do you decide to become an informed consumer of news or do you turn on the set and say whatever it varies what they have. i don't care about the news. ..

[applause] >> every weekend booktv offers 48 hours of programming. watch it here on c-span2. >> retired four-star general and former secretary of state colin powell recounts his military and political career next on booktv. through a collection of 44 remembrances, general powell presents his thoughts on life and leadership. this is about an hour, ten minutes. [applause]

>> i'm ready to leave now. >> yeah. as i mentioned earlier, i've seen a circus less well attended. [laughter] hi, good to see you again. >> good to see you, bob. >> in the book as brad graham summarized lessons that you've learned from the a life both in public service and private life, and you write, as we'll get to later, your experiences as secretary of state and the beginning of the iraq war and what happened. but i want to begin with one of the rules -- there are 13 rules originally published in parade magazine. this is the 13th and the last, perpetual optimism is a force multiplier. i find you the most optimistic person i've read in a long time. don't you get the decline out there, what's going on? [laughter] >> it's very important that that rule had to be the summary of the 13 rules. and it links to the first one,

also, that says, you know, things will get better in the morning. and i start that description by saying that's not necessarily the case, but it's the attitude you should have. things are going to get better, you're going to make them better. it is within your life to make things better, and then if you go through the rules and end up with perpetual optimism as a force multiplier, force multiplier's a military term. we're always looking for ways to enhance the power of our force, whether it's by communications or by supply lines, whatever it is. but we look for things that make the force more effective. and so i have found in working with human beings, and this book is all about working with human beings, i have found that if you as a leader or manager convey an attitude of perpetual optimism, we can do it, we can do it, then that will infect an entire organization, and it becomes a force multiplier. they can do more than they thought they could do.

i also, coming to robert's real question, as i go around the country, i see all of the problems that are discussed here in washington so very, very often; the unemployment rate, the fact that our economy is just starting to come back but not fast enough, the problem with overseas ventures that we have been involved in and other crises around the world. but i also see as i go around the country people who are hard at work, people in business, and i talk to business leaders, financial leaders, mass audiences, i still find that people are optimistic about country. they have confidence in who we are and what we are. an almost reagan-like confidence among the people. and if there's one thing that's really bugging them, it's that they sense their leaders in washington don't understand how much confidence and optimism is still out there and are waiting for the leaders in washington to cut through the gordian knots of conflict and lack of compromise and get this country moving.

and so i have always tried to be optimistic and convey an attitude of optimism, and i am optimistic about this country. these are not the worst of times. too many people forget in my lifetime, for example, in your lifetime, most of you, what it was like from '68-'74. bobby kennedy was assassinated, martin luther king was assassinated, and buses were put around the white house, april 4th, to make sure the white house didn't get burned down. and then bobby, martin, vietnam war, race riots, drug problems, and then a vice president resigned in disgrace, we had to come out of vietnam, we didn't win that war, and then the president resigned in disgrace. and there was still the soviet union, and china, we weren't quite sure where it was headed at that time, but it was still a communist nation that was aligned against us. and yet through all of that we never lost hope or confidence. and a wonderful man who, i

think, doesn't get sufficient credit, gerry ford, came on the scene. peek looked at him -- people looked at him, and they were reassured. president carter had some difficulties with the economy, but he moved it along, and then ronald reagan shows up, and he says it's sunshine morning in america, here we go. and a few years later it's the soviet union that's gone. it's china that's trying to become a world power not by invading anybody, but by selling to us. and they've gotten pretty good at it. just imagine where we are now compared to 30 years ago where china is selling us stuff, and the money that we are paying them they then loan us to buy more stuff. [laughter] this is our economic problem, ladies and gentlemen, we've got to figure this one out. so, yes, i'm optimistic. americans have to be optimisticment it's what fuels us, it's what makes us american.

>> i didn't know until reading the book that an important text for you is the movie "the hustler." [laughter] >> yeah. >> what's so important about "the hustler"? >> it's a movie about a pool hall, and paul newman goes by the name of fast eddie fellson. and he's determined to be the champion. he thinks he's the best in the world. he goes into this pool hall in new york, and he's going to play minnesota fats who was played by jackie gleason. and so the game starts, and fast eddie is good, he's very, very good. but minnesota fats has this manager or financier who's sitting in a chair, george c. scott, watching all of this. as the evening goes on and they're drinking and shooting pool, eddie's just beating the devil out of minnesota fats. and minnesota fats is becoming desperate, and he keeps looking to george c. scott to get him, you know, what do i do, what do i do? and scott finally says to him, stick with this kid.

he's a loser. and that kind of stuns everybody. and then they play some more. minnesota fats keeps losing. and he says, i got him, i got him. and then minnesota fats excuses himself, goes into the bathroom, comes out a few minutes later, and he's reaching for his coat, they think. and as the attendant is about to bring his coat out to him, instead of taking his coat, minnesota fats just smiles and puts his hands out and has some talcum powder poured into his hands. and then he rubs the hands, he looks at fast eddie, and he says, fast eddie, let's play some pool. and he beats the devil out of him, of course. and fast eddie is crushed. so minnesota fats never gave up, perpetual optimism. he thought they could win -- he could win, he did win, and he worked against eddie fellson's weakness. and as i say in the book, i love that scene. and many a day when i was in trouble -- which was a frequent occasion during my public

life -- [laughter] and i had to go testify before congress or go face a hostile press -- [laughter] so help me, i would put my uniform on, and i would go into my restroom and wash my hands, and i'd say to myself softly, fast eddie, let's play some pool. [laughter] >> but as you mentioned -- >> yeah. i never watched the last scene. >> you don't watch the end of the movie. >> yeah. paul newman is the star of the movie, he has to beat fats at the end. but i don't watch it. i don't want to see that. [laughter] >> an interesting approach. i guess you can turn it off early in that case. i want you to relate a very touching story that you describe when you visited a japanese school once. i gather it's a school full of kids who are really being prepared to succeed, and i'd like you to describe it.

