>>nk mhan. shif edri.

>> mr. howes? >> the federal government needs to fulfill its obligations. antamoved to a consolidated place. >> thank you. mr. fettus? >> a i thinthere's an acknledgent th aonst bapoces h me oons. bueranwlme t has to be first. >> mr. a alexander, anything else? >> no, i hope we will hve moe t witapri thyoryh.la >> iu eohat. i thank our colleagues. how much more time? o weeks. some of whom were not able to be here and would le to ask

ess ou ink thn prmneitoquon yusso t ewhlo thank you for your participation today and for your help. thanks. [iibonat], this hearing is

e ltn.ulcu n spnattcud canex potuty. it c guarantee our competitiveness. it can put america back on top. of w bw u aboutgas stgh, n oeof i e changes congress's behavior. >> from the time that i had lost total control of the committee and went up for two pitcherof we i istxblhef of aff d

hes a. tt i me dun and i said about 26? [laughter] >> you could make the advantages ritax m.nners much more ho mortgage deduction to a tax credit at our lowr rate. of balays has received for de0 miio se leonmg rnnadst. hefbsal amreedtuan wdey ief the british parliament.

he said he had no knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing until haouy hy. ng in today, mr. diamond. this earing ehopend ect co en oely f you've resigned. the hearing is about one of britain'five leading final. rty ed acay yo elssis w than that. even as it did appr i think before we go a thgi at ae dild

tie a pni explain your reasons. >> thank you, chairman and i as.o for beinghr. i icatpeople. it's 16 years ago tody on baysd bns 1996 that began us rmendsejyt, and that enjoyment has been driven by the incredible 140 dozen people over 50 countries around the world. cmad yd, ektocs bays au an nyay t ee first and the world looks at barclays in a small group of

creditors who had pseed r ats un reenvethrmh i love so much in the way they treat their customers anticlines cly e itke s rpehibutssonthis was recognizs put all forces in the state if there's a problem how we hdle what, what we doaout d moay h e eershrhe mo itarglry cin looa millions of buyouts of three regulatory ancies applauding barclays for their cooperion, their analis, their uctyweid xtl ir oebo

ormngen rt t cha t uit committee. three years ago when this was recognized a waset's get to the bottom of t. th ccs tnntify th oblm,e les iay u le mte . i tthat attitude recognized by the regulatory agencies and whatthe road isn't coming out in the court of public opinion over the last . ndtamyist siis yadid ess t eahi ven rtota. e best way i think i can hel bridge barclays to the turmoil of being the only one out and so this i lookedat nu inrya but idi baare he damage to their reputation that has happened the best way for me to that is to step dwn but

t queionstecmtre d answer wed gttrghhis period and the best way fo me to do that is to step don. wig rg teprth w atre purot ishtcrct chd ymind. 's a good question. it wasn't over the weekend because we worked over th weekend on a comunication to r colleaguesitry idt owttwd sut urhos d wrwfrth announcement towards the end of the week if our colleagues and clients and customers and regulators, and it was clear n oda tepp 'ta tat edtaa step the

regulation wasn't as good as it was. >> want to pin that down. did one or more senior larrk w st i e too, did e refer to the pressure of any type that had come? >> think that is probably a questionoret an tew w ved int nvti wohaad nversation about the sustainability of your continued chief ecute. >>ouayadpeg usas ad the focus it br m stensity, my leership,

hyeruso reluctant to tell us what might have transpired? so they were going to be before . dt, tg hn i ati. >> mr. chairman, i think it is just as smple as if marcus had dit icsstions with regulators i ma wdeele 'vstcnfidence with barclays. why do you thinktti? >>nkrebe foatre eves the last week on barclays being

identified as thefirst bank and s re t clyoujey vi a people. and how we dealt with that i think was appropriate and was a sign of the culture. but hat's not coming out. ist i irt sa ge o i' true we are concerned asncroh oa tpointment the e' achef. i e t vr r atre aueti about my point and as chief executive. i certainly went hrough as the chief executive appointment would th t fnnc

rv, otysrn wrn submission to the board at that time setting out the ranmmi thous fs ao e need to look better at how you were sitting and to control the improved framerk. you know nothing about t raknot b . t abspemb 201028 >> and you know othing at all about th suggestion that you s oprov suran hange -t llesh't taken the risk. >> i don't remember any specific

comments but i'm sure there we discussions with the regulators ring thepwhemay morobube bet inst bfonumber of years what idp able to disassocia myself? saddam as a group chif executive i would be able to lead the running of e inmean otem. >>tr neby yr tcao or as its prospect concern? >> in that februy meeting -- hass e oedon when got to controls which i think is what you are asking thtp ahaeheof

