communities, came to feed them from the shore. they would get through to the boat somehow. it would also collected the bones as british through the bodies over. washington continually writes letters come you can't treat our prisoners like this. he was insistent that we treat our prisoners fairly, and letters that i have read anyway. anyway, so these bones sat there most of the war and for a long time after. ..

>> up next, ahmed rashid discusses the afghanistan and pakistan problems. >> thank you all for being here. welcome. our plan tonight, we have about an hour together and we have a great speaker. that may interview with my

ability to see this when the time comes, but we will have our speakers be given we will have you asked them questions. uncertain stage i will ask you to present your own questions. there is that microphone right there in the aisle. you can line up behind it. there may also be someone for you on the edges and such. please identify yourself and keep it brief. there is no doubt that there will be many more who want to participate in we will have time for. thank you, ahmed rashid, for inviting me. i'm going to point out your book on camera. this is really the third come as you use the word trilogy, and i recognize this and recognize the work you have been doing this central subject. authoritative book that you produce after the september 11 attacks, and this is a little

bit more meditative and forward-looking and focused on the issues that pakistanis, afghans and americans have in common. i first went out to the region in 1989 for the "washington post." when i came through, ahmed's house was a place to be educated. and i still that way today. the first question is what is the nature of the crisis in pakistan could "pakistan on the brink", they are always on the brink of something. i wonder, there is an accumulation come as you point out in some of these essays about the failures of military, education, the rise of

radicalism, but thinking in the long run, pastors, what is the nature of the crisis, and how is this different from other period >> thank you for having me and i thank you for inviting me to be here. it is very very kind. everyone at the school of journalism. i think the essential problem today is that we never grew up after the cold war ended. you know, the pakistani elite, which is a military and ungentle lee, he basically indicated that you could no longer keep extreme -- islamic extremists as a frontline. you could not have a foreign policy that is based solely on

scare tactics in the region. you need trade and economic advancement and all the rest of it. for that, you need the neighboring countries to be positive. lastly, you needed to break the dependence you have on the united states during the cold war. and you needed to develop their own economy and society. essentially, the struggle after 1989, the last 20 years, has been trying to alert the pakistani elite that the essential -- the essentials of foreign policy since 1947. they no longer work. i think that is the essence of the crisis. most countries have a foreign policy that reflects domestic policy and development and all the rest of it. we have a country where foreign

policy is said to be up to the second element. for example, we have nuclear weapons but no education. or we have health no health car. we can't take care of our public. last line the last line in the book i say, you know, the essential of the pakistani elite, it should be to take care of the pakistani people. that is where crisis after crisis comes,. >> how healthy or unhealthy today is pakistan, and how are we on the outside of the government where the band -- we may have an election this year and asked her which will mark the peaceful handoff of the government from one group to another. some of the activity in the

urban areas seems to be rising, certainly compared to the dark days a couple of days ago. is there enough of an opposition to the military's influence to make a difference? >> there is no doubt that especially the political crisis in the last year has been generated by the supreme court and the military going to the government in trying to topple the government. without [inaudible] , which is the usual norm, it has been so inept, either extremely corrupt, a terrible reputation, and puppet for not good for the people. you have this double whammy of a military that is perhaps much more weaker than it was before.

the military is deeply aware of this, i think. at the same time, you have the ability to deliver the good. goods. i do hope there will be an election. you know, a bat, incompetent, corrupt democracy is better than military rule. military rule has led us into a cul-de-sac where we have to reinvent the wheel of democracy every decade. suddenly, it collapses for some reason or the other and we have to reinvent democracy again. so i hope that this election, this government will probably lose the election, there will be another complicated coalition, probably. i hope this will be sustainable. hopefully, the government after that, as long as there is intervention, will be better.

