d leerm he .n oizn ar eanduavo i r fiinign, the d. ltwohaeetts e eeemki- >> in january 2011, you you think it is? early part of 2011. thas mnt -- nks have to be better citizens, and i was aware of this investigation -- we have to

evolve the culture -- >> that is a long time, though. te r aet s beorthpe w hog adu phalicnd y su tul didote asure ou >> i think it is wrong.

it took us too long to fined it. i am making no excuses. but the actions we took when we found out, i think all of them were appropriate, including recognizing that we would be ahead of the pack in helping the relators. we did not think the focus on this would be as intense in terms of potentially harming our reputation. one of the reasons i thought it was important to come here toda-- barclays is an amazing plac--

>> wedend yt twain. yoepini 't , i 't " ayiorant. i am talking a lot about what we did about it. >> asahat lturis hoopehwho is wang no one was watching, not even the compliance desk. eris sethi more widely wrong with the culture. to this' danken such pains t ito exuto' coo se bio

>> transaction reporting -- fined millions of dollars for willingly and knowingly violatg internatnal sanctions in cuba, iran. adpa monnd seg yest prtsolpe. alat be is we're talking about today. what do these repeatedreacs the law and regulations s about the culte? >>he periods were fr quite a while and many of them were in areas i am not familiar with because i have not worked in those areas.

orwihehoes nilie]laut we had ppi -- we had a numbeof them. itpe ome b si t iatma hessfeik i s tisre vis se bio that does not excuse i and we sthao gohrou t es

y els sro erde pcay sick. isn't theasat yr hiisk,omesh-rerd kiantsasfr tubwafr s,dio l bussndkift inkis es. heioom7 menet oc os cls, is ac rdthe business of compliance, consistency of earnings, risk-managemt.

t ouk heck re orc cal isy ars n arlior eng laas cdeon he 2rtann tharin w, today barclays -- the investment in technology, the investment in customers -- it is interesting, the fines you meioned, the sanctns with iran, e ppi ind it does not excuse it, and the

head of the retail bank today -- a lot of this was happening in what you would think of as foreign banking. ifouk he htof thitin nal- seesusto cs, baf laai hax fa. itn't st-bng thasatis. i worry that people are willing to assume thatt was risky behavior that causes these things or bad culture. it is bad culture th causes these things. in these ces, wead a bad performance. stannt -stnvtmen

yle lweo gn iit t orhaif lat thrcys performance to the financial crisis, the things we're doing with businesses in africa, technology is being developed -- the technology coming to the u.k. -- the is a lot of -- e stio war

arph2,chks ttinseoron about the libor rate. 'rekibo nccr pd yo erboedtton ouepatacte >> yes. >> there was a conference call where the manager said, "thiis going to cause a storm." a lower rate was submitted. n,re a fulyear before paul tucker called. gr11et a run heeyke tveowste instca"t

stthlda of at irc08 am i correct? >> mm-hmm. >> there is a pattern within the financial crisis where there was consistently dishonest submissions to libor, detailed in paragraph after paragraph of the report. do you accept that? >>e prested in documents to yocomerom e od20 00hean cs, th ato bonli

it oiutyo hi yo hee re.n il er wneabbue acs et afrhe bghd eryi owuresd of the cases in that 12-to-13-month time frame, barclays was knocked out. oe ilta w bay agedpu r twe

r. yckedhat there is a pattern, in terms of the image of the bank, of putting in lor submissions, why was that released? >> i did not release the document. it was a package that came from barclays. i wasn't aware that it s new.

e package came from barclays. i think this the package, chairman, that came yesterday? >> yes. vee il pram makings r grof rt thaiat hee isly bngr >>he behavior of the people bmons g.thlo thll the call was alerting me that there was concern about why barclays rates were high, and it was importt for me tget in t kthheas jn hat c the importance of the call to me

was the heads-up about the ncerns with the white hall. igeameg dien haouai. re m toug prplf la coheanfe - stnttyai in that is the ethos of this bank that he spent two hours telling us is doing so well.

