it is interesting she left "o" magazine behind and oprah winfrey revised the book club as a few days ago. the book club was shut down 2010 when she moved to her own network. she brought it back with them memoir wild.

do they sell nearly as well as some of the novels we have been >> it depends. from what i understand, creativity, largely i think it helps when barnes & noble made it -- and certainly coming up maybe not so much this summer but certainly this fall, it will be interesting to see how nonfiction does selection related so i think if nonfiction looks do very well they will have some political or some

geo-history related elements that somehow ties into the election. for example i would be -- i would not be surprised if david maraniss barack obama book that should drop any day now does phenomenally well because of all the things to come with "vanity fair" and all the other magazines. people are very curious and it's a very big book. that's the first book that comes to my mind that i know they're a number of other political books that should be dropping very soon. >> we have been talking lucero weinman who is in his director of publishers marketplace. interested in following public news? the web site publishers marketplace.com and if you want to follow sarah on twitter, she is a constant twitterer. sarah w. matt? sarah w? >> i tried to keep it simple by getting twitter very early so i was fortunate to have as few

characters as possible so i could have 134 characters less to say what i had to say. >> thank you for being on booktv. >> thank you so much, peter. a pleasure as always. coming up next on booktv, after words with guest hosts phyllis bennis of the institute for policy studies. this week middle east expert, fawaz gerges and his latest book, "obama and the middle east" in which the international relations professor examines the obamas administrations response to the arab spring and its engagement with various middle east nations. >> guest: it's so good to be here with you fawaz. i'm delighted to see your new book. >> guest: thank you for having me. >> host: we are here now in

what appears to be thick coming onto the end of the fourth year of either the first-term or the term of the obama administration there is a great deal of disappointment in many corridors but can we even begin talking directly about the obama policy in the middle east or do we have to go back in history a bit? >> guest: we do. i mean i don't think we can discuss the obama presidency without discussing what i call the legacy, the united states in the great middle east. and that particular legacy has its roots in the cold war years between the united states and the soviet union where the united states sacrificed human rights and sacrificed her aggressive forces on the altar of what they called the struggle against the soviet union. in 1947 to 1989, so much damage was done to the middle east, so much hatred by the united states

in this particular legacy culminated in the 9/11 wars. the 9/11 wars particularly the invasion and occupation of it brought a river of blood and treasure and tears that were shed as a result of the 9/11 event. this is why the first few chapters of the book where i discuss this particular legacy, and when we say to the viewers, when we talk about it, we are talking about in a particular sense 9/11, multiple wars. hundreds of thousands of american troops battling muslim lands. the united states engaged in a social engineering project that went far beyond its strategic interest. the moral standing of the united states, the credibility of the united states as an actor. the united states of america pretending, and acting as the leader of the free world and

experimenting torture abroad. the economic costs of the 9/11 wars were $5 trillion. between three and $5 trillion. >> host: is one of those numbers i have been hearing and reading and writing this number for so long and is one of those numbers that is so large it's almost impossible to comprehend. blood is a trillion? i can't quite imagine a million. >> guest: think about when obama came and he said 700 million -- 700 yen dollars in order to basically reconstruct the economy. you are spending $700 billion. >> host: we don't have $700 billion. >> guest: no, we did not even have the three to $5 trillion that we have spent. most of the money was are owed money. not to mention the economic cost. it's also the opportunity cost.

while the united states was chasing bands of jihad is in the valleys of afghanistan and pakistan the world was going on so barack obama inherited the bitter legacy, declined economy and also the rise of the economic power of china, india, south africa, brazil, turkey and this is why any particular question must take into account what he has inherited and what he has enabled so far. >> host: that raises of course the critical question. we are looking at the scenario scenario where he has inherited this weekend position of the united states. the u.s. is no longer the sole superpower. there is no longer a sole superpower. it's not even clear that the u.s. is the most important or most influential power in the region. it's now contending in a whole new way with a whole new lineup of emerging powers.

