take into account the revolution of the broadcast industry and how it is changing and how it merges and encourages for other ways people are receiving the same kind of content. so it's an extraordinarily competent at issue, but when we do need to tackle an attempt to address on the issue of what is fair in this process. >> host: that also leads him to back your committee is looking at the internet sales tax, particularly if it comes to downloading you say, correct? >> guest: well, the internet sales tax relates to our jurisdiction because it relates to states collect contacts across state lines and that is another whole jurisdictional area for the house judiciary. basically state compacts in relations with others whose jurisdictions. that is an issue that affects transactions on the internet. we also have the issue of states in tight economic times attempting to collect matches

sales taxes, but other types of taxes from businesses that are briefly in their state. it's not just necessarily on the internet. could be driving a certain number of tracks to your state. if you past six or seven trucks they see fit by the corporate income tax returns or business that could be tax return. signed legislation that creates a bright line test so we can promote commerce, competition and encourage small businesses reflect that do business in other states because of the complexity when they might get hit by another state. we had to go to tell them, this is the line. if you want to do business come across that line in other states can tax if you don't cross that line. i think i would benefit not only business is expanding and6 creating jobs, but also states that waste resources trying to get businesses to dance on the head of a pin because they know

under what circumstances they could then taxing entity coming into their state, which should be afraid to minimize contact days doing other context wouldñ6 allow them to impose these taxes. if it's less than that, we see it is minimize and businesses shouldn't have to worry about that. if you go to a trade show in the state and set up your booth, don't install it and, if any contact with the state to require them to file a return. we should be promoting people going to trade shows, sharing ideas. but going into that state to set up a business and operated there for a period of time, certainly the state should be able to impose their state and local taxes on that business. after that is chair of the judiciary subcommittee on competition in the internet. he is also cochair of the congressional internet caucus and julianna gruenwald, tech and telecom staff writer for the

national journal. >> is a pleasure to be air group north korea passed the future and i think it was very interestingly structured the because it has part memoir, part history and part i guess what i would call the international

relations theorist sketchbook on north korea. but we are hoping to accomplish by writing this book and what impact do you hope will have? >> guest: i'm glad she didn't say punditry is one of the topics. the main thing i wanted to read this book is that unless the government in 2007, i really had no desire to write a book about north korea. i've been dealing with the issue for three years, involved in the negotiations come and seen everything really close up and i just didn't have a desire to read it then. but five years later, gave the situation in north korea within, it seemed like a good opportunity to read a little bit about my experiences there. a bit about the history and about the u.s. policy, even to a more general audience because i think this is the sort of issue where the educated reader doesn't know a lot about north

korea, is history. they see headlines about missile tests, rational leaders and all these sorts of things. i just thought it would be good to read a book that people could look to a sort of a comprehensive assessment as they history, the family, economics, politics, human rights situation, nuclear problem that they could look to every time they had a question about what was going on with north korea. so i wouldn't call it a scholarly book, though it does have footnotes. it is really written to a more generalized that might be interested in learning some in about the country in the far side of the planet. >> host: the book also has a point of view when it ain't is informed by experience of the bush administration. how did you decide to kind of

infuse it with that kind of point of view? you know, arguments really about north korea's future. it's little bit different from straight history of faith. >> guest: i think any history has an opinion and it. and i think in this case, particularly the parts of the u.s. policy, certainly they were born a man experiences dealing with the north koreans in the bush administration, but i thought i also try to give an objective process in terms of the overall view that every u.s. administration going back to ronald reagan is trite to do this problem. ronald reagan has to don't engage her initiative. george h.w. bush said, clinton did. george w. bush and barack obama all day. and so, while i think there are some of my own personal views

about how i thought president bush handled the situation, there's how he thinks american readers might disagree with, but their sinks in that readers would be surprised about in terms of a president bush sought in terms of diplomacy with north korea, which is not normally something they would associate with president bush's views on north korea. so that was a natural thing where i could add some pain on this that perhaps other authors have written on the topic would not be able to. >> host: you don't necessarily take an ideological giving your evaluation of the other administration's. do you do give of critical review of success and failures of other administrations in dealing with the issue. one of the the basic thesis of the book is north korea is the impossible state because no one inside has been power to overthrow it and no one on the outside cares enough to risk the

cost of changing it. i want to ask you about both of those. in particular, starting with notice and howard, why do you think that has been the case in north korea? especially from a comparative politics dave, this really makes north korea an outlier compared to what we saw with the former soviet union. just go right, that observation is quite accurate anything. we look at the soviet union and the regimes of the arab spring, all of which have had leaders in power longer than the farmer recently deceased north korean leader have all collapsed to survive. no one in the system is inherent to overthrow it. but i think it's also just because, as you know well, to very strict control that exists in this country is a society in which, to use the strong state

would be an understatement. this is about the strongest state in terms of the control it has been a society and nonpolitical freedoms and even the way people think. so for that reason it's very difficult to imagine that could be a group within a society that could speak out, that could challenge the view that a party congress committees or do things don't happen in north korea. so that is why it is blasted for this long, i think, because in spite of a lot of problems and economic elements, human problems, and it's lasted this long. that is because no one within the system is capable of changing it. >> host: but there are potential forces for change in north korea. you talk about organization, it her mission close. you know, it's maybe post-totalitarian, but were

obviously not too pleased that there's an organized opposition. how do you think it's going to take for us to see the evolution of politics in north korea to a point where it's possible to the express? >> guest: it's as political scientist we determine when these happen in the desert to reach a critical tipping point, but i don't think we can. i mean, i don't think we can say with any degree of accuracy what the tipping point in terms of when a society is ready to act to another then sent to the -- follows the rules on the current political system. in the case all three of you in the say in the book i talk a lot about the element that i think is new in this picture, which is the growing markets in the country really starting from the famine of the 1990s, in which

people basically had to sell whatever they could find. a cop, pen for food. that wa the start of a marketing system that never really had markets before. and that is going on now for 15 years. what we can say is there's this element there that was not there in the past that has created more of an independence of mind that the people of north korea and not being solely reliant on handouts from the government. but when exactly that is going to reach a point where the system will pit is very hard to say. >> host: how do you think the state is adapt and? >> guest: parts of a data is trying to crack down on this earth and the unofficial market that has existed from the official market. there have been efforts that perform, which you might call before but north korea said the economic projects with the affluent south korea, but these have largely been aimed at

bringing our currency in to help the regime, not so much to create real market reform in the country. and so, i think that what we are seeing now if we dcfs at economic agents of the outside world, the north korean egypt is doing this, not because they are seeking necessary to create a better life for the people. >> host: and what ways do you think protest could emerge? or do you think it's going to be a case for anything that happens is just going to be stamped out? did you see any possibility for the elites tolerating certain forms of dissent? >> guest: right now it's hard to imagine that. the question to wther you can -- about what we will see if

their toleration of dissent reemergence of dissent. a social scientist we can't predict that, but what we can do is put preconditions that exist that could lead to that. the market mentality is these things. at least there's not a lot of evidence that is tolerant of any dissent. there's not a lot of evidence that they have tried to listen to what the content of whatever protest has taken place in north korea. of course it goes without saying that this is a country that's very hard to get any information on what is happening inside the country. when they talk about protests and the beard and the dose, stories of things that happen in this military, that cd, but we really don't -- we really don't

know. and it is such a hematocrit to country. yet i think when the day comes when it opens up or however it opens up, if it ollapses, follows nuc unification that germany's, we will learn a lot about the political dissent exists in the country, but hd to find that in fact that the rs really brigid and therefore more like a cat or do you think it's flexible in that sense it's muddled through despite incredible global changes in the international environment? you know, how should reevaluate the care or to have a sense of what might come later on? >> guest: i think if you pose that's a chunk of it wanted the land of the spectrum in a regime that will crack rather than one that is sorted and malleable and

has managed to muddle through. the reason has been able to muddle through is because the second fact retype that it be upset at the conversation as it's managed to muddle through not because of any any internal for the system because of what's happening outside of north korea. but is this dynamic where nobody really wants to put in the effort to change it or to solve the problem. there's one country in particular the ones to ensure that there are no big changes or unstable occurrences in the country. >> guest: that's the second part of the observation is a winter's move to raise the cost of changing it. really that is quite striking when we look at the history, especially of how human rights can turn to motivated desires for international intervention

and then he has rwanda, kosovo, bosnia and yet somehow toward korea hasn't been subject to the same internationally this and despite the fact that, you know, arguably the human rights conditions are just as bad as certainly for large portions of the population. you know, how was it that this is the case? what makes north korea immune to that sort of focus of the international community? >> guest: when we say international community we have to be clear what we mean that we mean the developed west and their certain issues the developed west has taken up in terms of human rights. he mentioned some of them. really they've taken a few causes. others, sudan, to that, others taken up through great extent by

the international community. but north korea is not one of the issues. for two reasons. the first is the very successful efforts by the north korean regime to ensure that this remains a faceless policy issue and not a personal story of a story that the average american if you will somehow be influenced or take out across four. many north koreans would defect to the border with china are set back by the cheney's sunglasses so there's nobody that could associate namer phase with this terrible human rights situation in north korea. you know, just for example, military dictatorships have this

person by the name of ken jong il became lionized as a face for democratic activism in south korea. so you have these personalities that can be identified with the problem. north koreans have been good at not allowing that to happen. cheney said that a city not. that is one of the reasons why it hasn't been taken out. the other right-thinking sages passed not captured the imagination of some major personality in the west. i know this may sound catty, but practically as true when someone like richard gere takes a good dad or via sir takes the chinese policies in darfur were. this scares a resonance to the

