask it a slightly different way. the meeting of amano in tehran before the baghdad e.u.3 +1

meeting raised questions that weren't materialized. now the upcoming meeting is going to raise questions which didn't materialize. isn't it possible that these two streams of the iaea stream wanting answers to questions about possible military dimensions and the diplomatic stream are really interfering with each other and that we should really concentrate one on the other or the other? perhaps, preferably, the diplomatic stream, and put aside the other stream just for the time being? this. >> okay. par chin and the relationship between the two. >> parchin already has been visited two times. during our time and after our time. this has been already visited two times. and you know the iaea, they have enough technology instrument even if some buildings are

destroyed. in case there has been some enrichment activities, they can find it even 10, 15 years after. >> [inaudible] >> it was not because there was nothing there. i mean, it doesn't mean that the iaea couldn't find it, because there was nothing. but remember in summer 2011 when even the iaea did not raise parchin issue we remember, the russians, they put a step-by-step proposal on the table. this proposal included implementation of additional protocol, implementation of subsidiary arrangement, addressing military dimensions, giving access to iaea beyond, limiting their new installment of centrifuges. stopping at 5% be, you remember.

everything was there, even suspension. for a short period. iran responded positively and did the foreign minister publicly said we are ready to discuss the details. but the p5 +1 rejected. therefore, the russian proposal which had the measures for 100% of transparency, iran showed positive gesture in summer 2011 even before the parchin issue was raised. >> the winged chariot is drawing near. just a very brief word from -- >> a very brief word. i won't discuss parchin further except the notion that parchin has to involve the presence of nuclear material and, therefore s a violation loses sight of the fact that the interest in parchin has been high explosive development. it has no nuclear material, so there's a difference there. but there is a persistence in nuclear explosive material, but my own view is that's much less important than the other aspect of with the iaea which is

designing the inspections system for the future. that's the problem with amano. as long as we confuse these two, we've got a problem be. the second question, you want all the transparency, but you don't want to give on the other thing the iranians want give on. and that's a difficult problem for us. do we, in fact, address the question of how much level of enrichment is going to be permitted either temporarily or permanently this some arrangement with iran? as i've said before, i'm prepared to accept a level of civil enrichment if, in fact, the iaea has a situation in which it is satisfied it is doing the best of all possible jobs in inspection and can, in fact, improve that as technology improves and as things can go ahead. it appears as if that's on the table. my feeling is that that's too big for the present time for the u.s. to accept in the context of an election. and i'm sorry to say that. but, you know, maybe it'll be

reversed. maybe it'll be seen as a real victory. i would hope so. but at the moment we seem to run scared on this issue. there is an israeli position of deep distrust on this that, basically, says for them the only acceptable thing is zero enrichment. although nobody has sat down and explained quite why zero enrichment with weak inspection is so much better than some enrichment with the strongest possible inspection which i think is the shape of a deal you could get. and even then the president, in my view, would have to face be up to the question in the middle of an election campaign, does he want to present another issue in which he can be widely attacked even if distinctly unfairly? and that's a very difficult question, and i don't have the answer to it. it's down at 1600 pennsylvania. >> dr. cronberg. >> are just on the question of verification, i think it's very interesting that concrete proposals that have have been put forth on the verification processes and how it could be

carried out are put forth by former directors of the international atomic agency. people have come up with recent proposals on the verification which is very explicit on how you can take these steps and actually verify the question of military and civilian uses. so there are technical proposals. i think this is a political problem. >> thank you very much. please, join me in thanking our speakers. [applause] >> thank you, greg. thank you, panelists, for that insightful discussion on the iranian nuclear issue. we're now going to adjourn for about 25 minutes. we're going to feed you, we're going to pick up our program at noon with our keynote luncheon speaker, rose goettmuller, and

let me just note that the lunch is buffet style. there are two lines, one here, one back there. so, please, fill your plate, come back to your seats, and we'll be beginning at noontime. thank you. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] .. finish

>> there's responses to changes in the market place in a quicker way than regulation.

>> tonight, a look at the federal trade commission's enforcement role in dealing with privacy on the internet. "the communicators" at 8 eastern on c-span2. >> well, over the past four years, pulitzer prize winner has been researching and writing "barack obama: the story," he traveled and touredded the family homes and sites in kansas to find the origins of his mother's family. it comes out in bookstores june 19th, but booktv gives you an early look with exclusive pictures and video including our trip to kenya as we traveled with the author in january of 2010. join us sunday, june 17th, at 6 p.m. eastern time, and later at 7:30 that same night, your phone calls, e-mails, and tweets for

david maraniss on c-span2's booktv. >> now a look at nato, secretary general rasmussen held the briefing in belgium talking with nato's relationship with russia. >> good morning or afternoon, thank you very much for coming. the secretary general will start with an introduction statement, and then he'll, as usual, be happy to take your questions. attorney general. >> good afternoon, and at the chicago nato summit two weeks ago, we set ourselves three real goals. to shape the next stages of our engagement in afghanistan, to ensure nato invests smartly in future capabilities even in times of austerity, and to

