or after made a speech, i felt that the debate in britain had become colored by what we had to do in relation to terrorism. and you know it was very -- [inaudible] we wanted to have, for example, a longer print of potential detention for people who are terrorist suspects. but i felt on a whole range of other areas where liberty was at issue we could do better. we could do better about the freedom of assembly. we could do better about the freedom of speech, and we could do better about the freedom of the press. so i made a speech on liberty. these are my views. these are not the media gives. these are not mr. dakin cities. is not anybody else's abuse. these were my views but it was an issue i felt strongly about. i felt that america branded itself to the world as a country of liberty, and was able to persuade people that liberty was invented in america. in fact, the ideas of liberty the look on the british

constitution, some of the things that we valued greatly under region aided in britain, and i want to make that clear. so these were my views. and i think any suggestion that might have felt from industry is quite ridiculous. i was prepared to say that this was my view, and i'm still prepared to say this is my view. >> were you aware there already was a public interest defense in section 55 of the daily -- data protection act? >> yes. >> the speech you refer to under 103, so this post dates the dinnerware referring to buy about six weeks, and arguably if you look at the second page of the speech, our page is what chapter is that? >> tab three, page 14235. spent i think a rumor what i said. >> you are still referring their

two taking into account -- >> is that behind have a three for one? >> i have the wrong volume. >> it bears the number six on the top right. >> i think it's an extract. >> is not the full speech but i wouldn't want to bore you with all the detail. [inaudible] you say but jack straw has passed for guidance and consultation with the bbc to make sure we take into account concerns about the new rule which allow for prison sentence of up to two years. at that point what you're thinking still that an updated since was a progress because i think the issue was whether we would figure the two-year sentence at a later stage, while leaving in the legislation. >> that didn't come as an idea until march 2008. some documents we have on tap

20. >> what you're saying here is that clear guidance will make sure that legitimate investigative journalism is not impeded. so you're very keen to protect legitimate investigative journalist, but where that is not triggered, then it should be a sanction to protect individual privacy. >> yes spent that's precisely what you're saying spent i say the sanctions provide a strong deterrent, yes. >> there's also noteworthy in the speech that you said, top of the same page, no case of statutory regulation treads self-regulation the press should be maintained. the status quo is adequate. is that correct? >> we had no mandate for the. we never purported that should happen. i think that tony blair explained in his own evidence that we have decided that this

was not a priority for us, so it was not part of our mandate and, therefore, it was obvious that that was not what we were doing. >> so it's your evidence that you didn't respond to the lobbying of you at dinner on the 10th of september 2007, and modify the governments existing proposals to take into account a powerful present you? >> i felt strongly about this myself. i'm not sure the other minister felt a strong as i did, but i've explained the background to my own views. so i really didn't need persuading by mr. dakin about this. or by mr. hinton or who else was there, i don't know if. >> is it your evidence that you had a conversation with mr. straw before the 10th of september 2007 in which your skepticism was communicators? >> i think we're having conversations quite a lot about some of these things. these are things that arise from

time to time but i don't think there was any formal meeting about it. i think we were having conversations. >> evidence along the line when to pressures with the criminal justice and immigration bill that had to commit i think before the seventh or eighth of may 2008. iraqi compromise was carved up as it were, and that process started in march 2008. do you recall that? >> i recall conversations with michael wills it was the minister, and jack straw who was the minister, and i recall this unit we could find a way forward. i think in the end we did. >> ask you now, mr. brown, to return now to the issue of special advisors, put to you a number of questions about them.

that mr. campbell in a second witness statement, paragraph 64, suggested there was a real problem with a treasury special adviser. and by that he means mr. wheeler and, who is one of your appointments. do you agree with his analysis? >> look, there was rumor, gossip, political advisors, and, lots around and having debates and arguments. the one thing i insisted upon, and this is i think deals with mr. campbell is our political advisors worked to the head of communication it was a civil service. so anything that a big relation to the press they have to report to and through the head of the civil service, the civil servant had documentation and that's how we dealt with these issues. >> there were not -- [inaudible] a systematic perpetrators of selective anonymous briefings. either at your instigation of or with her knowledge?

