preparations for my book next year, knowledge and power. >> for more information on this and other summer reading list, visit booktv.org. >> ian bremmer argues that we need a new kind of global cooperation to fill in the leadership gap that is emerging in the world today. this is about an hour and 15 minutes. >> thank you, orval, and senator for joining us today for our conversation about ian bremmer's wonderful new book. this book is about the g-0 world. he is a fabulous political scientist who really speaks to

the big major changes underway in the world today, getting beyond the ivory tower. he has been making some money, which come as a fellow political scientist, i think this is a great tribute, but it also shows how politics and government are really driving so much of the global economy, so that the economists knowledge is really not sufficient, even for investors, as well as ordinary citizens to understand where we are going. this book is very interesting, we have this new concept of the g-0 world. it is really about the problem of global cooperation.

it is not so much a book about the competition among nations. it is about the kind of leadership in the world today. i wanted to start off they may be telling us you really think that the united states has been an effective leader up until now, and that it is really -- it is really a loss of american leadership that this book is about. >> that's a great first question, and i am honored to be up here with susan. i think everybody knows the background, who she is come and services that she has done, not just for us, but for our country. it is a pleasure. i am delighted to talk about the

update. i'm looking forward to the update. my good friend, orval, it's great to be here. so many people are turning out for this horrible weather. do i think this is u.s. leadership that has been affected? >> given the alternatives, sure. we can all point to plenty of places where we have made lots of mistakes. the most obvious ones involved the loss of american lives. when i think about -- when i think about u.s. leadership, as the world's superpower and i think about us-led architecture, i am not just looking at the last 10 or 20 years. i'm thinking about that post world order. well, think of what happened to japan and europe in that order. think about the marshall plan, i

think that is very effective for u.s. leadership. i think about the breton woods and the institution and the reflections of the exceptionalism of the united states. that brought our allies together. a series of institutions that reflect our political and economic values and priorities. it did drive the process of globalization from us-led globalization. if i was to give us a grade from zero to 10, it would be pretty positive. but it is over. it is over. >> when did it start becoming over? >> and started becoming over what the rise of emerging markets. they like to call that the rise of the rest. i don't think that is the

problem. it is the rise of the other, and that is the problem. when japan and europe rose after world war ii, we didn't have that problem. they agreed with us on fundamental stuff. the other countries coming in come you don't just have the coordination problem, vladimir putin did not come to the camp david site. he decided to keep his toys at home. frankly, that was good then. if he would've shown him, it would have been a top u.s. meeting with obama and vladimir putin. it probably would have hurt the relationship between the united states and russia. i speak the language, and i'm very disappointed as well.

let's be clear, you know, the g7 plus one, and you have a wife and girlfriend -- if you have a plus one, leave that person home, right? [laughter] ultimately, you're not sending them there. i have views on this stuff. i think to give back to the initial questions, which u.s. leadership started to erode globally when we had the rise of the other markets. all these global institutions were led by the united states. the world series sounds global, it's not. it is a world institution. >> when they start breaking down, we have to remember that it was tactful and not because

it was reality, right? they get it and they understand. but the underlying balance of power no longer reflected the us-led thing because of the demise of the other. in the last 30 years, that was the long-term shift, and did not sufficiently great indifference. at some point, the shock would hit. do i think that this is a story about the united states not doing it? partially it is. it is not a story about the u.s. decline. >> you think the situation is temporary? >> not necessarily. i think whether or not you believe u.s. is in decline is relevant. in other words, i don't know how many of you think -- let's take a vote. how many of you think the u.s. is declining? >> thank you. >> the large majority.

>> how many do not? three okay. about 60 or 65% believe we are in decline. we are good. i think it is irrespective of where you come help him not to we are not going to bail out europe, right? their the respective where you come out on that, we are not leaving a new global climate we are not going to remove power from syria, we are not going to bomb iran. i don't think it's going to happen. in other words, this is not really about whether the u.s. is in decline or not. it is about whether or not we want to see this up and we increasingly do not. it's about whether any other country is prepared to play that will devil. the answer to that is very clearly, no. i would argue that we really see is the u.s. end of global institutions and leadership. we may end up with us-led institutions that are not

global. we may end up with global institutions were neither. >> let's talk about global institutions that are not us-led. what is your expectation of the wcl were the i am a? what is your expectation of the wco or imf? what about the other institutions. even without american leadership, is the wco important >> of course so. i guess what i'm saying that the two, that they need to start to reflect the global balance of power that has now emerged. they will become less effective

