replace them. and, again, as you know from your recent trip -- and some of ththin i wastold o p - aanrmyles test aann en acn juhe . and this is ofthe americans having eyes onhe operations of these afghans reporting up the chain of command and then ka, thn ann mgo thfg uatyeth cis,ero t with informationand ey take it seriously. finally, the mier the of interior -- minister of the ri sophie' pe t'sik pahapeto b case is he's firing incompetent leaders, and he's just replaced 70 including a number of hiswn soeeot ssof

thtly tmoas sssut5% ll th toi finish on. thank you. >> very good. thank you, dr. o'hanlon. we'll begin with our line of questioning. i want to go back t my convertions when was in atwi grall a asmef e e she nin forward. ..

comehe, soyconcern is that doest logically ke sense in how to transition is to take place. chs ngee odiul r orsntive. threin tef b sd, as you said the interesting point is a somewhat of a differenapproach as far as the total number of rc t01drd nolofthe u he 300my conversions with defense minister wardak i he feels going to 203,000 at the 20wiea p vmme,t th endf beupi son

,0eoant productive element of society there and not have them become part of the insurgency. so i think there are number of different areas tre whe wt inivsot un abwh impact that has on our success, on the current ack. and what theontingency houl arannwingwa s psehaou e gebe f those elements of the plan don't work t as proposed? i will start with mr boot spent i would justrrawh ral anidh ioee thhono e pedbsed on a timeline dictated in washington, whether, or on budget disions made in washington for url washin

copoo dtion gr. i k ne a wocenlare, i think we need to be very careful about the drawdown mentioned that in a responsible way s that we don't leave a power vacuum. and i'mafraid hal trtohaearal the'otin t sf or shrinking our fourth presence prematurely, even if conditions have not improve a god do. in lt coupeabt some improvements 'suev thstaierngs. stino er- nseration to as my colleague said, i would urge a coastal conditions-based approach. thntrnet gig d of rai'ivoue

s ol ts war. and i give you the resources to do. i think anyone would've taken the. fiye's what we have, 0i t ai rem prm gm nnwertng s. rsmeth a petraeus and mcchrystal recommended a minimal force of , they get 30, which is 35% less. sian cigtat de to us? themutmurs 10 c no ol oo sequentially. what did that do? retracts the ere, tricep casuals, it operates more political willt . ndble , r ehnf,saean eee ches hm peid te30 chgemc i level. they are all gone. before this year is out. so that's where we are at the point of youquestionn.

enwongomed no halyap. eri rseon thrasns urcma forces in 213 totally, not 2014, and then get out of there by 2014. in my judgment what en sotif frmndn . ata ae ng o d gowe ngi. a that pressure off of them so that they can come back and say look, we have to slow this down. that is th major issue. wehav wooris swouesin em iniesw ifomerre ag th will, particularly in the east, and also keep the ansf at the resource level that shod d'hn?with itsenbl >>ilt heer coguavid ay l mb hn id ams inaugurated he'd been

adamant against the iraq war but he gave his field commanders time to execute the drawdown over theext 19months and und upepg oo icthnksao inioerta oa. acommanders times will to take it with the drawdown that would be. as we all recall they were allowed to keep theforces to bees advlehn ofery20 ve i h hte meua veesol ewin the late fall, at in winter, i hope they give field commanders the same leeway. because the answer to questn my mind s th adohi trsi tgheae tvestal toup ac efte wiuestelik what i would anticipate is that if we stay at 60,000 through the fall, which i hope will be the thwlecedpsi o vewby

he'soverrrmeo idob atrly 01 thpdearel defers to field commanders and keeps probably most of the 68,000 through much of the fighting season of 2014 him if that's what field commanders recoend. i o lon ddboha mb ro, d mi pni atts d otturn to him for questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. since i was late getting here let me def to my colleague, bel onpolaorey dran youad a statement that there's been i guess some issue that mae more of the commanders were tj, t ouok t n rceaemphll tc h oury tlipgic in oer words, is the tajik

leadership and to chic areas, s the travel almost and aiting to set up tt mae loong inikas o tl s acmas >> thank you, congressman. let me briefly answer, if you don't mind them but my colleagues who may know certin aspects of an to rrect me tsey e heeim on ney kii el norn i p ai ann r oy rout cry in current operations. the main additional problem, there are ethnic issues as you well know,and challenges. the other one it's harto recruit souther- oh thr wn oeditrict or province for certain period of time so that our challenge is but i do want to trivialize th. sometimes we haveto relyo otprce ll re f

vnt touhe lde. threeoyed throughout the country and they're serving well throughout the country, as best i know. >> you are sing we have maybe we are lacking in--coma irtpaof reut hnkepl fo elite come -- paramilita, i think those are ennmamemngajikled. is gly ele hasre ueyomeo on tnire dial integrated. it is a balance, relatively good balance if you look throughout the foe. there's still k panppatiof% alfft ct tc ghecy es e ks o are somewhat unrepresentative timesheets are overrepresented,

especially in a couple wings of stenatt hey. veins of he s sddin bsto pistan military. what's your prediction as to w i'tayfocrtld yield? wppe w t bsine st li itd know that we've given them tens of millions of dollars in subsidies over the speed if you're going to make that statement d't you have to figure it's going to havee impac >>dot oio s wtrer vi idge,a ly ouheay o eight -- that effort has totally failed and think as a starter but we thagnlb ektignize that effort

anfraonihink it's been counter productive to give all theubsidies we can do the pakistan military which, in essence, has beeindirectly idg tfreha llurso i ghta iotintaal i akn te ldtitod l etin,n alternative to the military dominated foreign and national security policy to purue but i soeofe such as aeh jihadists takeover of the state because i believe the pakistani military is stilvery good at rnondwlve bue urthte s foepng owa ainst india and for subsidizing jihadists groups that attak ourselves ouof ours, those resources will be decreased.

>> thank you. i have no furth queions an t y cmas. in reviewing your written statements tt have been provided to our staff, onething stds icula yd ha, nev kehasre o tuonssluup 20 afisof cost of perhaps 25 billion a year, and add another three to 5 billion annually in direct secured and economic support for the afghan govnment an le ticlut n icols bu nsntt d elkely w noiobe to do some things that have been suggested. on the other hand, i'm looking at other testimony of mr. boot thghatluye fn a wealotrquest of

perhaps up to 25-$35 billion annually for unid states supppersnel, andcial wegotemtt sroteisbi disianinf reduce the funding to approximate 4 billion which resultin an ansf reduction from 352000,o 203,000 benning in 26. mak nneatuofooeote rp e emes ov. me ican yt interject some financial realities, the position for united states of america's in and then i will ask you to think about where the moy is good to come from that ou r sin legh h 15ilon btke nbe wihehrnecuiv deficits in exss of a trillion dollars a year. we're going into our fourth one of a tllion dollars a year. we've seen what's been going on in ialy, gecedn.

re hge fohcoiter inenndkry. n'ow if anyone is similar situation would help the united states go into insolvency and bankruptcy if wecontinue on thish. ed ceohspe otc n o an sari inn s e h n money for national defense. think about that. no military personnel at all. even with the sequestration, which is a tip of theceberg situation. you're lking at layngo penead iia ppwos orva contractors who are supporting our military with the g. izbang weaponry that is so desid by other nations anicve oily theydntha biesh fa bnd yohari piy fi genti kind of situation,

ven the afghan economy. i've been to afghanistan and as you peronally, i don't thk th theemy x del blpo r dee s h s g tvet dos jsay' l er tnk the money i could come from to pay for the somebody suggests are desrable af siatas ouetabili t goontoo w y tthepsof tief? o,re w uh ram, and other programs? if so, which once? please give me ammunition our guidance on the priority that we n get financial house in r d a y tus spmrotstadte raanadedr ces, eh you about the dire state of our finances. but i don't agree that defense is the primary contring fact to it. cleay ase knowt' tiensinfe o

n oto r os st ate thhire defense budget. that's not t part for afghanistan. no matter what happens we will dramatic reducer spending in $1min y tmefrom abu le galneadnd yo tngo hr's dun afghanistan down to, let's say, 30 billion to 35 billion figure. and just that is a lot of money but the question in my mind i ifwar ntg o siiofhnin,o akn euso e in afghanian also allows us to affective elements in pakistan was you that were to fall would be the ultimate nightme, a nuclear armed state. we are abletpee ann fngk r col tetiba d qeaad >> g itjeus on agree with you that

national defense shouldn't take it is taken that's why of it against the budget control act that oposes the sstraonquat. ist hie to usu evata er rory? drg ouof otol ciand so if we're going to reduce the deficits we need to go with the money is which is entitlent, not in defense. >> welcome your other - ttasmeso g f ok haou 'lk tit y opo ennriting, back to the committee for mr. brooks question. will go to mr. cooper. >> thank you, mr. chairman thank the itnesses. in vew t pnge tb. sptt od ilofto u ff pphr pta particularly if we make a dramatic curtlment and aid pakist but and second, the allegiancef ansf troops, what trng o ha cl ee

rnins? thquonatld t k bla p ou we've had a main supply route closed for a number of months now on we e able to sustain the foe thate meatd ht h f surueinhnrh dontn wve tahe i think it's overstated, our dependency on that main supply route. it certainly is desirable because it's a lot easier to 's escho t chngha hbty w tiec actually take the issue off the table comen my judgment, in terms of our relationship with pakistan on this issue. anstmallrrtdo havete. adedndteef erleeqemt. his ite ansf, clearly, in terms of what we refer o as green o blue

anerndut htt baveke ho atfre ajeao gt s band large on the road r on foot path usng explosi devices. wee painfully wref h inra ithcu esbabtck. es d hak l go ws tng last night to general and minist wardak, general wardak, who yo know, is ty belve ats peaot apne ihcrngir intelligence, by getting people better, et cetera. th are very much aware of the challenge that we have, and i think the way our rces looka dit omngt ol y uighee s