>> no. i wouldn't say that at all. i operated or asked them to operate under these rules that they would work to the head of communications it was a civil servant, and he would have to report to me if things were wrong. >> so if they did in told in this behavior, that would be by definition without your knowledge, is that correct? >> it would be without my knowledge and without my sanction. >> will come back to the. mrs. brooks and her witness statement, paragraph 61, states that tony blair and his aide were convinced that gordon brown and his aides had conspired together in order to force the resignation. do you agree with that? >> i don't think that is tony blair's you. it is certain that my view. this is again, you are relying on secondhand conversations that are reported by people who are not participants in the events. so i don't take that as a serious comment about what happened. >> were your age involved in using the media to force or

attempt to force mr. blair's resignation -- this is in 2006? >> i would hope not. >> but where they involve? >> i would hope not. i've got no evidence of that. >> now, mr. blair said that he did know whether you, mr. wheeldon, mr. mcbride and mr. balls were briefing against him in the media. did you authorize your aides to brief against mr. blair? >> no. >> do you think they may have done so without your explicit approval, even with your knowledge speak with obviously did so because it was without my authorization. >> at. [inaudible] only to act with your authority, would you agree? >> no. i medically. i'm trying to explain why we change the system when i went to number 10 and why i thought it was better to have political advisors were a new development from 1970s onward. you always have civil servants without political advisors to they are obviously party people,

with their own views about what should happen. they had to find a way of working with us. and my insistence was the political advisors were doing a job, had to work under the auspices of the office of civil service, and this is what we tried to enact in the treasury but and this is why went to downing street, i removed the order of cuthbert i said we would not have a political appointee as head of communicate should. i appointed a traditional conventional civil servant as the head of the communications. and then when he retired and what back to the treasury, and incidentally went back to a formal policy job, you know, for the new government, i appointed the person who had been previously head of communications at buckingham palace. he was not a career civil servant but one who was trusted absolutely for discretion and his propriety.

so i wanted to send a message that we wanted to work within these traditional channels, that political adviser were instructed to do exactly that. if they fail, as happened in a terrible instance where mr. mcbride had to resign, then they had to go. >> did you instruct your special adviser of the treasury and of number 10 while you're prime minister to conduct off the record briefings with the press? >> no, but if a civil servant had the communications, was informed, then that was the way that anything would have to be done in relation to briefings the so they would have to be some communication between him and any political advisors. the press was been talked to. it's unrealistic to expect they don't talk to the press. i think they have to go to the civil service. >> lord mandelson, h. 461, states describing mr. mcbride as your attack dog, develop a

reputation for briefing against anyone who is perceived to threaten his boss interest, not only the tory opposition but those of the blair ride persuasion the is mandelson correct or incorrect because this is what i mean about it or tactic at the rumor, innuendo, people say something about something else. i don't know the truth of all these things. but what i can say is that the people that work for me were under specific guidance about what they have to and i think that's an important point in this. with their world there, were they reserved -- absurd. the person had to go. >> he also notes a conversation he said he had with you in october 2008 when you invited him back into government what he specifically raise the issue of gaining the bride with you, and reach what he thought was clear understanding that he would be transferred to the cabinet office, a steppingstone. is lord mandelson's recognition

-- [inaudible] >> i don't think there's any doubt about that. this is the first time i've read this by the way in, this appears to be in his memoirs. but i can't remember, mr. mcbride was pushed back from the frontline role and he was given a new role. but, unfortunately, in his new role he made a very bad mistake and he had to go. that's i think what happened if he wasn't in his original role. he'd been pushed back to another goal. i think it was to a number 10 but he had to go. >> but i'm back on october 2008, and us wondering whether you agree or disagree with lord mandelson's regulation and his memoirs about what he said -- >> i don't think there's any doubt -- but adobe is in talk about a cabinet office. i think what probably talk about