inaul ttd he board about relations with other regulators, how wedealt with ce t mopechat ae ta? dnhe yo ts k down and barclays? >> i don't recall that. >> didn'they tell you that they had confidence inr tece ge >> i. heas icun that had it got down to the organizaon they felt there was an issue that people setimes thanradsuss. th annual review. >> whi is the sort of thing

they say very year? >> i don't menthat ayw itsaayoi o inhaeye g ctcaf weldd ttutpecalhe re pleased with the tone at top to chris and myself anour colleagues on the xiv it i tthwe ales o handling the buyback interestrates would problems and of course now are bl >>on mnoe hifa there was a conversation i think there had been a series of banks which came quite an issue twthd ou trct bse w

transaction that was improved but i think to be fair it was a transaction thatcreated the ambaspata iteeti bu hensona rem eat than probably anyone anticipated when the tranction was done. i remember it coming up in a nohv ty on thecontext o as haedfeuary this year. can i turn to the decsion during tris or th l ern. w wrong. where was that decision? what does that decision take?

ussitu e llts ltter you out that there are three different areas the easiest for me to refer to there was the perio between 2005th meivthanra al lbuia gr of traders and the influence they were putting out. it was o period. the was a second period that i think you areferring th 20o wths es. if i could call one, two and three going forward. the third is he per g towards ocr,08reree tiabutbaf gl sssn h ere

the three. i think you were dealing with the metal. >> the decision was taken from what we can tellfomtefcuatn20 the decision to influence rates? >> yes. >> i'm pretty sure that a prab clear. is it a set out in paragraphs 111 to1mouseo juanocaify toyurtei indeed the decision in this set of actions t t wadrt

eisio meofsepnebee ptr . >> i'm talking about the period in the crisis to a lower level e si wnoke the result to take place over a year later t'rntt occasionally i would say. >> do you take your contacts th asevai? >> most of them were not made

and it is today homany of them are e >> oy thefd heascota laapfrhat one. >> what we were listed there was the specifics that o rce onars i of these contcts. >> i had fairly frequent contact gell wthnk f an peel hvebee ti jo s chief executive. >> how many of those? ltha adul

>>thftyou took it is significant indeed, isn't it? >> today i do it regularly because asthe chief executive i haveicimegs wcoyoe mcl t phre used in the you raise it down and put it in. >> i dd re ita nth communicated with john right away as yu saw. the concern we had i can put ocb9ti'vei s rdcmiw 08 l. h the government

> y mbytaon. senwr that dow >> on october 31st, 2 days later, the fund raising from the middle east wascpleted in oex eake in mireic a h ts i was asking. you think it was efficient. okay. ndeyhefle inl bowes >> he felt all of the rates relave to the other posters could be relatively lw tais, y awoiecotesty yay dot eieve rve

iddelit wn instruction. >> so what was it? >> the most important thing theommethwaa ep hturaeswr gh torha sha if mebers of the government ought the rates were high relative torsndeyto atmncultfn atobfung a whfact were funding adequately one of the worst market environment i had ev haemerency loans or had been nationalized or were having trouble finding.

yet we are posting the ih vhe iweae in hs eelbe ules er e other institutions can actually get funds at their level. >> what is the indications te heurdd'ta t aghw have recently. in other words the returns could be low. if i c mkeupo e bse hitsa if latg his si of 16 banks hich was the question att ie iu ateopf ac histeprtes

t. october, 2008 when barclay this was funding adequately inatiolbobl welas any thsstheera th twe nationalized and 100% of the day in october 20100% we were the ghtht ihst'sor iu be be mat acays was lowering their submission for the reputation for things like that. barclays during that months was reere 1 islsah t hdy 1r on re f h day were reporting at levels lower than that and some of those banks getnaterefund at any lee

f e or es the highest without knowing all that i just went through the might think it to themselves my goodness they can't fund. wenoniehe bshnd r reepraeh 4.7 billion pounds were rumors of a market the we couldn't find maybe we couldn't complete. so the single most importa it o eeaus h n'in rveos redtto almost anyone that looks at but you were monitoring the level r inerosee asky indicator of the