issue that we would not normally see. and in the case of north korea, we haven't had that. we haven't had an individual that does that. now i think one of the things we are seeing more as and their stories of this in the book as well if americans are learning more about the story that some defectors getting out of north korea. there have been several books written recently about the fact durso flies and manage to escape, telling stories. and i think that certainly helps. but still, compared to other cases of human rights, we just don't see the same sort of precedent with regard to the issue. >> host: you know, that they're testing defeat sure of north korea sakura to have an impact on the human rights observations by the international communities. north korea has been on

described to become a nuclear weapons state. i think that's particularly interesting when we look at iraq you were in the bush administration for part of the time the this issue was plain out. it turns out we decided to attack iraq and overthrow saddam hussein. he didn't have nuclear weapons and north koreans arguably have just as the cause of the regime we decided not to pursue that course of action but north korea. how do you see the difference between the two? >> guest: is a tough question to answer. without recounting the whole history of why the bush administration went into iraq, that was area for spot debility. so i'm not really capable of i thenting on that. buk in the case nor korea, there's two issues. the puzzle is now buy iraq

inside of north korea, but if in iraq, but why not also in north korea. i think there's two answers. the first is that you have china china sits right on the order with north korea. the last thing the united states or china wants is some sort of calm and haitian that would sound so -- somehow constituted that it has. so any time there is thought given to some sort of military action, this is constantly at the top -- not even talk, but halfway up the escalation ladder constantly concerned over u.s. president i think it's sad to think about seriously. so i think that is certainly one of the reasons, the china factor. the other is that the united

states went into iraq or afghanistan because it became a top foreign-policy issue on which the industry should saw a revolution. now we can debate whether that was the right or wrong thing. many americans think it is about being. many think nothing is resolved there. that's a completely different question. the point for korea is i don't really think that the north korea issue has risen to that level of priority for not ministration. it has been a crisis that she went to solve, at least in the sense of preventing it -- a bigger crisis through diplomacy. but the united states historically when it is thought to solve a problem has been willing to use those force and diplomacy to really solve the problem.

in the case of north korea, that is just not register the type and that is not specific to any administration. we've had crisis with north korea at the success of the administration. every administration as they think ovulation. when we reach a crisis of north korea, relent to go all out to the anti-solve this thing or do we want a solution that when we parked it momentarily, put on a diplomatic track, free sick, tepid and move on to the other issues that most concern us, weatherby domestic economic or iraq or afghanistan or syria or the middle east peace process. these tend to be the more important issues traditionally in u.s. foreign policy. >> guest: the other issue that makes iraq different is the u.s. korea alliance. and so, how do you see the dynamics of the alliance playing into our ability to address the top concerns that the u.s. has

relation to? >> guest: undeniably with a look at the situation is clearly more important than we have towards north korea. south korea is a key ally for the united states day. it's a major partner in international initiatives around the world. a trading partner, all these things make south korea extremely important to the united states in terms of its position in asia. i think there's always been a tension in the u.s. south korean relationship when it comes to north korea because we have different government and democracy in south korea, some of which tend to be more progressive. we seek more engaged with north korea and others tend to be more conservative, which follow are wise to follow a tougher path regarding the north. so for the united states, the question is sort of syncing up

with which whatever government is there at the time as they deal with the latest north korean crisis. so for example, when i was in government during the bush administration made a progressive government of south korea that was quite engagement oriented and was willing to deal with the behavior in order to fulfill its mission of trying to seek long-term reference liaison with the country in the north. and the bush administration was not as enamored with that particular strategy. i think currently you have an obama administration and the conservative government tend to be very much on the same page when it comes to north korea because both of them after having been burned by north korean provocation really are of a mind to kind of hold tight, hold firm and require the north meets certain preconditions before we have another round of

diplomacy. so you know, i've always said that sort of 75% of her north korean policies are south korean policy in the sense that we need to stay synced up with our allies and with japan also. whenever we're dealing with the north korean problem. >> host: you know, another aspect of the book you talk about is president bush's own issue in north korea. and you mentioned i think john jan as having been a major influence on president bush's 19. and of course he had the white house and other refugees in the white house. the appearance of kyoto. and so, he took ideas that approach, but actually my impression was that the human

rights envoy that was appointed really was not a major part of the picture in terms of the policy. now we have the obama administration, we haven't seen any refugees in the oval office, police in a human rights envoy that actually went to north korea and talked with the north koreans can i raise human rights that the north korean, even though that was probably relatively short conversation. where do you see as the merits and demerits of this approach is? >> guest: i think it's great the obama administration, human rights and robert king has been able to make a trip to the korea. two trips are more. i mean, i think that's great. the more we can open a dialogue with other users of issues the north, the better. admittedly part of what he was

doing, as you know well, with straight to negotiate a humanitarian assistance package in terms of food more than human rights abuses. the fact that he was there is very important. as you know well, the dialogue on human rights is kind of a ridiculous dialogue because you can tell them you need to improve the human rights situation and the response will be had this conversation at the official level. the response will be commuted the united states have human rights problems, too. and that is not a comparable discussion. and so, i think what president bush wanted to do was he wanted to make this an issue that people know about. and he wise, as he put it, he wanted to do something. he wanted his presidency by the time he left the oval office, he wanted to do something to

improve the lives of north korean people. and so i think there were two things that he did. the first was hoped to create the first resettlement program for north korean refugees in the united states. no had existed product. there's a big program that did exist and that would be to an extent expecting. but for another country is headed south korea and for a country that the united states to say we are going to take north korean defect is who want to settle in the united states was a big step. the administration didn't like to say his book the death, were doing what we think, but it was a big important step assertive set an example out there and put a marker pacing of the united states is not just talking about the human rights in north korea trying to do something. the second thing as you

mentioned was he brought attention to the issue by bringing in the tag goods, people whose book is read, stories he's known, intimate details he's known very well about all of these folks and talk to about this situation. ..

>> guest: when you are limited in terms of what you can do, and everyone republics sovereignty so you just don't go crashing into the country, these were tangible and concrete steps that tried to put this on the radar screen and create more international attention because that is, you know, that, creating that sort of knowledge base and that sort of advocacy environment is the first step to try to address a problem like this. >> host: now the book also, i guess, goes through and illustrates the wrong decisions north korea made in terms of building its own economy. this is striking. as you note in the book, north korea was the more powerful part of the peninsula compared to south korea for a long time until the ' 70s. you talk about their illicit

activities, and this was an area of focus in the bush administration that we don't hear much about these days. i'm wondering, do you think these activities are continuing? are we succeeding in screesing north korea in terms of customers in terms of military equipment and missile sales? do we see still activity by north korea in terms of trying to counterfeit cigarettes or corn fit u.s. money or sell drugs abroad? where do you think that stands at this point? >> guest: this is a fascinating story, the nation that one-third of its economy is based on illicit activities. as you mentioned, counterfeiting drugs, counterfeiting cigarettes, counterfeiting the u.s. currency. the north koreans counterfeit the u.s. $100 bill. it is known in the profession,

if you will, as the supernote because north koreans managed somehow to acquire the printing press, the ink, and the paper that is used for the production of $100 bills. the difference is that the printing plates they managed to acquire are brand new whereas the what the u.s. treasury uses are old. the imperfections you see in a treasury note you don't see in a north korea note. that's why it's called the supernote. this is a part of their economy, and so during the bush administration, efforts were taken to try to stop this. through a series of sanctions aimed at trying to target the count of companies that were known to be involved in illicit activities, and i think the reason we don't hear more about

it today is because these activities have been fairly successful. the north koreans probably do not feel that they can do the same sorts of things that they used to do for many years when it came to making money through this sort of activity. >> host: okay, so it's actually the international community and the u.s. are getting better at eliminating those markets for north korea for those kinds of activities? >> guest: i think so. i think so. i mean, i think that's why we're not hearing much more about to today, but i also -- i mean, i also think that for many of the financial institutions, they've just become much more weary of handling north koreaning thes and north korean money, and so that's also caused north koreans themselves to think about whether they want to be seen as being this financially liable asset that every bank regulator or bank president doesn't want

to see in their institution. >> host: and one of the other cases that's related to that that you had direct experience with was the bank of delta asia situation where the u.s. treasury issued an advisory about that bank and the possibility it was engauging in money laundering or handling counterfeit notes. how do you see -- and, of course, that occurred in a point of time where there looked to be some progress and negotiations, and then it seemed like everything stalled out. how do you see -- how -- do you think that was the case with bda, that it stalled the diplomacy and, you know, as we look today at, you know, more satellite launches, possibility a third nuclear test by north korea, you know, seems like a lot of people are calling for,

you know, reexamination of the financial area. you know, is it replicablo, and did it work? >> guest: yeah. well, the first thing i'll point out is the irony in the description you just gave which is on the win hand when the u.s. government pursued this financial sanction in 2005 and 2006, it was widely criticized as something both ineffective and hurting the diplomacy, and yet, today, as you said, there's people clammoring for it because they see it as a powerful tool in influence on north korean behavior. in twaif, this particular action was, as you said, it was a treasury department advisory to u.s. financial institutions to

be aware of doing being with a particular bank and bank of delta asia because accounts in it related to north korea were believed to be involved in money loppedderring. this, in the end, was a law enforcement action. it was something i think the u.s. government had to do. if a country's counterfitting your currency, that's technically an act of war. they were obligated to take action for protection of u.s. financial institutions. now, as many people who follow this know the effect was a ripple effect. this was against a small bank in china that then caused every other bank regulator and bank president and financial institution around the world to say wait a second, if the u.s. is not dealing with this bank because they are concerned about north korean accounts, maybe we should look at the north koreaning thes in our bank.

