and they were not introduced, the ultimate reason nothing was done was that we simply could not have been certain of the getting it through the house of commons. there was sufficient opposition within cabinet. to be certain there would be a larger degree of opposition within the parliamentary party. and since no credible way i

could've relied on opposition parties to pass legislation like that, i simply did not have a majority to do it. so it couldn't be done. >> the appointment of -- paragraph 91 of your statement. >> yes. >> over all, do you think that was a positive step in terms of what he was able to do over the time he was chair of the pcc. but i think if you wanted someone who could guide the pcc get a better code of behavior, it would've been difficult at the time to find anyone better than john, or more capable of being able to do. and certainly he made some efforts to do it, i think at the end john -- perhaps those more to be done that is able to do. it was perfectly credible he

would achieve more than almost anyone in doing it. >> you tell us, the byproducts of that, that his appointment made even less likely the concerted members of parliament would support statutory -- >> i mean, those who are queasy about, they get a look on here is one of her own. former cabinet member who is actually chairing the pcc. therefore, why do we wait to see how well he gets on. why rush ahead with legislation? so his appointment did have a material effect upon in the parliamentary department. >> in terms of the development that was given to it, just look out for documents, sir john, quite briefly. the first is on tab 22, which is a minute that was written to you by the secretary of state on the

second of march, 1995. our page 03949. do you have that? >> i'm struggling to find a. i will find in a second, i am sure. i have it. >> the package he was proposing, the second bullet point, the white paper should announce that the government has no plans to introduce a tour of invasion of privacy. we shall not convince. we shall simply appear indecisive. by saying we shall not convince, who was he referring to would

not be convinced? >> parliament, the media, the court of public opinion. i don't think it would have convinced ourselves. >> he elaborates on that to be fair on the next page, 03950, the second bullet point. he refers to fierce resistance to the introduction of a new tour. that would include resistant -- and the absence of legal aid you touched on this point. it would be seen as a measure which protected the rich and powerful. >> it was a point we were unaware of all the time that we were concerned about all the time. it wouldn't have applied if it into capacity to offer legal aid to everybody. it wouldn't have applied in that fashion though it would have thrown out different problems about whether you get all sorts of frivolous claims. >> and why also should you have legal aid for this if you didn't illegal it for other things, all sorts of issues?

>> exactly. it throws all sorts of problems. and the lord chancellor, although he was amenable to some form of legal aid in limited circumstances, threw up all those problems and realized it wasn't practical to make it widespread. >> and the secretary of state also makes it clear he'd been engaged in detailed discussions with lord wakeham on this issue. is just after i think lord wakeham had been appointed chair of pcc. we can see a middle of the page the paragraph of john is very conscious of the need to persuade the public of self-regulation and has teeth. possibly forlorn aspiration as well, wasn't it? >> in retrospect, yes. in retrospect just. i mean there were some things done. it has to be said on behalf of of the pcc that it did make some changes. they were relatively trivial changes, but they were changes. and they also if our member greg wood, appointed a privacy

commission from professor pinker at the time. so there were things that they have done. and the hope that stephen was expressing there is that john wakeham would be able to persuade the media, the press, to go a good deal further than they already have done. it was as you say aspirational. >> he takes the matter further forward chronologically. on the 20th of march 1995 you'll see on tab 23-a for the confidential policy minute to you, our page 03964. there's reference there to the lawyers in your cabinet, including lord chancellor. mr. howard i think was secretary of state for the home department. >> he was secretary and --

>> pardon me. >> james mckay was lord chancellor. >> and we see just below the hole punch, secretary of state says the talk would be the wrong thing at the wrong time. most importantly, it would mean a major riot with the press. there's reference to "the daily mail" beast which we have at 03968. you can imagine what he might say. it's good indication of the strength of feeling. so concerns about press reaction were a part of the mixer, weren't they? >> yes, they were. and more so than they normally would have been because it actually related to the press. it wasn't a question of the press making a policy that was distant from their natural self-interest. this was a policy that was very germane to their natural self-interest. and i think that is why stephen has written as he had. it would have meant a major

rabble. we know from the outset. we knew that when we started to go ahead. so that was a factor. but i do not believe in most peoples minds it it was the factor which determine is not to be able to proceed. >> the next page, we can see his thinking. we must not exhaust all of her armor at once. if in given john wakeham's approach. self-regulation come to with one precipitated by "the mirror" paper can't be ruled out. with that enacted which were left with only the nuclear threat regulation for improving but as you know i'm not attracted to the rhetoric of the last chancellor but my proposal -- [inaudible] so i suppose he's saying they would be the immediate step before the final nuclear option. we can introduce, perhaps it

breaks down the ticket in stages, is that what he is saying? >> that is what he has written. spent statutory regulations in this context means full-blown statutory regulation. >> i don't think that is what he had in mind. i think it's just a phrase. i think he is thinking of a statutory body but i don't think he was thinking of a statutory code of conduct, if i can draw that distinction. >> and finally, if i can move forward to tab 25, again to you, 24 april 1995, our page 03974, where you're thinking now, he's thinking of how does one present the so-called do-nothing option. on the next page under the heading press reaction, this

page 03975, and the issue of criminal offenses doesn't seem to be troubling the press so much. they sit on the contrary, the press are increasingly fearful that some of the tabloids are dragging him towards something far worse statutory regulatory of some sort. and then on the final paragraph of this section. on press reactions, there should be no confusion, proposal would give rise to a major stall and in my view would fairly parliament. so you don't with both of those to the opposition would oppose it, arguing that any action on this front must be matched with our freedom of information act. business managers are nervous about -- criminal offenses in this parliament, the argument applies trying to legislate. and any and -- and in the end,

the do-nothing option seems to be the least now choice. we see that, of course, at the bottom of 03976. or rather it wasn't quite the do-nothing option to be there. it's little r3, the whole bunch on 03976. and i think those, your tix or mark -- >> they are, yes. yes, they are. >> clearly, the core of it was the business managers were clear we couldn't carry anything through parliament. and at the time, i think we majority of i think our majority had fallen to single figures by them. so we are talking of majority of nine and argue be the most contentious piece of legislation that anyone would've seen for quite a long time. so the business managers were

robust that we couldn't carry the legislation. and that actual at the end of the day in politics is the end of the argument. it may not win the moral argument. it doesn't but it's a very practical argument if you can't do it if you don't have the votes. you can't do it. >> i think that takes the story forward as far as it can be taken. degraff 95. -- paragraph 95. you say quite frankly you feel this represents a missed opportunity come is that right? >> well, i do. i do feel that. i mean, many of the things that happened subsequent has led to this inquiry, may not happen if we been able to enact. and i think in the interest of the good majority of the press, the press would have fallen into the disrepute in which the criminal activities had laid. if these changes have been made, i don't think many of the things

that subsequently happened would have happened. so in that sense it was a missed opportunity. it was a mess, but it was a missed opportunity that was unavoidable. it wasn't a missed opportunity just because we should be. it was a missed opportunity because we couldn't do. we did not have the votes to do it. and in addition to that, of course, was a general philosophical differences and problems attracting, but the underlying, cut away all the extraneous stuff, we couldn't have carried it through parliament. so it was a missed opportunity, but it wasn't one in the event that could have been taken. >> could i ask a slightly different question? enemy be very difficult for you now to remember, and i've tried to think about it myself, this wasn't along with just particularly interested. what what was the public mood to

this issue? at the moment i can reach some conclusions about the public reaction to what's happened over the last eight months. by simply have no recollection of the position in the '90s. >> it shifted. the public mood at the time, self-regulation hadn't worked and we need to change it. the public mood at the time, so far as i recall, was very supportive. indeed, i remember even a couple years later getting memos from i think press secretary saying we were robust, there was a big public after that would support fix i think public opinion was supporting us. by the time we went out to consultation, public opinion was beginning to shift. and the responses to the consultation document put out by the lord chancellor and the secretary of state, of scotland i believe, produce a response

that was very mixed. and yet you would have thought it was a thing of most interest to the public at large. and yet they spread almost in three ways in terms of being in favor of it or not in favor of it. now, whether that was simply the press and practice was at the forefront of the mine at the time, whether it was because by then they were reading in the press the perils and evils of what the government propose to do, or whether they would sit back and reflect and thought well, i don't think this is the route down which we should go, i cannot know. but i do know that the public mood had changed between 1992-3, and 1995-6, to a much more equitable position than had been the case it had been published. >> so weeting between those lines, maintaining a dynamic of

what the inquiry has been hearing is itself an apartment objective, right? >> indeed. indeed. >> sir john, do you regret not having gotten more involved yourself with this? >> i invite whoever asked to ask the question to sat beside me between 1992 and 1995. i think unless you can invent a 30 hour day it wouldn't have been possible. >> talk to you about the philosophical objections within your party when you are leaving it. do you see similar objections arising now, and do you ascribe any validity to such objection? >> i think one has to be very careful about how one defines it. will there be people who say the freedom of the press is sacrosanct and you must not harm

it? yes. there will certainly be people who say that. if they were then asked a second question, is it terrible that people should have their homes broken into, that they should have their privacy broken into by long lenses, that they should have their bank accounts broken into, they would say no that was not acceptable. so there is a divergence. as often in politics the public would want to apparently contrasting, they would want the freedom of the press and they would also want protection against those sort of activities. and that if i may say so is a difficult balance that needs to be kept in terms of how one goes ahead and deals with this particular problem. and i think you air on the side of the minimum amount of direction and control your i don't think it is credible any

longer for the phrase the freedom of the press to be interpreted as though it were a license to do anything. i think it is a need to offer some protection in the liberty of the individual. and extremely difficult balancing trick will be to find out exactly what can be done and finding a way in which you can friend that that generally -- genuinely does not harm legitimate investigative reporting. there is an argument to be had there and i don't pretend one second that is click that are easy to find a way through that. >> before we come to the future though, paragraph 41 following a for statement, i just ask you please to do with your second statement in which with under tab 12. it's page -- [inaudible] and when you draw our attention to a letter you wrote on the

