otherwise, and i think we do need to develop more stringent standards for internal controls but there was during our examination, we look to make sure that the people preparing the segregation computations that were reported to us have the ability to do so. >> you talked about the confirmation process that you are now using. do you think that's enough? what are the concerns -- one of the concerns is on the one hand you can never totally stop. if someone wants to have an elaborate scheme and that is not confidence for people who want to use the futures markets. so going forward, again the trust but verify position in terms of from a customer standpoint, what is the verification? what is the independent verification beyond having confirmation?

>> and clearly the economic confirmation process was help full in this process but it was equally clearly not enough and that is why we are taking the two-step process of our august 4 meeting will require fcm's to give their segregated bank account so we can -- regulators can check the balance in town we want and any day we want for any anything they want without the involvement of the firmer the bank. even that isn't enough. as i mentioned in my testimony, we need to develop, we need to change the information process and make it a daily event so we get daily reports from all depositories and segregated funds, not just banks but fcm's in money market funds wherever those funds are invested. we need to get daily reports from all of those depositories and compare this daily reports on an automated basis with the reports we are saving from the firm so we want to take the econ process and make it a daily event.

>> thank you. senator roberts. >> thank you madam chair. this has been an excellent panel and i wish other members had stayed. mr. roth it looks like standard audit processes need to be updated in order to catch somebody like mr. watson dorf at fairland and you indicate that you have -- coming down with the talbott of recommendations that you will give the committee for philip are you sharing those with the rest of the panel here? >> well actually at this point we shared with the other panel and i hope so and i can certainly provide it. the recommendation we are talking about were developed in large part through an sro committee which is an active participant and we have conferred closely with fia. >> i'm just asking a stovepiped

question with the exception of mr. roe who is a the sheriff of a new posse and drove the point pretty hard but at any rate, don't ever get together and talk this over because it seems to me you all have good suggestions, either with some kind of insurance, electronic transparency etc. etc.. maybe that is the wrong question to ask you but at any rate, mr. lukken once your recommendations are any recommendations or place -- making place could and mf global or peregrine situations -- >> anyone who is bent on fraud or misappropriation of funds can try to con found the most sophisticated compliance system. however i think what we have recommended is going to make it significantly more difficult

after the mf global situation including separation of duties as i mentioned. this idea of going to risk-based audits is an important one. this modernizing of how we audit away from a check the box system to morph an automated daily confirmation directly from the banks independently verified, those are really important steps and the good news is it that will free up auditors to ask more difficult questions and to see the red flags and go forward with their audits on a more risk-based -- and then the checkbox. these are important proven to and i will mention you talk about discussion between the groups, we independently huddled with their experts and we all came to roughly the same improvements including the idea of studying the insurance fund with some of the panels so even though we we have independently studied this there is a significant alignment of recommendations that we have put forward. >> that is good news. does the fia support bankruptcy reform? >> certainly we are supportive

of some of recommendations. obviously is complex. i think this idea making bankruptcy code easier for people to thwart away positions to the customers during positions to other fcm's i think that is important concept giving customers more of a voice through the tc ftc or the committees on their own and important con -- and also i think we talk about their broker-dealer fcm going down like mf global. there are differences between the ftc and the cbc rules in this area that for years have been addressed and it's important for those organizations to sit down and make sure there their certaintyf rules make sure when this happens people know what's going to happen. >> that is the big issue that the committee has really interested in, both the chairman and myself. this question i asked chairman gensler on this first panel. went to have access will you be able to monitor and fcm for

unusual daily activity? >> is speediest that form a? >> anybody on the panel. >> you have already gone into the insurance question, which i truly appreciate, but i guess that would be for anybody who wants talk about it. mr. rossi want to take that one? >> i believe that direct on-line access could be helpful under those types of circumstances and when a firm was under financial duress, i think we would be making much greater use of actual -- tool checking several times during the day to make sure that the deposits are as reported by the firm and if there were fluctuations in those balances intraday, it could raise a red flag and create suspicion. with the funds are going down and miraculously at the end of the day they pop back up i think that would be something that would draw the tension of the regulator.

>> ms. subfor you are certainly a feisty advocate on behalf of the organization. i am fully appointed with a nick thank you for your interest and your leadership. you cannot do a rain dance can you? >> i wish i could. [laughter] >> what the end insurance would you like to see developed? >> every form of assurance -- insurance has costs and drawbacks. to my own point of point of vien behalf of ngsa the first thing is urgency so we might start with something that is not a long-run solution but the first step. perhaps itself funding such as chairman duffy said. even if it's not a billion dollars for 20% of that, one sent, my customers would pay for it right now. maybe that is not the long-term solution. we want to look at those possibilities including something that might be sipc,

could be industry funded, could be totally optional for each individual customer perhaps their nfa, creating the aggregate pool of coverage that customers can take or not take. >> your lenders would support that? i know you are quoting your lenders alike. your lenders have told you something like that? >> they are concerned about the safety of their money. there is a small cost to it. i think we would find a lot of lenders would step up to that. >> senator can i make just one point? with respect to a feed generated to nfa to cover the cost of the insurance i would point out it's a technical matter that would require an amendment to the statute because under the existing law there are very strict limits on what we can use fees and assessments for. so they can only be used to defray reasonable administrative administrative -- that would require a change to the statute.

>> thank you for that verification. mr. subfive you are fewer the co-founder of this group. the commodity customer coalition mf global situation, do you think the self-regulatory model are still viable given these recent events? >> i think so in the sense that i don't like it matters whether, whether the regulator is paid privately are paid by the government. i think that what both of these failures show is that there will be future failures. the system is human and therefore it's going to be reached by other humans, so to our minds it's not to look for ways to make it more difficult in a sense the sense of finding new technologies to stop fraud, but it's really the backstop of insurance. the only thing that really effectively addresses what market participants are seeing which is regardless of who is in charge, they can't be assured that their funds are going to be

there when the music stops. >> would you be in favor of a proposal by ms. klemme, we will call it the sub or plan. [laughter] >> i see happen to know a little bit more about it. >> it's called step-by-step. dotted a full gallop. >> on the surface absolutely and i think the mr. duffy is right that we can try to raise a billion dollars in three years. but the nfa just doubled its. >> this year and the world did not stop turning so i think we can raise $30 million per send that we assess and look at maybe getting assessments for member firms. based on the cash flow to fund you can actually ensure quite a bit more and if the funds then goes into the bankruptcy and pursues recovery can get all its money back like the canadian protection are funded. >> i appreciate your answer and i'm way over time. i am four minutes overtime which

is not a record for me by any means. but i just want to make a point that an chairwoman. i think with all of the questions that were asked here, by members which have been good questions, and the previous panel has been a good panel, but these folks here i think are the ones that are going to actually come up with the suggestions that turn into policy changes that would make a difference and from that standpoint i thank all of you and then i urge you to, don't stovepiped this. let's work together. been nice mr. subfive. you're going to be fine. >> thank you senator roberts and i am in complete agreement. i appreciate the recommendations you have already received certainly after mf global. we appreciate that. clearly there's there is more to do. we can't afford number three. customers cannot afford number three, and so i think it is

important. this has been very substantive and i appreciate all of few and as the ranking member this -- indicated this is very important and perspectives that are very important for us. as we move forward both with the regulators, both from the voluntary and the government regulators as well as the customers who were the most important in this whole process, we look forward to working with you and having integrity and a system that needs to work for people in order for minutes. thot

objection. mr. mccain: madam president, before i go to the issue that we wanted to discuss, i just want to point out that in this debate that has become so impassioned and the issue obviously is one of cybersecurity is one of transcendent importance, and i want to again reiterate my respect, appreciation and affection for both senator lieberman and senator collins, but i also point out to my colleagues that the people who are directly affected by this, and that's the business community of the united states of america, is unalterably opposed to the legislation in its present form. they are the ones who will be affected most dramatically by cybersecurity legislation. the united states chamber of commerce has a strong letter, a

strong letter, the united states chamber of commerce which represents three million businesses and organizations of every size, sector and region, supports the legislation that we have proposed. now, i would final just like to say that i have had hours and hours and hours of meetings with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle trying to work this out. i believe that we can work this out. we understand that cybersecurity is importantance of transcendent importance, but to somehow allege that the business community, the three million businesses in america should be left out of this discussion, of course, is not appropriate nor do i believe will result in effective cybersecurity legislation. but i really came to the floor today to talk about, again, the issue of the leaks, the leaks which have jeopardized directly american national security. at the asman security firm just

in the past couple of days, the head of securities command, admiral mcraven, have observed that the national security risks have put lives at risk and may ultimately cost americans their lives unless there is an effective crackdown. i quote from admiral mccraven, the head of our special operations command, who says we need to do the best we can to clamp down because sooner or later, it's going to cost people their lives or it's going to cost us our national security. this is another national security issue, my friends, and the fact is that i appreciate very much the fact that governor romney rightly referred to these leaks as contemptible and a betrayal of our national interest. and i would like to point out to my colleagues that, yes, there are supposedly investigations going on and acorresponding to media -- and according to media, that hundreds of people are being -- are being interviewed. well, why don't -- i'm no -- i'm

no lawyer, i'm no prosecutor. senator graham may have some experience in that. but what about the 2009 g-20 economic summit, when according to the "new york times" journalist david sanger -- quote -- "a senior official in the national security council tapped him on the shoulder and brought him to the presidential suite in the pittsburgh hotel where president obama was staying and where 'most of the rest of the national security staff was present.' there the journalist was allowed to review satellite images and other evidence that confirmed the existence of a secret nuclear site in iran." i wonder, i wonder how many people have the key to the presidential suite in pittsburgh, pennsylvania, hotel? you might want to start there. instead, we have two prosecutors, one of whom was a

strong and great supporter of the president of the united states. and the same people -- i'm talking about the vice president of the united states and other others -- that strongly supported a special counsel in the case of valerie plame and, of course, the abramoff case. we need a special counsel to find out who was responsible for these leaks. and i'd ask my colleague, senator graham, if he has additional comments on this issue. and it's -- it's receded somewhat in the media but the damage that has been done to our national security is significant. it has put lives at risk, and it has betrayed our allies. this is an issue that we cannot let go away until those who were responsible are made responsible for these actions. mr. graham: thank you. my comment, in response to your

question, senator mccain, is that what we do today becomes precedent for tomorrow. so are we going to sit on the sidelines here and allow the attorney general, who is under siege by our colleagues in the house about the way he's handled fast and furious and other matters, to appoint two u.s. attorneys that have to answer to him to investigate allegations against the very white house that appointed him? the reason that so many democrats wrote to president bush and said, you cannot possibly investigate the scooter libby-valerie blame leak because it -- val i will plame leak because it involves people very close to you. let's just read the letter. "we're at risk of seeing this investigation so compromised that those responsible for this national security breach will never be identified and

prosecuted. public confidence in the integrity of this investigation will be substantially bolstered by the appointment of a special counsel." senator biden, "i think they should appoint a specialty prosecutor but if they're not going to do that, which i suspect they're not, is get the information out as quick as they possibly can. this is not a minor thing. there's been a federal crime committed. the question is, who did it. and the president should do everything in thinks power to demonstrate that there's an urgency to find that out." then he goes on later and says, "there's been a federal crime committed. you can't possibly investigate it yourself because people close to you are involved." the abramoff scandal, which involved jack abramoff, a person very close to house leadership and some people in the bush administration, our democratic colleagues, 34 of them, asked -- said the following, "f.b.i. officials said that the abramoff investigation involves systematic corruption within the

highest levels of government. such an assertion indicates extraordinary circumstances and it is in the public interest that you act under your existing statutory authority to appoint a special counsel." so our democratic colleagues back during the bush administration said, we don't trust you enough to investigate compromising national security by having a agent outed allegedly by members of your administration. we don't trust the republican part apparatus enough to investigate jack abramoff because you're so close to him and that you should have special counsels appointed. well, guess what? they did. here's what i'm saying. i don't trust this white house to investigate themselves. i think this wreaks of a cover coverup. i think that the highest levels of the -- this government surrounding the president intentionally over a 45-day period leaked various stories regarding our national security programs to make the

administration look strong on national security. i don't think it's an accident that you're reading in the paper about efforts by the administration and our allies to use cyber attacks against the iranian nuclear program as a way to try to head israel off from using military force. i don't know if it happened or not but the details surrounding the cooperation between us and israel and how we engaged in cyber attacks against the iranian nuclear program are chilling and something you should not read about in the paper. the second thing that you read about in the paper was how we disrupted an underwear bomber plot where there was a double agent who had infiltrated an al qaeda cell -- i believe it was in yemen -- and how we were able to break that up and the man was given a suicide vest that was new technology and couldn't be detected by the current screening devices at airports, and how we were able to basically infiltrate that