i wonder why you have not made an extra bonus. you told us that it was right that there was a criminal investigation. you told us that other banks were doing the same thing. i understand from what youre saying that you never questioned the rates reported between 2005 and 2008, and you never discussed at the senior level the possit misreportg, mirein ytrs. ne integrity, and play dealing, that is how i have behaved through my career in the

business. oo iw esede d t any time there was misreporting -- >> did you read anything of other ople's suggestions that there might be misreporting? t wres ca 2 2 odien e. s awof report relati to is --

>> nobody came to you, not even those people who refused to act criminally -- even those who refused toct improperly did not come and tell you during that three-year period? >> they did not act improperly. >> no, but they do not report you lked about your obligation

to complete transparency, that seeing is believing. you see nothing, heard nothing, know nothing during th thr- tel epng was written by a u.s. academic. in 27, another group of u.s. academics proded preci mps y.g ond whepe. we have a series of academics who are reportinths g on

eventually igets into "the ll seeurna" fr , fepoons. t in.ihiou pa ts.ng "the wl street journal" report and the federal reserve report were about -- >> the academic reports -- you have notead them, but you are the man charge. le sstfr t ag estions internally? wain, oue gry igent.

he beinat bios peorver ri time. as soon as didwe tookl 's htoivot yaiste you don't really like barclays, do you -- "i'm in a more favorable group to people out there." u thn ha y teg yoha y otk t a gr yanbeyo .

you get these huge bonuses, and yet you did t see any of it. muavenss mpt ngt od ofe. >> last time you were here, you said, "i think it is clearhat if any banking institution gets inrouble, it goes the someone asked you, how wouldou lose out? you sa, "i would lose ouby that is what you td us you do in this situation. >> as i said earlier, th is a discussi witof t boa.

i'maheis. cake hgr i - numb of mes.een through this a wee of i tis anuswissnost bobmoninms e tamat o inrye stio -- >> there were no clear lines of responsibity for systems and control. you are the man in charge, and when you are the man in charge, you are the man being paid these huge, phenomenal bonuses -- you are accepting all the good side, the bonuses, and the people working foyou,otentially oemngpr, ce.-- ahe

u te us de tif ths siiooue thats a pretty small price for you to pay. and how you could show some contrition to the stomers where's all meoney, do i te that is what they are asking me. you are responsible. responsibility and i also accept responsibility for the actions we've taken to correct the situation, not jusat barclays, but the way we have engaged with the regulators.

u a k--ak fues oe w.a aviee iu what happens to the shares -- it disappeared somewhere. bon eyes eqleo am o y aheri y'yoke pr gee pumeio y pu os o lisethou sto anin aerer coguo ikewise?

then you might get a little love. >> i told you, i feel i have done a resnsible thingn ho deods e da the word of the barclays management team, the culture of the organization, whether it is in ppi or this, is tlearn our lesson in terms of how we behave going forwar and if any of our clients suff - heutn hek

english cricketer, i suspect your name would be jeffrey. let me try to weigh this with the culture and ethics of more than just barclays. i think question a lot of people want makis ith lethorym o chped r is caswesno first of all, you csi aderusinlifoei gao neal >>es ttinsete >> yes. >> do u think the submitters during the crisis were engaged in that behavior?

ap rte t5t l,a isoper wierttng, e etl? e,lo ieand ai- e ocon e ucs sth oner sd ha . in the vast majority of cases, going to the issue of derivatis with small businesses, the decision has been in favor of barclays. we do work hard -- >> i underand that from -- >> don't know the specifics -- ongeleh" bussm 25f l.