using an ied against us. they're using that kind of infiltration against our forces. it's rushing for our force alh , ate me sdepy ug d r li i anh n distheir performance nor the quality of that performance, nor te extraordinary morale tha w issenlyd for all these yeas. tainotonth t pakistanis and there's not that significant a worr about green on blue? ltiy kie'n cr at to mariandof dposio the northern distant vision network buit's an amazing alternative. it is still increases slightl uncomfortably,butsmeof t

h re ic rmon ia t, e mc tc t een lu tun v oublese. i don't think the general would trivializet either, and i think it does run a risk of really erodng our ability to gel n cone ouen ette h. in'senbea tecon. i e nkne ther are serious efforts being undertaken to try to at least cap it. that's not good engh but that may be the best we can do in the that would be lo thrc ly n o cai i.s get es o a, congressman, as well. a lot of this will turn on the 2014th elections in afghanistan which are crucial. as we all recognize. when wsvnglt onhfgan general d ak hmhta inhaan hty bee et w pn

ted bere off. and even i don't think president karzai has bee a stellar leader, the are a couple of things he is oe corcy th ane h t h s co irst vice president. the basic concept of having maybe a tie sheik as the first vice president and mayb n i kn niedoact. 4. d rntin o e stofuryo ed lest one non-pashtun in the top two positions as well. these are some the ement that i think will be important and then, of course, the president ka s. bem u hn frntpoteld tod qlyne explicitly to veto. and that's the pint i was time to get out in my testimony where i can imagine this congress

af a t pren ani iene obti hmaa i ino t sson. >> thank you mr. cooper. >> thank you, mr. chairman. that the witnesses for the praration andte testny yor f ho g oewndern yovenivb acither uh. mr. boot com in the lessons of your testimony, you say most afghans have no desire to be rud by th taba tocnli t ps-2 inivd mat at how committed to a more inclusive and moderate state do you think the karzai regime is in afghanistan? els sge est ai ain epat e'ous deep issues of

corruption there although it is possible to work with them as we've seen in the recent ansiy heo , anthe handover of y,eitihe lotesh,ik afghanistan, are trying to get the most they can out of the state. a lot of them are doing very well with dubai bank account itself with. ofs urgtay olot o a l dener dtui ice casa g mas cnou the other half of that argument is saying we will stay indefinitely and keep writing ecks, encouraging the kind of you. let me ask you this qe mteart taanay pofte country is wholly undesirable and the reason we're still there, what we are trying to event. i'm concerned the, i wonder if any of the witnessesre erthhep giigin q

agenereyldyt oe bhoin fact, be parts of the country that would be ruled by the taliban. and do whatever they want. tht, ir co f risk that thisgious tan s airtof the country and perhaps once again is the host with al qaeda parasite? what's wrong with that hypotheses? wefioflliseg th, t g f you know, ryan crocker i think has worked, you know, how cable b is as an ambassador. he's the best in the business in the wol. 'sfi tthwi oit ond at nlwthv er omcat a yokn, that karzai would find some means to sort of hang the nearby constitutional reform.

not happen, is going. i don'tthink we will get a anmaalr,ut doel wl e' prms t caused this country and don't try to make some incremental improvements. much more along the line we have seen take place in career over a number ofyears. i'mot hn hate gis ogtos th t'sen f shal in, helping to influence that situation as michael has suggested come and do a much better job of it here than what we i - fcu are ti coen tte f hw gites tr aligned with ours? to the tent that they are not, what do we do to influence a regime in becoming a lie, d espeit ti,ts lu n ibst

are ihogstn a wt, tma se it as something and there's. how do we make sure that our interests are aligned? >> i dot, just finished up, i was gog nsr that inhaant datles cenythuntoii taliban. and for all the obvious reasons viation hum andivtical ro folil ed dot thg like that, in my view. one of the most remarkable things that took placewas the lawyer jargon that took place spleaioipwih itese acion h a omtu erpoin i the country spend my time is about to expire. let me just close, mr. chairman, by cink's. mat yuimes think hoou

puanamnitin, haeeakgrot w en. h honfaeas transition over afghan security. i think the question is, how willing are they to cept it doa asjo hr cists. inesil h n us very sage tactical advice on how to achieve it, but tactical measures fail if it isn't strategic and for and to ndert exts an o. >>nk. ppat ht spng twis yo as ceweth on end of a boat series, and want to make sure hat we have an opportunity, if there are any as tthees that the panel as itsewii a at b nwe hse t omitt

d ati innk you for appearing before us today, and with that this hearing is adjourned. [inaudibleconversations] >> [inaudible conversations]

wagtisio ei r issso afghanistan's economy. the country's central bank says it needs six to $7 lion in something assistanceach year foe ntdcd fo ..absa o ann, o agann nd ki aorths. cy inaal developer, and a foreign policy fellow with the brookings institution. we expect this to stt in just a moment.nale osans

>> whi we wait for te start, the discussion on afghanistan's economy to get underway here at the oos inition, a upf k tst ngu o on hcstw. o annek-sar 0 a.vi idjoded his wife will be addressing the national education association to mrs. bidens an education professor at a cmmutycl nornvrni acsa lo. bli r i rigbf parliamentary committee to talk about the european debt crisis and its effect on britain. that wilbe live at 11 a.m. eastern on c-span.naleneio]

>>d in ryone. welcome to brookings. thank you for coming out the third of july in these difficult times of commuting and weather apiyocomeong else but we agss. aaee it oh w ele woin uniform, and in civilian attire to do so much overseas still today. i'm mike o'hanlon from brookings. tag thxerthe next 90 mutes inatalelnt bu ngstehs en etsa ra ssinagstte we will proceed is that first after

i introduc him in just a second, alex will speak from the podium with some prepared remarks. you will t rnean d lf aan scon wulte oy le eule f od oue wm le first, ron, ron as you can see continues through broken legs and a broken wrist and all to fight through it and continue in 2000 innfhta amado other countries. he was one of only two father-son duos in our nation's history to be ambassador to the same coury. 19anlla i tar am o r hiyoporio bu they both wound up residence so that a shorthand as well. an ente sthr featured guest for

sintthmiert inatl eop primary focus and lead director on the afghanistan-pakistan border of working in washingtn. alex hasa lonstanding coitme to ghanistana in 10wrdfo du tifltes vifan nein into the period of taliban rule. he's been distinguished solar at the u.s. instiute of peace with commitment to many of th eagof ith tth ntof ayf lak l trlo w,a ote ru mas. hs huge portfolio today with afghanistan still i believe our nation's largest dollar recipient of foreignassistance but a lot is about to ne. d,co,w ned thkynoonnc ma cgohere afghanistan was arguably issue number one.

but no less important than perhaps in some ways more important, thisupcoming tokyo do wneoakaou eirranei ermme annanat strategies might guide the ongoing efforts there. so alex, we are thrilled to have you here to heat up this topic, and thank you very much for inbooki thjim eomal ppe] haous sra to be here, and thanks, everybody, for coming out. i wasn't going to say this but i can't help. tocuoroi ftaing w hd r dvlturas oe ro iteoo ann. h lmha to cancel because of lack of power in washington, d.c. keg gentotob ann nk,s

and really with an eye not primarily only to naming problems, but to solving them. michl steln en u ttbainab yose tablw fa and son are right above and below each other at the moment, and that is rally a liy. ct akhelti-nerational evti se ilim doanrirlhe really first got to see his work, incredible infographics that has run through the new times for almost aenw exlysteaa tu ce ee' opinions, if not thousands, and certainly it did for me.

we are in the mst of tiecic sit tomi,llkl d fu othe country and the region for decades to come here for this to succeed it is going to require an enormous eesinmen, pe htik lo comeas come from the afghans and their leadership. but it also needs to come from antgth w serm gh 91. that moment,after about 12 years of international and instead focusn fhis as tug t. wotu iac

afghanistan. the nato summit in chicago, the donor summit coming up in tokyo this week, the u.s. afghan strategicpsh, ae t inaganpe real co, a allies come and, indeed, ourselves, that after another decadeo int tionnd nmewe o len aghto wles exis left unchecked are not lost, and that the stability of this region matters to u.s. foreign policy. en agrn apestma . auig ndgrtrs e emwe signed today sends a clear message to the afghan people. stalou stand up, you will not

comes o trorism and strengthen democratic institutions. it supports afghan efforts to advance develoen and dig cometrecy an teheanht of all afghans, men and women, boys and grls. so our relentless focus f t paelarbto retsme txaydlai ann, daem sustainable over the long term. in the last decde,we have helped afghanistan to develop rlyeagmr lyo toceth hiy. eaeni i realize that that box some

of the commentary and reporting that is passing foronventional sdomhay le att h tego prusad tin history. i know this in part because i first decided to go to afghanistan that fateful ar 9 r a, ied cia asro stic dismantlement of afghan society and state. as a rest a decade ago ann edng d'tifecy fofander mortality. one-third of the afghan populati were refugees, and re were leaving.