how mr. mcbride was moving back from what you might call the frontline, and he had a different role. but in the end it was only a few months later that he had to go. >> did either, or both, one you specifically about mr. mcbride? >> i don't remember any specific documentation or letters they may have said something in conversation. >> today in the course of conversation when you about mrmip bright? >> i don't know where the our document what happened in the leaking of these e-mails. they certainly would've talking about that when it happened, but i was very clear to on my own line that he had to go. >> i'm talking about earlier. and early warning speak to i don't recall other conversations. and perhaps you could better come information from these people that i have but i don't recall conversations about that. cozied general view that some

had that mr. mcbride had to change his role. >> you also -- were you also warned by ed miliband, douglas alexander about mr. mcbride? >> when i say there was a general view, i'm not excluding the fact that one or two people might have talked to them -- talked about him to me. he was moved back into we had this incident where he had to go. i may say that mr. mcbride was a career civil servant. he worked his way up through customs and excise and the treasury. he only became a political adviser in 2005. he was originally a fast-track civil servant. >> there's also evidence that jacqui smith warned you about him as will be to you remember that? >> i get women were all these things. >> it sounds like a lot of people will warned you about mr. mcbride. did you see that warning?

>> are you wanting to us and what relationship of political advisors and minister is a network itself through? i can say this, that i was aware that we had to move mr. mcbride from his original role to a new role. he had to be moved and that neutral and we had the assistance that he had to go. that's how it works. .. >> for the british economy for 60 years when actually what he

wanted to say or or had said was that this was, the global crisis was 60 years. and he told me that he wanted to go out and tell the immediate that that -- the media that that was the case. that's the incident. i don't think there's disagreement about the interpretation of that. >> do you remember the conversation you had with mr. darling which is noted in his book on page 108 where he told you specifically he knew where the anonymous briefings were coming from and that they had to stop? >> i don't know. there may have been a conversation like that and this con front bation within government, everybody worries who is saying what about whom and so forth. the one thing i can say to you which is absolutely clear, i'm not sure how relevant this is to your conclusions, but the one thing i can say definitely is nobody in my position would have instructed any briefing against a senior minister. and alistair darling was a friend of of mine as well as a colleague.

>> there's reference as well, it's not clear these were the words he uttered to you about henry ii's outers -- utterings, he says he didn't order his knife to go and kill beckett, but they had his blessing to do so. [laughter] >> these are very dramatic comments. no, they're not near the mark at all. they're quite wrong, quite the opposite of what actually happened. i think, if i may say, on the incident that you're referring to there was an interview given to "the guardian," and it was about the economic crisis. and alistair was sure that he'd talked about the global economic crisis. and "the guardian" had reported it as speaking about the british economic crisis. of course, the distinction was important, but there was no tape of the interview. the treasury had no tape of the interview, and that was the source of the problem, that we couldn't get to the bottom of it

because the treasury had not taken a tape, and i think that was the source of the issue. >> i've also shown you a letter from john major. he, of course, is giving evidence tomorrow. taken the 30th of june, 2008, and it relates to the withdrawal of the mcgarvey knighthood. and he makes the specific allegation that you briefed or you instructed either mr. wheeler nor mr.-- [inaudible] to brief against john major. is that correct or not? >> well, mr. wheeler was not working for us at that time at all. and mr. mcbright, i don't know which your year referring to -- >> this was june 2008. >> just before he'd gone. i don't know anything about this because i don't think despite the fact that my name is mentioned in this letter and gus

o'donnell and i talked about this in any detail, and i don't know really much about this incident. i know that mcgarvey lost his knighthood. i know that when sir fred gibbons lost hid knighthood, i was blamed for -- people say things and do things, and the press say things, and i've never been involved in a briefing operation against john major. >> is the position this, mr. brown, that a sort of mythology has built up around these special advisers described in certain quarters as paranoid attack dogs or whatever, but there's no evidential basis for it, or is it the position that if they did act in this way, they acted without your instructions? >> look, you've got special adviser, they're a new innovation. they've got a role to play in defending the minister and defending the policy.

