arrangements and nonproliferation, the non iranians would agree, and ask for a cessation of iranian and richmond, and i have a sense that coming out of the baghdad meeting could have got free results, minimal, to have another meeting. and the benefit of a sand storm keeping them another day and a meeting in moscow. and i remember as ambassador to moscow there used to be an old soviet story that there was a contest that first prize was the week in moscow and second prize was two week in moscow selects hope we go for second prize. there is a strong and important piece that the new president of russia who is the old president of russia is president of russia

despite the fact that he has been prime minister for some time has now got himself quote on this issue as he has been hooked on syriac. we have to do everything we can to persuade him some further success in moscow whether it is hanging on is important. the second piece of baghdad with a small agreement, perhaps the t r r for 20% enrichment and the third piece which some endorsement of what was worked on with the interlocutors in iran over transparency but it was clear that was not going to work because in many ways the iranians should receive something more. and an estimate of the situation has to take into account the domestic imperative that influenced both sides.

my summation is with united states smaller is better and for iran bigger is better and that is where the two side done coming at this. smaller and better for the united states because of an election year i speak frankly. the president takes great risks in making big compromises because the points of attack are multiplied and explaining why he went so far particularly early in the gate is a difficult situation. the president has national interest imperative in finding a diplomatic solution. the effort to continue to find a diplomatic solution is a small but not very conclusive weight against precipitous israeli action to attack iran. keeping the process going is valuable but keeping the process going until after the election with no movement also has a conclusion of sterility that will arrive sooner or later if

something isn't achieved. my own view is smaller is important and better for the united states perspective still remains. on the iranian side there is definitely significant degree of mistrust over the united states and has been for a year and that need over the western side in the sense the real policy is regime change. we have perhaps try to more or less to avoid conveying that notion from the iranian optic it is possible to see through whatever prison they are looking at that almost everything we do one way or another is examined in that context that have looked at them as a serious challenge in that regard. to escape from that and make some progress and deal with their preoccupation, the notion of two features on the landscape make a certain amount of sense and friends and i and others propose some years ago that the essential trait of would be some

permitted enrichment limited to civil purposes. in return for much greater transparency about the iranian program. this was not a sovereign and sir but provided the best we could think of at the time and seems continually now to swim into the picture and i am pleased iran is in favor of that. underlying this process is the notion that something that large so suits from the u.s. perspective would be difficult and something too small keeps in mind the lurking shadow that the 900 pound gorilla of regime change take iran out of the nuclear business. there in the business for reasons that difficult to fathom. my friend challenged to make it clear. why the hell would you spend billions of dollars to build

10,000 for a program for which you have no apparent use for the output? that worries everybody. there is from time to time talk of going to be 20 reactor program and recent talk of building one or two reactors in the next five to ten years. the accumulation of enriched material and accumulation of enrichment technology is concerning and that is one of the reasons there is a western preoccupation about enrichment even though it could be limited. underneath this affecting negotiations to the final point there is a continuing problem about what i would call different interpretations. hossein mousavian and his friends believe the fbi he provides a right to enrich but in my view it doesn't provide a right to enrich for purposes

that are unrelated to civil programs related to military programs and this is one of the difficulties. my sense is that a reasonable interpretation is you do what you need to do in a nuclear sins in order to try to get a sufficient amount of material for your civilian programs but going beyond is difficult and on the iranian cents anything that doesn't represent prove of diversion is permitted by the treaty and getting ready to make a decision or putting yourself in a position to make a decision to go for nuclear-weapons is in a sense the underlying difficulty or one of them that we have to look at. where to go. my sense is the next stage ought to be in the p 5 plus 1 effort to get around the t r r and some cessation of 20%. don't embellish or foul it up with more. maybe it could be slightly

enhanced by some willingness not to institute some of the sanctions that have been approved some of which may be small but not insignificant as one suggested, the sanctions on insuring petroleum cargoes from iran could be a way of beginning to indicate that the u.s. is ready to move on sanctions. the second piece is much more difficult but very important on the iranian side. it goes to my deep concern about mistrust. i think there ought to be a serious effort and so far i have to say iran has stood in the way of this for opening bilateral conversations between the united states and iran had a significant level to convey the assurance that the real decision of country x and countrywide, this could do a lot of things that kissinger did when things opened with china but it could begin to talk about a end game.

an end game in which weapons were prohibited in accordance with a binding national relationship with no uncertainty. a set of relationships which included much more transparency designed and carried out by the i a e a and we accepted iranian right to enrich simple purposes and sequestration of excess material the iranians produced until they're ready to use it and finally gradual but significant removal of the nuclear sanctions as this proceeds. and some serious effort to deal with the problem that has now arisen that there are sanctions on things other than nuclear which also impact iran. they are therefore purposes people consider legitimate and right including human rights issues but somehow need to be factored into the discussion in a painful but useful way. if these two tracks could

proceed as a result of moscow and beyond there's a slight way that we could fred the needle into a position where after the american election's bigger and more useful things from the iranian perspective could be done and my own view is to get there but giving the iranians some notion of the end game on a private basis would be an important aspect of the second track in the p 5 plus 1 bilateral discussions. >> hossein mousavian. >> thank you very much. always talking about difficult. and the mindsets are close. because normally it leaves nothing for you to discuss.

i would like to thank arms control associations for managing this. i would like to touch some point of my experience which i believe would be helpful for a savings solution for iranian nuclear issue. the best issue is to emphasize the case but too much. the two parties need to take steps on the issue. the second issue is what tom raised, definitely there is -- many other countries have enrichment. if it is illegal everybody should stop. talking about iran now. it is this.