thhweende aom inaal unfoeisr d o the population, afghan women, were about to be plunged into darkness and sor a d uon by th talibani s st xite $14 million worth of civilian assistance to afghanistan. and while this is a significant figure, at her most significant iman rbeatsst eca, is miry a. stof o et me give you a few examples of some of the progress we have achieved before going on to talk about at's happening ths pohas aie idat e aslcleuad aniprn outlined some of these things

statistically. talks about the results that we have achieved. for example, grossdomeic afishaote 1rr vagr la ee. dne fr those sorts of figures? per capita income has risen and is virtually tripled, bringing millio of ghanou ve he, etay n afghanistan in the last decade has creased 15-20 years in a 10 year periowhi islkl coy tetat pro moitpge w their previous,highest in the world mark. and 64% of the afghan populatio de ahave acces tbchealre e ny6 a

ci 's i in1,rote00 afghan children, almost exclusively boys,went to school. today, that figure is over to vr3% il i d e s lr-wn tof you look at energy, and i think there were handouts passed out, the number of energy conntions in megawatts avlablin ahaniane ed cal s,er trk elic t having 24 hour reliable power. but equally importantly, we have worked with the afghan utility which didn't even exist five freqngsss fne agatkeeoa system functioning, to only $40 million today. and they are well on the path to

self sustainability. u n tell a lsy oufhndst es ceigfo dod ihaados ars. ultimately, if the afghans are going to susin the progress d it's going to have to, from their own economy, from their own revenues, from their own privec. bee nwear aware of that and we have tried enormously to learn from our past falures comendake laewe h ay os er t si. wogon t idta i ecue tlo jufw things. in afghanistan, we issued the first ever sustainability policy, which requires us to sunaovhe temy go proctwdo tohiboow hit

idsth ced a two, accountable assistance initiative for afghanian. which has done things like limits thamot o beg raor, wee vuprt l akue are safeguarding where taxpayer dollars are going. we have also signed on with other donors, some ofe onstacs h anceosat ee afishagn o. and the bottom line here is afghanistan, although one of the most challenging places in the world, tdo this kind of work, we have aloecid to aei thhawtt pl, eptgte vanguard of our assistance reform to make sure that usaid is the preeminent assistance agency in the wod is using

thggprfo. theos wh tysta this progress remains fragile. due to ongoing insurgency, lack cotiipni aicaletnt itnsaoiyta ink 0eaf turmoil, we have an enormous amount of fragility in afghanistan. when i think about the fhns i kdotto i, n tell oa w al epeo afghanistan? how do they see their own future? and what is it that w need to do in order to break those patterns and o ovrcome os19 see ta sinyo

nd regimes, allies, ideologies, invaders. the only certainty for afghans over this period has largely been w etitk th hance to help the afghans to change this dynamic. and this is really the hart of what we are trying to accomplish in tko. u nttacng. thas cedfo aland debate and concluded these other coverages like the g8, like tokyo, that are leading us to undrstand together how we can secure so av tamp,uu evfrtni s es t 'vtl t h to be a long-term comtment to afghanistan. we have to convince our leg ann heand theagans

h,n raiove gaof lt decade, addrs the potential factors or causes of instability or fragility, like theooc cthe itdl se iatweavet priorities. we cannot do everything in afghantan, even afghanistan iuyele. wiheordswn t titmo rw weda ev sf priorits that need to be focused on a few critical things. private sector led eo thndnagnvme w aw ot goan and better

infrastructure. and humn capital development. in other words, cementing the gains thatw mfor fin th etian eme rey cm p heor irheee be reforms. these reforms in governance and on econoc policywil nb cculnoan lilasi th r.isbl d,al as someone who has watched this process intensive lay over the last ee,we c fw- ehms atl atrknckss hewer d weo where we are off-track, and how we will correct that process. we also need moreeffective tys omst 'nceivie so o he

ntd hehieee d owh ol oi out of tokyo is something that attempts to bind all of these four thing together in a mutual accountability frmewo. farka sa aet unane ga rn, ow together, we will achieve those four objectives. i will close by saying that i lievthathe cesis mmenheef a nealdonstbl ltiknythth outlined, are no longer nice to have. they are impetives if thneds bsin is going t voids rf. aym whha b ano d omo an afghan, and

afghanistan, and eonomyhats much more self-sufficient. there needs oer giira. on tea irain ol. d,al we need a successful political transition. i thinkit's absolutely fundamental oreember ha efraret hn 04wi a stitfgnistan. not only in this period, but ever in its history. and you dot get to thesecond fiont gog rouge t hd tita at afghanistan with these realities in mind. the troop levels are going down. overall donor investment over thex eailee. thh hsproce, the

afghans and their neighbors will have to make critical changes in order t sucd this process. sonk f ore. 'sleeie. spi anve plud >> yanak >> yut to just go bywia posedt say she sends her egards, but she's in london. >> and for very provocative and

helul remarks. congratulations on what yon heor oeh o i.ndeav mpedhaan e ha va rs amptun e' aranof the distinctions frankly between is effort and many other efforts will be go into a somec t rgo an hy an yehappinst tmoofdwhv made by any metic of quality of life is quite remarkable. i know we will want to now juxtaposethat wth the broader queson. thinron oo jusd t rer itheile cun y usu yon iner focus primarily on developing and governance matters, but that obviously carries over to politics and thtiis.s s mters owgto ro e e le i.u eg o quon anyg

you wish. as you cn imagine, alex's bar for this primary and the development and governance area ontescofll inve ron co ghtaale wu ke bo"ttharhih wrote a reflection of his time as ambassador but also has broader observation of how afghanistan has been going and continues to ever mta foinhrbs.n nk >> well, thank you, mike. of course, that broad invitation which still needs to be contained in about 10 or 12 minutes is really invitation dili it utdld tle ounmen fisenough for the american academy of diplomacy where i work, i'm clearly vested inany aspects of afghanistan. i cannot claim to b wl

alwhyuakg f t ngonka t atir ec n c wa deeply vested come actually shifted some of our funds to get some of that one. and crze aso o t cis tnvrtss gok abs i y, ito heme tasreears, to drive around a city which is no longer a blackity at night. thfein i t like to dr ec n ad itofghta o in there. which i think get rather short shrift in ur discussions, an which often i i owamptef. m epl me thi ta is this business of

developing capacity. we use this phrase, and the people in the business unta it i nkteeahggpdo ust t twou lta o civilians, for instance, in the difference between training and developing capacity. de o o yeaseea sodyd e to haynnization between our military and economic a political strategy. and i thought yself, if you mean that any woar ee t be ur cuheovo aga e repotea gomend development, you are asking for a rate of progress that has neverbee seenn the 60 years of wocoloniadevelopmt, othe reinr ehi

nnoe heye acmpinatver possible or feasible. there is a need to get realistic. now, there is real capacity development in afghanistan. buyu eonbil olio thths ry tein xle noacrdto last trip making major progress in bill collection in afghanistan. but we hav beat them over the headn s or1s. 1eakrarm bureaucracy that was outmoded, that was based on largely patronage d corrupt mdel, and thanpa hnsli el 's jthhell bills. it is that this is a critical

piece keeping lights on in kabul is you collect bills. but iuse this eaplbee s h ead t amofros. d heerd s acepesias d we strain at this a americans ouncil. we want this now. 24 hour news cycle, we nt it itwowoth a. remember talking to he first a direct in kabul whoold me about going to the education ministry in a00 wtoalgr ey ls o. throthwawn dark al too fine a minister working by the light of a kerosene lamp, with no ower in the building,n uteran anhet miryl

ul k tra . o the one hand, you have enormous development in th educational sysem, mill on o h yo ae or gs a se h st tea of where the country is coming from and how long it takes to get change, and we frustrate ourselves orly awaa ofm mes,y rydo gsatart fe ht s n icg program for failure for not doing what is impossible. ..

>>r any other similar experience well until we leave people in place for there's two to three yrs. you cannot build aleng gatin easf paul s aer rdrgfo a e not the only ones, we tend to come in -- everyone who comes in new want the look and find out what he ought or ught thsu pamau tarafs l pe was changed the program. why in the world should i bother to exert myself to buy into their latest enthusiasm whe it will change in a yea ilakhemo a h rersau

emes ttoomh gs oye tour, but i live here, and they're going to change anyway. so we jerk things around. that was d enough when we d t on enusrodu t ing. there will be a double economic shock because it's not only the foreign aid funding that's going down, it a huge aunof the omat bst ilypngan t's g a w w,soio ae onho. and it has some good parts, you know, the foreigners have been rking hard to train afghans saesthourkaying thextvaga gomesoe ge leaomntpl ckth cryif don't all leave, but overall there's going to be a large economic shock to afghanistan. but one ofhe things that's going to be terribly important,

ands this something that ive gr it fisin foont i one o sdi to a course of action. but this is going to be very hard, and one of the things that's going to make it very hard is this town. ch -de t ged ii ts telhi p tik tal ouli ev things are going badly, we like to change the policy. an awful lot of the probln afghanistan --nd ion'tean tholob ig ec i iemti tyetodo sth yo aetting other things drop. your enthuse be yam becomes like a small child that walks away from a complex ect, leaves e ks a orth f. not dn'yoed

iltoh, t aze what you're ding. aid gets criticized a lot for what happens with coractors. anth cramo lyep fd. r ngyo h a ntordoteyo reentor d dohihe contractor to come in and tell you you're wasting your money by doing something that's the wrong project for the strategic need prmshanhaana l oub rvg cac un wal r to a lev of staff where it can actually -- to a level of staff where it can actually do things again, and until we give them more legal flexibitynow cacnderth, eyl in ig fitodeth'tu alter. but we need realism in this town when we look at these problems not to always fixate on the immee, b tee tth

ee,unyi pem ancu tag the ne txpha i oretha did, say, when i first went to afghanistan in 1967 when aid was ten times as large in the wld as it is tod. rehe oizn ts,ou reudt orlyd u w y we u this is going to be particularly important in afghanistan because as we go forward now sadiness imanoing to benosl pobo cncthrl 'rin s er orornt point about succeeding in afghanistan than that. the majity ob w w ptare bon afiswi crume and

take care of contrary interests. the fact is that if we do not convey a message that we will ethele ngpnsly ar such major player in afghanistan that everyone takes position on what they think we're doing, wheer they're friendor ie rg tpoon thgh 'sng. e tis e the afghan army will be strong enough not to lose. and we're not winding down th war. comeun ting irown our part hoe t us t wpary sus price for that. but our most critical challenge in afghanistan, i believe, is to ma upuriha g y ave

ffntt ntt t ot . usat ge ere political dynamic, it changes the economic dynamic. i fear that what we will tu alf h polythec o unai t wller reap the strategic befit of the effort we actually make. um, we're in our pitic stregot f buhect rnsha t in tily o ability to project steadiness is goi to be enormouslyman a dest s si k'r whnellen doesn't know how many troops he'll have in

