>> they applied only 200 miles. my point is that others who are participants who might be paying into that fund today, those dollars go elsewhere without us having a say until we participate or become part of the treaty process. does that clarify? >> thank you. >> the other thing that i wondey have been covered to some extent, but i haven't heard much discussion since i arrived about how we benefit in the arctic. you talked that a little bit mr. gerard in terms of our ability to have much more of an opportunity to access the minerals and the resources under the arctic. ..

the outer continental shelf. we stand here watching that happen we have a very, very significant interest in the arctic. as i mentioned earlier, shall hopefully will start that today. seems that one quarter of the world's oil and gas resources are into the arctic. why we would sit on the sidelines and watch the rest of the world development resource to us is somewhat mystified within our own 200-mile exclusive economic zone in the

world that does not take full advantage of the outer continental shelf a big miss the opportunity to sit back and watch 30 years from now we missed on this decisions we made in the arctic which is so important to the goblet advancement and economic development. >> thank you mr. sherman. >> thank you. those were good questions for the record i appreciate it. let me close out senator lugar does not have additional questions i just have one or two quickly i want to get the record complete here. we will leave the record open for a week and is there are additional questions. at a hearing before the committee a couple weeks ago one of the think tanks out here from the heritage foundation said the u.s. companies are free to

explore the sea right now and the of all the certainty necessary supporting investments to drill in the deep seabed. nobody owns the fish it's of a person for themself. in light of this year of 161 nations and the european union zero those that have been mentioned it seems odd to sort of suggest every person for themself approach to this you've interested somewhat here and talked about the certainty and i just want to be crystal clear whether that is an alternative. is that flyable. estimates alternative but i don't think it's viable we could proceed as a nation i think it's very important to recognize the world today is extraordinarily different than it was 40 years ago we are in a global economy we have multinational companies that have the means to develop these resources but they simply

are unwilling to do so because of the risk that exists without ratification of the treaty if that theory were in fact accurate you would see that if a lot of the resources today and it's simply not happening. >> is it clear are you saying here definitively today that the people you represent and the interest you are here to advance will not be served by and that no one will invest in the fact the millions of dollars if you were to pursue that theory of every person for themself. >> i think our country wouldn't be served if it isn't ratified because the countries will not invest over take the risks if they don't have the certainty provided in the treaty that

means from a manufacturing perspective the manufacturing suffers which means the economy suffers which means jobs suffer and it's in the long-term economic and national security interest of the country to deal with manufacturers and the treaty to be ratified. >> we may find people doing that without the protection. they may be on our expended encounter continental shelf. it was more available and was before because of the thinning of the ice while it is sickening on the south pole with all this stuff going on but people are making plans to establish themself in the arctic, and as jack indicated we are on the outside looking in the fifth all sorts of power. but as you know in your job, the

most powerful things we can do we can't do all we shouldn't do, and i think the benefit of making this fundamental adjustment, taking a seat at the table with a lot of strength to protect our interest at least give this would ever steps we have to take to represent and help this country. so the answer is i don't think you are going to see a lot of american firms. you can get permission from the federal government. that's another point to access an area but then they won't give you the permit to drill. and we have all of those problems. but the bottomline -- we've been arguing this thing for so long, and when the old arguments run out, then we have new arguments and i respect the people that have that view and i suppose you can find some of my members that have that view but not many of them and we got tens and tens of

thousands of them and it's about to get on with that. >> i would just add there's one a different opinion about this i would suggest you look closely at those opinions that really matters. >> these are the individuals that are going to make those decisions and they may have been very clear saying they will not make those decisions, the risk is too high there's too much at stake to convince boards and shareholders that that's the best use and safest use of their money and resources so i would hope that looking at those that have experienced the door on the front line making those decisions give those more weight than others. >> at the same time to think about what the insurance chiefs of staff and military leaders challenge to protect us in many

ways in putting in those areas and you know they are not people easily convinced of joining the committee's. >> last question it seems to me listening to your testimony if companies aren't going to invest that if we are looking at a reduction and the availability of the rare earth metals and we could be mining of their rare earth metals sounds to me like that takes a lot of people to produce the equipment that if we are looking at the increased to find more resources for the united states it takes people to go out and do that and we're providing energy for the united states over the long term that affects our economy bottom line to everything here it seems to me is jobs this seems to me to

be screaming at us that there's an ability of jobs for america to do this more than anything else china and with each of you comment on these? is that really what is fundamentally at stake? >> the next great industry in this country is energy. that is going to create millions of jobs over the near term. we shouldn't make this more difficult for us to access rear dearth minerals, energy and whatever else you might find while 161 other countries are making their plans to do so. this is in the enlightened self-interest of this country and in the interest of the national security and i respectfully say those that

disagree command by the way, we try to learn something from them and the positive part of the treaty so overwhelming and now plays the objections which i respect that the plurality is highly significant. >> it's a very significant today their game changing proportions. to put it in simple context said within the next decade if the u.s. policy has done well we will become the middle east for energy production. that is how serious this discussion is if we as a nation are serious about producing our own energy. there's two dimensions. first we have to look long term and look at things like the law of the sea and say how do we

secure our energy future not only the next ten to 20 years but the next 50 to 100 years natural gas will continue to be the foundation of energy building block for many decades yet to come even as we strive to move to alternative renewable force of energy the second dimension goes back to center workers point earlier we have to get our job -- act together as a country in permitting processes and political will and ability to produce our own energy we can secure as a border we can secure the long term future to the law of the sea but we've got to have process these within the united states where we say energy is a priority. senator tuzee pointed out earlier the last 18 months we've created 83,000 jobs in the state of pennsylvania producing cleaner-burning natural gas that saved the consumers of

pennsylvania closed for a quarter of a billion dollars in one year because that supply drove the price of natural gas down to where it is today now it can't stay there forever. we have to save potential with oil with the number two producer the unemployment rate 3%, median wage in north dakota, $90,000 a year the median wage for everyone else, $42,000 a year. we talk about jobs, we talk about energy security and revenue and the government. we ought to think about energy as we make this decision because will be altering the nation for many years yet to come. >> if you want to add anything. >> the only thing i would add is while we are out mining the seabed for the rare earth metals we are putting these cables

across that provide the infrastructure so that these companies can make the investments and run their business effectively and i think we should do everything we can to eliminate the risk associated with despite all the work. with the significant and very, very thought of and thorough so we are grateful to all of you for taking time here today we look for to continuing the discussion over the course of the next months. thank you. [inaudible conversations]

it's pretty clear the effort was undertaken ran into a lot of controversy and a lot of miscommunication, so i think those bills are not coming back again this year or in a year for that matter.

>> last week the middle east institute held its third annual conference on turkey. one panel focused on turkish relations with the united states and the european union. among the speakers to former u.s. ambassador to turkey and a former turkish foreign minister. >> [inaudible conversations] >> welcome back everybody. if you configure seats once again for the second panel.

>> this is the second panel of the day tidal energy consumer programs -- sorry, my dad. the e.u. and the as involving partnerships and i can tell you formulating the names of the panel's was quite a task vitrain our colleagues here. as a, like last time i will briefly introduce our moderator who will then introduce to you the topics of the panelists. dr. weiner is the representative and senior advisor to the president and a stumble. prior to assuming her current university dr. weiner was a diplomat for more than 30 years her most recent overseas assignments was a counselor general from 2007 to 2010. earlier and would paris, moscow and cairo. in washington dr. weiner served in lebanon affairs in the near east bureau as the director of the state department operations center and as the chairman of the foreign service commission

board. from 1975 to '78 dr. weiner was an instructor with the university of maryland overseas division in turkey. i would like to start by congratulating the middle east institute with turkish studies and thank you in advance for the st and panelists that are here today to discuss the important subject. let me start by outlining the procedure that we will be falling because the good news is very strict in terms of the rules that we moderators' need to follow and we will try to stick to the rules. i will make some very brief comments to set the stage and the order in which they appear in the program to speak for 12 minutes each. you have the information in the program and i've been asked not to go through the bios in

detail. but i would like to know that we will have the four panelists today. brice de schietere from the commission representation here in washington ambassador robert pearson served as the u.s. ambassador to turkey. ambassador ross wilson of the atlantic's council, and also a former ambassador. finally, mr. yasar yakis, foreign minister of turkey and currently with the center for strategic communications. we are here to discuss the subject turkey the e.u. and the u.s. evil in partnerships post their spring and isotopic for just a little over an hour of discussion.

and we also have the disadvantage of the panel that comes after lunch and after it is therefore a little difficult to come up with anything new and different to say by way of introduction on the subject it is true though as people have reiterated since first thing this morning that turkey has arrived on the world stage. the recent council on foreign relations past of the report on to turkey stated clearly one of the most important of all of cements on international affairs of the past decade is the emergence of turkey as the rising regional and global power. we are looking at a new turkey and this new turkey reflects both changes in turkey and changes in the international arena in which turkey is

operating. obviously these developments have significant implications for both the u.s. and europe. even more so given both as a historic place at the second development of the arab spurring and economic challenges that e.u. is facing right now. in terms of relations with the u.s., commentators frequently refer these to a golden era in relations. this is true in contrast with the situation to two years ago i remember vividly because i was still on the post in turkey at the time. but there is definitely on the official government to government level been a very definite improvement in the relations between turkey and the united states. i would note that the situation on the economic commercial cultural diplomacy and public opinion front still leaves much to be desired and the leaves the

government to government relationship much more vulnerable to volatility than would be the case if the relationship all the way through the society is reflected the same golden relationship that exists currently on the government to government level. i would note that earlier this week there was a meeting of the ministerial level of the framework for strategic economic and commercial cooperation meeting in turkey. this effort is in fact one of the many steps that's being taken to address the imbalance between the political relationship in the two countries and other aspects of the relationship. on the e.u. front, everybody knows the challenges in turkey's e.u. process and abraham call

and has just review it that quite successfully. but the membership is only one dimension of turkey's relations with europe. perhaps it can be helpful to look at the european process of its membership is distinct from the end point of the membership itself. there is obviously no talk these days of turkey turning its back on the west as was the case several years ago. indeed in large measure turkey in seeking a greater international regional role has responded to the challenges of the development and its neighborhood on elsewhere largely by cooperating more closely to the u.s. and europe. we saw that this week one of the first things, one of the first steps turkey to in response to the crisis with the shootdown to approach nado. let me start here and turned the

panelists that make their presentations on the panel topics. they have been asked to speak from the podium to make sure everyone can hear them. they will have 12 minutes apiece and that should give us time at the end for some questions and answers. first i would like to ask brice de schietere from the european delegation to address. thank you for having given me the opportunity of speaking today good afternoon everyone. it's a good occasion to be speaking from the perspective of the e.u. since we have quite developments in the past months and the relationships.

the would be the name of the presentation to in light of developments. perhaps stating the obvious turkey in the economy of think it's been mentioned in a part in regional and continues obviously to be the key country for the european union and one with which. there are three plans are reflected mentioned first something of a latinos we're negotiating turkey with a european union with the process turkey has gone through a slow period recently it was a launch for ten of the dialogue which is the next question the commissioner for a large neighborhood policy mr. fuller was and is liable to launch this

process. and more in line perhaps with the topic of the panelists raised by ruse the third point not everybody knows intense but in the european union and turkey as recently in the history of the relationship it's been possible in the region's deutsch to progress on the common security prob, md u and even more important institutional changes we've recently and actually presenting now the european union and not any longer just the european commissioner like it was the case a year and a half ago. and obviously the intensity of the dialogue has a lot to do growing in the common averitt between the u.n. and turkey. so the first point on the negotiations and it's been mentioned in the previous three

criteria were defined in copenhagen its political and economic and also the key negotiations the realization and assessment at each stage of the process when the chapters are open and where they are closed. the present time out of the 35 chapters in the negotiations there of the 13 chapters and close on the one nothing has happened since. there are elements that are raised by the insist on the related to the challenges turkey has built for some of the member states. nevertheless i want to say that there are three chapters. the one on public procurement and the one on social policy and employment that can be open for negotiations.

