extraterritorial yality. i don't think you've said anything here with competitiveness. but i want to be clear. i want to make clear that i'm understanding you correctly. you're not arguing that all financial institutions u.s. or any others should always seek the least regulated regimes. . >> that's not my argument. >> i don't think so, but i wanted to be clear about that. i would suggest you're not wrong about competitiveness. it's nobody's goal to try to regulate you into a competitive disadvantage. and i think that's what the world is trying to accomplish now. basel three is a classic example. sit not the answer. but it is a step many the direction of trying to get all the major countries around to have similar approaches towards financial institutions. there are still loopholes whether you take advantage of them or not, there are leap hols, they exist in london and elsewhere. which is why people are there. you may not be there for that reason. i don't know and i really don't

really mind whether you are because you're one institution. the institution of j.p. morgan in and of itself is of little interest to me. what i'm interested in is the entire system and the u.s. competitive advantages that we might have. when you have a loophole in london or any place else that people take advantage of regulatory schemes we need to talk about it openly to try to find out whether their regulation is better than ours, or worse than ours and regardless how we can work them together so the loophole's not just for you so your competitors don't get an advantage. i would argue when you say you're looking out for the best deal, you're 100% right. you should. but the truth is if it's only about the bottom line best deal you'll be loaning your money on the corner of some street because they get a better deal than you do. they loan out their moneys at much better rates than you get. the difference is it's a little less secure. so when you talk about best deal it's not just bottom line. it's also the ability to get those loans paid back and to

make a profit, is that an -- you're not just looking. >> i refer to best deal for the client. we're not going to win the business if we give them not the best deal. >> exactly right. the best deal is more than the lowest common denominator. it's security, stability, it's operations under the rule of law to know what the rules are to know the deal you're making is a deal you can enforce. is that a fair way to say it? >> true. >> we're not that far off. i do want to talk about one thing happening today. there's another committee meeting, at least the news reports are reporting they're going to cut out $25 million from the cft's ability to pay their staff. do you think that's a smart thing for us to be doing to be cutting the ability of regulators to do their job? >> i have never looked at the cftc budget. we've already said by the way that we have an cftc and sec in duplication. i prefer to fix the duplication.

that's what i do at my company. i can create more staff, too, but it's not the right thing to do. >> do you think it's a smart idea with the regulatory that we have today, we agree that's not what we have, but it's what we have. do you think it's a smart idea to cut the legs out of one of the regulators? >> i have enough problems. i'm going to leave that to you. >> the only reason i ask you had no hesitancy expressing opinions on other matters. >> i know nothing about their budget. i don't know how many pleas they have. i really don't know. so i try not to have comment when i know nothing. >> i'd like you to learn and maybe get back to us on the answer. the truth is i'd like to hear your answer before we actually vote on the floor. thank you, mr. dimon. >> you do know that we're in serious trouble down here in our budget. you'd rather have your budget than ours, i'm sure. >> no comment. >> miss hayward. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. dimon, i realize that the

activity that we've talked about in terms of the loss for morgan in april was bank hedging that was within the institution. i have introduced legislation that passed unanimously to repeal most of the swaps. it strikes me that this example of the potential risk undertaken. there's always risk and loss from time to time. the potential risk undertaken in these sorts of activities does -- it would seem perhaps highlight the need for us to keep those activities within institutions where they are more regulated, if you will. i'd just appreciate your comments on that. >> i would agree with that. the push out i never understood it. i thought it would make things risier and not safer.

i never understood why it was put in there at all. >> i have broad support for that. i'm hopeful that we'll be able to move that through expeditiously. with regard to the fact that derivatives activities seems to be concentrated in london, i get the sense that i'm a physician, i get the sense it's because they're the specialists. they do that kind of thing all chairman gensler implies the rules are inadequate and threw the g will have 20 our regulators have coordinated fairly closely. do you feel that there is a need for us, the sec is about to come out with its ruling on extratorial active. do you feel that we need to have some sort of regulation that we apply to our subsidiaries? >> no. i've been clear. i think the foreign laws should

apply over there so we can compete fairly over there. they were always regulated. the occ and the feds, there's potential regulation at the top. and the trades we are clot ralized, 60 cleared. i think some of those rules wouldn't have mattered at all. aig keeps coming up as an example, aig was insured only, they weren't trying to hedge anything. aig was an insurance company. aig didn't understand credit derivatives. they were not mark to market and for the most part not collateral. completely different example and a different industry. >> and an enormous level of risk. but you cannot map that situation on to the morgan situation. and now clearly, sir, there have been questions about the activities of risk committees

obviously there are lessons that you've referred to that j.p. morgan has learned. are there lessons that we can apply to what our regulators use, the criteria they use and look at how the institutions undertake risk? >> risk committees, obviously we failed in this regard, we have very strong risk committees. you need prorply staffed. prorply reported. independent minded. the job is to challenge management. all the way to the ceo. why are we doing that? why don't we have more limits. let's stress test it. that's what those committees are supposed to do. proper reports. and protecting the management from themselves sometimes. and our risk committees do report independently. in this particular case the risk committee made the same lack of oversight that i probably made a little bit down the line about this one activity.