2013 and doesn't know what he's going to plan for as a post-2014 esence when ctcr to acaopha coin e n steadiness. that's a political choice which will have to be made after november in this country. an.an'tbeeow cbl t il, k,e jooif xt coua oest obama or governor romney, if we are going to stay in afghanistan, th let us say so. neasher l w evan aienf ab. stho if we are not going to do that, then we are causing americans to die for aaioli t'opinre in a t w n

we cay'rndo rse ts sme ac are not winding down a war. in fact, we are turning over less stability than we projected ourselves as turning over two reon o ,'117 not in perfect detail, but in sufficient detail that we can cae he eer from now andfghs okbahae ta aadou 's wtheeod y snidevha al i last year and that has put aid through the st excruciating business of trying to responsibly dowiz fowhicvem g ed sro lst a rtan rlyn gerou. so when you look as an afghan in that context alex talked about

of years of uncertaty, of having livedhaay y ree ou s t p nrsan unecto gdon numbers, budgets that are affected as much by our deficit as by o policy guou fiss nnvg isa sihext nitiilve whoellan do, and no kidding, is it prepared to lead the american people in speaking honestly about it? and i hope w stay. and, alex, ank you for a rengd an o inwhou flyt t ovend k stor, tdo y bfr now having tried to actually do the things you were talki about. congratulations. >> will amen to that. thank you, ron. i'm w going to make a couple a tio,ecnd hein tien

'l tll fo remaining time. just four points i'd like to make. first one is really another point that builds on the remarkable progress in the field. codveenecinkn thinadll thhaee ce iqofhe so-called civilian surge and other folks on this panel may or may not want to respond to those critiques in a new book by a waingt preer e'lo cqu ss an s irslyldage th nn li se hno b impressive. i think it's been quite impressive, and the individuals involved have been quite impressive again, there are plenty of caves, iudabu tre cinecf afischngow taeohho kluticn'v seen in the field is very impressive. second point, and building on that -- and, don't worrythis is not all happy talk ,

hanhe m how come corruption's sti so bad, and how do you balance the relative importance or significance for the mission of progress and itikait up ouc e sol u t. be i tha p en iasto i want to commend those great afghan reformers who all of us know very well, especially these two gentlemewho have workedin ghtar onir er t hheas o wen ayon was kind enough to let me go along for part of his visit, and -- well, he would have had me stay for e whe time. tafoe fe holsis.mof

let me just mention a couple very quickly. the minister of finance has been doing some useful things to make moou tunto cry suitcasesf tht e' aere nsatre ogss. why did it take ten years? there are a lot of rebuttals to my observation, i'not sying this is a happy place inerms thmypeel u enlo tgh l torioesato gh irar ra aealou a year ago in march of 2011 with arm supplies being sold off and not being available fortheir soiers. theye acal contiing on wihemi pitt le d t knchneerat t re der there's actually a legal follow-up. that was just one example that i was informed about. ron and i visited the asia foundaon office which is adminiera ra tg

thcale ihaan th 34 in ghtawith an average population of close to a million each, sort of the equivalent of the states in afghantan. and for the most part, they don't have a lot ofoner eidg bset e ettr ro oplte t elelnt gati tharwfory to give these governors a little bit more of a sense they have some control over their budget and that the amount of money they get will be tied to their pema t's aemaba rn f aheia da, deen nioninrihi oanir iss t trend line in average provincial governance performance. in other words, things were getting better on average in their mind. they hadnobivysf ua, n'ntma ou o l eng ame, nohy y t lyimt scientific.

but their overall trend line that they were seeing in trying to measure this as factually and quantitatively as they could was sot'yon p.-r a e a odpl ininitfgst en news accounts and our debates often focus on the kaai elite and the problems with that. third point, ron and i wrote frurri aan when we came back -n enif ws ouhi mof cu-otees, oela t erall financial commitment to afghanistan. as you probably know, there is an expect nation that the afghan security forces will be leuresard shortly after we have hi 2r6,ll thp 300 ty dic wta fairly small number for a country of this size with this pe of a war bth nr acinoso nnaan

atr tor do ou0, ah w enos s a nato has withdrawn most of its forces. rob and i raised a -- ron and i ised a lot of quest in our i wteiteha i tisomn poma t j because we're tired of spending money in afghanistan that we preemptively decide t downsize the force. pratas aedhen wch totn atirntld bu r ped out, we should not delude ourselves to think that the war's ending because we're coming home and that the threat envonment is going to improve substanly right afte weef doweus h ea wnt aie ti werth pui sgiln or -- saving a billion or two dollars a year

in afghanistan that we actually lose the war because of a fals economy on downsizing thef cuce rees atey iiaorio b 'stae to the financial commitment by the united states. and finally, my last point has todo with an area where i'm a bee rodoesoteeh to mention this af pic ert t kih ghfflstntt rue we s listersa them, at even as alex and his compatriots and international colleagues try to illicit thghth coiol supportfo uos nct a thayem obvious, you know? how could we possibly give several billion dollars a year internationally to regime that, let's say, cut ai re. th 2lenocin

ghta on know who's going to win. there are at least two or three people discussed who would be, i thk, worse than president karzai. and my view is we need toen a goo g$8ll inaalot ndaert. 'rtng wy, e ron point, we don't want to make this sm like a binary all-on or all-off kind o decision, but to me it'snot coue t anias eouop t t re aecnt internationally if the corruption problem remains in afghanistan. not to pick the winner of the 2014 elections, but sigl the whe crketh pren cda sofhe pey ugie a tre es bf necessary, fairly bluntly. because there are just, i think as a matter of fact, some people

that the u.s. congress is not going to support at the levels axisinat t d w'sco heky cre 'slamm b tou,lho d we wrestle withhe corruption challenge and make sure we don't give the afghans the sense that they're getting a blank check from the international communy? ts. bao e en y dofua acounli is fundamental. afghanistan has to have a vent itus witth m nd thclmaeowbu , il en i k cng fro both of these comments something really important occurs to me because i go to afghanistan so much and have almost over 20 seghta athle o

oci people le to look at afghanistan today and say, oh, it's failing, fewer would say 's sceedg, a trey hainmueor ers rymarkle og in some areas. when you go into these afghan ministries that ron was talking about that maybe had a good nisterrmae n ar thunadsrul, univsitynd o fulbright programs and the american university of kabul, men and womenthnd twoha eyreng teeng be'sare. en y tunhe intrturehat d no exist. if you traveled on a road in afghanistan, um, you kow, you went tough a bone-rtling

experience yho sit d ibovt me yoeeworeeuan this is not just in the capitals. in every part of the country, they have experienced globalization. ann ouide o alioor 3ard thwe a few ousand land lines in afghanistan in 2001. most afghans had never seen or to85e ane as he me ar iuth e robably be in a couple of years more afghans as a percentage basis using mobile money, using their mile phones tfeays t e i m, sabte.

remarkable and so these things are existing side by side, um, and what we have to do is to stk w ode e th evthh lo beehghta even as afghanistan does become more stable, it is still going to be a ratively fragile, extrelyrosfl at s ac wld socillue ou up,woat pl that sort of, you know, hit each other in the head. on one hand you have kabul bank ich was acaleof cupti fiiasthawa evlyee but the other side of that is that it demonstrated a couple of things. afinalwohall, that there is a

a or b nc itnst siv lean bevav en strengthened as a result of the weaknesses we saw in that. st week afghanistan got a positive report on i i og thashaatso gnanauhe y d thli klba ppitewfeverhing. t off the international confidence in their financial system, and the afghans have worked so hard over the last two years to overcome that chleng ut c hebuaca a t gs lachh mof bve w ha, he iwa lecoro anrs their prram. but then you see things on the positive side. i'm going to come back to mobile money for a mite beuse it's a fcinating example. e ti u tph po.tha nna ott'ee be ndoteaha whenhis first happened, the

afghan police who got their payments through their cell a 3 eauorhvedtheyadte rs tsk ra of c ndda a mmr and a mmanr, ten off s on and so on down the line, cash was ing straight into these accounts, and it demonstrates that even ayoveoi aleserron an set sgtng stiobybe ti d,an by empowering the leaders who demonstrate that they do care about these issues, you can make progress. and we just have to keep on suti pophore ll able te i ,am tt nas saying. when you look at governance development in a long-term perspective, these are things buthwhataseears aec. moaty tst de

loauans n a ys amazed by the potential that i see in afghanistan when i go, that despite the setbacks, t progss twe nsnt stily ve hatge le iictht n t. thank you. >> can idd -- >> please. >> -- a couple things? and really agree with particularly what alex was talking about, the young pele. e mo iring y i t ghta tin d 3megs caenio t d not exist at the end of the war, a generation -- i'm genelizing, but which has an enormous numbeof rll es pe nt ercoy. bee a ygers- d geghta is still in the 30s -- goes in or back into a ministry, they may

be a threat to entrenched itese thip, they kwmo veth icas keng lf cge in ministries that i've seen a that alex was talking about has occurred, some of it you feel now, some of , we svegno onsnapale it's, if i'm saying anything, it's a plea for detail and gelionic p ther than brd s ocdi my pcein aer tridmet you will never understand this country as clearly as on the day you arrive. that is very much true of afanistan. ha i tere t e e.

elon let me say i think we will make slowrogress. i think whether we are staying or not the poin i made earlier is aso important. we e goin w iti up bse f,yo th cefthlaw n ns we pull -- our lackf clarity pulls against ourselves. but it's also very important as one looks atorruio a b cfu enwatoth we're -- washington tends to say particularly because we have money and influence, tell them we'll do x or we'll doy. it is vy imrtthu thumhaureng bor.nsgh fo instance, i agree we're probably not going to do as much for afghanistan in the future if they have a lousy election.