the argument is emphasizing maintaining responsibility and then writes irian maintains the right responsibility that responsibility comes after. a step-by-step plan. in one step they can agree on this simultaneous approach. the p 5 plus 1 respects peaceful nuclear technology including enrichment and iran also immediately at the same time accept to sign a tentative draft agreement already agreed with tehran. this is a war plan which this

would address the ambiguities and technical questions including of the possibilities that are mentioned that. this could be parallel in order to end the game with chicken and egggate. the focal point of the plan in the last ten years have been focusing on suspension. in future negotiations they should focus on transparency. if they are looking for a sustainable solution, suspension would not work. the last ten years of negotiation proves it has not worked. the fourth point is they agreed in istanbul, i believe the p 5 plus 1 was asking too much.

they were asking as a great mentioned the leaders of lasting iran to stop to address possibilities that i mentioned and additional protocol, the maximum iran can do -- would never be successful. the fifth point i have, fourteen countries, operating or building in richmond, any solution on iran has the capability for other countries because iran would never be ready to figure it out as a member and the p 5 plus 1 should have a broader vision in order to get out of iran and create a model for

others. number 6 is to have a broad region of negotiation. a safe savings solution can become a broader cooperation between iran and the rest on bigger issues, security and energy and regional stability. if they have such a region it would not be everything to the nuclear issue. number 7 is this issue place a very important role. that is why i believe always i have mentioned iran and the u.s. need to have direct nuclear talks between iran and p 5 plus one. issue number 8 is impartiality of the iaea. nine years working on it, during

my time at the agency we have not seen a shred of evidence that iran has been recognizing. u.s. capable released -- in the u.s. court, basically the iranian nuclear issue and alleged municipalities of iranian nuclear issue. ..

they always are looking for a piecemeal approach, but iranians, they want to see the end state, the end again. that's why step-by-step plan. broad package be implemented in step-by-step plan is extremely important. but for moscow, i think zero stockpile, 20% stockpile initiative is best achievement for both parties, if they can agree in moscow. but p5+1 is there asking iran to stop 20%. this would not be a sustainable solution. because maybe for a short time at the end, iran would never accept that as a member of npt. because they have 20%, why

should not iran have? as a confidence building measure, but they should think about long-term solution. my ideas zero stockpile for 20%. what do i mean? a joint -- can be established between iran and p5+1 for the percentage of stockpile of 20%, which iran needs domestically. to convert the fuel rods. the rest either can be exported or converted to 3.5%. therefore, iran would accept zero stockpile forever. this is the best objectivity. rather than pushing iran to close or stockpile 20%, even if it works, which i don't believe it would work, even if they

accept this would be short time solution. the second issue, as i mentioned on transparency, the maximum question on iranian nuclear dossier is possible of issues raised by the iaea. what the iaea expect and p5+1 can expect, the maxim level of transparency. they can define for iran the maxim level of conspiracy whether it is additional protocol. if iran accepts to address the possibilities i've mentioned, p&g, it means iran would have to implement additional protocol and would have to accept, have to give access to the iaea beyond the initial protocol. if iran is redesigned such an agreement and keep i plus one should also be ready for at least the upcoming sanctions on

central bank and the oil, irene oil by the europeans, even if not by americans. thank you. [applause] >> dr. cronberg. >> i am the last speaker. [inaudible] >> first of all, i am a member of the european parliament, member of, a member of the foreign relations committee, a member of the defense committee. and also the chair of the parliament delegation with relations to iran. this doesn't mean that the delegation even if it is called a delegation is located in iran. on the other hand, we're in the parliament consists of different politicians from different

groups in parliament. and our goal is to understand what's going on in iran. we follow the nuclear negotiations. we try to follow also the human rights situation, and many other aspects of the everything society. we tried have contacts with the parliament and also with the secret society, as well as people outside of iran. so i am not a part of association, but following the negotiations closely. the negotiations are led by katherine action, the representative of foreign policy in the european union, and i think this is why we in the european union are on the other side of the atlantic, as ambassador pickering said, we like to talk about the e.u. 3+3 rather than the p5+1. but i don't think it does make a big difference. i will first, on the current situation, and then try to look at what i feel is too narrow

progress on uranium enrichment in the negotiations, and then go on to the european, what could be the next step for the european union to do. first of all, -- catherine ashton sent a letter saying that they would be respect for the peaceful uses, iranian uses of acknowledging. and this i think created the hope among the iranians that actually uranium enrichment was a negotiable thing and it would be on the table. they were willing i think to review their 20% requirement, but no such proposition was on the table. actually, the question was that the p5+1 insisted on suspension

of uranium enrichment. and i think the second thing that there was this question of, that iranians need guarantees of being able to access 20% uranium because of their 1 million, and no such guarantees were provided. i think there's a history, i presume that the iranians have had a hard time in getting 20% enriched uranium for medical purposes. on the other hand, of course giving up maybe to 20% enrichment and uranium would expect relaxation on sanctions. no such proposal was on the table. i think there was this proposal of airplane parts and maybe minor things like that, so there was this clash. and the question is how to proceed. the iranian approach has been

that the chief of the iranian nuclear establishment has said that they will not give up 20% enrichment. maybe what was just proposed, the idea of not stockpiling 20%, enriched uranium would be a solution on this question. but the stands is happening in the language is a different one. now, why do i feel that the focus on uranium enrichment is too narrow? i think the goal is to prevent a nuclear-armed iran. and nuclear military aspects of nuclear weapons is much more than uranium enrichment. this is only one of the aspects. and i think the other aspect has to be taken into account, design and application of nuclear weapons and how far is iran from this aspect. i think we're talking about

longer times than just one year or the sort of one year, three time before we have a nuclear weapon dominated iran. so much more than uranium enrichment in these aspect should be included also in the negotiations. the second question is the sanctions. the iranians expect some signs of relaxing sanctions. and at least the western powers are not willing to give this indication. this may be a step-by-step procedure. i don't know what means in the game as result of all the sanctions, but the question is of course i understand in the u.s. the situation is such, the congress is legislating on the sanctions, it will be required