unless they do that. if you look at the world bank and imf, they have very strong notions when they provide money. they support political and economic reforms. if the chinese are going to play more of a role and pay more money, -- that will weaken the capacity of the function. it will undermine. it reminds me of a point. i have this conversation with tony blair a couple of years ago where he was talking about the importance of the u.s. and britain playing a stronger won this global institution like the g20 and i am not. we are talking about a lot of countries that don't agree with our rule of law and the free market and different kinds of governments. if we are going to take effect of these larger institutions, which of our values and standards do you think that we need to fundamentally compromise

on? >> his response, he said that honestly i would say none of them. because ultimately, our values are the right values. and i applaud him for being honest. if you would ask obama romney that question, it is a caveat. they would say the same thing. if that is our answer, the institutions will not work. >> do you see sometime of convergence? you know, the market. the market is pretty well embraced by all these countries, including china. a well regulated market, we could go back to your previous book, which i have about the role of government and large they corporations and industrial

policy -- america has one variation of the market. i think most of the countries to embrace the market, which is why they might be the one institution that still has some real utility. >> i am not trying to disparage this, it has a great function. if you're asking if it will be global, the answer is no. in the postwar period, leading up until 2008, the capturing about was unheard of. i think that we are now in a world that is heading towards more diversions and more fragmentation. we certainly see that in the desires of other countries over time to diversify, in terms of currency, not today, but certainly over the long term they want that and they wouldn't necessarily supported in 2008.

facebook does have an ipo. it was 500,000 chinese, i believe, that are on the internet -- you talk about capitalism and tenderness wisdom, the chinese want to invest in nigeria. they would like to invest in 4-g networks. i think that you don't have us-led globalization, sure, lots of people support the idea of markets. but are we talking about one set of standards of markets were very different sorts of standards of market? i think we are moving in the latter direction, and i think u.s. is actually starting to embrace this. instead, we say let's get a smaller trade grouping together that embraces countries. new partnerships. we have canada and mexico and

japan. >> well, we hope japan. >> yes, we hope, but it's not done. and we have a lot of little companies. if you guys want to behave the way that we wanted to, we will accept you, but let's build stronger architecture. bob things the ppp is too ambitious. even though it is not as ambitious as others. >> we don't know where the bar will be. once you start negotiating the entry of these other countries, it is conceivable that the bar will come a little lower. >> sure, i think it makes sense. he does not read it worries me, that's all i'm saying. i was recently talking with some european leaders who really wanted a transatlantic

partnership. the germans like it, the french like it, the americans on u.s. trade deal, they really want wanted some kind of announcement at camp david. the obama administration was interested but not enthusiastic. i do think that increasingly what will be looked at is the coalitions of the world. ..

but you also say that the regions are going to be more on their own. some regions do okay in some regions will be struggling. you see asia is to reach and most likely to ask. that. >> asia and middle east at the regions and most worried about. i realized about that because the great john of leadership does not create a series of globalization because they integrate for a region much more

about common rules and chairman don't like the concept arbitrary to them and codify that in the political contacts. this set of norms that folks are voluntarily bharata, it's much more about common and economic commentary. it is much more about asia courses. it's much more informal. but then they look at a place like the middle east or asia. in the middle east be done if one country. with the turks, the egyptians depend that we do. those three countries on the turks support largely secularized middle-class. and europe in aries hearing and are in the opposite side of almost every issue in the tear

middle east. death by everyone with gadhafi. >> is not a lot scarier than asia? >> the middle east and asia are the most problematic. to most drivers for interaction have much more conflict. if the u.s. and europe and japan are focused too narrowly come in the middle east has left mostly to its own devices. it is a bad story for asia in a different way because if you think about integration and asia, china drives a lot of integration economically and the united states drives a lot of education strategically. you say to yourself that while both of those tanks, right? i want to hedge. obama china relation. as the project five years down the road, how feasible is it

that will sustain itself? the first is to what extent with the united state continue to provide the kind of security guaranteed him a credible way given the challenge they faced domestically as well as the likely limitation to how much economic benefit they get? and the second consequence, which is harder as to what extent will the chinese allow those relations to persist given how much greater china's economic -- >> in other words with a push to force it out of the region? >> i would. >> so far they really haven't. >> i think they have a little and we've pushed back. when you say so far they have been, the chinese power is only getting radically greater in asia. this is the problem with not yet begun to experience.

to the experience for a strategic amount term, wal-mart flexibility, i would argue it's fundamentally argued. it's headed towards asia. both of which are fundamentally about concerns of china's trade. >> they are also about -- it's like he had ikea adventure book or imagined your boat because he recognizes that there's a lot of questions in asia about how credible on a long-term basis the u.s. commitment is. the u.s. is the outside power. we like to talk about herself as a pacific nation, but it's a long way from washington to beijing, which is fighting so hard to get our officials and leaders out there frequently.