inntath w y,go w ghe haheht ti ksustd where aid has leverage and where aid does not have leverage. if you're talking about senior afghans, you'reki t ait sva dlilualy e ec eal iv is leveraged against the state, has no bearing on the personalnd political survival of a senior ti. yhi imsf a fra oal ivs ern ete i functioning are someplace down below. so if you're taking -- i've got this great lever to apply to iority numr three, and nue.ngthio re ile. wedo ustwh isentd wt

ereenl where it is useful pressure. but it has to be very carefully calibrated, and we have tthink through what seems an sy eocain tct ido der tt w t uc e reto sd that message. i have no problem saying it, i just don't think afghans will believe it. i ink by and large wre there womiu b rinesan w mo ahe rs oli es cosiabth eti one, that a bad election can be absolutely disastrous for our policy. exiofgstng all sorts of t wayd haof capur w hou pblo to that conclusion? first of all, i don't think we undetandhat a bad election is. we're very focused on transparency. you can have a b election if

itesto sseng orus w we lydeilg. cohahasuut cprocess. you could have anlection in which a large number of the pashtuns don't go to the polls because of security concerns, and e election is cleanly rround tar ioennif a brokered election between power holders is more or less disruptive than aepou ntin noll isas, first, we don't really understand what is more or less destabilizing in the electate outcome, a to think weis xeen hs. lege tek. rop as,nd

large, do not want to rock the boat because they want to reduce troops don't think they have any appetite for the level of tind rre tby ei mat i'tre'se ed our p d thoninou want to be very careful of when you're a big power is don't bluff and lose because it simply means ne timou havees infencehe bainoueaa daestar oay us. so if we make threats that we aren't fully determined tocarr t aurlua, inan, e futgh pic tton r behind waiting for us to fix the issues of the electoral law and the electoral commission. i believe rhtly orro webak l.t,

d,horwe otto m c ahegig of dhiisoia disaster, but this is your disaster. or your success. you're going to have to focus on it. by ingholiainng elraocwixei soom this counterintuitive view that we ought to make it clear that while we will help, we will fund, we will support be, this is their eltiontoe w o w legoyoghen pl, fheroe o ce,nt ur aos question to one person, if possible. but you can make it more bad if you need to. >> mark sneider, international crisis group. comefs. civilia,h state and our military there.

but i do have some questions. ron, you just said something ich em mebe st ifgst a comeanet you say that it may be that we don't have the ability to press afghanistan to have an election that we would ifo, ssmeha be hfw dt. ifteahaheth in ahaanwo than the current government particularly, and in at regard there are two other issues on the question of being realistic. cat aomnt cle pe. ee t we've had ten years, $35 billion, and everything that we see from the evaluations of the department of defenset or r ist aumoct ohepof

ua o at units, all of the army units. none are capable of autonomous action. and only 7% are capable of tous aiohhe h soha erh es cnd col aalys from dod aga is of the, i think, 47 units in the ministry of defense, none of fincng grcae cin abo cut tr io so the level of confidence in what the military's able to do as you go through a transition in terms of security seems toe sowouens ae,tion. >>at teo m adon m qio we're going down the row because i want to make sure we have the

development of specific question. we'll pair these things together. ot developmentes, u t i aur] t mtyw >>nk o. fotior ani. tebe g w actually gives a long question here, but let me preface my question. >> makit short anyway. >> i'll try. al yenedt ye ightadu' ntd cit di i k oued at bespa ilveea ar se in the military. but weave is last year, for example, out of the 0 some odd thousand students who took univerty erancam out bee e ooun at t er sm. weeminhe ie olteom towards universities, and we only he one or two master's degrees programs in afgnistan. in aun 80 te bin tig,erco y t h b,

amlseha i think what from a development perspective the cr aan cit lot afisin anissoinat algi lyic turnover results, you know? get somebody a master's or bachelor's degree, and you have em rdyor od. >> n m wrt th i -'sou maefe.rnh [laughter] >> no, it's a terrific point. and i think that one of the things as we have fused very innsivy basduon ann t fre tiglihin chenng to school. buthere will have to be gains in the potential for eloymt

roeet tel toell t lese psew inved dvem rty. tways that i believe that we arerying toursue that is that, first of all, a huge n cuoon tind thal ha ath twh look at construction and other industries in afghanistan that have done remarkably well -- the man rct ann ki l i ern t aaby. tso pemo ve ahaed o t ma shaer afghans who are capable of engaging not only in their own economy, but in thregional economy. the next big thing, obviously hon traeonhe du. a le o reasons.

one is if there was ever a case out there for the resource curse, afghanistan is it. and if afghanistan is going to extinry ii t n aloio tve odve n me e satos nurear a dispersed transparently. it will create a lot of jobs. but the mostmportant thing that the extractives industry will dfor afgni is not dirtsni du w aer rtan nke reharedy tke osobalth ancillary industries and growth and trade and corridors that will result around tha are really critical. ofildfg ahee to have aixture nttoe epur ank it. kn oho twe lin afghanistan were being taken out by afghans. and the reality is that there has to be annvestment climate afisan tens pntto ke

uc itr d ne ab inerdoat tndtha's about governance. if you tk to afghan businessmen, it's their challenges with governance and corruption and availability of electricity and her things thdos deftemmeeg ghta d 'sllin nd >>rou. rkedwo g questions, very different. on the first one, whether there's not a contradiction in my position, yes, there is. ankl the is cadon cati.snd it dstus to our ability to sustain ourself in afghanistan which i believe we shou do. cosi eouoesot lea to ssyjeuve pe. or a lot of people.

my poi is simply i do not believe we have the capacity or the will or the ability to ankeeaheer e conclusion. t contradiction between the importance of the election to our policy and the fact that i'm recommendinthat we hold back. of m ahaeala on the army i didn't mean my comment on what you can do in two years t apply quite tt wato t ay. m,cty, rivyre tiicut ou ilaly sstioue ye t a. and i have huge, huge complaints about the lack of transparency miliryinstandards by which wo d - t

tet w'm fopln vam as an infantry officer. i have watched the formation of foreign military forces under our training for the betterart rs a fs i h b lv soohi icty owet ae bj first of all, i think it's very important in this criticism to understand how much of this we yes. not been doing fore yes.en dng bung l e s g e lan0 just over 200,000, one-third the size, one-third the size of what we already had in iraq. and we hadn't red those taets. idotie il icio vehicles, airplanes, artillery, any of the things that allow a

force to go outside of garrison and operate in the field l ge0 ath w chll f. w dedan k w cctecn t am administration -- to have this very large, very big enlargement of afghan forces, we actually had to delay building a reoxut fe use eys inrys in wven b ge building the logistics base to support this force and sustain it in the field within the last o yea. d oit et i devery. en so that big decision 2009, build a force. november of last year when i ted s estimey ree el mt ai cndha e

ttn nob- n ttaln ab eath a full set of radio equipment. that's simply the time lag from making a decision to a unit ing t the door with a full compnt radios bus thao lted a t itcow i esat v critical in which we're turning over responsibility now to afghan security force and it's, theicture is hugely gelibote i mh, inot all of helmand, it's a big hunk of the center. and there were virtually no afghan forces as everybody read en t mesentnt inl en oaian el ans se aakisns about how they are redeploying their force to handle the drawdown of the marines, and i

heard gh about interaction between police and local police dy ron prd. afisesry itien ah dre isfe the east is different. one thing i heardrom all three vision commanders was the cruciati diflty of ttarar mne haffhe anse twarorsh te in short, the process of building this army is a very, it iotn- es thl.lvioes not a guarantee. vietnam is actually an ample of having done it well if you ok at 1972 an asith soieesyure

by75 w cffey and the ammunition, and the morale was already going to hell because they felt they were getting let down. en they fell apart, ye. but ere'a loto sha alui cte e. nayist haea ry critical issues to get through in the nextwo years. these two years are now a movement from quantity to quality. 've done quantit this last . by ms,algh we ttbe prm. ree ros o tinghepe levels of the army which we are not talking about sufficiently in our public discourt. discour. we nto sencth isen p-se gho ilal bet t isks, get hurt. we'd be backed up. that's going to be one of the critical -- that's a critical part of the troop decisi that president obama'sgoin me.

hnk dnhele o ps fn n y twea srt th tocwi ananul f but i think in two years of hard training and hard fighting if we keep theupport at the level we have, we have a serious chan leisotngoseha ham g oow keeeest, e gni ee vea s at 11. i'll try to take notes. >> i'll try to do shorter answers. >> that s a great sw w sre he lein fw, l sh . oh rbeh usaid up until january. this is about corruption. theerrmance-based governance of tclstovrsn t ov. n, tun

gh analysts network rated our provincial government as being the scond most corrupt in the couny. on thi s ikas t dienta t ionn think was data to, to decide if government official was rrup or not. owoure re evidence-based, objective rating of corruption, and howo you use it? >> thank you. gentmareth fhow >>nas lf ud] i,om mr he peace and democracy for afghanistan since 1996. heth se hsp isrn,nd

sut on mmntof. to afghanistan policy. and afghanistan geopitical is lo of prs lla reerinnc glr 2ea but how separate the united u.no endhuprem polits over ano o pbly a question for the 200th bicentennial or anniversary of the war of 1812. we americans can identify with the it of that. [laughter] ga flye. havech gattc,nd i anwaco back to the

question that mark schnider amadumannkron anat um, if tre, if there was a word to describe afghanistan from my perspective after this morning, it's corum. eonummsoe stptby fat thel we must stay the course, and we must convince friend and foe alike that we are in this for the long haul. unngthwere ocof dinwn pelch tospl is going to sound like we're getting out of town, you know, nicely. a se bbaor

umanuntah 'soiewbay ed lofplha ed urs wt aid can influence and what it cannot inflnce, and so as a consuencwe o t aror ft diertt e ghtadier rs d heeein deeply troubled democracy with its own set of problems with the bank unun lonne anh d fel like we've heard this morning and i'm wondering whether we should or can is, i the hac ti sitbathca articulated for why we must

afisanetr o inve in isin pssuean >> great. alex, if you like, we can begin with you, and you can respond to any of those questions that you would ke and, please, over to you. >> oka thas. rsohstm resefe i think a technical response and then a broader sort of political response. at the technical level, um, when ththherenyhis,ndle atnd osod dirspemae. but you are right, we need to measure those things. we need to measure them rigorously, anwe have to have ematoat stsehi il y t o

ingsha have tried very hard to do, um, at usaid -- and this has been a broader policy, i think, o adstr, jiha i aocn sus sunt catochwhe is ide t cree a relt, but we don't always spend enough time rigorously measuring those results. um, and we have put in a number ofros place in ghtaatllri mogolyer nkth ber qio politically coming from a rule of law and governance background, at the end of the day it will be the afghans tat know best. it is the local pple ow isoiatho rs t cre a day av empower afghans and afghan institutions to be the ones who are going to carry this out.