health of your bank. >> i was aware but i wouldn't say that i was the key person ye alring, no. ndouhak t erad ae-ma ergo us. i don't want to get you upset but this is going to tae a second. this is important because there was a repo in the prs today about hw t doe te ndaordy tee t oulk he et o novemberyou will see that through all of november barclays was neither the 14th, 15th and 16th. buisarltivg.ht t gh e sus he bn at rferring to is following the fund raising which was very positive news to the market, levels of libel went down acrossth mrk. th usias t a

streintoe levels. >> so it is the difference between e relave re an desn thae otbaas pedto war which means the absolute level of recent we have two different events. we have barkleys of the ghest level relative to the othe fis and then we ve th iiast n >>nk, mr. chairman. you have talked about the setting up in 19 aefth organ stanley. as a, how long have you been on

the debt market before you 19 o 82.as farclays? >> so that's 27 yers. exrry, 17. ftsok bef. tell me about your experience. youhd nhm dr ponr m tld for that so i was in the money market and when i was ctively involved before i s in manamenti wain t t.seaese

ro gnmorjaanesvernment. >> so in other words when you are right that the opportunity to set up, you had been iving d ahifntrm 17yasa the opportunity for you was to use the treasury topeceyont tt isudurea ti they had more of a u.k.

s ho aig they di't deliver very muc sth tscoa beegthtoe e teruweimpag blity to extend internationally. >> when youstu on thcrngsirtf ci w pct o as you refer to the markets around the world. those were all under the experience. >> certainly we would tte ard h eg's d o avn ai

was it decentralized or did you give people frerein to do with a light? tist eaint twahv ut committee that have all the representatives of the things that had been reported o me. certinlyhe osnsus e maghe d agontis a poch eve kill isions. if that is what you are asking. i think people would have it osth it morecriatlde l agh leofilty the bank recruiting the thud. and setting up he ks

>>s reg he sof h eohe een here 25, 30, 30 years in the money markets because barclays had such a rch nd strong tradition in ts maet tt awadwea operating onwe would he the outside. >> there would be lots of peoe exen the ank because of the peleh bin r s bank. >> it certainly would have started with group teasury. you may rmmberg e inil tc s trofungun icmes ecud.

i thinkthe execution was doneut through the market and the decisions were made by the group treary w ow rbeey en thm aethlot lashwihek f ante operation. end yhitere dttcii 07oi ha is what was it was ow th lying ebehind some of these things?g that is of >> no, i don't.coern? thk th think if we look woineofttheer bks eivth inut ays nal is so what is the best single best decision barclaysclt got right think i was cl in tobe2008erwhe

a sio l as ve nationalized the equity state in the merger hadben ng tnke n tay ilonndele rad. thitas after the announcement of the deal. a lot of things going on inthe maet as bfendk respond? resed ininf. raiow lays te s rns w could get from

from the central bank as far as the conditions. i don'tclsfipeca e dven atoftek ihr existing. >> i think they took the lead. i think -- i understand where you're going is where pop on e akeshe ul m valit it be ng ecgre vin k engd erf money markets.. estimate is whher or not the bank of england is slow to spbfuestnunss cetiheid ma rsurse nd created. peod,we look back at that period i hnu avenfr

r o rl tradition, the quality of the brand name, the fact that we have balanced funding comingnd fromut of the world as we f e rakpotsfot e rankjan intat w a a access to have acce funding that was different than idnhihe tis.t think therewr i think the funding of the bank that's what you're asking for if otbnk n jcegor ito t adtein ubu eo awas th to liudi

>> we hadto make sales of securities that we ft gotoetra n value. >> i don't want to orstate it because the markets were in turmoil but relative to the other banks i think the bank of sa asa e gd the fewould alo y make sure to come into the ts. ma.nhehe i t >> i would have had it before. >> thank you. canemthmss

hwihe ivat for help in the inveigations can we go back to chant hugte ust rerfd ooc got laonu said members of the government. which doyou believe? wendntnt' tthink they were? men o he was referring to. >> who did you think it may have sr lehrri to?di a a tto it c, what it was a concern? >> someone told me this morning are you something in the per

and i ve not had a chance to t soisty om. hanyercussions with ministers orofficials for the bank of england? >> is in the recapitalizatn of the bankin ..bue mo to new york following the decision made to acquire the yo th ceo., i moverothers w >> we worked very well in the primary responsibility in h ndreiby th fen s twa

often john. in regardsul miners would hve been people that john had on hi. ti tmehnetoueesk it e e discuionss. in this period on th 29th of october. >> i'm t se there we uss r efe wet.snge reen. y >> d rbe meeting happene them? i >> i'm not trying to be evaive. weoiit y.id you thought she ws y ngtbt iotk teiwas. primarily being german, yes, and ng i was hearing from john aboui his meetings wit tra but igive