-- korean accounts in our bank. it had a big impact on north korea. now, was this meant as an action to submarine the diplomacy that was taking place? i really don't think so. like i said, it was a law enforcement action. it was something that was happening on a parallel track with the diplomacy. all of us who are participating in the diplomacy were also participating in the decision making process on this particular action. in the end, it was something that had to be done. it did cause a delay in the negotiations, but as we saw later, the negotiations eventually came back op line, and it led to two very important agreements, one of which re-froze the north korean nuclear program, and a second agreement which led to the

dismantlement of important pieces of the nuclear program at young gun such that it's pretty safe to say today the plutonium program, the nuclear based plutonium is no longer functional. that was one of the accomplishments the united states made in terms of diplomacy ploam swhi it came to -- diplomacy when it came to stopping north korea's nuclear program. now, as you know, we have a new program that there's concern about, not just the plutonium, but the uranium program. in terms of, you know, the accomplishments that were made through these new sanctions at the time, these new sanctions, i think, were quite effective in getting north korea to give up at least pieces of their program. >> host: do you think their replicable as an instrument today or is the time passed?

>> i'm not as close to it as i had been in the past so i don't know -- i don't know, for example, if the north koreans have adjusted. i presume they have to what they saw in the action in bda in 2005. i think on the one hand the north koreans have adjusted and are finding work arounds so they are not subject to the same sorts of sanctions. on the other hand, when the united states pursued this, it was an advisory to u.s. financial institutions. it was not something that was supported by the u.n., supported by u.n. security council, but on the other hand, today, you know, after the first nuclear test by the obama administration in 2009, you have security counsels that give authority for pursuing these financial sanctions. on the one hand, the north koreans have probably tried hard

to find work arounds to avoid being subject to the same sorts of sanctions. on the other hand, the united states now has the international authority to pursue these things in the way they did not under the bush administration. >> host: one other question on this. you talked about, you know, the resumption of diplomacy, but, of course, as part of that, we gave back the money that was being held under the law enforcement action that had occurred. i'm sure the north koreans probably looked at that as exoneration for what they had done. how do you view the fact that the north koreans got their money back? >> guest: i think the main lesson learned, and, again, it's evident in the fact that we don't hear much about these sorts of activityings -- activities they were undertaking. the main lesson they learned from that whole episode was they can't continue to do business

this way. they can't continue to try to counterfeit other country's currencies or to sell fake drugs or fake cigarettes. they just can't do that anymore, and so i think that was the main lesson that they learned, and the fact that they came back to the diplomacy and back to the negotiations in earnest to freeze their programs and dismantle them, to me, was a function of -- was a function of this sort of course of diplomacy. i mean i think it was the concern about their financial reputation and everything that came with that that brought them back to the table and that led them to make these agreements. now, they certainly got things in return. i mean, they got heavy fuel law. they got energy assistance. they got new sets of political discussions with the united states. they got a variety of these systems from south korea. they got things in return for this, but, of course, that's the

nature of diplomacy, but i think the driving force behind that, and i know that there were some who would disagree with this, the driving force behind that were these sanctions that really put a bite on them. >> host: of course, they still, you know, are driving for a nuclear status even despite the apparent agreements made that was designed, actually, to deal with the plutonium part of the north korean program, but let me go back and ask about the north korean projects for reform. they are still catch hungry. maybe we don't see any immediate evidence that the leadership is committed to reform, but, of course, the chinese are always there suggesting that the north koreans should follow their path. you know, what really is the way to cultivate app environment where north korea can move, you

know, in a reformed direction? you know, at this point, it's still obvious they are looking for cash, but, you know, is there a way of drawing them into a positive path rather than pursuing the negative activities that we've been talking about? >> guest: well, i think the positive path that's been on the table, really, i think for successive administrations and i know there's always discussions about the extent to which the clinton administration was different from the bush administration different from the obama administration in terns of how they dealt with north korea, but in the book i go through the history of these, and in the end, they, you know, the package i may have been different, but there is a positive path on offer as you know well which is that in return for giving up their nuclear programs, the united states, the international community would provide security guarantees, would provide economic assistance, would provide energy assistance, would provide political normalization,

would provide money, provide a regional security environment in which north korea could feel safe and secure -- all of these sorts of things in return for giving up their nuclear weapons, but that has not worked. it has failed. it has failed for every administration going back to george h. w. bush, and i think with the obama administration, we have really reached the end of the road in terms of this because i think many would argue the obama administration in terms of its initial intentions was the most forward leaning administration to come into office when it came to the north korean problem, and yet, it is now in a position indistinguishable from the harder line that the bush administration took and even that the clinton administration took at times during their two terms. that's the positive path, and they don't seem to want to take it. what can be done in the interim? i think the most important thing

that can be done is to try to get more information into north korea, more information in terms of what is going on in the outside world, in terms of marketization, in terms of the internet, in terms of cell cell phones. i think this is -- this is the only way to really make end roads to getting into the country. from the perspective of the leadership, economic reform is a double-edged sword because on the one hand, they need economic reform. they need money, they need food, they need these things. on the other hand, you know, when regimes like this open up, it releases all sorts of political forces that i inevitay lead to a lot of crock and -- control and possibly the collapse of the regime. that's not a bargain that, you know, the leadership, particularly the new leadership

that's up experienced, just came into power, and that prizes political control. that's the last thank they really want -- that they really want to consider at this moment. i'm not optimistic on the prospects for reform at this time. >> okay. the way you framed it is very much a u.s. way of framing basically a deal by which the nuclear issue is resolved in exchange for a forward path. you know, the chinese, i think, may have a different idea about what would be necessary that is not about quid pro quos perhaps. it's about the question of essentially you follow us, and you can find a sustainable path. i think that's basically the argument. the question i have is based on what we've seen in china. i mean, north korea has not necessarily even seemed to be willing to dip its toe in the water, but, you know, what would a north korea shopping look like? how would we know if we, you

know, began to see a north korean leadership that was moving in the direction, and, you know, could a north korean ping succeed? >> guest: yeah. well, you know, scott, i mean, you know, i have many friends. who are chinese scholars, and when i talk to those friends, they are always optimistic about north korea, the prospects for north korea, and i never understood why. you know, when you ask them say they it's clear why they are optimistic because they have studied china, and they have seen china come from where it came in the cultural revolution and the great leap forward to being the country it is today. they think if a big cry like china is complex and as complicated as it is can do that, certainly north korea can do that, but, again, there's two dig disimpses here -- big differences here. the first is china had ping, and

he was a charismatic leader, a larger than life figure. there is no ping in north korea. there's an inexperienced 29-year-old running the country now. he's no ping. that's the first problem. the second problem is, you know, chinese said to get rich is glorious. making money was okay. even if it meant giving up a degree of political control. for the current north korean leadership, and at least for the foreseeable future, there is nothing more important right now than political control. that is -- that looks to be the case for the last leadership, and it looks to be the case for the current leadership. i think there are hopes that the young fellow, the kim il, the young leader, who spent a part of his life in switzerland in

secondary school, they are hoping he's ping, but, again, given the recent crisis and the missile test, and the failed deal that the obama administration tried to reach with north korea, i don't think there's a lot of hope right now that he shows signs of being a future ping. maybe there is a military general somewhere in north korea that is up happy with the current situation, that is unhappy with a young leadership that is making bad decisions, that has a different view on things. you know, maybe there is a south korean in north korea, but we don't know, and so right now, the prospects don't look very good for that sort of reform or that sort of charismatic leadership. >> host: some people would point to il's uncle as one possible reformer. certainly, he has had some international experience.

it's hard to judge whether he'd move in the direction of reform, but say somebody emerged to play a role, but within the same system, how do you think the u.s. government would be able to respond to that circumstance? >> guest: well, i think they'd certainly welcome somebody like that, but, you know, the obvious problem, and, first, they would welcome someone like that, someone like a senior figure interested in reforms and interested in taking north korea to a better place. if there was someone like the regimes in burma today, i think the united states would welcome that, but the 800-pound gorilla in the room, even if that were the scenario, still remains the

nuclear issue. this is when it comes down to the core where the chinese and the u.s. really differ. for the chinese, they want reform or want to promote it as you say, but they are saying in order to try to promote reform, we have to do things like give them a peace treaty and northerlyize relations with the united states and dprk as presteps, if you will, to trying to promote reform. i think the problem for the united states is that that's just not possible, and every administration going back to george h. w. bush made it clear that the number one priority is the nuclear program, and the united states welcomes reform, absolutely in north korea, but it must come be denuclearization. we have alliances in the region, our position in asia west on

these alliances, and i don't think any of our allies, japan or south korea, let alone the united states, would be in normalizing relations, full political relations with a country that remains a nuclear state outside the regime. it would basically destroy the nonproliferation treaty and regime and have a dramatic effect on alliances in the region so this is a rue -- rubix cube that's difficult to match up and a big problem every time we talk about a big deal with north korea. >> host: you talked about issues related it deterrence, denuclearization, and, you know, people thought if north korea conducted a nuclear test that constitutes a paradigm shift in the region. of course, you were there when

they conduct the the first test. was there something about china's reaction in particular that surprised you? how did you, you know, how did you see the response to that playing out and how did the response that you were involved with in the bush administration, you know, what should we draw from that, for instance, in the context of a poll adecisional nuclear test by north korea in the coming weeks and months? >> in the short term, it was a game changer in the sense that we moved to a new level of unity in terms of puppishing the north for these actions in the sense that we had u.n. security county resolutions really for the first time in which china and russia were to sign on to these and unanimously condemn north korea

and sanction them for the actions. in the short term, that was a game changer, and since then, every time the north koreas have done something egregious, for the morse part, the chinese and russians have gone along, certainly with nuclear tests, but in the longerrer term in retrospect, that was about the only real change. it didn't create the sort of game changing mentality in the way that the chinese dealt with north korea. there was a lot of debate in china as to whether they should drop the ally, drop this legacy of the cold war and help to end this reyeem. that has not happened. if anything, they have drawn closer to north korea over the last few years, economically and in terms of supporting the new leadership so it didn't create a major change people thought it would, and, again, part of it, i