cell. and god knows the damage done to our allies in that operation in the -- mr. mccain: could i ask my friend, isn't it all true that this individual had some 23 family members whose lives were also placed in danger because of the revelation of his identity? mr. graham: that's what we've been told in the paper. and you've also got a story about the kill list, a blow-by-blow description of how president obama personally oversees who gets killed by drones in pakistan. and at the end of the day, i'm not so sure that's something we should all be reading about. but if that's not enough, what about releasing the pakistani doctor, the person who allegedly helped us find bin laden? his role in this effort to find bin laden is also in the paper and now he's in jail in pakist pakistan. now, the sum total is that the leaks have been devastating,

they have put people's lives at risk, they have compromised our national security unlike anything i've seen. and you expect us to sit on the sidelines and let the white house investigate itself? no way. those who wrote letters in the past suggesting that bush could not impartially investigate himself, where are you today? is this the rule, you can't trust republicans but you can trust democratic administrations to get to the bottom of things that they're involved in up to their eyebrows? do you think it's an accident that all of these books quote senior white house officials? there's a review of one of the books you just mentioned, senator mccain, that talked about the unprecedented access to the national security advisor. there's a vignette in one of the books where the secretary of defense goes up to the national security advisor and suggests a new communication strategy when it comes to the programs we're

talking about. "should the eff up." well, that makes great reading, but at the end of the day, should we be reading about all this? people's lives are at stake, programs have been compromised, our allies are very reluctant now to do business with us. and this was, in my view, an intentional effort by people at the highest level in the white house to leak these stories for political purposes and to accept that eric holder is going to appoint two people within his sphere of influence and call it a day is acceptable is not going to happen. we're going to do everything we can to right this ship. and we're asking no more of you than you ask oed of the bush administration. so to our democratic colleagues, how do you justify this? how do you justify that you couldn't investigate abramoff without a special counsel, you couldn't investigate what scooty libby may or may not have --

scooter libby may or may not have done without a special counsel, but it's okay not to have one here? how do you do senate? mr. durbin: will the senator yield for a question? mr. graham: absolutely. mr. durbin: the senator asks whether this side would like to explain the position. i'd be happy to do it at this point but i could wait until you've completed your colloquy so it's your choice. mr. graham: whatever you'd like to do, i'm dying to hear how you think it's good government not to have a special independent counsel investigate the most damaging national security leaks in decades. i'm dying to hear your explanation. mr. durbin: you don't have to die. i hope you'll continue to live a good life because you're such a great senator, but i'm asking you do you want notice join in this dialogue or would you rather make your presentation? mr. graham: why don't we let my colleague speak and then you'll have all the time you need. senator chambliss, what do you think? mr. chambliss: well, i'm dying to hear his explanation, too. let me just say that. well, first of all, let me say that i join in with everything my two colleagues have said with

respect to the -- number one, the volume of the leaks that have come out in recent weeks. we all know that this town has a tendency to leak information from time to time but never in the volume and never with the sensitivity that the leaks that we've read about on the front page of newspapers around the country as we have seen in the last few weeks. and, you know, irrespective of where they came from, to have folks who may be implicated in the white house and the white house appointing the two individuals who have been charged with the duty of prosecuting this investigation wreaks of ethical issues. now, i don't know these two u.s. attorneys but everything i know about them is they're dad-gum good prosecutors and they're good lawyers. but why would you even put them in the position of having to

investigate, in effect, the individual that appointed them to the position that they're in? that's why we're arguing that a special counsel may be -- is without question the best way to go. and i'm interested to hear my friend from illinois' response to that issue. let me talk about something else for just a minnesota knit and that is the impact -- for just a minute and that is the impact that these leaks have had on the intelligence community. the number-one thing that individuals who go on the intelligence committees in both the house and the senate are told -- and i know because i've served on both of them, continue to serve on the senate intel committee -- is that, be careful what you say, be careful and make sure that you don't inadvertently and obviously advertently reveal classified information. be sure that in your comments, you never reveal sources and methods. well, guess what?

the individuals that were involved in these leaks were very overt in the release of sources and methods with respect to the issues that senator graham referred to as having been leaked. not only that, but lives were put in danger, particularly the life of the individual who was an asset that worked very closely with respect to the underwear bomber issue. we know that to be a fact. but there's also a secondary issue and that's this -- we have partners around the world that we deal with in the intelligence community every single day and we depend on those partners and they depend on us to provide them with information that we have and likewise that they give to us. and a classic example was detailed in one of these particular leaks on the front page of the "new york times."

today, why in the world would any of our partners in the intelligence community around the world, those partners who have men and women on the frontlines who are putting their life in harm's way and in danger every single day to gather intelligence information and share that information with us, why would they continue to do that if they are now concerned about that information being written about on the front page of newspapers inside the united states and blasted all over television or wherever it may be? the answer is pretty simple. and very honestly, there are some strong considerations being given by some of our partners as to how much information they should share with us, and that't creates a very negative atmosphere within the intelligence world. lastly, let me just say that we dealt in the intelligence committee with our authorization bill recently in which we have

tried to address this issue from a punishment standpoint. there are certain things that individuals are required to do when they leave the intelligence community and go write a book. one of those things is that they have to present their book to an independent panel of intelligence experts and that panel is to review the information and then decide whether or not any of it's classified, should not be released. in in the instance, one of the instances that we have here, one of those individuals never submitted his book to that panel, and in another instance, an individual submitted his book to the panel and the panel said you need to be careful in these areas, and the advice from that panel was pretty well disregarded. one of the provisions in our bill says that if you do that, if you fail to submit your book

to that panel, or if you disregard what that panel tells you to do, then you're going to be subject to penalties. part of those penalties include the possible removal of your right to a pension from the federal government, of the portion that the government is obligated to pay you, not what they have contributed. we are now being criticized in the intelligence community -- or our intelligence bill is being criticized by some individuals out there and guess who it is. it's the media. and it's the white house. what does that tell you about their fear and their participation in the release of classified information? so this -- this issue is of critical importance, and it simply has to stop for any number of national security reasons. but the ones that have been addressed by my colleagues

obviously are to be highlighted and i look forward to whatever comments the senator from illinois may have with respect to justifying -- i know he's not going to justify the leaks because i know him too well. but whatever his justification is for proceeding in a prosecution manner the way the department of justice is going versus what the bush administration did and appoint a special counsel in a case that, by the way, pales in comparison to the leaks that took place in this particular instance. mr. mccain: mr. president, before we turn to my friend from illinois for his i'm sure convincing explanation as to why these -- a special counsel is not required, even though it was in the opinion of his side in previous situations, i want to just again, and the senator from georgia and the senator from south carolina will also corroborate the fact that we

have been working and working, meeting after meeting after meeting on the issue of cybersecurity. we believe that we have narrowed it down to three or four differences that could be worked out over time. among them are liability, another one is information sharing. but i think it's also important for us to recognize in this debate the people who are most directly affected in many respects is the business community. and it's important that we have the input and the -- satisfy at least to a significant degree, those concerns. there are those who allege that a piece of legislation is better than no legislation. i've been around this town for a long time. i've seen bad legislation which is far worse than no legislation. so we understand, certainly i and members of the armed services committee and others, understand the importance of

this issue. we also understand that those who are directly affected by it, those concerns need to be satisfied as well, and i commit to my colleagues to continue nonstop rounds of meetings and discussions to try to get this issue resolved. to this moment, there is still significant differences, and i say to my friend from illinois, i look forward to hearing his convincing discussion. thank you. i yield. go ahead. mr. president, i ask unanimous consent the senator from illinois be involved in the colloquy. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. durbin: i didn't know if you wanted to make the consent request you came to the floor to payingic make. you're not going to make it? mr. mccain: you will object. mr. durbin: yes, i will. i want to thank my colleague from arizona. occasionally, historically on the floor of the senate there's

a debate, and this may be one of those moments. i hope it is because it is a worthy topic. let's get down to the bottom line here. i've served on the intelligence committee as some of my colleagues have. we know the important work done by the intelligence community to keep america safe. they literally risk their lives every day for us, and they're largely invisible. we don't see them at the military parades and other places where we acknowledge those warriors who risk their lives. but these men and women do it in so many different ways, and when i spent four years on the senate intelligence committee as my colleagues, i'm sure, people the same, i went out of my way to make sure that i was careful with classified information. so as to continue to protect this country and never endanger those who were helping us keep it safe all around the world. so the obvious question raised by the republican side of the aisle is whether this president, president barack obama, thinks differently, whether obama believes we should

cut corners and not be so careful when it comes to the leaking of classified information. and my answer to that is looking at the record. look at the record and ask this basic question: when it comes to prosecuting those believed to have been guilty of leaks of classified information, which president of the united states has prosecuted more suspected individuals than any other president, democrat or republican? barack obama. on six different occasions, five in the department of justice, one in the department of defense, they pursued the active prosecution of those they felt were guilty of leaking classified information that might endanger the united states. let me add another personal observation. it was last year when my friend, bill daily, then chief of staff to president obama, came to chicago for a luncheon. it was a nice day. we had a nice luncheon. it was very successful. he said he had to get back to

washington, he was in a big hurry, never said why. he told me later, after, he told me much later, after this occurred. i had to get back because we had a classified meeting about hunting down obviously. we -- osama bin laden. we were sworn to secrecy at every level of government so we never disclosed information that we were even thinking about that possibility. bill daly took it seriously, the president takes it seriously, anyone in those positions of power will take it seriously. to suggest otherwise on the floor of the senate is just plain wrong and it raises a question about this president's commitment to the nation which i think is improper and cannot be backed up with the evidence. now, let's look at the evidence. when it comes to the appointment of a special prosecutor, let me take you back to those moments when a special prosecutor named patrick fitzgerald from the northern district of illinois was chosen to investigate the

leak of classified information. let me put it in historical context. we had invaded iraq. we did it based on assertions by the bush-cheney administrations about the danger to the united states. one of those assertions dealt with africa, and certain yellow cake chemicals that might be used for nuclear weapons and whether they were going to fall into the hands of the iraqi leadership. it was one of the arguments -- there were many, weapons of mass destruction and so forth -- that turned out to be totally paul: , leading us into -- false, leading us into a war, which 'cause cost us dearly in terms of human lives and our own treasure. so one person spoke out. former ambassador joe wilson who identified himself as a republican said i don't believe there is any evidence. he was punished.

remember how he was punished? when someone decided to out his wife, valerie plame. valerie plame had served as an intelligence agent for the united states to protect our nation, and someone decided that in order to get even with joe wilson, they would disclose the fact that his wife worked in the intelligence agencies. and then what happened? if you'll remember, when that story broke broke, the intelligence community of the united states of america said we have been betrayed. if one of our own can be outed in a political debate in washington, are any of us safe? so -- it's a legitimate question. so there was an obvious need to find out who did it. who disclosed her identity. endangering her life, the life of every person who had worked with her and so many other intelligence agents. mr. president, do you ferl what happened? i do. the attorney general of the united states, john ashcroft,

recused himself from this investigation. it was the right thing for him to do because the questions about this disclosure of her identity went to the top of the administration. he recused himself and appointed patrick fitzgerald. the u.s. attorney for the northern district of illinois, a professional -- a professional prosecutor with the u.s. department of justice. well, the investigation went on for a long tim .. law. that came out and eventually we learned the identity of who actually disclosed the name of valerie plame. it was a serious issue, one that called for a special counsel, and if i remember correctly, there were even republicans at that point joining democrats saying let's get to the bottom of this. if this goes all the way to the top, let's find out who's

responsible for it. it was the appropriate thing to do. now look at this situation. this president, who has activated the prosecution of six individuals suspected of leaking classified information, takes very seriously the information that was disclosed related to the al qaeda techniques and all the things that they they were g to threaten the united states. and what has he done as a result of snippet let's be specific because i really have to call in question some of the statements made on the floor here. to say that the administration is covering this up as to this leak is just plain wrong. at this point, the department of justice has appointed two highly respected around experienced prosecutors with proven records of independence in the exercise of their duties. u.s. attorney manchinen has -- matschen has overseen a number of prosecutions in the district

of columbia. u.s. attorney rosensteinstein has overseen a number of national security investigations including one of the five leak investigations that have been prosecuted under this president. the justice department has complete confidence in their abilities to conduct thorough and independent investigations into these matters in close collaboration with career prosecution -- prosecution and agents. this is not being swept under the rug, ignored. this is being taken seriously by this administration as every leak of classified information will be taken seriously. i know it's an election year. we're fewer than 100 days away from the election and i know the floor of the senate is used by both parties this close to the election but i want make it clear this president has a record of commitment to protecting the men and women who gather intelligence for america. he has a record of prosecuting more suspects for leaks of this information than any other president in history. he has, through his attorney

general, appointed two career criminal prosecutors to look into this case and said they will have the resources and authority they need to get to the bottom of it. s that that is the way to do. will the day come when a special counsel is needed? up won't rule that out. but it is wrong to come to the floor and question this president's commitment to the intelligence community, it is wrong to question the credentials of these two men who have performed so well in service of the department of justice in years gone by. i thought senator mccain was going to make a unanimous consent request and if he wishes to, let me yield at this point. mr. mccain: i'd be glad to respond to my friend. obviously he's in disagreement with the chairperson of the intelligence committee because she said that these leaks were the worst in 11 years that she has been a member of the senate intelligence committee. so obviously the abramoff and

the other valerie plame investigations aren't nearly as serious. and they certainly weren't when you look at the -- at the incredible damage, according to admiral mcgraifn -- mccraven, of the incredible damage that these leaks have caused. again, the chairperson of the intelligence committee said it's the worst that she's ever seen. admiral mccraven, says it put lives at risk and may ultimately cost americans their lives. i wonder if my colleague from illinois is concerned when according to his book mr. sanger said -- quote -- "a senior official in the national security council tapped him on the shoulder and brought him to the presidential suite in the pittsburgh hotel where president obama was staying" -- i'm

quoting from mr. sanger's book -- "most of the national security staff was present. where the journalist was apparently allowed to review satellite images and other evidence that confirmed the existence of a secret nuclear site in iran." when leaks take place around this town, the first question you have to ask, who benefits? who benefits from them? obviously someone who wants to take a journalist up to the presidential suite would make it pretty easy for us who we should interview first. who had the key to the presidential suite? who uses the presidential suite in a hotel in pittsburgh? these leaks are the most damaging that have taken place in my time in the united states senate and before that in the united states military. yes, six people have been prosecuted. do you know at what level?