wa to elearhro im weraw. wrth final note down thatt me br in effect the senior figur and government officials or misters might haveeennwrthil e mycttoate f prtifalr inhis job. have what he was trying to tell me is hehaullaheministers who ar pront arno inura atwhth t n. f reaction was you have to make sure that we are funding find 's not wonderfulyis eqlybt hatyas 6.llpoo at

with a number of british banks taking capital from the government. so dnt uthwoy pressurizedtun. fiia markets. stomach but the effect of what you have down here is the ministers or officials were in yoursonasking you tohdular inle t. weryto oh >> it didn't need to be the case. islamic it'snot the firshat, t reve fl 'ton that i hadabou tht hse ods hosty a the high-end during this financial criis, and i wast thes worried that if i can be rcectlyfankwlei

thotatsn sexn osts bebui id oui al story which is that other banks were posting below ours u d yet or not those lels. 'stou re wrg e r wedi totruwawribo okat the banks -- this is why i've gone to sucs pains to say this we he banks with secret leels. wof bkst b oned stlindt ito i s bu w at that time so there were a number of banks that werg significantly below hours and didn't seeto ub i ta tisito l tharetisat ey re the fundi. banks, us, d

this is a huge issue. t and you discussed it earlier what were t ntes of tho co in >>tko an i turn now to the lack of the instruction you said in a supplementary submission here o an ntuc heen ed hnkyoy jerry? ho skotkeep ent see him every day, how did he misconstrue the purpose of this call? how did that happen? youeaeot nk cma

yhaenyonth e was a misunderstanding or miscommunication between the communicion of the bank of england and down. he ru. ton ont happened. i refer you back to those same pages in a october and november. look at e it or ibto os. bmonri. e top rates were excluded from the submission. it was wrong. it was pressure put on lor. teotngeor ust all of that. what i want to know is how did jerry debt is wrong whenou

were just talkinghim? ghiroheu >> my apologies, but i cannot put myself in his shoes. gury w w-rtf horwiars did an individual investigation. their conclusion was that it rrsa.rdi during this time, the fsa and a inig j.

i wadarf , thsao confirm that was their concluding. >> let's turn to theepartment of justice en crn tended to find a solution that would allow workers to submit honest rates without stand out from otheroans. prth v tbays coace gifer s itho r. re aware of that argument your senators were having with the bba and fsandhek? inisno geen it is a chart of how many times people apart as discussed wi

e ongt erthe b, thfed, we were posting rates, there was a worry that others cannot be posting rates athe level where transactions could occur. its rtant hi iclython o inry a number of years -- ffceitsi tono ba' rates. rates were tight. there waso much liquidity in the markets. if someone weroff, it did not show as much. it urmpese ngs

argument? >> no. >> these communications were noterds los thh arel rtcot he ors thatvenre >> let me get to the exact spot so that i know where it is. where is that? grex parraph 42. i ink you rall in one of those discussionsd ow thec oe et dsss and the fsa. the report was to carry on. >> you areot aware oit

o,as. a >> thank you. >> what does that say about the manament that you were not elir be these dcussns ' dngh. th was the misconduct. as soon as it was identified and investign -- >> we are talking about the discussions at were madep thme ern gac se ondngoullf ththsete y when this got serious were you aware? >> it was not broughto that level. utthheer lo wot

mething important is n report it up? >> i think there was a feeling that it had been resolved. ery omirhae rtiev-- >> i think you have answered the question. david. >> mr. diamond, d t inl oe ci between stember 2007 and may 2009, making submissions that took into account concerns. ll u shaok in the relation to that episode rnnturem ahich i ur

se me' crn llthth.e their concerns resulted in instructions been given by less nagent oed to oi netiedom. wngweef 29thfoctober 2008 and a telephone call with mr. tucker. is that coect? >> yes is i whaen rte yollan rof acty >> during the investigation. >> so, you did not know that thisas going on when you spoke to m tucr onheh be00 atlde bbe t stio k. when did you discover this in

the course of the investigation? what month? >> -thin hapne t ts haed cr. itas9. tonvgam the cftc asint wbohe it crisis was part of -- >>gie. oxelgh i do not mean to be cleared and in polit but to give me an pratte s imquon