30th of june 2008, is that correct? >> yes. i think that was the date. spent it starts at 14269. >> yes, that's correct. that's correct. >> in your own words please, why did you write this letter? >> there have been a number of occasions, two of which i mentioned in this letter, when i think there had been a briefing from people close either to the then chancellor or to the prime minister, that were totally dishonest and untrue, and potentially damaging. the first of them was in 2005, when i got off a plane from overseas to find and her headline saying that norman and i were blocking the publication of papers relating to black wednesday. it was utterly and totally untrue. nobody had asked us to release papers on black wednesday, and had we been asked, since the

papers it showed a much better situation than many people have reported them we would've been quite in favor of it. people said for years that we lost 16 billion on black wednesday. actually the answer was or wasn't even a fraction but it was a tiny fraction of the. and so we've no reason to object to the publication of those papers. but for reasons of their own, but then chancellor's, then chancellor's advisers had briefed the press but that's what we were doing. both lamont and i were angry. we put out a statement immediately complained at the time to the cabinet secretary. then immediately prior to the letter, there were stories put about that the reason mr. mcgarvey had not had his knighthood withdrawn was because of representations from me saying mr. mcgarvey's nitrd should not be withdrawn. and not only that but i ended into some fierce row with david cameron about it.

utterly and totally untrue. and on this occasion, we were given i might office was given by a reporter the name of the person who had run ground and spread that particular story. and it was one of the advisers working for the then prime minister. and it was on that occasion that i wrote to the prime minister, making it absolutely clear to him that if anything of this sort happened again in the future, i would go public immediately and i would mean the adviser concerned and i would take the matter further. and that is the letter that you have from me to gus o'donnell dated the 30th of june. i regarded the behavior that norman lamont and die as being absolutely dishonest and dishonorable. and i suppose were big enough to take it, but it seems to me from what i heard it was happening to lots of other people as well in

terms of this direct briefing. against people, and i thought it was time that there should be no doubt that the prime minister knew about it. so i asked the cabinet said it appeared i wrote to the cabinet secretary and suggested to him that he showed my letter to the prime minister so that he could take the necessary action to ensure it did not happen again. >> were you rewarded with a reply? >> i didn't get a written reply. >> is there anything relevant which arrived after that? >> he said he was taken up with with the prime minister. >> and that's what was left a? >> that is where it was left. >> actually i am rereading my letter and i to my office, not me, my office learned from two entirely independent sources the identity of the spokesman concerned who had spread, spread the rumor.

which causes some confusion in mr. cameron's office because it was untrue. a considerable amount of confusion and annoyance in my office because it was utterly unplayed untrue. it was a fiction, bound for whatever reason. i can only make a judgment as to what the reason might be. >> thank you. never go back now, sir john, two paragraph 31 of your statement where you do address the future. our page 08446. >> yes. >> your starting point is the pcc is no longer a credible regulated body. it does not and would not command confidence. was it ever really a regulator, in your view? >> i don't think so in any real sense. i think the second report summed

up what it was very eloquently and dismissively. i don't think was ever a credible regulated. nor would be a free constituted. >> paragraph 43 you've already made the point, you've addressed in paragraph 42, you recommend five options. can you take us through those, please? >> certainly. i think in terms of, the purpose of this is not to be punitive to the press, but stop malpractice. that is the purpose i think that we are engaged in your i think if people produce an article that is blatantly wrong, and an independent body determines it is blatantly wrong, i think rather than going in for large damages or preparation, an apology in a position of equal prominence to the original article would be appropriate. i think anybody establish a be

in a position to insist on that with the press. second, there might be occasions for nominal cash payment to the aggrieved party, but i do not favor large sums of compensation, provided a credible apology is offered in a credible position in the newspapers. thirdly, i think if there are repeated abuses in a particular newspaper, i think the regulatory body should have the power to impose sanctions, by which i mean either finds on the newspaper or insist examples perhaps a loss of their vat eccentric record which would be financially quite punitive, although there are legal problems with doing that. >> there may be -- five xp i entirely concede that. that's why i indicated it is in a session of the sort of thing one could look at. i think where people have been

seriously maltreated, i think cascash compensation for funds might be appropriate. and i the other thin or perhaps on an industry fund. the purpose of an industry funded rather than see the offending newspaper is that would put their pressure on the offending newspaper from the rest of the newspapers who had behaved properly. i think that these are all below options. i think should be considered. the other option i think is worth considering is making proprietors and editors personally liable for the content of what appears in their titles. and that may appear severe, but i would like to make a general point about that. we only have this inquiry, because proprietors and editors have not instructed their reporters to behave in a way which 99% of our public would require as proper. if mr. murdoch, mr. black and the others had said at some

stage, you will not hacked phones, you will not use long lens cameras, you will not pursue children on motorbikes, you will not do all the things that this inquiry has heard has been wrong. if it's set up in their reporters that they shall not do that, we would have had no need whatsoever for this inquiry, and no need for any discussion about sanctions of any sort. let alone statutory bodies. and the only reason we have this discussion and we have this inquiry is because proprietors, and to lesser extent, it has failed in their duty to hand that responsibility down to their reporters. the reporters operate within a culture. it seems to me. they have to provide stories or they are in difficult script the way in which they have obtained their stories, i found it very difficult to accept as a lay onlooker. that editors and proprietors do not know how they're reporters obtaining stories.

i find it very difficult to accept that wendi just -- when they get cash expenses of a significant size because they pay for something they don't ask from what is that from, what is that for, it defies credibility that they actually don't know what is happening. and i think i had no idea what was going on below me argument come is one that i find extremely difficult to accept. and since they could set a climate simply by sending an and destruction out to their reporters, i think to encourage them to do that, i think the prospect of making them liable for the content of the press reporting in their titles is something that might encourage better behavior. a defense to that, i think a perfect defense for that would be clear written instructions from the proprietor or the editor, and to the things that are unsavory that their

reporters should not do. if there are reporters are in receipt of written instructions to that effect, and i would argue that in any legislation that should be a classic defense on behalf of the proprietor or the editor. but i've returned to the central point, this whole inquiry has only come about because of those who could have ensured proper behavior have not done so. and they could do so, and they still to do so. >> not sure that written instructions would be sufficient, because i think you'll find that all the press is supposed to follow the code, and a large number of cases, contracts of journalists they do follow a good which would prohibit a lot of this material if followed to the letter, but the problem may go back to the word you used before, which was

the culture behind the need to obtain ever salable stories. >> i'm trying to find a way not to be unfair or unduly punitive to proprietors and editors. i do think they have the power to stop malpractice, and i was looking for a way in which they would have a defense in -- is one of the reporters went wrote and disobeyed what they had instructed him to do. now, it may be that my option is wrong. by think we need to look at that sort of option -- >> i'm not saying it's wrong. i merely sort of trying to put one of the propositions, had indeed been advanced inquiry, where i've been given comprehensive employment records which make it abundantly clear

that journalists must behave in this way or that way, and they must into the other. >> plain fact of the matter is, if one or two journalists misbehaved and lost their jobs, others wouldn't misbehave. it is in the hands of the employer to make sure things are done properly, in the media, as it is in every other business, or every other part of life. it can be done. people at the top cannot just wash their hands in pontius pilot fashion of what has been done in the name. there is a culture of getting stories. if that culture leads to wrong doing, then the culture needs to be looked at, and the culture needs to be change. and it can be changed by the people at the top. whether my prescriptions are right or wrong, i'm entirely prepared to believe that they may be wholly misguided and wrong, but i don't think the fundamental point is wrong. that it lies in the hands of those who own and control and

run the newspapers to ensure they do not infringe the individual legitimate liberties of the citizens. i've been one has to find a balance between legitimate investigative journalism and the sort of malpractice that this inquiry has heard on so often. not easy, but i think necessary. >> paragraph 44, sir john -- >> yes. >> when you say the state cannot regulate the content of the media or press. but i do not see why -- backup a credible system told the media to account. so are you saying that the existence of the statutory architecture underpinning would not impinge on the first principle, which is the -- >> what i'm suggesting is the ought to be a statutory enforcement mechanism rather than a voluntary enforcement mechanism.