strengthen our relationship with our partners. we achieved those goals. now we are taking the next steps. from afghanistan, we set out a clear path from now until 2014 and beyond, and we send out a clear signal to the afghan people and the region that we will stay committed. afghan army and police are taking the lead for security of 75% of the population, and in the coming weeks, more than 100 districts and cities in afghanistan will begin the transition to afghan security responsibility. that is a challenge, but the afghan forces are ready for it. already, more than one-third of a million afghan soldiers and

police are trained and ready to keep their country secure. 18 afghan army battalions and 55 police units have been certified and capable of operating independently with advisers from fica. at the same time, more and more former insurgents are choosing to come back into society. right now, around 4400 former fighters have interest in re-integration programs. that is an increase of 40% since december. >> translator: we will continue to provide the afghan forces with the support and training that they need in order

to make sure progress is irreversible. that is why we have decided that nato and the afghan government would work together towards establishing a new nato led mission for the period after the end of transition. we are starting the process of planning our new mission for afghanistan. this will not be a combat mission. in this new mission, the aim will be to train, advise, and assist the afghan security forces. we also made a clear political commitment. we will take our share of the future responsibility of these forces. we also heard president karzai

restate the commitment of the afghan authorities to live up to their responsibilities when it comes to good governance and defending human rights. >> we also reached agreements on reverse transit from afghanistan with three partners. kazakhstan and these give us a range of new options and the robust network that we need. i thank all three partner countries for their support and nato will continue to actively engage with afghanistan's neighbors to build wider support for the country's stability.

we are also making progress on implementing summit decisions on the other two key areas. in chicago, we signed the contract to acquire surveillance capability, unarmed drones to allow our commanders to see what's happening over the horizon any time and in any weather. i'm pleased to note that denmark has decided to join the acquisition phase of the project. this is valuable signal of solidarity and of commitment to keeping our lines strong and capable. we also declared an missile capability. that is in germany, and so our preparations are completed.

this is a first, but significant step in the longer term goal of providing full coverage in all nato populations and forces. i know russia's concerns on this issue. let me be quite clear. those concerns are grounded. nato missile defense is not directed against russia and will not undermind russia's strategy. russia wants to build a strategic partnership. last week marked two important anniversaries in our relationship. on the 27th of may, it was the 15th anniversary of the signature of the nato-russia

founding act, the document which sets out the frame work of our relationship. on the 28th of may, we marked the 10th anniversary of the creation of the nato-russia council, the forum where we meet as equals to discuss all. we have come a long way since those two agreements. we have are building cooperation in many areas where we have common interests -- afghanistan, counterterrorism, and the fight against piracy to name just three. our goal is to take that cooperation to the next stage, to make nato and russia a true stay -- strategic partners, but to do that, we need to improve the level of trust, transparency,

and predictability in our relationship. we welcome our cooperation with russia, and we want to strengthen it, but we are concerned by some recent russian statements including our military deployments close to nato borders. we intend to raise this with russia and across the areas where we did agree as well as the areas where we don't agree, and that is what we will do. finally, at chicago, there was a strong message that partnerships are essential to nato's success. our meetings were a mission of past reality and an opportunity

to discuss with our partners how we work together and how we can improve our cooperation. we have built up a powerful momentum, and now it's vital to keep going. that's why later today, i will meet the prime minister of new zealand, and next week, i will visit australia. those countries are making a real disirches -- difference to our mission in afghanistan. i particularly welcome australia's recent announcement that they will take the main mentoring role. this demonstrates australia and new zealand may be far away, but they are very close to us in terms of values and commitment. together, we will discuss how we

can come even closer together. with that, i'm ready to take your questions. >> okay. we'll start in the first row here. gotv. >> [inaudible] >> no more than what chicago did for him. can you comment on that? >> first of all, i appreciate

that president sadari attended the meeting in chicago. i calledded him and invite -- called him and invited him to participate in the meeting because we want a positive dialogue. president zardari confirmed that his intention, it is the intention of pakistan to engage positively in finding solutions to the conflict in afghanistan. as you all know, we still have an unsolved problem as regards with routes in pakistan. i still hope to see a solution to that problem in the very near future. >> german tv. >> follow-up to pakistani

questioner before. how far are the talks now, and any progress? have you just agreed on that you can use pakistan transit routes to bring the troops home. is it just a matter of money, or what ises question you have to deal with here? that's the first question. the second one would be, was in chicago, in afghanistan now, figure more clear now how many soldiers will he take back now from afghanistan? 1,000? 2,000? still to be figured out? >> first on pakistan, i'm not going to comment on details in negotiations with pakistan.