i think the rise of civil society has been very important. civil society is also very divided. they have a very determined society that is islamist, anti-western, anti-democracy, also, the liberal society, which is democracy and government and the military to go back to the barracks and all the rest of it. it is also like [inaudible] >> on a we want to talk about afghanistan, but you mentioned that the military does not seem to be in position to intervene now, and certainly not one of those moments of a rescue narrative where the body of politics is wishing for military intervention. to the contrary, if they did, there would be a resistance. why? >> people are seeing the record,

getting bogged down in afghanistan, allowing the growth of the pakistani taliban. and the failure to really invest in pakistan's economy even though we were getting, you know, two or $3 billion a year from the americans. we have a huge debt write off after 9/11. it was just no investment in the country and people. so i think that that is part of it. also, you know, i think if you look at it this way, perhaps -- [inaudible]

between us and this is the 21st century come in a country of 180 million people should not be having a clue. they should be allowing democracy to prevent. the essential side of this is that it is in the hands of the military. and the military is designed or changed or it makes friends with neighboring states and it concentrates on pakistan's own internal situation, rather than having the conflict with kashmir. no government can change the military's foreign policy except for the military itself. >> one of the neighbors that the military would have to come to terms with, of course, is afghanistan, which has been a problematic neighbor since 1979 or earlier.

i wanted to ask you your impressions of how severe and worrisome patterns of instability emerging in afghanistan are in your judgment now. you witness afghan government unravel at multiple intervals for 30 years. the headlines are very discouraging because of the horrifying incidents. when you talk to president karzai and people around him, and you think about the political forces and contacts that are holding cool together now, they stable? can they withstand the pressures that are being placed upon them over the next year or two? >> i think the situation is that afghanistan is very fragile. the government is horrible. three or four months ago, what people were talking about with

nato and the european forces, -- now, there are several reasons for this. watching and seeing the signs [inaudible] you may be seeing serious deterioration of discipline and morale. which is not surprising, given the tours of duty and etc. or it secondly, i think that there should be a political strategy to bring the war to an end. america cannot leave afghanistan and leave at the height of the civil war going on, and expect that the afghan army, will somehow hold the line and be able to fight as well as the

americans. essentially, what is needed is a political sovereignty. part of the reason is, with india's administration, whether the americans should have negotiations with the taliban or others. we do have to be very forward with this idea of the negotiation. the need for an orderly withdrawal. secondly, create an end to the civil war. some kind of political negotiation between the taliban and the afghan country.

that is one thing. on the other hand coming of government that is very concerned. you have a government that is facing a lot of opposition. they don't want to die with the taliban. they are facing corruption of the government. more than anything, that is more critical than anything else right now, is [inaudible] what will happen after the withdrawal is that the economy is dependent. tens of thousands of those are needed. they are pro-democracy, pro-

western, the wisdom that has been given during the last 10 years. they're going to be looking for ways to leave the country. there is a domestic crisis and an american strategic crisis, and there is a crisis of the region and the neighbors. pakistan, russia, central asia, india. these countries are dealing with the american role. >> when you talk about political strategy, one element be referred to is direct talks with the taliban. there is quite a strong chapter in this book, "pakistan on the brink", about the history of these negotiations. really, very revealing and authoritative, and i wondered, you know, you have been watching the taliban from their birth. you were the first book about them that was definitive of them in the 1990s.

you obviously favor the negotiations with them now and believe that they could produce a reduction in violence that could ease the american withdrawal and make it less likely that a terrible civil war has left behind. but what would you say it is realistic to hope or expect, that the taliban would accept, given that they are a declared revolutionary movement, they are an islamic emirate in exile, they believe that the government that they had was improperly taken from them by foreigners. what kind of an outcome, at least in terms of negotiations, the realistically hope for? >> i think they suffered enormous losses also. they are living in exile in pakistan. they are afghan and they want to go home to their country. again, they consider it longer. at the same time, we have seen