but that the code of statute that would call the statutory body ought to be voluntary agreed with the press, i think would be impossible to a great proper behavior with the press. i would like the body that has the responsibly for enforcement to agree with the press what is proper and what is not. it may not achieve all we would like, but it is better to do on a voluntary basis and not to do in a statutory fashion, which i'd be disinclined to do. i think we should try and do it on a voluntary basis, but once that has happened, the statutory body should have the powerful enforcement of the voluntarily agreed to code. a voluntary agreed code should not be in the hands of editors and proprietors and other members of the press. it should be entirely independent. they can have press members on it but it should be, the dominance of the should be independent and they should have the power to impose the sort of sanctions i talked of earlier.

so i am looking for a voluntary code with a statutory capacity to enforce sanctions if that code is infringed. >> thank you. that's clear. and then the final point, if i may, paragraph 48 where you deal with the issue of concentration of power. address under paragraph 57. power without hindrance is bound to be poorly exercise but it's doubly important to protect against abuse of power when it concerns the rights of others or information provision, and when it is directly -- forming about our democratic process. one man one vote is a principled we have long accepted. one man many newspapers plus satellite television ownership is a very different principle. such great power is not abuse. is there anything you wish to

add to that? >> i think i talked around on a number of occasions but there's not a great deal of to add to it. i we emphasize the responsibility for press misbehavior must lie ultimately at the top. and i think allies in hands of editors as was proposed but it is often said that editors have editorial input does tactics often i'm sure that is true. but the plain fact is editors know that proprietors minds. of course, they know the proprietors minds. they sit down with them. they're proprietor may not say do this, do that, but the editor knows but on a number of occasions i can recall editors very bravely went against what would infuse other provider, and i totally admire them for it. that isn't this the. the old the point is the proprietor an editor can set the climate, and i think should accept the responsibility for the climate that they themselves set. >> are there any points we have failed to cover in the course of

the last two and half hours that you would like to address because i should probably remember them at about 330 thymic if you are. i can't immediately think what they are at the moment. i think i made a point earlier that i would like to make. i did make it earlier, i repeat myself, i apologize. but accusing at the end of this inquiry, it is very important that we finally put this subject to bed, and we put it to bed but having a system that is acceptable if nothing happens at this end of inquiry, if parliament is unable to reach a conclusion and nothing happens, then i'm not entirely sure of the signal that sends out. i don't know how fair that is to the honest and honorable majority of the press who lose out because they don't often have salacious stories because they don't go out and get them in the way the less respectable do. so i think we need to curb the worst to protect the best. and i think that is what i hope

will be the outcome of this inquiry in due course. >> sir john, could i just pick up one of the points you made, and then make an offer to you. one of the examples you gave concerns the way in which the framework agreements are being leaked and, therefore, we ported in the times. and understandably critical of the way in which it had been presented in the times, given the concerns that you, for your offices, had expressed him and the risks that thereby would be run through the piece process but i understand that entirely, but i'm not quite sure how one would fit some mechanism for redress into that, while

entirely respecting the ultimate freedom of the press, which is sometimes may indeed include a freedom of behavior responsibly. >> you can't that i was very disappointed that it don't take again but at the end of the day, much of what is printed, whether it in french is directly liberties of individuals, you could have criminal actions or whatever, but on something like that i don't think you can pick you rely on the personal standards of the editor and the newspaper concerned to sometimes they would take a different judgment from to imprint, as they did on this occasion. i think it was wholly wrong. they probably think was wholly right because they thought policy was misguided. i was worried because i have seen in a very direct fashion what happened as result of there being no successful piece process in terms of the people who are being killed on the radio basis so i felt very strongly about that particular issue. i don't think there's a

legislative way you can cope with it and i would suggest it is. alternately upon the judgment and standards of the individual newspapers. >> i didn't think so but i thought of want to give the opportunity to just elaborate into thinking that. and the second is, if you do think of something else you want to stay complacent hesitate to put it in writing. >> take it very much indeed. >> sir john, thank you very much indeed for your time. all right, 2:00. >> all rise. >> once again, a break and our coverage of the investigation into british phone hacking and relationship between politicians and the british media. wrapping up testimony from former british prime minister john major. we will return with questioning for labour party leader ed miliband and that will be followed by deputy labour party

leader harriet harman, later today. tomorrow, deputy prime minister and liberal democrat leader, nick clegg, will face questioning and then thursday prime minister david cameron will take the stand. and live coverage all here on c-span2 starting at 5 a.m. eastern each morning. >> at 10:00 this morning the u.s. senate will gavel in. >> while the spree continues we will go back to testimony from former prime minister john major from earlier today. >> a plurality of the media.

i think the media is so influential in so many ways. particularly in the way it impacts upon public opinion and the democratic system, that there needs to be a proper plurality of the. and so do take the view that parliament should set a limit on the percentage of the press, the written press, and a percentage of the electronic media that can be under the ocean of either one individual or one company. and i think collectively they also needed to give you, parliament needs to take a view under the sum total of cross media by which i mean the ownership of all the different media outlets. they should be a limit beyond which in the interest of plurality no individual or single company should be permitted to go. now, very difficult to set that, because what one does not want to do is to set any it is a plurality, set the limit so low that you actually inhibit the

capital necessary to make sure that the media continues to develop. and so, my instinct has always been the cross media limit should be in the 15-20% bracket, but i freely confess that that is an instinct. parliament would need to look at much closer than that and i think part of should we give you and it may be a quite different view from the one i've said here. and i'd be perfectly happy with that, but i think we do need to have some clear indication of what the limit is to ensure that there are a collective number of voices representing media opinion. >> is your 15-20% related to the little eight our little be a paragraph 57, sir john? >> i think it's related to both of them. 20% of the press and 20% collectively the whole of the media press electronic, is much

bigger. so 20% of a large element and individual 20% of the smaller elements. but i put that down as a dipstick sum, though i don't put that down as a finely wrought conclusion after a lot of examination. the media has changed an awful lot since i was in government, and i freely confess i may be well out of date with some of the things that are happening within the media. so i put that down as an instinct, as an illustration, but i think it is really for parliament to look at and make a judgment in the light of modern circumstances. >> thank you. may i move to a wholly different hub -- subject now. paragraph 60 of your statement, sir john. where you deal with examples of intrusion over the years. ask you, please, do tell us about those.

probably take little a as rarely unsuccessful attempt to access your bank accounts. you're not the only one as we are just today. but -- [inaudible] >> the other examples on that page, can ask you to tell us about those? >> yes. on one occasion my office received a telephone call that purported to be from the accident and emergency department of the hospital. and the caller explained that my sons endorphin had been involved in an accident and had emergency surgery was necessary. but before this could be carried out, it was necessary to know whether or not she was pregnant. and we made a pretty routine check pretty quickly, and the girl concerned was working happily in her office at a meeting for the record, she was not pregnant. so that was an hellish vision of what was tried on another

occasion, my son was followed, then a very young man, was followed repeatedly by an individual on a motorbike with a long piece of equipment attached to his motorbike. this was at a time when concern about the ira was a big deal higher than is now. he like to join a many senior politician had been given instructions on what to do. seeing that he was followed repeatedly, he veered off his route, he stopped to get petrol, he stopped off to have a call for them every time it happens, he got back in his car and he was followed. eventually, when he realized this wasn't a casual accident at the first couple times and it was happening regularly, he phoned the cambridge armed response unit who flagged over the motorbike, and it turned out that the motorcycle rider was a photographer from the "news of the world." the equipment that he thought was a rifle or gun was a long range telephoto lens, and the

motorcyclist had been instructed to follow my son day and night until he got a story. that was a further illustration. a more mundane one -- >> how old was your son and then? >> my son was 20. >> thank you. >> may have been 21, that sort of age. >> that's right. >> followed the general election of 97 i went on a private holiday with my wife to relax, and i was sitting on a rock at the end of the beach drinking, i say in my evidence, a bottle. is actually a can, my wife tells me, so there's another correction to be made. i was drinking a can, and i tossed they can from the rock to my wife was sitting on the beach to put it in a bag to take away the rubbish. a long lens photograph was taken. my wife and the bag were cut out of the photograph. i was left sitting on a rock