so given the worries about america pulling back from asia, don't you think that most of what we've been doing this to try to reassure the treacheries repaired for its long-term and halifax gatekeeping that's been? >> i wish of his psyche that may put. i don't think that's true because i don't think it was intentional. i don't think he was proactive. >> i think of his react to it. the united states is not developing the asia strategy and i think folks like we climb you and singapore and indonesia and certainly the japanese in a number of other countries, rich and poor across the region were all thinking differently we are very worried about america's commitment and chinese right and i think the united states, not

badly and we saw some great trips by obama out there as far as they go they've been very successful. >> do you think the asians are reassured? >> yes, also i don't know how long the last. i think the us trillions are reassured to a degree. but i also thing for america is headed towards asia is to work, it will be headed to his security because ultimately we won't be interested in doing that. and he still has much more motives. i think if we hang a hat entirely given the uncertainty in the release so i'm sure you

don't seem to be entirely enthusiastic assent in the administration seems to be proactive on worries me. i think we need to do more than that. the big announcements about that on the security side. i think that's a problem. that is not the way we want to project our power. >> what about regional multilateral organizations? in the past the united states is always favored bilateral relationships, the hub and spokes. part of the approach the issue that came into office with decision to not marginalize ourselves and be more price and in one of the legs was to participate more actively in these regional organizations, not just rely on the lan and peered how well do you think

that going? >> i think regional architecture in asia is very important. obviously both confusing and most areas. there was a hope -- the reason i say -- i agree with you that america does not want to be absent when obama came in. no question. >> is different from bush. they say to blame bush for the bush administration for not being active enough in asia and been too focused on afghanistan and iraq. so now we're going to be more present. >> the pity towards asia music can be rediscovered in the middle east, which is appropriate for washington. but because he wants to do that. but when i think about what i think changed, it was not that the u.s. suddenly said let's get active. it was the u.s. suddenly

increase in the say we've got the china problem. i don't think obama came into office with as much concern about china's rice as he now has. a lot of it came from the industrial community. >> a lot came from the way china is behaving. >> that's true. reactive. i think if you hear hillary now i'm china, she says the bulk of the peaceful chinese prize as long as they behave the way we want them to. you don't expect them to do that, do you? given that, that's a hedge. you kind of mean containment, right? >> a means to china's allies. >> we are if we do and if we don't. in other words, if you take a more passive role in the region,

then trade and the china market will shift the center of gravity in the region it will shift outwards. then it's perceived as encirclement with days consider met with china. so what is the right talents? do you think the obama administration is striking the right talents? i'll throw another one here. i was president romney? do you think president romney look at the balance better? >> the last one is easy. the first question you asked is exactly the right question because you're right. kissinger comes back and says it's too hawkish on china. but he believes that because he thinks this policy is aggressive. i have a few and i really want talk about it. so romney says if he becomes president in a when he will

declare china, which is allied. he won't do that. but to be fair, obama says he's going to close guantánamo when he was running it. i don't care about this stuff. when it's david axelrod running against karl rove i just tried to -- >> his top asia guide is david stanford who used to work for me. adam is one of the most possible china hints out there. it's virtually identical to the folks. >> will basically be a continuation of our bipartisan approach. >> i think the bipartisan approach will become more harsh. and i think -- so the rate of roche -- i think economic statecraft. if i really and aligned with the

policies anyone comes up with, when this speech -- hillary gave her speech not covert, does the best foreign policy speech just for my personal perspective, i thought he really addressed -- if you haven't seen it is worth reading. they really understand the challenges of industrial policy in the u.s. and the economics and understand the state department has not been aligned to deal with. they get they need to engage with the your. it is pragmatic, it was smart. and the pity towards asia and generally aligned with what the strong caveat were not doing the economic reasoning need to notwithstanding. but leaving that aside, when obama was asked to the top geopolitical flow of the united

states was, he said al qaeda, right? which is. and romney of course that russia was even stupider. >> so what would you say? >> look, i try not to answer the question. i think the real issue -- i call china to baltimore countries my forehead hurts just saying that. i really believe that if we want -- i think were conflict with china is coming. i think there's much more more zero-sum and the relationship. i know we went to manage that. it is in none of our interest for the u.s.-china relationship to blow a good therefore to the extent we develop more problems with them we need to be honest and transparent. i think responsible stakeholder ship was not useful. because then the chinese to respond will stakeholder ship,