and you'll be more difficult to relax any sanction. in the european union it's the european council, the foreign minister they can decide on this question of sanctions. so maybe there will be some discussion of first of july, the european sanctions, and in moscow they should be a discussion of this deadline. the third point is on the uranium enrichment is the npt context. i think what the iranian case shows is that it's very difficult to define the limits of the peaceful uses as opposed to the military uses. so we have actually a treaty where there's no clear divide on these two aspects. and i think this is very detrimental for the negotiations. iran feels that they have the rights. on the other hand, the p5+1 field iran has not respected its

obligations. and the question is maybe what comes first, obligations or rights? i think they should be in alice. but the reigning argument is of course that there are double standards in the npt, and nuclear powers have not respected their obligations to disarm, that there are double standards in terms of other countries which have nuclear weapons outside the npt, are not pressured equally as iran. and, finally, the right to fuel cycle, what that means and how will it be defined. so in this case the npt, i think there's a fundamental question of the future of the npt in this case. and we should consider that as well. if a military strike which i hope will not be the case, it is a question of a country outside the npt with nuclear weapons

attacking a country within the npt, and at least as far as we know without reason to produce nuclear weapons. so the question is, how important is the npt for us in the future? the fourth dimension i would like to take up is the question of regional security, before going to the next european union. i think the question is, there are some security concerns in the wider middle east. we all know this, and i think it's interesting to note that when the continuation of the npt was agreed in 1995, there was an agreement of conference on the wider middle east on nuclear weapons middle east. and the conference of 2010 it was agreed that this conference would cover the whole scope of weapons of mass destruction, and the conference would take place

in 2012. we have a situation where this conference is going to take place. the countries that sponsored this is uk, russia and the u.s. actually proposed that this conference will take place in finland, and -- [inaudible] trying to discuss the question of mass destruction, weapons free middle east but the question is difficult, i know, and no practical steps will probably the taken for a long time. but it's important that all these parties will meet at the same table, and that will be able to lease start a process. sigh think these negotiations in baghdad and next time in moscow should also be seen in the context of this regional security and this u.n. conference that is coming up. they should not be isolated, and at least there's a timeline,

probably this conference will take place in the summer. so if the negotiations break up before that time, which also coincides with u.s., new u.s. president, then it would be very, very unfortunate. so i would actually like to appeal to the arms control association that the officer of this conference is taking place and that it's important that actually the question of negotiations would be related into the wider scope of secure, the region's security in the middle east. now, a few words of how it needs to happen. the european -- what is the next step, i think i'll try to concentrate on those. the european union has accepted the u.s. dual-track approach. so actually sanctions were approved at the end of january,

and the intention was to send two messages. first of all a message to iran that the european union is serious, and satellite send a message to israel not to strike and not to provide military solution. i think the decision was unique in the sense that it was actually the first time the european member countries supported the common foreign and defense policies. this was the first time the europeans actually agree. i think, this was historic. this was an agreement on the surface. there were different positions in the european union. i think one could describe them that the french president sarkozy was on the other extreme supporting sanctions, very tough sanctions, even tougher maybe than obama, and keeping obama on the sanctions line. and on the other end, sweden was actually went along with the

sanctions rather reluctantly. so there was an agreement. the european parliament had supported sanctions, and has a long-term standing position that long-term solution is possible. so i should the european parliament stands on diplomatic solutions with or without sanctions. now, the problem is that e.u. is leading the negotiations, but lacks long-term strategy on iran. contrary to the u.s. position, which sees iran as an enemy, the e.u. does not see iran as an enemy. there's no enemy picture related to the question of diplomatic contacts with iran. so this is a different position, so i think the european union should actually design a long-term strategy which implies cautious engagement rather than

containment of iran. and as the first up is long-term engagements based proposal by european parliament to establish presence in iran, actually the form of permanent delegation. secondly, it is important to note that the nuclear issue, nuclear dossier is only part of use of relationship with iran, and that this should be balanced with economic incentives as well as question of human rights. which is very important for the european union, and particular to the parliament. so the nuclear nonproliferation issue should be combined with this incentive. and thirdly, there's a question of the region security which it's important for the europeans, and here i think we should at least support the conference that i mentioned before, and see turkey as a very

important member for strict finally i hope that the negotiations will continue and there's no breakdown. and i think for the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and for nuclear nonproliferation, a military strike would be a fundamental mistake. thank you. >> thank you. [applause] >> we have about 25 minutes for questions. we will move quickly to the. i just wanted to use my prerogative to ask one follow-up question to ambassador mousavian. we often are cited as a model for future negotiation of nuclear cooperation agreements, the one negotiate with the united arab emirates as the gold standard. we in the united states obviously prefer a model that does not involve the whole fuel cycle, does not spread the number of countries that have a

full infrastructure for uranium enrichment. i gather from what you said you would be in favor of encouraging countries to the uae, like jordan, like turkey to use iran as a model for nuclear development? >> no. no. >> no. okay. [inaudible] spent may i explain? >> yes. >> i think enrichment today is just because of the u.s. policy. right after revolution went iran decided to shrink the nuclear activities, the u.s. position was no nuclear power plant for iran. the u.s. was not ready -- [inaudible] for power plants. this was the reason the europeans also, they could not do anything in order to complete the unfinished projects of

musharraf. the western countries, they left iran with millions of dollars of unfinished projects, and they were not ready -- iran had no plan, no program for enrichment. and the revolutionaries, they decided even to decrease the minimum the ambitious projects of the shah. they canceled many projects, when the west challenge iran for the right, even for nuclear power plants, you left no other option for iranians to go for self sufficiency. then after iran mastered enrichment, then the u.s. said okay, now we will recognize the rights for iran for nuclear power plants. after iran mastered enrichment, this was the best way in order to convince the u.s. that you should respect the rights of members of npt for at least

civilian power plants. then that time, i can the u.s. position was zero enrichment. but iran mastered 10,000 centrifuges. now the u.s. and the europeans are thinking okay, not 20%, i mean the mistake is from the beginning. iran was never going to have enrichment from the very beginning. you just pushed iran to the situation. if at the beginning of revolution, after the revolution, the germans, they have completed the bushehr power plant, iran had even know program to second power-play. it was the u.s. proposed iran to 23 power plants before revolution. after revolution, iranian said we don't want 23 power plants. now, after 30 years, which iran has paid hundreds of billions of

dollars of cost because of your precious, now you're expecting iran to give up everything. it doesn't work. it's very different with united emirates big you cannot impair a iran with united emirates. >> thank you. will take questions from the floor. please wait for the mic back. given name and brief. >> france want? >> -- françois? >> i'm françois, head a delegation of european union here, and i've been also working on -- 2005, taking part in talks with iran and am also an advisor to secretary-general ban ki-moon. that's why we respect a lot about this issue about the u.n. security council resolutions, and i have to say, presentation has been made about --