it should have been much tougher. >> in terms of obviously j.p. morgan has regulators in house who closely monitor your activities. is there an element of human nature that makes us certain to a certain extent comfortable with each other and how we do things that may lend a certain amount of hazard to these relationships over time? >> they can be pretty tough. it's human nature. i say it's okay. the next person doesn't spend that much time on it. and everybody say it's okay. >> because you have a track record. >> you can't be complacent about risk. it has to go through rigor. it's not if you trust the person, it's got to be independently verified. >> thank you, chairman, i yield

back. >> mr. hinojosa, five minutes. >> mr. dimon, thank you for your testimony. the recent j.p. morgan loss comes at a time when we have many in your industry complaining about the new regulations put in place with the dodd frank wall street reform act. for good situation the loss has pressed the pause button on the constant stream of attempted roll backs to dodd frank. it seems to me that with the recent conviction of a prominent wall street corporate director, wall street firms do not seem to be going out of their way to restore trust with the american people. i understand that j.p. morgan will still turn a profit this year. but the size of the loss and the complexity of the trades in macro hedging that caused the loss still gives cause for

concern. there needs to be an evaluation of not only prudent regulations, but also the broken culture on wall street. a culture that some believe provides perverse insent i haves to play fast and loose with other people's money. after the crisis there should have been major self-reflection and reelves of wall street. mr. dimon, looking back at this loss, do you feel that the compensation structure at j.p. morgan might have created incentives for excessive risk. >> i don't agree with what you said about wall street. i'll be direct about it. there are a lot of people you can trust on wall street. there are a lot of people you can trust anywhere. when anyone blankets a whole industry with the same fan, i think we're making a big mistake. i just think it's not fair. we try to have a culture of the company where people have long-term careers. they aren't paid just because of

profits. they're paid because they're good managers. they're paid because they recruit. they're open minded. they're independent on risk committees. they participate in the company. they mentor younger people that's what we do. it's not just financial results that drive people's compensation to j.p. morgan. no one in this area had formulas. is it possible that someone here says i was driven a lot by must be. people it shouldn't be a great surprise to anybody else, some people have driven a lot by money. some are not. >> next question, do you feel there's a problem with wall street culture? >> i think there might be a problem with some people on wall street. and wall street for the most part, you know, are honest, decent, horde working people. their slients trust them tom the extent we lose it, we should earn it back. i think if you talked to most of our clients they think that j.p. morgan tries to do a very good job for them. when we make a mistake we admit

it. we try to rectify it. and all the firms are different. so i can't speak for every firm while i'm standing here. >> mr. dimon, what would you perply recommend be done by congress to strengthen the dodd frank act so that we can prevent actions for the complexity of trades and risky derivatives and macro hedging that cost the loss of at least $2 billion at j.p. morgan which brought us to this congressional hearing? we want to ensure similar losses do not occur in other banks. i'd like to hear your recommendations. >> i have lost this argument publicly many times, i'll make it again. regulation is not binary. it's not left or right. it's not democrat or republican. these are complex things that should be done the right way in my opinion closed rooms.

i don't think there's a lot of progress in an open hearing like this. talking about what works, what doesn't work and collaborating with the business who has to conduct it. we want a safer system, too. we'll do anything we can to be part of the process to make it healthy and safe. i should point out it is a lot healthier and safer today. the market did a lot of thins like i mentioned, no sub spriem mortgages, no exact derivatives are going away. regulation has created more capital, more liquidity, standardized derivatives. it is a much stronger system. a lot has been accomplished. >> my time has ended and i yield back. >> thank you, mr. mchenry for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. dimon, there's this discussion today the distinction between hedging and proprietary trading. can you define the difference of

hedging versus proprietary trading? >> i'll tell you what i think. a hedge is meant to protect few yo something goes wrong in a decision you make. proprietary trading i think it's making a bet that prices change and you can make money in a price change. the problem is that is every time we make a loan, it's proprietary. the riskiest things we do is loans. they're all proprietary. irunderstand and never disputed the intent of the volcker rule trying to make companies safer. i totally agree. i think we made something very complex which is going to be very hard to legislate or put in leg latory terms that works. >> is there a bright line distinction between hedging and proprietary trading? don't they look similar unless there is a balanced trade on the other side that matches up?