you've got competition in different departments because that's the nature of politics. you've got competition, unfortunately, between ministers and departmentses and that's the nature of politics. the question is what you read into this as whether there's an abuse of the constitution. i asked my political advisers to operate under very distinct rules, and i actually had tougher rules that was the general rule that was applied to political advisers. after mr. mcdwight left, we toughened up the rules even more about the use of equipment for personal purposes. and i was determined we could integrate the political adviser into the civil service system. if it didn't work on occasion, had people behaved badly on occasion, then that was not because there were not rules that were there and instructions that were given by me that should be followed. but i think we know enough about politics to know there's rumor, innuendo, allegations and so forth. the question is what you

conclude from this. and my conclusion is you need tough rules, and if people don't obey the rules, then they have to go. i'm not sure it gives us a jenin sight into the way the media was behaving. >> well, the focus of this inquiry is rightly under its terms of reference. ethics of the press, but we are also looking at the conduct of each and, therefore, the political class. are there any lessons to be learned at all if one looks at the period 1997-2010 -- >> yeah. >> a 13-year period as to the culture of the political class? >> yes. as i said right at the beginning, and i don't know if you picked me up in the way that i might have expected. i said that we should have changed the lobby system and changed the system where people relied on exclusive briefings and had a far more open and transparent system of addressing the country through the press than we have even today.

and i, obviously, have got to take some responsibility for this. my only defense in this is i tried after 2007 to change the rules. we actually had a consultation, by the way, i didn't mention this, about the future of the lobby. simon lewis led, who's a very honorable man, but we could find no cone sense us -- consensus, but i would have preferred to have open briefings given by ministers to inform the press day by day. i'd looked to the white house system, i'd looked at other systems. so, yes, there needed to be more openness. we inherited a system that was based on, if you like, exclusivity. it was also based on insiders winning over outsiders. so a lot of people were excluded from that system. the political advisers ought to and had to work under specific guidance, and i believe they should have worked under civil service leadership. and we changed that when we went

into number 10 as well. so these are the lessons i learned about what some people call the spin culture. i come back to the point that -- [laughter] it assumes a great deal of success in dealings with the media that i don't feel that i had. you know, in the 1970s when i was a student, i read once that it was said the shah of persia when he was still the shah of iran had the worse press relations in the business, and a british politician had raised objections. and i felt if that had been said in the 1990s to 2010, i would have raised the objection. i did not have, unfortunately, good relations with the press. and i used to say of myself about spinning when people said, you know, you guys are good at getting your message across, i used to quote shelley when shelley was talking about relativism. he said he had lost the art of communication but not, alas, the gift of speech. and i felt like i'd gotten

myself into a position like that before i left office. >> be did you issue guidelines to any of your advisers, or were they just left to get on with it? >> they had to go through the official head of communications who was a civil servant. look, this is an issue that will have to be resolved at some stage because we've had political appointees as press officers. we've had civil servant appoint 250es, and it hasn't been wholly satisfactory because of what the press expects of the head of communications. i don't think we've got an answer yet to what is a real problem about how you deal with the prosecution on a day-to-day basis. but i would prefer a more open system, and i think that we will get to that at some point. and if your inquiry, sir, can take us further on these roads and call for greater openness and transparency, i would be -- i would welcome that. >> have you thought about how that might manifest itself? >> i would have thought that you move away from the daily briefing that is to what's called the lobby, and this'll be

very unpopular with people who are now in the gallery listening to me, some of who are in the lobby, that you will have someone who was briefing with the television cameras there, it would be completely open. you would have to allow in press that are not part of the lobby system at the moment, and that includes, of course, the new internet media that is, that is developing. and i think the civil service and the politicians have got to work a better relationship so the danger is you have a civil service head that people think does not speak on behalf of the prime minister or the minister because he's not close enough. but the danger is you have an overpoliticized head who looks as if he's, or she is pushing the civil service in a particular direction. so i think you've got this dilemma about how you organize the management of information. but i think the openness of it is much to be well cold. and i say to you we did try to