you know, i always return rsly ,yb grstitde thsterunar ertpa that at the end of the day it is competing factions who want power within the government that are going to be the ones who enforce ecks and balances. d l meweav emhightahe uve ano s tr resdid he ilto h os to account, then it won't work at the end of the day. d i think we've seen some to, we g l of progressin d ith rly g herrst that i think that you and many others have proposed, is what is it about this transition that is going tota annt eserngs ss elleizn ngrshhng

international engagement to something that is going to look much more like stability. and i think thathere are a couple of key inient e taf ait dekeir stioor self-sustaining, the ability of some afghans t hold others to arin m dree dese fod th itucy carrying forward which brings me to the last point whi was, i think, the basis of my remarks anthe thing that i'll focus on that raiics t e lyisre loer itnt.th because all of the challenges that we've identified in this discussion will remain. but i think at the end of t

un sesetwicty, is aes wo m for afghanistan and our other allies, um, are no longer in the driver's seat as we have larly de b ahe pio sorth ans th pssha knowing that we will continue to be there is going to be absolutely essential. >>'ll just add one wo bore givi it r tap ga qiooummnt el d eser aou hi i saner cenhe and that's unfortunate at some levels for many of the asons ron was getting at, that it makes it harder to cob say credibly -- com.erwe t evvien afs t t blngit has the advantage

of being true, and especially in fiscally-difficult times. whether or not the message would anacpt the challengeer matter, er i hit'rean a uf i t ho r ghliann at ti lel on your questi, and to say which possible presidential candidates would be unacceptable, but i heard a couple of names on my tip tt caryd t rt thh.hasa youen,ryis e ann' very to us and while i agree very much with alex and ron that we will not desert it ase did 20 years o,maala tio 'sinto t okndre ao guarantees about the outcome in afghanistan, and the afghans should not feel any guarantee of our commitment. they've got to continue to do wasotlak--efm bists thatlex

ueakboav bu tarru estipocs pes me fundamentally more corrupt, then i think all bets are off. and that where we try to and, you know, i make thiargument tyllrg nsos bue t bde now dead, al-qaeda central's a lot weaker, givess at least maybe 10%, %ess absolute cocoacnafiss toake ani eli dme back, lashkar-e-taiba could take sanctuary. it does matter to us lot. ouveatghseuldn't be deling re tioha hen'doir , t cel urrt d i in'sworying to get that message through.

>> t and a half minutes for the hardest question of the day. okay. on the first issue about the britis the was ari e dm, w t ca komhed em otin i own. but i think those days are past and that, in fact, we have a pretty tied-together strategy. i've talked to sme o theit hhaed h a re py ies. to n ro tyoo okay. um, there mitchelke t cyin lfme adstonoltos ann be a conundrum, it has been a policy that went in two directions simultaneously of reinforcing money an troops andmmnt iliin aer t

walite, therefore, set in motion all kinds of pressures in afghanistan against succeeding. yo ce'm umdothwel a at rtt. us do think it has undercut our own ability to achieve some of what we could haveievedyegop bvewediut e n e'di anth sending afghans toward what i would call hedging behavior. protect your money, protect ur family, protect your political otgu ri a t becauseoua fonere themehr'ot counterproductive for the better state we need in order to succeed in the policy. that's one reason i hope for

chity. clarity bu dxcessiop fuenquon t t argument -- i'm already 60 seconds over, but -- and you've asked the toughest question at the end of the day which, of course, was not our central the hiscon i inilcehe iby,y ofnslinf central asia streting from pakistan into the stansf afghanista s a cro ..neulushe

1015rsha t whole area unstable and an area that now includes nuclear weapons i think is ptty catarophnne sd selyfea oay and if things fall apart, first of all i think there is a push to radicalization that has occurred over the last decade atl qaaisnon a o enonr lee rroin en doknxa a'n ngsaat o, but if people who believe they are god inspired in their attacks on u

w th vdio t deyewhe sbe eain ann. inhy n mo psychological boost which will invigorate that movement of cotack ous for long timto n'ov er a trr u worry does not justify endless expense nor any level of expense. expenshave to come do a ooavcoowt e dree ee leanin in ri y, s in d, ve got to get out of here. i think too little of the debate that focuses on getting ta crcatmeth iceon ou dse tis ti ury that i think

exist in which case one can make an argument for going home, but if you agree those risks are there, th secd qutionam doleec o e is rd amngs pteineprobability of more attacks on the hoeland, more attacks on american interests, of instability in afghanistan? am i willing to say lhoin enlytoabos aa icr dr? ou nrre tomake that argument, then you are into a different argument about how much cost and how long. that is where i am in the argunt. thk you r isinthe es tic nk lo b'rele iftlert. >>asin in thanking alex and ronald. [applause]

[inaudible conversations] naleveio] [inaudible conversations] naleveio with the u.s. senate in recess for the july 4 holiday, booktv r- ei ek hrns. giga 0an aeffdnags eio trencl t prsidency from heert hoover to barack obama.

scineecn clng l wveh tiesd. he end of the day you are ready for some rest but you don't get a full eight hours of sleep. aboa the ship like constituon is for n, four hou . the sailor lives in fear of the possibility of being whipped by -- it was always carrd by a petty officer in a bag. towpy ceo

geg y a dolettt t yon'ntbehtf nine tails coming out of the bag. u.s. combat trpst ovei.serns aq e e omeet k a rinonheitio hat nation. the committee heard from the state department's undersecretary for management as well as officials with the pentagon a the u.s. agency for international lot. >> the committee will come to

order. i would like to begin this hearing by stating the oversight commsionvershtson ichaheht n is lenonke americans deserve efficient and effective government that works for them. thcommittee is to protect these rights. are lemnreonsilitio taeractae xps ahtoow tefr ir rn. ilrkiesin rthith citizen watchdogs deliver the facts to the american people and bring genuine reforms to the federal bureaucracy. this is e mission of the oversight and governmt rerm mme. meat ut prte ae e ofi my,odan resources for the mission in iraq. this is an interesting day on capitol hill given everythi that's happened wi the supreme court inheirecis wis cotee iol t

yoll aitumof er pripg today. we do believe it is vital that to get all of the tstimony that will be shared here today. soatitittionie oy hain citil afdh deon hrrnoolais inat b we erh pushes back to the latter part of july or perhaps august. we would like to be fairly close to a quarterly type of update doree yoesnyin givenhso de han coxi tissa today's hearing is entitled assessment of the transition from the military to civilian-led mission in iraq. weroio s r to agan ko rt a li ssth administration's progress and prospects for succeson whether this strategy should be used as amodel for

afghanistanin 014. nu otuions we can make the most of it. on november 17, 2000 the bush administration the government of iraq agreed with the united stes twithdraw tros by mb0. kegt haee nspanted b 5 uniformed personnel. miniature sport under the chief of mission authority of the officef security cooperation. th ateeparent tl tieonan,0o ppt contracts -- contractors, roughly a 7:1 ratio. this includes 7000 private security contractors thatmve onthghir rcinto wra clthatkeed

stdis wque designed to maximize iluence to new locations. he later said the state will continue to police development pong lo idmoving beyond baic liorwihe of.suphr e cesety fo capabilities for secuty assistance and cooperation and quote. there is an unprecedented missiofor the state rt. ths ptirp s tiit t ec oe ca bee ouavth n a result the embassy spends roughly 93% of its budget on security alone. without a doubt, this is an enorusox d dflt thes lth i min.cplng maros apprs to be facing difficult challenges in a number of areas. e oversight committees offered some criticisms based on their testimony today.

clg gome cobi oeogh atanns art ricils ot nad. e special inspector general for iraq states that quote thousands of projects completed by the united states and transferred to the government of iraq will no tuned wfao t nd preso deetminto raof eine ck tuoce agreement and the impact of land-use agreements in force and force protection passport visa requirements and our foreign military salesrom. of tfiha ot setyua hamd ability to monitor programs. mission personnel are only occasionally able to travelfor emyso htots and ote. it sat ete atovens fty thaqvent is s u checkpoints.

according to one official to ted re he liison to qute he t tr trh, o ot aps o be involved in an effort to be more efficient. the state department is evaluating its otprint poleucs. chnn teoer es nu o qio eengtk? e refg min? atsldexedth coming months and in hindsight is this a well-managed thdrawal? the purpose of this hearing therefore is t gain clarity moerneoxaq. etsuraiore ibnd ete ghta r onhdl -- dell draws only two years away and will likely present a greater challenge than iraq. we need to have the answers wetitooksecommitbilionsf

esr co ms i di teczeg distinguished ranking member, the gentleman from massachusetts mr. tierney for his opening stement. >> thank you mr. chairman. you talked about whether i lna vee tig.ce ththwdrl ep particularly difficult and we have to keep that in mind. i ask unanimous consent the my remarks be placed on theecord sowe can expedite the hein and frdth tns. t y re daree er hsedao submit opening statements for the record and we no recognize her first panel. patrick kennedy is the undersecretary for managent of peveis c otatepant demef nsd noe morris rudman as of

mid--- assistant administrative review isinternational veloropeen m ha.ranisurht do you solemnly swear or from the testimony you're about to give obey the trut the whole truth and nothing but the t anu. u be e t e o l t he es nsedth rme. oer to allow time for discussion please limit your verbal discussion five minutes. your entire statement wille-- of rd.ll pr ouowik oe mis.dy f kee mphis nice and close. there you go. thank you. >> chairman chaffetz, ranking memb iernnd inhe mb t yornvng

afthilyo ira vi-lraio s.ces ompleted their withawal from iraq in december of 2011 marking a significant milestone in our bilateral relationship. ben, ie mtigoacontue d leq. thsurasimed aluatn th ground remains challenging. nonetheless our diplomatic engagements are robust and our embassy meets gularly with president tlni pme st l imes soy ad c e e rt iwa tigrree aqh r arable u.s. missions. the transition planning calls for a robust structur thatan handle multiple situions. hehacul opion aspph hthlith isogs the securities do not deteriorate when u.s.