>> i think in some case there's a bright line, yes. >> okay. how is -- how long have you been in finance, how many years? >> a long time. 30 years or so. >> we'll just say a long time. >> for a living you're supposed to know the distinction between this. is there a bright line distinction between that and if you can't determine what that is, how can a regulator determine that? >> if upped to make the system safer, i would have said for trading, proper capital, proper liquidity, make sure it's large -- you look at inventory, you have proper risk reporting. you do have the ability to portfolio and hedge. you need that in trading. and you can track all these things to say if you're running a good customer business. it does not eliminate risk, it will mitigate the risk. >> did you support dodd frank?

>> that's a hard one to say. >> did you support dodd frank? >> we had a major crisis in. the crisis unveiled lots of flaws in our system. not one flaw. we understood the need for reform. there are parts of dodd frank we supported. there are parts of dodd frank we didn't. there are lots of parts of dodd frank. it's not like we had the same vote. >> suffice it to say you've got a little buyer's remorse. you know, i understand you're basically saying, yes, you understand the need for changes, you just don't like the result. >> some of the result. >> some. it can be modified. >> with volcker as it's being written, the distinction between, you know, proprietary trading and hedging that is a bit of the debate that's going

on right now. so, look, my concern is in the post tarp era, when we said we're going to end bailouts we codified and institutionalized it. therefore when a company like yours that received extraordinary support from the government has a trading loss, the government gets very involved. why is the government very involved? because we've institutionalized too big to fail and bailouts with dodd frank. now to that point, during your hearing last week with the senate, you discussed the distinction between a resolution authority and bankruptcy. would you touch on that? would you explain your view on what is preferable, the resolution authority as written in dodd frank or bankruptcy. >> a lot of semantics. i would use the word bankruptcy, but that implies the eequity gets wiped out. a court manages the wind down of the company. you do need an expert like the

fdic to manage the process that's got the right people, the right structures, the right capabilities to manage the wind down. that should be wound down and board of directors fired, the company should eventually be dismand nld a way that does not damage the economy. the name should be buried in disgrace. that's what should happen. >> that's called bankruptcy, right? >> you guys can call it whatever you want. i'm not going to get involved in the debate between bankruptcy and resolution. >> you're involved in the debate, actually, sir. i don't know if you've been here. anyway, the distinction between resolution authority which is in essence codified too big too fail and codified the fact the government will lift you up if you fail, the trading can be as risky as possible. this is the crux of the debate. >> they'll keep it going, but the equity is wiped out, unsecured is wiped out. company is not there without

damaging the economy. >> i'll put you on the record as support i ever of that. >> thank you. mr. milner for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. dimon, you were very dismissive last week with the senate about a bloomberg article i think you told the senate committee not to believe everything they read that said the cio had really changed from being a fairly sleepy cautious risk mitigation unit and had become much more aggressive, much more risk tolerant and profitable. it was your intention that it become a profit center and in fact, more than a quarter of the profits from 2010 came from cio's trading. but there was a question that senator johnson asked you from that -- from that article about -- that there has been a limit that traders had to

liquiduate. had to get out of any position they lost $20 million and you were very puzzled by that and said you knew nothing about it. have you inquired since then if there was such a limit and if it was changed. >> no. >> you have not asked within your organization? >> i think we referred to something back in 2007 or 2008, so i did not ask, no. >> you did say last week that the failure with these trades was not that it was rogue traders. they weren't violating the risk controls. the risk controls were not sufficient. that is correct, right? >> they were too low -- they were too high. they should have been much more lore limits. >> did they have any limits. last week you seemed to indicate not? >> the cio is total limits. the unit didn't have their own. but they used the cio's limits. >> but a limb of $20 million in losses and then you close the

position that would be a fairly granular risk control, wouldn't it? >> if that were true. it depends with the areas, but yes. >> youave been critical in this matter and you said that it was a significant risk management failure. said it was flawed, complexed, poorly reviewed, executed, poorly managed. but on february 29 you filed a certification required by law that you had adequate risk controls in place. that management's assessment, the firms determined that there were no material weaknesses in controls of financial reporting as of december 31, 2011. i know that you're entitled to rely upon your subordinates and i'm sure you relied upon your subordinates in making that certification, but was it correct? >> it was. >> it was correct? >> it was to my knowledge at the time. >> not based on your knowledge