they can fit and feel ready for the opening of the chapters and there are eight chapters or so that cannot be opened and until we can resolve with turkey with turkey and the e.u. joining together. and i have to say year the e.u. for implementation for the protocol would give the new boost to the negotiations with the new chapters that can be opened and closed. now, the question since 2010 the period systemic so in this context this question was raised to us and was held in the

process of turkey and put it back on track. so that's where comes the second edition of maffei wanted to mention today, which is the positive agenda that the commissioner and his agreed on. in fact the agenda actually is concept and aims to build and close relations between turkey and the european union the idea is to achieve steps forward and a number of areas of joint interest for the room exists and at the same time we can help turkey get better aligned and better prepared for. this deals with a number that have already been identified and i will pause at this dialogue. these are political reforms in turkey in relation in particular to the criteria there's a

general question of the elements and i will come back later on the for the good news. them migration and trade and foreign policy dialogue is 1i would develop later and further turkey in the e.u. programs. it's important to say that the policy agenda isn't a substitution for but it supports and as a complement to the process. it's based on the approach and the joint understanding of the natural constraints between turkey and the e.u.. so it offers actually an avenue that we hope will allow us to go ahead. and if if we can when both sides we would follow and the would be to the benefit. concrete was speaking, working groups reformed between turkish and e.u. officials and the working group is looking at how to achieve the progress on the alignment in the areas

identified. .. to develop cooperation with the areas in internal affairs in particular opening the way for the commission to negotiate the agreement. the u.s. welcomed the subsequent immediate major link with turkey. on that basis, and element of

the new relationship or renewed relationship with turkey in the past month is the development of a frank dialogue. she said recently when she was -- when she was at one of these meetings of political dialogue in turkey in a stumble on the seventh of june at the same time it took place on syria she said there's no question that we have an excellent relationship and foreign-policy and i believe it is vital that we do given our shared interest in our common neighborhood. we do have indeed a lot of issues for discussion and to seek cooperation in syria, iran, egypt and anything happening in the middle east regions. some in the western balkans which we shouldn't forget.

another important respect are the human issues and hear it if i can refer to the ongoing situation of the import number of refugees in syria to mention that the e.u. is pushing to support the efforts is of his making and we have actually 160 million -- to that name. nevertheless i think as the representative said if i can quayle are again on the same day, even if we do not always agree on everything we are absolutely determined to work together. so the frank policy dialogue is taking place. there have been various routines on different levels in the last six months. we have also a series of lyrical directors. it's not necessarily something new because it used to exist before the lisbon treaty but not with the same intensity. and there is also a reflection process that is going on and a lot of dialogue to see how we can intensify and find new areas of potential cooperation.

we are both active as i mentioned in south africa. we have agreements and want to see more progress for civil society. we share some concerns for example in egypt for the ngos. we show the same concerns for economic development in the region and on the importance we are obviously working together on syria. so i want to underline that set events besides the call of necessity that came with events in the region. the institutional changes approach by the lisbon treaty have been a key element and she is not only put in place insight, the newly created external service, specific turkey team which is responsible for managing the relationship with turkey as far as security policy in our political dialogue in this team is working of course in close coordination with all the other departments of the external service. the european commission

remaining in charge of the negotiations and being in the leadership for the political agenda. so, as a conclusion and i hope i am within the ticking clock, i think we can say the european union and turkey have much to gain from addressing the common challenges in our neighborhood together, especially in the context of all the changes we have witnessed in your neighborhood and probably can say that getting closer can only improve our journey and i'm not sure how it will assess on the -- [inaudible] the golden relation between the u.s. and turkey. perhaps it is a question actually for discussion later. thank you very much.

>> thank you very much for moderating our panel and i am very grateful to the middle east institute, the institute for turkish studies and my excellent relationship, and my fellow panelists, including my colleague foreign minister yakis who is the foreign minister in turkey when i had the honor of being the american invested or they are so happy to appear her today. i have the impression that there are only two perilous moments in turkish-american relations, and that is when everyone thinks that nothing is going right, and there is nothing that can be done about it and when everything is going just great and there is no need to do anything about it. so maybe today we can talk about some of the nuances of those kinds of issues. i think if i look at the macrotrends over the last decade among these three actors, here are the interesting observations that at least occurred to me.

despite a sharp downturn in the relations during the iraq war, and lingering concerns after the war, the u.s. has is reached has reached out to turkey more affirmatively and enjoyed greater success. i appreciate very much my colleague's explanation of the excellent process in which the e.u. and turkey are engaged, but i do feel that her haps france and germany together have given the impression that the european union doesn't really want turkey. and that this may confirm a turkish conclusion that is better off without the european union for some time to come. i hope it's not true, but i think it is an observation. thirdly, the u.s. once again as it did during the cold war period, seems to feel more comfortable dealing with turkey on questions of regional security. them on economic, political or human rights issues. you may recall that at the end of the cold war, many turks

wondered why the united states had not been more forceful on the issues including human rights issues during the time of the cold war with respect to turkey, and this is an issue that may come back to be on the table in the future. fourthly, turkey's foreign policy has grown more sophisticated, demonstrating more flexibility. turkey balances its regional global relationships. i think what has been of particular interest to me is the way turkish u.s. relations have reshaped themselves since december of 2010. and this nation revolution. at the beginning you may recall turkey of the u.s. seem to be far apart. as a -- as the revolution progress turkey and the u.s. found itself drawing closer together. nato was in the end decisive in libya. u.s. and turkey lined up together on egyptian democracy. turkey saw a new reality in syria and reacted courageously

and turkey and the u.s. seem to share more similar outlooks regarding iran. for example we don't hear the rhetoric anymore that seems to imply and a rainy and right to nuclear arms. if israel has such weapons. i think all of these examples demonstrate that both countries can focus on what is of value and a cooperative relationship in both countries have shown to some extent the ability to pursue both separate and shared interests in a well-managed framework. both have shown flexibility in light of changing circumstances in pursuing their respective national interests. i think the question for us today is where is this taking us? part of the u.s. and turkey reacting ad hoc to events in the region, which seemed to be the case originally, was there is some consensus forming in washington. so for the purposes of illustrating this point i will focus on syria. so far, turkey has old they

offered political sanctuary to the syrian opposition leadership. safety for refugees, a the clear intent and purpose to seek bashar al-assad replace. from the latest reports, turkey and the u.s. may be quite breaking in providing aid, including arms to the opposition groups. both appear to accept the a non-process has failed and are moving to build some form of another international coalition. despite the collapse of the annan approach however up until most recent events at least, both countries seem to be working to gradually bring the russians and the chinese along if that is possible. is clear that there are some missing gaps. "the washington post" report yesterday quoted an unidentified senior turkish diplomat to the effect that the article for discussion in brussels was called for by turkey in order to

pressure the u.s. to do more. since turkey says it same only is to type sanctions on syria and nato secretary-general has repeatedly stated that nato has no plans to intervene in syria, it is not clear just what it was the turkey wanted the u.s. to do. it is also not entirely clear how turkey has analyzed the u.s. options. the u.s. now has either two and a half or three wars in the middle east in the last 10 years. conservatives in this country are pressing the u.s. to prepare for war with syria and iran for a possible total of five wars. the u.s. is in the midst of a very tight presidential election, and any armed conflict initiated now will be used of course by governor romney and his advisers to criticize and critique every move of the president for signs of dead

choices and for trying to convert public opinion away from the economy. with the american people tired of war and eight president trying to focus on domestic issues, one wonders if this is a good time for turkey to be urging the u.s. to move closer to armed conflict with syria. it's very interesting mr. collins repeated twice that turkey does not seek armed conflict and does not want a war in the region and that is extremely helpful. if armed conflict is not the goal, aren't the measures that are are a public largely agreed upon and moving in the right direction. so the question remains for us, does turkey have a plan which the u.s. lack of action is frustrating? do the two countries have a common plan, and the u.s. is not moving fast enough for ankar or does calling on the u.s. to do more play well with turkish

domestic audiences and relieve pressure on the turkish government? is turkey planning to ask a leg towards a possible conflict involving nato, despite earlier nato statements? it is not clear which of these questions is accurate or if there is some other explanation that is accurate. but i do think this scenario clearly and uniquely illustrates the difficulty in trying to answer the question whether the u.s. is needs the turkey war or whether turkey needs the u.s. war. the diplomatic efforts by the u.s. in the region require turkish support. effective turkish approaches to gradually stabilizing the region while allowing democracy to advance, require active u.s. cooperation. whatever the plan, it ought not to be based on anyone's analysis

about who needs whom more or who has more leverage over home and managing the crisis. interestingly the current u.s. and turkey talks to open the door for the closest military-to-military cooperation between the two countries in the last decade. while corporation has gradually increased, there are still lingering tensions and resentments from the iraq war on the american military side and perhaps on turkey's. they still need to be addressed. the reconciliation of the leadership of these two militaries would itself be a very positive step in stabilizing the region for long-term democratic progress. as you know, reconciliation is not often an announced goal between sides with strongly held views. i will note however, that there are developments now it might be worth considering.

first come it seems clear that without a regime change, iran will be a strategic competitor. turkey's creative efforts to bring tehran along has certainly done no harm at turkey alone is unlikely to bring i ran around. secondly, the military counterrevolution in egypt last week executed through dictate of constitutional changes might remind many turks of their own experience with military and political competition that can last for decades. thirdly, it is impossible to predict short-term or long-term how the revolutions will evolve now in tunisia, in libya and in egypt. the ultimate outcomes also in syria, yemen and bahrain, have an influence. somewhere along the line, the pressure for greater democracy and the future of the monarchies in the region also will meet.

turkey's role in managing this process, already apparent, will likely grow in the coming years and decades. and in that long run, having a lasting difference with israel, will weaken both countries plans for the region and will be a strategic distraction. there is no doubt that israel should find the foresight and the high-mindedness to apologize to turkey for the mavi marmara incident and pay compensation. the two countries will remain at loggerheads is an encouragement for syria and more importantly for iran. for turkey, to achieve the regional leadership role it seeks, i very much hope it can they can find a way too to take the higher road, to move ahead towards improved relations with

israel. in conclusion, there are two great combinations of forces in the middle east for decades to come but directly involved turkey, its experience in the political realm. first, secular versus religious and secondly, collective governments versus the military. there are other components of course but these are the ones where turkey is direct irrelevant. with prime minister erdogan's speech in cairo last year turkey's advice in the middle east region turkey is already heard with its view of a religious constituency and the secular constitutional state. the second issue, a leftist governments versus the military, turkey has the opportunity to re-examine this issue in light of its external national interest and its ability to influence the future political developments of the region.