a private. the lowest level people have been prosecuted by this administration, and this administration says that they have to interview hundreds of people in the bottom-up process. and i can guarantee you one thing, i'll tell the senator from illinois now, there will not be any definitive conclusion , this investigation before the election in november. mr. durbin: will the senator yield for a question? mr. mccain: that doesn't mean to me that they are doing their job. although it is clear that one of these prosecutors was active in the obama campaign, was a contributor to the obama campaign. i'm not saying that individual isn't of the highest caliber. i am saying that that would lead people to ask a reasonable question, and that is whether that individual is entirely objective. americans need an objective investigation by someone that they can trust just as senator -- then-senator biden and then-senator obama asked for

in these previous incidents which, in my view, were far less serious and in the view of the chairperson of the intelligence committee far more severe than those that were previously investigated. i would be glad to have my colleague respond to that. mr. durbin: i would like to respond. first, let me tell you, whatever the rank of the individual, private, specialist, chief petty officer, if they're responsible for leaking classified information, they need to be investigated and prosecuted if guilty, if we assume that they're guilty. so the fact that a private is being investigated shouldn't get them off the hook. i would just say -- mr. mccain: i don't think it gets them off the hook. i do think it has some significance that as compared to this kind of -- of egregious breach of security that's taking place at the highest level. we know that. mr. durbin: i would say to my friend from arizona, if i am not

mistaken, it was a noncommissioned officer at best and maybe not an officer in the army who is being prosecuted for the wikileaks, so let's not say that the rank of anyone being prosecuted in any way makes them guilty or innocent. we need to go to the source of the leak. mr. mccain: but my friend would obviously acknowledge if it's a private or a corporal or something, it has not nearly the gravity that it does when a person of -- with whom the nation has played the much higher responsibilities commits this kind of breach. mr. durbin: of course, it should be taken to where it leads, period. but let me also ask, i don't know if quoting from a book on the floor if what was written in that book is necessarily true. perhaps the senator has his own independent information on that. mr. mccain: no one has challenged mr. sanger's depiction. no one in the government -- in the administration has challenged his assertion that he was taken by a -- quote -- "high-ranking senior official in

the national security council to the presidential suite. no one challenged that. mr. durbin: i would say to the senator i don't know if that has to do with the information that was ultimately leaked about al qaeda. it seems like it is a separate matter, but it should be taken seriously, period. what more does this president need to do to convince you other than to have more prosecutions than any president in history of those who have been believed to have leaked classified information? if you will come to the floor, as you said earlier, and i quote -- the investigation is -- quote -- supposedly going on, close quote. i trust the administration that the investigation is going on. what evidence do you have that it's not going on? mr. mccain: i say to my friend, it's not a matter of trust. it's a matter of credibility, because if an administration has the same argument that then-senator biden used and senator obama used in opposition to the administration investigating the abramoff case and the valerie plame case, they

argued that it's not a matter of trust, it's a matter of credibility with the american people whether an administration can actually investigate itself or should this be a credible outside counsel who would conduct this investigation which would then have the necessary credibility, i think, with the american people, and i think that's -- there is a certain logic to that. i hope my colleague would admit. mr. durbin: let me say to the senator here that in that case, the attorney general of the united states, john ashcroft, recused himself, recused himself. he said there was such an appearance of a conflict if not a conflict, he was stepping aside. it's very clear under those circumstances that special counsel is needed. in this case, there is no suggestion the president, the vice president, the attorney general were complicit in any leak, so to suggest otherwise, i have to say to senator mccain show me what you're bringing as proof.

mr. mccain: i am bringing you proof that this attorney general has a significant credibility problem, and that problem is bred by a program called fast and furious where weapons -- where under a program sponsored by the justice department used -- let me just finish what i'm saying, then i will be glad to respond. let me just finish my comment. and a young american, border patrol agent, was murdered with weapons that were -- that were part of the fast and furious investigation. what has the attorney general of the united states done? he has said he will not come forward with any information that is requested by my colleagues in the house, so i would have to tell you, at least in the house of representatives and with many americans and certainly the family of brian terry who was murdered, there is a credibility problem with this attorney general of the united states. mr. durbin: i say to my colleague and friend, senator mccain, i deeply regret the loss of any american life,

particularly those in service of our country, and i feel exactly -- mr. mccain: i am convinced of that. mr. durbin: exactly about this individual and the loss to his family, but let's make sure the record is complete. the fast and furious program was not initiated by president obama. it was started by president george w. bush. mr. mccain: which in my view does not impact the need for a full and complete investigation. mr. durbin: secondly, this attorney general, mr. holder, has been brought before a congressional committee time after time. i have been in the senate judiciary committee when he has been questioned at length about fast and furious, and i'm sure he has been called even more frequently before the house committees. third, he's produced over 9,000 pages of documents and chairman issa has said not enough, we need more. well, at some point it becomes clear he will never produce enough documents. and the house decided to find him in contempt for that. that's their decision. i don't think that was necessarily proper. but having said that, does that

mean that every decision from the department of justice from this point forward cannot be trusted? mr. mccain: no, but what i am saying is that there is a significant credibility problem that the attorney general of the united states has at least with the majority of the house of representatives. mr. durbin: the republican majority. mr. mccain: on this issue, which then lends, i think, more weight to the argument that as there was in the case of valerie plame and jack abramoff for the need for a special counsel. mr. durbin: i don't see the connection. if the attorney general and the president said we're not going to investigate this matter, senator mccain, i would be standing right next to you on the floor calling for a special counsel, but they have said just the opposite. they have initiated the investigation and brought in two career criminal prosecutors whom we have trusted to take public corruption cases in the district of columbia and leaks of classified information in other cases, and he said now you have the authority, conduct the investigation. they're not ignoring this. mr. mccain: those two counsels

report to who? the attorney general of the united states. mr. durbin: ultimately report to the people. mr. mccain: i would think just for purposes of credibility and with the american people, that a special counsel would be called for by almost everyone. look, i -- i understand the senator from illinois' position. we have our colleagues waiting. i appreciate the fact that he is willing to discuss this issue. i think we pretty well exhausted it, but -- mr. durbin: may i touch on one other issue you raised if you have a moment? mr. mccain: sure. mr. durbin: the pending bill, cybersecurity. this is a bill which i hope we both agree addresses an issue of great serious and gravity in terms of measure's defense. i know the senator from arizona and some of his colleagues have produced an alternative. i support the bipartisan bills that senators lieberman and collins have brought to the floor. the major group that opposes the passage of the cybersecurity bill is the u.s. chamber of

commerce, an organization which represents the largest businesses in america, and what i have heard the senator from arizona say over and over again is that they have got to be an important part of this conversation and the discussion. i think senator lieberman and senator collins would say we've engaged them, we have listened to them, we have made changes consistent with what they were looking for, but clearly they have not reached the point where they are satisfied. i learned yesterday when senator whitehouse of rhode island came to the floor that in fact the u.s. chamber of commerce really turns out to be pretty expert on this issue of cybersecurity, and i call the attention of the senator from arizona, if he's not aware of it, to a "wall street journal" article of december 21, 2011. this "wall street journal" article is entitled china hackers hit u.s. chamber, and it starts by saying a group of hackers in china breached the computer defenses of america's top business lobbying group, gaining access to everything stored on its system, including

information about its 3 million members, according to people familiar. the complex operation involved at least 300 internet addresses, four chamber employees who worked on asian policy had six weeks of their email stolen. the article goes on to say that the chamber of commerce didn't notice this breach that went on for six months. the federal bureau of investigation brought it to their attention, and then they learned that the chinese had not only hacked into the computer main frame, they had somehow hacked into the computer-driven thermostats in their office and at times in the office of the u.s. chamber of commerce, their copy machines and fax machines were spitting out pages with chinese characters on them. they were completely compromised by this cyber attack. now they come to us as experts on how to avoid a cyber attack. mr. mccain: first of all, let me say to my friend, that's just unfair. they are not claiming to be

experts on cyber attacks. they are claiming that there are issues of liability, issues of information sharing and other issues that they believe will inhibit their ability to engage in business practices and grow and prosper. so to say that somehow they claim they are experts on cybersecurity, they are not, but they are experts on how their businesses can best cooperate, share information, resist these attacks and come together with other people and other interests to bring about some legislation we can all agree on, and there are and other interests to bring about some legislation we can all agree on and there are businesses en organizations represented here. so it seems to me we should continue this conversation on issues of information and

liability but to somehow say we didn't agree with anything they wanted to do it is not fair to those three million businesses. we are making progress but don't say they portray themselves as experts. and my presidential campaign, didn't have a lot to do. go ahead. >> that wasn't the case. of fascinating treasure trove. great insights and information. let me say to my friend from arizona i am asking only for a little human leon both sides in the public sector and private sector by first acknowledging as security advisor is tell us, this is one of the most serious threats to our country and its future. we should be joining if you have been victimized in the campaign

and -- senator whitehouse came to the 4 from 50 american businesses, compromised and tapped into by the same, how it occurred. so the we share information and keep one another safe. not just about the safety of the business and important to be safe. >> to somehow in for that businesses in america, and the fair influence. what they want to do is be more he efficient in the way they do business. and liability, if they are not

given some protection in the information sharing they would do. so that they have that security so that they will more cooperative we engage in the information they need. i have no doubt the senator from illinois's comments about how important this issue is true but no one argues with that. get it right rather than wrong. some times we find out repassed legislation, adverse consequences rather than the consequences we contemplated. i would throw dodd-frank over there. no company is too big to fail now. i would throw in some legislation we passed recently which have not achieved the

goals that we sought. that is why we need more compromise and more agreement and i believe we can reach it and give great credit to both the co-sponsors of the bill. but please don't allege that this is, quote, by partisan in any significant way. most of the republican senators oppose the legislation in its present form. most republican senators, all republican senators understand the gravity of the situation and the necessity of acting. >> my friend from arizona, i hope we get this done this week. it is a lot to do but i believe that the threat is imminent and i believe it is continuous and if we don't find a way through our political differences, shame on us. i believe senator collins from your side of the aisle is proud of the fact serve as a bipartisan effort and she has

worked on so many issues. >> please go ahead. >> clearly bipartisan. senators lieberman and collins. to raise the question of dodd-frank and appropriate government oversight and regulation i would suggest you reflect on three things, lybor, peregrin investment and chase loss of $6 billion. to say we shouldn't have government oversight of our financial institutions that drag this into this recession we're still trying to recover from, i see it differently. but there's a continuing need for government oversight of these financial institutions. >> these institutions are not averse to government oversight. they are others to legislations which harms their ability to share that information because if they face the threat of being taken to court, obviously that

is reluctance. they also know how much has been lost because of the lack of cybersecurity to china and other countries and they have been most directly affected. they are intelligent people. they are smart people. they want this legislation to pass in a way that is the most effective way to enact legislation on this very serious issue. i look forward to continuing the conversation with my friend from illinois. i think both of us learn a bit from our conversations and i thank him for his continued willingness to discuss the issues. >> i think the senator from arizona and i hope other colleagues will engage in the exchange. i don't know if we can best one another but we left with the same level of respect we started with and i hope those who followed the debate heard more

about the issue. >> we yield the floor. >> live today this senate finance committee will work on tax extenders' legislation which will extend billions of dollars worth of business and personal tax provisions and have expired or set to expire at the end of this year. live coverage starting at 10:00 eastern on c-span3. also today the house foreign affairs committee hears from alberto fernandez of the center for strategic counterterrorism communications. live coverage from capitol hill starting at 2:00 p.m. eastern on c-span3. wednesday jeffrey zients testified about the impact of sequestration on the fence. here's a portion of his testimony before the house armed services committee. you can see this and other hearings on possible defense spending cuts on our web site at