in that context, we have the u.s. dispute i would say in iraq. we have the rise of iran and turkey that you describe in the book, contending with each other and with others for regional dominance and increasingly we have the arab spring that has emerged that has challenged that the u.s. could provide not only on israel but for these arab dictators for so long. what do you think would have been different with another president, either a neoconservative president like george bush, or someone else? did barack obama asa poses a fundamental question, have any options in what he has done? >> guest: well i think this is really raising many many problems. there is not just one particular point. we need to understand and the book is subtitled the beginning of the end of the dominance. the beginning and end of

america's dominance is very much related to how americans policy was hijacked and the deadly and costly wars that were waged in the name of security. it had little to do with security. the democracy using bottom-up american boots on the ground. barack obama, and this is to his credit, they have fully realize the damage that was done to america's reputation. they also have a vivid the vivid sense of america's decline vis-à-vis the rising powers. they realized america was and beginning the start of barack obama and this is where the rousing rhetoric comes in, and that is why many of us basically were blinded by the rising rhetoric. many on the left and the right, barack obama has never said that he was a transformational president, never. from 2006 --

>> host: he has always supported it. >> guest: in the tradition bush senior and jfk, and this goes to the very heart of who he is as their president. he never promised, and that is why from day one he wanted to mend the historic rift with the air of an muslim society and he wanted to go back -- he really wanted -- though there's one there is one particular point to highlight. he wanted to bring america's foreign-policy to -- report was hijacked by the neoconservatives. >> host: let's look at that because i think one of the questions that people struggle to resolve is even how much of a disconnect, not in tactical strategy, which clearly they wars against terror as it was called, the response to 9/11, was a break with the kind of prudent materialism if you will that we had seen earlier than that but fundamentally, it seems

that the interest of the neoconservatives was not so different than the interests of those who came before and those who came after, that being the key of middle east oil, israel and stability for markets and expansion of power, basically that sort of thing. those three things seemed pretty consistent before the neocons came in, with the neocons assault after 9/11, and with barack obama. do you see a big shift? >> one of the lessons i really have learned about writing this book and other books on america and the islamist movement and world power is what i call the structural institutional continuity in american foreign-policy. you really cannot understand and this is one of the lessons. you cannot understand the consistent failures of american

foreign-policy without understanding the structural continuity. is a do we mean? dominant paradigm. here is the world. and oil and gas is broadly defined. as you suggested, and the reason why i think barack obama, with barack obama and his father were trying to basically undo some of the damage done by neoconservatives in particular, became really into contact and resistance by the system itself, the start journal institution and what they call the dysfunctional american system, special interest groups. this is the dysfunctional american political system which includes special interest

groups, the congress, the foreign-policy is a whole. a foreign policy that really controls how policies are made. i mean, if you really want to understand, look at the team barack obama has. these people have the same faces, the same names, the same voices. not even a single dissenting voice. and this by itself, the same people come the same voices, the same narratives and that is why the policy itself is keeps re-imploding and that is why barack obama when he came -- the whole special interest groups -- three major confrontations with benjamin netanyahu and on three different occasions and he basically lost the three major confrontations. this is because he realized, he realized that he had to invest major political capital. he realized he had to take on

the entire dysfunctional american political system and he was unwilling to do so because at the end of the day, barack obama was deeply anchored within the foreign-policy consensus. not just in the middle east. he views the world through the dominant consensus that the establishment few. >> host: that sounds absolutely right but i wonder, if we look at i believe it was the third of the three confrontations confrontations with netanyahu that you referred to him this was in 2010. there was a great deal of media coverage about this question, is the u.s. being too tough on israel and there were accusations from a pet, from various neoconservative forces in the think-tanks, from some in the media and from plenty in congress. and they were all putting pressure on the obama administration, claiming, you are being too tough on israel. now in infected you document there was no real pressure.

