not from lack of focus by our civilian counterparts, they have been on point at provincial and district level for years and it has made a difference. the challenge is the link between the provincial and central government. that has got to be seen as functioning, incredible and responsive and in many cases at least in eastern afghanistan we have not achieved that. >> next question? wait for the microphone. >> i wonder if you could raise this. post 2014, number of u.s. troops as trainers, and what was in the east, the u.s. forces that were

needed. >> thanks for the question. general allan, the troops required, to the capability that is necessary to finish what we have started. and afghan security force capable of securing its country is the end state. if we agreed the enabling capabilities have to be fully fielded as functional that will drive what i would call the poor military task that needs to be there. and special operations forces and the role they would play from local through the counterterrorism level, and the advisory capacity is going to

depend on the progress that we make with conventional forces and enabling capability, from my perspective that drives military presence. i am not dodging the question. just telling you general allyn is in the right position to describe for the task at hand. if the decision is the force is going to be smaller resources drive progress. general king talked about the power being sequential versus simultaneous approach. regional command east connect kabul to kandahar by securing the highway 1 corridor was brought about by introduction of

an additional brigade in benghazi and that effort is underway and dependent upon the 2013 campaign and what is the afghan leadership is willing to reposition forces, to where the need is will dictate the success we have. and reduced, hard decisions have to be made for what we are not going to do. >> they would perform. and the euphemism for killing targets, and that mission would

continue. the conventional forces. and training assistance. some training assistance for the afghan national security forces less than what we're doing now but we need the forces to maintain the threat of consistency. the third mission are the enablers that general allyn was speaking of and absolutely crucial. we need enablers for other nato forces to stay. they will not say if we don't. we get people -- two doctors in a reasonable amount of time and they need other enablers from us as well. in the afghan national security force they're dependent on some enablers. they are good at human intelligence but we bring a huge amount of technology to the intelligence equations in afghanistan and eavesdropping capability on the enemy or ability to see an survey on a

regular basis. if we pull the plug and turn it over to afghan national security forces as good as it is the vacuum would be considerable land have major impact on their forces. take the anti a ip package we do. electronic countermeasures and the rest of it where we pick of 75%. we defeat before they are use. if we pull the plug on all that and leave it to the afghans to go out there casualties will rise dramatically and i think it will affect their confidence and the aggressiveness to be out there given that kind of exposure. they're protected by mind clearing equipment and electronic countermeasures and balloons all over the country that are watching people and watching all of this, significant capability and no artillery and they like

communications support as well. a number of enablers we want to provide. i am very concerned about it because if you track the history of our generals making recommendations to the national security team it is not good. you go back to what i said, they got 30,000. go back to the residual force in iraq starting the 24,000 and we wound up with nothing. general david petraeus came in with a recommendation on how to recover the surge forces. his recommendation was very low in terms of what those forces should be. he wanted to keep most of those forces in place through 2013. that recommendation was rejected and all those forces were coming out by next month. those of the three major recommendations our generals have made in the last three

years and here comes another one by general allyn. he will lay out -- these other missions but we want to do and the tasks supporting those missions and a number of forces it takes to accomplish that. i believe the national security team will do what it can to reduce that number and they will fight over it and hopefully allyn wins this argument but it will be the first time one of our senior generals has won an argument like this. general cote day. wait for the microphon . wait for the microphone. >> you didn't talk about the other force that is in there. i go back to the sustained -- we have almost 80% equivalent in

contractors over there that have reached back to the defense industrial base and reached back to all of the labs here whether it is i edies or task force type stuff, all that. that is a huge enablers that when we leave in 14 how do replicate contractors and a story -- i don't know -- how many contractor is we lost in this fight. is there an anticipation that those contractors are going to stay past 14 in an environment that may be as bad as enablers leaving? the reason i ask is we're spending $9 billion a month roughly to sustain this fight. as troops come down you are right.