some moderation in their view. they have the education of females now, they have approached al qaeda without an actual settlement. what i see is a series of trust building, competent measures between the u.s. and the taliban. which -- the taliban would have to reduce their military activity with exchange for the u.s. to do the same. maybe not all at once, maybe province by province or 40 period. your would say, well, -- government officials will stop the warfare and this could end the extended situation of both

sides to testing each other in this field. then you would have to hopefully -- once you could establish a reduction in violence. then you would involve the afghan government and try out the political situations, which would have to be through the afghan government and the taliban. i remember very well. [inaudible] was desperate for a political settlement. they wanted the political settlement. they have the same problem, they were fed up with the cia and all these other organizations. they wanted to go home. what happened was, of course, is that the cia and pakistan's military, both of them did not favor a political settlement. he wanted to see the actual

defeat. you know, having seen national protests unravel, and honestly having to get out without [inaudible] then the civil war starts in afghanistan in 1989 and 1990. i am deeply pessimistic. i see one unraveling. one failure to have a political settlement were to be able to put together a political settlement. i hope that the americans don't get the same thing that the soviets did. i hope they learn something. they need to end this war before you leave. >> the taliban have now issued a statement suspending the talks. i am not sure how you take that a source negotiating. another element is that the taliban seems wants to talk to

the americans because they are the foreigners and fielded army debate contest, and they are less interested in talking to president karzai. as you are outlining, with the opportunity is, you are making the point that it isn't in her afghan negotiation that would reduce violent in sustainable ways. how serious is this breach in this talks, so far as you can tell, and weird weirdest president karzai fit in this picture, given that he has felt annoyed with the americans, leaving him out of these talks, and also, at least in theory, in 2014, he is meant to leave office and see his successor come in. >> well, look, [inaudible] -- of the taliban. each one of these incidents could have led to a talk. but they didn't. there is a very pointed thing

that the taliban did. they were very brutal, but they did not extend the talks. now, they have to extend the talks come and that has a lot to do with the obama administration, rarely responding to the responsibility measure, which would be pending for the last three or four months. i hope that there will be something in the next few weeks. and i do believe that the taliban will be intoxicant. you know, need to talk to america, is they have to deal with a military situation to start with. and there is no point in talking about the situation, because he is not in control of the

situation. the americans are. president karzai comes in at a late stage when you're actually talking about some kind of sharing of power between president karzai and the taliban. yes, the very big issue is in president karzai. he has been very frustrated by the americans and by the activism of washington. , which has been no less, [inaudible] a special last two months. as i said, it continued division in the american administration -- deciding what to do and what not to do and etc. he finished his term in 2014.

>> do you think he'll leave? >> i really can't say. i hope he does. certainly, if i was president karzai, i would be telling you that from now you should be prepared to leave and then when someone you would like to see succeed you. i prepare the ground for that. there will be a fair election or a better selection than we've had before also, to a large extent, this would gratify the national community. and it will encourage the international community to continue to give aid. at the moment, frankly, there is a mood in europe right now, and i think i haven't been to washington yet, but even there -- nobody wants to help afghanistan in real terms beyond 2014. schools are going to need large quantities of aid.

you know, resident karzai has to take that for his country and to keep his national community on board. certainly, this will not be done if he insists that he is indispensable. if you will delay the elections or stand for a third term. i think it is a huge mistake and it could bring the whole government crumbling down. it would force the taliban to do nothing else but to take action. >> okay. the subtitle of the book is the future of america, pakistan and afghanistan. you have a number of interlinked essays towards the back of the book that are all very strong. it seems come if i read them right, that one of your things was that you feel that the american design from the street at design that the united states has, looking forward for afghan

and its relations and roles in afghanistan, its relationships and roll with pakistan, it remains a muddle puddle. we are talking about the background call that i was on at the white house put on to talk about how things are going. the good news is that things are going well. everything is right on track. there is not a single aspect of the plan that is in trouble. that gives us some time to think about the design you have in mind. and i wonder really what you mean when you say that the united states needs to clarify or improve, in effect, it its strategic vision for the region after 2014. what are the missing elements of that and the sources of confusion that are really making things worse now? >> well, i think the first thing is that there has to be a united u.s. plan. you can have one plan by the state department and the