there was a series of requests. do you stop building settlements? answer, no. no. and then the answer, request. during that time, the american people are being told obama is really going after netanyahu. my god, this is a whole new thing but there was a poll -- there was a poll by the zogby poll out that, one of the major democratic pollsters and one of the questions dealt with settlements. it gave people two options. one option was are they building it for security reasons and they have the right to build wherever they want? question number two, building on expropriated palestinian land, the settlement should be torn down in the land returned to its original owners. very provocative way of describing it. accurate maybe but provocative nonetheless. 63% of barack obama's own party voted for sentence number two. i think that was a stunning

shift. is a moment in time, a snapshot but why do you think there was such reluctance in the administration to acknowledge that public opinion had in fact changed and that it was not going to be the same kind of lyrical suicide to criticize israel in a serious way, but they had not done yet and still refuse to do at? >> guest: let me go further and you're absolutely right on the polls pulse and basically the shift, the monetary shift of the american public. i think the american president, barack obama has convinced himself since the late 1960's that basically there is one particular narrative, there is onearticular view that any president that takes on special interest groups will pay a heavy price. they have convinced him that the

jewish community -- this is in a way, which if you look at, and i cite many polls, that in fact the jewish community, the communities have always been really progressive and at the forefront of progressive policy. the majority, always the majority of the jewish community has always supported a two-state solution. i mean this is often -- >> host: although the definition -- >> guest: the reality, and i'm not talking about the tiny orthodox community basically. i'm talking about in particular young jewish and even rabbis. and this is -- aipac does not speak for the jewish communities. aipac does not represent the jewish communities. but the reality is, i mean even barack obama has come to view aipac as part of a special and all-inclusive special interest

group as opposed to being -- presenting the good tide constituency and also i think the reason why i "met barack obama the reality is when you take on aipac, you need to create a counter constituent. you need to create a constituency for peace constituency for peace that involves basically engagement and political capital and if you -- the american people, these are the costs and the benefits of the peace process. just the jewish community, the jewish communities know very well. you educate them about the fact that it's a win-win. no one is trying to undermine the security and on the contrary. the united states has an obligation to save israel. the particular point of view that does not take into account the right in in the off negation

of the palestinian. at the end of the day israel does not oppose the palestinian. as a separate community might end up with what? a one-state solution or another holocaust. a possibility. i am saying the options. in the two-state solution, what option do you have? a one-state solution or the ultra-right? most of the palestinians -- >> host: i think there's a new question right now the people are grappling with of whether there is still his two-state solution as an option given the expansion of the settlement and how dramatic it is. we are now at 650,000 israeli settlers who are breaking the law every morning just by waking up because they are on a legal land but i think the question of whether one-state solution would be an apartheid state or a democratic state is a big question. and there is still the aleutian if you will that there may be

still could be as two-state solution of some sort. but right now there is certainly no negotiations. there is no debate. there is no pressure. there was one line in your book that i was struck by, and i thought no i don't think that's true because you referred to obama challenging netanyahu, which rhetorically quite consistently, and at the end of the day, the two parties divided and that netanyahu went home empty-handed. and i thought, that can't be right because he was still going home with this year 3.1 and soon-to-be soon to be $4.1 billion in military aid. the existing promised to protect israel at the united nations come ensuring that no matter how many resolutions are passed, no one is ever actually held accountable, that all these things are taken as a matter of course. so to say he went home empty-handed i think is a bit --

>> guest: i'm glad you mentioned that. barack obama and the interviews in the last few months he says you know i don't understand all the notes. we have given israel carte blanche literally. few americans know that under the obamas administration has received carte blanche. much more than under bush. that is how much the question of the palestinian-israeli conflict and the reason why beyond the politics really, i mean that we can argue and debate but barack obama from day one made a settlement with the palestinian and israeli conflict a part of the strategic interest of the united states. he is one of the first presidents to articulate a narrative about the arab-israeli conflict as an extension of america's security interest. on the first day, on his first day in the white house, the first telephone call he made was

to abbas, president mahmoud abbas and he promised to bring even the u.s. military the first time. the u.s. military went public and said the resolution with the palestinian-israeli conflict had a direct impact on the lives of our soldiers. >> host: now i wonder, that was a critical development and i wonder if you think that, when president obama first made you know the statement that the issue would be an important one, that's an old story. that is not particularly new but his statement as you said, one of the first to say that this is part of our should teach interest. how much of that you think he was in fact reflecting the military few? we know top generals are saying this is crazy, our soldiers are at risk because of israeli soldiers. >> guest: truly, mean this is why i said the first time that the u.s. military basically went public, trying to --