think, is the fact that the status quo bias, if you will, in terms of dealing with the north korea in the crisis is to try to bring it down, lower the temperature. it's not to try to solve the problem. that is a political choice and administrations in washington, seoul, tokyo, beijing, and moscow, these are choices they make. in the end, at least for now, stability equates to peace and prosperity. status quo equates to peace and prosperity in east asia, the most economically vibrant region of the world, and do people want that or do they want to go down the violent path with north korea, potentially very violent path with north korea where you try to solve the problem? it's clear what everybody governmentments tews is -- government wants to do, and that's maintain the status quo. >> host: that brings us to the

question of creating unification. it seems to be a gap between the u.s. vision and a chinese vision, and also it involves what south koreans want in the future. my impression was you were bullish about the prospects for achieving unification. you dealt, to some degree, with some of the challenges that would emerge. at this point, you know, how likely do you think it is that carerra can achieve unification, and how do you see that process playing out in terms of, you know, in a context where china's influence continues to rise? >> guest: i don't think the united states and south korea on the one hand and china on the other hand has the same view of unification. the united states has said explicitly in the joint

statements of the past two presidents with the south korea counterparts it's for a single carerra free and at peace. that's the natural order of things in the international relations of this part of the world, a unified korea peninsula, and the chinese don't. the chinese don't want to see unification. they just don't. that's become clearer and clearer in the past couple of years so i think there really is a conflict of interest between the two sides when it comes to that. in terms of the future and unification, it's impossible to say how it would happen just like no one could predict how or the conditions under which germany unification would happen, but i think what we can't focus on is the question of whether countries in the region are ready and willing to take on the task of unification, and i think ten years ago that was not the case.

ten years ago, i think, the general consensus was, unification's too difficult, much harder than the two germanys, too dangerous, and something that should be pushed off as far as you can into the piewch future two or three generations if you will. basically, not my problem. nobody wanted it to be their problem, and as i talk about in the book, i think the attitude on that is slowly changing now. in part because the weapon situation is getting worse and worse. the human rights situation is getting worse and worse, and i think while no onements it try to push north korea over the edge, there's a growing feeling that it is coming, and we have to be prepared. there's that change of attitude in south korea, and you see it in places like japan where the north korean threat is the biggest threat to japan today,

and while on the one hand japanese are always concerned about reunified resur gent nationalism in one carerra, they see the current situation as being quite dangerous, potentially very unstable, and i think their attitudes are changing on this too. in the back, you know, we look and talk about so both of the things we need to watch because no one can predictupification or say when it it's going to happen, but the question is are you prepared for it? that's the operative question for the societies and governments in the region, and whereas before no one wanted to talk about it at all. there's openness and willingness to talk about this now. >> host: yeah. i also want to ask as we close after kim jung il died #, you wrote a piece saying north korea

as we know it is over. we see a fair amount now of continue newty. the question is, you know, how durable is the possible state? >> guest: yeah. well, you know, it all depends on how you define "north korea". i think north korea, as we know it, with the death of kim jung il is over in the sense that as i talk about in the book, i think we're entering a new phase where you have a young untested leadership with immense challenges in terms of main taping his own position in the system and also dealing with a crumbling economy and an acute food problem, and at the same time, the society is increasingly influenced by a market mentality like it was not the last time you had a leadership transition in 1994 when the first leader died and

the second leader came into place. in that sense, the north korea today is not like the north korea of the past. sure, it's not collapsed or has not changed since the death, but we're only talking a few months. this new regime in north korea's only been in power for a few months, and in the broader scope of history, there's many regimes that lasted months, years before something major has happened in terms of change so i think that the verdict is still out on this. i don't think that we can simply assume that everything will go smoothly and they will be able to muddle through for because prior to the death of kim jung il, i would ask any expert, including you, scott, what's the most important variable to create major change in the country, and i think everyone would have agreed the sudden death of the north korean leader

so i think we have to respect what we thought before, and i think we all have to watch what is going to happen because i think the future of this regime is not at all certain, and the ramifications if something happens is huge for the united states and for others in the region in a way that doesn't matter for the average american. that's why i wanted to write the book. >> thank you. i appreciate the chance to further explore the issues in the book. >> guest: thanks very much, scott.

>> host: hi, steve, thank you for joining us at "after words" today, and congratulations on quite the achievement. >> guest: thank you. >> host: first of all, i enjoyed the book. >> guest: thanks. >> host: it read like a novel k like non-fiction in places, which as a writer you encounteredded the feeling as well, and i know as a reporter who dealt with exxon mobile most of her career how difficult it was to probe the company. let's start there. why exxon-mobile?

you looked at getty oil in your career, but why this company, and how was it -- how did it differ from some of your other subjects like the bin ladens? >> guest: uh-huh. and it's just an interesting -- to me, it was an interesting gorpny, i started out as a business reporter on wall street when i was young, and then i went abroad and worked more on international subjects, and after 9/11, i wrote about the origins of the 9/11 attacks in 20 years of american covert policy in afghanistan and the ghost wars, and after that was over, i wanted to keep writing about america and the the world after 9/11, the a-symmetric strange groping we had as a country to understand what the attacks were, what the relationship with the middle east was, and that led me to the bin ladens which was a book intended to be about saudi arabia and its modernization and how complicated it was for this generation of oil shock boomers

that osama belonged to to be of age in the 70s when the kingdom was a wash in wealth and they had to buy identities in the world, and one became a terrorist and others moved to florida and so forth, and so that interested me. when i was finished with the project, i really wanted to write about oil and american power in the post-9/11 con tex -- context, and so i started, actually, the project didn't begin as a book about exxon-mobile, but oil and geopolitics and wanted to take the prize, the book that inspired me as a young man a long time ago, and update it. it was a work of non-fiction about the era of oil that was in an era of expansion and discovery, and i wanted to write 5 book about global oil and the era of limits and constraints and climate and the rest of it, and so i started out on that

kind of open framework, and i got about six to eight months into the research, and i thought to myself i really need a subject here. i need a company, and once i came to that conclusion, i thought it was the only choice. i backed into them as a subject, and i didn't realize what i was getting into when they were forced upon me in my thinking as a subject. i didn't know how difficult they were to report on, just thought it was a normal corporation, and i also didn't understand that much about their internal culture so a lot of the three and a half years that remain was about discovering what exxon really was. >> host: in the course of the reporting, the bp deepwater horizon spill happened. at all, were you like, did i pick the wrong company? >> guest: i had mixed feelings. i joked to the journalist friends there has to be a word in germman that describes what journalists feel that when others suffer, but you get an

ending to the book. this spill, this environmental disaster on this scale, although it was not exxon mobile's responsibility, it provided a bookend for the valdez spill, an origin story for modern exxon mobile, a story they tell themselves the story they were scared straight by the valdez and reformed themselves and who they are, traces to the reforms that started with that accident so i thought, well, the deepwater horizon accident could be a book end. at one stage wrestling with how to make the book more specific, i did consider a dual narrative of exxon mobile and bp, and my regret that deadly deepwater hon was maybe i should have done that. it would have been too much reporting, and i never would have got under the surface if i had not concentrated on one corporation. >> host: talk about that. that's an interesting point. starting the book out with valdez and making it new, it's just a new narrative that made it new, and then ending with the

deepwater horizon disaster in the gulf of mexico in april 2010. as a person that really delved into, and i know you wrote the transcripts from the exxon valdez incident, but did you see any parallels? i did a little bit. i didn't cover valdez, i was young then. i did cover deepwater horizon, and in your description of valdez and exxon's response to it, i did see some -- it almost seems like bp took a page out of the play book. did you see that at all as you were seeing the coverage of bp? >> guest: deaf -- definitely parallels. a few that come to mind are that in the decade running up to valdez, there were warning signs that exxon was not operating in a consistent manner in a way that would give you the highest possible reassurance that such a

catastrophic accident couldn't take place. in fact, before they cut 80,000 out of 100,000 employees, they re-organized the entire safety department, entire environmental department, and, you know, obviously, the fact that a tanker captain with a drinking problem who had dui arrests was still in his job making more than $100,000 a year in 1989 dollars, that's not the exxon mobile you would expect today. there was a series of warning signs that culminated in the accident. same true of bp. i don't know what you would say, but i the had impression from the people in the industry that bp's record as a weak operator and, you know, the texas city plant, the osha record, the fact that they basically had a culture and strategy that emphasized financial engineering at the expense of operating discipline was pretty well known in the industry, and i sort of came to the conclusion after

talking to people for three or four years, if you called up people the thing happened. who do you think the super major was operating the platform, got a strong majority from bp at that point. that was there. the second parallel was preparation for actually mitigating the disaster. in both cases, paper plans said we can handle this, and they were not at will to do so, and the kind of learning how to deal with all of the traumas, bp had the benefit of 20 years learning about corporate crisis management that exxon, you know, in those days, 1989, the whole philosophy how to communicate and get on television making things right and so forth, that was not as well developed a strategy in exxon's day, but,

any way. >> host: i agree. i think the aftermath strikes me more than what happened before because as a reporter in the deepwater horizon, bp gobbled every expert. you couldn't find an expert to save your life who was not on bp's payroll. there's a role that emanates through the book, i think, emanated after bp in terms of kind of controlling the message, controlling access to people that independently talked to reporters about what happened, and technical subjects again, and you go every in the book. you globe trot. you also tackle numerous environmental issues from global warming, a tanker, to making

underground storage tanks, and nteb, i covered that in my early career in upstate new york, and risk of fallates, all controlled from cradle to grave. how did you pick out the antedotes? the company that goes back to standard oil days. there's a treasure-trove, and as a reporter i know it's difficult to do that sifter and which nuggets are you going to pick. how did you pick out the antedotes for this book? >> guest: yeah, so i started with a map. once i chose exxon mobile as the summit, i looked at the map of where they owned oil and gas, and i asked myself as a reporter, well, what world is this? why are they there? why are they there? i was interested in trayfulling across that -- traveling across that map. as you pointed to earlier, they are a closed subject. they were not excited to learn i was doing this book. they dbt volunteer to be written