$2 billion we shouldn't be arguing over provides enablers but we have seen in history where we left formations like 1975 going to hell in a handbasket. had the same type of situation in 2014. is anybody talking about it? it took us a long time to build of that capability that supports what you have got. and a pretty secure environment. >> i was not involved in that conversation during my tenure but the fact of the matter is as we have reduced our military presence, many critical tasks previously performed by the military have been picked up by

courageous civilian contractors many of whom are former military. that has been a capability, met requirements. the requirement doesn't go away just because we draw down forces. our two options are develop afghans capable of doing that. some of those tasks we are not developing because of what is left behind post's 2014. your point is very valid but the short answer is i was not involved in that conversation and i don't know in the particular is of our security agreement long-term how that addresses the civilian presence. i think iraq gives us an extreme model of what could happen.

>> most of the contractor support supporting our operations, u.s. contractors supporting u.s. operations. a lot of that will go when our forces go but there are plans to keep those contractors there to complement the enablers that hopefully our forces have. the specifics of all that and decisions surrounding that are not finalized. in fairness you put your finger on something that is pretty significant in the sense that the support we enjoyed from contractors will be dramatically different from what the a msf receives. got to be honest and upfront about it. next question? >> good to see you again. just curious to address the issue of how much risk is

present in this mission because as general keane said you had to do this sequentially and like to have done it as a whole campaign approach. you didn't get the surge of forces you were hoping to get in that sequential campaign. when i talked to you last you were pushing the leadership to afghan forces quicker than anticipated. i would be curious what the spring revealed to you in that regard. 2014 election in afghanistan. you have seen how that plays out in that country. address for us where you see the risk involved in this. is it acceptable risk or reaching red lines? >> you put your finger on the crux of the issue and what command responsibility is which is to manage risk. frankly risk in regional command in two key areas. risk for sandra's commission. risk to force, one of the

approaches we took to mitigate risk of force was it was going to be afghan sustainable or we were not going to do it. in other words we could have had a u.s.-led effort to clear sooner than we did but we deliberately did it at the pace that the afghans could sustain which meant they were going to be leading the fight and we were going to be supporting them and what that drove is the repositioning of afghan security forces to enable that because the size of terrain requires decisions about resources and it was a decision about afghan resources more than ours. frankly our success north of kabul in regional command east we reduced our forces by three

battalions. that is significant. we were able to refocus that force south of kabul. i talked about the introduction of a brigade that was an introduction of force without an increase in force so it was a repositioning from north of kabul to south of kabul that enabled that and that was tied to the growth of afghan security forces as well as success against the insurgent networks operating there in a capacity afghans to be against that going forward. rescue force is the approach we took and i suspect it is still under way today. in terms of risk commission you spoke to the sequential approach we had to take. the risk to mission is we don't

finish the work that is necessary which is -- and this is not insignificant risk. there are two ways to deal with it. we sustain if a force close to 68,000 through the next fighting season that enables us to get after that or the afghan security forces reinforce that effort and enable a more comprehensive approach than currently capable with forces that are available. i hope that answers your question. >> next question. >> as you were finishing your deployment these new security forces started to beat floyd.

can you talk a little about how those are going to work or how you plan them to work? what makes them different from the other things that have gone before? is it reinventing the world? >> every commander identifies the requirements that he has based on needs of the mission that he has provided. they are purpose built for the needs of developing security forces of afghanistan and i think what is a lesson learned from iraq, very effectively apply in afghanistan is it is an integrated approach. you don't flip a switch and go from partnership to security assistance. within brigades north of kabul to date, battalions that have coalition partners working with

them very closely and other battalions in the same brigade that had a security force assistance team that is developing, completing the development of that force and so it is a team that has the minimum capability to develop the forces they are aligned with. security forces team with an infantry battalion is not the same as an assistance team working with the of border police. they are purpose built for the task they have to accomplish. you heard general allyn use the term and evolution of security forces assistance from partnership but it is what enabled that is very effective