that is part of the extension of america's security. our soldiers in pakistan and afghanistan, there is a consensus within the american security in particular among the intelligence services, i mean the cia in particular and believe that the military has come to believe that this is a majors t. chick -- and that is why the inability of barack obama to really carry on to basically -- is also destined to the failure of the international nations as we call it, the tail that wags the dog. and here you have benjamin netanyahu insulting the president in the white house and receiving dozens of standing ovations. but the big., tells me that there is a institutional continuity and barack obama has

chosen not to challenge the institutional continuity and also it speaks volumes about who he is as a president. 's. >> host: how broad is that consensus? >> guest: the consensus is that, you see, the entire world literally the entire world and even the american security, we know at the settlement is. a two-state solution so it's the consensus within this tells you within u.s. foreign policy goes against the consensus of the world including the military and the intelligence services. and also it is not just basically when he is challenged, he retreats on what i'm suggesting that unfortunately, regardless of the statesman basically, on a very strategic

send me pick vacant policy challenge that barack obama decided to prioritize at the beginning of this administration. >> host: if we shift a little bit away from the israel-palestine question and look a little bit more broadly at at the other middle east aspects, you quite brilliantly i think take the reader in your book through these shifts of the bush administration and then what changed and what didn't change as obama took office. one of the questions i had had to do with the rhetoric of president obama. he is clearly a brilliant speaker. he is an inspirational figure. his charisma and his ability to inspire is really unmatched i think perhaps since president candi. >> guest: he truly is. inspiration. >> host: and globally, and

impact but there is a way, i wonder you seemed in the book to accept parts of the rhetoric as his real views. for example when you talk about his decision about libya, you spoke of the moves within the administration -- though there had been a move particularly in the military and hillary clinton the secretary of state for some period that were against military engagement in libya. there was a pro military, pro-engagement, pro-intervention faction if you will particularly in the state department led by samantha powers and others and you talk about president obama starting -- very hesitant to engage but being persuaded because of the fear of a maacre. now, i have some real questions about number one, whether that massacre they anticipated was either inevitable or quick. at the time that it happened as you remember, the first french

attacks actually were on tanks tank that had been driven out because the people there have the capacity to drive them out, but it was also being talked about quite widely that president obama's fresh amount was primarily because he was afraid if he didn't back up the europeans, particularly the french and the brits, and their initiative, in libya, that they would withdraw or at least consider withdrawing from their support for the u.s. in afghanistan. now do youee that more strategic partner do you really think that obama was responding purely to the humanitarian impulse? >> guest: barack obama's heart was not in the operation. we have seen a very limited amount of data, but barack obama, the reason why, i mean few people know that the middle east does not talk about obama's

foreign-policy. barack obama and his foreign-policy team from day one to leave that america was too enged in the middle east, far beyo what the strategic interests are from day one. america's future lies somewhere else. it lies in the pacific region. from day one, and in fact be a rousing rhetoric without which basically was launched by barack obama using his own personal story, his speeches and cairo, were really designed to begin systematically to shift american foreign policy priority somewhere else. and that is why barack obama wanted to basically reduce the american boots on the ground. the area itself, he really wanted to bring most american troops from iraq and american from afghanistan and that is why he was deeply suspicious of a close national security. in fact it was hillary clinton

that forced his hand a great deal, hillary clinton because sarkozy and other people -- so at the end of the day barack obama and the national security was supposed. robert gates and any president -- though the military said we are too overextended. so the reality is that the end it was really presented -- and the whole debate was you have to do something abo it in the truth is we also have to -- we will chase you from house to house and we will go after you and we will kill you and your children. >> host: if he was speaking to the armed rebel, not to every individual. >> guest: yeah, the idea even many of us, if you had asked myself as a student at the airport, would you trust --