[inaudible] i think there is an interpretation which is shared by almost everybody, and which is that we have the right to enrich them every country in the npt has right to enrich. but at the same time, you have to have a use of that. and i agree that it's ambiguous between civilian and military use. because even military use is admitted for brazil for building possible nuclear submarine. also by candidate. but at least it's not building a nuclear weapons because -- [inaudible] >> the question is very simple. we have no use -- [inaudible] so if there is a solution we have two -- civilian use, and my question to you all, do you see

a possibility of -- [inaudible] and if not, can you reduce the program to a size of uses which you could have? because it is very little compared to the size of -- [inaudible] it is an absolute presumption. >> so how to make commensurate i guess spent i think friend saw raises a very important and interesting question but that lies at the heart of some of the disagreements but that disagreement about interpretation, but the fundamental and broader accepted interpretation of quality air is anything that looks military the goes -- anything that looks military goes beyond and look suspect the in the course of negotiation, at some point we are going to have to sit down and defined the question, otherwise we continue to

obligate the misunderstanding or at least the difference, the difficulty. i think it's very important. i think doing that early rather than later is significant. one of the reasons i proposed u.s.-iran bilaterals is the question among many others might be exported privately. it wouldn't be to the exclusion of the p5+1, but it would begin to give a sense of confidence for people who have much less contact with iran and the e.u. three have had. and i think that that along with questions of different interpretations make a lot of sense. i also think it's very important for us to continue to think about how to plug the loopholes of the npt. one of those is interpretation of one of those is definition. but what civilian and everything that is not simply an excluded, or is everything allowed unless it's diversion? these are brought questions. and the fbi think put into shape. i think finally we need to think

about the in state. if you ask me, i would say there is no palpable reason, apologies to france while, for the use of plutonium in any fuel proposition unless it can be conclusively demonstrated that there is an economic imperative. and if there is, then that, and i were then asked for enrichment to be totally multilateralized and be done on the basis whether its competition, but done on the basis whether his absolute transparency. and the greatest safeguards against diversion rather than as hossein would say, forcing people to go independent on the one hand, or alternatively failing to persuade people that there is a reliable international system with competition that cannot be used as a way to bring political pressure on countries are questions that go beyond

proliferation, and my hope is that it would support nonproliferation in an important way. but that's my hobby horse, and i'm sticking to it spent dr. cronberg, did you want to say something? >> i agree with ambassador that we have to define the question and reach a situation where a civilian and military uses are defined in a way where political -- as little as possible. but i want to make a point is that there's a third dimension between civilian and military, and that's the prestige dimension. and i think we are seeing all over the world as nuclear technology carries with it prestige which probably has nothing to do with military uses, what civilian uses. but actually provides the country with a self-esteem about being on the level of other country. this was the case in china when it acquired nuclear weapons. this is at least to some extent

the case in iran today. so i think the question of civilian and military i think is a prestige question is very important because otherwise we will see the proliferation of a nuclear technology. we see that technology is the same, and countries want to acquire this knowledge. so how you see the question of getting rid of the prestige aspect, the iranians need at least one to remain serve on the nuclear technology program. >> ambassador mousavian, do you have a response to? >> i think again after revolution, it was france. the contract iran had already with france on enrichment. if you have not declined, if you had accepted the rights, it was supposed, the enrichment to be done in your land, not iran.

but you didn't want. the second issue is that if, if the problem is nuclear bombs come i'm 100% confident that the iranian side would accept all measures, all commitments to ensure the international committee that iran would remain for ever a nonnuclear weapon state. this is not an issue for iran. on transparency measures, openness, cooperation, up to the end they would be 100% open. if their rights are respected. ultimately the sanctions also should be lifted. and remember, france while, again in 2003, 2004, the europeans e.u. three, they were asking of objective guarantees. for a year we're asking them

okay, define for us what is objectivity. they were not able to define what do they want. and then we had the meeting with president chirac in early 2005. we agreed with him that we would leave to the iaea to define object to the guarantees for non-diversion. we left paris. when we arrived in germany we were told that has discussed with washington and washington has rejected them. even they were not ready to leave to the iaea to define the objective guarantees. and the spring 2005, i have explained in detail in my book when i met privately with three the e.u. three interlocutors. i told them, let's agree it was before presidential election.

i told them let's agree four i read to have a pilot. we would export 100% of production, even production of the pilot. and then we would negotiate for a longer period in order to reach some kind of compromise to give more time to you, europeans, to define a check to guarantees. and this, even this proposal when we were ready to have one pilot, this was rejected, again by the e.u.'s. iran was not really very much eager to accelerate the program. even that time, this proposal was confirmed by the leader. but europeans, they were not ready to cooperate with iran. spent next a brief question. >> thank you, greg. thank you, panelists.

