a question for mr. wolfsthal. when the administration budget was released in number of members of congress said that the money for the national nuclear security administration was inadequate and you were basically walking away from the agreements you made in the new s.t.a.r.t. 3d. i wonder if you can't go through with the thinking on the budget you represented. is the administration living up to its commitments? >> i am please refer to me as mr. wolfsthal from time to time. david was a great help as for a number of people on the new s.t.a.r.t. process. we got to work closely together. i think it is a very -- on the administration's budget. it is un fortunate. in the context of new

s.t.a.r.t. the president submitted a plan as requested by congress which said it is our intention to pursue programs and capabilities necessary to maintain a nuclear arsenal. our estimate was those capabilities will cost $85 billion over ten years. that is just for the nuclear complex part. that is separate from strategic launch vehicles. after the budget control act came into force there were new restrictions on how much the president would be able to request and so people wanted the president to basically break the law and say we're going to ask for money we legally can't ask for. the president said we are not going to do that. we went to work quickly saying if this is the money that is available and this is what we need how do we insure what we need. that is a very open process with the pentagon and nuclear weapons council and lab directors who said over the next ten years

there's a reasonable estimate we can provide for with this will cost. congress chose not to fund that number. behalf controlled by republicans pushed for the 1251 report shows not the funds the administration shorted by $800 million. the lab director's said we don't think you are going to get the money. that we all agree we need to build these facilities. we think we can save you. lab directors coming saying we think we can save you money. an unprecedented step and say and we can to plutonium work without building the c m r r in mexico that will cost $5 billion and rebuild facilities and fund people that do the real work in the system. they came with an alternative plan.

the administration asked the defense counsel under the secretary of defense requisition, will this work? we went to congress and said here is a new plan and congress is screaming you broke your promise. it is largely designed to attract the president's impressive accomplishments on investing in the nuclear complex in a reasonable way and congress will finally do what is right for the nuclear deterrent. >> to general jameson and jon about how we move forward in the next two years. with russia, the next step in boosting u.s. and russian stockpiles below the new s.t.a.r.t. levels which are 1550

deployed strategic warheads and that ceiling is to be met by the year 2018. new s.t.a.r.t. creates verification system that will be in place until 2021 and given the difficulties of a formal negotiation with russia and given the challenge we have with the next round of negotiations the need to deal with, not just deployed strategic weapons but tactical nuclear weapons and non deport weapons are their simple alternative approaches? might there be a way as george w. bush did in 2001-2002 period to use the existing treaty framework to provide transparency and verification necessary to assure both sides but reduce the two countries the ploy strategic arsenals below s.t.a.r.t. levels. is that a pact worth considering

given the very difficult relationship between the u.s. and russia on various issues, syriac and other things? >> if there are 100 people in the room you probably have 100 plans how this would work but there are a couple prerequisites. the first is i would argue we need to have a decision preferably -- which frankly just means us to go to new s.t.a.r.t. numbers. very modest reductions. i forget what the number that was released but roughly 1750 going to 1550. you could pull 200 weapons of of alert in a few days. not a few weeks. we should just quickly go there. we need the new guidance in place that the president has direct support from strategic command and the chairman of the joint chiefs saying we looked at

the plan. we can go lower and give them flat flexibility. then you have the new verification framework in place to say to russia let's go to lower numbers more quickly. you can go below 1550, you can reach russia to do that and have verification in place to show that those numbers have been reached. the challenge is the non strategic weapons where trine's thought of valuable. transparency measures are needed. the u.s. should do that up front. we need to find a way to manage the alliance so the withdrawal of those weapons don't lead to a new schism but we should give russia a year privately and if they don't move within that time period say we're going alone and push them to come with us. >> general jameson? >> the only thing i would add is until the election anything that

even hints of doing something unilaterally is not going to be on the table. the process and i certainly agree with john crimes in the pentagon that inside the belt way things are going -- and interagency wants it to happen and some of those things are budget driven and save as much as they can realistically and it is not going to be agreements with russia or anything. that is my opinion. >> other questions? right there in the middle, bruce. >> bruce macdonald with the u.s. institute of peace. it is safe to say with in this room there's a broad consensus

in support of further reductions and today our nato allies have been extraordinarily supportive of the new s.t.a.r.t. process. i am imagining going forward and seeing levels go down substantially more, particularly want to ask dr. flockhart but other distinguished panelists as well. is very point at which the u.s. extended deterrence which is more than just nuclear-weapons or conventional capabilities a very important dimension of that but there is a point at which, some sooner than others to get a little nervous about how far down we go because we have taken almost as a given that our allies have been wonderful in their support but is there a point where the perceived

benefits of nuclear deterrence begin to outweigh the value of further directions and how white we address that? >> realistically speaking we are going to face deployment country number of 2 within a questionable period of time. no doubt that germany will continue to want to be on the table and they're pretty stern to withdraw. the question is whether there's a place in those countries that will be transferred to turkey and italy or whether they would be withdrawn to the united states. would still mean there is a deterrent. and within the alliance. you could go down -- and i don't