so if i were and i am suggesting we don't have the complete evidence yet. i think based on everything that we no, he was really trying to do it himself, to stay away from -- my take on it, my own take and i could be wrong, that his hand was forced. he realized that a massacre did -- that could take place and look, the united states was not an iraqi invasion. france, britain and the arab league provided a great deal of just a go and military -- >> host: and the vast majority of the bombs most importantly. >> guest: absolutely. i don't think barack obama was keen to intervene. >> host: i think he was not that the question of what pushed them over the edge remains critical weather was humanitarian or whether it was a strategic calculation that i really don't want to do this. this could be a disaster in my military is telling me not to but if i don't i risk antagonizing the european leaders and they could you know,

play around in afghanistan. >> guest: your interpretation makes a great deal of sense. had the u.s. military and the security apparatus really decided to support that mission, in fact his decision was at odds and that is why we have to wait for the evidence to see at this point. >> host: let's go to the question also the ideological backing, the ideological framework that you describe i think quite early and late, of how the neocons, particularly cheney and then bush taking it up. he was not the initiator but he accepted cheney and wolfowitz and the others who have this language about democratization and we were going to forced democratization. and i wondered in reading it, do you think that is really what motivated them as opposed to the more traditional assumptions of many in this country that they were really motivated primarily by issues of power expansion and

oil in iraq, that the democratization frame was how they were going to sell it to the american people? >> guest: you are raising an important point. in fact these are the least people expect to talk about democracy and democratization. that is my own view. i think the big int for me as a historian is we don't have the evidence yet. it was a social initiating process. to be blunt, a project that neoconservatives argued that the united states should not shy away from being part. this was an area that was the weakest wing -- weakest wing. iraq was the weakest of the links. iraq was a very weak regime,

collapses. mr. president he will go down in history as the president that basically remain to the middle east. that is the whole narrative of course and we had to take our troops out of saudi arabia. iraq would become a base and the whole idea -- so i don't think myself, and i don't know, i don't really subscribe to a single cause. is always complex. and i think it's multiple causes but i think it's the whole notion of what we call the arab power and the idea that the united states was part and is one of them said oh yes we can change social reality. guess the people are engaged and they did but unfrtunately i mean, in horrible horrible ways. >> host: you know if we looked into this question of

transition, continuity, non-continuity, change or non-change, one of the things you point to in the book that is so important on the question of how president obama has carried out the so-called war on terror. saying this is a useful term and it implies too much. it's too arrogant. in his actions, as we see, as you document and some others have, that the number of drone attacks for example was twice as much in barack obama's first year than the entire eight years of the bush administration. the use of the same kill or capture lists that the bush administration initiated only with obama using much more emphasis on killing rather than capturing. maintaining, despite an early effort that didn't go very far, maintaining the basic guantánamo.

all of these things were things that he simply carried on the same war as george bush was slightly different rhetorical definition. >> guest: i mean, neoconservatives talked big and fought wars and theaters that had less to do with barack obama. the heart of barack obama strategy is american boots on the ground were a source of instability providing ideological and venetian to various elements. the idea from day one was to bring american troops home, to reduce the u.s. military footprint and that is the correcidea. this has been really one of his major political achievements. even though the military wanted to maintain its force in iraq, barack said no we want to give you a legal immunity. in afghanistan we know barack obama does not believe the

mission would produce -- what he did though, what he did though and this is important, in fact barack obama has waged a much more lethal and deadly war than bush. he has given the security, the establishment carte blanche, anything literally in strategic priority. he said i want this war, i want it dismantle. you can do anything you wanted afghanistan and pakistan. we cannot document drone attacks anymore and special operation forces. he is talking about civilian casualties. the reality is he is proven to be -- al qaeda does not exist as an organization. it no longer -- it ceases to exist as a common control and my most recent book on the anniversary of 9/11, the rise

and fall of power. it no longer exists. you are talking about very very few surviving. i mean skilled soldiers and i think what we really what we have not discussed so far as the potential of blowback. i see it, really do and i am talking about, you might wake up a few years from now this blowback potential might come to haunt us in the same way that afghanistan came to haunt the united states and from the mid-1990s up to 2001. pakistan, i made the extent of rage that exists, the nato conference just ended. think of how pakistan, i mean even the political leadership, go to pakistan and talk to the junior officers. not just the senior officers. we don't debate it. even the u.s. military realizes how bad the situation is in