the liquid effect can you say you want to buy flickr which rich country but were a poor country and you want to accept u.s.-led global standards that don't benefit our countries. why should we do that quick >> they say condi rice says that russia is interest on iran and america is identical. that is breathtaking. >> if we say it, it will be true. >> they talk about win-win. >> they don't believe it themselves. when you have a relationship sum of virtual, especially if it conflictual, and makes it worse. so i think we need to build trust in the relationship in the way you build trust is by being honest about where there's complex growing. to be honest about what we'll do if the chinese do not do x,y and

z. >> okay, so let's take an example. the chinese really don't like our military act dvds and their exclusive economic zones. they do more surveillance than we did in the past because the chinese are engaged in doping submarines and high man and another spaceflight that. our ships and client-side various? chinese really don't like that and sometimes fishing boat come out and harass. we have a lot more maritime incidents going on. that has been kept very quiet. there's been a lot of discussion between u.s. and china about it, which is going nowhere, but it's been very quiet. do you think i should be

discussed very openly? it's been on the front pages of "the new york times" all the time. is that good for the relationship? >> i'll tell you, in areas where the conflict is more steady-state and low-level than keep it quiet because it's manageable is okay. we understand each other, we deal. that understands that the kneeling between the u.s. and soviet. the regime is largely understood in the case of cyber, it's getting exponentially worse all the time. and the two sides are engaging on that, it's very scary, dangerous finance the potential is spilling over into genetic conflict. nobody wants that. which means we've got to be public about it. we cannot allow chinese to believe this is now becoming who

is serious challenge. there's truly commonality adventures. busy we whitewash a lot of it. >> so your view of china is quite agnostic actually about the future of china. one of the rising powers is probably the most difficult to predict. is your view of china today that if we have a good understanding with potential government about cybersecurity that would fix the problem? >> i think would make lack lazily to spill over into other areas of the relationship. "the new yorker" did my favorite review in beijing called the unsentimental. i love that. i feel that dave kissinger has a knack gnostic view. i fear that the challenge is that they are facing are greater

than any significant economy is based in a very long time. i know their government is smarter. that's a good thing. it doesn't mean they're capable putting the fix is in place. this economy has to fundamentally shift economic and political systems in a relatively short time. many of them are highly not individual to do that. i was asked last night what keeps me awake at night. and my response was that i believed to be well if they were one thing that would keep me awake at night, it would be wikileaks in china. because in u.s., we don't know any thing. we know of is that because different talks and america. wikileaks in china strikes me is the kind of thing you have

execution income you could easily have a military coup. it actually was transparent about how billionaires engaging each other at the top of the chinese party system. i don't know what the likeliest, so i went to the guys writing this new book on technology and she is security. i read the first draft. it's not quite there. so i asked jerry. i see jerry, is this a plausible scenario? he said wang? on the site i don't know. probably not over 50%. it's definitely going to happen at some point. >> a week of internal decision-making and communication by the elites? >> we are talking about a force incidents that transparent the

documents that describe the relationships in out of highest level communist party officials. if there were anything in the world to really worry me right now, it would be that. >> don't you think were having a glimpse of that quick >> bush last time he and this guy who was out there chest bumping and how did we find out about it? the security went to shane do and am all the information to the american consulate. those little rocky and everyone aligned against him very quickly and even then, were in an environment where we have a country that desperately needs to control information and staying power at some high level that needs to. we are in an environment where information much more easily gets out. i think that is fundamentally

dangerous. that worries me. when you ask me, are your agnostic about china, of the world's major economies today, the level of volatility in outcome in china over the next 10 to 20 years is greater than any of their major economy. my definition of emerging market is at least as much to market effort. people say it's not true. we have occupy wall street and the u.s. >> it is funny because chinese friends, one that was going on, that was occupy wall street, they try to explain from the politicians that were a much more the voters than they do about the demonstrators. they are worried about the

demonstrators. i think we should open this up to this very knowledgeable audience to ask questions. i have lots more, but why don't we give others a chance. there should be a microphone. yes, right over here. firsthand up. >> if someone -- >> can you identify yourself, please. [inaudible] >> if someone came from nowhere and that i give you a choice, does the relationship between russia and the united states, pardoning the soviet union united states 30, 35 years ago where people worried about blowing each other up in the relationship between china with all the problems you describe on the united states today, wouldn't you be very caught

things are as they are quick >> that's a great question. that's a great question and i think the there is somewhat more complicated than the implication that the yen. the u.s. soviet union was very steady-state with an enormously hairy fat tailed. enormously speaking we weren't impacted negatively on day-to-day basis. there was very look into linkage between two countries. and yet, there is this possibility with one and three that we could've had thermonuclear war. if that's really true of those one and three, then my god how much worse could it be. the entire soviet period was not that much of the soviet period was much more state do not.

it's a very normalized distribution, but she hides this fact tale. but the u.s. and china, makes pretty marginal. the baseline is going to become much more problematic. again i think cybersecurity. adding industrialized and globalization and the moving of intellectual capital and property away from american people and american companies. i think about american treasuries and who's going to buy them and the ability to economically blackmail each other in the eyes of the punched in the face, too. we've shown it before. so it depends on -- i guess it depends on how risk-averse you are as a person, what kind of decisions you like. >> i prefer to live.