throwing a can, and it was presented in a large double page spread as the former prime minister go back to private life as a literary. and irritating, but not the sort of thing that would happen, that should happen. frankly. i should add for the record that was illustrative, not exhaustive in terms of the things that happen over the years. the entrance of what might be done about that sort of thing, a distortion of a photograph, and speak to i think that is traceable. yeah, i think it is very simple but i think where that happens, the newspaper out of instructed to what the photograph as it originally was, alongside the photographs that they printed and explain to the readers why they had done that. and i think that happened once or twice. the newspapers would stop doing it. it doesn't involve hefty fines but it doesn't infringe the freedom of the press. budget actually stops deceiving their readers, and it is good as

apology to the personal affront to. they should be instructed by whatever body replaces the pcc to print the photograph as it was in the same page in the same position alongside the photograph that they printed with an explanation of why they did it. >> you passed over point b., sir john, a competition your head with -- >> oh, yes, so i did. we arrived for a family holiday in portugal, and when we arrived there we learned from the made who didn't speak english, but we learned my broken conversation with an interpreter that "the sun" newspaper had arrived before we did, and either talk or bribed their way into the holiday home, rearranged the furniture, took photographs and published a story. they subsequently printed a

story with a photograph, detail, i can no longer remember. my wife it was fairly tolerant of these things was not at all tolerant when it comes to dealing with our children and our family life. and she phoned of the editor, mr. mckinsey, to ask for an explanation. and through the course of the conversation was told by mr. mckinsey that she and i had, i quote, no right to any privacy. after further exchanges, i believe he hung up on her. >> thank you. paragraph 61 now, sir john. referring in our request of you to conversations, you had i think with -- noted in his diary. one of these on the fifth of december 2000, he recorded as having said you were quote, provoked by the continual

attacks on you by the murdoch press and in the telegraph. but you set out in paragraph 61 your recollection of that conversation. but more importantly, your view of mr. murdoch a generally. can ask you, please, to address that? >> i don't remember the conversation with chris mullin. but he's a pretty honest guy. and what he writes that i said something much to me as though i might have said it to them. although he said the other side of the political fence, he was something of a distant friend to i don't mean a thing in the sense that a state of my house, but he had a -- which i rather admire. so i did talk to mr. mole. i think it's entirely likely that i said what he reports he is saying. sorry, he reported it as a private conversation but i think it is probably entirely accurate. as to my view of mr. murdoch, i was not an especially admirer of

mr. murdoch's activities as a proprietor. i did recognize his enormous skill as a businessman, that he built up sky, that he had rescued the times and the "sunday times" when they possibly face a very bleak future, that his sky channel offered a very diverse variety of very high quality programs. i think their sports programs and their wildlife programs are very high quality. so i recognize that. i wasn't an admirer of many other things mr. murdoch did, but i think my criticism of mr. murdoch should be set against the acknowledgment that in that respect he is setting up that alternative television channel was of a substantial contribution to our national life. >> in terms of the aspects of his activities as a proprietor,

which you do not admire, we can see at least one of them in paragraph 64 where you refer to him having excessive influence over editorial lines. and we understand that. but are there any other aspects that you would thread in the next? >> i think the principle concern i would have is, i do think part of his press, and they do not enter this charge against all elements of his press. i think part of his media empire have lowered the general quality of the british media. i think that is a loss. i think it is evident about which newspaper i'm referring to. i think they have lowered the turn. i think the interaction that has been with politicians has done no good either to the press or to the politicians.

i think the sheer scale of the influence he is believed to have, when he exercises it or not, is an unattractive assets in british national life. and it does seem to me and auditing that in a nation which prides itself on one man one vote, we should have one man who can't vote with their large collection of newspapers and a large share of the electronic media outlet. and i don't think you could or should, in a sort of diverse world in which we live, actually do anything about that. but it does strike me as slightly odd that that actually is the position. >> thank you. now, the matters you cover in paragraph 65 to 71, i think we have already touched on. i would like to ask you, please,

about paragraph 71. this may be relevant to the future. it is due 8460. mr. mullin is referenced in his diaries to your suggestion that a two-party alliance would be necessary to do with the influence of mr. murdoch and it is politics. it is early something i believe to be true. you have no hope of such a consensus with mr. blair, and did not pursue this option. but putting aside the past now, sir john, isn't this something which you think is still necessary looking forward to? >> i think it's probably necessary, and certainly desirable. and i have no idea what this inquiry will recommend. but if it makes recommendations that require action, then i think it is infinitely more likely that that action will be cared into legislation if it has the support of the major

parties. if it does not, if one party breaks off and decide it's going to seek future favor with power for proprietors and press barons by opposing it, then it will be very difficult for it to be carried in two law. and i think that is something that is to enforce i think there is an especially sponsored building on the lives of the three major parties. 20 odd years ago, over 20 years, 22 years ago i think, a senior minister said the press were drinking in the last chance saloon. i think on this occasion, it's the politicians nor in the last chance saloon. if at the end of this inquiry with recommendations that may be made, and i don't seek to forecast what they may become but if the recommendations that are made are not enacted and nothing is done, it is difficult to see how this matter could be returned to in any reasonable

period of time, and those parts of the press which had behaved badly will continue to behave badly, and put at a disadvantage those parts of the press that does not behave badly. and i reiterate, i think the underlying purpose is to eliminate the bad behavior and bring the bad up to the level of the good, and the bad is just a cancer in the journalistic body. it isn't the journalistic body as a whole, and i think in the interests of the best form of journalism, it is important that whatever is recommended is taken seriously by parliament, and it is infinitely more likely to be enacted, if neither of the major parties decide to play party at short-term party politics with it, by seeking to court the favor of an important media baron who may not like what is proposed. so i think what i said to mr. mullin many years ago, that a

two-party consensus is necessary, remains in my view the case. >> well, we will, to the future towards the end of your evidence, sir john, that may i deal with a separate chapter, and that's the poker report what you take a paragraph 72 of your statement. >> yes. >> can we seek to set the background info, that the third report is dated june 1990, which was for five months before he became prime minister. and as you say recommended, the press council be replaced by the pcc. there is an 18 month period to demonstrate -- [inaudible] ipcc was set up on the first of january 1991, and report in january 1993.

can i go then to paragraph 76, which is trying to do in the overall success of that is not an effective regulator, did not have -- between the press and the individual. et cetera because they tammy assessment of the pcc, in which you agreed. to what extent though, sir john, was this an issue which you left your response to secretary of state, and to what extent did you, as it were, acquire direct ownership of the issues because i didn't acquire direct ownership of the issue, certainly not. i think, it was one of 20 '03, there were 30 to 40 issues a day across a prime ministers a desperate the fact of the matter is he or she can almost never have direct ownership of an issue but it has to be subcontracted to the appropriate secretary of state, and the

appropriate cabinet committee. and that is what happened with the calcutt report. i think my view that the caltech report was necessary was well known and understood. and was the subject of corresponds. but the day-to-day detail of examination of what is a very, let's matter but it is not nearly as simple as it looks, as we found out getting with calcutt, to actual address these particular problems, but it was predominant in the hands of the secretary of state, although when things were snarled up, they were reported back to me and i became sucked in in terms of expressing an opinion and inviting people to go back and look at something again, are recognizing that it wouldn't work. but largely it was subcontracted to the initial response of governments, and refer to this in paragraph 78, was to accept the calcutt recommendation in relation to new criminal offenses. and also further consideration

be given to the introduction of a new -- invasion of privacy. is that right? >> that's correct. snapback can ask about paragraph 79. you sell the government agreed to pcc had shown itself to be an ineffective or later, the press, it was extremely reluctant on grounds of principle to go down the statutory tribunal route without further reflection. now, what were the grounds of principle which were bearing on this issue of? >> well, the grounds of principle we have in mind was the freedom of the press to comment, and that was why we regard the idea of the statutory tribunal as a very much a very last resort. and something that we were not at the time attracted to. it was a very difficult, different style, a very difficult balance to be kept that a thing has become crystallized between early 1990s when looked at calcutt

two and today. there is an extra important principle of the freedom of the press. cannot, should not dictate to the press what it can print. that his office gear, not possible, and certainly not israel. i don't know of any politician who would contemplate doing that. .. >> and it isn't practical to say they can always go to law against the long pockets of the proprietors. it isn't practical.