turkey could see, and we all could see, decades of bitterness and struggle between militaries of countries and new democratic forces. we just saw in syria this last week the tension between civilian committees and military fighters inside the country. this is an issue that is quite apart from the role of religion. turkey has very good reasons to have and very importantly, to be seen to have a first rate military force forward capable of defending national turkish and the region. in the present circumstance, if it seems true, there is no present danger of an internal military threat to the state or to the government of turkey, and i listen to mr. collins remarks about the good relationship between the turkish government and the turkish military, then resolving in a positive way the issue of military officers being

held for trial in turkey could provide an excellent example to the region. about the primacy of democracy and the healing power of reconciliation within a society. if egypt or libya, or some other middle east neighbor, needs an example of how it can be done the right way, turkey is the only state president with the relevant experience on these two transformative issues. secular government and the religious constituency on the one hand and elected governments and the role of the military on the other. turkey has an enormous interest and long-term stability and democratic progress. if the region explodes, turkey will be forced to make very difficult choices. for turkey to take the higher road on regional strategic differences and approaches, and

for washington and on kara to practice collaborative and realistic diplomacy will be to key components of an effective plan for the region. thank you very much. i will come in a slightly different way and i will

illustrate what i hope are strikingly different points although not substantive fleet different in those types of conclusions. i was struck during the ambassador's remarks of a phrase he used. he said -- he reflected on how pivotal u.s. turkish relations have become. for the united states and for turkey in a very troubled part of the world. and i'm sure ambassador pearson would agree with me that it didn't, it certainly didn't look that way in 2003 to 2005 oren 2005 to 2007 or 2009 and 10. arguably even in 2011. each of these periods were some pretty serious dissidents as if not disagreements or worse. of course, the disagreement over iraq in 2003 was an important watershed in the region. it dominated u.s. turkish

relations from march 2003 or arguably somewhere before that, up at least until the end of the bush administration, to some extent beyond that. sharp disagreements, and although obviously the disagreement on the invasion of iraq has not gone away. there is still plenty of kind of raw bits that remain in u.s. turkish relations that are related in one way or another to the iraq problem. the pkk presence in northern iraq may be one of the sharp disagreements over iran. i was struck when i arrived in 2005 by the limited extent of our discussions about the iran nuclear problem, or bilateral discussions, and for a period we were able to get ourselves reasonably in sync, but things really fell apart in 2010. a huge disconnect, however it

happened, whatever was the sequence of events, a huge and profound dissonance between our two countries. and disagreements on a range of other issues. in 2005, prior to my going to turkey, a big stink between the united states and turkey over then-president, think it was 2005, 2000 or maybe, the president's plan to visit damascus as part of turkey's outreach to president assad to so many people from both the united states and turkey nullified extensively this morning. disagreements about the caucuses, obviously issues related to armenia, a serious set of difficulties on the palestinian issue on the plaques the and how people were talking about the black sea. a seeming accentuation that ebbs

and flows throughout these periods but an accentuation of differences and an accentuation of grievances. a whole popular mythology that was sort of associated with this that aggravated anti-americanism in terms of the united states somehow supports the pkk and we had a hidden agenda flowing out of our iraq -- our efforts in iraq to dismember a country that the bush administrations broader middle east and north africa was somehow going to be part of the a bigger plot to remake turkey in the american image of moderate islam. and i kind of wanted to go back over those things because that really wasn't very long ago, and it was the world that i had to deal with. it was the world to some extent that ambassador had to -- ambassador pearson had to deal with and vestiges of these things continue even today. and i would note even on syria.

in the early part of 2000 -- syria and libya, the early part of 2011, pretty sharp disagreements between on kara and washington about how to deal with that. i was there when erdogan gave a fiery speech at the world of forum, the first world political forum that turkey had called in istanbul, a fiery speech really coming up quite stridently against the idea of any nato involvement in libya. so, what changed, and what can go wrong today? and this again are some of the themes that ambassador pearson has touched on. one important thing that this whole conference is reflecting on is the arab awakening and the opportunities and threats and complications that presents for turkey, the opportunities and

complications of presents for american policymakers, and after this course correction or what looks to me at any rate like a course correction of turkish foreign policy with respect to the arab league beginning in march or april of 2011, a real sense of, not exactly identical goals, certainly pretty similar interests and efforts to try to collaborate more decisively there. and substantive fleet of policy change was to shift turkey much more decisively in favor of support for democracy, democracy movements as opposed to continuing relations with autocrats who had been convenient for turkey just as they had been convenient for the united states, europe and others, autocrats in egypt and libya and syria and elsewhere. so both of us made that shift and both of us have found ways to work together in an increasingly complicated region. i think a corollary of that is

the u.s. withdrawal from iraq. that does make a very -- it does simplify bings in u.s. turkish relations and secondly adding to the stakes for turkey's leader felt in involving turkey more directly in the iraq project, more directly in baghdad and in baghdad politics and involved more directly in a communal conversation between the shia and the sunni, between the kurds in particular. the stakes one up for turkey in finding ways to work better with the united states on matters related to iraq. a corollary to that is the pkk and the initiation in november or december of 2007 of u.s. intelligence and other assistance to turkey in going after pkk encampments in iraq. that allow the different kind of

behavior by turkey toward the united states on matters related to iraq and also facilitated a sea change in turkish relationships with the kurds, the iraqi kurds that then also had some beneficial effects in terms of u.s. turkish relations. but there are some other pieces that are a little bit farther afield. i'm not sure i would hundred% by the argument that i want to entertain the argument that the difficulties between turkey and the european union may actually have helped to foster a better u.s. turkish relationship. certainly their dramatic slowdown of turkey's e.u. session did and an increasingly brittle dialogue and a whole range of other things that kind of culminates in paris on the

crisis, the arab awakening region of libya at that point and just oh by the way turkey. and you know, the feeling in turkey they needed to shore up in their relations with the one important, the one western ally on whom they thought they could count a little bit more, and i think i want to at least as i said entertain the idea that the slowdown in the u. has helped us. and development of a whole set of economic dialogue in reference to some of this in the earlier sessions but that is quite new and a whole range of economic issues that are now on the table that weren't in part because our relations were so dominated by relative security matters or in my term on iraq or more or less 24/7 basis. but there are a couple of other pieces i would want to refer to.

one is a big change in the way that washington and turkey deal with one another. in my time, turkey and the united states, the u.s. turkish relations was basically run through the embassies. but i would say somewhat more largely in the american embassy in ankara but the turkish embassy obviously played a very big role. today there is a proliferation of ties that, communications and things going on for all different kinds of channels on the phone, e-mails, meetings and third countries. from talking to my counterparts, my former colleagues in unhcr they spend a significant amount of time finding out what in the world is going on but they don't know about it because it can exchange their not part of an part of what ambassadors are supposed to do a sort of piece together what is happening so it sort of fits. secretary gates came to turkey while i was a belief in 2007, and he was shocked when i told him he was the first secretary of state to visit turkey in six

years. he just found this astonishing. gates and panetta have repeatedly visited turkey. are secretary clinton, secretary rice a thing came twice and secretary clinton has been in turkey number of times. ustr ron kirk, active commerce secretary blank are there now, but a whole range of other assistant secretary for the middle east, assistant secretary for counterterrorism matters, for economic business, so on and so on, at whole lot of things going on that i think gives a different kind of fabric to our relationship. and then laughed, i think turkish leaders came to value somewhat more than they did earlier in this decade or previous decades. the value of a close relationship with the united states. ..

>> that will introduce at least some personal discontinuities that are going to have to be stitched brach together, obviously -- back together, obviously, much more the case if governor romney wins election. um, second, a second thing that can go wrong, i think there's a

whole series of things that can blow up. what happens if armenia and azerbaijan go to war? which could happen. i wouldn't exclude it. what happens maybe in a somewhat less dire way if russia invades georgia again? 2008, a tough year in u.s./turkish relations. turkey all of a sudden looking like it was on the front lines of a reemerging, redeveloping cold war and not very comfortable with that. several scenarios you can imagine in the caucuses that are difficult and complicated. what happens if israel or israel and the united states or the united states alone strike iran? big problem. and a conference a year from now or a year after that takes place, u.s./turkish relations could have a whole different tenor, i would submit.

differences may well emerge over syria, differences may well emerge over, or worsen, over turkish relationship with israel. there are a whole series of things that can go really, i think, very, very wrong. um, the e.u. piece may come back together, and that may change at some point turkey's calculations or the calculations of turkish leaders about, you know, where they need to make investments of time. we all work on 24 hours a day, but there's only 24 of them, and so if you're going to spend more time with the e.u., you're going to almost by definition be spending somewhat less time on other matters. and i think that can be a factor. and then there's a problem that i think ambassador pearson at least referred to which is a problem of expectations. and there is an expectation now that our relations are great, and they'll continue to be great, and it will go on, and everything will be wonderful. our relations only got to be

better because of concerted efforts by a whole lot of very senior people in the united states and turkish governments to put it right. what takes a long time to get right can be broken very quickly. either intentionally or unintentionally. and i think for our relationship to succeed it will continue to require a very sustained effort whose nature and sustainability may get to be more complicated after november 2012. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you very much, ross. and i'd like to ask now former foreign minister yasar yakis, please, to address us. >> thank you very much. i have the advantage of being the last speaker, so almost everything has been said. i may, perhaps, dwell on certain question which was not properly

covered or where further explanation may be needed. on the turkish/american relations, there is a saying that in the international relations network always does the -- america always does the right thing. but after having tested all the other options. [laughter] and the distinguished ambassadors who are here who served in ankara in certain periods of their tenure there united states was trying the other options. [laughter] so i know that it was very difficult task, but being very brilliant and talentful diplomats, they served turkish/american relations in excellent be manner. and if turkish/american

relations continue to improve and arrive the point, the level that it has reached so far, it is thanks to their efforts and their very untiring efforts that they have done during their service in ankara. i am very grateful to them. i worked with both of them, with ambassador pearson when i was minister, and with ambassador wilson when i was in the turkish parliament, so our friendship continued. is there anything left to be done in the american, turkish/american relations? yes, of course, a lot of things in between two countries which have so many diverse interests. on the bilateral level, economic, political, cultural and other levels and, also, at the regional level. i will not say international

level because turkey is not yet at the point where it could assume global roles, global actors' roles. i regard turkey as a country which is thriving to assume regional responsibilities, and it has covered a long distance in this direction. but, of course, it has to compete with countries like iran which is actually poised when you look at them from the iranian side to become a nuclear power. and egypt now having gone through this turmoil is also gaining its own identity with the military maintaining certain roles. egypt is going to remain a very

important country in the region. so turkey has to compete with iran and egypt for, to become an important actor in the, in the region. and it has advantages, it has disadvantages. so turkey, perhaps, can cooperate with the united states for the regional roles, for the american vested interests in the middle east in the caucuses, in certain parts of balkans and in central asia where turkey has some sort of presence. on the specific subject of iran, turkey thought that it would a good contribution if it tries to make, to take an initiative

regarding slimming down or regarding taking under the control of the nuclear, iranian nuclear program in iran by volunteering to mediate that the iranians should stop or suspend the program at the time they were at the level of 3.5% most probably. and they were going to stop this, they were going to enrich the uranium to the country, turkey or other country. and the vienna club countries were going to provide uranium rods enriched up to 18-21% which is necessary for scientific purposes and be for medical purposes.