>> you prefer to live, most people do. we all are going to die at some point. we can do the actuarial tables and mass data into. it does remind me of an older gentleman when asking a question about north korea looking at the transition was to reappear the guy was about 80 years old. he said do you think in our lifetimes will ever see reunification of korea? i asked which of our lifetimes every time. i won't go there, sir. >> i want to know because people like president obama, the outcome talk about the u.s. is not to seek to contain china, but what you describe is just about dgp seems you are trying to reinforce that you received him as a strategy to contain

china. have you convinced which you describe what the u.s. should do is not to contain china. of course the mystery here is about china's dreaded g. the chinese think this is ridiculous. >> well, the problem with the u.s. strategy as is presently spoken is that the chinese are neither nor weak. and so we cannot get away with telling and selling them. i mean, we could snow them if they were and we could snow them if they had no choice. but the reality is the policies we are talking about are not to china's benefit and therefore they should be invented themselves to combat them. you see this on trade with china, japan, coaster reappear but could be diplomatic, but

among those girls, let's see what we think. i think that the other part of this course is being honest with the chinese cell associate implied that we would like to chinese to adapt behaviors, but if we do there will be included in some of these organizations. the problem with iran which is no moore's parlous part of the organization is that we tell the iranians that they mustn't do, but we don't actually tell them what we look at them if they do what we want. and so, why exactly -- yeah, we've made it very clear what the six iron type and what behavior we don't want that we haven't said before court going to engage. that's the problem with the diplomacy can't even though i don't think the diplomacy report in either case and i banned for

lots of reasons. we should give it the best possible shot. but china, i do think that being honest about the potential for containment should also be honest about what kinds of behavior relate to and sent and how china might then affiliate if they actually were to engage. right now i saw a big chinese say there is no state capitalism china. that's not true. vicious characteristics. we are more mature than that. we should stop doing that, right? dislocate features state capitalist. i would advise. scary. if china were to have democracy tomorrow, right, the instability now, probably the resulting government with the left opposed it we should be honest about that.

we've done a decent shot in the middle east is american moving away from heavy-handed liberal democracy support we've tried to be a little more balanced in how we support economic development, stability and the rest, even if it's not usually effectively tried. in russia we've shown we don't care. my buddy, ambassador to russia are really smart come is usually pro-democracy, tweeting that the opposition the entire time. we would never do that with china appeared the reason we wouldn't do it is because we don't want the china relationship to screwup. >> i heard jon huntsman yesterday talking about gary locke with dissidents. we have a whole office in the state department designed to overcome the style wall.

so we may not talk about it quite as much, as openly as previous administrations have, but there is a very active u.s. government efforts to promote human mice in support. >> they'll say we should not criticize them at the top level with thomas of it. since his comeback with with a different public, and a when he he was ambassador. i think we can do more. my point is simply that specifically on the show we actually basically said we just don't care. if the relationship but that it's okay. we have to be clear and be more cautious on not. >> wait for the microphone. >> alan young. it looks as if europe may very well be facing a disaster in terms of the euro zone. i think we know our abc think we

know what the economic consequences of that would be for both europe and the united states and for the world. by the geopolitical consequences of the collapse of the euro zone? >> that question. >> a question we haven't talked about much today, but it will be absence of global leadership in the u.s.-led global leadership is that the european are massively distracted by this crisis. in the japanese have a 17 prime in 22 years. it's not just the u.s. and the allies will be spending much time focusing on ice. the europeans do actually provide an awful lot of support, not necessarily in terms of money, but certainly in terms of broad agreement and accept his values and structure and a rule of law and governance around the world. if europe were truly to fall apart, you would end up with a whole bunch of countries that

would be off making their own individual deal. so think about what that means for russia. think about a brush on the downstream and energy has been able to play off the polls and the germans and ukrainians and the rest. think about what happened if the chinese could do that. you have an embargo against china. if the euro zone collapses, that the land and countries make their own deals. if the euro zone collapses, took issue with russia. they lose theirs. they've got the great russian orthodox could be introduction. were they going to can't go to germany? is that it is someplace. we see a lot of traditional political relationships have become unmourned, but the germans and europeans are not going to cut the ultimate deal with china rampart china has relied them to do it. it requires a strategic shift are incremental and cautious. but in part to europeans are