>> this came to name four or ve days before as s ivysor w nwa of it. my job was to make sure we have thinvestigation going on. as i explaino the chaian is douco thdiu ov this? it raises the question, you as ceo, why on earth do not know this was going onn your watch? u giv daires. ha t treo >> let me put in context that

these aremportant questions. we should not rush through es wlavt ou g ugem 90 the -- >> you have made that point. you have said this many times. it is on the record. please do not repeat. fa rnsesad istill a breach of principle five. do you accept that? >> yes. >i onick cnt? es heorhameme or not the relive weighting. >> why did you not follow up? d hanycuns yet no discussions with him on

what he had taken away fmhe tis tirim je discussions. >> no. after the 30th of october. yo niscu whe r opthhe miry? >> as i said, my main focus in that note was the issue with white h urcc, ou discussion of the 29th of october? that is what i am asking. what discussion diyou have?

perhaps i have no separate rela piimayer the fsa made clear that he had and misunderanding of what was requir. y wihehaveio oecun on context of that note. he had the impression that the conversation that i had with st. hainct ymria, the best of yournowledge believe atby under investigation,

united states of justice? >> not to my knowledge mipr do you think that would be a necessary deterrent for bankers o are on their reckless itnggs thgur.is you have been on the mill for the past several days. i am sure that some people have sympathy for you. i am asking u. u q aotsa n'tou amin, ane ro of banking suld have eight more punitive regimes such ckly dery ers,thct

ea sentences for banke? it is a st. yes or no. >> i think people do things that they are not -itas teh >> i nee a l oe des henvga. i wahare a osra, i got physically ill. it is reprehensible behavior. if you are asking to those actions dh, absotely icaleine stioatre w

with at the time. we d not wait for the end of the investigation. there weimes when it was less clear and due pcessas iman the we timn as hel henvga f lebecen rmedopd sure, that behavior wa reprehensible. it was wrong. i am sorry and i am disappointed. i am also anr. therisex fhe the types of eails that were written. i stand for a lot of people at barclays that are really angry about this. one of my bigge wores i th thiis wng. ut oe ur w people knewe t .

rpthw.nt its reenhek of in and out for their clients and customers. we have to be very careful. barclays also got onop of it. therwaitthds thoueesfoe inign. taking actions on it. it was wrong. >> final question, chairman. heeidfouem hit hehtecn foent. do you agree? >> i was not aware of that. i did my decision was the right decision for barclays. >> and for coury sth cell. iatet ygr ? avi ars. part of the financial industries

in the u.k. i have developed relationships. lmyeer s eaaco . this misunderstanding under your fi note lead to wrongful porting. i vysuilte atn gh td him every day, he never succeeded in clearing up this misunderstanding? >>yoe sic i wo we're worried about your judgment and how you r that firm. de m d wrut have a great f

jo banks to nationalize. you did. we have to wor about this cathe vent oninks >> i did noteel that way at all. >> that is what you said. >> i was only referring to the counselor. >> lete asyou isuestn. u sd t , tvike about phase three, which was after the convsation in a octer. examination, is that the first time youad any of the

activities in phase two? e la ratphon know anything was going on at yourank in that nature? whayou eskist >> thewere actinon behf ilehe i fibays neninrc. >> if we take phase one, where they wwere actually cheating io aen f. betoes.

ywere cheated investors. you did not know anything about this. m,m goo hihee dre esonve problem with it? it is one thing. t-m?not expected to lookt all dythirulhi --isth integrity of the bank. this is crucial. >> this is reprehensible behavior. >> i know th rc -weal u now out of a job because of the integrity of the

ers neyoir e wapngnl dehameyo syovewah this or else we will ben deep trouble. >> this it first came to light k.heesti heaniod w ablha hto fi >> from your point of view, that does not wash. afd av t wry, hoe id ohe intesor elnc so the boss, some people are doing actions that could destroy the bank? tief ima haou phase two?

is is the report. levels but expressed concern over negative publicity. their concerns in turn resulted introninveo d dibs senior management at barclays? as aheuranu rrbo gnmofh ral to nationalize the banks would yss on you -- pounce on

mdendroe re ahe you have had three years to find out who the hell were t senior advisement? >>eoon tur u? >> at the time, i was not the chief executiv >>elu? ouhegees. at the time, i was is possible for other avenues of the sigitvi adse anint wa the regulators have said that

this is an industry-wide problem. >> mr. diamond, let me put this to you. ere gs. you have a telephone conversation on october 29, 2008. palyt sandyunta go iucis legeisone. it nev turned arnd aai i sorry. i did not get a word that came from? >>nd me ever008, was awthavoi

a conversation. it spoke to him about thi mdeod vees iucs atd anio is that if he d that? why did no one turned dark brown to him and tell you, have en dnghatormo. hbengs e e d i that could destroy t bank. they were doing it. en y have thisveio ot k. knheavior was wrong.