at the time, but based upon what you know now was that certification correct? >> that's why we're having the review to make sure we have all the right things in place. that's what companies do when they have problems. they analyze them, review them and make determinations like that and their view's not done yet. >> all right. who is entitled to, it seems like that certification is intended for regulators. it's also intended for investors, isn't it? aren't they entitled to rely upon adequate risk controls? >> i don't know the thing you have in front of you. >> what's that? >> i don't know what you're referring to. we try to give proper disclosures to our investors. >> we're talking about the certifications to risk controls. that's the certification required by law and presumably it's for both regulators and also for investors, isn't it? >> we try to disclose what we're supposed to disclose. >> all right. what inquiry did you make about

risk controls at cio before you signed that certification? >> i believed that the risk controls were properly being done. that they were properly being done. >> you were surprised last week at the question about the $20 million limit. it appeared to be something you were hearing for the first time and you haven't inquired since then whether that was true. it seems like there must be a limitation on that entitlement if you have noticed that there's something wrong. one of the ways you might get other information would be from the financial press. did you read the bloomberg article? >> i don't remember if i read the bloomberg article. >> it's an article that said there's $100 million limitation that traders at the cio d to close position once thelost

$2millio a that would seem like that would stick out as a pretty big deal. >> it wouldn't stick out to me. it happen m years ago. tention to it.uay bl thank you. your time is expired. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks for being here today, mr. dimon. before you were seated we had a first panel where we had five regulators. and the two things that really stck meut that panel were something mr. alvarez from the federal reserve said about capital. that's a theme today about how your strong capital position saved this from causing j.p. morgan to have a big problem and it ensures that it won't cause the rest of the system a problem. the other thing was risk management that's your questions that you got from mr. grimm and miss hayworth. is there anything in your internal review other than capital and risk management that are lessons learned that other

institutions should know? >> i think some things about models and implementation of models. making sure risk committees are independent minded not just having coffee. they'll be more than just that. >> yes, sir. mr. frank talked a little bit about smart regulation that you referred to earlier. we had the five regulators sitting in the seats before you. not one of them really is in charge of the others. they don't really coordinate a lot of questions about how they share communication. in fact, no questions came up from any of the previous panel about harmonizing the regulations between europe that they passed in march on march 29th with the u.s. regulations and there don't appear to be any lessons learned that are shared with other firms after what you go through to make sure there's real shared knowledge. do you want to comment anymore about what smart regulation means to you? >> when dodd frank was done, one of the things it has was f

stock. like an oversight committee to make sure no gaps in the system and the learnings are shared. we supported that. it was set up with virtually no teeth. the legislatures had to change it. someone should tell them who's responsible for mortgages, who's responsible for volcker as opposed to five people in the jurisdiction. you see how complex it gets. how long it takes to work it out with foreign regulators. so i think simplifying it, clarifying it, adjudicating sis duties and giving authority and responsibility to the same people would be a good thing. >> do you want to comment a little bit about how the impact on a multinational financial firm like yourself with regulations in europe and regulations here that are not harmonized? >> so we talk about dodd frank which has 400 rules. we have to accommodate basel which has hundreds of different things. we're not against them all. liquidity, capital, et cetera, the rules out of brussels fsa in the uk and several others.

and cftc, sec, we have to deal with a lot, we're going to. we're going to. i wish it was a little more coordinated and we dealt with important ones first and not treat everyone like they're all the same like they're equally each important tom a hammer everything is a nail. that's what we're doing. >> some questions have come up earlier today. i'm going to make a statement instead of asking you this. there have been a lot of questions about too big to fail. i'll say too big to fail happens when policymakers let it happen. i'm not asking you to comment on that. that's a fact. i do want to talk to you about the volcker rule a little bit. you had some questions about it before. but it really, you know, the key thing on the volcker rule will be getting it right. i don't want financial institutions that can run to the fed funds window borrowing money and then putting it in trading account and, you know, essentially gambling with it. >> we don't. >> but at the same time, you have to be able to risk to hedge