about. they handled my up qir ris in a professional way, but they didn't really cooperate much, but would say relative to some projects they cooperated more than usual, but from the perspective of the ambition of the book while it was helpful, everything that they oured, it was limited. i basically had to go outside in, and so once i started with this outside-in process, i started with the map, and so the first year i traveled a fair amount into the field where they operated. i tried to understand their role in the wormed, sense of themselves as an independent sovereign, how they operated on the ground, why are they in these countries learning about reserve replacement challenges, learning about why equity oil in weak states had sort of evolved as part of their port foal yo, and so on. i came back to the united states, and i thought, well, i have a pretty good first draft sense of how they operate abroad, but i have to concentrate on their washington strategy and their lobbying and political strategy so i then

turned to the tools that you use as a reporter to go outside-in in the united states which is basically lawsuits and disclosures. i had filed freedom of informationing the -- information requests for the overseas work, but for the american subject, i looked at lobbying disclosures and mapped those out too saying what are they lobbying about? fallates is an example. what are they? in the summer of 2008. they were like all over the subject. it was really the data that said, okay, there's not to be something here. to finish on the lawsuits, you know, they get sued by everything over everything, and so it's a great tool of reporting to be able to look at civil litigation because in those cases records and temperature are produced even if the policy is to never give interviews, they have to testify. i was looking for cases that told structural deep stories, points of entry, and one i found

was a gasoline spill in maryland where i realized searching litigation records started with mtbe and fought my bay down, and i realized there was a huge trial record around what was one the largest gasoline spills in an area that depended on fresh ground water supplies in audiocassette -- aquafers. there was a trial by executives and documents produced, and it was just a gift. i went straight into the retailing and downstreamed a vision of exxon mobile through the trial report -- record in a way i couldn't do in interviews. opportunistic is the word for choosing the subjects. you look on the map, and then there's a way to tell a story. >> host: it's interesting, though, despite how broad they are in terms of geography and subject matter, the lesson, i

think, is the same over and over again which is i think it comports with the public's perception of exxon which is this company that is rigid, that is all powerful, that you don't want to mess with. >> guest: right. >> host: to put it colloquially. did anything you come across surprise you or fit outside the narrative? seems to me the book, all the stories come back to that. >> guest: yeah. >> host: in different ways, you're right, each one has a different take on it, but some of its parts is this image of the company that really comports with what everybody in their gut feels. >> guest: yeah. they are who they are, and the reason that it's true across settings, that the same kind of decision making and the same kind of culture and rigidity where they might say focus and consistency is present in

indonesia and suburban maryland and the washington offices because they have constructed a global system, and global policies that are so unified and so codified and so distributed down all of their channels of operation that i think more than any other corporation i've every encountered as a journalist, everybody there reads off the same play book. it's like a military operation or a sports team that's exceptionally well-organized around the same play book, and i think they are self-conscious. they are unusual among corporations everyone at the top grew up together. if you took the top 100 publicly traded corporations in the united states, and you chose, say, the top 40 jobs at each of the corporations, and you mapped who the people were, you would fibbed there's a significant number of people who came from a competing company laterally late in the career as an executive. they moved over and or came from

another industry as a marketing specialist and reformed ideas, and so mort corporations are informed at the top by an outside perspective. at exxonmobil, they come up from college graduate school, and if you are selected for management tracking, you grow up over 30-40 years. it's like the marine corp.. you are not a general without having a successful career at ibm and wear two stars on your shoulder, but you grow up, have a common view of the world. what you observed about as a reader of the book which is that whether it's a lawsuit in venezuela or a civil war in indonesia or a gasoline spill in maryland, the story's all end the same way. >> host: exactly right. >> guest: forcing their will, and that's a reason for that, that's their system and who they are. >> host: late in the book, a person who covered energy environment as long as i have, this surprised my. you get into hydraulic

fracturing, which is all over the news. the interior department today is putting out rules for fracking on public lands, and you almost make the case that that corporate philosophy gave them a blind spot when it came to hydraulic fracturing, and it was more surprising because you make an amazing point and i remember this, this is like page 600 that rex tillerson as a young engineer at the company was actually using the technique -- >> guest: right >>. >> host: so do you think in the one case, the fracking case, that corporate philosophy of what's manage or risk, make sure we make a return on what we do hinder them from tapping into what is now this huge gas boom, huge economic opportunity in the country with natural gas? >> guest: well, they were slow, but they are ouch slow, and then they are decisive once they decide a direction. they get to places late, and

then they buy the way in. that's the pattern. they've never had a great reputation as the world's greatest oil and gas discoverers. i'm sure they have winds and a story they tell themselves about successes in exploration, but -- and they have some, but by and large, their strength is financial and operation strength. they have more cash and more discipline about choosing opportunities. generally, if they fail to discover it for themselves, they buy it. that's what they did with fracking. they have been trying to buy a natural gas strategy as natural gas emerged in 2005 and 2006, increasingly looked like a real opportunity, and they went out to do the kind of land games and buying up leases, putting it together one patch at a time and trying to build something, but at their skill, in order to be a player, they had to be in big. now, one of the things that's interesting to me about the fracking story, now they are the largest producer of

unconventional -- >> host: of course they are. they make a decision and then think control; right? >> guest: if you have $40 billion to lay down, you're the largest of almost interesting. what's interesting, and i wonder what you think about this because i think of climate as a challenge of climate legislation, carbon pricing as an analogous challenge faced in an earlier generation dealing with resistance to their investments and thinking with a pretty aggressive strategy. now, fracking is not just a business challenge, it's not just a geological challenge, not just an germing challenge, but it's a political challenge. there's an e nor maws amount of anxiety in the country about the fracking techniques and environmental consequences, land use consequences, the unknown, are you going to induce earthquakes in places that didn't previously have them?

if exxonmobil is the postal child of a rigid, corporate, stiff and profit driven approach to the challenges, then they may have a problem over time. can they actually adapt themselves to the trust building and coalition building that proves durable, or will they take their systems approach, our way or the highway, and, you know, sort of end of defeating themselveses in some respect? they could end up with a tougher public response to fracking than they otherwise get if they were -- >> host: will they align themselves with the other companies doing this? they have in some cases, and from the gook, they are the odd man out. >> guest: that's right. >> host: pursuing what they want to pursue and doing it their way -- >> guest: yeah. >> host: taking no punches and making no excuses for it. i had a conversation this morning with allen jefferies who

i know you know the name well, chief spokesman for exxonmobil, and i asked him about the book to get his reaction from you, which i think you'll find very exxonmobil-esque, but he said essentially how we see the book is it's telling the story of exxonmobil's commitment to safety and community. may not be conservative approaches, but we think they are good qualities of a company of this type. basically, i said to allen, i said, that's how we are and take it. he's like, yeah, that's what we're saying. obviously, that does not surprise you in the course of the book. they actually read it, as you probably know, numerous people have pouredded through the book. what's your response to that? >> guest: well, i appreciate that he's dealing with it in a professional way, and they basically are about media, about journalists, about political

opposition, about environmental groups, they basically stay in their channel, and that's what he's doing. he's saying, you know, we are who we are. that's socially their strategic position. now, sometimes we are who we are feels like a defensive crouch, and that gets to the fracking question. can you really be -- have the sort of strengths of the operating system? they are safety driven, focus the on operating excellence and so forth, and they are project operators. if we were the co-dictators and wanted someone to develop our oil and the project to be on time, on budget, and to get paid early, you know, we would definitely entertain the powerpoint presentation. they have a record of project management that's good where they get into trouble is they extrapolate these operating systems, this remgdty into -- rigidity into political affairs,

the human factor, things that are simpler, made up of community and social change, and they are on record, for example, as a social entity themselves as a corporation on the promotion of women, on diversity, on responding to the kind of world we live in. it's not great, you know? >> host: right. >> guest: yet, these conservative values are out of fashion, and with the we think they are powerful, you know, that's fine if you are talking about crossing your t's on safety at the workplace, but can they succeed with the strategy in a world where nay are so closed to the changing social merrickup of, say, you know, who is the educated work force in the united states anymore? it's mostly women. it's more and more diverse, and if you work at exxonmobil and go home to your family thanking giving dinner and say i work at exxonmobil, and most suck in their breath in disstain or worry, you know, that's not a

winning strategy over 30 years either so somehow something's got to give, i think, i'm not sure they think that though. >> host: that's one of my questions, too, is that it seems to me that kind of we are who we are, take it or leave it, we don't care what anybody else thinks about that. has that backfired on them? i mean, it seems that could have been a force to cultivate more distrust and distaste and help make them, as you say in the book, public enemy number one at points in history. >> guest: well, i mean, it's a great question and complicated one. i think one of my goals as a reporter was to try to understand as best i could and think about what it's like to be so unpopular? does it matter? their view, their default view doesn't matter like allen's statement to you. we are who we are. ..

and basically know that you have to overcome a presumption that you're evil. >> i do think there are consequences. and but the probably from their

perspective is let's think of a way out of this box. one of the things they did was they said, let's go back through history, is there golden age of oil popularity where we can. and the answer is no. it goes the basic question if we are who we are, is there a way to communicate about that what will change anybody's mind. is that putting lipstick on the pig in the pr business. shouldn't we be straightforward and have a strategy who says we are again and again and hope it allows -- that's what they've done, basically. >> [inaudible] in new york in the next energy writers. he's reading your book. and we were talking about, i said, hey, i'm interviewing steve. any questions for him. he brought up apple. since apple was now more valuable than exxon exxonmobil.