writs against barcys for libel fixing would you consider that to be unethical? it is possible to conclude that there was quite a nsiderable degree of activity that was, at least, questionable and, in some cas,nethical. at t tt ar y heo

rgitin the united kingdom, visiting with small businesses and medium-sized businesses the feedback on theervice they ge g ussen h eamon er ba the last year and a half. i am confident our team gets it. on of the fras t liodyoe brngsoinn. was so long ago. i was not aware of it at the time. to bring it up today is not as releva. 057. of this behavr wa i

does your board get a list of legal actions against it? >> sure. >> so you are eingis o leacs held kn april? that would be something you would know as an executive sitting the main board? s. iounoe ar ouldo w t le propinwihat? >> guess. -- yes. >> note singt g hoanio are outstanding against barkley is -- barclays? t aeg anstum

stear, i think it was 40 something. it might havbeen more than that. i cannot recall. that would not hbe ie lere. >>if l roe down -- [unintelligible] y inresthe h ap li anr illi. that is now $4 million. >> the economic impact is a swap. maevoewnau s fl? top about the

value of the loan and the covenant he is given on that. stngn thw onge. woue heir government. -- of their covenant. >> i am not se the point. are se b uc the net result is you are able to negotiate -- >> i am not su i understand. >> there is ae rin ei businesses. is that the reason lots of small bunesses are finding it difficult becausethwa eye .

l goowtihe apto go up. none of em understood what they were purchasing. but they were obliged to take it. t fostks ihihereor e paof ti will but that very differently. that the walk through it. was there an impact on suitk'e es in the.k. - longer-term as -- longer terms. enit wtheele ragsbechd. e ct best have taken out fixed loans, in

theory, the economic impacta fim lera flngoaheac t newhou interest rates went down. the bank of england has a low monetary picy interest rate because ofhe ecomy. anha us sisonwaps but on overall interest rates. i tnkhere been anmp de s. dat d me te thanaya ce . >> we just had a conversation lasting three or four minutes that probably ed understandingf pe.

tahang. ths st bng high-speed used to be run by people who did not understand it buo peop money. thats it? wednoe b a' b two colter's. and lture that understands the high street and they. t wvet. ihit beon nhihibo ne models. the people will cover our st a i n,usinesses nef thsm businesses? if there is a need to provide a fixed term loan where it wod

nopoialla ra adiin vr plena cameacroritf eo aikan aga the country is interested in barclay's bring in this of rustication along t s n bine nkcathal htope with companies coming down from china, india and the middle east. they need access to head out t to cdirian er ace a gr m.

l. it is about our culture. the definition we lked about inside is t e se deonak -a -- for us to believe that, everyone has to behave in that way. it isuttu,ue gr hty iha barclay's is about. i think the issues we are facing are about bad behavior an eay- retto us on the 28th of june, you spoke about your concerns.

nilie] who at barclaysaices level of every meeting. i think one of the letters, there is a diussion of who peoper bh s. ilt idat m ag ou kw whthpeople were raising these concerns. >> it was often in the group treasury. in some cases, fm th oue li pe -- have complied people

making approaches to regulators. thbankend nam. spthnvti came up in the general sense that we talked about earlier about the wall street journal repo hong had barkleys been concerned about other people making the libor rate- this becama much bigger concern during 2007 and 2008 quy plfurates have beenai

fiiasid adh mones and banks were having difficulty lending to each other which is the genesis of liber -- l. ui i mas. it was coming from mone funds, nantmscorpoteas the was a fundamental change driven by those factors. nilie]e of the rate h rve nusat

being made aleve people would nobe able to borrow. >> at tpom th others when you raised concerns of some of the rates your competitors have? >> various lels e g nd iat between january of 2005 and july -- you did not appear tr m o twh wasappe

l'opere ceerplins but none internally was able to identifyhatt oi degoonide yerd wed it is why i have been very clear today that -- to not nflict the three issues. the 'familiar with the various reasons. aminhyplt in this but were unable for what ever reason to recognize it

going on internally rc w ranking elaborates -- of libor rates. bt ot dre e ll ce barclays notice of the people doing it but could not noticehemselves doing . what was the falinagt sehepl ternly? >> ipad the trader behavior we have been through -- i think the trader beviore haee mesenant'