your positions. so i hope that we can work with the regulators as policymakers here and with the industry to craft something that makes sense. and if you have any ideas for us, i've got a minute and four seconds, i'll let you tell us if you have any ideas on how to make that happen. >> the only idea i have is people should get in a room, talk about what we want to accomplish, go through the specifics and not pretebd it's for or against volcker. sit the process of the law of the land. you may want to get rid of it, but we have to deal with it. it's a very detailed thing. i remind people we do have the best capital markets in the world. you should go home at night and say that we sit upon the best any in the world, the best capital markets in the world. the best job creator in the world. we need to start doing jobs again and fix the mortgage market. do a lot of things. if we do it, we'll help this economy recover quicker not slow herb. >> one of the things mr. ginsler

said earlier today, the one thing he did talk about is the advantage europe has being in a time zone between asia and the u.s. and there have been a lot of questions about why certain trades go to london. and i know you need to follow your customers who are global, too. isn't there some advantage to that time zone? >> thank you. your time is up. >> i think is answer is yes. >> yes. >> mr. scott. >> thank you, mr. chairman, welcome mr. dimon. good to have you. i want to start off by paying you and your operation down in georgia a tremendous compliment. georgia's number one in home foreclosures. we had a great home foreclosure event down there and i want you to say a good word for your folks down there in georgia. mr. david bahlau and todd williamson. your chase homeownership center. good job.

we saved over 1,785 homes. many of them yours. so good work. let me just wait for a moment. i think it's very important for us to set the stage here. i think that we in the united states of america and probably the world economy dodged a bullet. and we dodged a bullet basically because of your size. because of your largeness. you were able to handle and absorb this loss. but there's much we can learn frit. i think if i get my hands around this correctly, one was not enough attention was paid early on in the game. is that correct? would you say that's one of the major reasons? >> yes. >> and your reporting was diluted in the aggregate which caused a problem as well. the fundamental issue here is so buck learn from the future is your risk management tool is referred to as value at risk.

that was your model. and it is one of the reasons it was used to effectiveness. but it's basically predicated on a large financial institution. you are the largest financial institution in the world. certainly in the united states of america. and that's why we are still profitable tax payers didn't lose anything on this and it was effective. here's the question, would smaller firms have been able to have those same protections using the same risk at value model as chase? >> we use lots of protections. one of many things we do to manage risk. community banks do a great job. j.p. morgan chase is one of the biggest banker to banks. the history of j.p. morgan was to bank banks. i think some of them can.

i can't go through each one. they have different business models. each one should do what they need to do for their own business. >> let me ask you this, as a result of this, should one of the things we do now, should banking entities like chase morgan bank, j.p. morgan bank be allowed by our regulators to hedge only on positions specific basis as opposed to on an aggregate or portfolio basis? >> if i were the regulator i would allow prort folio aggregate. i want to give one example. j.p. morgan himself used to love italy and would go there. we have exposures to italian companies that you can't get out of tomorrow. if you were on my board of directors and said i don't want

italian exposure. there's only one way to do it and that would be to do port foreyellow hedging. if you said do it by individual name, it would be impossible. >> mr. dimon, i think the american people would want to know when this happened, when you first got wind of this $2 billion loss, what was your initial reaction. >> when i fully realized it, i told our people that everything is going to happen from coming down to washington to questioning volcker, that i think we've been hurt other bankers. it causes a lot of commotion inside the company. soul searching. my opinion is let's fix it. we have to make changes. it's a very tough time for us. however, it does affect it, it shouldn't attract us from our mission of serving clients. we have 82 chase home offices.

weapon opened them all in the last three, four years. we'll do all we have to do to serve the clients right. >> i can't let you leave without this question. the fundamental question going forward is this whole issue of too big to fail. how do you feel about that especially since you are the biggest of the biggest? >> our goal is not to be the biggest. i think everyone agrees we have to get rid of that. >> you said get rid of too big to fail. >> we have to eliminate too big to fail. therefore allowing a big bank to fail in a way that doesn't damage the american economy and the taxpayer never pays. i think we're on our way to working through the ways that would allow it to take place. >> thank you. two minutes and that will then

conclude our hearing. >> mr. dimon, i want to go through a calendar here. on april 6 bloomberg had an article you're familiar with that article. >> yes. >> i think "the wall street journal" had an article that same day. >> um aware that i don't know if they came or we called them. we share everything with them. i do believe some of our people spoke with the regulators and described to them what we thought about it. >> it's reported on tuesday april 1010th, that particular position lost $300 million that day and subs subsequently on the next tuesday and wednesday with smaller losses. were you familiar with those? >> yes. >> on april 13th, then you made a statement that it's no big deal, it's just a tempest in the teapot. >> was that an accurate reflection of that transaction?