>> it was a private japanese school in tokyo, and very intelligent, smart kids from well-to-do families. and i gave my speech to the students, i love talking to students. i talk to them everywhere i go. and when i was there, questions were ready. and i noticed that kids were lining up with their little cards with their questions. well, i don't like that because these are the questions that teachers have looked at and proofed and made sure, and these were all the honor roll kids. and so i took a couple of them, and then i started looking out into the audience, anyone else have a question? and a young lady in the back of the auditorium where i used to hang out when i was her age -- [laughter] she raises her hand, and she gets up and said, general, are you ever afraid? i'm always afraid. i'm afraid every day. are you ever afraid? and i said, i'm afraid of something almost every day. and i fail at something almost every day.

if not every day. and what you have to learn to do, my dear, is to understand that fear and failure are a normal part of human existence. and you have to learn how to control it. you will never defeat it, but you can manage it. so have confidence in yourself, be optimistic that you can get out of of the problem that you're having, and if it's a failure, figure out what you did wrong and then correct it and move on. take your failure, roll it up in a ball, throw it over your shoulder and forget about it. and then move on and see what's ahead. and the room was deadly still, and what i came away, i think everybody had that thought in their mind. kids are afraid, and they have to be taught how to manage and overcome fear. it was the most moving moment for me. and if i could justty depress for a moment -- digress for a moment, robert. most of the book is about this. this is a book of parables, a

book of stories, it's a book of reflections and memories. and and it's kind of a fun book as well. and that's why it doesn't have an index. we didn't want to bother with an index. read it. 44 short chapters. give me a break, read the book. [laughter] this isn't heavy lifting, guys, you can be through it, you know, it'll take three hours. some of the chapters are a page long, a page and a quarter long. and you can dial in anywhere. there's no sequence, just 44 stories. >> for some readers, as when you watch "the hustler," they won't read the last -- [laughter] >> i gather when you were a kid, you say you were hanging around the back of the classroom, you were not the obvious ball of fire who was most likely to succeed. >> that's exactly right. i come from an immigrant family. my participants came here in the -- my parents came here in

the 1920s, and they settled in new york after bouncing around a little bit. and they all had children, so there was lots of cousins in the family. and we were all simply taught we have expectations for you. we didn't come to this country to have children that are going to stick something up their nose or not get an education. so we have expectations for you. one. and, two, don't ever do anything that shames the family, do you understand? and that was the killer of them, the killer argument. because if any of us ever got in trouble, we'd beg to be beaten rather than have someone give us that shame the family wit. it was devastating. and the third thing we were taught is mind. a word you don't hear much anymore, mind your manners, mind your teachers, mind adults. and so this embracing family expected us all to go somewhere in life. my cousins became lawyers and doctors and judges, and i just sort of hung around rolling with a straight c average all through

high school and through city college of new york. i'm not sure how i got in, but i got in and graduated with a low average a number of years later. the only way i got out of city college was because i was great in rotc. i found my calling there. i wanted to be a soldier. so i got straight as in rotc. and the administration rolled my as into the overall grade point average. that brought me up to 2.0. [laughter] and they said, good enough for government work, get him out of here. [laughter] [applause] and the funny part is that, you know, now i'm considered one of the greatest sons the city college of new york has ever had. [laughter] they've named a center after me, the colin powell center for hardship and service. my professors are rolling over in their graves imagining this. [laughter] and what i say to kids when i tell the story is, it isn't where you start in the life, it's where you end up, what you

did along the way to get to where you end up. and your past is not your present, and it is not your future. your past is your past. grow. always be growing. and never think that you can't make it. and in my family, you know, one of the problems we're having in our country right now is our graduation rates aren't where they should be, particularly among minorities. and what i tell kids is when i was a kid growing up, when i got bored with school if i'd ever gone home and told those two immigrant people -- my parents -- they were short people, about 5-3 and 5-5, if i'd ever gone home and said to either one of them, you know, i think i'll drop out, the answer would have been, we'll crepe you out -- drop you out, go get another kid. [laughter] and there's a chapter in the book called "we're mammals." and it, essentially, i love not only the hustler, i love animal planet, national geographic, wild kingdom, i love watching

lions and tigers raise their cubs, little kittens and all that. and what i get from it is the cub finally opens its eyes and then is allowed to start moving a little bit away from mom and out of the den, but only so far. the cub is given a box in which he can do things. and if he steps outside that box at the wrong age or he's not ready for it, bam, grabbed behind the neck or hit him upside the head with a paw, and he's back in. and as the cub grows and gains experience, he gets a little further. you meet your aunts, your uncles, your cousins. you meet your daddy, he roars a lot and makes noise, but other than that he doesn't do much, he's just around. [laughter] but the point is that i watch this, and then when they're about 2 years old, they're sent out on their own. but what has happened in that two-year period? they've learned the importance of their siblings, their

cousins, the females in the pride and the role of the male in the pride. they have had passed on to them a thousand generations of what it is to be a lie job. -- lion. and how do we think, how can we imagine that we don't have that same requirement to pass on all the experience that we have as human beings to our children? but there are too many children in america who are not having that experience passed on to them. and if you don't have a good experience on to you, if you don't see the good things in life you're supposed to be doing, guess what? you're going to find the bad things in life. and that's one of the problems we have in our country right now. >> by the way, when we spoke last week at npr, i told you i'd within to jamaica for the first time doing a story about sprinters. and when i interviewed jamaicans, it was wonderful. when we recorded two of them talking to each other, i couldn't understand a word they were saying. and you grew up bilingual.

>> i grew up bilingual, and all of my relatives spoke with a heavy jamaican accent, a pigeon accent. my mother and father weren't too bad, but i had a couple of aunts that i couldn't understand at all. and they never lost it. so i can speak with them and understand, and i could also slip into a jamaican patois if i had to. no problem, man, no problem. [laughter] and i was telling robert there's certain things in the language that you have to understand. so if you say to a jamaican, hey, man, how you doing, no? he says, not bad, man, not bad. that means he's doing good. if you ask him, how you doing? oh, not so good, man. that means bad. you have to understand this reversal that they have in their lexicon. but i love my upbringing. all of us who are immigrants or not immigrants have a special feeling for the family we are a part of and the place that we

came from or they came from. and it was very tight knit, a story i love telling to -- it's not in the book, but i've told it elsewhere. in my neighborhood in the south bronx, it was all tenements, of course, and i had all thes living in every -- aunts living in every other tenement building. and when i left home from school, about four blocks, they were all hanging out the window leaning on a pillow on the window sill. they never left. [laughter] they didn't cook, they didn't go to the bathroom -- [laughter] they were always there watching. and if any one of the cousins did anything wrong or got caught misbehaving, it was instant retaliation. you talk about the speed of the internet, nothing compared -- [laughter] to the speed of the aunt net in south bronx city. because we were their greatest

treasure. all of our children are our greatest treasure today, and they would not let us fail. and we have too many children in america today, particularly in our inner cities and in some of our rural areas and on our indian homes and reservations where children are not being raised to not fail. the kid out in denver who was the hispanic kid from a poor family, went to a private school, it was a catholic school, he became the valedictorian of his class. and he was first, you know, person in his family to have such an honor. and he was being interviewed on it'll, and the guy said to you, how did it happen? he said, i was never, ever, never given the opportunity to fail. they wouldn't let me. anytime something p went wrong, they were all there. i was never allowed to fail. and if they felt that way about me, i had to feel that way about me. and i'm the first one in my family to finish high school. then he paused, and he said, i've changed the history of my