return to the situation where when you made an announcement in the house of commons, it was new information. and we did try to return to the situation where you made a speech, and you were giving the information for the first time. but i'm afraid that the way things worked, these things were not reported. they were not seen as news in this highly competitive business in the media unless someone either had an exclusive or a group of people had an exclusive to these stories and felt that was something that was new. so this competition between the different media outlets is intensifying, obviously. 24 her hour news is -- 24-hour news is a reality. newspapers are in danger of being left behind whereas the internet is going all the time, and this will only intensify. therefore, i think more openness is an essential element, but, of course, the trustworthiness of participants is important to this as well. >> may i just touch on mr. watson now, a different topic. you address this, page 16 of

page 14223. just be clear what your evidence is about, mr. browp. you say that you can recall tell willing watson that the government had been under pressure from news international to sack him. are we back near 2006 in relation to the plot to, um, detrone mr. blair -- >> we're talking about a conversation that you've asked me about that mr. wattton had with me in -- watson had with me in 2010. and mr. watson has thrown me off. and i remind him of what happened in the past. i'm not giving him new information as far as i'm concerned about something that happened in the last week. i'm telling him, look, you know ha that when you are p in government that news international had editorials that they wanted you sacked. and i did say that mr. mrs. brooks had made her feelings about mr. watson pretty well known to my wife. that's all the new information i think i brought to this. >> yes.

there may be a misunderstanding. that's why i was trying to tease this out. did the text message you referred to, did that relate to earlier event, or did it relate to phone hacking, can you remember? >> this was -- news international had taken the view that tom watson was to be held culpable for anything that had happened in 2006, i think. and this was still the line that they wanted to pursue. you, i don't want to get involved in this because i don't understand everything that happened. there was a legal case taken about defamation by mr. watson, and for all i know there are still proceedings. i don't know. but there was an animosity between news international and mr. watson. and i was merely reporting to him when he asked me about these things that i was well aware that news international had wanted to get rid of his when he was a minister. >> this was because of alleged machinations against mr. blair, not because of his persistent --

[inaudible] >> but you are putting words into news international's mouth. i don't know. all i reported to him was that news international had made it clear that they wanted, they didn't like him, of course, and i think they had an editorial saying tom watson had to go, i can't remember the details. >> can you remember what the text said? >> they're not my texts. my wife's text, i think you'd have to ask her. >> she might have communicated? >> she thought it was important. i haven't asked for texts to be disclosed, but it's your right to ask for them if you need them, but i think it communicated the feeling about mr. watson. >> the issue is so important, we're going to have to ask to see the texts on your wife's phone. i'll put this question to you in relation to mr. watson, in 2006 the media reported that he visited you at your house in scotland before his resignation.

did you discuss any political matters at all with mr. watson on that occasion? >> no. our baby had just been born. he was bringing a present for our baby with his wife and his family. and we were talking about children. i mean, if i had known that he was planning any political initiative, i would have told him not to do it, but i knew nothing about it. >> and the follow-up question was, did you discuss mr. watson's subsequently published round robin letter according to mr. blair's resignation -- >> i think i've already answered that. if i'd known that he was planning on anything like that, i'd have told him to desist. this was a bad mistake, it was wrong thing to do, and i told him so once i found out about it. >> so your evidence is this is entirely a social call to deliver a present for your baby, is that right? >> entirely. because he had his family with him, and they were talking to sara, and they were talking

about -- we were all talking about our children. >> and, mr. brown, you called for a judicial inquiry in september 2010 in the sense that i think you wrote a letter to lord o'donnell. we've got it at tab 35. >> yep. i remember. >> [inaudible] and, obviously, the context was, although you don't refer to it, was the piece in "the new york times"es which was published on the 1st of september, 2010. is that correct? >> yeah. and the report that was being done by the culture media committee. that was the prompting for asking whether something had to be done. look, we did not know about, as i said in my speech in the house of commons about this matter, we did not know about the extent of this phone hacking, and it only gradually became known to me that it could be considerably more than what had been reported