>> it's totally a positive and accurate reflection of what i believed at the time because folks had done work to look at the additional stress. that was the first trading day after the article. so part of that was expected since we showed the world our hand a little bit. on april 13th, i believed it was a tempest in the teapot. i obviously was dead wrong. it won't be the first time i'm wrong. it won't be the last. i was dead wrong. the concern i had was that was a couple days after the $300 million pop. that's a pretty big pop even in your organization, isn't it? >> our folks looked a reports about how bad it can get. i may have seen them, the report to me doesn't show to be that

much worse. if that's what we believed, i would have considered that a small thing for j.p. morgan. >> thank you. mr. green for two minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman, i'll be quick. mr. dimon thank you for appearing today. is it fair to say that you probably had more than 50 meetings concerning that issue that we're talking about today. >> 50 what? >> meetings. meetings with people. talking on the phone about this. >> yes. >> probably 100. >> yes. >> more than 100. is it fair to say that you are amenable with meetling with and talking to various people about these things and other things associated with their business and you meet with congress and talk to them about these issues. >> i talk to people if appropriate. we operate under a lot of rules of what i can and can't say. >> if appropriate do you meet with congress people? >> yes. >> i'm asking this because i want to talk to you about a cob

september that's near and dear to my heart. we've been talking about too big to fail. i want to talk to you about a concept that i have called a concept that's too small to live off. that's something that is happening in this country. we have in houston,texas, some persons who are janitors and they are paid $8.35. i know this is very small compared to what we've been talking about. i think you made about $19 billion in 2011 thereabout, is that right? >> yes. >> your fourth highest paid person made about $4 million in 2011. i won't mention the name. there's a reason for picking the fourth highest. with persons making this kind of money, by the way, i salute you for it. i am a capitalist. i commend people for making the money that they make within the rules, of course. but what i want to talk to you is this. $47,000 is what it costs a family to four to live off in houston. the poverty level is $23,000 a

year. the average janitor working full time will make about $18,000 a year. that's working full time and living below the poverty line. i'd like to heat with you and talk to you about too small to live off. and i'll pay my way. i won't use congressional funds. i'll be willing to do it any place that you'd like. can you and i meet and talk about too small to live off, mr. dimon. >> yes, we can. >> i'd be honored to do it. i'll talk to you after the meeting. >> or maybe tomorrow or the next day or within the next -- >> i'm going to miss the vote. >> thank you. >> this concludes the hearing. the chair thanks our panelists for his testimony. the chair notes that some members may have additional questions for this panel. which hay may wish to submit in writing without objection the hearing record will be held open for 30 minutes for members to submit written questions to those witnesses and to place their responses in the record. this hearing is

>> remarks or about 20 minutes. [applause] thank you very much. what an honor it is for me to be with you again. i am one of those who from time to time has had the privilege to speak to you at your conferences, and i know that this is an ever-growing and ever more important group so i'm delighted to be here with you today. but my job is to introduce to

you someone that i think should be a great source to all of us. so marco rubio, an american sign that is the title of his new book that has come out and i think if you pick up his book and read it you would understand that he is absolutely one of us and why is he won of us? because he comes from a family of humble beginnings who chose a better life by coming to america, immigrated here and then he is the son of the family, the second generation of that family that worked hard. they wouldn't have been unless they were serving at a banquet could honestly because they work in hotels, they were the servant class and their son got an education, became a person who wanted to come back and be in public service, rose to the rank and remarkable time and fraiman. his dream of being an nfl receiver never materialized but he did something even a little more remarkable and became a

young age the speaker of the florida house of representatives. i was always a very proud of him and what he did and what he accomplished at such a young age. i went on a tour of the capitol when i was up there as the united states senator from florida and what an honor it is for me to be here today to introduce to you one of us. he knows what it's hard to work hard and what it's like to get in the morning and to see your dad get off to work and what he knows very well that it's the future of the country and how we handle our educational system and how our children get an opportunity to be educated so that they can also have an opportunity to succeed. please come help me welcome someone i am immensely proud to have follow me in the united states senate in the seats where i used to sit coming united states junior senator from florida, marco rubio.