pentagon -- and you have to have a united plane. there has to be -- the u.s. has to help and [inaudible] on a regional settlement. relations with iran are very bad because of the nuclear situation. over the last four months, you had no speaking relationship with pakistan either. i hope that will be rectified very soon. at the moment, it is a complete dead-end. there has to be unity on these two things. seeking an internal settlement. i support of a lot of the things president obama has done. the military surge was matched by more money for development and etc. but it could did not take up because the fighting intensified. my criticism of his administration has been that they have defused many different

initiatives, none of them fully consistent. none of them to the end. what happened, for example, the document that put general petraeus and use -- we are fighting to protect the people. that has all disappeared on the reports are from anything but the administration says. again, the failure of the last three to for years, the afghans need an economy to keep them going. and the failure to build an indigenous economy. it is not just about our industrial forces. the biggest problem is right now in the united states, as a result of two bush presidencies, and two wars that he fought, and god forbid that there might be a third war.

but, you know, the military has exerted enormous political pressure on this administration. a lot of you pakistanis say that you have an overwhelming military, you know, basically who pushes the concept of foreign policy. they regularly deal with force of arms, victory, we will not be beat up by the taliban, that kind of thing. i think that has changed. i hope it has changed, after this incident, it needs to be changed. but i think obama -- president obama has been trapped in this outcome, which is not a result of his policy so much as much as a result of president bush's policy of having fought two wars. quite simply, right now, many say around the world that if the

united states -- if it attacks a third country, in other words, around, there is no say what chaos and confusion would ensue for america. it would completely undermine the arab spring, and it could underlie all the democratic aspirations of the going right several other countries along the way. i just hope that, you know, this doesn't happen. that there is some settlement. >> in a moment, i want to invite the audience to join us. those of you have have questions, if you would like to start lining up at the microphone, you can do that. i have one more to complete the loop on this. if the problem with american policy for the design of american policy in afghanistan, as you were saying, is part that it is fight and talk, simultaneously, which does not

always seem to join together as a unified approach very well. in pakistan, tonight the parliament is going to start a debate about the future from pakistan's perspective of relationships with the united states. united states is in multiple conversations in washington, as i am sure that you will join in once you get there about whether the relationships between the united states and pakistan should be redesigned. what is a mutually sustainable basis? for civilian relations between the united states and pakistan over the next 20 years? what should be the basis for rethinking of that relationship? >> from the american side, these talks -- they need to be brought

in at some level with the taliban. the more that they are kept up, the more angry and sidelined the military intelligence will feel. the more resentful they will be in the country, propagated by them. but americans have struck a deal without including pakistan. i think the second thing will be restrictions on freedom vet u.s. intelligence and the drone have. there are thousands of cia officers operating under et cetera. i think what the u.s. has to do, a lot of this bad blood that was created between the u.s. military and the pakistan military was a result of pressure on the pakistani

military to do this or that. now, but the long-term goal should be is how does the u.s. helped change without putting come you know, day-to-day daily pressure. forget the intelligence relationship. that is not going to be restored in the way that it existed before. forget about it. you don't need an american general single after that communist world where there's for that. what you need is american civilians basically for a shift in pakistan's strategic plan, and a real strategic deal with pakistan, in regards to foreign policy and what the u.s. can do to help. not the u.s. to take it, but how the u.s. can help. economically, improving relations with india, energy,

electricity, etc. how the u.s. can also help end in galvanizing the international community to make sure that afghanistan and pakistan remain on the agenda, despite the international recessions and the economic lesson here, i think, you know, the u.s. needs to ship towards a longer view and a more strategic view about not wanting a day-to-day result. in the tribal areas. having said that, you know, as you will read in this book, i am extremely critical of pakistan and they continue a desire to keep the taliban for as long as possible. they continue to allow them to fight. i think pakistan should give a deadline now or at least once the relationship [inaudible]

