its trade covered under free trade agreement. real-time and isn't in the korean economy. for japan the number is roughly 16%. so join into free trade agreement, not just the fda or the ttp or the scheme that david described but a variety of free trade agreement would unleash in and give japan real influence in shaping regional trade and financial architecture. it's not just about ttp and the bilateral economic relationship with you is that it's about japan and power itself economically and internationally binding of in foreign trade uzbeks are these are some of the areas and there are others where despite the well-known challenges japan has demographics with energy and so forth, there's some real potential, and part of our purpose here is to try to explain why it is a use interest. japan will make a choice but that potential be tapped.

>> thank you, secretary armitage. good morning. the importance of energy in our economies, each of our economies and our national security is often overlooked but cannot be overstated. it is something really took on board what our group to this project in the context of these japanese alliance, we identified several major energy challenges and opportunities that are emerging at a like to briefly review the fourth and. first, nuclear power. we are very mindful of the tragedies of march 11, 2011, and extend our deepest condolences to the victims of those afflicted by the earthquake and tsunami and then the subsequent nuclear shutdown. the fukushima disastrous setback the cost of nuclear power in japan and elsewhere. however, we applaud prime ministers brave and wise decision to initiate a cautious we start with two reactors restarted so for. before fukushima, japan was the world's third largest consumer of nuclear energy for good

reason to nuclear power remains the only substantial source of emissions free base load electricity generation. its resumption is critical for japan to sustained economic growth and meet its emission reduction goals. over time and reducing its oil years from 1970, 80% of japan's energy use was oil. it has been driven down to 42% in 2010. last month fuel oil consumption in japan, 10 largest regional utilities is up burning more oil to replace those nuclear no longer does. a permanent of a shutdown shutdown would also stymie responsible international development of civilian nuclear power. as china plans to join russia, south korea and france as major vendors of nuclear power plants, japan cannot afford to fall behind. these plants will be built all over the world, and wouldn't benefit from japan's efficient reliable and safe reactors and nuclear services.

for its part, for our part, the united states we need to remove uncertainties surrounding the disposal of nuclear waste, prove our permitting processes. we must take on board the lessons of fukushima and resumed world leadership promoting safe reactors designed and sound regulatory practices. second issue, natural gas. one thing i enjoyed in madrid at energy is how we can surprise you. who would've thought a few years ago we we talk about the united states as a major exporter of natural gas? not many of us i sure do. but large increases in u.s. natural gas reserves mainly due to hydraulic that fracturing being deployed has turned the united states into the world fastest growing producer of natural gas and make substantial export possible. in fact, a lower 40 it will begin exporting lng in 2016, and the iea says when widened the panama canal and 2014 it will allow 80% of the lng tanker fleet to pass through there, and supply competitive price gas to issue.

the opportunity here is obvious. japan needs the natural gas, and we have to. we started, we started natural gas trade elegy trade in 19 seat nine and going forward the united states can and should increase its exports to japan, three things are necessary. first, the united states must reject calls to limit exports of all when she. is not a time for resource nationalism. it's time for a resource alliance. we should not be inhibiting private sector plans to build lng export project. next the united states should put japan on a level plane filled with other potential international customers for lng. finally, in a time of crisis for japan the united states should get the no interruption in lng supplies barring a national emergency. asked previously negotiated commercial terms the third area we discuss with protecting international energy security and the global energy comments. like it or not the viscount of modern civilization and future global growth will depend on

increasing access to flows of fossil fuels, especially oil, for a long time. even as the u.s. and north america become less dependent on imports the world economy will still rely heavily on energy supplies from the -- have the world's oil reserves. the persian gulf is a crucial supplier of elegy. as china and other international is nations fall in our footsteps and become major importers of water oil and put the middle east, global peace and prosperity will depend on this build of the region and the security of the sea lanes in between it and our respective markets. japan joint antivirus emissions off somalia in 2009. this year she got imports from iran by over one-third in the first five months come in compliance with u.s. sanctions. going forward tokyo has increase participation in multinational efforts to combat piracy, protect persian gulf shipping, confront regional threats to peace such as currently posed by iran's nuclear program, and

secure the sea lanes will be needed and welcome. fourth and final area, methane hydrates. this is a little bit longer-term and aspirational. methane hydrates are natural gas crystal strapped and deeply buried ice formations. deposits off south-central japan are estimated at 10 years of japanese domestic consumption. globally the resource has been estimated to be as high as 700 quadrillion cubic feet, well over 100 times the current proven global natural gas reserves. like shale gas ever years ago, we know it is better, but we haven't figured out how to get out of the earth's crust safe and cost-effectively. these are technical problems that countries with a steal and the motivation and eventually solved. japan and the united states cooperate closely in research and development of potential large-scale methane hydrate production. images japanese field -- north slope successfully extracted methane hydrates by pumping in and sequestering see a to demonstrate both energy security and environmental benefits.