forces departed and the government of iraq also stliu.is.s the valu the hbe vatu es ucpenn s ncogn f ss hoes expect to reduce direct staffing 25 to 30% by the end of 2013. is not arbitrary. raer we examined our opatioderd ey wee d isi 0 hfgplit hires now on board. we have also emphasized to our contractors the need to hire iraqis as well. over the next mos,wi condreinh e li ibaad e daliol annex, fbi headquarters and the prosperity support and ask. we will continue to make i d et o ts. eltsou p

20 and involved the interdisciplinary teams within the department working closely with our dod and a.i.d. colleagues. since thll gat th08 s.aqur emweotomte r icwaateao eufen on october 1 of 2011 the embassy and our consulate for fully operational and mission capable as we plan. ile esnale cm dodexs dha rouapie s in pti consular and support activities even though some of our facilities were not fully complete. we have connued to complete our fcilies a spth alin ienee enlltitocy a om si. ancu we ar under the worldwide protective services contract for all state department sites, the fear of

diplomatic security is peorming its increased prsiis siture e ntorpo. de t rese life-support services through 2013 under the competitively awarded logcap and by the defenseoisti age. arshite rt oferes ghec. -titwog p liup.no us og on local sourcing of more food and fuel. we look -- we are looking rward to state plans to award a lifsuppt coct pllo be f 13 opioup a.siv govement elements in iraq using five dedicated fixed-wing and 31 helicopters. evacuatimo ectye medical troronpene ini demof oninnd a

pa to -- under the glidepath. in conclusion, the scope of the department's diplomatic activitiesn iaq ai efs.yf st ry toidin ha completed the largest transion from military to civilian leadership since the marshall plan. civilians are leading our lasting panership with the asinaqengtto s adth u stoward becoming a secure, stable and self-reliant countras efficiently and effectively as pssible. thank you again for viting me stt heart ng t yerch ss kdy will now recognize mr. verga, peter verga the chief of staff for the undersecreta for licy for the u.s. department

ofdens i reh mee members. i do appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today along with my department of state colleagues to provide you an update on the united states transition from thmilita to girsiocesatdree ia ane tiol interest that iraq emerge as a strategic partner with the united states, a sovereign, stable self-reliant agent and a poitive frceor deon slin gi t is wlpar res meete comein u.s.-iraq security agreement by withdrawing all u.s. forces by the end of december of 2011. sttop reen cian pnca trtiodviall

ssible support to the state, for success as u.s. posture of state for success as u.s. forces withdrew fromr dae rt oee demef e elet doeonleqit loans and contracting assistance. the focus is now on cementing a normalized presence in iraq with the department of state in the lead. that mns buildi on yaro rkwiheqi ea alat lte prm.remiryes currently are fms program with iraq is the foth-largest in the region and the ninth largest in the world with a total value ofarat .6ll ahe c w a e ktds a rnon tonrm -istgic relationship iraq has requestedhe sale of 36 f-16's and assoated training a a al of

to tiasos tos sanlri hestcr are scheduled in sepmber of 2011 -- 2014. we are not a pot where the strategic dividends ofur efrts aethea demef e el suusstrtio ciiadpenin . sssful transition enableus to concentrate on building that long-term strategic heart worship based on mutual interest and mutual respect. na qre detrg de f -t at dsn isesnythtuf u.s.-iraq partnership. i thank you for your attention and look forward to yur questions. wiowog teoed rd tssnt eaea .e for international development. ms. rudman you are recognized

fofive minutes. >> thank you mr. chairman and ranking member tyranny. thank your ortyo usas ith ex teaioom mirydo liedis iaq r i -- this is critical to u.s. interests at. it's a goal made possie through enormous sacrifi by usis jngftp i iwihe lottgy weaecd q aie lot r the terms of the u.s. iraq strategic framork agreement. over the pst 10 yea usaid's role ged ouhr st ss. meelteh iio aiph w retg astundvian ppngemocratic processes. then, as part of the military and civilian counterinsurgency campaigns we concentrated on antgtnggrnaliraq'smit itns leshf f i

aqusoeselg iraqis improve how they manage their own resources for development. our ability to adapt to work closely with the iraqi government and people i proved cotiity uro cenfore ssle o eea deon sustainability. today usaid provides technical sistance to iraqis to improve thr abilities to finance and prt.ent their own devepment araorinthr inse tatn pltfail coe atct economic growth, support development of good governance and democratic institutions, support ethnic and religious minorities and provide durab ofrlypl pnsrenat l fo aesd sinit m so as an end goal iraqis will manage everyone of these projects without u.s.

asstance. in addition to the considerable human capital the iraqi people emes hrt poiapprll u e i gven. dly the country's institutio and ability to deliver seices have been degraded by decades of redihe ue er factors. sicyfeivs e e, pteto re. i aq erreros s primarily on improving the capacity of iraqi governmental institutions and give assistance that requires iraqis to tch a.i.d. -- ntrti esan s cas e mcar ef prtswhwee ie g. work with the government of iraq to establish common objectives for new activities. we then come to an agreement n its quir matchin trtig ma r thventros

rougutleatwe toamurth i've's progress. the steps help ensure long-term iraqi investment and commitment to the sustainability of usaid activies that specicall nefi irer vor d. fcuny veenac. o efts ssl an early 2009 the state department and uid in consultation with congress adapted a set of policy guidelines on iqi govement cobusf mu. ndpc they direly benefit or involve the iraqi central government. in showinghe resources provided for american taxpayers cobus i'srss boar aonenmori opa a engagement of the iraqi government and other partners. bus in addition to standard usaid protections against waste

fraud andabuseilud checks onerstinanng, e un otin a a aq usaid contracts with third-party monitoring that conducts independent evaluations of all of our projects. their muiple there are bohaffurpgrpdent oversht d teeieve ucmoha0 ncpemae di since 2003. finally our focus on sustainability extends to the staff of our effort in iraq. re nrffond wi trmooclen haeerouhdlby third untry nationals. in summary our programs and our record isoing to hel iraqis their own resources to foster self-reliance inta stability ountd ii moatheore acthu ertnd ne o s -t

nep. i too appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and i'm happy to answer questions. thank yo >> thank you very ch myfiv te rni ss kdyho m rsl,trrs u ventmeesmio iraq currently have in its various sites? >> mr. chairman, we have apoximately 16,000 personnel stdrt adleg ci aieclg demefdennd e d. >> do you know how those are broken down versus government employees versus contractors? >> yes i am us are. so1 ls,riy10 'm iraqis who are government employees and approximately 14,0 contractor so relativel 2000. and hdo tt brak

oue rdof naal vs i >>, e p or minus american u.sgovernment employees. coct.raqiempee d 00 >> yonave kdofcoras ok dws as. us iraqis? >> most of the contractors are eier aeransrhi trtis. emee p u t uro. we have informed our contractors that in certain categories we believe, they are engagingi coy ononto a how safe are our

operations in iraq and al? at one point, you are seeing a pene ote siof cta u --t apngow >> cmae personnel has been operating outside the green zone since i was in iraq in 2003 in004. we go outside the greone ery helaurof 1, le 2 t were 3000 missions, security missions that are personnel executed ouside in t te seen zone nd i blieve al u 0. s.ma i m dendthsa ha had -- helps iraqis oversee projects cause usaid mplees e reluctanoea consso cu

2elni t we hired were not overseeing the projects. they are monitoring the work so it's an added stff for tob te on ff evaluation k labs elth to aeua wk. >> why can't our personnel be out there? is it accurate that theyhav consy er >>is actehat rions. wo t uri vien n q proving. it is still not a normal security environment in the sense that we have embassies elsewhere. pole moranavthe alonk ouot, s agothfo nitong and evaluation work to have iraqis doing that work.

as well part of frankly the sustainable development effort catyat t ve t bedeeretu w lo ask, what needs to be done to create a level of security and confidence where are personnel can get out ti.re ti' rnou i awao yo ,srorthra cutebut s 60lion of which $10 billion was available for future spending. wire reporting a lot of money cenl br e rs >> sir, we have been reducing the amount of program money tht we are putting into iraq. isomeg w foog isgo

icr i my testimony we have been working wih congress, have been working on the cost-sharing arrangements with iraqo in 9ras ntteitl ala thatunsnty r free thing we do with them. any capacity building, any iraqi governnt, h mtoe s. pde eecal sicetman hvyt twedwi asanheang how to d and will eventually take over into on their own. >> america certainly invested a lot in blood and treasure in iraq areuys my me h pianwi rnihe inmboren. thfrim tyoe hi committee. would you put your microphone on

for us or pull it closer, one of thk yoher? you4,un ss onini whau gh >>rhe are 16,000 -- 16,000 total of which 1600 art anotr , qatlst empoyees. o dilyloby cocts, both american, iraqi and third country national. tdoovtecy. the 14,000 e ic scy. derns teeouropes o iraq. they do life support such as feeding our personl, medical, aviati, an mal mb atre f ihe vi. 20eoletao

ha cct sir. what is the embassy in egypt ok like in terms of those same installations? >> certaly egypt dotve u crnat ceir. hau, approximately -- that is 6500 of tha 14,000 or inranpeneha fni. avw sen the world and it's directly related the security conditions, which are improving but are innturpenenot athine owy r of the security personnel are we responsible for? >> they are responble or

deinpoowc o deetitner o. bears the embssy, the eassy thisogcs aexelf. this feoecy ac ttrfrhe embassy. there is the police training site. there is a support operation we ha adjent the bhdad an rt teth rpin north. here is our consulat in basra. there is a joined osc-state departntenkua dofif ri opiotintt she,

and -- my where ey carry out depmthy ean miitary salean sio isti, is is for all of you. what lessons are relearning in iraq that we should take heed to wel rthrom when go d the . an sue we preferred -- repaired for in afghanistan? >> i would say at w tha thvent qnowk whe t our switch to the sustainable development approach with the government of ir so that they are working in the abin for. s

the cost-sharing aspect of it has been a very smartsp klat rre u whouer hth y-thav por uff anthey have to make it work. there is much less weight involved at the front end. and the scoping of the prram masefotm.sign ofhro dk avena if oprag and the workability of our programming. that is te single most fourrctiv etn for . rtle we ni plng eti aed in cooperation as we move through a period.