in gdb you have to leave this country in six months or year, seven comes with the americans and president karzai and leave. we are not going to sustain you for longer. i believe that kind of step would win enormous international support we know, that would obviously mean a complete you turn his first-ever policy is concerned remapped let me invite the audience. i can't really tell in the square whether someone is standing at the microphone or approaching it. [laughter] please do identify yourself and ask a direct question, if you will. >> by your opinion, how would the pakistanis react to the current administration were a future one if the focus moved away from extra upsets like with

india or the f10, taliban, and move towards economy. is there a point of pride in the pakistani public that is related to holding onto kashmir. maybe that would be an internal reason that government keeps these military operations on the table? >> there is no doubt that there is very strong american activism in pakistan right now. this could change, people really want to live normal lives. what i said earlier that the military being unsure of itself, the military not being able to launch a coup. not because it suddenly change, but because it knows it will not be supported by half the population. i think that most pakistanis want to see prosperity and education and economic

development. and they have not been, you know, they have not been delighted by it in some years. certainly, if you changed with india, the business community wants to do business with india, they want to do business and trade in india. in order for that to have them come you have to look at the changes. pakistan is at, you know, it is at the center of all of these things. from iran to central asia to the gulf. it has not given itself the opportunity to do so. it means to do so. and i think the public would really support that. >> thank you. >> first of all, i want to go

back to the warlords. if you look at [inaudible name] and the success he has had in the balkan province, dc president karzai being aid in anti-calvinism? you kept stressing there is an importance to build a domestic economy. if you have specific, i guess, recommendations or ideas of how to do that, given that the climate, the environment is very area, trade would be dependent on international relations, which is a very tenured position right now. what you see except as to doing that? >> well, i hope president karzai won't be there in 2014 and i hope he will step down. i think it is critical that pakistan have a new leadership to who can bridge the ethnic

divide and after the. the ethnic divide is not very big in afghanistan. especially over this dialogue of the taliban. you need a new face and figure, with endorsement from president karzai. you need a new political sensation and kabul, and i hope that will happen in 2014. his first economy is concerned, look, for example right now, electricity in more than pakistan is being provided from a northern nation. the electricity on the west side of the nation is being provided by iran. this is without the government involved, because they have deals with the neighboring countries. you already have the basis for what president karzai would be best back, but this is a landlocked country. it has six neighbors. all these neighbors want to

trade with each other i road and rail, except there's a lot of differences going on. there is a war going on. if the war ends come you can make a lot of money there is the whole idea of pipelines, oil and gas coming from central asia, afghanistan, pakistan, india -- trade with the gulf and etc. the second thing is investment in agriculture. only 12% of afghans territory is actually higher row. they did themselves in the 1970s that they had a small agricultural service but they afforded. we have not even been able to restore the state of the economy since then.

that was heavy, and obesity today come you can do wonderful things, freezing and shipping and all of those kind of things. the fruits of afghanistan in the 1970s i think there is enormous potential. >> what do you see the warlords doing going forward? >> i hope that we see a new political leadership and they will cooperate. i think that there is progress in the course of the taliban. i think the mood can shift very rapidly. id., at the end of the day, even though they don't want another war. >> just to follow up on that, warlords is a term -- were not

sure who deserves it and who doesn't. in the united states or afghanistan. when you talk about a new world after president karzai, and you said that the new president will need to hold the competence of non-palestinians. to hold the competence of the country and not ignite fearful groups. that is a heck of a search committee. [laughter] if you were to name names, i welcome you, but where is that we are going to come from in afghanistan? president karzai is going to annoy them and his family are going to have competence. >> there have been some very good ministers in the afghan government over the last 10 years. i am sure they were thrown out