think it is the numbers. much more to do. and let go of what is attached to those. most nato allies realized they have no strategic importance and that strategic in the united states providing protection of by can call it that based in europe. i don't think it is the numbers that are at issue. >> one clarification. the defense deterrent posture review by nato in chicago state's the supreme guarantee of allied security are the strategic nuclear weapons of the three countries, the u.s. you can and france. it does not talk about tactical

nuclear weapons as being vital for that deterrent capability and the last i noticed our european allies are very supportive of further u.s./russia reductions. jon's of the points? >> jack mendelson explain away this is the world that developed. i remember his lecture on why we had tactical nuclear weapons in the first place which is going back to it outdated thinking that the europeans were worried that we were going to be couple our defense from their defense and we need to have an addition to long-range strike capability the capability on the ground so that when we had a nuclear exchange to block tanks from the boulder gap that russia would not just launched at a sand wouldn't just be a nuclear war in europe. all of that is out the window and useless in terms of american strategic thought. does anybody believe a tactical nuclear weapons from europe on

russian territory would not be seen as a strategic threat to russia? if we think we need to challenge russia in a strategic way we have a lot of submarines and tactical nuclear weapons don't have a military role. [inaudible] >> overall strategic levels are a level at 300. is there some level of u.s. strategic nuclear warheads that begins to make some allies and others nervous. maybe poland or turkey get nervous before germany and denmark? >> if all we were doing were maintaining everything we have the status quo started drastically reducing nuclear weapons there might be an argument that country's get nervous and the concern is they might sell nuclear capabilities of their own or want us to fall apart but as trine said, things

don't happen in isolation. what we need to think about is how you supplement your extended reassurance capabilities and that is the political process that gets to how often you engage with these countries and the question where american troops are deployed and what sort of capability the being purchased on a conventional side. there's a whole list of things we could do and should have done that we didn't that would then make it much easier than going to lower numbers but even if that were true we have a long way to go before these countries start to get nervous. >> we have one or two more questions and lots of hands here. why don't we go over here to nancy in the green and over here to mr. s.t.a.r.t. -- cronberg. >> flockhart, one thing you mentioned was what the effect of the european missile defense capability are. i am wondering whether you think

nato allies agree on what the actual defense capability is now and in the near future, the threats we face and whether you see it as performing as a military role or in political role and if it really is the latter, what are the effects of building up a missile defense capability to perform same kind of political and tactical nuclear weapons tests in the past? are we replicating the same problems we currently have with russia over an issue that is politically symbolic? >> you can look at the role in two ways. it does have a military role but it is not a military role that is -- a military role that is with iran. that is why they are there but they could gain the defense capability and could gain an important political role in the

alliance if it were to become the push for example of changing the deterrent posture from one that is based completely on punishment to one that is based more on the nile. going back to some bizarre, old-fashioned debates that i thought i had seen the back of in 1990 but never the less those of the things that are being talked about. if you have a different deterrent posture that move from deterrence by denial, clearly you have are completely different position within the alliance to discuss what is going to be the deterrent posture in the alliance but that is the first thing -- a great shame. sir it was not an overall discussion looking at a conceptual understanding of what

the posture of the alliance should be. the other role of missile defense would be more political because there would be a facility to say we don't have the non strategic nuclear weapons anymore. they were not needed any way with this new defense posture but we can use missile defense as another form of showing commitment in the alliance. that is the same as what has been happening with non strategic nuclear weapons like the wedding ring you show your commitment. you could do the same -- that is what i meant. >> any others on this? we have a question over here. >> i will continue on the defense question. with nato there was friendship with russia and russia was not present in chicago. what is happening in between?

the next question deals with the economics of the plan to finance missile defense in economic difficulties. we are in the defense committee and sharing and actually more country's increasing defense budget so how do you plan to finance missile defense? >> jon? trine? >> the relationship with russia as i am sure you know is worse than it was in 2008. it is a piece of string. difficult to say what the relationship with russia is and we have to take into account all the negative developments. i am not completely without reason. given that list for missile defense, sounded much better than what it is. i had -- difficulty seeing what

russia could gain from what is being offered. perhaps it is surprising there has been a downturn in the relationship and on some of that presidential debate, important for that relationship because nato is in russia perceived as the enemy. in the public is difficult, we are friends with nato. nato has been painted as the big double land will continue to be the big double in russian public for a long time to come. the relationship with russia will get better. and the cause of missile defense, that the americans are going to do that, the main benefit of it and the option for