daryl kimball. i have a question for ambassador pickering and ambassador mousavian. there's a report out this morning saying they will be yet another round of discussion between the iaea and iran regarding the framework concepts for dealing with a possible military activities that iran is suspected of being involved in, in the past. so my question is, what do you see the possible and his discussion which comes just a week before the iaea board of governors meeting? what needs to be done in order to move forward to resolve these questions? and if that could be achieved, how might that affect the dynamics of the p5+1 and iran discussions in moscow? >> maybe, daryl, i could take a shot at it. i think it's an important issue. for me, the possible military

issue bonds before naming 2003, there's some continuing disputes, but the intelligence community is basically continue to reassure us that judgment made in 2007 remain, the u.s. intelligence community. that therefore, the question in my view is that most salient importance to in effect provide the iaea with the fullest possible information to guard against problems in the future. what i would call the south african model, a no fault process. you tell the truth, the whole truth, there are no consequences. if you don't tell the truth, there are all conceivable consequences. in part it's a test of good faith. in part it's a way to determine if the answer, and in part it's to take the burden of the guilt

trip off the back of iran. which come in my view, is not necessary if, in fact, we are proceeding in a reasonable basis for the future. this may be totally naïve and starry eyed, but it's my since the notion that we're going to spend all our time worrying about the past when the big bang problem is in the future is not a very useful enterprise. and i think what the south africans did with respect to their own terrible record in apartheid and how they handled that awful devise a difficult problem for the future, not anyway perfect, but those who didn't tell the truth suffer the consequences to those who did tell the truth emerged and had a record and, indeed, there was closure. and my sense, we need some closure, but we need more importantly to have the iaea as fully as possible, widely informed as they can, but to design for the future. and i just heard hossein say, hossein and i don't represent any government. we could probably agree to more.

but the problem is the governments aren't there and it's like the middle east peace, as greg said. but if that were the case, then i think there could be an answer. so i think cleaning up possible military developments is important. but do i think it should stand in the way of you to progress? probably not. i think the uncertainties with respect to possible military developments are not all that salient, that the end result is going to be bent or skewed if they remain in seeing the obscurity. what is bent or skewed in this is iranian good-faith. and i think iran need an opportunity under conditions that are not punitive to demonstrate that it has, it is prepared to approach the negotiations good-faith but i think there are the test of good faith on the other side, and i don't exclude them, but now is not the time to explore them. >> the iaea's questions, they have two technical questions.

one, relates to after 2003, which i think 80-90% of technical ambiguities are already removed. 10, 15% are left. this has been already discussed in the previous visit of a mono to tehran, and agreed to give process to cooperate in order to remove this remaining issues. possibility, as tom said, relates the 1980, early 1990s, to the current program, which needs iran to implement additional protocol, and even to give access to the iaea, beyond additional protocols. again, this has already been agreed in tehran.

increases the visit of amano, 90%, 95% of issues how to cooperate, giving access inspections was resolved. they agreed. 5%, 10% are left. i'm sure iran -- this is not an issue. let's say if iran agrees to give all access, inspections, cooperation's with the iaea, then p5+1 in moscow they would be ready to respect rights of iran or not? >> just have a few minutes. let's take you questions and give our speakers a chance to respond. barbara? >> barbara slavin from the atlantic council. with all due respect, army, we understand that iran is cleansing parchin and has been working fastidiously to clean the site. so we talk about establishing

trust, ambassador mousavian, and this is not something that engenders much trust among the p5+1. it seems that what you're saying is that iran is going to trade an agreement with the iaea for something at moscow, but obviously we have a disconnect because once dashed that what the p5+1 is saying is they want action on 20% in return for some action at moscow. so if you could address the disconnect, do you see that there's any possibility that perhaps your proposal or something like it could be agreed to on the 20%? or are they just going to go round and round on the right to enrich? >> in the middle. i'd like to follow up on what daryl's question and ask a slightly different way. the meeting of amano in tehran before baghdad, e.u. three plus

one meeting, don't materialize. at the upcoming meeting is again going to raise great expectations for the moscow meeting. isn't it possible these two extremes of the iaea extremes wanting answers to questions about possible military dimensions and a diplomatic extremes are really interfering with each other and that we should really concentrate on one or the other or the other, perhaps properly the diplomatic and put aside the other purchased the time being? >> okay, parchin and relationship between the two. ambassador mousavian? >> it has already been visited two times. our time and after our time. it has already been visited two times. and, you know, the iaea, they have enough technology,

instruments, even if some buildings are destroyed. in case there has been some enrichment activities, they can find it even 10, 15 years after. [inaudible] >> it was not because there was nothing. it doesn't mean that the iaea couldn't find it, because there was nothing. but remember, in summer 2011, when even the iaea did not raise the parchin issue, remember? the russians, they gave step-by-step proposal on the table. this proposal included implementation of additional protocol, implementation of subsidy arrangement, and possibility i mentioned, giving access to iaea beyond limiting their new installment of centrifuges.

i think, remember, everything was there, even suspension for sharpie. iran responded positively, and the foreign minister publicly said we are ready to discuss, but the p5+1 rejected. therefore, the russian proposal which had the measures for transparency,. [inaudible] in summer 2011, even before the parchin issue was raised. >> just a very brief word. >> is a very brief word. i won't discuss parchin further accept the notion that parchin has to involve the presence of nuclear but, you know, therefore is a violation, whose to say the fact that the interest in parchin has been high explosive developers that has no new good but too. there is a difference there. but there's a persistent in nuclear explosive into but my own view is that's much less

important than the other aspect of this with the iaea which is designed inspection system for the future. and hossein is talked about that. as long as we confuse these two, and one holds up the other, we've got a proper i'll go to the second question. you're in a horse fo for a bettr situation. you want all the transparency but you don't want to give on the other thing the iranians want to give up and that's a very difficult problem for us. do we, in fact, address the question of how much the level of enrichment is going to be permitted either temporarily or permanently in some arrangement with iran? as i said before, i am prepared to accept a level of civil enrichment if, in fact, the iaea has a situation in which it is satisfied it is doing the best of all possible jobs in inspection, and can, in fact, improve that as technology improves and as things can go ahead. it appears as if that's on the table. my feeling is that that's too big for the present time for the u.s. to accept in the context of

an election. and i'm sorry to say that, but maybe it will be reversed. maybe it will be seen as a real victory. i would hope so, but at the moment we seem to run scared on this issue, it is an israeli position of deep distrust on this, that basically says for them the only acceptable thing is zero enrichment. although nobody has sat down and explained quite while zero enrichment is so much better than some enrichment with the strongest possible inspection, which i think is the shape of a deal to can get. and even then the president come in my view, would have to face up to the question in the middle of an election campaign, does he want to present another issue in which he can be widely attacked, even if distinctly unfairly? and that's a very difficult question, and i don't have the answer to it down at 1600 pennsylvania. >> dr. cronberg? >> just on the question of verification. i think it's very interesting that concrete proposals that have been put forth on the very