work being done particularly at the brigade and battalion level between our commanders. the commanders of our battalion and brigades on the ground, security forces sins, leadership partners and afghan leadership. what encourage and gave me great optimism was the strength of the afghan security force leadership. they have always had very good technical leaders. what is emerging now is the effectiveness of the brigade in core level leadership. and frankly the most complex assistance teams that we have are working with the court and brigade staff so that we can show them how to synchronize and unify operational focus which is

not something they have historically approached the fight with. they have a tactical focus and there is an operational mission at the core level in afghanistan. hope that answers your question. >> go ahead. >> general allyn, mcclatchy newspaper. i want to go to your point about the inability of the haqqani network to disrupt kabul. i covered what happened and it was quite obvious that by taking over three buildings and not just in kabul but in three other provincial capitals at the very same time it was obvious their objective was not a military objective but a propaganda/morales objective which they accomplished. they held out in a building in

the most secure area of kabul firing at the american embassy and firing at headquarters, doing the same taking 18 hours for the afghan security force with the help of scandinavian special forces to end that. surely that is not as i said a military objective but is linked to the question of the ability of the afghan government and its security forces to keep the people save. they did the same thing -- scandinavian security forces had to lead the effort. >> do you have a question? >> the question is you are saying militarily they failed but surely they have managed to continue this effort to undermine confidence in the afghan government and afghan security forces.

>> who held the ground? and so -- your point about the purpose -- to demonstrate capability -- i am sure they were forced to pursue a very limited objective. that is a sign of the eroding capacity and objective that they have. i would tell you when you are fighting an enemy they are going to pursue tactical objectives to achieve short-term effect. the longer term effect you have to ask yourself about is psychologically at the end of the day where people confidence in afghan security forces and

their government or not? since april, what has happened? you highlighted something that happened. >> let me comment -- i understand the point but the fact of the matter is they cannot sustain that. that is the key to. as the enemy was able to do in baghdad in 2006. the very next day children go to school, marketplaces were open and people going to work and that is the measure of the people's confidence that they were going back to a sense of normalcy. they came back the next week to do it again, that would be a serious issue. why can't they do it? they don't have the logistical infrastructure. what general allyn's forces have

done is take that away from them and that is very significant from a military perspective. is there a psychological game for that? of course but in a long tenure of things what is the impact on its people? to people in kabul believe the haqqani are on every door threatening children on a regular basis? absolutely not. you have been in the city. people were in cafes that night and that is the reality of it and that is how you measure that. can they execute a mission at the psychotically dealing with seizing a piece of ground or killing people in a suicide pact? yes they can. the do that ten years from now? probably. we don't have to stay there to prevent that happening. the afghan national security force should deal with that. we don't want them to have the infrastructure in place to

sustain-and delegitimize the government capacity to function and haqqani has not been able to achieve that. that is how you have to keep it at the strategic level and bring it up on the tactical level to occupy the buildings 18 hours or 24 hours or whatever. what is the strategic impact and effect of the matter there is very little. yes, sir? >> how are you doing? you had mentioned the transition to afghan. how do your commanders measure minimum the sensual capacity before they recommend that? >> it was an integrated assessment that was done with civilian counterparts at the afghan levelland within the

leadership brigades. the afghan security force and afghan civil leadership went from the regional command level to higher. in general terms the overarching question is are they capable today of providing for the needs of their people to conclude security against the threats that are inherent. if the answer to that was yes, then you would recommend the transition was ready. if the answer was yes, maybe, we had to ensure that the operating agreement would enable finishing what needed to be done. what is different in the approach in afghanistan from how we did it in iraq. in iraq when we transition to,

that meant coalition forces were no longer operating in the area we transition to. that is not the way it is done in afghanistan. there's still a residual threat that has to be dealt with. and we have to retain the ability to partner with and enabled the afghans to deal with that threat. in a transition the afghans are in the lead and we are in support with security forces sins and advisory teams or partnered forces, whether the police or army. i hope that answers your question. to be honest, at the national level there is a surprise political component to this that has nothing to do with assessments at the local level. what is an example?