europeans to contribute towards it but that is only an option and this is where my argument is that the option will be to show commitment by actually buying into that. it may be a waste of money. can't just the technical details of it but that is the thinking. >> trine is right on missile defense. we placed it within a nato context which is a great step forward in the missile defense program, and the old plan. ready economic come down is on delivery capability. multiple european countries will spend a lot of money on the most expensive fighter planes as a member developed, the budget is nonsensical. the united states will be in a position where we argue on one hand get your economy in order but on the other hand you have to buy this plane is

unsustainable. our f-16s the going to wear out in 2017. we won't have dual capable capability. what was written these problems will solve themselves in the midterm and we need to start thinking creatively how to put that to our advantage. >> thank you all. we are out of time for this panel. we will return to many of these subjects. tactical nuclear weapons. and future -- and before ask you to join me in thanking a panelists i want to invite the next panel to hop up here because we will resume without a break. if you need a break you are welcome to do so in the course of the next session but please join me in thanking dirk

jameson, jon wolfsthal and trine flockhart. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> former ambassador tom pickering says it is difficult to see are questions over iran's nuclear program will be resolved without bilateral talks between the u.s. and iran. he was on a panel hosted by the arms control association. this is a little more than an hour. >> as those in this room know we are at another critical juncture

in efforts to negotiate resolution to issues surrounding iran's nuclear program. after a long interval these six powers being gauged with iran on april 14th and assembled on may 23rd, '24 in baghdad to discuss specific proposals. six powers called for iran to end its enrichment of uranium to 20% and shipped its stockpiles out of the country in exchange for providing 20% enriched uranium in -- nuclear security assistance and critical spare parts for civilian aircraft. iran's presented their own five point plan offering greater international actress to its nuclear facilities in exchange for easing of sanctions and recognition of its right to enrich uranium. iran's chief negotiators voiced

disappointment about the lack of sanctions released in the six powers and complain their proposal was unbalanced. the head of the six power delegation was more positive hoping for at chance for the next round of talks in moscow on june 18th and nineteenth. the head of the international atomic energy agency went to tehran to discuss the framework to discuss iranian activities. displayed existing sanctions beginning a sanction in all foreign banks the process iranian oil, and europeans ban imports of iranian will starting july 1st and a centrifuge keeps

spinning and suspicion about possible military -- of iran's nuclear program lingers. as with iranian palestinian dispute is it easy to sketch out the shape of a realistic solution than to figure out exactly how to get there. to help us sort out this more difficult task we asked a panel of three experts. highlights have been provided in writing but let me introduce each tea with a few words. ambassador thomas pickering has been in more embassies than most people work in their entire career. he lead the u.s. mission to the united nations and served as undersecretary of state and been very active in discussions on iranian nuclear issues. ambassador hossein mousavian was

ambassador to germany for seven use as head of the foreign relations committee of iran's national security council and spokesman for iran's delegation in the european union in 2003-2005. now a scholar at benson university and author of the new book iranian nuclear crisis, a memoir which will be launched here. tarja cronberg is head of the european alliance faction of the european parliament and chair of the parliament delegation relation with iran. and engineer by training, the business and administration and served as minister of labour and speaks six languages the most difficult of which is french. without further ado let me turn to our speakers for the brief remarks on where we are in the wake of baghdad and what we need

to accomplish in moscow. ambassador pickering, if i could ask you to go first? >> thank you for the kind introduction. of pleasure to be on the panel. hossein mousavian and i have done shows together. if it won't destroy his reputation at home on a lot of the ideas particularly the important negotiations, just had the pleasure to talk to dr. cronberg. let me compliment the arms control association. having emerged from obscurity of government business, i believe you have made and continue to make a major contribution to thinking and constructive examination. a policy in this critically important area. i am honored to be here and old friends -- have a chance to address this critically

important issue. i was asked to address two questions. what is my judgment about baghdad and my view about the process ahead? i have done that against the backdrop of a third issue, the question of the overall situation i see at the present time. i used frequently tell this story about a man jumping out of the empire state building. going to the twenty-fifth for everything was simply splendid. i have to modify that taken to the west coast. a guy jumps of the golden gate bridge. he survives in the water and the currents sweep him away. we are more in that mode at the moment that we are on the empire state building where even with the new york police holding the safety net the chances are 99.9% death. we struggle very hard to get to the negotiating table and it is important obviously the maximum use be made of this.

against that backdrop, it is extremely hard to see how and in what way this process will move ahead. there are 32 years of mistrust between the united states and iran supplemented by galloping misunderstanding and lack of communication has been a thoroughly and i think completely deleterious experience, being able to examine the problem. the worst case on both sides. and the controlling peace to talk. good european trade, and which side of the atlantic had preferred. and in any serious commitment of

this sort, and in istanbul and baghdad, and the golden gate bridge. and then a leading go away, complete disagreement, to negotiate the best meeting. istanbul in the sense that the iranian side, the 9 iranian side agreed to. stage by stage and resolution of a problem. and balance and reciprocity at each stage, disagreement by half that iran would like to make the guideposts with