afghanistan and pakistan now. people think that we are waging just wars in afghanistan and pakistan, yemen and somalia. we are talking about dozens. according to the u.s. military theaters, counterterrorism measures are applied and now with american forces out of even in iraq where we are flying drones in iraq, and even though american forces might come home from afghanistan in the next year or two, counterterrorism measures will go on and drone attacks. just this nation, these killers basically are doing the job. we don't have to send troops and no account of the legal and moral and the human dimension. >> host: none of the cost. the blowback costs. we are hearing now about the possibility that the negotiations that are underway between the u.s. and pakistan involving how much money pakistan will get for each truckload of goods that go into

afghanistan or later they began to take goods out of afghanistan, and pakistan is now saying instead of the old $250 per truck they are now going to be charging $5000 per truck and the u.s. says that a going to happen. were going to rebound the so-called northern supply route which is all the other dictatorships and the notion that uzbekistan might be in the mix somewhere. if you had to pick one regime with the worst human rights record, they boil people to death there. it's an extraordinary thing. but my question has to do with whether the debate that you are speaking of, the divide within the pakistani military, is that by the pakistani president zardari who was of course in chicago this weekend, though without apparently a serious meeting with president obama, is that why he is sticking to a hard line, because his military is demanding it and he's afraid

of being overthrown if he doesn't? desk of the senior officers in the pakistani army have been warning their u.s. counterparts about the revolt going on. american generals have also spoken, including i mean robert gates about the difficulties trying to really calm down the junior officers and pakistan. it's the urban middle class and pakistan that his outrage. think of these so-called lone radicals and militants sanctions. most of them come now from pakistan. they are no longer air of. tells you a great deal. the anger and they are going to al qaeda and the taliban because they are angry and what i'm suggesting is that we really have not had a debate on barack obama's counterterrorism measures and the cost. the legal aspect because not to ntion the moral. we estimate that more than one or 2000 pakistanis are killed, whole families wiped out. now in him inhuman there is

another debate, i've been taking place in yemen about the whole american -- the united states is fighting the iraq war in yemen against al qaeda. the big point here to come back to barack obama, barack obama, and realizes that one single terrorist attack and the united states would undermine his presence. he realizes very much how important national security is for barack obama. that is why he goes far and beyond what -- the republicans cannot even -- i mean he really preempted the foreign-policy question with romney. he has no foreign-policy and ironically and historically it's the democrats and this tells you i mean, how deeply anchored barack obama's foreign-policy is. >> host: but does not mean the risk remains at a sky high sky-high level of the exact kind

of blowback you are talking about, that by escalation on this scale, when we are talking about civilian casualties on this scale, that what we are facing is the almost inevitable response is somewhere in the region it doesn't take much do you know, the kind of grand thing that maybe they can do that but terrorism, the nature of it is the instrument of the week. >> guest: i think, and you know much more than i do, it any academics, to really caution the american public about questions of cost and blowback and you have time to draw links between militancy and foreign-policy and domination is perceived to be as being apologists. truly, and the debate, and i have a chapter in my book on the arise of al qaeda.

up almost every single drone attack, i spent countless hours trying to understand who the are and where they come from. one of the lessons i learned through my research is basically there is a link between foreign-policy and the perception of victimization and what the united states is doing and the process. the way we discuss it in the united states here is that homegrown radicalism and bolotin sea and extremism is devoid of any kind of context. people are radicalized because they are bad and they are evil. i am saying that these are of course -- though that is a reality. the reality is we need to understand what has happened? and why the shift in the radicalization process? why pakistan, middle-class

relatively integrated, more and more in the majority are basically migrating to militancy and there is no debate. we don't debated. it's unacceptable to say look, our actions, could it be "the new york times" said it in one of its editorials, it says somehow counterterrorism is creating more terrorists. that is the reality and that comes back to your question about -- though even though technically president barack obama's policies has been lethal in potent, al qaeda which doesn't exist, the bigger question in the greater question is that the costs have not even addressed -- been addressed or debated. >> when we get to the question of cost one of the differences now, and we did work early in the first year of the iraq war on the cost of war, looking at human and environmental costs and financial costs. it didn't go very far. as you say, because it was a war