wn mp -- t to impact libor rates. so as not toeico ma tis te isavwascd wihe fsa there were discussions between compliance and the fsa abou t tpe acnte a, d amine during the inquiry or what was happening prior to the -- do yomean during the iny haasapng prto iry had a different interpretation of the meetings but what came back to barkley's and the chief operating officer was that it

me ie rt the discussion with mr. tucker. heak to ministers or officials in t treasury about that matter? >>es. nvti h r be before we completed the equity as aictiion in abu dha whu

wobe at me pnt. >> i will see if we can provide that. >> u einre mibe i dersnd tt. what i am not clear about is what is your understanding of what mr. tucker wanted you to do inkas se conversation i had with paul or jerry and i had with paul r. jerry had had with paul. paul posted job is to work with people at ourel. an.teiv sometimes it would go right to jerry. it was a broad disiobo

rc a hh riv t rs it. >> what it you thought mr. tucker wanted you to do? >> he was pointing out the problem and i was pntinout at pem nit ou?i wyo >>s i said, i did not take it as a directive. i took it as a head up that youare -- ah. eaaier wre id arpoing rates at which we borrow. it appeared giving that a number ofhe instituonposting nelow us h to gnm atseel e ssha bloomberg

reported on. the same issue that the federal reserve report after the crisis reported on. repe.onat did cross your mind to launch an investigation inside yourwn organization to check that this did not mean you as well? ofrs kou ci wa u tmpioat -- >>t no our tyou to say, let's check? >> as saifiur -- >>inig] m'ldan ale

maf ws,ks uty matorng s to avoid the perception funds as credit marketssing [uelbl u inr nion -- [unintelgible] le shiai i'm not excusing any behavior. if we can have a bigger discussion. what i sd ishis notus rc. keomba t barcys are responsible for.

>> can i finish? you will see that throughout 20nd8,inutof than wat anresit barclays. questioys was getting and wee ngweig us t-fomee t hwabi clearly there was an issue there. with that, there was pressure being put . n excusing that behavior.

thsl c - >>y st tef esithe transaction that was undertaken initially last year.

thilsy t saclur wyono e awde cptnd ierb wrong. >> i hope they look at the a decive action with the culture and the willingness tht whenm, er a wiingns wiet la, n lo hstatitane mbf s t today.a nu >> we have been -- two more colleaes want to chip in. reurn t >> given the fact that strategy 08 acbaysared - orc

to ask for information. they asked them to provide information, including the re atclwarry te, laai ea -d t more of 20 basis points. that was in a discussion -- -- if theydwono are really trying to do something useful,e want to knowe hee iebee ige une. . the truth is that -- u t

. erocta oat >> reading through the nework report, they talk about it. tr e s. tonthmo. >> what i thought was presented wi what was done by barcys if you do not have those, i am

sure barkleys would be happyo send them to you. you can al look at th1 or sars- ca ltoer cucie lir coha that. there was no -- there is no attempt here other than communicatns othha t us paner- jeanad. the sterling -- we can send you the sterling as well, if that helps. twobepfor t is. m d, t, ny rate, -- mr. diamond, we have tried to ctact barklov

ast e s. ad rng hea t market readings in the other direction, underreporting during the financial crisis, which goes to ehe levels. ou wd aoariton wr --her. d mer did not ttnftirouoised that he had mme.er t have you anything you want to add in response to that? >> ippree orty toer che ep, as soon

as they were identified, they werected upon immediately. inas - ese w enivse a d,h eul it to see it barkleys -- when there are mistakes, we admit them, we learn from them, we act on them d hcoue. tits cari barclays, a firm i care about so deeply, to be isolated on this. i w -knars. meomut the first and corrected. but i worry that the impact of that this was, becau we re most

at f odeth incentives for others to come forward. rw the end of the day, l une es oug r. some of those issues are profound. if there is anything that barcys can do to help in that es kthe . daor. as bany in . we are grateful for you to ming this afternoon. thank you very