family. and that's what we have to focus on in america these days. >> one chapter of your book is called "tell me what you know." and you write about rules that you developed for your intelligence staff, and the four rules are, one, tell me what you know; two, tell me what you don't know; three, tell me what you think and, four, always distinguish which from which. >> yeah. >> this brings us to iraq. >> yeah. >> and i guess my big question is in huge capital letters, how? but specifically, someone whom we identify with caution and the use of military force, never going in light, weighing our obligations very carefully, being very much the realist in foreign policy, tell me about the decision that was made to go to war in iraq, how you figured in it and your presentation to the u.n. >> in the first year of

president bush's administration, george w. bush, iraq was an issue. remember, we had planes flying over the north and southn portion of iraq, and the iraqis were shooting at them. but for the most part they were contained. but the sanctions regime was starting to break down. and we were watching it very carefully to see whether or not we could allow the sanctions regime to break down, the u.n. sanctions, and iraq is free to do whatever it wants to, oppress its people more or build weapons of mass destruction again. remember, they had them in the first gulf war. remember that they used them against their own people, they killed some 5,000 iraqis.ga they fired them against the iranians. so it's not a figment of imagination that these people don't have the ability to do it, and we thought they had them. >> they used chemical weapons. >> chemical weapons. but they also were playing with nuclear programs that weren't that far along, and we had a pretty good idea that they were playing with biological weapons as well which are much more

difficult to use, but nevertheless deadly. and then along comes 9/11. and the president is faced with the challenge of, you know, bringing the country together, fighting this conflict that we are now in brought to us from afghanistan by al-qaeda. and so we go to afghanistan correctly, and we get that what seems to be under control at the time. did a terrific job, although it didn't stay under control. and then the president's attention turned toward iraq because of his concern and legitimate concern, one provided by the intelligence community, was there could be a nexus between the weapons of mass destruction that iraq has or could develop and terrorism. and so the president started to ask his military authorities to give him plans for such a contingency which they do. in august of 2002, i sensed that the president is receiving a lot of military information, but we really hadn't put it into a

broader political context. so i came back there a trip, and i asked to see him. is and i went up and had dinner with the president, condi rice was there. and after dinner we went into his private study, and i said, mr. president, you need to understand if we have to use military force and take out this regime, we become the government of this country. international law. if you take out a regime and there are 25, 27 million people standing there, you're in charge. so if you break it, you own it was the expression i used. and we talked about it for a while, what that meant, what it could, the implications could be. and he said what do you think we ought to do? and i said, mr. president, i think we ought to try to avoid the war, and let's go to the u.n. they're the offended party. and see if we can get the u.n. to act and get a resolution that will put the inspectors back in and see if saddam really wallets to play by the -- wants to play by the rules and and turn over everything he has and give us all the information he has.

the president agreed. and in september of 2002 he went before the u.n., september 12th, and made the case for the u.n. to get engaged, send inspectors back and pass necessary resolutions. i worked on the resolution draft for seven weeks, and we got a resolution in early november from the u.n. putting saddam on notice and also demanding that he -- demanding that he turn in all the information and the weapons that he had. well, he flunked that test. and i also made it clear to the president that if he passed the test, you might still be stuck with saddam hussein in power, but he won't have weapons of mass destruction. the president understood that. i also made it clear to him that if it was necessary to use military force, i would be fully supportive because you've tried. we tried to avoid the war. and then to speed this up in late january president -- none of us were satisfied with the response or what the u.n. had been able to fully uncover. and so by the middle of january

i was with him, and he said we need to present our case to the world and do it next week. so i had four days from the time he told me to the time i had to make the presentation. i wasn't concerned because the case was being worked on by the national security council, is what we all thought. and it wasn't what we needed. it didn't connect up to the intelligence. it didn't cross-reference things. so i asked the direct every of central intelligence, how did it get like this? we didn't have anything to do with it. we provided the information to the nsc, and they handled it from there. so i was concerned. i wasn't worried because there was a national intelligence

estimate asked for by the congress that had gone to the congress the previous fall and based on that national intelligence estimate, the congress had overwhelmingly passed a joint resolution saying to the president, try to solve this diplomatically, but if you can't, we will support you going to war. so almost four months before i was going to the u.n., congress had already said to the president if you have to do this, we'll support you. and it was not a close vote. it was rather overwhelming. so anyway, i knew i could pull it all together from the national intelligence estimate. i went out to cia and lived there four days and four nights with my staff pulling it all together. with the director of central intelligence and with the combined wisdom of 16 intelligence communities that came together for the nie. and so we pulled it all together, and i tossed a lot of it aside because there weren't enough sources for it. and the things that were in the

presentation, and i was assured were very, very well sourced and they'd stand behind it. and so went up to new york, brought charts and other slides with me and had a presentation that had been vetted by the cia, every word was attested to and bought by the cia. it was the intelligence the president had, he'd been using it, my colleagues in government and the administration had been using it, the british were using it. and so that's what i presented and thought it went off rather well. and the british and the spanish foreign ministers joined in agreeing and others such as the french and russians and others were not in agreement. but that's where we were. and then about a month later the president decided to launch the military action. and then within a few weeks we discovered, hey, nobody's found anything over there. we can't find anything. and then over time it started to

emerge over time that some of the sourcing we had been assured of, congress acted on and the president acted on, we all acted on, some of the sourcing was not reliable. and i was taken aback when i thought there were four sources for the radiological and back tier logical bans only to discover it was a single source, and we'd been getting information from the germans, and we'd never talk today this guy. curveball, was his famous name. so the case of the presence of mass destruction started to fall apart completely. we still felt he had the capabilities to develop them, and if left free of sanctions, he would develop them. we knew he was still interested in nuclear weapons and everything imaginable that would be bad. but the thing we presented that said they were there turned out not to be the case. now, a lot of people agreed with the case and bought into it.

six months later the cia said we still sport support the judgments we made last year. and so the problem that i've had for the last nine years is that notwithstanding all of that, my presentation is seen as the defining one, the most prominent one and became the symbol of the whole intelligence package that we put together. and i've been answering questions about it. but all i can say is i'm glad saddam hussein is gone, we don't have to worry about weapons of mass destruction being present or not present, and i'm glad human violations are no longer. we've given them an opportunity for a better life for their people. and i will always regret that the information i presented was not wrong, but i get offended when people say, well, you all knew better. you all knew this was a lie. no. we accepted the considered judgment the, the analytical judgment of the direct every of

central -- director of central intelligence and all the 16 intelligence agencies that feed into him. but i was still seen as the symbol of it all. and that's just something i have to work with. i discuss that in the book, it'll be in my obituary, so i you actually -- i believe you apologized for giving -- >> no, i said i regretted it. yeah. wrong. i didn't want apologize for it was i -- i didn't apologize for it because i wasn't the source of it. >> if, in fact, as you told president bush, if saddam hussein gives up his weapons of mass destruction, that would mean he'd be in compliance with what we're demanding. >> that's right. >> in reality, he didn't have any weapons of mass destruction. he was in compliance. >> he -- yes. he chose not to take the get out of jail card. >> yeah. >> we gave him an opportunity. but he didn't want us to know that he didn't have them, and he didn't want his own people to know he didn't have them.