-- how it could be carried out are put forth by former directors of the international -- the international atomic energy agency. others have come up with a reason proposal of verification which is very explicit on how you can take this step and actually verify the question of military and civilian use. and so, there are technical proposals i think is a political problem. >> thank you very much. please join me in thanking our speakers. [applause] >> up next, senators lisa murkowski talks about her support for federal energy programs, including the loan guarantee program. the senate is in at 9:30 a.m. eastern and will continue work on the five year farm bill. live senate coverage on c-span2.

>> today, the senate banking committee will hold a hearing on the implementation of the dodd-frank financial regulatory law. we will hear from head of the consumer financial protection bureau, richard cordray. live coverage at 10 a.m. eastern on c-span3. on thursday, federal reserve chairman ben bernanke will talk about the u.s. economic outlook. .. in the 21st century it's unquestionable that how we

manage our energy resources, what sort of economy we build, how efficiently we use them and a degree of dependence or independence from foreign oils forces -- sources will be a critical determinant of our flexibility, international policy and the health of our economy and in the long term the health the entire ecosystem. so these are crucial and essential issues, easy to be rolled i think by the fact that some of them feel like long-term issues. there's this temptation eyes to say well yes it's important but that is a can that can be kicked down the road. the road is not infinitely long in which we can kick the can and somewhere in the 21st century 21st century these issues will become crucial to both our country and the entire planet. and the earlier we forge intelligent policies that manage our energy resources to use them essentially to exploit domestic resources wherever policy and to

shift wherever possibly when economically feasible to renew resources the less serious the problems of the next generation will face with energy policy and i think you'll be safe to say one of the the crucial indicators of the success of the country olson mallett will be whether we take on these challenges and manage energy resources effectively in our country. so with that, it's my pleasure to welcome you all here. look forward to a great meaning. i unfortunately have to come in and out but i am confident that this is a meeting that will help reform us and reform energy policy may be. with that, it's my honor to actually introduce former senator byron dorgan, who will offer a few remarks to start us off. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you very much. it's nice to see all of you here and to the provost at the gw

university one of america's great universities, thank you for coming to this energy summit. two years ago i was chairing the senate panel that funded our energy projects or public energy projects, in this country, and the ranking member of that panel, senator bob bennett, and two years later we worked together again at eric fox which proves bipartisanship isn't really dead, at least outside of the senate. [laughter] and today we have put together an energy forum that asks the question in the keynote address, what is ahead? what is ahead of us in energy policy? and second a panel that asks about tax incentives, what does the future hold for tax incentives, which determines what kind of incentives we provide for certain kinds of energy production. senator bennett and i will take a couple minutes each to frame the discussion and then we will have senator murkowski and we

will have secretary salazar and then a panel discussion. j. paul getty was once asked to define success. he said success is very simple. at go to the best school you can find and do well. then find a job and exceed everyone's expectations and then strike oil. [laughter] well by all accounts, america has had a substantial measure of success recently. we have struck oil in oil and natural gas in a way that no one could have or would have predicted. we have four times the number of drilling rigs now in america then existed three years ago. we have more drilling rigs in america than our drilling in the rest of the entire world. think of that. and we are now producing more energy, both on public lands, yes public lands and also private lands and more energy than then we were producing before and more energy than anyone ever would have predicted. it is the case that imports have gone from 60% of our energy use

to now 45%, and i come from a part of the country that has had a significant role in that, i think the most significant oil way in the world. when i describe it to you it's a 100-foot seam of loose shale, two miles below the surface, 10,000 miles down. excuse me, 10,000 feet down. they go down 10,000 feet and the drilling rig goes down two miles out two miles searching for the middle third of a 100-foot seam and then they hydraulic fracture it and force grains of sand up into the loose shale and the oil drops and the drilling 2400 wells a year in western north dakota. so everything has changed and no one would have predicted it. no one in this room would have ever predicted that. at its the impact of the highly improbable and what will our future be? i guarantee you our future will not mirror our pasteur are

present and so the question for all of us is, what do we do and how do we make sure that we have greater energy security and greater national security? it is the case that increased production is about tea for our country in both oil and natural gas. changes a lot of things. it's also the case that what has contributed to this better and energy security is greater fuel efficiency vehicles, café standards imposed by the federal government. everyone understands it has had a very significant impact. the renewable fuel standard. i was the author of the original renewable fuel standard with two of my colleagues, has also had a profound impact. now 10% of our gasoline use comes from while fuels and good for us. and also a slower economy, which is not good but has had a significant impact on the issues of supply and demand of energy in the short-term. but no matter what we produce or how much we produce with respect to oil and natural gas for oil

in this country the price of oil is still an international price, and therefore for energy security and national security, we need in my judgment, a plan and a plan that yes, emphasizes production, fossil fuels as well but also production of renewable energy. and it is the case that one could say well, we are doing so well that defining success that we can sort of rest on our laurels and keep doing what we have been doing in that will be just fine, except 90% of oil products are used in transportation and the united states. the folks living in india and china very much want to drive cars. i just came from china and while ago. they very much want to drive car so project two short years ago, five, 10, 20 years and projects three to 400 million additional automobiles driving on this planet looking for a gas station once a week. and then ask yourself whether we need an energy security plan

that represents national security that uses all that diverse set of energy that is available to us, wind, solar, biothermal, the areas of biofuels, all of those areas are areas that we ought to produce. and they would come in my judgment as a result of very substantial research, which bob and i paid a lot of attention to. i believe our future is in energy research, and let me just ask you the question, do you think perhaps our future might mean that we will find a way to extract liquid fuels from thin air? do you think that's crazy? we are working on it in research. how about the development of the low cost, 500-mile battery for a vehicle? maybe not? well, maybe. it's being worked on. how about using solar power at night? does that sound crazy?