when i first arrived in regional command east the announcement had been made that the problems would transition with the first -- no one felt they were ready for that transition. the good news is it helped to jump-start the effort that needed to happen and with in six months of us being there, they were fully in the lead to an ready and able by the courageous leadership of the provincial governor, that is what gives me confidence, the capacity of the courageous leaders on the afghan side to finish the work that has to be done. 2013 is going to hold some very

challenging times for transition because the areas that still quite contested as scheduled to transition. the thought process is make the transition while we still have a sufficient force to help finish with the afghans the work that has to be done so that is going to be of major undertaking. >> thanks so much for being with us and whet me add my own congratulations. a terrific job that you did. a nice gentle question about safe havens in pakistan. a couple years ago fundamental planning assumption was pakistani take action against safe havens significantly diminish their utility and we planned accordingly.

for a lot of these this seems extraordinarily unlikely and planning assumptions have changed. what does that mean in terms of the resilience the staff in afghanistan needs and what would that resilience look-alike? >> easy question from you. we went in with some fairly aggressive goals to work with the pakistan military along the border in a complementary fashion and my predecessor in regional command east, the mighty 100 first division made some head wind. the mission to take out osama bin laden in may, cause the

pakistan government to start to limit cooperation and collaboration along the border between our forces. we had a couple cross border incidents subsequent to that, added to the limitation of our ability to do that and so we did not make progress with complementary operations that need to happen in order to achieve some level of effectiveness against the free movement of weapons and equipment across that contested border. all, leave the afghans both military and civilian leadership are going to have to take the lead in the coordination that has to go with the government of pakistan.

our approach to that was in the border dialogue that happens on a quarterly level with pakistan military that had heretofore been led by u.s. forces and readership. we changed that during our time there. we had the afghan border police commander host the quarterly meeting that we held in october of 2011. he not only hosted the meeting at his headquarters but he led the dialogue with the pakistan military. ultimately, that has got to be what leads progress in a complementary way against common threats to the two countries. it is it unachievable? it is not. is it prominent on the radar screen of the afghan leadership? no it is not.

frankly there is some history there that is making that very challenging. it is something that has to be afghan led and as i mentioned we have got to assume the movement of illegal materials for economic gain or military game is going to continue across that border as it has throughout the centuries so in order to assure that materials that will destabilize the government are not allowed to come forward without intrusion by afghan security forces we have to continue the effort repositioning their forces to the right places where they can limit success. you fully understand the magnitude of the flow. if any of you have not seen that

you should look at that. it will describe to you the problems and when we arrived we were screaming about 1% of what was coming across every day in vehicles and people. by the time we left with coordinated efforts of interagency that had risen to 25%. is that enough? no. is a trending in the right direction? yes. frankly if you can bring it across a legal crossing highway into a country, why would you put it on mules over the 14,000 foot mountains? you wouldn't. what is coming the cross is not destabilizing kabul. it is what is rolling through the gate that is the stabilizing

kabul. that improvement and focus from kabul has to continue on protecting their borders from external threats. long answer to a simple question but hopefully that -- >> another editorial comment. if we are able to provide afghan national security forces with the funding we talked about of 352,000 for four five years after 2015 if we are able to provide a residual force, and able to make a political transition in 2014 with better not necessarily transformational government but a better government i believe the long-term mission's success in afghanistan is still at risk because of the sanctuarys.

senior pakistani military leadership provides intelligence, money, training and logistics support in those sanctuaries particularly to the haqqani network. so they can effectively kill and maim us as well as afghan national security forces. they are free to fertilizer plants in pakistan that produce 85% of all the ammonium nitrate that is used in the aid package is used against us on our regular basis. we know what they are and what they do and pakistani maintain that is just a fertilizer plant and is not their responsibility. this is the issue we have been dealing with. ambassador crocker is on record and others on record inside the administration. we won't get into the details. ambassador crocker is on public record of long-term success of afghanistan's stability we have