i'll just reiterate that i still hope that a solution can be found in the very near future. tame, -- at the same time, let me stress we actually concluded in number of important discussions in chicago that will contribute in a very positive way to our operation in afghanistan as we gradually wind down our combat operation, so much to the end of 2014. as regards to france, i would leave it to the french authorities to commend on their concrete figures, and i have taken note of the statements

from president expressed in clear terms at the chicago summit that france will be committed to the isap training and stay engaged until the end of the training commission, until the end of 2014, and i highly appreciate that. >> gentleman right here. >> i'm publicked radio, two questions. first one you mentioned, the transit contracts. does nato pay for reverse transit, and second question is on smart defense, the next steps. probably you can give me the next steps for the smart defense initiative in regards to the fact that some countries, for

example, germany, always have to give green light when they would like to participate or send troops somewhere or that they would like to participate in a mission. thank you. >> first, i do not comment on details in the transit arrangements, but it goes without saying that we have concluded agreements of mutual satisfaction of the involved partners, and as regards to the next steps to -- as far as smart defense is concerned, we decided at the chicago summit to initiate some follow-up work. first of all, we will continue to develop multinational projects, and secondly, of course, we would have to find

solutions to a number of issues. one of them is the topic you mentioned and how we can presume the availability of the multinational capabilities, but based on what i heard at the chicago summit, i'm quite optimistic that there is a strong political commitment to actually use and deploy multinational capabilities when it is needed. obviously, that goes without saying, it is, at the end of the day, a national decision whether the country wants to participate in the military operation and deploy military assets and how.

i think all nations realize that if, in the future, we would rely increasingly on multinational capabilities, we also have to end hains the presumption that multinational capabilities will actually be available. if we don't enhance that presumption, then, of course, some countries would be reluctant to actually invest their resources in multinational capabilities. all nations are very much aware of that aspect, and all 28 allies endorse the concept of smart defense at the chicago summit knowing that this is a challenge and based on that, i'm sure that there is a strong political commitment to actually regard the assets, multinational

assets, when needed. >> [inaudible] >> secretary general, could you elaborate on what exactly has been done on the follow-up mission in afghanistan since the chicago summit, and what's the time frame for coming up with a definitive proposal? >> we have started preparations already. it's work in progress. i would be reluctant to set any exact deadline. ultimately, of course, the deadline is by the end of 2014, but for planning reasons, understandable planning reasons, that we need clarification sometime before that, but having said that, it's also a fact that

the exact profile of the first 2014 mission will very much depend on the actual security situation on the ground as we approach the end of 2014, and this is the reason why i would be reluctant to present to you with any exact deadline, but i can assure you that we have started propose rigses already, and as you know, the core of that, those 2014 mission, will be a training mission with the aim to train, assist, give advice to the afghan security forces. >> [inaudible] >> translater: regarding the attempt to withdraw forces in

afghanistan with allied nations, there's five or six nations expressing intent to withdrawal the troops. some say this is essentially down to an issue of security, protecting the lives of their troops, but others have raised the issue of nato's budget. apparently, there is a financial crisis within nato. how can you -- how do you explain this? second question -- several months after the fall of gadhafi's regime, we are still waiting for the final operational report from nato. how's that coming along? >> there is no financial crisis within nato. >> translator: quite obviously, there's an economic

challenge, but i feel we've found responses to that at the chicago summit. the solution is, indeed, our smart defense initiative. we're going to promote cooperation on a multilateral basis, and, as you will be aware, we have adopted a certain number of multinational concrete projects, and this is a very compelling response. this is not the path to be followed in order to avoid the key financial crisis.

will become a security crisis if there is no financial crisis within nato. we are, indeed, facing an economic challenge, and we have found a solution to that challenge. would you mind reminding me of your question about libya? >> translator: several months after the fall of the gadhafi regime, we still have not had the final report on nato operation in libya. why not? >> translator: well, we have reported to the united nations in keeping with the established rule. >> question about the common funding. the purpose of the ags, as we

all know, was achieved with some political difficulty in the financial mechanism, and that is a group of 17, now 18 nations, are buying the equipment, and a large part of the operation costs comes out the nato's common funding; however, this is not a rule, but an exception so far op how it works. my question to you is for smart defense to move ahead, to pursue more of the multinational models, won't you need to reform -- do you intend to form the way funding is used within the fund? thank you. >> yes, definitely, and that's also one of the follow-up works we adopted in chicago, and we will look closer into how our funding mechanisms work, to

ensure they are fit for purpose, that they work first efficientlt we make the most efficient use of the resources, that they are completely transparent, and, yes, in order to promote multinational projects, we also need to reform our funding mechanisms so that all allies so multinational projects are funded for the defenses. >> that does mean a loosening of the rules, in other words? >> no, you might argue that it is also strengthening rules to make sure that things work transparently and efficiently.

>> [inaudible] >> thank you. i'm here -- yeah, now it's okay. the -- last week started operations in the north to remove the barricades and okay for soldiers attacked by local serbs or whoever they are, but endangering peace and provoking danger there. for each barricade remove, concerns can build anew. going to continue the game, removing barricades in order to see the new ones, or this time better mind to ensure freedom in the movement in the north? >> three points. firstly, our troops acted in

self-defense. secondly, i would commend the way in which our soldiers handled the situation, and thirdly, i can assure you that they will continue to implement the united nation's mandate to maintain a secure environment and ensure the freedom of movement, and conducts operations in a state of neutral and impassioned way. i strongly regret that we saw violence in recent -- during recent days. i urge all parties to do their