fundamentally focused on moran's and rules and institutions and they just can't do a big china tie up because of that. if you're postapartheid accompanist think it will, but if it were to fall apart i think he was the suddenly -- >> commercial interests dominating. a g0 world of definitely one good for small individual commercial interests because again they can just go in minutes whatever it happens to be. >> those commercial interests have really been very strong with china. if you look at national policies towards china, i think they are very much dominated by the commercial interests in europe. >> the european level of course is very different. >> going back to your earlier comment in the last question and discussion we just had, you were

talking about the g8 minus one and benefit of having like-minded countries. so the implication is there going to have g like-minded countries. however, if you look at the list of like-minded countries, most are economically and shaky grounds if not actually declining, military most are enacted and potentially quite incapable with the exception of the u.s. would that be like building a fort? >> i think the answer to that is now, and the first of all coalitions of the willing and like-minded countries can be different depending on the issue. if you are talking about a coalition willing on various rule of blog related issues, you might well include a country like brazil. you want economic statecraft, you might clue a bunch of

emerging markets. turkey could be a part of that. i am not simply talking about all developed states all the time. there's some places that would be cheered. the united states and europe differ radically. it might be anything the u.s. does wouldn't include europeans. the europeans should be leaders on climate and they should be the ones forming the coalition and the u.s. should be excluded. this is not a u.s. dominant view of the world. the u.s. happens to be the world's largest economy and military, civil be the most important is coalitions. but you are right of course that the g0 comes at a particularly unfortunate time. the financial crisis is not just on the heels of that then comes face crisis which limits the capacity of america's top allies and that definitely makes it more challenging. >> what about korea though quiet korea is a nato ally with

increasing copal lodz. >> and ability to engage with china in ways that lots of other countries can and the interior china. we need to do much more without a rant that i think we need to do it fast because there's a big generational shift in south korea to see the war in the united states very differently than fathers and mothers do. you know, they are not support enable easy opportunities in china and don't like a lot of the more conservative government officials in place. i think the u.s. gets a lot of information and they don't necessarily have south korea on the ground. reminds me a shack up really in georgia, which is we have this

guy that loved us and gave us this information. >> how come the opinion is so volatile quiet for one month to the next election i know, resent the u.s. they resent china, like the u.s. better. it's very hard to figure out. >> okay, yes in the back. >> hi, state university of new york. directing a program notes mba student and from school of business in montréal here for a month. my question is, what it is can you give them as they pursue careers, but others junes, graduate students as they like to do things internationally? >> to the extent that had any success at not because émigre political scientists. it's been because i was able to find a beach between politics and not particularly well

occupied. >> in the way the world is going today. >> the markets don't work with people trying to be competitive. the markets were because he tried to become a monopolist in the grand your own thing. so if i'm talking a student that is entering the work environment the next few years, i'm basically saying, do not have a specialized because the world is very volatile. try to understand systems and patterns in the way we proudly, when bradley and try to figure out what emerging trends might be developing the u.k. take 11 or two diverse skill set and use it in a unique way other people have not. markey yourself differently. we are all path dependent. that is one i would focus on. >> order cybersecurity. by the way, there are people in

the back, but if you'd like to speak, just raise your hand and i will look for you. >> james dealer. we haven't spoken about asia, the emerging world's great need for natural resources. there is speculation the u.s. may be energy independent in 10 years depending on how you see the technology developing. do you believe that possibility of energy independence for this country will allow us to be more assertive and perhaps bring a marriage more act to play in this world you're describing? >> i think it may allow us to be more assertive. it will certainly allow us to also be less assertive. in other words, if we've got a problem in iran and they decide to close down the streets of form is, that is a problem for

us. bigger problem for china. her problem for india. bigger problem for lebanon, for turkey. we'll have more of these conversations. particularly more as the united states becomes energy independent because the middle east is not a happy place by now. there's more across the entire region with a positive trajectory may fear that will not change anytime soon. there's no one in the u.s. prepared to send troops back to iraq if they break apart by the fact the u.s. is not providing the security applies. but other countries will be slow to do so. i do believe in a lot of the unconventional oil and gas story that we just have another analyst in the decoded the other day. unusual field trip. i'm told that food is horrible. those zoning regulations that architecture. i will not move to that state.