to take these sanctuaries down and collect on them now and start targeting targets and killing those leaders much as we're doing against al qaeda and do that 2013-14. with all the inherent political complications that provides us ambassador crocker had been a former ambassador to afghanistan and very successful ambassador in iraq and currently just left afghanistan for health reasons but there's nobody better informed to the harsh reality of what we're dealing with in afghanistan than he is. we have been unwilling to deal with this reality and that the end of the day we have a problem for the afghans and hope they will do their best with it and i think it is a recipe for long-term failure if we leave

them with that problem because it is a significant problem. one last question. you have had your hand up for 30 minutes. >> please comment on political and operational ramifications of strikes in afghanistan and pakistan. >> no. >> not to be trite it is my responsibility on our side of the border with pakistan i have no responsibility in coordinating what went on or didn't go on and on the other side. to say that effective neutralization of leadership that supports operations in afghanistan is important to success is intuitively obvious.

that has been a central effect. the elimination in the mid point of our time in regional command east had a significant and enduring impact. haqqani's efforts had still not recovered when i left in april. you fully understand or you wouldn't ask the question, the effect that it has. it exceeded my responsibility as regional command east. i had plenty to do and had great confidence in those who had the other strategic missions. >> thank you for sharing this morning with us specifically what you have done -- major progress that you made and what

your troops did is really significant. everybody who saw that up close and knows how material that really is. he is at the center of the universe. ford bragg, carolina and is a happy camper to make sure and we wish the best of luck with your command. [applause] >> thank you, sir. your favorite bad in b.c. as military leader, i am thankful for that. thank you. >> well done. >> this weekend on american history tv the turning point of the civil war was gettysburg or the seven day battle for richmond? >> in a broad sweep of the conflict george mcclellan's failure and robert e. lee's emergence as a successful field commander marked a decisive moment in the eastern feeder that in turn profoundly shaped

the larger direction of the conflict. >> professor gary gallagher on the june 18, '62 battles -- 1862 battles that drove the army from the capital. key political figures that ran for president and lost. change political history. >> i would remind you that extremism in defense of liberty is no life. >> arizona senator barry goldwater. the 1964 republican candidate who lost to lbj at 7:30 eastern and pacific. american history on the c-span2. >> we did not begin as a city in kentucky. there was only a vague native american region and later a county in another state called kentucky. we began in 1778 in virginia.

>> join booktv, american history tv and c-span local content vehicles from louisville, kentucky. literary life with booktv and c-span2. jon david died on kentucky senior senator mitch mcconnell and jason gayness on rebuilding american politics, the internet revolution and at 5:00 eastern on american history tv, in 1841, key in shaping abraham lincoln's views on slavery. also the heyday of the steamboat on the ohio river. once a month c-span local content vehicles explore the history of literary life, from louisville on c-span2 and 3. >> house majority whip kevin mccarthy gave a talk at a breakfast hosted by the christian science monitor covering a variety of topics.

shea talked-about repealing the health care law and the federal budget. >> in california at this point the party doesn't have a single statewide elected official in the legislature, losing even 1/3. for those who watched that over the years is clear one of the biggest reasons is the allegation in california and on the national front what seems to be developing. lot has to do with immigration. are you going to try to bring immigration? >> any immigration bill that you do is going to have to be bipartisan. you watch the end of the george bush administration one was tried and not able to which eve.

it is a big challenge for both parties and the big challenge for the nation as a whole. >> we are a country of immigrants. we want to maintain that and we want to maintain and protect our borders. at the same time we want to be the magnet people want to come to as a world. it is a challenge from all. if you take that issue away and look at congress as a whole i am not sure congress regardless of the issue can take massive bills -- you may have to break up

the-when you pick up the pieces the pieces that defeated individually and the only way to pass the bill has been to come of with an overall package where everybody gets something -- >> the same thing -- in these big on the bus -- the argument sounds pretty good. >> that is the senate's problem. >> you can dislike congress like the rest of the american public. i do too. i want to change it. if you want to judge based on past congresses that is fine but i wasn't here. >> and immigration -- >> let me finish my question. we passed seven bills. that is different. different from when the republican -- isn't it? if we made gains and have a plan