partially because they were too competent. they had better ideas than what we had. i don't want to name names, but i think that many questions have been thrown out who could play a very important role in the next election. there are more people that are moderate in the north who could also hopefully form some kind of working coalition. i think a lot of this will depend on how the talks with the taliban in progress, and how these are conducted by the americans and their president. there is one theory, and this is a deal that the karzai family is having with the taliban. they're going to have a deal with the taliban and they will give the taliban a seat at the table in the government, and it doesn't involve rest of

afghanistan or the ethnic groups or anything like that. now, so far, prickly, president karzai has not built a consensus for the talk were conducted to talk in a politically wholesome manner. this needs to change. now, it is not going to change by telling him. the american ambassador said you have to change and bring in all these northerners and he's not what to going to do it. he is going to change only if there is progress on the ground between the americans and the taliban. if he sees the inner stability of a settlement, and a settlement that would have to be fair and square for all afghans, not just for his family or network, as you say, then come you know, i think it can happen. i agree with you. given the present state of affairs with the american deployment in afghanistan, i give them the wishful thinking that you described, that everything is hunky dory and

fine, which it is exactly the opposite that is probably true. you know, i would not have become an author of the subjects that i was not an optimist. [laughter] every time i write a book, new civil war breaks out. and i just thought oh, my god, this is going to be a big deal and big settlement. etc. etc. i think this happens too many times. i am really an optimist because i believe the afghan people have something in them and they really wanted peace and a settlement. i don't mean those that are cashing in on corruption. >> look at what they have put up

what is from us in the last 10 years. >> i have two questions. would you share your opinion on how the distinction with a two groups of the taliban with the same ideology? you thought that they were moving away from the [inaudible] would you share your opinion on what these two groups have that make them distinct? is what will it take for the pakistani taliban to allow the government to survive in a sustainable fashion? >> just for the sake of those who may not know the nuances, could you also just start by giving a quick thumbnail of your pakistani taliban are today and why they are distinct from the afghan taliban?

>> the pakistani taliban initially rose in the border regions between afghanistan and pakistan as a result of the presence of the taliban and al qaeda's presence in the border regions after 2001. in those who survived the american invasion, fled into pakistan. they set up shop there and had a lot of money. etc. they cultivated militancy amongst the people there. this military expanded and developed, and then started not just hoping the war in afghanistan -- not just taking on one of afghanistan. the pakistani taliban is toppling the central government and -- the real differences but

they have -- they have the links of al qaeda and links of military groups. these groups, who are basically [inaudible] many of these are what he calls the pakistan taliban. the pakistan taliban troops from all over the country, which is what it was a much bigger step than there was before. slowly, moderating positions on various things, like you mentioned. the outgoing taliban -- they allow education, the pakistani taliban doesn't. they don't allow any education except their own kind of education. how would the pakistani taliban

come to rest? >> well, we are fighting the afghan army. because there is a chief todd in afghanistan against the infidel americans. it's support that jihad. now come at the afghan parliament were to make peace with them, then jihad would disappear. what justification would they have for continuing to attack pakistan taliban. they would be no religious justification at all. and i think if there was a reasonable kind of peace in afghanistan, pakistan would be enormously productive.

the taliban would be less without an basis. i think the pakistanis have to find something important [inaudible] but we also have to deal with the militant groups are fighting against india. they still pose an honest threat. there are large numbers, and they have been supported by the military for a long period of time. that has to be -- that status quo has to be broken by the government. not by attacking them or killing them or anything, but by trying to bring them into the system. in many ways, that is the only way to mark. >> thank you. >> two questions for you,

mr. ahmed rashid. the first one is what happened with someone who is [inaudible] and i would like to know your opinion on what this man is all about, what are his politics. you think by not going to india, he is going to give them -- that he would've struck a deal with them and so on. the second question relates to the pakistani elite. why is the pakistani elite -- why has it been so apathetic for so long? what makes the pakistani elite a strange creature that you think it is. >> you might have to explain what it is because probably not everyone here was following online.