and, in fact, without a privacy law, many of the elements or problems that they faced are simply not credible to take to court. and so when we talk of freedom of the press, with which i agree, we do have to balance it with the rights of the individual. and when we come to what i propose, that is where i have made an attempt to do so. but i think at an early stage that balance needs to be recognized. freedom of the press by all means, but do not forget the liberty to have the individual. freedom of the press be must not mean a license for the press to do whatever it wishes without net or hindrance. >> i think the thinking, though, sir john, in 1993 was that a statutory tribunal route on grounds of principle might impinge on the freedom of the press in an unacceptable way. is that the gist of that finance? >> i think that was the concern,

yes. >> do you think it was a valid concern then regardless of the fact that your position now may be different? >> it's interesting when you talk to people about freedom of the press, they actually have more than one thing in mind. when some people talk about freedom of the press, they actually have in their mind the fear that the government would actually regulate the content of what the press would publishment wholly unacceptable. other people take a lesser view of what the freedom of the press might mean. i think the press should be free to comment in any way it wishes on wherever it wishes -- on whatever it wishes at anytime it wishes. but i think then must be in place an incredible mechanism must be in place to hold them responsible for what they have printed to insure that irresponsibility and unfairness does not creep into the reporting with beliefs that they are immune from respondent for what they say and do. >> taking the chronology forward

in 1993, in paragraph 80 you remind us that the national heritage select committee on privacy media intrusion reported on the 23rd of march, 1993. you projected the recommendation for statutory tribunal but recommended a statutory press ombudsman might be set up, but also recommended legislation to introduce a sort of criminal privacy infringement -- which were in line with before the human rights act which didn't come into force until october 2000, so there wasn't a common law right of privacy as such. when you take the story forward in paragraph 81 and 82, particularly about paragraph 82 the difficulties you saw at the time in relation to the definition of the new tort of

privacy. could you tell us about those, please? >> there were several difficulties with the tort of privacy. one of the difficulties was that it was very easy to portray a tort of privacy as being a piece of legislation that favored people who were relatively well off and relatively well organized. but without complete access to legal aid for everyone, would not be available to be used by the vast majority of people. so it was in the words one of my private secretaries put to me, it could be portrayed as being a piece of legislation for you and your pals but not for the public as a whole. and that was a real concern that we were are wary of with the tort of privacy. the other point about the tort of privacy that became apparent in the deliberations of the cabinet subcommittee was that

there was a very substantial philosophical difference within the conservative party, within ministers as to the desirability of the tort of privacy. some thought it would be very difficult to frame and might only be unfairly framed, and that would be unfair on the media. others thought it would provoke such hostility that it would dwarf everything else the government were doing. and to that extent, some of them were very wary. other were philosophically unsure it was the right time and place to actually go down that route. so people fell into quite different groups about the tort. there were several different reasons why people were opposed to it. curiously, some of the lawyers were much more attract today a tort of privacy than to the criminal offenses. our information was that the

press were not relaxed but not very surgeon concerned about -- but not very concerned about the risk of criminal offenses for things like criminal intrusion. but they were very concerned about the tort of privacy presumably because it could bring a huge raft of civil actions against them on a regular basis. and i asked the then-secretary of state why he felt that the press weren't very concerned about the criminal, the criminal clauses, and he said that was what they told him in discussion. i don't suggest they were enthusiastic, i suggest -- i would suggest that will wasn't a last ditch determination by the media to have fought against that. >> well, the hostility that you refer to in that answer was likely to include if not be predominated by hostility from

the press itself, is that right in. >> indeed. >> you've given us some examples of press reporting at the time on sjn9 which is tab 10. the consultation on the select committee report. >> yes. >> and we see a range of views from the independent, "the financial times," "the daily mail," page 084 and 5 expressed themselves somewhat more penchantly than the two other papers i mentioned. and they refer to fighting a law based on a lie. >> yes, they did. >> "the guardian" once altogether -- [inaudible] so you already had a range of -- >> as it was -- there was a universality of opinion across the press that a tort in

particular would be very damaging to investigative journalism. that was their view, and they expressed it forcibly in the columns of their newspapers. it was also the view of a number of colleagues in the subcommittee. so although they should not have known that and probably did not know that, they did have a number of people who took the same view inside the subcommittee dealing with the calcutt recommendations. >> press influence, if i can put it in that way, was certainly a factor, was it? >> it wasn't factor. it was probably a factor with some of our colleagues, but it's very difficult to know what is in someone's minds. you know what comes out of their mouth, but what the motivating force is that causes it to come out of their mouth is not clear. it may be a philosophical view

of their own, i can't judge that. i simply observed there were a number of colleagues who argued the same case as the press in the subcommittee. >> it does say something, does it not, sir john, about the relationship between politicians and the press that you include within your concerns you've identified the risk that taking on a policy such as this would dwarf everything else that you wanted to do as a government, because that somewhat echoes something that mr. blair said a week or so ago, that taking on the press would take over at a teem when, actually, he had all sorts of other policies he wished to promote. >> here we were talking about something that directly affected the press. and it was for that reason, i think, that it was potentially likely to be so serious. i think there were many occasions where you follow policies that the press don't like. >> yes. i think mr. blair was also

talking about policies that directly affected the press. >> yes. yes. in that case, i think he and i would be in agreement about that. certainly, there was a universality of opposition to the tort in particular, and it was a universality of opposition that we thought would spill out beyond opposition to that into opposition on wider areas of policy as well. the government, in effect, would become anticipated, i think some colleagues felt that, and be it would be a general opposition to what the government was doing. not just an opposition focused on that particular piece of legislation and that particular provision. that was the concern that some colleagues had. >> the risk is that the balance then gets out of kilter. >> it does push the balance out of kilter. the balance is then out of kilter. it is exactly why i regarded it as important if action is taken that there is a two-party consensus at least and a three-party consensus if possible. something may be right, but it may not be possible to enact.

one of the reasons -- the principal reason at the end of the day, not the only reason, but the principal reason at the end of the day why we were unable to enact calcutt is we could not get it through the house of commons. you are powerless. that is the difference between a government with a large majority can force something through. a government with a small majority -- and in the 990s -- 1990s we had a small majority to start with and it shrunk to a majority of one -- makes it, makes you very dependent upon the whims and fancies of a handful of members of parliament in your own party, quite apart from the opposition you can expect from parties other than your own. and so it isn't something in the real world of politics, the political position and whether you can carry something isn't something you can lightly brush aside. if you advance in doing it and you are defeated, then the

government just looks weak and incapable of carrying its legislation. and the truth of the matters the, it is in the literal sense weak because it doesn't have the votes. that is always a problem with no majority. and we at the time had no workable majority. >> thank you. in paragraph 85, sir john, you tell us the government drew two conclusions there the process of consultation. this, i think, would have been in the summer of 1993. first, you did not believe there was a sufficient public consensus on which to base statutory intervention. secondly, it strongly preferred the principle of self-regulation. but it was that principle which calcutt had told us hadn't worked, wasn't it? >> self-regulation was tried again and again and again. what i'm referring to there is not having a statutory press

complaint -- i'm not referring to the fact that it wouldn't been desirable to enact the tort of privacy if we could or the criminal offenses if we had been able to do so. we weren't able to do so. >> the, the hope was and this you do in paragraph 86, you address the considerations of the cabinet subcommittee who you weren't involved with day-to-day with that. you considered the possibility of the enactment of the three new criminal offenses with the possibility of a new statutory tort of privacy as well as the application of pressure on the pcc to strengthen self-regulation. the pcc could be encouraged to reach a position of effective self-regulation without a statutory tribunal. that was aspirational, wasn't it? >> um, very. very aspirational. >> and in events which happened, we know that the new statutory tort of privacy and the new

criminal offenses were not introduced, were they? >> they were. no they -- they were not introd. they were not introduced because of the philosophical differences. they were not introduced at the end of the day because there was concern among the government as to the drafting of those particular clauses. and they were not introduced, ultimately -- the ultimate reason nothing was done was that we simply could not have been certain of getting it through the house of commons. there was sufficient opposition within cabinet to be certain there would be a larger degree of opposition within the parliamentary party. and since there was no credible way i could have relied on opposition parties to pass legislation like that, i simply did not have a majority to do it. so it couldn't be done. >> can i ask you, please, about the appointment of lord wacombe which was on the 1st of january,

1995, paragraph 1 of your statement. >> yes. >> overall, do you think that was a positive be step in terms of what he was able to do over the time he was in, he was chair of the pcc? >> i think if you wanted someone who could guide the pcc through a better code of behavior, it would have been difficult at the time to find anyone better than john wacombe or more capable of being able to do it. and certainly, he made some efforts to do it. but i think at the end john would concede there was more, perhaps, needed to be done than he was able to do. but it was perfectly credible to believe that he would achieve more than almost anyone in doing it. >> the by-product of that, and this ises the last sentence of par -- paragraph 91, the appointment made it even less likely that conservative members of parliament -- >> [inaudible] i mean, those who were at all

crazy about it could say, well, look, here is one of our own, a very respected former cabinet minister 40's actually chairing the pcc. therefore, why don't we wait and see how well he gets on, why rush ahead with legislation? so his appointment did have a material effect upon the, upon views in the parliamentary party. >> in terms of the development of the tort, or rather the situation that was given to it, may we just look at four documents, sir john, quite briefly? the first is under tab 22 which is a minute that was written to you by the secretary of state doyle, i believe, on the 2nd of march, 1995. it's our page 03949. do you have that at hand? >> i'm struggling to find it. i will find it in a second, i'm sure.