he really thought we would not attack, that somebody would stop us, the french, the germans, the russians, somebody would keep it from happening. and president bush was determined that we had to remove him and this potential threat and also provide a better life for the iraqi people. still controversial to this day, but that's, that's the story. >> did you feel strongly that the u.s. was sending too few troops to iraq to occupy the country -- >> you didn't know, you didn't know what was going to happen once baghdad fell. there was no question in my mind that the capture of baghdad would be easy. the first iraq war had brought the iraqi army down in size considerably. so i had no question about that. but as we developed the plans, i was concerned that perhaps maybe not enough force was going in anticipation of what else might be a problem once we got there. so i called general franks, who was the commander, and i said,

tommy, colin. i don't want to get in your business, but are you sure you have enough troops to deal with this? and i don't know what "this is" is. that's the interesting thing about war, you don't know what's going to half after you achieve the objective. he was satisfied that he did, and i presume the joint chiefs and secretary rumsfeld were satisfied. and these are the military authorities, and they persuaded the president. baghdad fell quickly, and what surprised me is as soon as baghdad fell, you could almost see within a week or so that ministries were being burned down, old animosities that saddam hussein had kept suppressed had popped up between sunni and shia and kurds, and then the bombing started. and my colleagues dismissed all of this as sort of, well, these are just dead enders, as one of my colleagues described them. and it seemed to me they were not dead enders. while this was emerging, we were

sending troops home, and we had stopped the flow of the additional troops that were supposed to come because we expected some sort of iraqi government to sort of spring into place rather quickly and that there would be no need for these large number of troops. some of you may remember when general shinseki, then the chief of staff of the army, now secretary of the veterans department, but he was asked at a hearing how many troops do you think it'll take, general? he said a couple of hundred thousand. and he was immediately criticize ed by the leadership of the department of defense the next day. as saying it can't be right. we don't agree with the general. this is a general who's lost a leg in vietnam, who's been around for about 30-odd years, who was involved in the balkans. he knows a little bit about all of this, but his judgment was immediately dismissed because we didn't expect that to happen. well, the things that you don't expect to happen are the things that you plan for and be ready

for when they do happen. >> come pounding this, you write in the book that the decision had been made to keep the iraqi army in uniform so that they could help to main tape order in the country -- maintain order in the country once the regime was decapitated. and you were quite surprised when paul bremer, the man who was the u.s. chief of the operation -- >> yeah. >> disbanded the iraqi army. >> there was a serious discussion of how are we going to keep order if we don't have enough troops to do it, and would we need some force that would help us keep order. and the iraqi army was one of the few functioning institutions in the country. not functioning that well, but a functioning institution. ambassador bremer, who was our man on the scene, he felt strongly that the army ought to be disbanded because it was such an instrument of presentation. and -- of oppression. and that was his point of view. but we had studied this, and we

had received three separate briefings from the pentagon saying that they were counting on getting red rid of the really bad leaders of the iraqi army and filling it back up with trusted individuals because the structure was still there rather than building an entirely new army. the cia felt that was the right way to go, i did. my staff did. and the president was briefed that this is what we're going to do. and so suddenly between the pentagon, and it's not clear where it originated, mr. rumsfeld, mr. wolfowitz or mr. fite, gave mr. bremer the necessary instructions to disband the army if that's what he thought was right. and jermy issued the order disbanding the army. i didn't know it was going to happen. i know senior members of the joint chiefs of staff didn't know it, cia didn't know it, and suddenly the army is totally disbanded, and you have these hundreds of thousands of people

who are armed and trained in the use of arms who are set free. and within a few weeks they're lining up wanting their pensions. now that they've been fired. and we had to pay some of them in order to keep, keep some peace. and then we started to rebuild an iraqi army, and that's taken some time. so i think it was a bad decision. if jerry bremer was here, he would tell you it was the right decision, but i think it was the wrong decision. and most importantly, it was not what we told the president we were going to do. >> given that the u.s. is now out of iraq at least in terms of being a combat force what, ultimately, is the, what's the legacy within the military and within policy making community as you understand it? what are we going to be like because of the iraq experience? >> let me start with the military. the military has a remarkable capacity to learn from

experience. they are one of the most introspective organizations in american society. as i say in my book, they look in the mirror and see the reality. they don't hide from the reality. so i'm absolutely confident that the united states armed forces will recover and recover rather quickly now that they're not going back and forth every few months, and they have time to get back into training and rekit themselves, refit their forces. and they will learn the lesson. and one of the lessons that they're looking at now and i still keep in touch with my army friends and read all the necessary magazines and literature. even though i've been out of the army for 19 years, i want to keep my finger in, you know? i'm retired, but i haven't resigned. they may call me back. [laughter] right after the cub scouts, they'll call me back. [laughter] we're not that desperate, trust me. but they're great. and they'll learn from it. and i think one of the things they're looking at right now is

what is counterinsurgency, and what's the best way to go about it. a lot of what i saw in iraq and afghanistan was called counterinsurgency, but to an infantryman, it just looked like fighting bad guys. for a young private or a young sergeant or lieu tempt, they're in a fire be tight -- fire fight with somebody or getting blown up by ieds. and i think what the military is looking at is what doctrinal concepts are appropriate to this new 21st century war now that we're out of iraq and we'll be coming out of afghanistan in due course. the good news here is that there really is no peer military competitor to the united states of america. the only two nations that even have the potential economic capacity or the population to challenge us, i think, would be, you know, china and india because they're large, big

countries. but there is absolutely no intent on challenging us that way. the chinese are building up their forces, and we have to watch that and ask for greater transparency, but they're doing too good a job selling to us. they're not going to blow that. and so while i watch china with great interest as a professional matter, i'm not of the view that china is going to become an enemy because they've gotten nowhering with our enemy in= the -- nowhere being be our enemy in the past. and they still have 800 million people who are dirt poor wanting to know when is it their turn. and so we have no peer competitor like we did with the old soviet union. russia is not the soviet group on. union. >> mitt romney said they're our main geopolitical rival. >> i disagree with my good friend mitt. i don't think they are geostrategic photous. do they get silly? mr. putin does that all the time. [laughter] but, you know -- >> is that the russians you're talking about or --