>> [inaudible] he has enormous support from young people who want to be changed. that is quite understandable. that step was that both ron and we were invited to delhi at a conference. this gentleman refused to go because he said he was insulted. i don't want to go into it. he was too into the military, that is why he didn't come. look, you know, the matter is very popular. he is trying to build a political belt. but, there are some visible signs that have been right. the entire cabinet that

politicians has joined president karzai. his policies would not move 1 inch without clarification from the military if it was okay or not. secondly, he has had very close links to islamic partnerships. many of the items on islamic rights. he is accusing liberals of pakistan of undermining him. etc. but i still believe it is too early. i think that we are going to be faced with an election campaign and we have to see what is actually being offered. at the moment, everything is being offered and he's going to change the economy in 90 days, -- it is going to be a hard sell in an election campaign. he is to become more concrete and accurate as to exactly what he's going to do.

and also, who his friends are. we have to wait and see. >> i was in pakistan pakistan last month and spend spent some time with him and all i can see is that he looks great in saturday night live. there are two people left. there are five minutes left. the two questioners will break the pattern of asking two questions each and ask one question each, then we can take those and have ahmed respond to them and get your downtime. >> all right, i will try to make it quick. i am not an optimist. my question is do you think a full-fledged counterinsurgency program aimed at the taliban is necessary to prevent al qaeda from attacking the united states and also necessary to secure nuclear weapons from pakistan? thank you. >> behind him? >> yes, please the last word.

>> with regard to nuclear weapons, the atlantic monthly ran an article in december, essentially a shell function alleging that weaponize materials are being transported in utility vans through traffic. i'm curious about your take is or whether it is sensational reporting, and how it affects the dynamic of the relationship. >> we know very little. we certainly know that the army controls them. the army remains a discipline, higher goal for us. -- hierarchal force. everyone hopes it continues to hold. the other thing is that there is a relationship. certainly there was one after 9/11, i think it would be great

on the economy and would be putting far more pressure on them than what we have seen. as somebody who knows very little about this, and pakistanis don't know very much about this, i was saying that if the americans and nato -- as it is for example on pursuing the haqqani a network and etc. opposite, there is a stable control of the nuclear weapons. the international community does not seem overly worried about it. as i said, i think we need to change our foreign policy and we need to reconcile with these

militants inside the country and we need to end his insurgency in pakistan, by the pakistani taliban and etc. etc. it is not an easy issue. the second thing is, look, i think that al qaeda is being decimated. the core group of al qaeda that existed in afghanistan and pakistan has been more or less decimated. i don't think the afghan taliban had a very close relationship with them over the years. but i don't think politically speaking, now we want a relationship. i don't think they want a relationship. they have done their best to distance themselves from the taliban. they have said that no one group will be allowed to take up residence in afghanistan again. the political settlement inside afghanistan. i think that that does not meet al qaeda schools. we have the rebirth of al qaeda, it also includes some new places that did not exist before.

whether it is nigeria or somalia or north africa or yemen. and of course coming of the development, even for the first time in the united states -- i mean, you know, the times square bombing and other individual acts of terrorism that have taken place. it seems that most of these acts of terrorism are getting inspiration, not necessarily from the core group operating in pakistan, but operating ulcer. for example, the yemeni al qaeda has much more extension in recent months. you know, i don't see -- i think, you know, pakistan needs work at its own problems. he needs to come out with its own solutions. it certainly needs a military to

deal with this issue in entirety . not doing so would lead to disastrous implications. it could divide the country and the army. it could lead to very catastrophic long-term threats. pakistan really needs to sort out its own problems. the purpose of this book is to try to explain with a long-term pakistan is going on, and where, you know, corrections have been made. >> a purposefully realized. pakistan has brought us here together. "pakistan on the brink" is your book that brought us together. thank you to all of you for participating. ahmed, it is always an inspiration to us and you and a privilege. i think those of us who know you, and perhaps take for granted and should understand, is that your work is not only brilliant and