>> apple is cool. >> exactly. >> i work on the ipod everyone is going to cry. >> what a difference it was. from that question full circle, it's kind of a two-parter. do you think exxonmobil strategy has kind of tarnished the rest of the oil business and people associate big oil with exxon and everybody in bill oil is bad? do you think it spreads to other companies in the case of apple it's thin skinned and secret and be hip in cool. >> it's interesting. one of the things if i go back to e and look what are the top five corporations from 1989 to present. exxon is still on the list. where the company in the 50s that were number one on two, u.s. steel don't exist anymore. you look at today, apple and exxonmobil are one and two.

two years ago it was exxon moble and walmart. microsoft was in the mix. if you look at fifty years further, what do you think is going to be around? that's one question. i read the biography it's a terrific book. itstriking how completely different and similar it is to exxonmobil. what a country. only the united states could produce apple and exxonmobil on the one hand, apple is completely california-bred creativity. >> fact ronic. >> in the book, the steve jobs used to go into interviews and ask serious job candidates if they have done lsd in the hope that the answer would be yes. exxonmobil -- [inaudible] , you know, take this cup and provide a dug test. >> and report it. >> on the one hand, their very different. on the other hand there are similarities, they there they are closed systems.

they have a command management and they are driven by a desire to control the environment. steve jobs wanted to control every element of the customers' experience. every element of the design. they both were not good partners. they didn't believe in partner ship. they believed in the advantages of total control. that makes them secretive. because it's intuitive. secrecy is the control. it's fascinating. the other point about exxonmobil i came to think about over time, you know, most big strielized democracies because of the nature of the energy of the economy. they have big stake oil companies. bp, and question yes in the

they're playing ball harder than others. they mid plied they have direct to dick china any and call on washington what it helps them. but one of the things they found interesting the talks in here about politicians getting it wrong. i put down the page number and it's even more apt today.

here it is. the quote from tillerson, the theory it didn't matter where you get oil from. you put in the bathtub and you have more supply. in the negotiable market the -- energy made in america is not as important as energy simply made whoever it is most economic. >> right. >> yet exxonmobil has carried that message for a long time. it goes back to raymond, it went into tillerson. they're communicated it to a lot of the republican and allies. you make the point, lobbying is heavily skewed to the republicans out of the party. yet, that's not the message you're hearing from politics today. >> right. >> you're hearing a almost resource nationalist approach to u.s. domestic.

>> host: it is not embarrassed to join in that. >> host: it's shocking to me. how can it the powerful company with huge influence not have changed that political discourse to make it actually more here to the facts of how global oil market works. engage in it as you say. >> guest: i think it had influence in the elites in the united states. educating, they carried out the very intense education campaign to try to bring when they informative influential around government immediate a ya into the information about how the global market actually work. but most politicians don't have time or interest to study in depth these kind of complexities and one of the executives of the executives interviewed told me that one of the world leaders who understand it best how the global market are are grated and

liquid and nationalism, so it can be real vaunt it is not what it seems. with tony blail and he was talking to blair and he said you're one of the few people who runs the government who knows how to works. isn't it a shame? he said you wouldn't want the other politicians to run it. then they would think they could do something about it. >> host: it's sticks in my mind. it's happening in washington in both parties. both parties are trying kind of get a handle and show that they're reactioning to gasoline prices, in effect, they have very little power over gasoline prices. >> guest: exactly. the question of what are the benefits of energy independents or energy independents mean. oven though the way it's used is frustrating. it's divorced from the actual subject matter. but there's a real subject there that is important and interesting and changes.

exxonmobil's position in the quest for energy independents is changing. basically while it's true that being a net net porter or importer of oil is not really the right way to think about energy security, because everybody's price tag, it doesn't matter whether you're selling or buying. that's a global price, it's not true of natural gas. which is more reasonably priced. there's been some evolution toward a global integrated gas market, but we're not there yet. and so, in the united states, if we have onshore natural gas that is cheap for a long period of time. that could make a big difference in the economy. it could reduce the cost of manufacturing. it could change the energy mix in response to climate change. while, you know, being a net importer or exporter may not matter in some ways politicians talk about it it matters to the balance of trade to the amount

of dollars we sent abroad to unfriendly regimes versus we keep at home. so, you know, if we do shift toward more energy energy dependence, you call it nationalistic which are economic language, there will be advantaged. they're not the same -- they're not the advantages that politicians described. >> host: one of the other currents event was i was think abouting in reading the book, was going back to the days of iran f which was a brilliant chapter. exxon has shunned alternatives for a good reason. they're an oil company. that's their business. they don't want to hear about hydrogen for cars or, you know, electric cars. they make an excellent point how people mix the electrician side of energy production with transportation. but i couldn't help think there

are pieces in the book where lee raymond talks in the ear of al alan green spean and saying his speech on solyndra which has grabbed headlines and failed. if big oil is behind that given their animosity toward renewables. would you see any evidence of that. >> guest: the government to making -- >> host: in making the bad loan but fans the flamings. >> guest: the american petroleum which is the trade group in washington they're a spunup communications machine. that seizes every opportunity and the political allies did the same thing. but, you know, i think that underlying the question about alternatives and exxonmobil is, you know, they're a corporation. they can pursue whatever business strategies they want. the question is as a country, do

we want to create subsidizes and incentives to the loan program that ended up with solyndra provided why would we? if you look at it, we're been talking about how everybody in the country shares an interest in the lowest cost energy possible consistent with a sustainable environment. that's the i did limb that. you want the lowest cost energy but you want to achieve the environmental goals. we may not define the goals the same way. if you talk about a rapid and costly shift from cheap coal and oil and gas, to more expensive but cleaner renewables, you better have a good reason to do that. now the reason that's the most excelling and the world we live in today is liement. if you believe, i find 97% of clients send their warnings and findings entirely convincing. if you believe that, now you have a reason to endure short

term cost for long-term gain. if '02 want -- if you want to try to convince the public there's no risk then the case gets harder, which is why exxonmobil's resistance to the basic finding of climate which was so -- [inaudible] because there is a residence doubt in the public validity about climate science and the climate. and scientific telling there should be -- why is there? well, these interested parties funded a campaign in the communication campaign to plant it down. the american people are adults. they're entitled to their own opinion. the campaign was influential. >> host: also, let's talk about that. it's an interesting part of the book. you make -- and i don't want to put words in your mouth. it read as almost as exxon had invented the strategy. they were a company that really was in the business of playing the scientific doubt funding research. great, i love that part with the

scientist on the beaches and of the twelve years after the spill and they're being tagged by a yacht who want to know what they're up to and criticize the their methods cast the oil was still there after all the years. and that tactic now seems rampant in the political culture. as a reporter who pays attention to it closely. where the scientist of climate change, you know, with the theory the theory by many people, a valid theory, you are seeing it in areas that are rock solid. they're talking about the difference between smog. they're questioning the cost-benefit analysis of the epa when it drafts regulations. >> guest: right. >> host: do you look at the

exxon as tracker and be like, hey with they are responsible are in kind of tactic it seems now a very common one. let's not talk about the regulation, the tax and the regulations are trying to address. >> guest: i think they have responsibility for the some of the that. and they really were a distintive investor in that specific strait gi after kyoto. when they were signed, there was a lot of opposition to them in the united states and in the industrialized world on economic grounds, on fairness grounds, some of it was about the since really that urgent to we need to impose the cost on ourselves. there were a lot of different groups that opposed kyoto for the economic and fairness reasons. exsewn mobile was unusual in my judgment in the aggression they browghts to the science part of the campaign. really funding groups whose

principle activity was to communicate as nonscientist a narrative of doubt about what was emerging as mainstream climate science. and that is i'm afraid a tactic that is more and more present where science and public pots intersect and it's dangerous because our whole progress as, you know, an centralized democracy depends on an honest argument about science and, you know, the publics good and if we're going to have a especially in the infrastructured media times, a completely hard argument even the public trying to act in good faith isn't sure who to believe about what. we're going end up damaging our society. >> host: the book makes clear that exxon is almost an i believe penetrable fortress as a company. when you get to climate change and i'm biased here. i'm a climate junkie. it really seems this really

scares them. it's great -- until then there was one black swan intervention that could shift the curve of rising global demand when exxon enjoys. a decision by governments to limit greenhouse gas emissions by heavily taxing them. is it a fair estimation. that issue because of what it could do to the oil. what really kind of had them shaking >> guest: i think it got their attention. it was a combination of how it was a rare threat. the reason we were talking about before. they had over come the previous somatic threats to oil threat in the world which was spills and environmental damage and the seepage of oil into water and drinking supplies and air pollution. all of that had been more or less brought into a sustainable

impact of regulator and regulated. they had themselves adopted, they accepted the validity of these environmental goals when its to spills and air spews. they adapted themselves imposed cost on themselves in other words to build the sustainable impact. [inaudible] more abstract global challenge to the primacy of fossil fuels in the system. and i think that was one factor. lee raymond personally, as a trained chemical engineer and a direct and, you know, determined chief executive decided that he would say what he thought and use exxonmobil's resource to prosecute the views. most corporate chief executives even though they have those personal convictions would not have acted.