but in terms of excitement about the u.s. economy, definitely. in terms of ability to stay away from the middle east attire. how much support there going to get. we ever do no support from the traditional interlocutors in the middle east. jordan as restrained as well. i might be willing to go and say the u.s. has become more assertive if i thought that more americans are likely to feel they benefit from the u.s. global placement or the lender of last resort are driving localization. but we increasingly see an average american. we see the large number of americans who like despite all the wealth being generated by multinational corporations in the u.s. and their shareholders that they are not a part of that. so the u.s. is more energy

independent? great. when we focus on the u.s.? i do not think we are addressing this. i think there's more of a challenge going forward. >> there's always been an isolationist strain in america's foreign policy. are we always seemed a fatigue after afghanistan and iraq and of course economic problems, global financial crisis than just returning to an isolationist u.s.? >> i don't think it should fatigue. i think some of it is structural. some of it is a bunch of american who do not feel for legitimate reasons that globalization will benefit them. big manufacturing jobs in this country are gone. we can do policy in this place that will create them, but generally speaking we need to reach and our people. you need to have a college education to get a job nowadays and a lot of people don't.

in britain of course they said okay let's give everyone a college education. they basically didn't approve the standards. we are not driving towards a real fix to that problem. the caveat dances american is so dominated that we can afford to ignore this problem for much longer than other countries would appear so that we continue to not pay attention to occupy wall street or 15% unemployment we can get away from that for decades. that challenge will grow. >> talking about isolationism or lack of entries and nonaggressive or assertive or just more act gave u.s. leadership in the world, you say in a way that one day and noted with interest as you said that

we are not worried enough about china to galvanize us into a more leadership role. >> before putin didn't come again say, he actually brought up world war ii and said that without these atrocities that have been in asia and europe before the united states is the one to come in. so what is a skill, but the u.s. has to be galvanize. it's not like there's no governance to the u.s. but financial crisis hit, governor bush for all of his perceived flaws was able with congress to react very quickly. and obama was able to once he took office. and then he stopped because it is no longer a crisis. the problem they have is a safe haven cars or countries have resources and the g zero convair not looking for countries that growth.

there's so much risk out there that people just have more cash in u.s. treasuries, which means we have a lot more rep to hang ourselves with. snp can downgrade us. doesn't matter. they don't understand the underlying reality. download this again. but it also means we don't need to address these big issues. >> no urgency. >> the big urgency for bobby obama. if you asked me for quite a fundamentally address the long-term big budgetary issue, i think the answer is no. >> mike is coming. thank you. cheryl wallace. i'm interested in original vision for eurasia group and how that evolved over time. my purpose for asking us to get

an indication of whether you are seen as american corporations or your client base abrogates rising importance of the international issues were discussing. this is obviously a very wonky audience. with all understand only about drink the same kool-aid. but you can hear out there in america these kinds of issues just don't register. have you seen increased over time? we see the word globalization a lot more. >> i have -- there's academic background that would lead anyone to believe i should have a successful large can any. i don't know how to run one. i have no business experience. gas, profoundly lucky, but also people need to see this field is equal. my initial to start eurasia group post because i have a phd in political science. good condi on the right, mike

mcfarland left and i'm just interested in how it works when i want to give private-sector experience. i never had a real job so i wanted to come to new york and get a job. a company or a bank, just to learn about the markets and understand because i didn't phd in political science. i didn't know what an equity market was. in emerging markets is emerging markets of natural resources, with regulatory policy, with massive geopolitical tech tonic changes seems like a no-brainer, so i came to new york to new york and now these wonderful people at aig and goldman sachs, and lehman and these were really nice, smart folks would then run to block a bit and appreciate this to unveil a set, you know what? you are a nice guy, but we don't hire political assignments. we hired -- they don't hire

political scientist. after here is frustrated in that if you're not going to hire me for your kind any, he were to put out a shingle and caught eurasia group because they studied eurasia and eurasia guy was credible, then would you hire me? which you become a client? and they said yes. so all of a sudden i had a hundred clients and that's how i started it. at the beginning because no one knew what this stuff was i had to explain here's what a political scientist as and how it can be useful to you in a lot of them are helping me say this is interesting, but this is how i'd apply it. it's not like you had a business plan. i took no outside investment. i wish his doing it. what has changed is that companies now understand. the oil companies always understood. i didn't know them back then,

but there is work in places and putting cash on for 20, 30 years. the banks didn't get it, now they get it. manufactures didn't get it. now they get it. i'll tell you doesn't care. technology companies don't get it. and that's because they're run by engineers. they are people that basically think governments are relevant. i remember talking about playing to that of government relations who basically said that their purpose was to make sure that the ceo never had to deal with government officials, that they wouldn't be distracted by that encourage us to their business. unlike wow, the struble don't understand the way the world is. i'm not going to get them as clients anytime soon. but the point is that i looked at how badly google about china run because i made these were conversations -- remember 10