bob and i also had the opportunity to fund all of our national laboratories and those national laboratories are crown jewels and the research that is going on there is breathtaking. i'm a big fan of that research and i think that's going to have a lot to do with the kind of future that we have. so this is a perfect time, really perfect time for our country to think through what next, and it's often said there is an old cherokee indian chief who once said the success of a rain dance depends a lot on timing. well, that is true in a lot of things. that's true in a lot of things in this is a perfect time for this country to think and develop strategy for the future of its energy policy. let me introduce my colleague, someone with whom i have worked a long while and had great affection, senator bob bennett. [applause]

>> i am delighted to be with you and i am delighted that byron was on eric fox. we both left the senate together. he did it voluntarily. [laughter] i did it happily. [laughter] and we found -- we didn't go to aaron fox together but aaron fox recruited us. they were looking for somebody on each side of the aisle and we have re-created the kind of relationship that byron has discussed while we were respectively chairmen and ranking member of that subcommittee. the interesting thing that has become clear to me since we have left is that the action is not necessarily in the congress. the action on driving forward many of these policy issues lie

outside of the congress right now as they continue to sort out exactly when they are going to answer the next quorum call and deal with the political gridlock that has taken over. so i have always had an interest in energy and i'm delighted to be at the law firm where energy has a very high-profile. now let me share with you this perspective about where we are right now with respect to energy. we are in a time of enormous flux, and enormous change. i will give you a few indications of that. as in the senate over the years, we talked about energy. we were in a situation where energy prices, particularly and specifically the price of oil, were always set outside of the united states. that is not historically true. there was a time when the texas railroad commission could determine the price of oil.

because the main source of oil came out of texas and oklahoma and it was priced, why the texans left it with the railroad commission i don't know, but that is texas. they can determine by the kinds of allegations that they made, how much oil would be produced and what the price of oil would be. that shifted away from the united states and into saudi arabian hands in the 1970s, partly because we were running out in texas and the opec states decided to try their hand at creating a cartel and the center of gravity of pricing power and their production power particularly with respect to oil, shifted away from the united states and we were left somewhat at the mercy of someone else's decisions. now, byron has already described what has happened in the united states with production.

for the first time, we are exporting energy. the first time in a long time, we are exporting energy. we have enough to not only take care of ourselves, yes we are importing 45% of our needs, but we have energy being created so that in market fashion there can be exports. the technology has made enormous changes. yes, the discovery of this block and is very important that the ability to get natural gas out of shale has changed the equation tremendously. i remember just as recently as the stimulus package, when byron and i put in loan guarantees for nuclear into the stimulus package. nancy pelosi took it out on the house side that it was in the bill on the senate side as we were trying to promote nuclear. fukushima has changed the entire

debate with respect to nuclear and its role and people are looking back at nuclear and what do we do and safety in all of those kinds of issues. we are in it period of enormous turmoil and change, and the technological improvements keep coming through the door. add arent fox we see clients that come up that have new technology that they need patent help or they need guidance in making their contracts with their suppliers or contracts with foreign governments. we are seeing a tremendous change in the private sector in how people deal with energy. i was in europe, attending the brussels forum. that has put on by the german marshall club every year in brussels, and i'm on the lord of that fund, so i go to the forum,

and one of the issues that is always discussed his energy. i won't bore you with all of the things that were set in said in the energy forum, but this interesting comment by the woman who is facilitating. after the panel had made their presentation and we were in the question and answer period and i was going on, she stopped just long enough to make this observation. she said, alright, last year, when we were here, talking about energy, everything was russia, russia, russia. this year, listen to yourselves. everything is china, china, china. alright, it's just another indication that the entire world situation is changing, not just to the american role. so that is why we are delighted

that byron and i have been able to talk to our two former colleagues, lisa murkowski and ken salazar, and get them to come give us guidance as to what they see the future might be. now, don't be so presumptuous as to ask lisa, who is going to win the election. [laughter] because if the republicans win the election, lisa will be chairman of the senate energy and natural resources committee. if they don't, she will remain as the ranking member. and of course, don't ask can salazar who is going to win the election, because his job too depends in part on the outcome of that but both of them, as they look ahead, have got a sense of where things are going. from personal experience dealing both byron and i know that these are two very thoughtful people. and they are not ideologues in

the sense that they have lined her son that we have to do it this way. both of them are open to the sense of maybe it could happen this way and let's look at new opportunities in and new ways to go. so our program is to have senator murkowski here for about 20 minutes out of the 30 that she is allowed, and then open it up to questions and answers and then she will be followed by, slip of the tongue, secretary salazar. i don't mean to demote him. the secretary of energy interior rather than the senator from colorado, but secretary salazar, the same kind of thing. he will have some opening comments and we will do our best to go to the question and answer. i have caught my eye to see if senator murkowski has arrived yet, and, so being a senator i

can go on for a long as you need. [laughter] that is not a problem at all. the one thing that undergirds all of this is of course the recognition that byron talked about, of the importance of energy and the economy. if you look at the economy and overall circumstance, you see that access to cheap energy has been a driving force, in building the economy, ever since we entered the industrial age. and one of the challenges we have had elliptically in economically has been the uncertainty of that access. it hit us with the oil embargo that came in the 1970s during the nixon administration. it was not just the price that went up dramatically with the oil embargo in the arab