that was what he was. the book reflects, i interviewed him, and i asked him at one point, you know, truly, you could have handle the cost of modest carbon pricing legislation. right? look at your cash flow your profitability, why would this -- you adapted to air pollution regulation. you adapted to spill regulation. you run -- you pride yourselves on your compliance with regular will story regimes that impose cost on you for making the oil industry sustainable in a political environmental sense. why not adapt to the regulations and, you know, i found the answer not that convincing. he sort of said, we thought the cost of on whole economy would be too great. it would break up america's economic progress and so forth. there was a visceral reaction to kyoto that exxonmobil had that was out of line with the business interest. i would understand if you were a coal company and you see them

coming and a price of carbon. it could be extent sal. but the oil industrial because of the mix of gas which is a lower footprint, they had an opportunity to adapt to this in a more forward leading way. frankly, the european companies saw that and publishes were already there and they moved with much more indepthness i thought. >> host: another idea i found interesting in the book you raise it a couple of times at least twice they remember. you're in the hearing it at all in washington when you talk about gasoline prices is regulating gasoline prices like we do to push electric and we want the lights on. it's a public right and how we regulate that. if it got out of control and prices price seared --s are high. why aren't we hearing it more when if comes to gas and should we be hearing it more as a

solution the government could do. >> guest: i think it's a serious question. the reason we don't hear more is the political arguments we have dpurg campaign seasons are theater. they're not serious arguments. there's no reason to bring a serious policy question. the point you make is really important. you flip on a switch in the room and generate power and a company profits from that use of power. that company is utility that is regulated by a public interest standards in every state or jurisdiction, separately but the public interest standards is there. that's our history the provision of electric. we think it's so important ha we require the profitable companies that provide it to meet certain public interest standards and be accountable to the public for the performance. and we cap the profits off. now, in exxonmobil's case, they're a global company, they're out discovering oil and under ice and in seas and so forth, nobody is going to

regulate them in the public interest. but not vision of gasoline, it is a similar utility fumtion. if you're a commuting construction work has to drive sixty miles a day in prupt to a job set, grow to the pump you have to put it in at whatever price is there. you can't understand why you have no accountability and control over that crunch that you're in. i think it's a serious -- it's the history rewe treat the provision of gasoline as entirely a free market function without any public intersection oversight basically. some taxes and one environmental regulation. but we public electric as a public thing. they organize it differently in other countries. i don't know if there's a easy way. exsewn mobile fixes the problem. but they're unpopularity because the fact that the brand name is stuck on the pumps no business tried to put the customer into a

customer of pain while stairing at the brand. >> it's the only way they're vizble. otherwispeon understand the oil they are not watching them drilling holes into the ground or deep offshore or editorial as with you you travel in the book. all we see of them is the tiger in the tank, and, you know, they're brand name. >> guest: there's a 0 board meeting described in there toward the end of raymond's career says to the board for all the reasons you listed. why not get out of the gasoline business. why not take our signs. why don't we be like due point. nobody gets up saying they are evil. they are huge industrial corporation. >> host: one of the other points that you make later in the book, as in reference to the discussion about energy policy and kind of the lack of u.s. energy policy or at least a coherent one made the point in earlier conversation exxon is

the policy. the politician struggled with that, at the end of the day it requires a public to make sacrifices. and they really don't want to step there. they don't want to go there. once you go there, people start to say, hey, i don't want to do that. every poll we've done at the associated press on energy says yeah, we want, you know, to reduce the risk of climate change and clean air, we but we don't vice president to the bill -- we don't want the electric bills to go up. it's a consequence of any market. and consequence of carbon tax. it trickles downtown consumer and changes habits. to turn the tables a little bit, exxon is the bad guy. it seems to me that our inability as a public to make sacrifices makes us more beholden to the companies that we don't like >> guest: right. i think there's truth in that. it's interesting trying to think about the question of price that

people would have to pay to address climate change in particular. and i think no public at any era wants to volunteer for higher prices in the household expenditures. our politics shows that we're a public saw a threat to living generations, if they thought their children were more likely to get asthma or develop respiratory disease because of air disease. they were more likely to be exposed to cancer as a result to pollution in water supplies with, people were willing to pay a price whatever it was to protect their living generation. the problem with climate it's over the horizon. and the dangers aren't serious but abstract. you may be motivated to think my grandchildren in a world where there's 3 degrees cell yous higher than we have now in rise fees. it's not the same.

the cost benefit equation is part of the problem. and the other thing about what you observe is that the government in the world where politicians don't want to make gasoline as cheap as possible. it's like -- [inaudible] most of the world governments oversub decides gasoline so they continue have to deal with the publics' anger about the prices cost if they let market prices roll. we let them roll to a paint and we add to a lot of taxes to remediate to reduce driving and so it's expensive already. you go to politicians and you say, i have a plan to make gasoline even more expensive. and you're not going to find a big caucus lining up. >> that quote from barack obama was in the edit board in california where he says as a result of cap cap-and-trade gasoline doesn't necessarily

skyrocket. he was being honest. they have to go up. if you put a price on carbon. that has come back to bite him over and over and over again. on subsidies let's talk about that you mentioned subsidizing gasoline. raymond has disdain that you are nubbles need to be -- the crushes that oil has. it's a huge debate right now in congress. and the president is pushing to end tax breaks that oil companies have enjoyed and they make these enormous profits why should they continue to have them? did that come up in the conversation with raymond at all. it doesn't come out in the book very much. it's kind of pointing out kind of their little bit of hypocrisy a little bit. >> guest: i feel state mated. i don't know what to think about it. or what you think about it.

basically there are some tax breaks that oil companies alone get through interpretive appeals about what how the oil industry in specific terms is located. most of these allowances are manufacturing allowances. they happen to be manufacturered of gasoline as opposed to trackers and something else. and okay, we can say let's discriminate against the oil industry they're making too much money and people are paying too much for gas. let's rebate it to driver bhos have to drive to work. that's a reasonable public policy. to say these are subsidizes only for the oil industry. i'm not sure it's correct. i don't quite know what the right. i know, it's great politics. i get that. one of the reason why it keeps happening is because it's great politics for both. there's no danger of the laws passing. >> host: right. glrg i think it's a serious question how you should

restructure american policy. i'm all for opposing greater cost. i'm they should be doing more to facility a national energy policy goal of addressing a serious risk of global warming by moving as rapidly and economically as possible to new energy mission. i don't think that stripping out manufacturing subsidizes and not repurposing those funds to achieve that national goal ..

tends to extract huge amounts of greenhouse gas emissions in the extraction process. but now, i guess when the book was written, that was raised to the heart of that. obama rejects keystone type line. they were furious about it because of the climate change issues. i'm assuming that you would conclude that exxon is also a furious as it was back then. >> i think that they don't quite know what to do about the politics of the keystone type lame because in the book it is so irrational that they almost can't overcome their own in dignity about how disconnected the politics of the pipeline is from the underlying questions of

climate change regulation, the tar sands are the oils and in the global oil market. recently the keystone pipeline is a continuation of earlier. they're just trying to attack the problem. look, even the environmentalists would admit, i am sure that if they could not a universal price on carbon as a basis for addressing climate change and global warming they would come of that they fail to do that. so now they're looking understandably to keep the issue of life by looking for opportunities to call attention to the problem and keep challenging the status quo appears to be sure you send the oil sands because it's available, not because they are solutions to global warming. but they certainly made an example. and basically they are trying to

leverage the unpopularity of pipeline of general and not in my background politics to kind of keep the issue moving. and from canada's dave, i'm sure it's aggravating from the oil industry's it's definitely aggravating because the pipeline that would otherwise make economic sense is punished for campaigning reasons, not because of some politic framework overall. the truth is that his keystone is in or else it be built. as soon as the election overcome either president obama will reverse the judgment needs to get himself to the campaign of one way or the other or the romney administration will build the pipeline. that is $3 to get your cup of coffee at starbucks. in any event, the canadians to just export to china. it's actually not that big of a deal. >> host: it will happen either

way. >> guest: unless canada changes their policy. congratulations on the book. >> guest: thank you very, very much. >> at one time in 1967, this is

called the bloodiest 47 acres in america.

>> on "washington "washington j" tuesday discussion of the supreme court ruling on the 20 tenet healthcare law >> now, national review editor, jay nordlinger on his book, "peace, they say: a history of the nobel peace prize, the most famous and controversial prize in the world." on afterwards, he spoke with matt ernie. murray.

>> host: jay, good to see you. >> guest: you, too. >> host: why about -- why a book about the peace prize? >> guest: it's just a plain interesting subject. i think an author can only message. the peace prize gives you an overview of the 20th century because the price, like the other nobel prize began in 1901 so you mark through the first floor, the depression, second floor, cold war, arab-israeli conflict. environmentalism, war on terror, obama. almost everything. this prize has his finger in many parts. then you have this fast noble laureates and other people sounding the prize. another interesting. some people say as i was writing the book and the book was like

any. constantine on this less interesting ones. but there are interesting or at least i found. and then the book, but that the subject makes you come at some of the biggest question concerning war and peace and freedom and tyranny and makes you decide what you believe for which you can set your. so i found it a really what an exercise to the nobel peace prize. it is a juicy subject regardless what i've done with it. >> host: in some ways when you add up all of the peace prize is , it's usually controversial in a given year. usually someone very unhappy about it. overtime almost anybody can find someone to like or hate about it. we say of golf, every shot pleases someone. every selection pleases someone.