years ago having conversation that we know we have a problem with chinese government, the chinese people -- we are on the side chinese people. if i were the chinese people, i don't want american corporations owning that data. what happens if something bad happens in the u.s. and china come at you think we're going to do nice with that in her mission? would better use that information. i want us to use that information, but the chinese should not what i said there is a consequence. this all comes down to many to be really honest about the places they are we pretend they are aligned interest in their frilly bonnet and that is i think something that technology companies in the west have been really slow to get under likely to get hurt as a consequence. >> i think we can take maybe two more questions. but in the front row and one in

the back. >> you mentioned a book about the activity with canada and the pipelines coming into this state and the uss wanted to build the pipelines in canada has other options. can you give other examples of this? >> specifically with canada or globally? be met globally. >> we have the u.s. globalization. if we have a world where different regions have different kinds of integration commendably win is to make sure you can hedge all that fast, what i called to the states. turkey pyramids beautifully. >> are they getting dizzy. >> implement came out to meet. she asked me a question. i was very surprised you were so positive because you really don't like berger one. she was like it's not bad. this is an attractive, educated woman who was not dressed

conservatively. she eventually admitted that was the problem. not everything is great in turkey. this problems that the government a lot of locals will talk about. the number two trading partner in jericho as italy. they've opened 12 embassies in the last year in africa. >> is one of the fastest growing companies in the world. >> they do extraordinarily well and yet all this is exposed and they figured out how to pay that. by the way, the israeli relationship is definitely part of that strategy. i hate to say that because we don't want to judge the relationship, but if i were at a scene urgo on, i might've told them to do that. but each more frequently put them in the shoes that if we do the best for our leaders, but would we be telling that person? we don't do that. i think indonesia it is pretty well. they have a large consumer base

and they have a large chinese population unlike other populations in asia is not towards china, but they're local, intermarry, take on names and they decentralize the government. singapore does incredibly well of course. there is small and everybody wants a little piece in their transparent. kazakhstan translates well, not just for energy, but outside of moscow. >> what about india? >> india pay this while in the short term in part because their economies so far lagged behind china but they're actually quite complementary. as that stops happening over time the demographic staff picking up, but as the indian economy because the resource intensive though pay much more. so i don't know that india pay this while in 10 or 20 years, but they could a while now.

in africa as a continent, brazil, so there's a lot of countries out there that could a while. >> okay, final question right here. >> return a irenic company that focuses on virtue markets. speaking of demographics, the one thing you speak of is our own. this year the majority of kids born in the united states or of african, asian or latino origin. in 30 years or less will be the majority of the country. are we getting birth? >> if you believe that being of a different ethnic background is going to create much more engagement internationally a massive domino type chair, the answer would be yes. i certainly think we have a much more vibrant economy as a consequence of that level of diversity of the population.

we have a vibrant economy because people live in cities and interact with each other. but then you read people like richard florida or showed throughout a market how 60% of new bills in the united states are gated communities. these are communities incredibly segmented from each other. demographically very homogeneous not just in terms of ethnic background, but while thin types of education and religious orientation. those are not places where you get premiership and overlooking. the media, trends in social media and the way we digest information as consumers as opposed to citizens. increasingly face the test mass to that important. they want us to like it so they can give us more stuff we like and will show that very spirit we may have friends that are

black in his panic, but we tend to orient toward his friends that are black and hispanic but at the same world we do. i think one of the most dangerous trends in the united states over the long term is we are deepening the segmentation of the orientations and our political and social preferences and clearly or politics in washington is like that. i don't know how we get to that. it's an interesting observation. but absolutely the diversification of the ethnic competition of the united states is the admitted fact terror. >> well, this is an interesting conversation. i feel very lucky to have had a chance to talk with you and all the other knowledgeable people here. i don't have a copy of the real cover of the book right here, but "every nation for intself." i believe there are copies in

the bat. jay ian to sign it. get his other books, too. they may not be in the back, but they're not hard to find. thank you very much for coming. [applause] >> what are you reading this summer? booktv wants to know. >> i am wrapping up citizens of london, which came out a couple years ago. it's a marvelous history basically of london during the war and three very prominent people. edward r. murrow was reported back to the united states with rather strongly held views that we should get into the war.

it will care a man who was said of the that president roosevelt to deal with the basically the foreign aid program for a wind and the ambassador, a fellow named lane in who had replaced joseph kennedy, president kennedy's father who is partial to the chairman's and hispanic that was the reason he brought them home. a marvelous book about the three of them and their interaction with churchill and their advocacy. the advocacy of the united states breaking out of the isolation of spouting getting out of the war. and also had previously written another book, which i highly recommend about troublesome young men and. it's about the members of parliament to rally behind the