and turkey took this initiative in cooperation with the united states, and when turkey achieved to persuade, was able to persuade iran to do it, then america at that time thought that it would be more appropriate not to go along with this program or with this initiative and to impose sanctions on iran and to pass a resolution in the united nations security council. so turkey was left out in the middle of nowhere. the time proved that turkey's initiative could have been utilized as a good opportunity. how did we see it later on, several years later when this

initiative came to the a agenda again? by that time iran had already reached the enrichment program of up to 23%. so -- 21%. so at that time when it was at the level of 3 or 4%, the west had something to offer to iran in exchange of stopping there. now that iran has already reached 21% enrichment, the west is deprived now of any concession that it could make to iran. so the proposal that was made by turkey was a good opportunity that was missed. of course, we should not assess the relations between two countries like turkey and the united states on the specific issues like this. this is only one example which

was not elaborated in this form, so i wanted to give my perception of it. there may be details where i may be wrong, perhaps during the discussions and question and answer periods if there are questions on this subject, those who are more knowledgeable than me perhaps may contribute with their, with their knowledge. this is regarding iran. turkey is, of course, the last country to see a benefit in iran becoming a nuclear power. why? because it will upset the balance in the middle east to the detriment of turkey and in favor of iran. the balance which was established since 1920s when the ottomans withdrew from the middle east. there was a balance of power

between iran, turkey and other countries. now especially after the withdrawal of the united states from iraq and with iranians filling this vacuum in iraq, plus if there is, i mean, if this nuclear program continues like this and iran becoming nuclear power or a candidate to become a nuclear power, then the balance will not, will not continue to be there any longer. and if regime in syria is maintained thanks to the russian and the iranian support, then, of course, this balance will be changed more in favor of iran again. because iranian political

influence will expand all the way from iran to the mediterranean. at present the only missing link for iran to expand its influence to the mediterranean is syria. they have a presence in iraq and in lebanon through hezbollah, so the missing link is syria. and to maintain the syrian regime in place is very much important for iran. it's a strategic goal. same thing applies to russia, of course, because russia wants to come back to the middle east. and it had to withdraw or perhaps bring down its visibility in the middle east since the dismemberment of the soviet union.

then, now that russia has achieved its control in the -- [inaudible] it wants to go back to the middle east, and the country that it could use as the best steppingstone in the middle east is syria because of its relations from the time of the, of the soviet union. and syria is in dire need of the support of a country like russia. so russia wouldn't like to miss this opportunity, and it will give utmost support to the present syrian regime to maintain, to continue. of course, this brings us to the question of what type of solution should turkey and united states be looking for for syria?

military intervention, if there is no international legitimacy, it will be a breach of international rules. international legitimacy means security council decision. security council resolution means that russia should not use its veto. under the present circumstances, i don't want -- i cannot figure out how russia will give up this idea of preventing any resolution which will allow outside military action in many syria. in syria. therefore, another version of the six-point plan -- it may not

be six-point plan, but another version of it -- that international community will accept will have to be used as solution for syria. and there when you look at it, when you clear it from the details, was aiming for a negotiated settlement rather than a military solution. negotiated settlement, what does it mean? is it a negotiation between fraction in the opposition? it is not. it was a negotiation with the regime. so it presumes that the regime will have to be made part of the solution, not part of the problem. if this is the only exit, then, of course, turkey and the united states will have to cooperate to

act with the international community. is it finished? okay. in this case i will say a few words regarding turkey's relations with the european union. distinguished representative of the e.u. mentioned the problems. one thing that is, perhaps, interesting but important, the council suspended the negotiations or blocked the opening of the aid chapters in negotiations with turkey, tying it to the opening of the turkish harbors and turkish airport to the greek ships and aircraft. turkey upon this says something, yes, i will do it.

it is my commitment stemming from encouragement, but the european union has also commitment. what is this commitment? in the year 2004 when the greek -- [inaudible] fought against amman plan, the council held a meet, and to punish the greek superiors, adopted the position to extend economic aid to the turkish -- [inaudible] and to enter into direct trade with the turkish -- [inaudible] this is on the 24th of april, 2004. five days later the greeks joined the european union and blocked the implementation of this decision. well, if a country that joins the european union has the obligation to adopt all the -- [inaudible]

which was accumulated at the time without any discussion. so this decision to enter into direct trade with the turkish sip ri yacht was a decision binding with the greeks. so turkey said that i will open the harbors and the airports, but at the same time that you implement your own decision. and this proposal is very, is on the table since the beginning of the year 2006, and we are waiting whether the european union will one day see this offer. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you, mr. minister. let me, um, take the moderator's prerogative to ask the first question, and then we will open up, um, to questions. we will be, just for you all to

know, we will have until 3:20 instead of 3:15 on the schedule. they've given us an extra five minutes. i would like to ask each of you the same question. if you had a golden bullet of advice, that is you could give a bit of advice, um, that would be followed to either the e.u. or to turkey or to the united states as you look at turkish relations with the u.s. and europe, what would you consider to be the most important piece of advice you could give, um, that if it were implemented would make progress on this overall subject that we've been discussing? and let's go in reverse order from the original presentations. mr. minister, if you could go first. >> thank you. shall i go again there? is. >> if you like. >> in the european union, of course, the present circumstances does not allow to revive despite this positive

agenda which is, which is being implemented nowadays. i don't see that the accession process will change in nature in the days to come. because european union has its own problem and perhaps it is better for turkey to put more order to its interior. when i was chairing the european union commission in the turkish parliament for last eight years, i always said that turkey should put aside all what angela merkel says today or sarkozy said yesterday and should try to use the accession process in order to put more order to its interior, to make turkey a first

class democracy, to make turkey a country where fundamental rights and freedom are enjoyed better, to make turkey a country with more transparent market economy, less corruption. and when turkey achieves all these things, perhaps it will be, it will not be that much important whether it joins the european or not. we are still there. and turkey is performing very well in the economic field, and there's some portion of the turkish public opinions believes that rather than pushing in the membership today, let's leave it to later where turkey's bargaining position will be stronger. in the future turkey will be in a better position. today it may be force today make certain concessions -- forced to make certain concessions. in the future it will not. in the turkish/u.s. relations, i think we talked with you before

the meeting. there's a volatility in the public opinion dimension of the relations rather than in the official level. it is more or less there are zigzags, but more or less at a certain level depending upon the circumstances in the region and in the international landscape. so if we can add to the present relations, not the political one, not the military one because there are, they have their own enemies. but economic relations and the relations at the public opinion level. people-to-people democracy, people-to-people relations, then we may perhaps achieve a more stable set of relations between two countries. thank you. >> thank you very much.

ambassador wilson? >> i have two silver bullets but, hopefully, they'll be briefer. one, i think, is for the united states to continue to give sustained and high-level, cop instant attention -- constant attention to u.s./turkish relations and to dialogue with turkish leaders on important issues. it is a big change that's taken place in the last couple of yearses. got to sustain that, and the model needs to look more like the nature of u.s. consultations with the u.k., with france, with germany, with japan, with other major allies that we deal with on quite a regular basis. for turkey and the e.u., i think they both need the to work hard to enrich -- need to work hard to enrich this foreign policy dialogue that our colleague referred to earlier. the accession process needs to go forward. hopefully, it will at some point. but if that's all that there is, it won't work. and u.s -- turkish and e.u. relations and interests, i

think, will suffer as a result. so work, both sides need to work harder to enrich this foreign policy dialogue outside the accession process and make that work. >> ambassador pearson? >> thank you. mine would be really process-focused, and that is to say that what's often missing is what i would call active listening to the other side. often in these dialogues i see people quite anxious to clarify what it is they want and they think. and i actually believe that a little more commitment to active listening and a willingness to act on what you hear would be an excellent prescription for all of the parties involved. thank you. >> mr. political counselor? >> thank you very much. i think i would join most of the comments already said. i think perhaps what's important now is to set aside populism and to work on improving

perceptions. and that means working concretely on achievements that we can have. i would, of course, have my mind fundamentally on the e.u./turkish relationship there. we have a lot of work ahead of us to transform what the situation basically is and to change per tseng. and i believe -- perception. and i believe -- and perhaps i will contradict you, minister, as a matter of fact turkey getting a lot readier would become a lot more attractive for the e.u.. >> thank you. okay. let's follow the same pattern that michael used this morning. we'll call on two people at a time, one from each side. please, identify yourself. be brief and, um, ask a question rather than make a comment, please. so on this side first. >> peter humphrey, i'm an intel analyst. minister yakis, you mentioned that you saw no circumstances under which russia would

surrender its veto. i believe there are two circumstances, one would be for the united states to surrender its missile defense shield in europe or at a minimum integrate russia 100% into such a system. and second of all, for us in the west to extract a promise from the revolutionary forces that the russian submarine base would not be shut down. those two buttons could well move a veto to neutrality in the u.n. security council, don't you agree? >> okay. and this side, please? >> my question, actually, keep d of continue his question this way. regardless of what's going on last ten year or last 18 months in arab spring, the bottom line my understanding is it's a battle of influence, basically, between west and east. when i say east, i'm talking about north africa, middle east all the way to china. so the question is, is the --

are there half american -- i wasn't born in this country, but my daughter born, so i also pay taxes, i vote. my question is why these last ten years -- to the ambassadors is -- the american policymaker in the name of the security of the american interests spend almost god knows trillions, trillions of dollars and all these lives we lost, is america or west as a whole, is it better positioned influence wise in middle east compared to 10, 20 years ago to today? >> thank you. >> that's the question. >> okay. mr. minister, if you want to answer the first question? i think -- i don't think you have to go to the podium for each answer. >> regarding the question of the negotiations, i mean, in which case n which case russia wouldn't, may agree, you're right. i said, i did not say that it

will never agree, but it will do utmost in order to support the present regime. and you are right, if for bigger reasons, bigger agreements russia finds to its advantage that it is going to benefit from it, it may agree to support the fall of the present regime. for the second question that you, second part of the question that you mentioned, if the russian naval bases will remain there, it may not, russia may not agree for this concession to give up its support to the regime because russia's only interest is not maintaining the naval base there. it is more than that.

it is to come back to the middle east. and its presence at the level comparable to the soviet time during which it has a very visual and strong presence in the mid be l east and -- middle east and especially in syria. and naval base is only one portion of it. so by giving permission for naval base, it may not be sufficient. thank you. >> thank you. i think the second question was directed to both ambassadors wilson and pearson. >> okay. i'll go first, thank you very much. i would say that the more important question is not influence. influence goes up and down. but whether the interest of the u.s -- whether the interests of the u.s. are the same today as they were 20 years ago. i would say that they are, and they're three. one is to avoid a general war in the middle east.