to make gains that we should give us credit when we do what we say we will do. i don't know exactly with the immigration bill will look like because i don't see a coalition on both sides able to get it done but i believe if you are looking for principals and frameworks to make it happen it will take bipartisanship. if i look at the structure of what has gone through the house big comprehensive bills died. what am i going to judge about that. and a big comprehensive bill. and my goal is to solve problems. i would rather learn because i don't have enough mistakes. these big comprehensive bills. probably going to take it by pieces. and let me see what the makeup of the next congress is.

>> cut a deal -- people pushing for the six months which they were talking about a few weeks ago were the most conservative members of the house and senate. talk a little about how that process and what they were involved in and on a sequester you talk about framework for tax reform going forward on the other side of the ledger. you have a lot of republicans traveling around the country talking about this this week. how do you see congress dealing with the sequestered over the next few months? how would you like it to work? >> sequestration -- [talking over each other] >> in six months it was interesting. one is no one can sit back and say government will be shut down and both sides come together.

harry reid and john boehner announced a continuing resolution. conservatives wanted six months instead of three month. there was never a debate whether we get to a c r and he said the number at 1047 from one standpoint and look where you have been able to control the growth of government from that perspective so you have some victories. the argument between three months and six months everybody looks at you have a lot of living things before you from tax increases coming, sequestration, could be another dutch women to. this could hinge into a lame duck scenario. you could have a new presidency or a new congress, six months gives the longer time. some conservatives will say if you put it out further not everything collapsing at once so

the argument being giving yourself time to do things if you have flexibility. doesn't mean you can't do things earlier. just came from both sides of the aisle thinking the better way of doing it in the short time. sequestration if you watch what republicans have done in our budget we took up and dealt with sequestration. a year ago we cut $497 billion from the military. those are planned cuts. if you cut the military, it is programs you want to look at when you make cuts. you can't go into the military and say i am going to cut half a billion dollars. when you take your house payments you can send 10%. see what happens when you do? you can't cut programs that 10% across the board. most everybody says this is a problem. we have been trying to find ways to solve this. has been going around and we put

it in the budget and there's a coalition of democrats and republicans on the senate side trying to build something. harry reid said he won't bring it before hand. almost an education to america what sequestration means. we found other places to make the cuts. a better plan scenario what our military looks like. that issue i believe will continue to grow, go into the framework of the election in november and i would hope we do something sooner instead of putting everything in lame-duck. i don't look forward to the lame-duck. >> congressman mccarthy, it sounds from listening to you almost a slam dunk republicans are going to extend all of the bush tax cuts and aren't going to back down.

if that happens and if the senate is incurred, votes to extend 98%, could you picture a scenario where the american people are upset with republicans for holding up the entire process by not banking down? >> i could see the american public obsession. for washington as a whole, cutting 710,000 jobs were economy continues to slow. we have had 11 recessions since world war ii. one of the longest lasting recessions based on policies of washington that extended longer. 82 was a much deeper recession. if you look at double digit inflation. if you measure the growth out of 82 compared to now, fourteen million more jobs.

stimulus. what did do for us? let's take the question of what you just gave me. two years ago the same question rose to the american people, the makeup of congress was a little different. democrats controlled the house too. 139 democrats in the house voted to extend. the president wrote in his signing that you should not raise taxes in a down economy. 86 of those democrats reside in the house. are they going to think something is different? bill clinton believes you should not raise taxes in a down economy. independent study says 710,000 more jobs lost. if we are serious about changing this economy and making america competitive again eliminate the uncertainty. you extend it and reform the tax code that lets us compete. the american public will be

tired of short-term and taking politics over people. if the president said two years ago it was wrong why is it right now and if this is right, to this come from his business council? no. never has time to meet with them with more than a hundred fund-raisers. that is what the american people get tired of. they are tired of the gimmicks. they are tired of the process in washington to solve the problem and move on. >> we have 20 minutes. we will try to squeeze in the following. robert schlesinger, mark shields, molly hooper, set up -- >> everything wrong with congress -- [talking over each other] >> doesn't meet the house so far. you represent an agricultural the sins farm bill. could you lay out a road map on the reform bill and whether you have to get an extension?