>> keep in mind thawas no imchngor s. >> when did john discover all of this? he washeefcu. ifhaenyoea ow w bd. kif t oha time. what did he think about this problem here? >> both john and i were witnesses. veatdis er of ition find out what happened. i am sorry to come back to it again, but it is a signth urk'the relio brsd fandlio

ha another point. but does is that two chief executives at barclays have been no they told the chief executive. that is very woring. re rnsu ako >> the culture has shown that when we have a problem, we get all over it. as soon as we had a problem, it was dealt with. k.at is an imptahi w. pemco hucor noise doesn't have to be before it does come a tradersou havera

shouting out across thtrading floor? paragraph 54. thiss nosameg t thrcatars het tupso noait thwa g i a. >> ok. >> mr. diamond, you seem to be u uthetutlve la a tis w officially the problem. surely you realize that people are shocked at the criminality. apch.e l olkt aknhae aut va fsede

io tinal cs waerso gain. the reward was equal to the efilif baty and not lke >> what is the queson? aye ple o li in a parallel universe as compared to the rest of the uk? >> i is wrong and it is reprehensible. it makes me angry k.isin gation. >> yes, it does. >> 14 traders. we have a couple of thousand. >>, get othat?

wao a t iny hi eo eweid30 la to thousand seven and then sporadically afterwards -- mid-2005 to 27 anden rste ng from tax- barclay traders askinghe barclays senators to fixed rates on their behalfs. whens it wasimit to s nr deth on e nooix s. thlog to impact -- >>an you please answer that question? >> it is wrong. >> do you agree this is n a dialbr isa isonra e. onim t had it

was. what do you have to say for those individuals? they were allowed to be incentized simply doing about the pfilif r o persuade them? what does that say about the culture at barclays? >> the behavior was appalng asoos minute, we moved it to eradicate it. some had a ready laugh. when it was clear that there -- some had already left. i nnotoacd ge i i deit. i'm rs t'lla fo-uim itigaon ontallivls o support that? >> it is not up to us. >> let's go then to the process ulveasd uroth ait

. coyolls e sa rihi time? where was your desk? did you have a desk on the dealing floor of thfixed inme dart? rnt i d did you park it in the daily morning meeting next? > wott ha inasvee inom >> that is a very important point. it woulde interesting to see whether it waserised t nee h top. >> and would have come out of

this investigation. it is a very thorough vestigation. >theec - t d on to look for criminal actity, whose function was it to be looking for criminal tth tin da room? >> i am sure that they were looking for people complyin with all of the rules and regulations. eyldecognde it is quite pervasive. >> their clients would sit in the dealing room or not? >> i amurmeld

aitinn t >> we did not get a report from thpeorhek se d,he inign alrnd thehr topped. >> with the supervisor know and appreciate that falsifyi libor is an offense? and target implicit in this fraudulent activity? >> i think there have been cases where the supersors were e seasehe suiswere ad bdealit ond d with. inome cases, we have asked

em to beusedh r enonpe. on began the moment that it was published. mpioto gan soangrre ayan in't tefarsthre people doing things it for their communy is, customers, clients. they were all impactedse 14dendis o >> this is about the attitudes within the banks which allowed them to do what they did. yoe ngtvees rv w navee

onlsngor >> i would think that that would be known. you would require them. >> whaouheui gn? >> you keep going on the same issue. it was wrong. it should have beenepd. at tuarore w hn t o s gone to and what part of the organization? >> andhat is part of

compan? us tghple. veheesiby d haee ts. ctively, w crm thhi jo have some of these facts out there because they aread a urheutn. dendthhere assthhich are industry-wide, i blame it on these individuals and they are beg deah. >>re tg atldsuto

frle behavior? >> i was gratified thatheac atdi naiets rt. thpantti -- okt?hich other arease inowyfe - markets have been in some ways fixed by barclays trades? veoumihoas ha is a regular part of our audit sectors.

t d bpa o r? >>it was the behavior before the submission was put in. he fd icor sel stre a ly hyook other areas of the bank's where something like that has been going on there r years? >> we have. t r s frle fixing. >> i think the way to do that is to start by going through the r t rtses and ourons ereerlaso , ofrsldt. ths oera prs.