c-span.org. >> recently tension in congress has focused on seeking information from the administration on planning and preparing for sequestration. a lot of stress in the very unfortunate event congress fails to pass the deficit-reduction package and avoid sequestration. the administration will indeed be prepared to issue the sequestration order on jan. second and manage its implementation. let me be very clear. no amount of planning, no amount of planning will mitigate damaging effects of sequestration. moreover, our planning must be delivered so that we avoid inadvertently triggering some of the negative effects of sequestration. we do not want to waste scarce resources or disrupt critical

government operations. to make this visit the right course is not to spend time moving around rocks at the bottom of liquid to make for a less painful landing. the right course is to avoid driving off the cliff altogether. implementation of sequestration governed by procedures set forth in the law and i want to implement the law provides omb and agencies with very little flexibility or discretion in implementing sequestration. a uniform percentage at the account level which would apply evenly, equally across programs, projects, activities. because congress has not made a balance deficit reduction, the administration is taking a number of actions to prepare for

possible sequestration. earlier this week, omb issued guidance to agencies and will engage with agencies on matters necessary for issuing a sequestration order. i have notified congress to the president to exercise his authority to exempt military accounts from sequestration if it were to occur and regarding federal contractors the department of labor issued guidance on blow warn act clarifying contractors are not required to issue a notices to their workers in advance of january 2nd and doing so would be inappropriate in light of the underlying purposes of the act so we are taking necessary steps but as i stated no amount of

planning will mitigate the damaging effects of sequestration. sequestration is a blunt in discriminant instrument designed to force congress to act. it is august 1st. five month remain for congress to work together to pass balanced deficit-reduction and avoid the sequester. administration stands ready to work with congress to get the job done and i look forward to taking any questions. >> thank you, dr. carter. >> thank you. ranking member smith and members of the committee thanks for the opportunity to be with you today. please to join my colleague mr. zients and i will focus on the impact of sequestration and the department of defense. let me begin by thanking you for your continuing support to our

department and service members and military families. not only in afghanistan but everywhere around the world. it is much appreciated. i just returned on friday from a ten day trip around the pacific theater. i have an opportunity to meet with troops in hawaii and guam and the republic of korea, japan. for 70 is the presence of our service men and women has been the character of free peace and prosperity in the asia-pacific region. in the peace and stability created by the military presence first japan, and south corey and southeast asia and china and india and we intend to remain a pacific power for decades to come because we believe this region is where an important part of the future lies. our new defense strategy calls

for exactly that and that is one of many reasons it is important to all of us. i would like to ask my full statement be submitted for the record and are will continue with -- >> no objections. the award. >> secretary panetta and i have emphasized sequestration of the lot to happen would have a devastating impact on defense. i will focus on the impact of the department of defense, acting director zients's testimony indicates the operation of non-defense agencies would be equally devastating. he described the mechanics by which sequestration would work and i would refer you to my prepared statement for more detailed treatment of the mechanics of sequestration. i briefly highlight the impact of sequestration specific to dod.

much to be echoed by non-defense government managers. turn-critical goods and service for the federal government. i can describe many impacts on dod but it is not possible to devise a plan to implement it, somehow eliminates these consequences or mitigate them substantially. the intent of sequester was to use the threat of mutually agreeable cuts to defense and nondefense programs implemented inflexibly and mindlessly forced congress to enact a compromise deficit reduction plan. never designed to be implemented. sequestration if it were allowed to happen would introduce sins was chaos into the management of every single one of 2,500 defense investment programs. waste in the defense spending at

the very time we need to be especially careful with the taxpayers' dollar, inefficiency in the defense industry that supports us, and would cause lasting disruptions even if only extended for one year. sequestration in fiscal year 2013 would seriously disrupt our forces and our programs. over the longer term the lower spending caps in fiscal 2014 through fiscal 21 would require that we substantially modify and scale back the new defense strategy that the dod leadership under guidance of the president so carefully developed a few months ago. sequestration is triggered its impacts would be devastating for defense. given the recent announcement the president will exempt military personnel funding from sequestration.

the rest of the cuts will be 10%. under sequestration rules the same percentage cuts apply individually to thousands of defense programs one by one. overseas contingency operations would be subject to sequestration. supporting our war fighters in combat is our highest priority. we would therefore endeavor to protect wartime operating budget as much as possible including the key operation and maintenance accounts. this is possible to do because the accounts contain oco and base budget funding. these two categories merge together during execution of the dod budget. we could therefore reduce the base budget fortunes of 0 n.m.

and spare the oco portions and we could take similar steps as needed in other accounts that include oco funding. specially in the army and the marine corps this action would lead to correspondingly much larger impact on base budget 0 and am and readiness of those services. we would seek to minimize the effect on readiness of units deployed in the near-term but we could probably not do so fully. as a result some later deploying units including some deploying to afghanistan could receive less training especially in the army and the marine corps. under certain circumstances reduced training could also impact the readiness of other units to respond to new contingencies should they occur. sequestration will also affect training and other services, the

navy and the air force as well. next, sequestration would force be cody and other government agencies to reduce funding for civilian personnel. we would probably have to release temporary employees and imposed a partial hiring freeze. we might also have to impose unpaid furloughs on civilian personnel. you can imagine the effect on the output not to mention the more our of these defense employees who conduct so many departments of central support functions from repairing weapons to conducting needed oversight and audits. military families and retirees would be adversely affected by sequestration. for example we could be forced to cut back and base support services, facility maintenance and maintenance of government-owned family housing. >> we have to be really clear

about the very many ways that we alone ourselves and the we own our history and the we make decisions that our history is phenomenally personal vital and special. >> former president of bennett college julie in malmo comments on politics and african-american economic history. this sunday your questions, call legal e-mails and tweets for the author of surviving and thriving 355 fact in black economic history. in depth live at noon eastern on c-span2's booktv. >> an independent report on the fort hood shootings found the fbi poorly handled intelligence related to accused shooter nidal malik hasan. hasan is awaiting a military court martial set to begin mark 20th. mark guiliano of the fbi national security branch testified before the house appropriations subcommittee that

the shooting was preceded by pour information sharing with the military and disagreements between field officers. this hearing is 2 hours and 10 minutes. >> i just want to thank the men and women of the fbi who have done an outstanding job in so many areas and the purpose of the hearing is to do what we can to make sure we prevent this from ever taking -- i am disappointed director george miller could not be here. this would be inappropriate hearing for him to be here but the hearing on the final report of the william webster commission on counterterrorism and intelligence and events of fort hood, texas. i want to welcome the witness, mark guiliano, director of national security. thank you for your service to the country. november 5th, 2009, the united

states army maj nidal malik hasan entered the fort hood center carrying two pistols. he shouted got a great and killed 13 people and as we go through the hearing we should remember 13 people were killed. and injured 42 others. hasan is awaiting military trial for 13 counts of premeditated murder and 32 counts of attempted murder. the webster commission report was issued publicly on july 19th. the report includes extensive factual findings on the fbi counterterrorism authority program assistance as well as specific fbi investigation of anwar al-awlaki in the assessment of nidal malik hasan. this analyzes the bureau's actions engaging recommendations for policy, procedural and other actions which after reading the report i am concerned there were warning signs and a more aggressive investigation there's

a chance that this incident could have been prevented and further concern the reason for less aggressive investigation may have been political sensitivities in washington funeral office and may be in the fbi investigating guidelines. active duty member of the military communicating with a recruiter should have been taken more seriously than it was. the report shows the san diego field office believe that the time that the unusual reaction to how it was handled by the washington funeral so they believed at that time. the commission found the decision not to interview hasan was flawed the fbi got land and culture made this the path of least resistance. the webster commission makes no recommendations to changing the domestic investigations and operations guide but if these guidelines were followed in this case and failed to prevent these

deaths and injuries it may be worthwhile to question whether the guidelines themselves are a problem. we want to understand what took place and to ensure agents are empowered to prevent similar attacks in the future. i also have questions based on a report's findings and recommendations and what steps have been taken and will be taken to improve counterterrorism assessment and investigations. several of these recommendations have resource implications which we will want to consider in terms of f y 13. in the interim during the month of august the fbi came to meet with staff on both sides as putting together the so-called c r and what ramifications are, and you should have staff meet with staff on both sides as we worked on at. i am concerned the fbi may not have provided and this is important, concern the fbi may

not have provided the commission with a full accounting of its prior interactions with anwar al-awlaki including his return to the u.s. in october of 2002 when the fbi dropped an outstanding warrant for his arrest. imagine if it had not been dropped. it would not be good if the fbi had not communicated to judge webster the full accounting of al-awlaki's prior whereabouts. i want to recognize minority member faahtah mr.. >> i thank the chairman for today's hearing. we have had an opportunity in a classified session to take in this information and a chance for transparency purposes this hearing is very useful.

i want to say that that i'd -- i thank the chairman for doing this. and appropriate oversight given the issues related to fast and furious i want to make it clear at least in my view is that none of our work should be in terms of criticizing law-enforcement. whar enforcement officials are doing an extraordinary job under difficult circumstances and it is easy to go back and look at these things and we should see how we can create better policies going forward but to take people who are risking their of lives on behalf of the country and breaking them over the coals i don't think is the right way to go and i know the chairman whose father was a policeman has great appreciation

for law enforcement. i think that the issues here in terms of what we ought to do going forward are well represented in the 18 recommendations for at the commission has laid out. as we did looking at the oklahoma bombing or what we have done with the situation in denver when there are these horrific incidents we have to take a look and make sure we're doing everything we can do. there's very little ability to figure out exactly what an individual is up to and all circumstances. the commission under the webster commission for doing the work that is done the chairman is correct to say that obviously we do need to look at how we

prioritize weeks and this question between discretionary leads and some discussion about the fact that the policy has been changed but i want to welcome you to the hearing and thank you for the work you do each and every day and protect the united states of america and its citizens and the great work since 9/11 to deal with this focus to by first, second or third which is a different type of work because you try to prevent the incidents versus get the bad guy. thank you, welcome and look forward to your testimony. >> you may proceed. >> thank you. good morning. members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

following the events in fort hood the fbi director ordered an immediate internal review of what the fbi knew about major hasan knew about and several shortcomings in internal policies and procedures and training we started to take corrective action almost immediately. the director also recognized the need for a broader and more in depth and independent review on how the fbi handled counterterrorism intelligence before the fort hood shootings. the director asked former director judge william webster to form a commission to conduct that review. judge webster completed the commission report and that report has been available. the webster commission had full access to fbi holdings and conducted 100 formal and informal meetings and more than

10,000 fbi documents. the commission also consulted outside experts on counterterrorism, intelligence operations, information technology and violent extremism. the commission found a number of short shot she -- shortcomings in fbi policies and technology and training and 18 recommendations for corrective action. there are limits to what can be discussed in an open hearing end there was an ongoing criminal prosecution and many aspects of information related to this matter remain classified. we did provide full classified briefing and we will answer as many questions as we can in this open setting. let me summarize commission findings and recommendations and review the corrective actions taken by the fbi already. the committee recommendations fall generally in four distinct categories. one was information sharing, operational policies, information technology and training and i will discuss very

shortly each one starting with information sharing. the commission found more information could have and should have been shared with the military at the headquarters level from the fbi headquarters to the pentagon. internal review came to the same conclusion and within weeks the fbi and the department of defense created -- sorry. created new information sharing agreements regarding counterterrorism investigations of military personnel. this agreement made sure senior pentagon officials and department of defense task force officers around the country were aware of all fbi cases involving the military. working closely on these matters we have clear policies in place to make sure information sharing continues. turning to operational policy, the commission recommended there be clear policies covering all counterterrorism and for resolving disputes as relates to those leads. we will get into that more as

questions come up. fbi internal review found similar issues with policies. as a result the fbi has sets new time limits on reenforcing existing policies on who owns the leads and responsibility for every one of those leads and provided additional guidance to make clear that any disputes between members must be pushed up to the supervisor level in the field office and at headquarters. the fbi has provided enhanced analytical investigative resources for strategically significant investigations to make sure all proper steps are taken and there is additional oversight. ..

we have since instituted a 90 mandatory training course for all jttf participant. there are additional detailed recommendations not in these categories are we publicly responded to each on our website. as you know and as was stated on a daily basis the fbi and its partners on jttf across the u.s. and, indeed, across the globe must identify, respond to indicate counterterrorism threats. we do this in an ever-changing and a complex and private. in recent years we have been able to successfully disrupt dozen's of terrorist plots. we also know that the threat never wanes and we cannot overlook a single lead.