>> thank you for that question. if i go back and study the house i like to do that. farm bills and transportation bills. their five year bills. committee studies these and these other big items of the committee's. and the last amendments at 2:00 a.m.. you allow both sides to see what is in the. that is different from the last congress. i believe we will get the farm bill done and one thing i think has started working better between the house and senate is conferences. every time we go to conference we have gotten back out. not in a perfect time line but

we have. same with transportation and faa. that is much different. what you will find today because democrats farm bill last time not deal with disaster and only took it to four years because they extended funding on other items. we have to fix that. this week we will deal with the disaster because of what has gone up there especially with cattle and it does not expire until sept.. when we come back we will find a way to get into conference and come back with the full bill. >> what do you mean? you mean reauthorize by the time the current bill expires? >> i always have goals. that is my goal. >> before you go to robert, farm problem in your district and how badly the district has been hit by the drought? >> the old saying in california

has always been whiskey for drinking water for fighting. our waters from the north and comes to the south much as our drought and we have had from for years is more done because of man-made decisions whether you can pump based on an environmental issue. i have communities just outside my district inside of jim costa's current district with 40% unemployment. two families in my district grow 80% of all the carrots in the country. i will let you in on a little secret. there is no such thing as a baby carrot. it is a big carrot that is jobs and you get charged more. it is innovation. cesar chavez is buried in my district. when the nation had a depression in the 30s there was a dust ball across the drought in the middle east--i mean the middle part of

our country. it is -- people put everything in trucks and went to california. hopes of a better future. they came and worked our fields. those people that were in line for food a year and a half ago are handing out food, carriage capital of the world and carrots from china they were giving out. america the breadbasket. this is because the ability to come and bring water down was a decision based on a fish that didn't originate from there and certainty of what it would bring. we have watched land get plowed under. we watch small communities many of them highly immigrant communities with 40% unemployment. we have been hit with a drought that was man-made before even when you have 136% of snow pack.

and you walk across the country the drought is getting worse. >> a few questions. you said you want to get it done before the lame-duck. what is the likelihood of that? more broadly, you voted for the budget deal with sequestration year-ago and use the defense cuts are bad thing. wasn't that the point of that? what is changing? what changed in the last year? >> let's walk back and walk through the debt limit scenario. inside the debt limit the discussion became if you want to raise the debt limit than the ability to cut as much as we want to raise. john boehner had many serious discussions with the president. there came a moment in time when leadership had to rise up and make a decision not from parties but individuals whether you could come to an agreement.

the president decided he could not come of with an agreement and walked away from the talks. harry reid -- john boehner turned to harry reid -- laid out -- [cellphones] [laughter] -- harry reid asked for one thing. he said i need a supercommittee. why do you need a supercommittee? i can't deal with 60 votes. the last one, don't want people from the outside. how do you know you will ever get it done? if you don't you go back to the cuts $1.2 billion if that is where you want to get to and make it so painful people will act. my study of the supercommittee republicans for proposed about an senate democrats tried to come to a conclusion.

house democrats never even produce a plan. didn't seem like much they wanted to get something done. so the bowl of the supercommittee was to find the cuts. it is never been my belief of power rests with the people. the power rests with the supercommittee. the goal of the debt limit was to find the cuts. if they didn't in the supercommittee went across that that does not mean congress cannot find the cuts as well ended is better plant. if those are not able to achieve it it doesn't mean we can't. so i do like this. we have a responsibility. that is why in our budget we proved it could work. we put a plan out that takes away sequestration and reforms the tax code and gives you the ability to solve it and the other an end. we don't say no cuts to the military. from that framework i h