we can't drop any of the that are going on and ithk coatanfoio arha mth anonsccul [inaudible] >> would say ther are thr ts se, gemge, sihakinoal you go to the line of scrimmage and you have got a plan. sometimes you ha to call an audible but you have to be prepared to ca that audible so i think that we have done at. dtd,t n ir w velipah aci the ll we spe tmake sure that we are safe and secure and can carry out her mission, but siioegngg as we hope onthe iny mo or

e me mostle y ghsowca ce sinjustwe are now doing in iraq. >> are youdon >>s oor qeon stqukhtrof amaden,y ioth baghdad police college annex facility is one of the facilities. it's my understandg that the inede n monstaxrse ha e. po dtmrm, multibillion-dollar effort that is currently being downsized and as result of the ste department's failure to secure land use rights, the entire facility is being tne r ra a st laseenr esa only five out of all of the sites it operates.

can you say with confidence that those sites are operating without leases or agreements an wi note tu otoq rrshec w u.axrsifywere to lose compensation all of those facilities? >> thank you mr. chan. hahyorngntt thghpodeen site for failure to have land-use rights is simply factually incorrect. we have a land-use agreement for that ste. t epame ceelnto rialiehae underway and my colleagues to do that, it's not part of my general responsibility. sintsithery wiheerto r

waay anoke juntrr pe lot ra over time but thstatement that somehow we have wasted or had everything pulled out fromnerus ecause agenha vsi ls hagren for everysingle property we have in iraq, excpt for one which is their inerim facilitybr sy inat rm.sli fit buenth regard, we have a long-term agreement siged by ambaadorepo 2in he prrtwi e rn oaq t a 10-acre facility in basra of our mutual choosing, sowe are

covered, sr. ga texpelndi re a tk a pot responsibility of this committee to be watchdogs over the taxpayers dollars ag i timru. monn stnglo m t lo in iraq and we just need to be careful that we are not wasting any moreoy, sinyomo s d mpo w anataraul araas of the united states. one of the chief roles ithk waogr putr. sebeare t

thwe g t nt tep a eye n and all of few walls purview. as chairmachaffetz said earlier this isa vebu giivy it pot turemo ii y bthmar y aor mr. tierney five minutes for additional questions. i do want to thank the witnesses for their written estony d i n flo ol hirewi mnd mxd v w thyo >> i too would like to thank the panel for their appearance and cooperation with the ommittee inogr to npedtspt t mmeath er tye at this point we will take a short cess to bring in the other anel and we will resume as soon as they areea

thatpmeacng ir onctel naleveio >> cttsllac se l.og ts

first we have dr. michael courts the acting director of the international affairs and trade at the u.s. government nee aorhaldty f seheinspr ra t.spant state. mr. make you mcdermott is a special deputy inspect general for southwest asia d the u.s. mil oldeyt of f ecgealhs. depmanehoe stuart w. bowen is an insptor general for iraq reconstruction. pursuant to the committee res, be teyessllbs anisurht n you solemnly swear or a friend of the testimony you are about to give up the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? wisesw ieecord lth the

rme. se at ynoh g u onitildad de allow time for questioning, and then discussions, i would ask that you limit your testimony to five minutes. your entire written atement hie ps ra o rk wst off with mr. courts. you are recognized for five minutes. >> good morning mr. chairn and ranking eryran. m se dss prceina is work is a continuation of gso the efforts to review the planning and execution of the drawdown of u.s. forces from cianprt e.ip he plfoedom u enndqimeo prce work

capabilities for personnel in iraq and their capabilities to provide security for those sites and personne st pantd t.nmessage ofy laiiad en iahiricit t eiatsere unclear. further, supported security capabilities for the presents have not been finaled and most importantly effos to identify curivneli d og tdsigg no ftke plorobprcen iraq for fiscal year 2012. they allocated an estimated $4 billion planned over 1600 ac tou.ei o tepesowld resifocu a gialsor o last month, state d.o.t. were assessing the present in developing a plan to reduce the number of sitein irq hover woplicsein

my first pointed -- second is that mission iraq has encountered deys in establishibc fruc lsut bieshashosi tepp tronjearhi he. ssaisllis emergency evacuation plans to request the end country combat force and the mission contractors encountereth le ieag t aqreac inoishaatd asleno mission irq or smell and facilities face humorous threats includi a routine rock and -- rocket and aslaonheseacks,ipp. rt ud] haak nr steps to address vulnerabilities however while dod has reported

some efforts to address vulnerabilities that the sites foe esiptiptfly sie woldt i comeo psence remains unclear. commissioner support functions are working progress andost importantly whilepatio sit pitano fullmscabld vuabiedetear bng fully tracked and therefe it's unclear if and to what extent u.s. personnel an facilies of these locations may be a risk. tiyin cl m kme rkd beay dr a st u ve haouy . ilget to the questions after we have heard testimony from the entire panel. mrgeisel you are recognized rag erteyanfut

pniodsshe transition to a civilian-led mission in iraq purpes to the state department state office of inspector general has conducted intionanalon nd ud aq resio mmtiaroda of 2011 oig reported that the u.s. military wa managing more than 370 civi dvisers. resity tol lot ranis ul wirofal eat u needs and efforts accordingly. pending the audit report from the special inspector general fiuncis, reconstruction ad a t art' ert lacian sicegrinmah o 13 rponse to state oig recommendations that create an office of security cooperation in iraq, sufcien sor

aqcu us naewaef mellra pit october 2011. we will coordinates to monitor osc-i progress in coordination with dod ig. demeone ac le itahi inpost questions regarding land-u agreements, staffing, construction and life-support operations. while security threats prevented bareediuk1onconsatesin onindea -- currently serve as osd eye i operations has. oig and remains concerned about theafetyf the u.s. inm20oapo tl riis cul

gathh erki lashwihe rnnt of iraq and its security forces. during fieldwork for an ongoing audit of private security contractors inbhdignd roeleincknt and the government of iraq is restricting airspace jeopardizing potential evacuation routes. in april 2013 oig will udit the anotl.tor ri eart urirt ailt ovro e rn o aq and other foreign authorities to establish embassoperating routes between amman and aghad wh fas of fhe ndar unip cri a 2012, commercial round-trip fares between amman and aghdad were available for approximately six to $800. oigildi te part'

an sir s0 consfomia r av y , re o the cost to provide medical care for u.s. personnel and contractors a rt cacnould be considerae. er nehyus. wiaedrt's nantmel at ct of 2012. in may 2011 oig reported that baghdad left adeqte - ssatye. nu2012ig teha e ss bad ulalat ery action plans in compliance with department guidelines and has conducted regular of urgency response briefings andandated dills. son ay20a 21 fati aapy reticiiaafd

contractors. oig will audit the department's implementation of the baghdad master plan in juy 2 ns fs a op 2o se wnng intif min y in 2013 to include furher valuation of scrapping and security needs. state oi is uniquely qualified ro mon if poraiovien unthe pe veat red programs into operations in iraq and intend to assign six additional personnel to monitor progress in iraq. cohee c og a diintian veat oe ri s.sei a mr. chairman, mr. tierney and members of the subcommittee thanyou once again for this opportuny and i'm pleased to answer any questio youm ve haou yrsny

e ri n rni mcotfoiv gmogmrhannd ing member tierney. distinguished members of the the subcommittee. thank you for this pportunity to appear befe you today to discs our assentf th tranonmaita e cvan monn . e f sri osopeser the chief of mission authority. osc-i is in charge of him maging the security loerrac prthi twth gnman gomefi. gng mportance of the challenges concerning osc-i and the fact that the scope of the securities program is one of the largest in the world, we ef f transitioning the security mission. we determined the osc-i planning

was progressingthe significant contributiona b e fritu.or i. shomnd recommended the u.s. centracommand issued iraq specific country planning -- assess assist the procedures and resources appld tohe lot e sit led rdthpece rganizing the osc-i. 2011 we assessed the establishment of osc-i and dod efforts to povidsustd ctoperns st1 d . ouhat e tsh i on track but identified some shortfalls in the planning efforts. weekend determined the shortfalls were due torq ifanndal rtlagli

thhe of ocu init osethed mp communications between both the osc-i externally and key officials at the iraq ministries of defense dntr t os dure rdsety inp t susman and osc-i made improvements in the flow of information to its irofalnel and with key seor nearcu coat on april 16, 2012, we issued a third report which is classified related to the transition on the nant y ri loonreine i although osc-i was generally successful and didn't check -- transitioning from dod to the

department state the u.s. in iraq government d not filiz enons sstoe le-ith y e dy p otir environment. responding to our report,dated ofaldid en at seury ret us fraee was affecting apects of its operations. some of the challenges cited by these officials included obtainingor extending land-use agreements. forcotoneres aid nd em cod ewirepe to achieving short and long-term osc-i goals is unclear. however having a formal follow vaivfyaned a a f