>> yeah, the russians. >> i'm sorry. >> yeah. mr. putin. >> mr. putin. >> president. >> yes, not mr. romney. >> i said putin. >> you did. [laughter] >> you see what happens when you work with these guys? >> in a moment we're going to take some questions from the audience, but if you got your calls returned and if you were in the discussions these days about policy, two quick questions. what would your, what would your key message be about, number one, syria; number two, iran. >> on syria is it is an extremely difficult situation. i know president assad. i've worked with him, i've met with him in damascus. he lies constantly. you can't believe or trust him on anything. but he is in solid control still of the country even with all of the troubles that he is facing. and he is of a minority group as

was his father. his father went through something like this and killed 80,000 people. so these are brutal folks who are not going to give up power easily. and even if they were to leave power easily or otherwise, it's not entirely clear what it is we'd be supporting on the other side. so if i was in right now, i would say be very, very careful. before you start suggesting that intervention is appropriate or providing more weapons is appropriate which just might fuel more violence. i think finding, finding some kind of political solution is the best way, but it's going to be very, very hard. because the opposition will want him to leave. he really is a bad guy. he ought to leave. but he knows if he leaves, the consequences to his tribe and to his interests maybe more than he can bear.

and on the other side we need to have a clear idea, a clearer idea of who we would be supporting, who would be taking over power. with respect to iran, um, i think keep putting the pressure on them. they're really starting to hurt. but they're not going to give up their nuclear program easily. we've been trying to do this for be eight or nine years. they keep insisting they don't want a weapon, but i've seen they're developing rockets which you don't need for nuclear power. so you can't trust them. but a solution may well emerge that says, okay, look, if that's all you want is power, then let's talk about how you could do that in the most strenuous regime of inspections that we can come up with. and to put you in the box so that if you make the slightest mistake or if you're lying to us, it's detectable, and you

will face the most serious consequences. >> the most serious consequences mean we will, we will attack you? we will bomb your facilities? >> in my world of diplomacy and military stuff is most serious consequences is a wonderful term because it doesn't tell you what we'll do. [laughter] let him worry about what we might do. you know, don't tell him what you're going to do. when you're going to do it, you do it. [laughter] and so he will understand that, he knows what we could do to him. and the other thing where i think i'm more heretical on this than my colleague in the academic community, i've been around nuclear weapons as a soldier and national security adviser, chairman for close to 50 years. i was taught how to deploy nuclear weapons as a young captain, age 25. as a corps commander in germany guarding the narrowest part of the nato core of nato defense

area, if they came through me, if the if the russian army got through me, it was done. they would split nato in the half. so my war plan had to be to top them as best we could waiting for reinforcements to come from the united states. we thought we could only do that for a few days because they had three armies. so we would have to call for nuclear weapons. i still remember out in the field one day we were studying this problem, and the game we were playing, the battle reached the third day, and my staff was saying we need to call for the release of nuclear weapons. and i said, let me see the target list we're going to drop these on, and they were all in west germany because the russians had come through. i said what did all the germans go? oh, we evacuated them. really? how? and it was so, so surreal, but the real. the weapons were there. they could have been used. and if we had done it, the russians would have responded.

and i don't think you would have stopped the escalation that would take place. and i learned from that experience that these things are really not that usable. you could deter somebody with them. we deterred the russians, the russians deterred us. reagan is the one who wanted to put in strategic defenses to make them worthless because you shoot one at us, we'll knock it down. and then as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff i had under my supervision some 28,000 nuclear weapons. 28,000 of all kinds. and my russian colleague and i would talk a lot about this. mosea was his name. and i was telling robert backstage that when the cold war was just about ending, and we were talking very candidly to one another. one day we were talking about the security systems that we had on our missiles to make sure there were no accidents, and one of the systems that we were talking about he had a level of security that was higher than mine. he had one more level of

protection to keep them from being used. and i said, publish shah, how come you have this extra layer? he said, colin, we lost 40 million people in the great patriotic war, world war ii. we don't ever want to take that used, colin, you know it and i know it. i said, i agree. and the consequence of the, existential consequences of such use are almost unimaginable. and so when you look at iran, a country of 60, 80 million people, i guess, broke, it's under enormous pressure, people can say they're crazy, they'll fire one of these just to hit israel. well, i find that a little difficult to internalize because they know that they would be destroyed the next day. and they may want to go to heaven and meet somebody up there -- [laughter] but more important for them is

to survive. >> that's the heretical part. that you believe they would buy the logic of deterrence when it came down to it. >> i wouldn't rely on it totally, but i would not dismiss deterrence by saying they're crazy. they're not crazy. they may not be like us, but they want to survive. just like the north koreans, they want to survive. and the first thing to insure that they would not survive is to use those weapons. so i think deterrence and containment plays a role in all of this, but i don't want to see them get a nuclear weapon. i don't want their nuclear program to go higher toward enrichment toward a nuclear weapon and to create rockets that would deliver such weapons. and so i think we ought to, you know, put all the diplomatic and political and economic pressure on them that we can because sooner or later it will, it will cause them to rethink the awful position they're putting themselves in. i once met with the iranian foreign minister at a dinner. we were both very careful not to get in trouble talking to each

other. i wanted to make small talk, and i said what's the biggest problem you have in rapp these days -- in iran these days, minister? unemployment. we have to find 600,000 jobs every year, and we're not doing it. the greatest political force at work around the world, and we need to understand it here in the united states, is wealth creation through economic growth and economic development. it's what china's doing. china didn't get successful, where it is now, by invading anybody or attacking anybody. they did it by making things that others wanted to buy. and india's coming along the same direction. we have absolutely no reason to fear any of these countries because they need to keep growing wealth in order to bring their people up out of poverty. what caused the arab spring, fundamentalism? islamic fundamentalism? no, they want jobs. they want to get rid of corrupt governments. it was a fruit seller in tunis who set himself on fire because

he got in an argument with the local authorities. he said, enough. and be -- and he set himself on fire, and he started the arab spring movement that we now see in such full flower. >> there are two mic stands, one in each aisle in the front, and we have time for some questions, and we'll alternate from one side to the other and let me begin with this microphone here. >> okay. mr. powell, i'm very proud that you're here tonight, and i appreciate you talking to us this evening. since you have been on both sides i like to say of the last couple of decades from the military side and also from the state department, do you think with our military force which is incomparable to anything else in the world in terms of doing their job, but are we asking them to do a lot, to not really

defend us, but also to do nation building? >> the principal reason is to defend us and apply the state's power against an enemy. it doesn't mean we can't do other things, but that has to be the principal mission, in my humble view as an infantry officer. the way the constitution is written you raise and support armies. when you don't need them, you get rid of them. when you need them, you raise them. but fundamentally, they're there to fight. but when you look at japan and germany after world war ii, they weren't run by diplomats. douglas mcarthur and a series of generals in germany. and they were doing peacemaking and peace keeping. they created constitutional governments for these people. and so the military can do just about anything that they're asked to do. very, very competent, skilled group of young men and women,