than this rogue hacker or rogue reporter was not a proper defense. but as the information became available and as i realized that this was a bigger issue than people had imagined, it seemed to me we had to look at what needed to be done. now, the home secretary had looked at whether the police investigation should be extended to, or be carried out by another body. i had to look given there was some, i think, media speculation at in this time, but there was a case for public inquiry as to whether there was a case for judicial inquiry. unfortunately, when i asked sir gus o'donnell to look at this, he did not look at other evidence than simply the report of the culture select committee. i think that probably was an unfortunate decision. and, therefore, we had to report back that, basically, reflected the minimum amount of

information that was known to the culture select committee and said nothing about any further information that was actually known within government at the time including the home secretary's examination of this on his open behalf. own behalf. >> to be fair, mr. brown, the letter he wrote back to you on the 10th of september, 2010, simply says the information is under review -- >> you're talking about the second letter. my first be question was before we left office. >> yes. >> and that was a request that he answer with a memo that i think you've now got about the various pros and cons of taking action. and it's at that point that i think we might have looked at the other evidence available within government. and that's the point i'm headaching. when i wrote him in september, 2010, it was because further knowledge was available, and that is "the new york times" -- >> i'm focusing on the september

2010 issue because as you rightly say, we've looked carefully at the march 2010 consideration. >> yeah, yeah. >> can i ask you this, we know that mr. miliband was not elected leader of the opposition until, i think, the 25th of september, 2010. did you discuss these issues with him at any stage, either before or after his election? >> this letter was independently done me. i didn't consult anybody before i sent that letter. >> no. i'm not suggesting you needed to consult. >> yeah. >> i was suggesting did you discuss your concerns about the issue with mr. miliband? >> i had expressed my concern to a number of people about what was happening, but i can't remember a specific conversation with mr. miliband. perhaps there was one, perhaps there wasn't. i did raise it with mr. craig i remember at one point. >> okay. now, may we look to the future now, mr. brown, and

recommendations? [laughter] we know what you said in 2007, and we've seen that speech, the excerpts of which you kindly provided us with. your witness statement at page 14212 you set out some ideas for the future. >> yeah. >> and the internal numbering is page 6. which we've considered. but can i just pick up some themes and where we are? statutory backstop, could you elaborate on that? and differentiate between that and state regulation of the press. >> can i just say by way of introduction to this section that i would make a distinction between two roles that this

inquiry might have and, indeed, the way that further self-regulation or regulation may go. i think there is the issue of dealing with wrongs that have to be righted, redressed for individuals who have a complaint to make. and i've said i think pretty clearly in my evidence that i don't think the present system much is it maybe the better part of the complaint's commission dealing with complaints is satisfactory. the second aspect, however, that you would urge you to -- i would urge you to look at is not just how we can deter the bad, but how we can incentivize the good. if i'm right, there was a problem developing in this but also every advanced country in the world about the quality of journalism and the commercial basis on which it can proceed. and if in the 19th century you have big proprietors and in the 20th century you have advertising that manage to finance quality journalism, there is a big issue about what can incentivize or give support

to quality journalism in the future. so i would just want to make by way of introduction if you're dealing with that, yes, we can look at a better complaint system, and you have, sir, put on the web site, i think, very, very good guidelines for how we might proceed in sorting that issue out. and i believe there will be all party support to do so, and i know that that is important to you that there is all party support. but we have to look at a second issue about the quality and standards of journalism and how that can be improved and what we can do to help good journalists actually be able to survive based on their ability to sell their content across the media, not just across newspapers. and that may demand quite radical thinking about how we incentivize this for the future including what happens to the bbc license fee, what happens to spectrum auctions and the fees that come from that. and i think these are all issues. there is going to be a real problem in the next 20 years about how quality journalism can

flourish. >> yes. when you made that comment at the beginning of your evidence, i wrote in the margin how, question mark. and if you could answer that question even with some ideas, i would be very interest today hear them. >> well, i have tried to give some thought to this. when the bbc was set up in the 1920s and then developed its license fee system in the 1940s, it was clear that there was a market failure. in other words, the finance that was available for supporting quality broadcast journalism and quality content was simply not there. there was a market failure, so it had to be dealt with. it had to be dealt with by taking action. and the action that was chosen which was popular for at least some time was the creation of a license fee. and the license fee was to support quality journalism. and, of course, the argument in fave of it was that there were