at the fbi we accept this responsibility every day. we are committed to improving our capabilities to protect this great nation, now and in future. and without, i am ready for your questions. >> thank you, you very much. congressman carter came in and i ask unanimous consent he is a member of the full committee but not the subcommittee that he be up to set since fort hood was in his district. without any objection. the first question, the reason that hasan first comes to anyone's attention is his initiation of contact with anwar al-awlaki. it becomes her important to understand that the fbi thought awlaki to be. and understand what the government knew about him at the time. according to the report awlaki was under full investigation by the washington field office, w. f. o., starting them in 2001. while the report mentions awlaki moved inland in the spring of 2002 it does not mention his

return to the u.s. in april october 2002 with the ousting award for his arrest was inexplicably withdrawn by the washington field office. why was this return to do is not referenced in the report, and why was the work with drug if awlaki was in a full investigation by wf at the time? >> a good question. so to issues of litigation. awlaki did return in 2002. there was a diplomatic security service, dss warrant out for them. we knew awlaki was coming back. we had information he was coming back, and colorado u.s. attorney's office look at the war, looked at the factual basis for the warrant. it was not fbi warned and it was dismissed simply because they did not feel they have the ability to prosecute awlaki for the alleged passport fraud.

so it was not an fbi warrant. certainly if we felt that warrant was good and it was a way we could have incarcerated on where awlaki, -- could have incarcerated anwar al-awlaki, we would have. that was a state department war. the as is is a normal course. the u.s. attorney's office will look at it weren't especially when someone is coming back into the country to see if process can be serve. they determined it was not enough evidence to prosecute him on the passport fraud case. >> it was very unusual at the time it was early in the morning, and there's more that i think is obvious, but why was the return to the u.s. not referenced in the report? did judge webster no? was he told of awlaki's return? >> yes, sir. the commission had full access to all of awlaki's information. i don't know why it wasn't referenced other than the fact it was not an fbi warrant and we did not ask for it to be

dismissed. >> you are confident in judge webster new of awlaki's return and the fbi told him of that return? >> i'm confident yet all the documentation on awlaki that would've referenced it. >> okay. if awlaki was under a full investigation from approximately 2001-2003, why was awlaki approved by judy security to speak at the pentagon? >> sir, i can't speak for dod. i can't answer that question. >> what was the fbi's understanding of the relationship between awlaki in the 97 hijackers in january 2009? >> so again, sir, great question. as you know, after 9/11 awlaki came up both in the commission report and there was allocations that awlaki have supported some of the 9/11 hijackers, extensive investigation done by the bureau and the rest of the intelligence community to try to determine

whether awlaki had anything to do with 9/11. as you know, awlaki early on was the imam of a mosque in san diego, where two of the 9/11 hijackers went and in subsequent transfer from there to a mosque in falls church, virginia, where akin to of the 9/11 hijackers went. we interviewed awlaki after 9/11 on three separate occasions but he identified one of the 9/11 hijackers of somebody he knew as to go into his mosque. we were never able to obtain a stitch of evidence that showed awlaki knew beforehand about 9/11 or supported the 9/11 hijackers. >> based on history do you think that's still a curate -- still after a? >> i do. >> in awlaki meet with the 9/11 hijackers in san diego? >> i don't -- i can't -- let me step back. so awlaki was the imam of a

mosque in san diego where we know two of the 9/11 hijackers went. when we question the awlaki, awlaki admitted that one of the 9/11 hijackers went to his mosque. he knew him tangentially. identified him and gave us a description of his activities, but we were never able to substantiate any of the information that stated a awlaki sport in any shape or form any of the nine 9/11 hijacking. >> is awlaki connected, and the report comes in, and the connection of anybody communication with them i think would have been allowed, it would've said something is wrong here. the same element security commission issued a report, senators lieberman and collins issued a statement praising the webster report. however, they also stated that quote, we are concerned that the report fails to address the specific cause for the fort hood

attack, which is violent acts from it -- he agreed violent extremism was specific or was the cause of the fort hood attack? >> sir, i can't say specifically what was in -- >> do you believe it played any role at all? >> i can't. he's getting ready go to trial. i can't comment on what role in what was in his mind when he made that determination. clearly on what awlaki was an individual who was well known in the community. he was a propagandist at that point, back in the time. we know from some of the e-mails hasan looked at him in his own words as a leader and an activist, but i can't, i can't get into mr. hasan's head. >> have there been specific changes in the way the fbi approaches and response

particularly to the domestic islamic extremist, threats that a person based on lessons learned from fort hood? >> yes, sir. there's been a number of changes made, starting with radicalization. and this comes out of the senate committee report, and we have met the various lowest levels to include our new agents added, class designed radicalization. so with the early stages our agents are looking for and no deradicalization at the radicalization for mobilization, it is in all our basic courses for our joint terrorism task force and are advanced forces. there's more training on radicalization from the standpoint of understanding an individual like awlaki, one of the things the report kind of pulled out and threaded out is that when somebody is moving from maybe a propaganda to at some point being operational, where we saw awlaki collated, there needs to be not just field

office eyes on what we are recovering, like the e-mails are there also needs to be additional look from the headquarters level, and maybe even from the community, from some of the inner agencies so that we make sure there is a full, a fuller picture of someone like awlaki and those that have incoming contact with him. >> there seems to be a significantly different view of assange relationship with awlaki between san diego and the washington field office. what was the fbi's assessment of awlaki as of december 17, 2008? and when hasan contacted awlaki through his website. >> again, sir, it's a good question. it's an interesting question, so as you know we looked at awlaki for a number of years. in that timeframe in '06-'07 awlaki's incarcerated in yemen so we actually interviewed him while he was in jail.

as he gets out at the end of '07, the beginning of '08, he comes online again very quickly with his website, and walks a very careful line, i think, between what he puts on his website and his e-mails. the interagency come the intelligence community, begins to look at awlaki. we look at awlaki to determine whether he has become a operational. we don't see that at that point so when the snapshot of time of '08, early '09, we are just looking at him. he appears to be a propagandist. there's information that he is starting to get involved with individuals who are related to a.q., but our understanding at the time is that he is an individual who was born in the u.s., spent time in yemen, was educated in the u.s., for many people he was considered an individual who they went to for

advice for, on his website. but we also know he was becoming more radical at the time. so when the snapshot of time, that's kind of the look that we had. >> how many people were radicalized by him? who were some of the people that we know about who were radicalized by awlaki? >> there are a number of other investigations that we have had and had where we know that they are listening to awlaki, sermons online. again, to say that that is the one note that radicalized him, without a doubt he was part of the radicalization process. individuals like chester and others. >> to chester ever -- >> i can recall that but i know he looked at awlaki spent how many other state in the category speak with our number of others. i don't know the exact -- >> which is with them for the record at this point you believe were part like chester that were radicalized because if i could go back and look at our notes,

yes or i can. >> get prior investigations shape the fbi's understanding or misunderstand of the threat he opposed? >> sir, i think that if you look at, you referenced it, believe it came out of san diego, they felt that they had come and i feel that they had an accurate reflection of what awlaki was at that time, at that snapshot of time. >> coming of the u.s. government or military employees were found to have contracted awlaki during this period? have these individuals now been fully investigated? did any hold security clearances as hasan did? and i would like to show, the staff to show with members of the committee an npr story last month that indicated that the fbi has conducted more than 100 investigations. how would you assess the threat and tell us what you're doing about it. is that accurate, the npr

report? >> i can't -- exact numbers classifieds i can't talk about the setting the icann in another setting. >> you can tell us that. >> i will. it is something that we look at their very carefully. there are many investigations that we are running jointly with the department of defense right now. to get to your point, we know who. we believe we know who has been in contact with awlaki, or at least potentially, is listening or has listened to awlaki. sermons, et cetera, and i believe we do have been well covered. >> okay. if you were to tell us, we could get that from you. the e-mails show in the report between hasan and awlaki are troubling and very first e-mail assigned raises the question of religious dutch justification for muscles and u.s. armed forces killing of u.s. forces to keep raises awlaki's religious understanding and asking for a reply. it is hard for me to understand

the context of what such an exchange was found to be benign without any significant assessment or investigation. does that seem unusual to you? >> sir, i think as you know there's a couple issues here, and it's where the commission found that we certainly fell short. so the two e-mails, that is one where hasan is asking awlaki to make some general comments about muslims in the military. i quote that from his e-mail number one, and then the second e-mail which is pushed forward, san diego pushes that lead to the washington field office and says while the e-mails may seem somewhat innate, if he should be in the military, that should concern you. that's the way to lead us forward. for a couple of things occur. the addition e-mails that the field office agent was not privy

to. so he looked at these two e-mails. he did a couple of things. i think rightfully invited from. he went to his dod counterpart so that the task force age in the washington field office is from the department of defense. he does a database search on hasan on his e-mail, on astronomers to see if he is tied into any other terrorist group or somebody that we have under investigation. but then he goes to duty and asks them to provide him the report on. so he goes to his online files. so he goes retrieves 30 files from dod. he also retrieved his defense employee interactive data system, and retreated -- retreat about five or six of his we sent performance appraisals. so the agent does the checks,

finds nothing else unusual about hasan. finds out he is an active duty military, that within that timeframe, within that month of may have been promoted from captain to major. the other thing that he found unusual is that he held a secret security clearance, and that the time was doing his masters degree, getting his masters degree, his e&p a, specifically talking about what it was like to be a muslim in the military, and the conflict that occurred there. so when you look at, and the department of defense record lots him dashing record lots him for his research there is think it is cutting edge and it is looked at by his peers as cutting-edge research. so from his standpoint where he sits in that time can he is looking at an individual who holds secret city cliffs, who was recently promoted from captain to major, who was not

trying to hide his identification in any way, shape, or form from the sun. in fact, i mean from awlaki. he goes to his website, so the contact is out of the awlaki's website, not a personal two-person e-mail address, and believes where he is sitting that he is in line with the research he is doing from where he sits. all his performance appraisals are positive. they state that he should be promoted, and he doesn't want to take a chance to move forward at that time and potentially risk the fact that awlaki is under investigation. so again, a snapshot in time, easy to go back and second-guess that dod task force officer. and again, i'm not making excuses. i'm trying to put in context of what he had available to him at the time when he made that decision. >> i have a few more questions.

didn't follow the approved guideline, delineated in the domestic investigations of operation guidelines? and if so, does that indicate a problem with the dialogue in that it discourages aggressive pursuit of terrorism leads? sure the dialogue be changed to encourage or investigation of fleets? and when the dialogue was adopted, and how does it differ from previous guidelines? and then want to ask you something. were outside groups involved in the development of dialogue? >> sir, i don't think the. i think i was an internal -- >> was care ever inquired and asked to speak of comment? >> yes, sir. >> when it was adopted how does it differ from previous guidelines? and do you believe, should it be changed to encourage more investigation leads based on the circumstances in the webster report you mention?

it is mentioned in the webster report spent okay, so just i will try get all your points here. so the first question, did the agents while the dialogue was written at the time, and edge is that they did. >> so if they did then, and agent followed that? does that mean the dialogue should be changed to encourage more investigation of leads? because somehow, as they did into this, if i say here's an individual who follows the guidelines, and the guidelines result in 13 people dead and numerous wounded and based on the guy like awlaki has been involved, he also radicalized a fellow from north carolina and many others, should the dialogue be changed? >> just a couple of things. we have changed a number thing since this occurred. so the time the lead was set as discretionary leave which gave the discretion to cover the lead and how the lead was covered to

the washington field office. that has been change. there are no longer discretionary leads. in the dialogue asked the agent to use the least intrusive methods possible so it gives us an escalation of our ability to utilize the tools that congress has given us to investigate those involved, potentially involving terrorism. and so what the dialogue basically states is that we need to use the least intrusive means mr. as we escalate the tools that are available to us. so in this case i think under those rules, the least intrusive, the agent felt with the databases it checked with the information that came out of the dod files come with the fact that hasan use his own name, didn't try to hide it, his recent promotion, that he had done everything he needed to do based on information he had. to answer your second question, dialogue, the way it's set right now gives us the tools to do what we need to do speak so you

don't think it has to be changed? >> i don't know, sir. i believe with the tools available to do what we need to do. i believe our investors are amongst the most -- not only in the country but in the world. this is the case when we look back and we armchair quarterbacking second-guess which mr. fattah had mentioned we need to do to make sure that we get better at what we do, i believe the tools are there. i believe the dialogue the way it is written gives us the ability to do. and i believe the fact that it requires us to use the least intrusive means to be able to escalate the tools that you have given us make sure that we are walking that fine balance between protecting civil liberties in this country, and making sure there isn't another 9/11. >> the report faulted the decision not to interview us on. washington field office feared that interview could jeopardize

the awlaki investigation, but the commission rejects this explanation. with a pretext interviews have been appropriate in this incidence and allowable under the diog? >> yes, sir, to both questions. washington field office also believe and if you did not -- however, simple records check was clearly not sufficient in this case to uncover the threat posed by a song. what further or could have been done to determine whether hasan was involved quote in terrorist activities? are you confident in a similar case today so we don't have another hearing two years from now, another year from now, we don't wake up any newspaper some morning and hear that in forthcoming you put the last inning, something like this has happened again. what further or could have been done to determine whether hasan was involved in terrorist activity, but most important, are you confident that is the fbi counter, is director more