>> host: you know, barack obama winning and people say what's this about her in a moment where something clicked and she said at that to look more deeply into this? >> guest: i decided to write a history of the peace prize before obama won. i think he was first suggested to me in 2002 after the prize was announced for jimmy carter. i've said it was a good idea and i put it on the back order until 2009 or so. and then i returned to it. so i have to be reminded that the incumbent president is a nobel peace laureate. sometimes i forget. >> host: i want to talk about the recent book winners, but we should start by going back and tell it which learned about alfred nobel and what the original vision for the peace prize was and how it came to be. >> guest: i loved getting to know alfred nobel. i don't know if you found the same, matt.

i enjoyed reading about his life in discussing his life. >> host: he jumps out as a quintessential 19th century figure with a lot of different interests and activities and enthusiasm. >> guest: what a talent. he was the brother chemical engineer. probably a genius. he was a brilliant entrepreneur and manager. he presided over an iron something like 90 factories and facilities. victor hugo called from the healthiest back upon. he traveled all the time managing these things, so inventing and corresponding. demystifying one of the most prolific of his age. he wrote dozens of letters either in five or six or seven times for recipients. he's a brilliant guy and i enjoyed reading many of his letters. complicated then. sometimes a semi-idealist, a

list, send in the dark, dark cynic. about 355 patent. his most famous invention come his dynamite. we are told by people who know -- i'm not one of the spirit dynamite was not his most significant invention. the dynamite was his most famous. there is this myth, always has been. he established the price for peace at it guilt of this invention of dynamite. i think i say in my book that is hard to know exactly what is in a man's head and heart and that this seems not to be true. he's quite proud of his achievements and explosives. they built today would call infrastructure, tunnels, rivers. central pacific widowhood in the country inside. he also was a great believer, as you recall from the book and the power of deterrence and the ability of terrible weapons to deter war, perhaps eliminate poor. he was in over believer in

deterrence and missing is a little of the 20th century, especially the first war has these would've been to as many views were different. he dies in 1896 senate races will, one of the most famous was ever written in 1885 and he rails -- five -- everybody said ben mono lagging. >> host: no, go ahead. he's an interesting figure. your book travels a lot with his vision for the peace prize and how well decision has stared and that's one of the real dominant then said that the. >> guest: i think an american to think this up with is that the u.s. constitution. there's people who are really enthused about it. as a living document,

excessively filled with their own thoughts on the times. said the borough has often been at the word. but he establishes the five prizes and in his order they are physics -- at least thought it would've started with chemistry. physics, chemistry, physiology or medicine as he put it, literature and peace. what is missing there's economics. it's not a real nobel prize. an add-on from late 1960s established by the central bank of sweden and its formal name to something like the central bank of sweden prize in economic sciences in memory of alfred nobel. they don't mind if you and i caught a nobel prize. they're happy not to correct essay thing, but informally it's not a nobel prize. but in any case, alfred nobel establishes five prize in the last forever peace anyone surprised principally for those who figure the cause for fraternity between nations and

that's the signal phrase regarding the peace prize. fraternity between nations. also human cell press is your wear for work done during the preceding year. this is a surprise to me. i reset the nobel prizes were cumulative awards a lifetime achievement award for golden handshakes at the end of an illustrious career. but i think -- i didn't do any math, but no more than 10 or a dozen of the winners and you write about them, probably actually fulfill what was the nobel laid out. there's one other element i think we should talk about, kind of the norwegian myth at the heart of the peace prize and a time when the peace prize was created. can you talk about that a little bit? there is a special quality from norway, all the nobel's really.

>> guest: alfred nobel has five prizes. he gives for them, swedish prices. the bill itself is swedish. did most of his growing up in st. petersburg. very much a universal man. i guess for the prices to sweeten in the fifth went to norway. he asked the norwegian parliament to elect a committee of five. he doesn't say in his will that the five committee members must be in the region and there is debate about this in norway and the very beginning. 1901, 1902. arguments on either side. since day one has been on the beach in panel and i say -- some of winter beach and friends don't like what i see this very much, i think one could say that the nerve region people elected

the legislature. the alleged the committee and therefore the nobel peace prize is a reflection of the nerve region people and their political culture. >> host: how he described culture? >> guest: are a very strong special democratic collectivist country in which the phrase is socialist solidarity is very important. they are not bad, not commies. and maybe little pink, sir by american standards. there is one in norway now called progress party. >> host: with their emotions between norway as a small country of sweden for a long time. so it also comes across as a funny cosmopolitan aspect is a

small country and at the same time it kind of parochial of the northern, slightly remote country. just go -- i won't be seen in norway, will it? believe it or not, you know this. some people may snicker at the scum of the suite 19th century and beginning of the 20th was a bit of a power come in at a great power, but substantial. norway was not. the belief was that norway would be disinterested and pure about it all without real geopolitical interests. as an arbiter of mankind and like other little nations it absolutely adores the international organizations and places great emphasis on the u.n. as it did to the leak of nation from emphasis on the league of nations and also before the league of nations

parliamentary union. >> host: the red cross particularly, which won three of four novellas. % of organizations that come back as well, particularly in wartime that have a soft spot for the borders. i think when in 1999. >> guest: part of its psychological. this is another impolite thing. international organizations are away for a little powerless country to be somebody. also no rations are very keen to check american power and they never shugart international organization as checks on american power. >> host: do you think it's american power because of something about america or to think anytime in a world power is in america for quite sometime? >> guest: probably the latter. certainly the u.s.

>> host: i.d. oppression whenever the itchy when in thinking some things about the nobel peace prize is a suppose we all do. as you reported some of what you thought may be turned out to be true in some of you may have challenge your perceptions. can you talk about what surprised you about the process and what you learned about the peace prize and where you had it to turn out to also be true? >> guest: any of the laureates for for new to me and he enjoyed getting to know them. i enjoyed getting to know the apartheid leader named john of thule. he was a zoo zoo chief and president of the anc and a dedicated christian and a straw man and meek and meek man and i

very much enjoyed getting to know him. he was a practitioner of nonviolent. his kind when away at the banning of the anc at the price of people like t-tango annabella. i very much enjoyed getting to know many others including a german pacifist or quit. some of these pacifist side essay were quite sent the ball and even stirring and brave. and at nighttime, and our time to worse pacifists are a bit of a slur. if you call someone a pacifist you may well object. certainly before world war ii very much before world war i if you said to someone you're pacifist come you might well say to you, of course the end. what are you, a militarist? the pacifist were wrong in my judgment, that they were

monolithic. they took different actions. i have this section, and abused concept and an elusive concept. what is peace after all quite we know it's not the mere absence of order, but it's not worth either. his were the worst thing in the world? probably not. but it's a nasty, horrible, murderous thing to be avoided if you can. these are all creepy question but i guess what i found was nobel peace prizes altogether are a mixed bag. a few of the prices that are clearly good or clearly bad. i think most of the time the nobel has had a case -- a bit of

a case. even arafat. a lot said to me and i thought i was doing cover history of nobel peace prize that kind of wrinkled her face and say, didn't arafat write that? put them that see it as a story. what more do you need to know? was a committee member who resigned and it would've been with him making. but it's well to remember that the price alone in 1994 when accosted with two israeli state. prime minister routine on the prime minister of paris. the two of them were at least willing to do so i went on on to say in his nobel lecture that arafat shared the prize was fitting, unquote. so the arafat example was that i felt so all your taken seriously or need speeches were trying to

see their views and along the way, you mentioned the pacifists and her pretty open-minded about discoveries about people that even if you disagreed in one of the things -- i think what you just alluded to, what is peace and what does peace mean? that's been there since the beginning. what jumps out as the majesty and ongoing discussion in the mobile committee they come up and talk about anything as a reader, boy they got it wrong. an annex to the same people give a stirring speech you can address. >> that's right. and in my view, some of the laureates turn lousy after they went with that kind of back to some, but they weren't awarded that. take linus pauling come the genius of hms.

certainly a fellow traveler. great sport of the soviet union. he won not just the nobel peace prize, which began life as the stalin peace prize and he said the price of the soviet war to have been the price from under regions. but a first when the chemistry prize, which was for his advocacy of the new year test cowlishaw truax was signed by president kennedy and other cold warriors. so what do you do at that? i think the political life what was that price? maybe not so much. >> i want to talk about what the nobel winners. before you do it, some being you think about, which was the notion of peace and the wrestling with that. how do you see the concept? you have an essay that is a

slippery concept that alfred laid down. did you come out of the experience thinking that that kind of fluidity was good? or do you think that they're certain different guidelines are really think about peace but it's more useful? what is peace from your view? >> there's political peace or national peace or world peace. there's individual piece for spiritual peace. margaret thatcher like to talk about peace and freedom and justice. the soviets were very big on the word piece. there was a peaceloving nations, 10:00. the west call themselves the freedom loving nations. they and their space station near, schmidt piece as well as world. soviets were as banging on about peace. they did favor the certain kind of peace.

peace comes with absolute submission. that's the kind of peace stability, dictatorial stability. not our kind of peace. we think more about peace that freedom. phil buckley says sometimes -- a little bit embarrassing because concepts can be buried down to embarrassing bumper sticker language. better dead than red. better red than dead. they say they're free or die. okay, but how many are willing to follow that? are we all pray far as? please stand and fight and reach accommodation? these routes have questions. and very weary of people to talk about peace and have that phrase. the stinging criticism that tony blair made was going to do diplomacy in the arab-israeli

conflict as it did george w. bush before he left, if i win the nobel peace prize fundo icefield. and he would not not that hard on the nobel committee. >> i don't think he turned it down. so if someone like me another reagan conservatives -- someone like me can listen to it macarthur called peace cracks in the reagan post this in the it used cracks the piece is just a joke, a snare and a delusion, a crock, were not very far in new york from grant's tomb. they joke about grant's tomb. riverside park over here if i had my bearings. i want my hour and then i said let there be peace. the were killed over 600,000

people, americans. the population wasn't that large at the time. think of the carnage. i think war is necessary and just under eight every now and then. but there's nothing like true peace. i quit amid the. above this line from orwell. comes from one of his books, coming up for air. when there is peace, there were some or all of the around. if you can get peace, you've really gotten something. but the question is, cannot come you guys talk about peace, patrice peace? belgians, bulgarians, piece of the grapes? tough questions. >> host: let's talk about some of the winners and get a chance to reflect more on some of them. i pulled out some of the ones -- >> guest: who do you like?

>> host: one of the ones i wanted to ask you about that stood out was carl mono in 1935. turner believe if i'm not mistaken a decade in which a couple of nobel's are in the impression. we should mention that used to be mature, and that in recent years and there's many decades in which one, two, three years. >> guest: you are brave. now comes every year the christmas spirit for somebody anyway. but he stood out as a fairly compelling figure and one of the bravest man of his times. >> host: did she know about him at all? >> guest: only vaguely. only vaguely. he was a german journalist and pacifist. he was jailed even before the