great externalities. if you're an economist, there were great benefits from the educational effect of that, from getting trusted information, and there was a public good to be supported. but the market itself would not necessarily support in broadcasting. and then, of course, there were further benefits because once you put it on a broadcaster network, the marginal cost of delivering it to millions of people as against thousands of people was my mall. some of these arguments, in my view, now alie to the internet. -- apply to the internet. there is a problem about the hack of quality journalism. most internet journalism is, has not got the resources to be as, if you like, persuasive and be as trusted of information as you would like it to be. there's a problem now developing in the newspapers because their advertising model has collapsed, basically and, therefore, they're find being it more and more difficult. every week i see a local newspaper going under. so we have a problem about how we finance quality journalism

for the future, and there are journalists sitting here today who are in employment today, but i think the quality journalism that we need and that they represent for the future will have to find new ways of financing it. so is the bbc model of any use to us? i think we ought to look at that. it certainly deals with this issue that there is a public good that the market cannot supply, and it certainly deals with the issue about how you might apply this to the internet as well as to broadcasting because there's zero cost in getting to millions of people once you get to the first be thousand people. and i would think that if we are genuine in trying to root out the bad but also trying to encourage the good, i think we've got to say something about how quality journalism in this country can be financed, supported and really sponsored in the future. this is a problem, by the way, that is even greater in america, and there's a huge debate now in america about how quality journalism can survive. and there's some very good people joining that debate. all i'm saying, sir, if you

forgive me for doing so is that you can deal with this issue about what i think is, was a terrible injustice done to the dowler family, innocent people who have their rights trampled over, and we need to have a complaint system that deals with that and proper penalties and finds for doapg this. but we -- doing this. we also need to look at not just discouraging the bad, but encouraging encouraging the good. it's making a judgment that you will need trained journalists and the media, like the internet, to be able to sport that in the future. >> one needn't just look at the journalism of the national newspapers. you commented and, indeed, t been the subject -- it's been the summit of evidence that local journalism is very much suffering from the lack of advertising -- >> absolutely. -- >> and the consequence is that local issues, therefore, respect reported as once they were, and

as more newspapers find it difficult to survive, the loss of local information will be a very serious blow to the development of local politics, the development of holding local health boards, local councils to account -- >> absolutely. and this is why i defend the freedom of the press and the right of the press to have the powers that they have. because without shining the height on potential corruption or maladministration or the abuse of power -- and that's true at a local level as well as an international level -- people get away with doing things that are completely unacceptable. and that's why you need a local press. there was a study done in america about what happened to a town where they were faced with, i think it was a flooding or something. and because there was no local

journalism in place and because the information could not flow properly, then citizens were being deprived of the means by which they could deal with this particular difficulty. this will continue to happen. >> at least one of the witnesses who has given evidence has brought my attention to the development of the con especially of local free, local authority newspapers. which then deprive the -- [inaudible] of an opportunity to deliver their product. >> well, as you know, therest a debate about whether the bbc should be local radio, whether it should be simply commercial radio and how the integration of local newspapers with local broadcasting, with local television and local radio should happen. and it's clear to me, however, that without some underpinning -- and it may be financial -- then the market failure here, that there is not enough resources now to support

the quality journalism that you are talking about. so my own local newspaper has just had its editorial staff merged with the next door newspaper. they're running down the numbers of staff that are providing this local service, and i think you would find this in every part of the uncan that you -- the country that you go into and all across the world now. because an internet journalist who's someone who is sort of doing their own, if you like, self-journalism, you know, can put their views up on a screen and put their views across the world. but if they're not resourced and they're not doing proper research and there's no investigative journalism, then we're diminishing the quality of the output that is available to us. so it's not a straight answer to this problem that there's more people communicating on the internet. that's a good thing. when you don't have the research that is being done and the investigation that is being done to bring quality journalism. so my point to you is that we can deal with the issue of