confident, is the leadership confident that in a similar case they an agent would field empowered to pursue their instincts told them there was something of this, that it comes, mr. fattah said that becomes the whole thing. would we take the current diog, the current circumstances, and are you confident that any similar case that agent would feel empowered to we begin have another fort hood? >> sir, there's two prongs to the answer to that question, and i think first of all, the way the information sharing setup is now with the department of defense. so at the ground level, the fbi shared with the dod individuals on the task force the information it had. what did not occur and whether there was a clear lapse, is there was not headquartered to pentagon sharing of information. had that happen there's a possibility we would have seen

had dod look at hasan differently where he was. and that may have changed the complexity and the direction of the investigation. the second thing that has changed and we've reiterated his when there's a difference of opinion between a san diego and washington field office, it needs to be pushed up to management so that they will help steer that direction. and i think that, that potentially could have changed what happened. i don't think we will ever know whether and if he would've changed anything, but it certainly would have allowed us to get a better handle on what the fbi had and what the department of defense on the ground had, and understood. >> just on that point, why wasn't that done? why was it not been? >> why wasn't the pentagon -- >> why did it not quote the higher authority? >> sir, that's a great question and i don't have a good answer

for that. it happens every single day. where there are disagreements on the complexity or the tenure or tone of how we conduct an investigation. they are pushed up to management. they are pushed up to headquarters. headquarters is involved, and in this case, the dod -- spent is this the san diego office? >> that's correct, sir. >> was a lack of aggressiveness on their part? >> sir, i think san diego actually felt that the washington field office should have done more. they felt they needed to be more aggressive. what did not occur and what should have occurred is it did not get pushed up the san diego chain of command, which i think would've pushed it up to headquarters where we would have stepped back and most likely said we want an interview to be conducted. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> my last question before i go to mr. fattah. the final phone call between san

diego, i urge members to read the report, too. i commend the bureau. i think the public report almost has as much information as you need without the classified one. the final phone call between san diego and washington field office included an exchange about anything muslims who visit extremist websites as a politically sensitive subject for wfo. the conversation was said to have included the comments quote, washington is not san diego. what does that mean to you? was political correctness a reason why this lead was not aggressively pursued? if so, what has been done to prevent a recurrence of this? and i, i periodically have a number of fbi agents come up to me, as you know my district is in northern virginia, will tell me they believe there is a political correctness encroaching into the department of justice and into the department of interior, and justice and fbi, and it was said, let me just say, this is a bipartisan thing.

it was said the same thing with regard to the final years of the bush administration. so the question is what does that mean to you, washington is not san diego? >> so, i'm aware of the comments that you're making, sir, in the report. the report did not find political correctness wasn't any way, shape, or form responsible for his lack of going forward with the interview. and that is a snapshot of a conversation that took place. the agent on the receiving end does not recall the conversation, so it's very hard for me to get into the minds of the one agent that did it. i personally do not believe political correctness had anything to do with this determination. i laid out the facts the way the agent did in the washington field office, what he used to make those decisions. again, it's easy to go back and second-guess. i believe an interview would have been prudent in this case, but i don't believe political

correctness nor the does this report with political correctness was a reason for that. >> sometime during the recess i would like to have the opportunity to speak to the washington field office people who were involved. i'll just do it alone. i just want to ask them, because my sense is, and i'm making this official request to meet with them. we don't really need anybody else there, but i really want to know, and lastly as a go to mr. fattah, i want to make sure this never ever happens again. no lead is not pursued because of fear that your career will be ruined because you do something that may very well save peoples lives. mr. fattah. >> thank you. and let me thank the chairman. and we try cover some, a number of pieces of this puzzle but right after 9/11 the house health and hearings and we're former speaker newt gingrich was testifying, and i asked him a

question. at that point, you know, was about how far we need to go to prevent, you know, future 9/11's. and so, and i am reminded -- i reminded the speaker we criticize countries like china for, yeah, locking people up without charges, not having access to lawyers and so forth and so what. and what was really, where was the rule of law relative to these kinds of new challenges. ..

>> it's pretty clear in the constitution that those things are protected. and then there's a set of actions that are of concern. now, this question of radicalization is not new in the military. there have been any number of groups that the finishing bi's had -- fbi's had to be concerned about. attempting to get members trained in the military or to radicalize present members of the military. and this has nothing to do with any, you know, particular set of dynamics. this is a concern ongoing. and i thought that congressman -- [inaudible] was interested in this question. the issue with dod and fbi and

the issues of coordination is something we may want to structurally look at a little bit better because, you know, maybe we need to try to create a process in which the fbi could be, have greater access and maybe even some joint alignment with some of the investigatory units inside dod. i was out at the terrorist screening center in virginia, and the agencies seemed to be working very well together. and the agencies seemed to be working very well together and, obviously, a lot of good work has taken place. but we do need to be mindful as we go forward that you have constitutional proo -- prohibitions or constitutional protections depending on how one might want to view it. i view it that it is our

absolute responsibility to uphold the constitution and that each of the agency of our government have that responsibility. so when we determine political political -- [inaudible] it gives it a certain, you know, i think it cheapens the issue. we have a responsibility to follow these rules, and we also have a responsibility to try to create as safe an environment as possible. so i want to go to what the bill's response is to these recommendations. now, they've been made in a number of different categorieses, and if you could take the time in this hearing, which this hearing is about these recommendations and how we're going to go forward and respond to the recommendations, i would appreciate it. >> okay, thank you, sir. i'd just make a couple comments if it's prudent regarding our relationship with the department of except and how -- defense and how it's integrated.

they have increased the number of their personnel in our jttfs throughout the country, and the kind of node that we coordinate all these investigations now occurs at the national joint terrorism task force where the deputy is a member of the department of defense. so that deputy is a dod person. he sees every investigation, um, that touches the military immediately and then, um, is the belly button that pushes that over to the pentagon. so i think that process, that formal process that you spoke about is in place, and i'd be glad to talk to you more about that offline. so let's -- we'll kind of go through the recommendations and kind of what was done. and one of the recommendations surrounded training, and one of the concerns was that there was not enough training done to our jttf personnel, especially as it related to the number of databases that the bureau has

and where collection is stored. we recognize that immediately after 9/11 and bought some 3,000 plus task force officers to be trained on all our databases. we -- and the director asked us to look even further at training and be to step back and assess whether the training we were giving to our jttfs as a whole was up to speed, whether it had changed enough with the change in the threat. so we went back and looked at that and changed the way we do training as a whole for our jttf personnel. and there were a number of online courses they took before they came on, then there was regional training that was mandatory. but now that training has been all moved to quantico, and it has gone from a couple of days to a nine-day, mandatory basic training -- >> now, this is training so that people, this new system -- and the chairman has led the way,

and we've invested tens of millions of dollars in this system -- this is the trainer 3,000 on in this new system that accesses all of the databases? >> that's right. so the process will continue as sentinel now is online, the training for that will continue. some of the new software we have been able to purchase, again, at the behest of the committee, um, to help us do a better job analyzing data, um, is also being pushed out and being trained. the ore issues go to -- the other issues go to your earlier comments and to mr. dick's comments also, just about the lead being covered, how it was being covered and disagreements and how those were taking place. there was a number of policy issues around those identified and have subsequently been changed. it took too long in both our opinion and the opinion of the other committees to cover the lead to begin with. so we have changed policy there that, again, reiterates and

requires leads to be cover inside a shorter time period and duration. >> but in plain english, this lead came as a discretionary lead, we've eliminated that -- >> that's right. >> there's no discretionary lead, and there's a timeline to follow up on all leads from now on? >> that's correct, sir. discretionary leads were discontinued immediately. the timeline for those leads for the routine leads was tightened up. the other thing that's changed, we have reiterate inside a number of venues, but we've changed the policy on -- the policy always existed, we have written policy on where there is disagreements in the leads and needs to be pushed up to the supervisor in the office and then to the appropriate oversight group at headquarters. but i think the other point there going back to mr. dick's comment is that we have also looked at other cases like awlaki's and decided not only do the leads need to be covered more closely, but they need

another group to oversee them. so there are now robust groups back at headquarters that looks at individuals like awlaki to make sure there is nothing miss inside those leads as they go out. the other thing that was highlighted, and i think rightfully so, in the committee -- or in the commission report was the i.t. system that was being used to look at the e-mails. it required the case agents to go back and the analysts to go back every time there was a new e-mail to search it and see what other e-mails were in the queue. that was fine for the way we used to do business, but on an individual like awlaki, that system was not up to par for what it needed to be. now the systems have been changed so that if there is an e-mail of interest where the court authorizes us to look at or we're able to get those e-mails, the system automatically threads, um, all those e-mails together, and it also tips the case agents or the

analysts when a lead has been set as it relates to that specific e-mail address. so the point is that some of those other e-mails that were not pushed to the washington field office would have been teed up by the system automatically, put into a queue so they can look at 'em as a whole and maybe make a more informed decision. >> well, but -- and that's, just to drill down in this in english, go back to the first point, when we have an awlaki situation. the point is, that change cans, and we went through some of this in the classified briefing, but there have been significant changing to the way the pruning of the information or the way it's looked at in total so that you're putting the e-mail from a hassan together with -- >> that's correct. the system will allow all those e-mails to be dropped in one bucket and be looked at in total. >> now, the commission

recommendation on this working through challenges relative to control of determination on leads, right now you said that's going to be bumped upstairs so that anytime there's a dispute between two field agents, field locations it won't be just settled through, like, muddling through or doing nothing, you know? someone will have to make a decision. >> that's right, sir. so, and that occurs and has occurred every day. what we found when we went back even though it was the standard operating procedure, there was not clear cut policy that kind of set that out. so that is what has changed there. >> [inaudible] any of these relations that the bureau does not agree with of the 18? >> sir, there is none that we do not agree with. the only one that we are, continue to wrestle with is

their assessment that this lead should not have gone to somebody from the department of defense, rather it should have gone to somebody, somebody other than somebody from their home agency. our experience is and my experience in running a jttf is that when you push a lead to somebody from that home agency, they are in the best position to understand the nuances of that agency, how to cut through the red tape, how to get the information, how to cover the leads. and in most cases they are investigators who are from their agencies who have an exper teas in -- expertise in investigation. so we're still trying to find that sweet spot between that recommendation and how we make sure there is more oversight from the fbi. >> well, and we've had this discussion before, and i'll conclude my questions on this point which is that, you know, at some point this became, you

know, became a subjective matter. so you can look at the employee file, and you can see the top secret clearance, you can see the recent promotion. and one could have saw that as a reason to be more concerned, and one could have saw that as some type of information to say, well, there's no reason to be concerned. some of it has to do with, you know, one's kind of view of, you know, the responsibility. so we, when we get to, you know, maybe ordinary what might be potential criminal activity, that's one judgment call. when the judgment call is about saving lives, then that's where the fbi's post-9/11 role f you would, in which pushing the envelope -- and i know you personally agree there should have been the face-to-face

interview. not to say that hasan may not have been able to get through that interview in a way that would have alleviated people's concerns, but there should have at least been eyes and a talk directly with him because you really weren't trying to track down, you know, bank fraud or some other, you know, unrelated matter. the issue here really was whether or not there was something more nefarious afoot relative to a potentiality that wasn't necessarily based on some rational, you know, criminal enterprise. so i thank you for your service to -- >> yield just briefly? >> yes. >> apparently that came in december of 2008, his first one laid out a question: what would al-awlaki think of muslims who have joined the military and

have even killed or tried to kill other u.s. soldiers? that seems pretty stark to me. >> yes, yes, sir. >> i don't know how you use that he's doing a master's degree or something to justify not looking into that. >> sir, i don't disagree. as you go to the next line, it says can you make some general comments about muslims in the u.s. military. would you consider somebody like alaska -- act bar or all those soldiers fighting jihad and if they did, what would it mean to you? agreed, when you look at it in its context, exactly how it is, it is startling. the problem is if you put yourself back into the agents' position at the time and you look at this e-mail with what he is looking at on the performance appraisal where it states, and i

quote: says he's going for his master's of public health, hassan has outstanding moral integrity and concern, he took on a challenging topic for his mph. the project regarding military service during the global war on terror. so without any question while it sits by itself, i concur with you 100%. when you look at it from this aspect, it changes the dynamics a bit. again, i'm not here to -- >> well, you know, so many times in the history of this country we have information and didn't act on it. i mean, people going to flight schools to learn how to take an airplane off but not land it, and that was sent to the fbi. and nobody acts on it. i mean, at some point you've got to have some instinct, some gut instinct that something is not right here and to follow

through. pearl harbor could have been avoided. i mean, all of these things we had -- what's always so frustrating as you look back and 20/20 hindsight, what's so frustrating is we had the information. we knew in this guy, that this guy had a relationship withal al-awlaki, and we didn't act. and that's what's, that's what frustrates me. thank you for yielding. >> thank thank you. mr. culberson? is. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i could not agree more with mr. dicks statement and really appreciate chairman wolf having this hearing today. and i want to thank you, mr. giuliano, for your service. we -- all of us admire the fbi and work that you do. it's important, though, that we all, as mr. dicks has said and the chairman has said, learn from this, and it is distressing