the second is to encourage the economic development of the region, and the third one is to make it possible for, i'll say democratic or pluralistic governments to gradually assume power through the region. so those three interests were, have been there for 50 years, and i predict they'll probably be there for the next 25. thank you. >> i would only add that i think it's probably incorrect to assume that what's going on in the arab awakening countries is a one-way trip down the tubes for western interests and western influence in that region. um, i think that's a profound misreading of what has given rise to the revolts that have taken place, and i strongly suspect it's a misreading of where the new leaders will want to take their countries. they will want their countries to suck is seed. -- to succeed. and among other things, that

will require a strong relationship with the united states and with the west. >> okay. next round of questions on this side, please. >> my name's erin we try, and i just -- we try, and i just wanted to ask a question in regard to the strong u.s./turkish relationship that's developed over the past couple years. now, if it's a strong relationship between the u.s. and turkey, is that a possible challenge to the turkish bid for e.u. accession? because i know ambassador wilson spoke to the fact that there's only 24 hourses in a day, and they have to, turkey needs to figure out where between the e.u. and the u.s. needs to spend the most time. >> and from this side? >> hi. dwight from george mason university school for conflict resolution. my question, actually, goes both to u.s. ambassadors and the representative from the e.u. delegation. it's been argued that in the past couple years now that the turkish armed forces, basically, come under the direct control of the turkish government. there is an observable

democratization process in turkey. none the less, at this point there is i think the number is around 100 journalists in jail, around 3,000 politicians are in prison, and in the past decade when we looked into the e.u. records, there was always a criticism in the state of human rights in turkey. but recently that criticism had become less and less. and i would also like to hear from the u.s. ambassadors on their opinion about the state of human rights in turkey. >> okay. >> thank you. >> and the first question, it wasn't directed to anyone. anyone who wants to answer that, please. okay. >> [inaudible] if i understood the question, the first question properly, it

was about whether the american/turkish relation is a substitute with turkey's relation with the e.u.. no, on the contrary, turkey believes that it's relations with any country in the world be it countries of the middle east, balkans, caucuses and the in central asia or the major powers like the united states, such better relations is not a substitute for turkey's relation with the e.u.. on the contrary, it is a complimentary dimension of it for the following reason: the european union will take turkey more seriously if turkey maintains better relations with the countries of the region and with the united states. and both the united states and the regional countries will take turkey more seriously if its

relations with the european union goes better. thank you. >> and i think for the second question he want today -- he wanted to hear both -- and one of the american ambassadors. go ahead. >> thank you very much. i can actually react very quickly saying it can only be good to see the e. u., u.s. and turkey showing common objectives and concerns. and i would not see any particular element of competition between this very factors. in regards to fundamental rights, i don't have the individual cases you raised. but to say that, um, we are seeing definitely fundamental rights in our dialogue. as i mentioned, i think, during the intervention having a discussion with this was one of the first topics and elements, and we choose in discussions

with turkish authorities under the agenda. i'm not 100% familiar with the ongoing reforms, but i understand that there is a quite important judicial reform package which is coming under discussion within the turkish parliament, and as i say, it's something that we are strongly encouraging, and we are encouraging to double the force that will follow on, and we hope these elements will actually help improve the situations you mentioned. >> i will just say that i think the u.s. and the e.u. share -- and many, and many, many, many millions of turks -- share the vision of a turkey where there is a robust freedom of speech and a lack of concern about the consequences of speaking out. and protection under the law for that freedom. and i do believe that the e.u.

process is very helpful in that regard, and i think that turkey has continued to have those discussions, and i think you have seen some responses to it. there is widespread concern in the united states about the journalists. i can't comment on individual cases either. there are reliable reports that circulate of journal is being forced to -- journalists being forced to give up their jobs and people being intimidated because of allegations made against them when they wished to exercise their free come of speech -- freedom of speech. and i share minister yakis' point that that's -- to deal with those issues fairly and justly is an ambition turkey has, and i applaud that ambition. thanks. >> thank you very much. okay. we have four minutes left which would be time for probably one very quick question and, um, i'd like to choose somebody that's

not asked a question in any panels yet today. go ahead. >> thank you. this is for foreign minister yakis. what are your thoughts on how to improve israeli/turkish relations? we heard this morning from the current ambassador who said, well, the way to do this is on the table, israel can kind of take it or leave it. i wonder if you have further remarks. >> please. >> actually, a government position was explained a few moments ago in his skype program. i am one of those who believe that israel and turkey need each other. i never enter into discussion of which one needs the other more. it is like husband and wife, who

needs the other more. but in case the two countries overcome their emotional dimension of their problem, it is not a substantive problem to resolve. perhaps the present governments are not ready for it because they have collected themselves perhaps to a far ec tent that they -- extent that they cannot reverse. otherwise, the solution -- it's not an unsolvable, unsurmountable difficulty. and when this difficulty is eliminated, both cub -- countries will benefit to a very large extent both at the level of bilateral relations and also at the regional level.

the -- [inaudible] countries will benefit as well because turkey was paying a very important role as message carrier between israel and the palestinians is and with syria. and now these countries are also deprived of this opportunity because turkey has no access, has lost this leverage. so it is not only for the bilateral relations, but it is for the entire region that it is very important. and i still expect that either one of the parties will give up some sort of dilution and e rogue of this e -- erosion will be e eliminated or we will see other political development which will make it easier. thank you. >> thank you. i'd like to thank all four of our panelists not only for their informative and perceptive comments, but also for sticking to closely to the time limits that were imposed on us.

again, join me in thanking them. [applause] >> more now with a look after other countries in the region. journalists and foreign policy scholars focused on turkey's dealings with iraq,s israel, syria and iran. this is an hour and 20 minutes. [inaudible conversations] >> okay. so i guess the earlier we get started, the more time we have left for questions so welcome back to the final panel of the day, everybody, and we very much appreciate your attendance, your support and all the very interesting questions that all of you have been asking throughout the day. it makes us feel very, very appreciated. and the last time we saved, well, hopefully, the best for last. some of the most interesting topics and some of the most

poignant questions that are troubling the minds of diplomats, scholars and journalists alike. so for the last time, i will just introduce our moderator who has kindly agreed to give up his time and serve as moderator on this panel, some of you know him very well, and then i will leave it over to him to take it, as i said, take over. so the washington bureau chief of al-jazeera and host of a weekly round table on american, political and cultural affairs n. 1990 he worked as reporter, anchor and journalism instructor in various departments including arabic, english, african and world service journalism training n. 1999 he joined the bbc's the world as a world affairs reporter. in 2001 he continued to report for the bbc in london out of d.c. while also serving as a senior editor. in 2002 he joined the al-jazeera

satellite channel and subsequently as head of the united nations office. so we're very glad to have you here and will throw it over to you. thank you. >> thank you very much. and thank you all for having me moderate this panel. this panel, as you know, is turkey's leadership role in an uncertain middle east. about three, four years ago the arab world was besotted with the love story between -- [inaudible] a turkish soap opera dubbed into syrian arabic. mohamed was good looking and romantic, a heartbreaker who literally called many a jealous arab man to threaten or threaten to divorce his wife because she only had eyes for mohamed. mohamed was a parable of what was happening on a wider,

grander, more political scale in the arab world which had fallen under the spell of turkey, a moderate muslim country with a democratizing political system and a thriving economy. a geographical, historical and cultural bridge between europe and the middle east. in the eyes of many arabs who still consider muslim spain with its grand cultural achievements and religious tolerance as a lost paradise, turkey is almost a paradise regained. a perception politically and economically reinforced a few years ago when the ruling and development party of the prime minister settled on its zero-problem policy with it neighbors, many of them, obviously, arab.

but the arab world's relationship with turkey has also a schizophrenic side to it. many arabs, particularly among those who do not subscribe to the notion of the islamic caliphates, see modern-day turkey as an extension of the ottoman empire that had lorded over their ancestors for several centuries. this perception has been further nurtured in places such as syria where the supporters of president bashar al assad support what is up described as the syrian revolution as literally, literally a blast from the ottoman past. to further discuss turkey's leadership role in the arab region, a great and talented panel has been assembled. i've been told there's no need to do bios for them, so i'll just rattle through their names

very quickly. joost hiltermann from the international crisis group. yigal schleifer is a freelance journalist. should say been based in istanbul various times. robin wright doesn't need any introductions either, except that i will say that i interviewed her when she plushed her book "rock the casbah," on the so-called arab spring. also another interesting book, "the us lammists are coming." without further ado, i'm going to give each one of them 12 minutes. i'm going to be as strict as a sword, guys. literally, 12 minutes, even of you -- each of you, and then we'll go to the audience. we must finish by 5:00. i'm going to be an arab dictator today. [laughter]

so i'm going to start with you. by the way, on my list is someone from the egypt freedom and justice party. he is not here, and i'll follow the order i have here and i'll begin with joost. over to you. >> yeah, joost hiltermann. nice to meet you. thank you for arranging this, you know, sizable event, i'm very grateful to be here and to speak to you. if i'm a little bit, not in my normal being, it's because i have a cold, and i just arrived from turkey yesterday, was in ankara on monday and then in

baghdad last week. so still jet lagged. so i was asked to talk about turkish relationship with iraq. and that relationship was pretty bad in the aftermath of the american intervention in iraq in 2003. turkey didn't really like what was happening, was fearing the vacuum that would ensue from a military assault on iraq even if it was grateful to be rid of saddam hussein. they were not alone in that. but the situation was pretty rocky for about four years. and then with the surge in 2007 turkey realized that the united states had finally seen the light and that it was finally doing something that turkey had already a long time urged it to do, and not only turkey, but also the arab states which was recalibrating power in baghdad against the shias that turkey

saw as close to iran. and that now there was going to be a new arrangement where the sunnis of iraq would be more fully included because, of course, after 2003 they hadn't really had a seat at the table in any meaningful sense. so for turkey this was a great step forward and a change, and it made its own sea change in its relationship with iraq. it decided to work actively with the iraqi government and also with the kurdistan regional government both at the same time. and this was especially what occurred was a huge step, but even baghdad at that time was a big step because it didn't really trust the shiite parties in control. and in 2009 it signed a number of agreements with baghdad which until this moment exist on paper anyway. but at that time there was a lot of hope and promise that these would be implemented.

it also was the krg in particular as developed very close bonds and is talking about a, quote-unquote, strategic partnership with the krg into the turkish economy. so these are unprecedented at that time anyway, were unprecedented steps. then the relationship with the iraqi government in 2011 took a nose dive. even as the relationship with erbil continued to go up. and now what turkey's doing in its relationship with iraq is, actually, contributing to the centrifugal forces already in existence in iraq and driving the country apart. this is not what turkey says its strategic interest is, and so it leaves us confused as to what turkey actually is trying to accomplish in iraq, and that's one reason why i went to ankara two days ago, hoping to get that resolved in a few meetings.

and i am as confused as i was before i went there. and so if you want an answer from me, you will not get i. -- get it. what happened? well, it's important to understand what turkey has long wanted from iraq. it has wanted a buffer against iran. that is its top priority. and secondly, it wants -- and it's probably almost of equal weight -- no external support or impulse for kurdish nationalism inside turkey. in other words, it doesn't want an empowered kurdistan region in iraq that could then empower the kurds in turkey and create the nightmare scenario, a larger kurdish state in the region. turkey also wants access to iraq's considerable energy resources, oil and gas. it wants access to it markets because you are the can key's economy is growing rapidly, and it wants, of course, regional stability and, indeed, a agree of regional -- a degree of regional stabilization.