this is not meant an excuse. the behavior was abhorrent. i dohi tttes hel. e seh he behavior. the rate-setters,any of them have been hereor5,ea s car la.kinhae jeasinboar. this was not something created recently. many of these people ve been in their jobs for quite awhile. rt ot t sds were tight before we saw that. it was not considered high risk. yiha l o

mpncadn gn fors >> aits are whereheks ar e criminality before the financial crisis. individuals wereooft usbee enhe powhthouti uaom t help them. this is absolute corruption within iividua within bays is edy th n.ptatyth >> i think you take the

conclusions too far but i will not defend the behavior of that group ofpl cnsn nas t wrok. i drehou avas wrong, it has been eradicated and dealt with. >> n veioat wee ar- ould t thwrwiheki end st i've talh y shtis ch exiv ththhereec hetu

seesch po fcirind opelan and in anytime, any age, any business. ng reed me dlr s ttet but can all of the problems you have had, like changes in obwit in as lyre ouepat >> there are problems in the baindu t--ay on tifltng bahixeve recognize there were proems like ppi that happened many

years ago for a period of time, but today you still have to fix it. thbeste cado rni mplynsnth retountahae im wlefrho ak- >> but there is something more you could do -- you could join the calls for thmerit of having an iepdent ulu oratki y pi iatre is a lot of regulation, now, and it has heightened a tremendouslyt-ist d onomic growth and competitiveness around the world.

f retithve tis ere s er okack to the period of the crisis, when a regulation wasn't this strong, other institutions failed anthis has been a burden -- >> you're talking about -- t wve la eon t, anwofaoftihe trti- sthansuppt the goal of regulatory change, but there is something much deeper at work hereand really, that has to be ventilated. u rt th banking industry -- would we establish trust, confidence making it more transparent -- would that be of some benefit to the banking industry? i aanetha ise, ditat lte, isit is, against is impacting our

sts?ity to do business with the wthrmhano nke t a devastatin blow to barclays' reputation." do you accept that? >> i said in my opening that i think the actions announced last week -- even though this is part of something industry-wide, part of something that was many yearsgoishoan ars t be even more preure on barclays hade ct

onts brand and reputation. oot hahan obtio 00op emear y of besin ierd ct a l p rk that the people of barclays and do with their mmunity and customers -- >> let me ask you, in terms of the deferred bonus scheme for orcus,onha doar reputati may be asked to forgo some of those deferred bonuses paid to you think that is appropriate in the circumstances, given that you agrethat barclays' reputation has been harmed? the board. >> you have heard comments in the press reports that the brd is pressing it to give up future share rewards.

ie ben a reader of the press. >> sorry, you rather took my attention. e finapayoff, as you leave s e lays -- do you tnk there whhobee ign fu? mebays were a time of

immense pride. we have an episode we have to fix, and those are questions for the board. haotedm,as th boferto the last day or so. sie i resign, my focus has been on preparing for today. onale er >> yes. attuf g alare familiarith a er w tr,. >> ys ulwi r ea hucsi oue - hiule - ss

it doesn't, i wasn't pre-libor bn er out a better result of the end of the day -- >> nothing like that, no. >> never even speculated -- >> spelated about -- no, i didn't. >> easquestion. gati-a t-- 'm y? >> just looking for a little love. l, t lslhe ouf itr t to bm compliance risk.

you had spent quite a lot of thseivlsn this industry, and la0srl's,er what i am trying to get a sense of is whatever as you made it paanio iislian rks ty organization, how esisa ail li stuhaul iact riou asedki wp riy.ncs n ece ars c >> remind you of the architect --

t vempnt oe function is to have the technology and culture in place so things like this cannot happen. while this did not pose a ekbe t ben hio thllok i was getting frustrated with my technology and getting them downloaded. std g ug a i got to some of the e-mails. the culture was absolutely opposite of anything wranted. the no-joke rule, serious in barclays that when people misbehave, they have to ave --

bou iarfnd veac rnsitthat system, so you okat tattts , jumins wog baysan bain ln y et debt, is thatight?

rkofm i the rate setters were in london. wng baynk in london under the money market. aomin money market traders i try to make sure that the balce sheets -- >> treasury wod be doi that thiis wt wee o her s,n llil -on money-market debt would then go out -- you also have a profit

lora - >> separate. >> isn't it a largeonflict of interest that yohave a group qun baanu ha lint demes well? >> they were separated. no overlap between those. >> sro es rohem ho ottet c wpa dealer taking a position would be able tonow what it would be.