>> i believe -- >> i have it. >> -- he referred to this in his evidence. >> i have it. >> the package he was proposing, the second bullet point, the white paper should announce that the government has no plans to introduce a tort of invasion of privacy. i'm not attracted to seeking by continuing the tort as a threat to continue the rhetoric. we shall not convince, we shall simply appear in decisive. by saying "we shall not convince," who is he referring to would not be convinced? >> parliament. the media, the course of public opinion. i don't think it would have convinced ourselves, let alone anybody else. >> he elaborates on that, to be fair, on the next page, 03950,

the second bullet point towards the top. he refers to fierce resistance to the introduction of a new tort. well, that would include resistance within the press itself, presumably, wouldn't it? >> yes. >> and in the absence of legal aid, you have touched on this point. >> it was a point we were aware of all the time, that we were concerned about all the time. it wouldn't have applied if there had been the capacity the offer legal aid to everybody. it wouldn't have apply inside that fashion, though it would have thrown out different problems about whether you get all sorts of frivolous claims. >> and, also, why should you have league aid for this if you didn't get legal aid for other finish. >> indeed, sir. it throws up all sorts of problems. and the lord chancellor, although he was amenable, threw up all those problems and realized it wasn't practical to make it widespread. >> and the secretary of state also makes it clear that he'd

been engaged in detailed discussions with lord wakeham just after he'd been appointed chair of the pcc, and we can see in the middle of the page: john -- that's wakeham, not you -- is very conscious to persuade the public the self-regulation has teeth. probably a somewhat forloan -- forlorn aspiration as well, wasn't it? >> in retrospect, yes. on behalf of the pcc, it has to be said it did make some changes. they were relatively trivial changes, but they were changes. and they also, if i remember correctly, appointed a privacy commissioner, a professor pink beer, at the time. so there were things that they had done, and the hope that steven is expressing there is that john wakeham would be able to persuade the media, the press

to go a good deal further than they already had done. it was, as you say, aspirational. >> to take the matter further forward at least chronologically, on the 20th of march, 1995, you'll see under tab 23, it's our page 03964. and there's reference there to input from the liars in your cabinet including lord chancellor, mr. hallet, i think, was is secretary of state -- >> mr. lyle was secretary general, james mcchi was chancellor. >> yeah. we see the secretary of state said the tort would be the wrong thing at the wrong time. most importantly, it would mean a mayor row with the press, and there was reference to "the

daily mail" piece which we have at 03968, you probably don't need to turn up, you can imagine what he might say. it's good indication of the strength of feeling. so concerns about press reaction were part of the mix here, weren't they? >> yes, they were. and more so than they normally would have been because it actually related to the press. it wasn't a question of the press making a fuss about a policy that was distant from their natural self-interests, this was a policy that was very germane to their natural self-interest. and i think that is why steven has written as he had. it would have meant a major row, but we knew that from the outset. we knew that when we started to go ahead, so that was a factor. but i do not believe in most people's minds it was the factor which determined us not to be able to proceed.

>> on the top of the next page, we can see mr. dahl's thinking. we must not exhaust all our armory at once, even given john wakeham's more robust approach, a future -- [inaudible] capable -- cannot be ruled out. with the tort enacted, we should be left with the threat only to encourage improvement. as you know, i'm not attract today the rhetoric, but my proposal still keeps the tort up our sleeve. so i suppose he's saying there would be the intermediate step before the final option. we can introduce the tort if press regulation breaks down, take it in stages, is that what he's saying? >> that is, that is what he has written. >> statutory regulation in this context means full-blown statutory regulation. >> i don't think that is what he had in mind. i think it's a slack use of the

phrase. i think he's thinking of a statutory body, but i don't think he was thinking of a statutory code of conduct, if i could draw that distinction. >> and finally, sir john, if i can move forward to tab 25, again to you, 24th of april, 1995, our page 03974. where you're thinking now, he's thinking now how does one present the so-called do-nothing option. on the next page under the heading "press reaction," this is page 03975, and the issue of criminal offenses doesn't seem to be troubling the press so much. they say on the contrary, the press are increasingly fearful that some of the tabloids are

moving towards something far worse, statutory regulation of some sort. and then on the final paragraph, on press reactions to statutory talk, the proposal would give rise to a major storm and, in my view, would fail in parliament. so there are two limbs there, respect there, and you've -- aren't there, and you've dealt with both of those. the opposition would oppose it, business managers are nervous about trying to legislate criminal offenses in this parliament. the argument applies in spades trying to legislate the tort. and in the end the do-nothing option would seem to be the least bad choice. we see that towards the bottom of 03976. although it wasn't quite the do-nothing option, to be fair. it's little roman three with a hole punch on 3 be 97 of --be

3976, and i think those are your tick marks or do. >> they are. yes, they are. >> i think that clearly -- >> the core of it was the business managers feared we couldn't carry anything through parliament. and at the time i think we had a majority of, i think our majority had fallen to single figures by then. so we were talking of a majority of nine and, arguably, the most contentious piece of legislation that anyone would have steven -- would have seen for quite a long time. so the business managers were robust in their view i that we couldn't carry the legislation. and that, actually, in the end of the day in politic is the the end of the argument. it may not win the moral argument, it doesn't, but it's a very practical argument if you can't do it. if you don't have the votes, you can't do it.

>> i think that takes the story forward as tar as it needs to be -- as far as it needs to be taken. paragraph 95 in relation to -- [inaudible] you say quite frankly you feel this did represent a missed opportunity, is that right? >> well, i do. i do feel that. i think many of the things that had happened subsequently that have led to inquiry may not have happened if we had been able to act. and i think in the interest of the good majority of the press, the press wouldn't have fallen into the disrepute in which the criminal activities have laid it. if these changes had been made, i don't think many of the things that subsequently happened would have happened. so it was a missed opportunity. it was a missed opportunity that was unavoidable. it wasn't a missed opportunity just because we shirked it, it was a missed opportunity because we couldn't do it. it's the votes point again.

we did not have the votes to do it. and in addition to that, of course, there were the general philosophical differences and the problems of drafting. but the underlying problem cut away all the extraneous stuff, we couldn't have carried it through parliament. so it was a missed opportunity, but it wasn't one in the event that could have been taken. >> could i ask a slightly different question? and it may be very difficult for you now to remember, and i've tried to think about it myself, but this wasn't an area of the law in which i was particularly interested. what was the public mood to this issue? at the moment i can reach some conclusions about the public reaction to what's happened over the last eight months. but i simply have no recollection of the position in

the '90s. >> it shifted. the public mood at the time calcutt ii was published saying self-regulation hadn't change canned we had to change it, the public mood at the time, as i recall it, was very supportive. indeed, i remember getting memos from my press secretary saying there was a big public opinion out there that would support us. so i think public opinion was supportive. by the time we went out to consultation on the tort, public opinion was beginning to shift, and the responses to the consultation document put out by the lord chancellor and the secretary of state for scotland, i believe, on the tort produced a response that was very mixed. and yet you would have thought the tort was the thing of most interest to the public at large. and yet they split almost in three ways in terms of being in favor of it or not in favor of it. now, whether that was simply the press malpractice wasn't at the

forefront of their mind at the time, whether it was because by then they were read anything the press of the perils and evils of what the government proposed to do, or whether they had sat back and reflected and thought, well, i don't think this is a route which we should go, i cannot know. but i do know that the public mood had changed between 1992-'3 and 195-'6 to a much more equitable position than had been the case the moment calcutt was published. >> so reading between those lines, maintaining the dynamic of what the inquiry's been hearing is itself an important objective. in other words, getting on with it. >> indeed. indeed. >> i've been asked to raise this with you, sir john. to you regret -- do you regret not having got involved more

yourself with this issue? [laughter] >> i invite whoever asked you to ask that question to have sat beside me between 1992 and 1995. i think unless you can ip event a 30-hour day, it wouldn't have been possible. >> can i ask you about the philosophical objections within your party when you were leading it. do you, do you see similar objections, um, arising now, and do you ascribe any validity to such objections? >> i think one has to be very careful about how one defines it. will there be people who say the freedom of the press is sacrosanct and you must not harm it? yes, there will certainly be people who say that. if they would then ask a second question, is it tolerable that people should have their homes broken into, that they should have their privacy broken into by long lenses, that they should