and they always have been. we should be very proud of them. but they exist to fight the nation's battles, first and foremost. >> yes. question here. >> is this on? >> uh-huh. >> yes. >> general powell -- >> get a little closer. >> disappointed that you didn't run for president, and i would like to ask you personally to, please, consider running again. [laughter] [cheers and applause] >> [inaudible] as robert said, and it's in the book, it was an enormously difficult time because, and i felt this obligation that was being put upon me by many people. there were a lot of people who said we don't want to see you

anywhere near politics, we don't want you, we don't like you. so it was not all as unanimous as is suggested. but what finally pushed it over the edge was there was not a single morning i woke up and deep inside of me did i think it was the right thing to do. it just didn't fit me. i am not, basically, a politician. i'm still, basically, a soldier with some other suits, and there was never a morning where i wanted to get up and go out and to that. i'm so glad that we have the obamas and romneys and bushes and kerries and all the rest of them, and they have that feeling for it which i don't have. and also my wife was not in fair fair -- favor of it. [laughter] people think, well, it was because of your wife. no. we've been married this summer 50 years, and we've been a team for 50 years -- [applause]

the decision was 900% -- 100% beginning with me, of course, she shared my view. and people say, well, gee -- look, he didn't marry me when i was a chairman. he married me when i was a young captain heading off to vietnam leaving her behind with a baby that would be born while i was away, and we're close. very close. >> sir? >> there's another part of the book that says the best thing about being disappointed is, you get over it. [laughter] >> well, i think a lot of us -- >> see, everything's in this book. you've got to get it. >> we need you. we need her. so think about it again. [laughter] >> thank you. >> will -- sir? >> america's promise? >> yes. >> a little different. some of us are really good at engineering, some of us are really good at rotc.

do you think educators should allow more choice among the younger of graduates in the those first two years so they can select those careers and those subjects that they have an interest in and stay away from those that they really can't do that well? >> this is a fascinating question, and we could spend an hour on it. my public school education, i flunked out of engineering. that's what you're suggesting, i know that. [laughter] >> but now you're being asked to theorize about higher education. >> and one of the things i found, and i've only tripped over this in the last few years. only the last few years i've gotten old oar and trying to bring up old memories is that this high school i was exposed to tough that bored me to death at the time. but 30, 40 years later i remember it with such warm vividness. and i'm sure it was there all

the while having an influence on me. we had art appreciation. we had music. i can still hear bolero coming out of that 78 rpm. the night watch by rembrandt, cater bury tales. all of these things our children need to be exposed to and not just how do i pass this math and science test and get to the next grade. and it would be a shame if in the course of the education of our children we don't expose them to lots of things and give them greater choice of what they want to do with their lives. expose them to lots of things. give them a menu. and sooner or later something will catch them and turn them on just like rotc turned me on. if rotc hadn't come into my life when i was 17, i don't know where i'd be. that's what i found that i fell in love with. that's what i tell kids at all my graduation speeches.

keep looking for the thing you do well and the thing you love doing. don't stop. it isn't fame and fortune, it isn't the amount of money you make or the titles you get. it's doing that which you do well, which you love doing. and i was talking to a group of students not too long ago. i said, i didn't come in the army to be a general. i came in the army to be a soldier. and they could have sent me home anytime i wanted, and would have been happy. so we have to get kids down from this, oh, i've got to make a asking dollars as a hedge fund manager, or i'm going to be the next guy who invents facebook or something and get them to find which they love doing and not stop seeking it until they find it. >> sir. >> general powell, sir, i -- most of the iraq incident i was

in europe at the time working of environment than you had here where i was the crazy american who all these europeans were talking to about why are we doing this. and i tried to hold, play my card pretty well. but i had a couple of puzzles i really couldn't account for. one was there were so many leaks that shocked me so completely, and there was an awful lot of rumor that just before the outbreak of the iraq war there were caravans leading what might be weapons into syria. can you say anything about either or -- >> yeah. no, i saw those reports, and we looked into them pretty thoroughly, and there were a lot of people who said, well, the weapons were there, and they were either buried or sent to

syria. i've seen no evidence that either of those things actually accounts for the absence of weapons. there were no weapons. in my humble judgment. and in the judgment of the intelligence community now. >> yes. >> general powell, you say that you feel the u.s. military has no peers or significant geopolitical rivals. why didn't you think so many of our politicians and, obviously, so many of their constituents feel that the same level of military spending needs to be maintained to the detriment of domestic spending that could benefit nation building here at home? >> well -- [applause] a couple of answers to that question. i'm not sure what the right level should be. i'm not -- i recommended to vice president cheney and president bush that we cut 25%.

we cut 25%. i don't know if that level of cut is in the cards. i don't think so. i don't think we can make that kind of cut. but i think the pentagon should be like any other government department, analyzed to see what we don't really, really need. there are a lot of hard programs that are going to be challenged, and if the sequestration comes anywhere close to being implemented at the end of the year, the pentagon will have to make further reductions. we should not spend a dollar more on military spending than we need to, but we should not spend a dollar less. you've got to find the right balance. and i have confidence in the generals and admirals who are there to find the right balance. they understand the real sprept of the -- strength of the country comes from an economy that's working well. ..

that would have been a start everybody had to come to the table ready to give up something. it did not pass political muster and we're trying to figure out how to get beyond it. one thing we have to figure out, cannot keep spending $3 trillion and taking in $2 trillion. as one businessman said to me we can't run a gas station like that. how can we run a country like?

easy, we borrow the money and your grand kids will pay for it. it about fair. we have to figure out how to bring the government spending down. all of us have to give u up something. i can think of several things they can take away from me and i won't complain about it. there are ways to cut spending in a sensible way and reform our tax code which is terrible. there are things we can do but you can't find the right combination of political support politicians will move in the direction. it is isn't going to happen because of an election. mr. romney or president obama or supermen. superpeople are those of us and around the country. you better start examining the issues, examining what the folks stand for and not only what they say they'll do, or they're able to do because of the political strength or strength of the party.