t inat you have thoughts all of these things on the desk in practical terms dey half a billion of asss an >> i'm not quite sure -- ti isk don't me to be holding out the questions --

ital t yav li--y log hitho t bote rare i a p,'t it? you have a trading dk running out proprietary position. itonalut suepen it is all about -- >> sorry, they would not have information on the positions of the group. mpcethhent image issoi' nnd able to work out in my head.

de t kit d oo to send a bottle of champagne and say, "can you fix libor for us?" w'th trs ishee lll "? >> some were, some weren't. somen weren't -- erre 1xasfth comin

g heag or t wvero," officer and saying, why were the libor settings not alerting complnce department? >> during this period, they were not, and it is inexcusable. >> durin2007, u get inat-- lea emd suiso tht s too high, we ought

toe ow aimyrythhe seed to be contributing false threats, and we are dishonest by denition. can we discuss this, please?" that was in 2007. wnlent ngdethheat yio.g nd e stios came le to meur if i am answering the wrong question, just tell me, but there was pressure from the group treasury in the 2007-2008 riod, ring the fanci isd e a reitthhaeye twascd bo

>> we have got over that point a great de. i am trying to geto why t sms pssil deer9. you did not provide training t lievator a ognansk getting this culture right, it islso in the middle office --

s'e . e --t gong is also on the middle of this function which is this libor. >> i agree with you. 30r-.etreno erbl so what has gone wrong there?n why has that department got it so fundamentally wrong? >> i'm tryingtoieei cctat oop thte stseaca usy s ncl risks involved. nt, xc -

started right aw to get that improved. that is the area where i do feel good that the department of justice has been clear that we ha a strong set of systems a controls in that a out n. id wunthdf inigns ipr. in 2007-2008, do you feel you were let down by the fsa, given the fact that you were, by this point, reporting what was going ? hes rvie brt teonat federal reserve bank of new york, the bank of england, there were multiple, many-ye decisis initiated by people at barclays, and in t context of the finaial isistherwa xpine ee ctt le ne rtri

bark is ways that there was an issue around these issues and if i can say this in thecontext of the nal is, there a se ihel et navenufs t r t fctat righ b rpng there is a report from the federal reserve bank of new york that looked at libor duringhe fun it's a crisis and said that ave asoihierat peoleborow a e eeyeosg d e xe ate ericas. let me just finish. we ca't sit he and say no when they there was an issue around libor. we cannot do it. "talreou"a surpse. ieeo ted rvnof ydi y rtn tie sida iiedith

the various regulators to bring these issues to their attention. obviously, there were some issues. [inaudible] si'otinm oyols e viasa. whl, weren't they? >> chairman that is very difficult to say yes to that question but where we disappoied with multip en aule trllewe-e. he isouer d hohaeeal with. >> mr. diand, you said the asetraders were not acting on beha of tba ng taroat yer acs?s thr >> andrea asked a milar question which is was there award based solely on profitability? bearthwaneth and i also had

ctthentond asf-in uthnort the package, the praisal process? >> absolutely it is part of it or goes to be senior>> manageme of e ba h end adrd em ro cn? >>nowo'tt. er fdoas sa coisth behavior went on until he caught it during the investigation >> when the evaluations are made, profitability will be -- >> ah -- >> is that part of the appraisal? rtesbehaoranor sasree , pe wfi-- the reports are not just financial.

aubwis he you would imagine thatt mentions the word "risk" 1,734 times. baysthrl >> you did a word search. lureor?ey you bet. they are a precondition for everything else. haru .how smart you i noar i t , thwad beor

oud itas rreib ite phalic tht a l er sof professional development did they have? what review was ever made of that? you have people at the banwho behaved soadlyhat they me you sick. do you not as an employer have responsibility to make sure they have undergone proper personal developmen >> yes.

ncvember 2011, the fsa at all mobile phone communications recorded. cosas 00h thnkend,ldy haeeco? >> not to my knowledge. caam m mfi ewk. veat iu'ea ha ve h aor.

hedewhhee tang calls --" [unintelligible] tra dotav w ne wang iat oe on reed waspblr la ta tim w one l er feel a strong sense of responsibility that when we recoize mistakes, we are open about them.

we report them to the regulators and take action on the people. i know how angry it makes others, because it made me angry that we had this behavior,ut i am also very proud of barclays because they were not worried about hothasng t ok o het es o e rnnaw s. how about the forensic exercises -- how much did that ? heun m ipe hiveatisut 10llpo.

>> ethics in the forecast -- >> i'm not sure if th is the tord used watu d sfi actually a cultural rot that led us here today? if you take the traders first and foremost, there is signicant investmentn the eastem a conols thi ouea ude li. li.