[applause] >> thank you. thank you, senator martinez. [speaking spanish] thank you, senator martinez for sharing my book which is available on amazon for $16.99. thank you. appreciate that very much. >> [speaking spanish] [speaking spanish]

[applause] i apologize to those that don't speak spanish i was telling them how i saved a bunch of money on my car insurance. [laughter] thank you so, i wanted to talk to you today, and i thought one of the things that frustrates me sometimes is that when people speak to hispanics and latinos, they only want to talk about immigration. the point that i make is immigration is an important part in a hispanic community but the vast majority of us do not like the morning and think about immigration all day. we wake up in the morning and have the same worries and hopes and fears as everybody else in this country who worry about making payroll on friday and at the end of the month we worry about what tomorrow will be better for them than it has been

for us and that is what i wanted to concentrate on today when i can't speak to you. but i want necessarily limit myself to that, because i think that both my head and my heart to me that today we are as close as we've ever been to a critical turning point in the debate about immigration have abandoned my hopes of my talking about the economy and jobs important as that may be to speed up the issue of immigration what i've learned in my ear and half in the senate and what i hope can have been moving forward. the first thing i learned when i got to the senate there were too many scars, too much pain, too many people had been beat up by what had happened four or five years before. i tried to raise the issue and people would say look i don't want to go there again. i tried that five years ago, i tried that three years ago and

all lagat was the degree that is what i got when i walked into the senate and i want you to know it wasn't just republicans. it was senators who had been burned by the way this issue was discussed and approach and just really didn't want to talk about it anymore. that's what i first learned. the second thing i've come to realize is how truly complicated this issue has become. this is not a simple issue. both sides like to talk about this issue like it is an easy yes or no answer. it's much more complicated than that. those of us involved in the debate need to start to recognize that openly that both sides raise valid points. the people who are against the illegal immigration and make that the court of their argument view it as only a law and order issue but we know it is more than that. yes it is a law and order issue but it's also a human issue. these are real people, these are

human beings that have hopes and dreams. these are people that are virtually doing what any of us would do if our children were hungry and countries were danger is if the had no hope for their future. [applause] and too often in the conversation about immigration, that perspective is lost. who among us would do whatever it took to feed our children and provide for them a better future? yet the other side of the debate is equally guilty of oversimplifying them. illegal immigration is a real problem. it's not an illegitimate problem, it is real and it has consequences. one of the great untold stories in america today is no community understands that better than ours. it is latinos and hispanics that see the impact of illegal emigration of was a personal both the human element also its costs and the burdens that it places on our society and places

it is in control. we also need to begin to recognize that we are an extremely generous country. a million people a year and agreed to the united states legally there isn't any country in the world that comes close to that we need to recognize there are probably 50 million people including many in latin america many family members who are waiting to come here legally. every single day in my office here in the senate and i have people come and say my mom has been waiting, my sister has been waiting for 50 years they've paid the fee and waited their turn. what is the message to them, come illegally it is cheaper and quicker? that's not an answer either. last but not least there is a notion that sometimes i feel like people are demanding rights. the truth is there is no right to legally emigrate to the united states. when we talk about illegal immigration it's not about demanding rights, it's about a feeling of the compassion of the

most compassionate nation in the history of the world. why is the issue is simple fight? i will tell you right now because of this powerful politics. it's a powerful political issue. i have seen people use it to raise money. i've seen people take the legitimate concerns about illegal immigration and turn it into panic and turn the pan again to fear and anger and turn that anger into votes or money. i've also seen people on the ever direction anyone who disagrees on the issue of illegal immigration as anti-immigrant that's ridiculous everything is about politics. i seen it firsthand. three months ago i came up and started to work with my colleagues on the concept how can we accommodate children in this country through no fault of their own undocumented but also as a nation of law the reaction

from any of the left is an immediate dismissal a similar fight is proposing a new 3/5 compromise harkening back to the days when a slave was only 3/5 of a percent a was accused of supporting apartheid supporting the dream act without a dream and if that if a similar idea and implement through exhibit action now it's the greatest idea in the world. i don't care who gets the credit. i don't but it exposes the fact this issue is all about politics for some people, not just democrats but republicans, too. the proof is after actions last week all the questions are about what a brilliant tactical move it is not from you but from the people that cover politics. what does this mean for the election. what does this mean politically wasn't this a brilliant political tactic? i guess if it is about to then maybe it was. but i wasn't looking for a

talking point. i wasn't looking to influence the election in november. i was looking to help these kids that i met. these aren't kids i read about in newspapers, these are kids i've met who came here when they were five who didn't know they were undocumented until the applied to go to college. they got accepted to an ivy league school and want to deport them in the country that needs more molecular biologists. that's what it was about for me. all the evidence about that will this ever get solved? as long as this issue of immigration is a political pingpong each side uses to win elections and influence votes, i'm telling you it won't get salt because there are too many people the concluded this issue unresolved is more powerful. they want it to stay on result. it's easy to influence