and to this end or to these ends turkey has supported iraq easter tore y'all -- iraq's territory y'all integrity. now, in reaching out to both the government of iraq and the kurdistan regional government, turkey has pursued all of these above goals, and it has pressed specifically for a federal oil and gas law, hydrocarbons law, and a federal revenue-sharing law in order to bring the country together and to keep the kurds ensconced inside the iraqi body politic. because that would precept the kurds from -- prevent the kurds from serving as an example in turkey. but at the same time serving, creating a strong iraq that would be a buffer against iran and would at the same time provide turkey with it oil and gas needs. perfect. it is also argued in favor of an inclusive government in baghdad

based on power sharing. so after the elections that have taken place, especially the 2010 elections, it has pressed very much for a power-sharing arrangement where all the various, the main groups that won votes would be allowed to sit in the government. of course, it expects the krg now that the krg is a very good friend to fight for turkey to the extent that the pkk, of course s in iraq. and on that front there's been a little bit of frustration still, but turkey hopes that with time and as the krg becomes more dependent on turkey economically that through that leverage turkey will accomplish that goal and deal a setback to the pkk. and finally, turkey hopes to mold and contain kurdish nationalism in iraq and turkey by controlling the krg. on the one hand, it is empowering the krg because it's

economically becoming much stronger, it's becoming potentially an oil and gas exporter to turkey. but it wants to contain and control it and keep the krg wholly economically dependent on turkey. now, the nose dive, what changed? what happened in turkish relationship with baghdad? well, first importantly was the perception of maliki. that, as the perception had been of the iraqi shiite islamists that maliki is an iranian proxy and not, in fact, an arab shia who has some autonomy in decision making. and secondly -- sorry, this is still number one. the perception of maliki as a would-be dictator, that he has been amassing power, and he's planning to stay. he's not about to, first, share power or to leave when his term is up. the second thing that changed is

the arab awakening. and the syria crisis that came out of that which is reshaping all the relations in the region and leading to a total realignment of forces in the region with the sectarian task because some are pushing sectarian arguments and discourse and policies. and so there is this emergence or the perception of an emergence of a sunni alliance, of, you know, saudi arabia in particular and turkey. and that is a raid against iran and its allies who happen to be shia. so iraq, the iraqi regime, of course, but also hezbollah and then the syrian government which is not a shia regime, but anyway it's not a sunni one. and so there's some sympathy there. now, these are perceptions. i'm not saying there are

actually these alliances. um, now, in 2009 what happened was that acting on the first perception of maliki turkey decided to support one party in the elections that were taking place in march 2010. it started in 2009. and this was the -- [inaudible] and the argument that turkey presented was that, well, this is an inclusive list, it's secular, it includes a cross-section of the iraqi population. so this is the party that should lead iraq. well, two things about that. one is that it was only one party in iraq and not the only one, and so you are presenting yourself as a partisan actor now by supporting one party. and secondly, maliki won. maliki didn't win, maliki's party came in second, but after forming the large e bloc in parliament -- largest bloc in parliament, he was able to reprise his role as prime

minister, so maliki won. and his -- turkey's problem was suddenly faced with a hostile government because it had opposed vehemently. two minutes, right. so now we start wrapping up the last second half of the presentation. [laughter] i knew that beforehand, this is my fault. so, um, in 2011 the second issue kicked in, that was the syria crisis. and now, um, the relationship between turkey and iraq has led to a fairly major breakdown between baghdad and ankara where turkey now is, essentially, calling for the removal of maliki if he doesn't reform to the point of, basically, going back to the original power-sharing agreement that was the basis of the 2010 government. um, now, the krg is the important element in here. it's a dynamic element that is starting to change everything. because the krg is now using

turkey just like turkey was using the krg before as part of its vision for iraq. the krg's now using turkey to persuade it to cut its ties with iraq. now, turkey is not ready to do it, and there are strategic reasons not to do it, but it is, the krg is hoping to push turkey towards a tipping point. it is appeasing turkey on the pkk, it is enticing turkey on oil and gas saying we've got a million barrels a day to give you of oil and plus the gas. um, and it's making appeals to turkey about maliki's dictatorial inclinations. ..

but regional game changer. low and behold. could be syria. now what is happening is that i already mentioned this perception of these alliances arraying, i was just -- a month ago spoke with other people there the perception is strong whether genuine or not, manipulated realty as well. the perception is that the gulf states in turkey are gunning for, first of all, the syrian government, and once they're done with the that the iraqi government is next. thirty seconds. and the term they use for -- [inaudible] is that he is an islamist --

that is the new term and they see him as pushing this particular agenda. i can -- [inaudible] i was going to make some recommendations because i'm international crisis group. i was supposed to do that. i will leave it to the questions and answer. the particular perception has a way could become self-fulfilling prophesy. and the situation right now, the dynamic is negative, and we need to find ways to reduce the perceptions and to reinstate especiallily the strategic agreements that cur key and iraq signed, maybe to exchange invoice in order to get away directive dynamic that's there. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you, thank you very much. i appreciate that. the next speaker is .

>> get my timer going. okay, thank you to the middle east substitute for having me. thank you for giving me the easiest topic, turkey as a revelation since everything is moving fast. fortunately the last two years it's the model of stability for all the wrong reasons. i took a survey of other turkey israel watchers to take the pulse and the most common words you get are dead and frozen. so with variations such as deeply frozen and very dead. that's turkey's relation. thank you very much. no. i think for the time being, and all jokes aside, i think you can put the question of israel and turkey from the perspective perhaps in the cask basket as the same -- the frozen conflict that appears to have very little

hope for progress. in the short to medium term. colored by rebelling use and cultural one that has regional ramification from both countries but ones that mays in the american arena and the potential to color. turkey's relations with washington is it's true pane now israel. it's something that should not be taken lightly. how the two countries got the point. it's fairly well known. i don't want to use today to rehash the events. i think it's suffice to say the incident itself was the final nail in the coffin what strugging relations the kind of breaking point. since the event the two countries have painted themselves into corner that are proving hard to get out of turkey maintains as you heard from abraham today and from the ambassador. they will not be renewed until

an app gi is offered. he mentioned again today the third condition which is the deal breaker that israel lead the blockade on gaza. we heard things it's matter of doing symbolic gesture on gaza. publicly, the instance is still that israel that blood candidate which clearly is something that israel is not ready to do. it's operational mistakes express for the loss of life. compensation but not provide more blanket apology. that turkey is looking for and not provide turkey with any kind of victory on gaza. but i think beyond the question of apology, what kept the two countries from coming together they were negotiating two separate things on how to frame the apology or negotiating over two separate things. israel was looking are

reconciliation not to get things to where they were before. but to makeup after the breakup. to get back to a real working relationship. the turkish side was being -- getting back together turkey was looking how to negotiate the split rather than the messy one we've had. something that, you know, lays out the terms of the divorce, you know, joint custody of over certain issues. joint visitation rights to certain things, but certainly a split from the way things were before in a deeper way than i think what israel was expressing. and i think, also, as we heard in abraham as he said, turkey now sees itself stand on the right side of history the foreign policy is not build on state to state relations with something nor fill soft candidate and i think israel in many ways at least regarding the

palestinian stays the way it is right now simply doesn't fit into the new turkish cob seption of the foreign politician. and even though that's not applied across the board,ic in the case of israel for perhaps aid logical reasons and other reasons, this is being applied. so if we look at the relations, i think, you know, debt frozen, i think signs our discouragings. i would look at the public level, to me the certain extent it causes the most concern. both countries mutual distrust is on the rise. in turkey the relation with israel novembers a poplar one because the palestinian issue because of history of the arab israeli conflict. and i think the fallout with israel has deep end certain strains and both nationalist and islamist that have been there, but the fallout with israel is strength end those.

and israel turkey and turkish policy are viewed with a lot of suspicious and prime minister is deeply unpoplar figure, and this, you know, will definitely color any sense of the israel government tries to make with turkey like on the other side. in a certain way, the question of turkey and israel has become a domestic issue and reinvolving them is something that both governments have to consider not just in terms of foreign policy concerns in terms of domestic concerns, election et. cetera. just an antidote in terms of the issue of the poplar conception it was recently there was a story of the israel mountain climber climbing up mount everest. he stopped to save the life of a turkish climber. the way the press covered the story was if the historic enemies come to the the aid of each other.

i don't know the hat field helping the mci do. it was incredible to see the countries who was close friends, suddenly the act of, you know, just regular human kindness had been or frayed as a sense of some kind of historic breakthrough. like wise with the other bright stops is the relationship -- doing the big caramel mountain wild fire in 2010, israel aid to turkey during the earthquake last year, you know, these were seen as breakthroughs, you know, called the i guess the wild fire diplomacy. fire diplomacy and these are things that regular neighbors do. help each other. during a crisis and the fact these were seen as breakthroughs were more indicative not of the breakthrough but how deep and crisis in the relations are. another bright spot that i think a lot of point out to are trade relations between the two countries trades is at the

record level between the two countries. i think it is encouraging. needs to be put within the proper context rather than telling us about turkey israel relations and where they are, if they could tell us more about the global economy how two countries that are part of the global economy how they can't boycott each other anymore. when they get sold in israel, they are actually made in turkey. and so boycott, you know, if you boycott turkish cars, these cars with being made in turkey are part of the israeli project to help launch a electronic car system. the economies are deeply tied that it's very hard to, you know, boycott one another in the way that countries did in the past. i would take the economic part as not necessarily a, you know, the kind of bright spot that some portrayed it as. what is new in the relationship what is the developed in these two years? on a certain level, both

countries are working to punish each other in the international arena. israel is now practice itses what you can almost describe as containment policy against turkey deeping relations with cypress, greece the intention not here is to stick a i think if netter eye. also to show turkey has alternatives. not necessarily great ones. it does. it can sell weapons can transport gas to europe through cypress and ask have a security alliance with countries like greece and romania. it can do the air force training it used to do in turkey in romania. again, maybe not replacements we replacements nonetheless. statement, it's pretty clear that a large section the large cross section of israel -- including secretaries of defense and the newly appointed deputy minister. other top leader are in support

of the idea normalizing relations with turkey. they realize it's a strategic it's essential for israel and especially considering everything that's going on in the region right now. that's a turkish side doesn't appear in the rush to change the situation. they are toned down in a recent months. but the stabilitieses them are what we've heard today is israel knows what to do. and at the same time turkey is practices a program to show diplomat sanctions against israel blocking the participation in various international forum. and keeping israel sort of on notice until it does what it knows it needs to do, things will be tough for it. what are the prospectives for the future? i would say that for now, you know, the fact that we have to wait for massive fires in israel and turkey for any kind of breakthrough is not encouraging. what relearned from the most recent port of the israeli

report was that one of the reasons the incident turned out the way it did, was because the already frayed relationship was high level communication at the time it was about to go. and so considering the potentially explosive issues that are out there right now. 9 sigh press issues. having this a complete lack of communication right now is what we have between the two countries is very dangerous and the real recipe for disaster. what that really leaves us with is the only option is seems right now that the two countries need outside push, shall we say. that is an american push i can't see it coming from europe or niche else. to help the countries set up the mechanisms that can perhaps go around the mum mar incident go around the recent history and find ways to cooperate in the

energy field perhaps through trade. they are entrepreneurial have high-tech industries that are developing. perhaps create some sort of mechanism with cooperation. it seems it's not necessarily possible but otherwise it's hard to see what else can do it. ultimately i think restoring relations to a level of trust and open communication and a variety of cooperate is used to be it's imperative for both countries. for israel it's a strategic reason, obviously. for turkey it goes a bit deeper. i noticed they a big promotional box -- almost the same price. your choice. i think it says a lot, to me about the role that turkey wants to play and can play in the region. i mean right now turkish airlines flies to both -- tel aviv and teheran, but the

government were the only welcome is not welcome certainly in jeer jerusalem. in teheran, there's issues too. renewing it with israel would allow it to reclaim the regional mediator. and to again, establish itself as the region's political economic religious and cultural crossroads role that it can and should play but currently can't. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. thank you for finishing a little bit of ahead of time. >> thank you very much. i am the last speaker of the day. [laughter] [applause] i have the hottest topic, syria and iran. i think these two countries are fascinating to discuss in context of turkey because they

represent in many ways some of the most profound achievements of the turkish government during the first seven years. and also, the two of the toughest challenges over the last year and a half. when you take a step back and look at what the government has done, it talks about creating a foreign policy with 360 degree strategic depth. and it has done extraordinary things in becoming one of the world's arguably most important half dozen countries. it's clearly the most important player in the 57 nations of the vietnamic world. it is the model for democracy decision in the 22 nations of the arab world. it's the world 17th largest economy due to become the 15th next year. it's going to be head the g20 in 2015. it's become such a big player under the akp government.