we are in charge of this right now. not the super pacs and rich guys writing checks to people. american people have to back away from far left and far right. back away from the tfghts commentators, commenting on other comment they or its, and start taking a hard look where we are right now. up for the common they or or its for a second. were you saying the cuts that would take effect under the administration in nothing else happens is do able. >> i think it's not going to happen on the book. in my judgment, it's not going happen. i'm not political handicap. i don't think it's going to happen because the consequences will be too severe not only for defect spending but defense spending. that. they're kicking in between $400

and $500 million and they would double that number. they are not able to take that kind of reduction. nor do i think congress would allow it to take place. they would find exceptions. since they put it into the law they're capable of taking it out of the law. >> we have time for two more questions. one here and one more. >> general powell, it's an honor. thank you for being here. i wonder if you could touch on the leadership principals you took away -- specifically these are the president bush coming, being seen as an relatively young and experience the individual. but really strong veterans but veterans who had strong personalities that -- [inaudible] and created a in leadership, if you will. what team leadership advice can

you give to leading a team well that has a strong personalities. >> we're, strong personalities don't necessarily create conflict and bush -- [inaudible] the personalities were very strong as well to include some of the personalities in the second bush term. mr. chaib any and others and we got along well. this time around, we got along well on so many issues. if you look at what we did to expand nato. we did to support the expansion of the european union, what we did with hiv/aids investment. what we did to increase the amount of assistance we did to the rest of the world. lots of things were done well. the -- not the issue. on the issue of iraq, we had different points of view as to

how many tripes were needed. different points ever view how we should resolve some of the issues. finally reached a point where president early in 2004, that we weren't working as well as we should as a team. and that seems like there's somebody more out of frequency than anyone else. it's me. i wanted to stay one term. therefore right after the election, i wanted to step down and the president agreed. he understood the problem. so in any view, we were not functioning as a team. how do you function as a team? everybody has to have a common purpose, a common view of what we're trying to achieve. mutual respect and trust with each other. andic i would have done is better job of that. as i said, i was probably the one that was most out of sync with the others. that's why i lifted. i said i was going to leave and the president thought it was a

good idea too. >> i appreciated your point of view, the most, personally. thank you. [laughter] [applause] one more question. >> my question is simple. a lot of americans are saying what's wrong with america. i personally have to believe that we're still the land of prosperity and opportunity. in your opinion, what's right with america? >> so much! we've got a wonderful democratic system that is noisy, looks like it's driven with conflict. it's always been that way. we're designed that way. right now it's harder to resolve conflicts. our democratic system has stood the test of fine and we faced slavery, civil wars, all kinds of challenges and we ultimately come out the other end in good

shape. it's the other guys who fall apart. soviet union said they would beat us to death they collapsed. trying to realize we have to be friends with america, not their enemy. we have to be trading partners. we have the resilient city in our makeup that takes us through difficult time. i say difficult times. when you look at the some of the founding fathers what they went through, these guys they fought with each other. they were shooting each other. never mind -- [laughter] the two documents that i love to read are jefferson's first and second agnawing recall dress. address. it's talking about america what it means and what we're going to do for the people. beautiful. a four years later, when he wrote the second address, he

mostly mad and annoyeded. and he was mostly annoyed at the press. [laughter] the long section in the address where he's going an on they ought to be thrown in jail. where why don't they lock the people up. i'm serious. i'm paraphrasing a little bit. not much. they ought to be thrown in jail. they're violating the law. what they say about me and the others is typical. he pauses in a typical matter, and he says, but we given the choice between allowing people to speak freely or throwing them in jail, i choose the former. and the reason he said he chose the former, everybody speaks long enough, the truth will win. the truth will always overcome foals hood. we live with that principle. we the best economy.

even with our difficulties it's the strongest economy democrat world. we're number one. and have been and will don't. and resilience and the strong economy, strong military, i think political wealth creation processes and policies are more important now. and above all, we have glue that hold us together as americans. we're proud to be americans. and when i really think about this, and see the way that imgrans that connell to -- the immigrants that come to the country. i give two quick stories and i'll end on this. about what it means americans to understand how we effect the rest of the world. even though people are complaining about us. people are lined up in the ambassador and tomorrow morning they'll say the same thing. i want to go to america. if two stories has to do with a

japanese businessman. very rich, owned many things. and he was on japanese television and the enemy says. which is your favorite? and he said -- and i guy says to him new york. why not london, rome, paris. new york city is the only city where i walk down the street people come up to me and ask for directions. [laughter] try that in paris. it's remarkable. we're a nation of nations. we're strengthed. we're renewed. every generation with immigrants coming here. and coming here immigrants grow to europe to get jobs, immigrants come here to get qobs but also to become americans. try that in half the countries in europe and see if you can become one of their sister. you can't. the final story, my assistant with me in you know well,

whenever i'm in new york i love to walk up park avenue on a beautiful day and look at the church and the shops and the synagogues and everything. admire all the people going by in the other direction. i have to stop at one of the numbered cross streets where there's a push cart hot dog peddler. i always have to have one. and special mustard and red onion relish. i have to have one. so you know when i was secretary of state, i would come out of my suite start up park avenue and go around me and three police cars running aside me on park avenue to make sure nobody wacked me as i was going unup park. i stopped and ordered my hot dog, and the guy would look at the body guards and the police car, and say i have green card! i have green card!

[laughter] but now, i have guards or police cars. i still do it. it kind of goes something like this. hot dog, mustard, red onion, relish he fixes it and hands it to me. he said i know you i see you on television. you're general powell. oh. and he hands me the hot dog and the money. it happens over and over. you can't. pay me, you don't have to pay me. america already paid me. i'll never forget where it came from. now i'm here and my children are here. we're americans. general, please, i've been paid. take the hot dog. i take it on and continue walking up the street. and just watch other me. my god, this is still the same country that greeted my parent

the ninety years ago. don't sell the place short. we're still the top. thank you, thank you, thank you. [applause] we'd like to hear from you. tweet us your feed back twitter.com/book tv. and you're watching book tv on c-span2 and every month we visit a different dwriewfort talk to professors who are authors about their books. now joining us on book tv, is thomas blafm chough. he is the author of this book. "embryo politics." >> it is centered on critical, ethical question or set of questions about when human life begins and deserves protection about when embryos might be

sacrificed in scientific experiments to advance knowledge. it's something we're familiar with in the country tbhb of course and the context of the stem cell gait. the passionate debates. what i do in the back is go back four decade to the beginning. somehow how it's developed to the point it reached today. and broaden international context through examination of france, u.k. and germany. . the subtitle remps to atlanta democracies. why did you choose those nations. >> several. i'm a europeist by training. political scientist and i've lived there six or seven years. i know, the countries i know the languages. i know the culture. it's important to be able to immerse yourself in a different culture. i think the main reason has to do with the fact this these are leading scientific powers. that have been on can the outing

edge of the since, the technology as well as the ethical debates around the issues. it's in the country that you see the political systems take up the question in the somatic fashion. >> when did the history of "embryo politics" begin. >> i did from 1968 a year that is familiar to us as great social unrest. i suspect historians will note for another reason. that's first time in human history a human egg and sperm were united in the laboratory. in 1968 in england. it's beginning of story that began around questions of icf a story that lead to the birth of the first child in 1978 that runs through stem cell research the initial breakthrough in 1998 and up to today. >> who are -- who is the father and or mother of embryo

politics? who lead the experiment. >> there's a team of robert edwards and patrick based in the u.k. who were successful in the creation of an embryo in the laboratory. it began the efforts to transforto the womb. it was the international race that had been going on for some time including researchers from different countries. the politics of it, really only picked up of after it came to wider public notice. ethics committees looked into it in the 1970s. i think seeing the first child through ivf lewis browne which we remember those who were old enough, really brought this issue to the attention of a wider public. >> 1978 birth of lewis brown, does it compare to the founding of a vaccine for poll polo et.