elections. it's easier to raise money. the balance the approach recognizes that this is complicated. and i think the way you have to do it is you have to approach number one by understanding that we have to win the confidence of the american people back. the confidence that we are serious about discouraging illegal immigration in the future and that's why enforcement process these are important as any reform but we have to inform the legal immigration system. the greatest contributor to illegal immigration is a road in some bureaucratic and complicated legal immigration process. there are millions of people will go back home if they thought they could come back next year to work in their seasonal jobs and i don't know anyone that wouldn't agree illegally if they could afford it. there are some people that have a status through no fault of their own. someone told them they were in

immigration lawyer and they gave the guy a 5,000-dollar check and he vanished. now they are undocumented. it's complicated. if we are able to reform and modernize our immigration system and when the confidence of the american people back, we'll left with an issue of millions of people and documented and the great question is then what do you do about them? i talked about what you do about the kids, what you do about everybody else? here's the truth. we are honest with ourselves. we don't know yet. it's not easy. i know we are not going to deport roundup for 12 million people. i know we are not agreed to grant amnesty for 12 million people. and somewhere between those two ideas is the solution that will never be easy but i promise you it will get easier to find if we have a legal immigration system that works in the conference for the american people that we're serious about enforcing our law.

some may say that is too much to ask the balanced approach. well it is if it continues to be politicized. i was tempted to come here today and rip open the policies of the administration. in a few moments you will hear from the president. i was tempted to tell you he hasn't been here in three years what a coincidence it's an election year. i was tended to be content to say why didn't he make this issue a priority? i guess i did just tell you. [applause] but that's not the direction i want to go because if i did, if that's what i came here to talk to you about, then i would be doing the same thing i just criticized, the exact same thing that i just criticized. so is it possible for us to reach that point? let me close by telling you why

i think we should and we must. i really rely on a story i recently learned. i didn't know the story before. i recently learned the story of an elderly man came to the u.s. illegally and then decided to go back to his country because he was a little discouraged about the way things work and he decided to go back to his country again and then after a few years their things were not going well and he decided to come back. i don't know this for sure but when he came back to the united states, if he thought since he had can legally before, she was still able to re-enter and he was wrong. i think he didn't realize, i don't know this for sure but i didn't realize if you leave for the year your immigrant visa expired and you have to renew it made an elderly man and he was disabled, didn't speak any english and he gets to the united states and immediately is detained and questioned and he's told he has to appear in court. i just think if you're elderly,

disabled, don't speak the language confronting american jurisprudence he must have been panicked. but somewhere along political of the conditions of the country and all kind of other factors at the time the u.s. said you don't have the legal right to be here but we are going to let you stay because your case the tugs at our hearts and our legacy as a nation. this story matters a lot to me because years later that man was so grateful to this country that he would spend hours with his grandson talking about how extraordinary america was, what a special country it was. today his grandson serves in the u.s. senate and stands before you here today knowing that we have in a past been a nation

able to balance our law and compassion, our desire to live in a nation with the law but also to have a nation of immigrants. so i close by asking how did we ever get to this point? how can immigration be a controversial issue in a nation of immigrants? how can a country built by people that came from everywhere else be so divided over who gets to come here now? may be the best way to confront it is to remind ourselves of who we are and how tightly wound it isn't the essence of our great mass. the statue of liberty is often seen as a immigration. liberty was billed as a symbol of immigration. was built to the republicans, republicanism, not the republican party although some people claim but i am not kidding. the reason why it became a symbol of immigration as immigrants from europe when they would come to ellis island the

first thing they would see about america is that statute. and a letter of the last century there was a poem that was written and inscribed on to the platte i think reminds us of who we were, what makes us different, and who we must remain. when i read those words, i am reminded of the journey my own parents took people to provide their life better than theirs, making sure that every opportunity they did not have would live in the lives of their children and grandchildren. this sentiment exists among people all over the world. but only here in our country has the dream become reality time and time again. so let us remind ourselves once again of the words of that poem which calls to us and says to answer the simple question of what do we love more? do we love our party is more than our country, do we care but

the next election more than we do about the future, are we still the beacon of hope for the world? are we still the country or parents found when they came here? or will our children inherit a different one? one more like the rest of the world? are we still the nation that believes in these words keep ancient lands silent lips. give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to break free. the wretched teeming shores since these the homeless, send these to me i left against the golden door. thank you. [applause]