to see -- as mr. dicks has said -- the one sentence looking at that december 2008 e-mail, looking at that one sentence, you don't really feed the context. the statement itself is a real concern. and i wonder if i could zero in on the question that chairman wolf asked in a hitting more de-- in this a little more detail if i could, sir. when the washington field office had assumed because they were the recipient, i understand it's a standard practice at the fbi that the washington field office in this case looking at page 46 of the report, that the washington field office owned the hassan lead and bore ultimate responsibility for its outcome because it had been referred to the washington field office by the san diego office,

and the san diego office was not satisfied with the washington field office's response. the san diego agent, i believe the assessment was slim and was concerned enough that for the first time in his career i see that the sand san diego officer followed up with the washington field office to pursue this because they couldn't -- the san diego office could not understand why the washington field office would not pursue this leeld -- leeld and actually go out and interview this guy. and i see from the report that the fbi had a policy, and i don't know whether you still do or not, of pursuing an investigation in the least intrusive, using the least intrusive means necessary. is that correct? >> that's correct, sir. >> and that in this case the least intrusive that the washington field office decided that the least intrusive means necessary was, essentially, to

do the, a check of the records and not conduct the interview because they were, the washington field office was concerned it might affect major hassan's military career? >> so -- >> it was one of the factors. >> that's correct, sir. so that was as you, as the webster commission talked to the agents, as he laid out all the reasons he felt an interview wasn't germane at the time, that was one of the comments. i do want to make a comment about least intrusive. least intrusive has never meant not aggressive. i will tell you, and i can't talk about it in this setting, but the investigations that we have across the nation and the world are extremely, extremely aggressive. this was a judgment call. and, unfortunately, we make these judgment calls every single day, and we have to be right every single time. it, as you look through it an

interview would have been prudent in this time. it's hard to tell whether it would have changed things, but the fact that the least intrusive means, and this is just a way to insure that we use the tools that congress has given us in a way that they are ratcheted up appropriately. and that is the purpose of that. that should not have and does not mean that we cannot conduct interviews -- >> sure. but you in this case the assessment was made by the washington field office that it would be, it would perhaps endanger major hassan's career. >> that was one of the statements made. >> okay. and as mr. dicks just pointed out quite correctly, just look at the december 17, 2008, e-mail the major hasan asked the question that there's -- i'm looking for it in here -- that

some appear to have internal conflicts or may or may not have killed u.s. soldiers. clearly he's asking a question to al-awlaki. if a muslim in the u.s. military tries to kill soldiers, is that a problem? is that something that, you know, muslim faith would -- what would the muslim, you know, how would awlaki look at that from the perspective of the muslim faith? if major hasan had been -- what if that e-mail had come from a senior fbi officer? >> sir, i think it would have raised the same concern from san diego as it did with the individual being in the military. i think the difference here is when you have a guy like hasan who is doing research on that very issue, so it goes on to say

can you make some general comments about muslims in the u.s. military, i think it puts it in a different context. again, i'm not here to make any excuses as to whether that interview was conducted or not, but it just puts it in a slightly different context. >> yes, sir. no, i understand. what if, for example, what i'm driving at is another point. if the e-mail had been sent by a senior officer in the dea or department of homeland security or border patrol or some senior law enforcement office, some senior officer in the law enforcement community of the united states had sent that e-mail to a maniac like awe lack kick, what would have been the response -- awlaki, what would have been the response in the fbi? similar set of circumstances, but hasan is in the law enforcement community. >> so two things. awlaki, i think it's important to remember that awlaki then was not the awlaki now.

awlaki had thousands of people writing to his web site asking for legitimate islamic advice. so it's a slightly different awlaki back then. that's number one. number two, if the dea or fbi agent had been writing a thesis that was similar to what hasan did, there may have been a different viewpoint. however, i think san diego would have looked at it with just as much alarm as they did when they sent this lead to the washington field office. >> all i'm asking you is to think about the same set of circumstances, but the guy's not in the u.s. army. he's a senior officer in the u.s. intelligence service or he's a law enforcement officer. it seems to me that the statement itself and the fact that the individual is working for the u.s. in the military or intelligence services or u.s. law enforcement, major hasan's position alone should have been

enough to require further action on this. >> sir, again, that's -- i think that's the do bait of the commission -- debate of the commission, and i don't deny that. >> have you changed the policy so that if you find somebody in a high-level position in the u.s. law enforcement community or the intelligence community or the u.s. military making inquiries like this, that it automatically kicks it up to a higher level of inquiry including a personal interview, automatically? >> sir, there are no automatics in what we do, sir, but what we have changed is if there was somebody in law enforcement or somebody in, say, department of homeland security where we saw something like this, it would come up to headquarters the same way now that is mandatory and an investigation of dod does, and ld go to the national joint terrorism task force, so that has changed. >> request i shouldn't have used the word -- i shouldn't have used the word "automatic."

you now have a procedure in place where it is reviewed by a senior-level official, and that's changed, an improvement. >> yes, sir, that's correct. >> so i shouldn't have used the word "automatic." what i'm driving at is regardless of whether or not this guy was in the military or not, you do you have policies in place now that would elevate the scrutiny of e-mail exchange like this if the individual is an officer in either the military or the u.s. law enforcement community? >> that's correct. so it's not just e-mail, sir, it goes a little further. if we have an investigation that is predicated on law enforcement on somebody who holds a secret security clearance, has is the access to military bases, so we've even broadened it wider than that. >> the chairman's always been very generous with the time, so i'll just close with this and do follow up when i come back.

talk to us about political sensitivity. you do have a reference in the report on page 60 that the washington field office indicated the subject is, quote, politically sensitive. what types of things are politically sensitive in inquiries of this type? >> so i'll go back to the comments made by mr. fatah. i don't believe political sensitivity had anything to do with the decisions that were made here. the commission found, i think, the same exact thing that there are sensitivities as it relates to first amendment, there are sensitivities as it relates to civil liberties and civil rights. and i think our job with the powers given to us by congress are to make sure that we keep this country safe while protecting civil liberties and civil rights. it is a fine balance -- >> yes, sir. >> -- every single day.

i don't believe political sensitivity played any part in his decision, sir. >> e know you do, sir, and god bless you all for what you do. we're deeply, deeply grateful for the fbi and all that you do. to your knowledge, do you have any memories about political sensitivity and whether or not it's politically sensitive or could be offensive to the muslim or islamic community to pursue -- without reference to a particular lead, but to what extent have you seen or heard discussions in the fbi or the doj about political sensitivity or insulting or offending the muslim community? >> so there's, there's very little talk about political sensitivity inside the bureau. the bureau is an apolitical organization, and we try to stay apolitical. there are sensitivities as it relates to training. there are sensitivities as it relates to first amendment and can civil liberties.

those are things that we always look at, always strive to find the right balance between both. and as you know, sometimes finding that balance is very difficult because there are strong advocates on both sides of the table. but i, where i sit in my position as the executive assistant director for national security, i am not concerned about political sensitivity in what we do to protect this nation. >> we're very proud of you and immensely supportive of the fbi. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i'm going to go to mr. carter, but i think, mr. giuliano, you're misleading or overstating something. there is nowhere -- i read the commission report twice, and i want you to tell me what page it says there's been no political correctness, no politicalcepstivity. the commission doesn't deal with it or against it, it's silent on it. so you have led us to believe that the commission just totally

said that's not a problem. would you tell me the page that i missed where it says that that is not a problem? >> no, sir. i think my point is that if you look at the reasons that the committee set forth as to why the interview was not conducted, um, it does not say that the -- their findings were it was because -- >> yeah, but nowhere does the commission -- >> correct. >> okay. you were incorrect. i just wanted the record to show that because you sort of -- also one other issue because i think you misled us in another way, probably inadvertently. you indicated the decision to drop the warrant was made by diplomatic security in the u.s. attorney's office, but it is my understanding that the washington field office agent was wade aberman who made the call to release awlaki. so the washington field office was conducting a full investigation of awlaki at that time and also aberman was

involved in the paintball case. do you remember that case? >> yes, sir, i do. >> and that person is in jail, i believe, for life, correct? >> i don't know that, sir. >> well, i think he is. you might want to check that out. and there are some inferences maybe awlaki was connected there. so when you answered the question, you sort of said that's not our game, that was diplomatic security. this was a washington agent of the fbi who called to say to drop the case, and he was the very agent who, apparently, is still with the fbi today and was the fbi agent on the paintball case. so, you know, again -- but those two things were sort of misleading, sort of like brush and bump and move. they were involved. this done at the request of an if, bi agent, correct or not correct? >> that's ip correct. an agent of the fbi cannot tell a prosecutor whether to drop a case or not, that's simply --

>> with to drop the warrant? >> to drop the warrant. >> he never called? was it a sunday morning or a tuesday morning? >> yes, sir, there was a dialogue between them as there always would be if a case agent has a case on somebody that is coming into the country, the system is triggered and set up so that there will be a call to that case agent. what time was that? >> i don't know what time it was. >> was it sunday? is. >> i don't -- >> was it early in the morning? >> i can't. >> i really want to get a letter on this, we may even subpoena the thing, but i think it's important. and the inference was the bureau had nothing to do with it when if there was a call from the fbi agent who had worked the paintball case, that has a bearing to a u.s. attorney, and my sense was it could have been very early in the morning when most offices are not even open in the federal government. i could be corrected. we're going to get this for the record. i think it was somewhere before

7:00 in the morning, perhaps on a day when the government was not operating. so i think it's been a little misleading. >> can we give the witness a chance to explain? >> sure, absolutely. >> so i disagree with that comment. no matter what time it was, an fbi agent does not have the power to tell a prosecutor whether to drop a case or not. the prosecutor makes that call based on the evidence that is at hand. and so if the prosecutor at the the time regardless of whether a call was made or not looked at that evidence and decided there was not enough to be able to arrest that individual as would be in any case that warrant would be p dropped. but i assure you the bureau if anything at that a point, if we could have incarcerated awlaki, we would have. >> well, we can go back and forth, so i'm going to go to mr. carter. the fbi agent could have said something else. >> i don't know -- >> and so with that, let me just, let me just go to

mr. carter. go ahead. mr. carter? >> i'd like to thank the chairman and mr. fattah for allowing me to participate in this hearing. identify got a little bit -- i've got a little bit different line of questioning because i have a constituency to answer to, and i've had a lot of questions that have been raisedment i want you to tell me what you think i should tell these people that ask me this question. we're talking about people who were killed, many of whom had been deployed two, three, four times fighting in the war against terror which until recently was the subject matter of why we went to war. it seems to have changed in this administration, but in the previous administration it was the war on terror. they went to fight the war on terror. they went to fight the war on terror that involved people of the islamic community.

now, we've got 'em coming to me and saying my husband went in harm's way for this country three times, or my son went in harm's way for this country four times. and he gets killed where he's stationed by a member of his own military who begins his shooting career as a murderer by shouting allahu akbar. and it gets investigated by the department of defense, and they find it was a work force violence incident. and nobody seems to even talk about is the war against terror even involved in this killing, but my husband's dead, or my son's dead after fighting for this country on numerous occasions. in the war against terror in the islam you can community. islamic community. and what i got from the defense

department was a whole series of places where excuses were made for why they didn't catch this. and they have a whole series of recommendations to change their procedures so that they can hopefully catch it next time. and then the agency, the law enforcement agency that at least historically in america in my lifetime americans have looked to for the highest and best investigative procedures in the world -- not in america, in the whole wide world -- at least in my generation anybody that said we need this investigated, who does the best, we would say the fbi. and this same person comes to me now and says from the law enforcement community, i get the

same story. yeah, mistakes were made, but really it's more excuses are being made as to why, quote, procedures didn't work. when did we stop having people who use their brain to investigate and start having people who use procedures to investigate? have we discovered that procedures written by bureaucrats actually operates better than somebody's common sense that says look at this, this looks like this guy's talking about shooting somebody? maybe we ought to look into this. what do i say so that woman -- say to that woman who's lost her husband or to that father who called me and lost his son and say who can i look to in my government that my son or my daughter has fought for that will stand up and say it's our job, it's our responsibility, we failed, and instead of making

excuses and coming up with new procedures? can you tell me what i say to them? sir, i don't think there's anything you can say to them that will take away the pain that they have suffered. and as i stated at in the beginning, i am not here to make excuses. we will not make excuses. they should and do turn to the fbi to do exactly what you said. and we have to be right every time, 100% of the time. and when we're not, the consequences are dire. so i make no excuses. our goal is to figure out what could have been done better. we strive to be better every single day. this entire commission report was commissioned by the director after the senate will have did their review, after we did our internal review to make sure that it never happens again. he is committed to it, i am committed to it, our department is committed to it. but i'm not here to make excuses. >> well, you just made a

statement that i'd like to know the answer to. the consequences will be dire. what are the dire consequences as a result of the failure of the fbi? >> so -- >> who got fired? who got changed, promoted, moved, whatever? i'd like to know what those situations were. >> okay. so the -- any action taken by the bureau the boss or the director has to be held until this report was done. this report has been pushed over to our inspection staff, and our inspection division which handles all reviews of how our individuals conducted themselves during the investigation. and can -- and once that is done, it will be pushed to the director for a determination of what action, if any, should be taken. >> what kind of time schedule are we looking at on that action? >> i would say between 60 and 90 days, sir. >> so i think i can tell those

people at least as far as the fbi's concerned there are dire consequences, that's your statement, that will come to the people who failed in this project. >> sir, if i can, if i can just reiterate, i said when we fail, there are dire consequences to the public. i do not and cannot -- >> to the public. oh, that's a different statement. you said, when we fail, there are dire consequences. of course, we know there are dire consequences. there's a bunch of dead people stacked up at ft. hood that are dire consequences. >> sir, that's exactly right. my statement was from where i sit, we have to be right 100% of the time, every day and every time. and if we are not, there are dire consequences. as you see at fort hood. what occurs here internally will be determined by our internal inspection process, and it will go to the boss once they conduct a review.