cetera as far as scientific experiments. >> i think so. absolutely. it's a different kind of junctionture. it's not another vax sign however important tps. the first time in human history a child has been conceived in the laboratory outside the womb. it raises issues about family life twef been breast ling with. sexuality, and whey i focus on is what it means for science and technology. where we have drawn lines in the future. about the kinds of research we're willing to. >> professor, would you consider "embryo politics" to be a personal issue a scientific issue, a state issue, a religious issue. >> i think it's all of those. as a political scientist, i'm most interested in the political die mention. what makes the book different for most political science book

is the ethics, and fundamental questions about life and death in hiewfm suffering that link back to the personal level that you mention and look back to the religious traditions. for example, we're familiar with this in the embryonic stem cell debate. how do you balance the moral status of the embryo the human life at early stage against the promise of reason genitive medicine research through embryonic stem cells that may help cure or at least address diseases such as parksons and alzheimer's. both of those are imperatives. it's fascinating to me to see how different societies seek to join the practice and how governments and political parties take them up and pass the laws that regulate the activity. >> if you would walk us through and give us a snap shop to embryonic politics. >> they are different. it's once of the fascinating

things i think i've learned. how different and unique the debates are here. the polarization between religion conservative and secretary scientist. you don't have that to nearly the same degree in europe. ironically, you have a country like germany where religion lays less of a role on the political sphere or france is even more per innocent example. countries where religion is less important than politics and yet, the politics and the regulation that edger are -- emerge more conservative than in this country. >> how does it happen? >> it has to do with the very different historical legacies that shape debates on both sides of the atlanta in the u.s. and degree in abortion which frames represents a frame of reference and that emerged gradually so that the issue of embryo research stem cell research gets

grafted into a polarized apportion debate in this country. there are, religious conservatives against scientists. in germany and france the abortion issue was never settled a comprise was reached early on in the 1980s abortion was recognized as a moral concern to taking of an innocent human life. legislators made the decision not to prosecute women or doctors. and that kind of pragmatic compromise took abortion off the table. the issue of embryo research is framed by different legacies. in germany the most important legacy is naziism. the experience with human experimentation during the nazi era something that resonates in france as well. there's generally more caution about science and technology in pushing some of the limits that americans americans are more willing to push on the scientific side and more

suspicious of on the religious. >> do you feel abortion is relative to the embryonic politics debate? >> i think it is. i mean, the issues that i raise up front about when life begins and deserves protection are issues that we recognize from the abortion debate. but the connection does ?rot to be as strong as it is in this country. in fact, it's fascinating to see how the catholic church in the first decade after the 1968 breakthrough did not frame the issue of embryo owe research in terms of the abortion debate. their concern was with the idea of using technologies of reproduction taking sexuality outside the married couple into the laboratory. that was the major concern. you can't find many on the catholic side until the 1980s condemning this as the taking of an innocent human life as kind of research what happens is the abortion issue heats up.

and the church finally comes without a position in 1987 on ivf and embryo research that is restricting and makes the connection. it wasn't there at the beginning. >> are there pro-life movements in the european countries that you explore? >> there are. most certainly the u.k. is as i mentioned before, the most similar to the u.s. there was a time in the mid '80s when it looked like the pro-life movement there might be able to mobilize parliament and that effort failed. since then they've on the defensive. they don't have the same societal base in the churches that the pro-life movement does here. the pro-life movement in germany and france is much less significant. >> professor where we have

gotten since lewis was born. >> when scientist were able to freeze or preserve embryos. so since then, we've dealt with the question of em brees left over from ivf treatments and many of which will not be used by parents hoping to have children and so that breakthrough preservation, the ability to through a embryos and use them in research created new opportunities for scientists to work with embryos and other research programs. >> the next major breakthrough really was thizelation of human embryonic stem cells in 1998, which raises perspective of in new era of regenerative medicine. as i said changed the ethical stakes of the debate by bricking in the question of ethic of healing. hope for people suffering from the disease. things became much more visible in the political sphere.

>> so then there's been a breakthrough in what are called induced potent stem cells which can be created without the use of embryos from body cells that are reprogrammed to act like embryonic stem cells. that's added a new twist over the last cup the of years. and some argue that let's focus on that area it doesn't raise problematic moral questions. others argue that scientist needs to move forward on all tracks. that's been a more recent development. there's more contemporary concerns about genetic diagnose. whether in the context of an ivf procedure. parents can may even should look at different em breess you in the pee tree dish with the doctors and make decisions base order the genetic makeup. that raises a whole set of questions about what are the

criteria of making such selection. where might we be going with that? >> we to that point where you can look at specific embryos and make judgments. >> we are indeed for twenty years now the technology has been there. and usually as a rule it's been applied to avoid jet nettic conditions genetically based conditions. this is an ere which is not regulated in the united states. very effectively where as in the u.k. germany and france, it's illegal to select embryos, for example, on sex, there's an industry here fertility industry that in some cases, 40% of the cases in one survey offers family balancing. to families that want to make these kinds of selections based on that criteria. we have to see where the science goes or knowledge of the agree gnome as we find out more

conditions not diseases qualities like height, intelligence, propensity to alcoholism, to the effects tent those have a genetic basis. we may be facing debates about kinds of criteria can be used. >> i realize your study is of the atlantic democracies here and the united states. what what about some of the emerging superpower rs such as china. >> that's a project i'm working on now. and it's quite striking how unique the western atlantic experience has been. these are countries the united states and the major allies the leaders in the technology early on that had a tradition of democratic deliberation where you had a series of national bioethics committees deliberate. there's open debate. they are far more less advanced

in places like china, india, and japan. what i hope we'll see is ethical debates in the country that draw on some of those traditions con futurism, buddhism, traditional religions as well as different perspectives on nature and science. it has to be a global debate eventually because if we're going draw lines before we get to things like human genetic enhancement. some kind of international coordination will be necessary. well have to acknowledge different kinds of traditions and points of view. >> professor where do we stand in the u.s. as far as the law structure and the embryonic politics. >> we have a kind of difficult status quo, i would say. that emerged gradually. it's been the case since the

1970s that federal funding of research that resulted in the direction of embryos is illegal. or is not available. and president obama, to the supporters did not try to overturn that. it goes back to 1995, appropriations writer, amendment which has been renewed in subsequent years, didn't want to pick the fight. what he had done, and what represents a change from george bush's administration is broaden the array of stem cells embryonic stem cells available to researchers working with federal funds. it was the case that you may recall in 2001, president bush limited those cells that were derived before that date in twawn and president obama has opened up somewhat. what's striking is not much change on the federal level in