have their bank accounts broken into, they would say, no, that was not acceptable. so there is a divergence. as so off in politics, the public would want two apparently contrasting things. they would want the freedom of the press, and they would also want protection against those sort of activities. and that, if i may say so, is the difficult balance that needs to be kept in terms of how one goes ahead and deals with this particular problem. and i think you err on the side of the minimum amount of direction and control. but i don't think it is credible any longer. so the phrase, "the freedom of the press," to be interpreted as though it were a license to do anything, i think there is a need to offer some protection in the interest of the liberty of the individual and an extremely difficult balancing trick will be to find out exactly what can be done and finding a way in

which you can frame that that general winly -- genuinely does not harm legitimate investive reporting. there is a genuine argument there, and i don't want pretend it is clear cut or easy to find a way through that. >> before we come to the future, though, john, i know -- [inaudible] paragraph 41 following your first at the same time, let me just ask you, please, to do with your second statement which we've got under tab 12. it starts at page 142 -- 6. and you've brought our attention to a letter you wrote to lord o'donnell on the 30th of june, 2008, is that correct? >> yes, i think, i think that was the date. >> starts at 14269 -- >> yes, that's correct. that's correct. >> and in your own words, these,

why did you write this letter? >> there had been a number of occasions, two of which i mentioned in this letter, where i think there had been briefing from people close east to the then-chancellor or to the prime minister. that were totally dishonest and untrue and potentially damaging. the first of them was in 2005 when i got off a plane from overseas to find banner headlines saying that norman la not and i were blocking the publications of papers relating to black wednesday. it was utterly and totally untrue. nobody had asked us to release papers on black wednesday, and had we been asked -- since the papers showed a much better situation than many people recorded, we would have been quite in favor of it. it wasn't even a fraction, it was a tiny fraction of that. and so we had no reason to

object to the publication of those papers. but for reasons of their own, the then-chancellor's advisers had briefed the press that that's what we were doing, both many lamont and i were very angry, and we complained at that time -- we put out a statement immediately, and we complained at that time to the cabinet secretary. then immediately prior to the letter, there were stories put about that the reason mr. mcgarvey had not had his knighthood withdrawn was because of representations from me saying mr. mcgarvey's knighthood should not be withdrawn. not only that, but i had enter into some fierce row with david cameron about it. utterly and totally untrue. and on this occasion we were given by my office -- my office was given by reporter the name of the person who had run around and spread that particular story, and it was one of the advisers working for the

then-prime minister x. it was on that occasion that i wrote to prime minister making it absolutely clear to him that if anything of this sort happened again in the future, i would go public immediately, and i would name the adviser concerned, and i would take the matter further. and that is the letter that you, you have from me to gus o'donnell dated the 30th of june. i regarded the behavior that norman la month and i in -- lamont in the first instance and me in the second had suffered to be absolutely dishonest. and i suppose we're big enough to take it, but it seemed to me when i heard it was happening to lots of other people as well in terms of this direct briefing against people, and i thought it was time that there should be no doubt that the prime minister knew about it. so i asked the cabinet -- i wrote to the cabinet secretary and suggested the him that he showed my letter to the prime minister so that he could take the necessary action to insure

it did not happen again. >> were you rewarded with a reply? >> i spoke to the cabinet secretary on the telephone. i didn't get a written reply. >> anything that arises out of that conversation? >> the cabinet secretary said he would take it up with the prime minister. >> and that's where it was left, was it? >> that is where it was left. actually, i'm rereading my letter and, actually, my office -- not me, my office learned from two entirely independent sources the identity of the spokesman concerned who had spread the, spread the rumor. which, of course, caused some confusion in mr. cameron's office because it was untrue and a considerable amount of confusion and annoyance in my office because it was actually play taxly untrue -- blatantly untrue. it was a fiction from start to finish, peddled for whatever reason. i can only make a judgment as to what the reason might be.

>> thank you. may we go back now, sir john, to paragraph 41 of your statement where you do address the future, our page 08446. >> yes. >> your starting point is the pcc is no longer a credible regulatory body, it not and would not command confidence. was there a better regulator, in your view? >> i don't think so in any real sense. i think the second calcutt report summed up what it was dismissively. i don't think it was ever a credible regulator, nor would be if reconstituted. >> in paragraph 43 you already made the point, and you've

addressed in paragraph 42 you recommend five options. can you take us through those, please? >> certainly. um, i think in terms of the purpose of this is not to be punitive to the press, but to stop malpractice. that is the purpose, i think, that we are engaged in. i think if people produce an article that is blatantly wrong and an independent body determines it is play adaptly wrong -- blatantly wrong, i think rather than going in the for large damages and reparation, an apology and an equal prominence to the original article would be appropriate. i think anybody established should be in a position to insist on that with the press. secondly, there might be occasions for nominal cash payment to the aggrieved party, but i do not favor large sums of compensation provided a credible apology is offered in a credible position in the newspapers.

thirdly, i think if there are repeated abuses in a particular newspaper, i think the regulatory body should have the power to impose sanctions by which i mean either fines on the newspaper or in serious examples perhaps the loss of their vat exemption for a period which would be financially quite punitive, though there are obviously legal problems with doing that. >> they may very well be insoup rabble -- >> no, i entirely concede that. that's why i indicated it as an illustration of the sort of thing one could look at. i think where people have been seriously mall -- maltreated i think cash fines might be appropriate and levied on the vendor or perhaps on an industry fund. the purpose of an try fund rather than the offending newspaper is it would put peer pressure on the offending

newspaper from the rest of the newspapers who had behaved properly. i think that these are all below the line options, i think, should be considered. the other option i think is worth considering is making proprietors and editors personally liable for the content of what appears in their titles. and that may appear severe, but i would like to make a general point about that. we only have this inquiry because proprietors and editors have not instructed their reporters to behave in a way which 99% of our public would require as proper. mr. murdoch, mr. black, and the others had said at some stage you will not hack phones, you not use long-lens cameras, you will not pursue chirp on motor -- children on motorbike, you will not do the things this inquiry's heard were wrong. if they had set out with their reporters they shall not do

that, we would have no need whatsoever for this inquiry and no need for any discussion about sanctions of any sort, let alone statutory bodies. and the only reason we have this discussion and we have this inquiry is because proprietors and to a lesser extent editors have failed in their duty to hand that responsibility down to their reporters. the reporters operate within a culture, it seems to me. they have to provide stories, or the way in which they've obtained their stories. i find it very difficult to accept as a lay onlooker that editors and proprietors do not know how their reporters obtain stories. i find it very difficult to accept that when they get cash expenses of a significant size because they've paid for something that they don't ask what's that from, what's that for, it defies credibility that they actually don't know what's

happening. and i think the i had no idea what was going on below me argument is one that i find extremely difficult to accept. and since they could set a climate simply by sending an instruction out to their reporters, i think to encourage them to do that, i think the prospect of making them liable for the content of the press reporting in their titles is something that might encourage better behavior. a depension to that, i think a perfect defense for that would be clear written instructions from the proprietor or the editor as to the things that are unsavory that their reporters should not do. if their reporters are in receipt of written instructions to that effect, then i would argue that in any legislation that should be a classic defense on behalf of the proprietor or the editor. but i return to the central

point, this whole inquire -- inquiry has only come about because those who could have insured proper behavior had not done so, and they could do so, and they still could do so. >> not sure that, um, written instructions would be sufficient because i think you'll find that all the press is supposed to follow the code, and in large number of cases it's in the contracts and employment of journalists that do follow the code which would prohibit a lot of this material if followed to the letter, um, but the problem may go back to the word you used before which was the culture behind the need to obtain ever-salable stories. >> i'm trying to find a way not on the unduly punitive to

proprietors and editors. i do think they have the power to stop mall practice, and i was looking for a way in which they would have a defense if one of their reporters went rogue and disobeyed what they had instructed them to do. now, it may be that my option is wrong. but i think we need to look at that sort of option to protect -- >> i'm not saying it's wrong, i'm merely sort of trying to put one of the, one of the propositions that has, indeed, been advanced in inquire ri where i've been given comprehensive employment records which make it abundantly clear that journalists must behave in this way or that way, and they mustn't do the other. >> the plain fact of the matter is if one or two journalists misbehaved and lost their jobs, others wouldn't misbehave. it is in the hands of the

employer to make sure things are done properly in the media as it is in every other business or every other part of life. it can be dope. people at the top -- it can be done. people at the top cannot just wash their hands of what has been done in their name. there is a culture for getting stories. if that culture leads to wrongdoing, then the culture needs to be looked at, and the culture needs to be changed. and it can be changed by the people at the top whether my prescriptions are right or wrong, i'm entirely prepared to believe that they maybe wholly mistided and wrong. but i don't think the fundamental point is wrong, that it lies in the hands of those who own and control and run the newspapers to insure that they do not infringe the individual legitimate liberties of the citizen. and then one has to find a balance between legitimate investigative journalism and the sort of malpractice that this inquiry has heard of so often.