being fought on a credit card which mostly the china writing the check, but now what do you see as the difference, now that we are in the midst of a massive economic crisis both here and in europe, it's dramatically having an immediate impact on people's lives, the question of what happened to the military. we have young soldiers. this example of the one soldier in afghanistan for a year is a million dollars. when that soldier actually qualifies for food stamps because his salary is so low. all the rest of the qasr to get everything into afghanistan. it seems that people are hearing more that sense of the cost of war and beginning to be able to weigh it. but do you think that is enough to change that discourse so that it becomes possible for historians, for academics, for analysts or others, to make the case that not only is this too expensive but it doesn't work?

can people hear this differently now do you think? >> guest: i don't know, really don't. i mean, even in terms of the military and the budget more than $700 billion, i mean and, because of barack obama's interest in national security, barack obama has also gone on to great things, to embrace the military, to say that he is a president who supports the military. of course there are some bills of the military will have to pay in the next 10 years or so but we are talking about really very minor numbers. if you are really talking about the cost of war, you're talking about his tinkering with the system. >> host: if you look at that, right now the new budget that was passed very recently, a majority of democratic members of the house of representatives, barack obama's party, voted

against the military budget for the first time. now to me that was huge. how do you read that in the context? >> guest: i mean it's wonderful to see. you're absolutely correct. president barack obama in the last three years has shown that he really is a consensus president. even on the question of afghanistan, when he did the search. i mean he knew that the surge would not have the desired effects. he kept asking questions for several months, the same questions. many members of his party -- >> host: and he had a general that was against the surge. why did he not choose that general? >> guest: it tells you how barack obama thinks. barack obama governs, basically looks at -- i mean he made choices. he wanted to please the military

and the senior echelon of the military. knowing full well that this particular strategy based on this question as you said, it is brilliant. his ability to absorb information and touche process information. people know who he is. the question you are asking, the very question he was asking and they were coming to him and saying well, we don't know. he was presented with numbers from 80,000 to 40,000, and my take on it, coming back to the question, how local politics, i mean local politics in the sense of establishing a military -- >> host: but the military had different of pinions. >> guest: the majority, the consensus, the military came to him. the pressure that was applied on barack obama was overwhelming by

the security apparatus, by the military and that is why i mean, he caved in. plus, that is why i don't understand when it comes to the national security apparatus. i think he has gone out of his way. the oncessions he is made, even though he knows better, and this tells me as a decision-maker, he is really -- in foreign-policy, barack obama, foreign-policy is not really his priority. he is a consensus president within the american foreign-policy establishment. his record really shows it. even in iraq, barack obama promised the american public that he would pull american forces out at -- yet from the last-minute barack obama accepted the military's decision to maintain a sizable force in

iraq. it was put in place by the united states. again if it was not for the iraqis, we would have between 10 and 20,000 troops. >> host: that is what barack obama's talking about afghanistan though, 15 to 27 -- 15 to 20,000 troops, green berets, special forces, the fear is just and permanent u.s. bases in afghanistan at least from 2014 through 2024 and presumably sometime in the future. the parliament of afghanistan is nowhere near as powerful as the already very weak parliament and government in iraq. afghanistan can't even match that. but it means that there is this kind of consensus for a permanent u.s. military presence. now do you think that is primarily the military itself that is urging that, or is it

from financial, economic and other political interests, whether it's in terms of making sure there is access to pipelines, whether it's a question of bases, for what they called solar projection? what are the pressures on obama now that led to that decision? >> guest: leaving afghanistan, before he left office he said america will never leave afghanistan. the american national security in particular the military believes afghanistan is one of the most fragile theaters, not just as global jihadism. they have convinced themselves that the united states can never leave afghanistan because when it laughed left at the end of 1980 when they pulled out of afghanistan, think it of is that conception about aniston as a potential theater whereby al qaeda and the taliban which