it's recognizes as the soft power giant in the middle east. and i read one thing morning it called turkey the china much europe. which and i often laugh at what you think about how it's a good thing it didn't a member because it would be bailing greece out. syria and iran are interesting as both reflect as i said turkey's expanding region in the region. and what it wants iran was important to turkey as a source of energy. it needs to fuel the economic growth. iran is also an issue around which turkey can display the new diplomatic muscle. the standing in the world as a big player. and syria, of course, was important as a source of new markets and again, in allowing

turkey to play a bigger role in arab israeli piece. over the past 18 months. both countries have become a real headache for turkey. and the tensions with both suns have undermined the attempt to become the big bigger and the credibility to be able to navigate and lead negotiations. syria is iran's , i mean, is turkey's longest border 500 miles. until last year, turkey can significantly improved with relations with syria. it's amazing when you think they called each other personal friends and their families went on vacations together. he said that syria and turkey shared a common fate, a common history, and a common future.

trade grew significantly under the akp in 2004, he flew to damascus to sign a free-trade agreement. diplomacy deeped. turkey took on a role in regional peace by launching new diplomatic effort between israel and syria on the golan heights president bush cut off negotiations and the diagnose with syria. turkey became the most credible player when it came to the peace process during that period. in 2007 he shuttled between damascus twenty times and 2008, he hosted five rounds of diplomacy in an corp. shuttling between the hotels two of the delegations. militarily the two countries expanded their borders significantly. in 2009, they held three-day

joint military maneuvers. hard to believe, isn't it? which they both had ak excess to each other's outpostcrossing the border. what a contrast with today. over the past year, he has repeatedly talked about the 16 month uprising, in terms of syrian tact tits calling it savory. turkey has done more visibly than any other country in helping the opposition in the many forms and often at a cost. economically, turkey has suspended kind of trade relations and trade gree.s that it built up over the previous seven years. it absorbed thousand of rough giews who fled mainly the flighting in the north. politically turkey is the base for the syrian opposition, the national counsel. and militarily, it's the

frontline for the syrian free army. and reported the root for the arms going to the rebels. but since the spring, tensions have actually tangibly escaladed between the militaries of syria and turkey. in april, syrian forces fired across the blord -- border into turkey and he announced in a speech before parliament today there have been -- by syrian helicopters. of course, last week, last friday, the shooting down of f4 plane. in a speech to parliament today, he called syria a clear and imminent threat. again, what a contrast. he called him a man who he once on vacation with a bloody dictator. he warned that however valuable turkey's froip is, the wrath is just as strong, he said don't

take our common sense, and cautious approach as a sign of passivity. it was strong language. so the question is, is the episode a turning point, a tipping point? after the speech today, the turkish media -- and the they had been put on high alert. the latest tensions may not be a decisive turning point. it's hard to see give what's happened particularly since april, that these countries, at least under the two leaders are going to have anything resembling a normal relationship any time soon. tlg take a long time, i think to get back to where they were and a change in in the leadership in damascus. on iran, my other subject, iran

is turkey's second longest border. about 300 miles. relation, again, just like syria have been strength end under the akp. they are lead by islamist governments. even those there are differences. all lead by various people. economically twobt countries have deep end ties under the akp over the last five years, trade has actually doubled to some $10 billion. with expectations that trade could triple in the not too distance future. last year, one-third of turkey's oil imports came from iran. iran was turkey's fifth largest customer buying at least 200,000 barrels a day from iran.

which was 7% of iran's oil exports. turkey also imported 20% of the natural gas from iran. and this month of vizzing iranian cabinet minister said in turkey trade between the two countries reached $16 billion last year. on diplomacy, again, turkey and iran became very close in the process of trying to navigate the international communities pressure over iran's nuclear program. and in march, he personally went to teheran after meeting president obama at the international summit in south korea. and with brazil he had been pivotal if actually trying to broker a deal separately when the previous u.s. effort fell through and iran walked away from it. with the current round, of

course looked to host a new effort and turkey to a play a key role in pressing the iranians. turkey really has been a talking about the p5+1, the five members of the security counsel and germany the key players. there's a seventh player out who plays a important role, that's turkey. the turks have become frustrated with iran's stubbornness and the failure of diplomacy to make real headway, and so that relationship, i think, has done through significant sedbacks in part because of pressure. by the united states. over the last, turkey has cut

back on oil imports from iran, in i think may, it was down to it was down from -- 270 barrels per day in may and in june -- no, in april, and then in may, it went down 180 barrels. there was a significant decline. this is because of turkey faces real pressure. okay. i've got less than that. on the united states on sanctions and turkey would be a price. turkey is talking to saudi arabia some of the caucus states about finding alternative sources of oil. you see this tension brewing between the two because of the failure on nuclear talk to make success and iran's stubbornness

to find a solution. and the syria has complicated as a third in the triangle of relations. a revolutionary guard commander charged earlier this month that tour key was part of a regional alliance with saudi arabia and -- taking orders from the united states and israel in a plan or grand design to oust the syrian leadership. a prominent revolutionary guard leader called turkey a strategic exelt or it of iran. so we see from both countries, this with which turkey had made profound progress in trade, in diplomacy, in enhancing the own image and suddenly the ground effort to have a 360 degree foreign policy that reached to around to all that wasn't just relinted on the west, increasingly turkey has turned to the west whether nato in the

aftermath of the shooting down of the syrian plane, or to the european union in the aftermath of, you know, the lack of success on diplomacy on iran's nuclear program. so this is a turning point for turkey too, it is an important moment in terms of redefining what it does over the next year in terms of its alliances and the region, and whether it is able to keep the 360 degrees or drawn back into itself the western alliance that defined so much of the foreign policy over the since -- the since the modern turkish day was born. thank you. >> thank you. [applause] >> we go to q and a. i'm going toker size my right to ask question. i'm glad i didn't introduce you with the compression last but not least. i'm coming to you now to the fist -- first question.

as a new beginning, and as was said earlier to the people in the region, see turkey has bridge between the east and the west. the west is no -- opposition and between the united states and france over the innovation of iraq pre2003. now, do you see turkey in terms of its role in the middle east as an extension of american power, would you see it as an extension of european power, notwithstanding, the e.u. snub to turkey's moip bit? >> i don't think extension of either. ic turkey arguably is very much acting on the own interest and , i mean, it looks to nato in a crisis like with syria. but turkey is very much the own entity.

it's a 21 tion century country in a way that lot of other aren't. and i don't think it i think it enjoys a healthy relationship with the united states. not healthy relationship with europe. but that when you look at 21st century and what is the most interesting countries of new players out there china, india, brazil, and turkey. we kind of all know what the traject try for china, india, brazil. turkey is the one that surprised us. boss somed on the own. become a dynamic player and has been dragged down the crisis whether over the iran's nuclear program or the syrian uprising. when you look at the bigger picture, i'm sorry we don't have somebody from the egyptian justice party to talk about that, it really is the country that you so many of these

societies look to as a model. not maybe precisely but as a country that has actually negotiated whether it's with the military, or how to bring islam into the a system cultural without scaring the whole world, how to keep, you know, -- how to prosper economically, stagger 8% growth and you talked about the soap opera. i remember going saudi arabia during just before rom dan very recently, and saudi cabinet minister had the theme song as the ring tone on the cell phone. you know, from turkey? when you think about their history. so on i think turkey is the open player. i it needs the alliance, but everybody does. it's more independent arguably that's it's ever been. >> let me put the same

question. if you could take the international crisis hat and put on the european-dutch hat. whether you agree with her or not, what do you think are the implications for the europeans and for the americans for turkey's success or failure in the leadership bit in the middle east? i'm jiewrpen, my name is yost. i've been outside of holland for 36 years. i'm more american in many ways than european. i'll try. but the -- for turkey, first of all, it has not given up on europe. it's important to understands that. terrorist a lot of discontent and happiness about not being able to join the european union. it has done everything in order to join the europe union and is

proud of at chai. in doing the measures in terms ofly eliminated serious human rights abuse and other tortures. europe is extremely important to turkey. i think turkey is as robin said is the on. it's not the instrument for anyone. that's also because it has huge things at stake because we're talking about countries that the immediate neighbors syria, iran, iraq. it's going to take the lead of no one. and i think you know what it ends up doing will have huge impact beyond turkey and europe, for example, and so these countries european countries need to turkey 20 the play role. it has a more intimate knowledge and intimate relationship with them. i think they see turkey, of course, still sort of conflicted between the past and the very moderate islamist future.

they see turkey as a potentially playing a not just the bringing role between east and west but also the bringing role between the christian europe, and a muslim middle east. that is muslim brotherhood. certainly diswript and tunisia and more rocco and yemen and who knows possibly in syria as well. that is going to be the very important bridging role, because there is an innate fear in europe of anything muslim, basically, to put it mildly. it's very racist. it's a fear of the unknown. even though, you know, europe is very christian, it is moderate christian, fortunate ily and in that sense is not different than moderate islam. it's not christianity and so turkey can play a role there.

i think that is important. >> i want to come -- [inaudible] a little bit later on. let me ask you a followup question. just the the role that the turks are trying to play in the middle east, now do you think that if they're member here -- membership skeesldy have tried tol a >> it's like history. why would turkey want to limit the influence? had been allowed into the european club, you know, it would have obviously escaladed the links the economic links with europe. but that's further increased the economic proless today which would have increased the

incentive or the impulse to find new markets where it's good. and you could easily see how it would feet in one hand into the european market with sort of higher class goods, which turkey can is produce and can has been producing the flat screen tvs for europe. and electronics and others and on the other hand, feed other products which is doing for iraq for example today. it's not at best products as we would say, but in iraq, our highly desired and are a lot better than the indiana began products. you have to say in other arab countries. there is a huge market out there for all four range of products turkey would be able to provide. i think for turkey, even though it mit not have taken such a very open and explicit approach to the arab world the way it has done, on the other hand, it would essential want to do the sometime time. might not have made a stipg

about it. now it's like europe -- now we're going there. europe rebuffed it. it might have done it but not made a point of it. >> robin, take one more stab at it. obviously, turkey's membership bids with the europeans strongly supported by the united states, the united states has a very strong vested interest in the turks also playing a leadership role in the middle east. is there a tug of war between the europeans and the americans as to whether this role that the turks should play in the middle east ought to be going? >> i actually think that they both hope that turkey plays an important role in whether it's guiding some of the arabs as they try to define a new order. that the washington where the

republican or democrat see an important role for turkey in iran, negotiating with iran a lot of people were happy in the town when turkey and brazil tried to salvage a initiative on their own and the deal came up shorter than the six major powers particularly the united states were willing to accept. but i think they one of the things that is so interesting about turkey today is how everyone accept the own self-image as a major player. they might not -- or says they may think he got too big for the pants on some issues. they feel he's a man they can do business with. i think when it comes to syria, everyone is looking at turkey whether it's in europe, which is