not easy but, i think, necessary. >> paragraph 44,er john -- >> yep. >> when you say the state cannot regulate the content to the media or press. finish but i do not see why it can't frame a allow to back up a credible system to hold the media to account. so are you saying there the existence of a statutory architecture underpinning would not impinge on the first principle which is the state cannot regulate the -- >> what i'm suggesting is there ought to be a statutory enforcement mechanism rather than a voluntary enforcement mechanism. but that the code of practice that would could the statutory body intoing with ought to be voluntarily agreed with the press. i think it would be possible to agree proper behavior with the press. i would like the body that has the responsibility for enforcement to agree with the

press what is proper and what is not. it may not achieve all we would like, but it is better to do that on a voluntary basis than to have to do it in a statutory fashion which i would be disinclined to do. i think we should try to do it on a voluntary basis, but the statutory body should have the power for enforcement of the voluntarily-agreed code. the voluntarily-agreed code should not be in the hands of editors, proprietors and other members of the press. it should be entirely independent. it can have press members on it, but the predominance of it should be independence, and they should have the power to impose the sort of sanctions i talked of earlier. so i'm looking for a voluntary code with a statutory capacity to enforce sanctions if that code is infringed. >> thank you. that's clear. and then the final point, if i

may, paragraph 48 where you deal with the issue of concentration of power addressed under paragraph 57. power without hindrance is bound to be poorly exercised, it's doubly important to protect against a piece of power when it concerns the rights of others and tripoli so when it was directly allied with our democratic process. one man, one vote is a principle we've long accepted, satellite television ownership is a very different principle. it's important that such great power is not abused. is there anything you'd wish to add to that? >> um, i think i've talked around it on a number of occasions. there's not a great deal i wish to add to it. i reemphasized the responsibility for press misbehavior must lie, ultimately, at the top. and i think it lies in the hands of editors as well as

proprietors. it is often said that editors have editorial independence, and often i'm sure that is true. but the plain fact is editors know their proprietors' minds. of course they know their proprietors' minds. they sit down with them, their proprietor may not say do this, do that, but the editor knows -- now, on a number of occasions i can recall editors very bravely went against the views of the proprietor, and i thoroughly admire them for that. that isn't universal, though. but the ultimate point is the proprietor and editor can set the climate and i think should accept the responsibility for the climb -- climate that they themselves set. >> are there any points we have failed to cover in the last two-and-a-half hours that you'd like to address? >> i shall probably remember them about 3:30 if there there . i think i made the point earlier that i would like to make if i didn't want make it earlier, and if i repeat myself, i apologize.

but i do think at the end of this inquiry it is very important that we finally put this subject to bed, and we put it to bed by having a system that is acceptable. if nothing happens at the end of this inquiry, if parliament is unable to reach a conclusion and nothing happens, then i'm not entirely sure the signal that sends out. i don't know how fair that is to the honest and honorable majority of the press who lose out because they don't off have salacious stories because they don't go out and get them in the way the less respectable press do. so i think we need to curb the worst to protect the best, and i think that is what i hope will be the outcome of this inquiry in due course. >> sir john, could i just pick up one of the points you made and then make an offer to you? one of the examples you gave

concerned the way in which the framework agreement had been leaked and then reported in "the times." and you were understandably critical of the way in which it had been presented in many "the times" given the concerns that you through your offices had expressed and the risks that would thereby be run to the peace process. i understand that entirely. but i'm not quite sure how one would fit some mechanism for redress into that while entirely respecting the ultimate freedom of the press. which sometimes may, indeed, include a freedom to behave irresponsibly. >> you can't. i was very disappointed, but i don't think you can.

at the end of the day, much of what is printed, when it actually infringes direct liberties of individuals, you can have criminal actions or whatever. but on something like that, you rely on the personal standards of the editor and of the newspaper concerned, and sometimes they will take a different judgment from you in print as they did on this occasion. i think it was wholly wrong. they probably think it was wholly wright because they thought the policy was misguided. i was worried because i had seen in a very direct fashion what happened as a result of there being no successful peace process in terms of the people who were being killed on a regular basis. so i felt very strongly about that particular issue. but i don't think there's a legislative way you can cope with it, and i don't think there is. it depends, ultimately, upon the judgment and standards of the individual newspaper. >> i didn't think so, but i felt i wanted to give you the opportunity to just elaborate your thinking on that. and the second is that if at

half past three you do think of something else you wanted to say, please, don't hesitate to put it into writing. >> thank you very much, indeed. >> sir john, thank you very much, indeed, for your time. l 2:00. >> all rise. >> former british prime minister john major answering questions on the investigation into the relationship between the media and the press. he is the first person to testify today. up next, labour party leader miliband, and he'll be followed by deputy leader harriet harmon. that'll be later today. tomorrow deputy prime minister and liberal democrat leader nick clegg will give his testimony, and then thursday prime minister david cameron will answer questions. we'll have it all live here on c-span2 starting at 5 a.m. eastern. just a few minutes left in this break. while we wait, we'll go back and show you more of what former prime minister john major had to say to the leveson investigators this morning.

[inaudible conversations] >> i swear by almighty god that the evidence i shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. >> sir john, your full name, please. >> john major. >> the evidence you are formally tendering to our inquiry? >> it is. >> there's one minor correction, sir john, you wish to make. paragraph 56 of your first statement which is our page 08453 on the internal numbering page 3. we'll come to it in due course, but you wish to expand on that? >> i do. >> sir john, thank you very much, indeed, for this statement which has, obviously, been an enormous amount of work. i'm very grateful to you.

>> thank you very much. >> first of all, sir john, paragraph 4 of your statement, the relationship with mrs. thatcher enjoyed with the press, and you explain the reasons. for it. i mean, it's fair to say, though, that only the mirror group and "the guardian," i think, were not supportive of her, was that right? >> i think that's probably broadly correct. >> can i ask you, though, about the nature of her relationship? you say in paragraph 5 that you did not inherit or seek a close relationship with any part of the media. in relation to that in paragraph 65, if i can move on to that, you say that you saw firsthand rupert murdoch's relationship with margaret thatcher. can i invite you to expand upon that relationship at least as you witnessed it? >> well, i witnessed it only, of course, at a distance.

i think those, if i may enter this caveat first, i think those who were inside number 10 with mrs. thatcher would have a better and more objective view of the relationship than i have. but i saw it from a reasonably good vantage point. and margaret was probably the most right-of-center leader the conservative party had had for quite a long time. and i think that appealed to the natural instincts of many proprietors and editors of the time. and i think her support was accordingly offered. there were also a number of policies that particularly appealed to them. i think there were common aims in terms of things like trade union reform where there was a clear meeting of minds between proprietors and the then-conservative government led by mrs. thatcher. there were prominent attitudes to business. i think there were a similar attitude towards the european union, not exactly the same because the parity that one

often gets, mrs. thatcher's relationship with the european union, is far from the reality one actually saw at close quarters at the time. and, of course, she became pretty iconic after the fallinglands, and i think -- fallinglands, and i think it was a combination of things that produced the support for mrs. thatcher that came from the right-of-center press. in her turn, i think she admired the businessmen who were prepared to take risks. so i think it was that meshing of those particular aspects that produced the strong level of support for her. and when i say i didn't want inherit it -- i didn'tic -- i didn't inherit it, plainly, it was different. >> thank you. and you make it clear, sir john, in paragraph 5 that you did not, um, engage closely with the

maxwell press, center-left titles and didn't seek a close relationship with any part of the media, and you describe that as quixotic. what do you mean precisely by that? i mean, we know what the term means, but what did you mean by that? >> yes. well, of course, a natural symmetry between the press and politicians. the politicians, all of them -- myself included -- would like to have a supportive press. the press have a quite different objective. they need stories. and they wish to sell their newspapers. so it was quixotic not for me to be close to the press. i wasn't able to seek to influence in the way perhaps others have earned editorial support in particular. i didn't want do that, a, because i thought i wouldn't do it very well. in fact, i'm sure i wouldn't have done it very well. but secondly, i did think it was rather undignified. i think there is a different role for the press and the government. the role for the government and

politicians is, as best they can, run the country and determine what legislation is correct for it. the role of the press, it seems to me, is to hold the government to account. they may do that fairly or unfairly, but i think once you begin to meld those roles, then i think neither the politicians, nor the press are doing the job properly that they are best fitted for. and so i thought -- and this may well have been quixotic, most people tell me it was -- i thought of relative distance between the press and the government, particularly myself, was a good idea. now, it would be easy to misunderstand that and to say that indicated an hostility between me and the press. i wasn't hostile to the press. indeed, when i first became prime minister, i tried to get -- i didn't want try, i did get "the guardian" and "the independent" back from the lobby which they'd excluded