so i'm sorry if i misspoke there. >> well, that -- okay, then that's a good extra nation. maybe there won't be -- explanation. maybe there won't be dire consequences. i just think at some point in time we have to decide we're all protecting not only our rights, but we're protecting the rights of an awful lot of other people, and i don't have a problem with that. they've done that for most -- if not all of my life. but more and more i have people asking me who's, who's going to take responsibility for this instead of just telling us, oh, it's really not our responsibility, it's our procedures were bad? but if your procedures were bad and you wrote 'em, you're responsible. and so is the defense department. and both of you have gotten through this -- both reports, and you say there's no political correctness. but how do i explain to them that still we get no indication of of a man with a

heavily-loaded automatic who walks down shooting uniformed soldiers who have either been to war or are on the way to war? it's not a battlefield, it's not a war action. they're not entitled to the benefits of a soldier at war, and yet they're dead, or they're wounded, or they're shot in the brain, and they're having to rehabilitate themselves to just stay alive. all these things have happened to these people, and nobody's taken even defining the enemy. and i just don't understand b why the two, two of the most important agencies of this government still haven't defined what happened at fort hood. by even mentioning that islamic terrorism had anything to do with it. if it, if he yelled out jesus christ is god, would they have said christians were involved?

i mean, at what point does it get to be islamic terrorism? >> so i'll -- >> that's the simple question. just answer that one. >> okay. so there's a difference between somebody who is tied to a terrorist group, an islamic terrorist organization which we could not tie hasan to during our investigation and somebody who appears to have been radicalized by them. where the difficulty -- and, again, i'm not here to make excuses -- where the difficulty lies is where you have somebody like hasan or so many others who are listening to somebody like awlaki and trying to determine that difference between what is in their head, their radicalization and their subsequent mobilization. and that is just something we did not foresee, and, um, the question here is whether if we had moved forward and done an interview, would that have changed the facts?

>> well, you know, where -- once again, getting back to this wife or this father that contacted me, they would say, but wait a minute, all this stuff -- he was talking to this guy can awlaki -- isn't in the same guy that our president told us that he authorized a hit on because he was a terrorist, and we killed him with a drone? >> so again, sir -- >> it certainly is. but now we say hindsight's 20/20. >> there's no doubt that awlaki that met his demise recently was a different awlaki that we knew and understood back in this time. again, no excuses, but awlaki had not been involved that we could tell operationally at this point. doesn't change the facts, but he is and was a different person at the end of his life. >> well, finally i guess i'd better quit, but i want to say one more thing. 9/11 took place, but the american people really look at

it all we did was say we screwed up. we didn't, we didn't -- even though there was all kind of indicators not only for your agency, but for others that should have, that should have kept those people in new york alive and at the pentagon alive. but we failed. we have spent trillions of dollars to pick that problem, and the next incident we have we failed. who does the american individual took to to protect us? the defense department? no. the fbi? no. who's responsible? i think i am. i think most of the people sitting on this dais think they are. and we depend on you and the other folks that are involved in this fight with us to be

effective and, quite honestly, if the average american is going to be frightened as to who in our government is protecting them from these people who want to kill us. after ten years, twelve years. >> judge, if i could just interrupt you for a second to say that it's a very unfortunate incident, fort hood, but i want to make sure that the record is clear. there have been many, many, many other instances where the fbi have prevented circumstances that would have harmed americans since 9/11. so i don't want to say that this was the next incident. this was, this was a circumstance in which the fbi didn't hire hasan, they didn't give him a gun, they didn't let him on this base. they did have a shot at looking at he mail, and they made the wrong -- at this e-mail, and they made the wrong call. but i think that you're correct

in, you know, the dod which had plenty of opportunities over a period of years to look at this person, right, and to make some judgments is more accountable than the circumstance in which someone gets a discretionary lead to take a look at. so i just want to be clear that at least for my view of this situation that there are, there are -- this is a truly, this was, i think, preventable. i'm not sure it was preventable in terms of where we put the weight at i think more on the dod side than on anyone else. so i just want to make -- >> and i think that the gentleman's comment -- and i realize my time's probably run out, but i want to point out that the frustration level at some point in time somebody's

got to be able that has some authority -- and this was a commission that looked into this incident as it relates to our law enforcement authority -- if the dod should have declared it a islamic terrorist event and they didn't and that had some influence on what happened from the law enforcement side, it ought to be part of the report. what shouts from these two reports is there's nothing in it. as the chairman pointed out, there's nothing in it to indicate this had anything to do with what we've spent ten years fighting a war about. and that just, it dumbfounds me, and you cannot explain it to people who lost their families and now are being treated as if they were just casualties of the work force. et -- it really is hard to explain, and that's why i wanted to protest.

thank you. >> well, i think what judge carter's saying and i share his concerns is that there were 170 or more people from my congressional district that died in the attack on the pentagon, on the the day of the pentagon. i rushed out and sat on the hill there watching what was taking place. we won't make this into a 9/11 hearing, and let me just back up too. mr. giuliano, you are a good guy. i talked to some agents out of my district, and i say this guy mark giuliano's coming before me what kind -- and they say he's a good guy. i don't think you should b feel personal. >> i'm sorry. >> but washington office, somebody in washington missed the opportunity to open the laptop. had the laptop been opened, we

don't know, maybe -- and this is not a 9/11 commission hearing -- but maybe deb la burling -- deborah burlingame's brother would still be alive. so what dr. carter, mr. carter is saying and others, people just don't understand. and the not open, the laptop was not open x we see that there was recommendations coming from your guy out of phoenix with regard to flight schools, and there were things missed. and we want to make sure nothing is missed in the future. also i have other questions i want to go through, but we're going to do a letter to you on this. but i think people just have to think about this. i think you were misleading on the amerman case. the dates and times were awlaki came in at 4 a.m. washington time, he was arrested up in new york at 4 a.m.

that's 4 a.m. denver time. the u.s. attorney's out in denver. so here at 4 a.m. i know a lot of u.s. attorney work hard, but 4 a.m. where is he? he's probably home. at 5:40 they drop the case. al-awlaki's arrested, and they drop the case at 5:40 in the morning. now, denver or time. then he takes a flight to washington. the u.s. attorney is in denver, wayne amerman is calling from the washington, d.c. area, so all this decision was done by 5:0 denver time. wow, that's amazing -- >> sir, can i just -- >> you can, go ahead. >> knew he was coming in before that. >> i'm sure he did, i'm sure he did. but while the -- if you go back and check in fair 'em because i know you are a good -- if you go back and check, if you don't think you were a little misleading, then i think we went to different high schools, we have different approaches of

things. but you acted like the fbi had no involvement whatsoever. now, while the fbi cannot tell them to drop it, the fbi can make a recommendation. what we'll do, we'll give you a letter asking you to comment. but i think mr., dr. carter, judge carter really speaks for a lot of the concerns that people have had. i was the author of the national commission on terror in 1998, and there were a lot of recommendations. it was a bremer commission. guys up here on both -- men and women both side of the aisle didn't think there was any terrorism involved, and some people said why are you doing this? you found that the bush administration and then the clinton administration missed some things. what judge carter wallets to do on the committee -- wants to do on the committee is make sure it's not missed as we go off into the future. during -- were wfo agents or supervisors rated on their development of relationships with outreach to outside groups? >> can you repeat that, sir?

>> were the washington field office agents and supervisors rated on their development of relationships with outreach to muslim groups? i've had some majors tell me they were rated on their outreach. >> i mean, the community outreach personnel maybe, sir, but as a regular part of their performance appraisal i don't know how much that would weigh into an investigator's day in and day out par. >> so it could be in a rating? >> i don't know the answer to that question, sir. >> could you then get -- >> sure, absolutely. >> for the record. was awlaki or hasan ever a confidential informant for the fbi as the san diego office appears to have suspected? >> no, sir. >> we understand that the fbi has in the last year established a counterviolent extremist cve office with a national security branch. this was done without submitting

the reprogramming notification required by section 505 of the appropriation bill. what does this office do, and how would the work of the office inform the handling of cases like the hasan lead where political correctness about confronting extremism could have played a role? >> sir, it's actually a very, very small office -- >> how many are in the office? is. >> there is one gs15 and maybe less than a handful of analysts. it came out of a requirement from the white house for all of us, the department of homeland security, us, nctc to try to get to the root going back to mr. carter's point as to home grown violent extremism, but going back and trying to figure out what is causing it and whether we can get on the front end of it rather than on the back end of it. in other words, is there a way to counter it? can we learn from we, in the fbi

in particular which is what this office is set up to do, can we learn from our investigations, ce with learn from -- can we learn from those radicalized bilal awlaki or somebody else and push that back into some way, shape or form into the community so we can prevent it from happening in the meantime? and that is the purpose of this very small office that falls directly under the national security branch. >> the webster report includes on page 11 a list of 13 violent plots foiled by the jttfs. are any of these other than violent's lammist extremeism? violent islamist extremism? >> i'm sorry, sir, what page are you on? >> page 11, a list of 13 violent plots foiled by the jtts. >> so many of them are home

grown violent extremism, not all of them. >> okay. [inaudible conversations] >> were any of them not islamic extremism? >> so all of them had some kind of ties to islamic extremism, so i guess my point was and maybe i misspoke, they weren't all considered home grown violent extremism. so i stand corrected. >> okay. based on the report it appears that the most recent task pursued is to advance a culture within the fbi of prioritizing timely pursuit of leads and reassure employees that legitimate and aggressive pursuits of leads suggesting violent islamist extremism will not be perceived as politically correct and will not be detrimental to their careers s.

this what the office is doing? -- is this what the office is doing in. >> so the cve office is an office that i think will help and hopefully the other cv offices help us, our investigators better understand what causes radicalization and what indicators there are of those that are being radicalized. and, again, i go back to the point that it's not good enough just to understand those that are radicalized, it take more. there are many people who are radicalized that never do what hasan did. we need to understand what caused it, and we need to be able to underthose nodes or mobilization -- understand those nodes of mobilization. >> can you have those people in the office come up and see me in. >> sure. >> okay. jutte have them call the committee, come on by. the implementation of a written policy among fbi's field agency, is that accurate? >> yes, sir, it is. >> can you provide this written

policy to the committee? >> i will, i will take that back, sir. i don't see why we can't. it's classified, so we'll are to just -- >> one of the major findings is the lack of clarity over the ownership of the hasan lead where san diego and the washington field office disagreed on the resolution of the lead. has it been now formalized, the process for resolving such disagreements? is there a formal process? does this process kick in because of something like the fact pattern that happened here? >> so we did put out written guidance on that which will go into our corporate policy the next time it comes around, so it's not a cyclical basis. so one of the most troubling revelations in the report is the length of time that was taken to act on the hasan lead. the san diego field office sent the lead on january 7, 2009. this lead was not read until february 25th.

at which time a supervisory special agent assigned the lead to a task force officer. that task force officer did not read the lead until may 27th. cold, snowy day in january, may, the azale yas are out. so a good bit of time has gone by. during the time from january 7 to may 27, there were numerous contacts between hasan and al-awlaki. is the time taken to lack on this lead standard for a lead of this type or priority? >> sir, it would have been then but not now. not under the new guidelines. >> okay. is there any indication that this lead was categorized or given a priority that was incorrect at that time? >> not at the time. >> okay. is the delay in acting on the lead, could it have been related to workload or the fbi counterterrorism squad that they were overworked, had too much work? >> sir, it could have been. i think they were working on the

inauguration and subsequently the shooting at the holocaust museum. but again, regard he is of workload it should have been -- regardless of workload, it should have been covered sooner. >> what does the fbi now believe are decent guidelines? >> these leads now from the second it's set, it doesn't matter when it's assigned, 60 days from the time san diego would have sent it to time it's completely covered. >> i think you have answered this but you may want to elaborate because it's the only time i think you're disagreeing with judge webster. in this case the hasan lead was assigned to an officer from the defense department specifically because hasan was in the u.s. military. the report recommended that the fbi should adopt a policy whereby no task force officer shall be assigned a lead when investigation of employee of