creates a sick he -- mom -- there are economic questions involves. as you know, even now we are spending on average $100 million in afghanistan. it's too costly, too prohibitive for the military and the consensus that exist, consensus within the american security apparatus we can never afford to leave. >> host: i know that there is this understanding that every military is always fighting the last war. we understand that, but i keep coming back to, do they really believe, do they really believe that al qaeda or any other militant organization or terrorist organization needs a physical space to train in the air of the internet? the 9/11 or student trained in afghanistan. they trained in hamburg for gods sakes. why did they think that would

matter? of the taliban came back it would be pretty terrible for people in afghanistan but it's already terrible for people in afghanistan. what do they believe? what does barack obama believe we need to do? >> guest: the taliban are coming back unfortunately for the people. they really are. the taliban have no vision, if no progressive vision. that is what's sad about afghanistan. the many years of alleged that in wars enforcement of the taliban will likely play a key role in the future of afghanistan. everyone knows that. now the united states again, the way the argument is constructed is that it's not just al qaeda. it's al qaeda, sorry, the taliban and al qaeda. they believed now there ar certain segments of thetaliban that is subscribed to the globalist transnational jihad is party. this is joe biden's argument as you know when he sat down to

search american troops in afghanistan relied on counterterrorism measures. the idea is we have 2000 troops in afghanistan. bring most of them, and leap between 15,000. you wage the war relentlessly, and they realize that because they want to prevent -- here's the idea. the pakistani afghanistan he theater is in the center of any emergence or reemergence of a transnational jihadist including the taliban. when we talk about the taliban, the taliban really are factions must. they have multiple factions. look, this is how it seems. i've basically, and i have written again on the taliban, the taliban don't have any interest in welcoming the few

surviving al qaeda because the history of the relationship between the taliban and al qaeda is fraught with tension and contradictions. >> host: when you look at what president obama is facing, and we have only a few minutes left, what do you think barack obama believes will be his foreign-policy legacy? you have spoken a foreign-policy not being his primary interest come his, his primary interest is domestic consensus building, but how does he define national interests? are they different than the national interest that we have defined by george bush? the national interest as you say that have been the same for many many years, the concern about israel, the concern about oil, the concern about stability. are those still the national security interests? is that the realism of president barack obama or is there something else that he is hoping

for? >> guest: i mean i think he himself tried to answer this particular question more than once from 2006 until the president is realism, the realist thinking of american policy work makers from 1947 to 2001. it is based on mutual interes, collective security, not democracy promotion. in the middle east itself, as you said, israel first and in his speech in september of 2011 at the united nations really was a classic realist speech. the consensus in america and israel as an island in a sea of arab muslim hostility. the question of oil lies at the heart and the question of military deals. saudi arabia has the largest

military, purchased in the united states ever. i think barack obama, the way he has defined his own legacy for using the u.s. military footprint of dismantling al qaeda organization is beginning to shift the debate in foreign-policy to domestic interest. the united states is -- i think a foreign-policy legacy will have nothing to do with it. i think barack obama will be seen as the first president who is, really his doctrine ultimately will be seen, and i hope he is elected, basically in eight years we will be seeing it present the shifted u.s. foreign priorities from the middle east as opposed to european president. >> host: he has an amazing moment with the arab spring to

show the world a different face of what u.s. involvement really would look like. do you think he's going to pull that off? >> guest: no, he's not. first of all the arab spring uprisings forced barack obama's hand. the last meeting with hosni mubarak, he looked him in the face and said -- [inaudible] and the following day in egypt and other newspapers. he politically welcomed and embraced the uprisings. his speech on may 11, 2001 at the state department was really a historic speech. he percolate rhetorically embraced the aspiration and here is the qualification. he has never offered any concrete initiatives and i'm not talking about american money.

he has an show the global leadership and know to help societies. while the embraced the democratic aspirations, he basically fell silent with saudi arabia invaded to suppress the aspirations of the people. in saudi arabia, and in our speech on may 11, 2011 he did not utter a single word about saudi arabia itself so in this particular sense coming back to the conceptual underpinnings of his policy he does not believe in preaching to other nations. he believes, even though he expressed his delight at the upright so in the revolts of air people, he said i think that is healthy, he said you must take ownership of your own revolts. and he kept a healthy distance. and that's fine absolutely and to his credit he