countries, it was the uncertainty that went up, and with that uncertainty he began to get changes in the marketplace that came as a result of the fact that there are any industries that absolutely have to have energy. this is not given to what economists call it lasted demand. if you are running an airline, you have to have jet fuel. you can say well, we will cut back a little. you have to have it. and for many people in the way america is structured, you have to have enough gasoline to put your card to get to work. we do not get to and from in any other way. for most of america except by automobile. i was in the nixon administration and the

department of transportation and everybody was talking about airlines killing rail transportation. i remember riding on the train. that was the way you got from one city to the other. by passenger rail. we watched passenger rail disappear and indeed, during the time i was there, amtrak was created by shrinking all of the rail passenger service in every railroad in the country. it wasn't the airlines. the thing that destroyed rail passenger service was the interstate highway system and even today, over 95% of the intercity trips and the united states are by car. not by air. alright, you can argue that was a good thing or a bad thing, but it transformed america in a very fundamental way. our former colleague, pat moynihan once said everybody

said eisenhower was a passive president whereas kennedy and johnson were active presidents. eisenhower just kind of sat there but kennedy and johnson were out there moving. he said, eisenhower change the country more than anything kennedy and johnson did it together when he built the interstate highway system. it transformed the way americans live, transformed the way americans of americans traded, it transformed all industries. it created boom cities. if you were on the interstate, you had an entirely different situation than if you were -- he said eisenhower transformed us. alright, that was the 1950's. by the 1970s is when the air of oil embargo hits. it did and just cause some energy price changes. it hit at the core, the way america was structured in the way america performed.

the fact that we are now beginning to get back on top of our energy supply and getting into position where we can indeed determine our own future, is an enormous game-changer in this period, some 40 or 50 years later. and we are seeing all of this calm and are we going to have an increased percentage of biofuels? i always voted against ethanol which proves that i never intended to run for president because i could safely go to iowa without worrying about it. i never thought it was all that good an idea. but the whole question of can we put things into the gas tanks of our automobiles that does not come from oil is still a very legitimate question and one that we ought to be pursuing.

and all of the legal and economic issues connected with that are something that we hope we will go away from this forum with a slightly better understanding of. so we appreciate you coming and we appreciate your being here and we look forward to your questions. the next reality check. has lisa shown up yet or do i continue to filibuster? [laughter] >> i don't know how much of the keynote speech you have left. [laughter] but most of us as politics can go for at least a half an hour. >> i can cut that. >> no, no. [laughter] but i was thinking if i might just tell you a short story while we are waiting for lease. [laughter] >> she is here. speak you can introduce her. >> this will be very short.

ladies and gentlemen, one of our very best friends, lisa murkowski, the ranking member of the senate energy committee who knows all and we now expect she will tell us all. [applause] >> knows all and therefore is going to tell all. what expectations. i am delighted to be back with my colleagues. i miss you both. i miss you both. senator bennett and senator dorgan. we all served on the energy committee together, and senator dorgan had some good policy when he was chairman of the indian affairs committee so we have some great relationships there. i miss you but i'm glad to know you are carrying on in a good manner here with this forum, so i appreciated. i have been invited this morning

to give a general outlook on energy policy. i think what is certain is that a lot of members from both parties have been thinking through legislative responses to our various energy challenges and for all the progress that we may have made, those challenges i think remain pretty considerable. when we think about what we face as a nation and energy issues that present themselves, i think it comes down to some very key things. it's not great rocket science here. what we are looking to do is, we need to keep energy affordable. we need to ensure the safety of its production. we need to maintain the balance in the federal regulations that are affecting its use. it coolly true is that for all the talk about energy policy, there really hasn't been much

action of late, especially when it comes to legislation within the senate. i think one of the more common refrains that you will hear today in discussion of energy policy is that the united states really doesn't have a policy that the federal level, at least not something that can be described as long-term or coherent. now recognizing that, i have been working with the energy committee, my staff there, to look at ways to renew. we describe it as a reimagining federal energy policy, and what we did is we started by looking at the energy plans that have been put forth by each administration as well as the energy legislation that has passed each congress since the 1970s. so we have gone back quite a ways. we have looked at the resources that the united states has and how long those could last us.

we looked at the federal policies to identify gaps and negative trends. we look at looked at how energy affects our economy, and of course the critical importance to our growth and prosperity. today i am more convinced than ever that many improvements can and should be made. i am also convinced that energy policy should not and cannot be a partisan issue. instead, it has to be an area of agreement between parties, and across administrations. as for energy itself, you think the goals again are pretty straightforward, pretty simple. they have to be abundant. they have to be affordable. they have to be clean, diverse and as secure as possible. to get going through the simple criteria i have tried to come up with an acronym so i don't have one. abundant energy will allow us to meet our growing demand and

increasing standards of living both here and around the world. affordable energy i think we would all recognize is a must for our families and their businesses and our nation's broader ability to attract investment and manufacturing, and industries in the future. now i would probably define clean energy a little bit differently than many of you, and perhaps some of my colleagues but further improvements in this area are essential. our nation has dramatically reduced our pollution overtime and that will continue to be the case into the future, but it's an imperative. diverse energy drawn from a number of sources and locations will help safeguard against supply shortages and price shocks and of course secure energy produced domestically will provide us with a stronger hand on the international stage, tamp down volatility and ensure that fewer and fewer dollars actually flow out of our economy.

so that is all going to take time, take patience and yes new federal legislation to achieve these goals but i think we need to be very serious about reaching it. our countries future strength, prosperity i think are competitive and are truly on the line. now one thing that i won't suggest today, or i'm not going to tell you, exactly which are resources, which technologies or really even which exact policies will enable us to meet these energy goals. some of that will be laid out in the energy plan that i intend to release later on the summer, but for now i will simply suggest that it's inappropriate for the federal government to focus on one technology to the exclusion of others. markets and consumers will make the choice far better than anyone else, and what i think policymakers need to do is focus on the outcomes. we should be op t