much closer, or in the united states, as the pivotal country. it's the one the arabs are backing, that, you know, turkey is the one that people turn to whether it's the solution, or the frontline, and that's what makes the place so interesting that it has managed over the past decade to take on the role and convince the world to the point that very quickly, request you think of another country that transformed the image so quickly, diplomatically, economically. i can't. >> you so eloquently talked about the tensions between turkey and israel with the last 18 months or so. , and do you see any tensions given that israel is such a close ally for the united states, do you see any tension

within the u.s. vision to the role of turkey in the middle east given that there is the class with these israeli and part of the clash is seen in the region as a clash over influence more than anything else between the turks and israelis. >> i think 2 works on different levels. i mean, there's the regional level, there's the domestic level, if you go to any event in town you're dealing with turkey and the u.s. official is there they'll talk about the great cooperation with turkey and the first but. and the first but is israel. i think on the one hand, they need to say it. i think on the other hand, they need to say it because the potential of playing out in various ways. on the regional level, i mean, i listed some of the issues, energy exploration in the eastern -- we've had before everything blew up with syria. that's where the tension was over sei press, oil, and gas

exploration. you had words coming from turkey. you had them working up them an arains. you have interesting things in the turkish press talking about israeli plans for building military bases on sei press. it was a kind of, you know, a sort of bubble that was building up there of tension so, you know, regionally, there's that issue. i think domestically we haven't seen it play out much. the one thing that struck me as a kind of indicator what you might see during the republican pry their debates when the fox news anchor asked rick perry the question about turkey. the only time it was mentioned. it was a very strange question and perry answered it strangely. nonetheless, it was an indication of, you know, the possibility that turkey can be sort of cass in a certain light that's not favoriteble for

turkey. it can enter into the campaign and in certain places that are of importance, i mean, this is ain't antidot l my parents live in a building in miami beach that is primarily orthodox jew. i used to live in turkey, they say you got out just in time. how do you manage to live there? this is a perception they can see turkey getting sucked into in a time you have a growing fear of islam, just like in europe. it wouldn't be hard if somebody wanted to put turkey in the corn of, you know, the dangerous islamists or and definitely i think turkey right now is riding on the fact there's a great relationship between president obama and him. and the white house is in turkey's corner. capitol hill is a different story. they've been quite. you talk to people there, there is the sense of a perhaps a mistrust of turkey.

there's a lot of strong proisrael sentiment on the hill that could play out against turkey, you know, the issue of will turkey get drones sold to them and obviously the question of israel plays into that and, you know, i don't think drones are going to get sold before the election in israel. the question plays into that. it cuts on various levels. it's something tour ski needs to watch out for. >> as we all know, the heated debate in the united states and worldwide about whether the united states is a powering decline or not. some of those do subscribe to the notion that u u.s. power is in decline argue that the u.s. is delegating some of the influence to countries such as israel and turkey. the specific case of turkey the argument is that they -- the united states is happy for turkey to play a role in iraq, happy to play a meetuating real

as heard from robin in iran, in syria, which one of the two skills to do you subscribe to that turkey is a power acting or power acting as a delegate -- as a delegate to the superpower of the united states? >>, i mean, i think the last year as seeing things move perhaps not in the way that turkey had imagined, i think if you look back to 2003, and the decade later, 2003 was the year that the turkish parliament decide the not to give the united states to invade iraq through the territory. it was a real declaration of independents an ton my. it was saying the quelled war is over. we're not going to do what you tell us to. the motion did pass in parliament but not with enough votes to make it effective.

you know, doubt a decade later, you know, turkey is sort look together u.s. military backing to, you know, for backing to perhaps pursue military option again the neighborhood syria. it's looking to nato to support it and in that so i think that the last year perhaps i answer the question a year ago. i think perhaps the last year has brought back a cold war mentality or reality to the region the way russia is falling on one 0 side. the way the iranians are falling and turkey is very much gone back to the warm embrace of the western alliance. so, you know, is if acting as a proxy, i mean, that's not the word you used. obviously they have their own interest they're a mature country and more self-confident. on the other hand they're looking for a safe harbor. right now the safe harbor is, you know, the western alliance

nato and the relationship with the united states. it's clear the turks is increed belie important right now. as are the americans. >> robin, back to you, as you've pointed out, there are now the proliferation in the middle east region of parties that either carry the same name as the ak, or that carry names that echo such as indicate of egypt that echo that name. does that mean that the competition between the turkish system and let's say the iranian system post arab spring is a done deal in favor of turkey or we don't know that for sure. >> it's true. it's a done deal. and i think as the arabs begin fighting the new order, they're rejecting both the model of a hide democracy and sunny democracy that neither one turkey is closer to what they

want. whether it's more rock can party that won the right to form the government of the same name or the egypt that are looking for was justice and development or freedom of -- anyway. [inaudible conversations]. >> right. >> but not the soap opera. >> right. and they are looking for that kind of model. they're all talking quite realistically like the turks in whether it's about honoring camp david or international treaties about canceling with the west inviting tourist to return that you find the prime minister in too newsha who got up in front of a group of tourist agencies and said bring them back. there was note belie a bar behind him. they're trying to divert attention from the booze and being i can any argument and talk about real issues. i think that turkey, which became -- which matured faster

than any place else about the debate about islam democracy. showed how they were interdepent rather than conflict has been an incredible lesson. historically will look back and say even though they adopt it in the contact ways, constitutional and in dealing with the military too. it's what egypt faces today and turkey is the one country, north carolina -- unlike pakistan has deal with it. i don't want to inflate turkey's influence, but there's no country that has come close. >> just let me come back to you, obviously deal with crisis of the international crisis group which is just talked about the crisis a potential crisis and that is between the muslim brotherhood in egypt and the staff, the ruling that military counsel. is there anything in turkey's

political system or political history that could help you analyze the potential for being a real crisis con down in the road in egypt and think of ways of dealing with it. or do you think that altogether turkey is an inspiration, the countries such as egypt are going have to develop their own wings? >> that's easy, the answer is yes. the arab countries with turkey. turkey can serve as a model up to the point. you apply the tier kish model to the arab countries. they have their own histories, structures, and there are some superficial similarities. egypt is going to have to develop in the own way, and i think that, you know, in terms of military civil relations, turkey has come much further than egypt, and if you were to do this in egypt, you would have to look at turkey the way it was

fifty, sixty years ago. that's how it was today. just on the other issue -- [inaudible] much brotherhood senator medicare cane had the question. he didn't understand it. didn't answer it. i think there is a, you know, something to be said about the emergence of the muslim brotherhood and the arab world and that this is something that is closer to the turkish model but there is also the competing element which is the -- [inaudible] and syria today we don't know exactly what the strength of the group is because we didn't know it during the regime, certainly we in knew it was a cay nottic situation and some of the troops may be shifted. people like mccain support that. we don't know the outcome yet. i think there is a potential strug 8 between two visions of islamism in the arab world. one is possibly supported by tour ceer. even though they wouldn't say

it. and the ere one is the gulf version, and closer to the trend. the struggle is undecided in a place like egypt or tunisia and potentially could play a major role in syria as well. >> and the -- this leadership role that turks are seen trying to play, where does it fit into the debate about sue nighs and -- during the arab springs and what role, again, that creates the relationship between turkey and iran. >> well, the arab spring was only in countries where there were sunni regimes and with the exception of this. to turkey's credit he went there

and i think it was march of 2011, and offered his help in mediating the conflict between the regime and the opposition rising up there, and sort of i diluting the whole she hide nature of that. he was rebuffed. he was sent to shut the door and he left the same day as far as i remember. that was it. so, you know, the and that's the only other place in iraq there was no arab spring except. of course. but they didn't go anywhere. and so the sunni shea hide thing didn't come up. because of the secretaryism -- as a survival mechanism now it is now looking especially in the syrian case, which is the pouf

to the one, as if there's a sunni alliance that is in this case which is fighting a minority regime. it was a regional superpower competition. as i said earlier clearly among them, the perception is this is what is happening. now the issue is becoming sectarian. turkey is seen to be part of that. it is a negative directive dynamic. that's with we need to get away from. >> the issue that was pointed to the outset, which is that the turks had a one-time prided themes having a having a zero problem policy with the neighborhood. if you look at the vicinitity. they have a problem with every single neighbor, almost in the vicinity.

does israel rejoice at it? >> at the problems that turkey is having? [laughter] , i mean,, you know, that's an interesting question. >> without being too flippant. does that undermine the position of israel or ? >> i think like what i said, there is deep suspicious of him and israel, i think they're seen, you know, in the like as it goes from the public to leadership levels. i think they're seen as islamist, you know, depending who you talk to. they could be of the radical kind. i don't think anymore would call them moderate anymore. i think the incident helped convince israelis and that, you know, israel, i mean, that turkey has a vawmist agenda -- islamist agenda. they're willing to use the

relationship with vale, they're use to israel's way as a steppingstone forward a leadership in the middle east and to a certain extent, they have. so, you know, i think in that sense, the idea that the policy of turkey is sort of failing with, you know, would be perceived by israelis as a sense of wealth. these are the guys who tried to start a fight with us. look where they have ended up. with that said, there's the understanding there that turkey is the emerging regional superpower, that as 0 positived to the neighbors in the region the stable one and will likely remain stable with perhaps the kurdish issue erupts. having strong relations with turkey is a strategic priority. >> if you project -- okay.

i've been told up to wrap up in about five minutes. let me quickly ask you, if you look at what may happen down the road, if these israelis and the turks manage to man test between them, these problems that the turks are having with the syrians with the iranians and others, are those likely to impact israeli position interest in any way? >> what -- so you to remember what brought israel and turkey together in the first place was problems with syria that turkey was having back in the '90s. so, you know, in the certain way, things at least in the region nam context are back to where they are. things are different between the two countries. i think turkey sees the role in the region very differently. and i think like i said, in my talk, i think the way the

conception lose foreign policy now israel as long as it continues in the current policy the palestinians falls like outside of their framework. so i think it's hard to talk about this, you know, until there is movement on the palestinian issue, and until israel makes some serious strides. so, you know, in that sense, even the situation with syria, i don't see it right now bringing the two countries together again in the strategic allowance to protect their borders or, you know. i think for the decision for turkey has been made without any -- without israel changing the policy, they see little room for close or normal relationship. >> robin, back to you. the issue that you racessed, which is that many arabs are looking at the turkish model as

source of inspiration for their own political system obviously with the assent of slammist party egypt we have a islamist party in the sort of lead in the government. in mor crock koa. tunisia. there are reports if the muslim brotherhood will play a very important role in that country. does that by definition mean that the turks will benefit from this new change in the reink with all these israelist movements on the rise? >> short terming with yes. who knows long-term, i think we are such at the raw initial stage, you can't tell. but when you look at the fact that morocco, tunisia, libya has elections in two weeks, the

islamist are likely to do very well there. yemen has elections in july. they are likely to do well. and syria, those are just six of the 22 arab countries, but they are account for over half the arab's world population. and you have islamist parties that popular really aty or majority in each one. and that tells you where they're heading in when it comes to defining new order. when you look around, turkey is one of the few that has done it. so i think turkey does benefit not only in the own reputation, and the influence in the rest of the world because everyone will say, well, you know, the turks are we need to deal with some of the new governments through the turks with the help of the turks whatever. but also economically in terms

of likely whether it's business, development, reconstruction in libya where turkey was a major player. who knows in syria when it comes reconstruction there. there's potential for turkey to be a big player in multiple ways. in the next decade become more influential power. >> when you were up there speaking. i timed you very strictly. i'm going to do the same to myself and end this session. thank you all very. [applause] [inaudible conversations]