in light of the transformational potential the united states and japan should accelerate process, progress in researching and developing cost-effective and environmentally responsive production of methane hydrates. in sum, a cautious restart a nuclear power, a new chapter in our bilateral natural gas trade, enhanced protection of the global comments and methane hydrates appear to our group as worthy and promising areas for our clients to deepen and succeed. thank you. >> thank you, bob. can i ask kevin. >> thank you, and my gratitude both to csis for hosting us and to you for organizing this effort again. and trying to say where we are now in the global economy, and comparing it to the moment when we were last together in 2008, the difference for usenix, we were in the trough of the u.s. financial crisis that had morphed into global economic

crisis with the unthinkable happening, and actual contraction in world trade. look at where we are now, and while it's certainly not the optimum moment in the u.s. and the global economy i know we are the lowest u.s. consumer debt in decades. the u.s. exports have increased some 43% and are on target, perhaps to get president obama's aspiration 50% growth in u.s. exports. american companies today, as opposed to four years ago, are sitting on top of more cash than at anytime in history since 1963, positioned to take advantage of economic growth. bob has described a very a manic energy situation. i would submit there's at least as much dynamism in the manufacturing sector with 3-d printing and other technologies are offering significant promise to the two countries in the

world, the absolute leaders in innovation and productivity, the u.s. and japan. the question is what do we do with this now? how do we step out of the shadow of 2008, and where do we take our shared future? well, as we set to say, both the trade investment picture, and i should s on the investment side, we have seen some largely un-chronicle movement in investment in my mind that is very important since 98, 98 to 2010, the last year for which the numbers are available. we've seen basically a doubling in u.s. investment in japan. that's really good news. we haven't seen corresponding movement, in fact this direction, but what's clear is underneath the surface for companies when we wring our hands about some features of the relationship, that neuralgia and that anxiety are not shared by a

lot of corporations but they see the promise and they want to act on a. as we started to obsess this and start to come up with recommendations, david challenge us not to think about just to use the oldest metaphor entry, how to keep the bicycle upright and moving forward, but how to agree a new paradigm that not only operated the u.s.-japanese advantage, but significantly improved the outlook for trade liberalization for the region. is going to ask david to talk about where that thought experiment is. >> thank you very much. you know, japan is a nation in a period of great challenge. but there is some tremendous prospect for opportunity, economic development, advancements. japan is a country that has really never -- prospects.

so as a country that faces the most rapidly declining working population, asian society, debt and deficit, we've frequently look at the dark, you know, prospect that japan may face but we don't pay attention to the opportunities for japan to advance its state, society and economy. and we forget that japan is still the second largest economic partner for the united states, especially if you account for japan's production in china. the armitage-nye report recommends a secret agreement between u.s. and japan that would really cement the relationship not just between the u.s. japan, economies but between canada, mexico, and north american free trade zone.

the context of this is that japan already has a free trade agreement with mexico. japan has announced in march an agreement that it will now negotiate for free trade with canada, and there really is no reason why the united states should be left out of this process. so we see an opportunity for japan to address its long-term assessments and economic prosperity by creating a much deeper, stronger relationship with the u.s., and taking advantage also of the huge economic opportunities for investment here. returns on capital in the is our first topic returned in japan are rather low. we see a free trade agreement as a way of increasing the sense of confidence between our countries. that will allow japanese investment to flow into the u.s., and north america writ large, much more unfettered

fashion. we also, particularly see an opportunity for japan to invest in the energy sector. bob mcnally talked about natural gas and methane hydrates. the u.s. is actually a wash in natural gas. prices are washed out. there is relatively little investment going on right now because of this asymmetry the japanese companies have an opportunity that they are already taking advantage of intent to but i also think take advantage of in the united states itself to increase their investment. the u.s. has to change its policy. we need to make sure that japan can invest the security and safety in the north american natural gas and energy opportunities. the only way to do that is through free trade agreement. so the bottom line is that free trade is not as complicated an equation for japan to solve as people think.

the working population among farmers in japan is alarmingly in decline. the agriculture issue have been blocking free trade for years, i'm really not that substantial. japan has negotiate free trade agreements with many countries. the united states, people thought they couldn't. including mexico. i think that we need to finally break the barrier, sound barrier of free trade with japan and move forward in a way that will undergird are aligned for the next 50 to 100 years. >> thank you. torkel, which you make a few comments about neighbors. >> i will. i really like that sound bite david is about breaking the sound barrier in u.s.-japan free trade relations. the section i'm speaking about his robust u.s. and japan and the main point of this section

is that the u.s. and japan and korea share extremely important trilateral national interest. it's hard to place on the u.s. agenda to issues that are as important, although there were several, but to issues that are as important as how do we together approach that we rise of china and how do we deal with the issues of north korea. these are very difficult issues that are key to the stability of asia and peace in the region. and the growing friendship, japan and korea and china it and we really have to focus on these issues together. and we can't achieve our common interests and goals unless we all work together. there are lots of areas to build trilateral cooperation. we talked about energy cooperation. japan in the midst of its

nuclear incident and issues resulting from that and the cutback from its nuclear power position may be tempted to not recognize it's very important worldwide role in the promotion of nonproliferation and the safety of nuclear power. japan's role in that is well recognized and respected around the world. and for japan to retreat from that position and not move forward their would be a big mistake. likewise, south korea has important nuclear safety track record, and rule of transparency. and together, the three countries, the united states, korea, and japan can make significant progress in promoting continuing promote and ashore the safety of nuclear power, and also our continued

commitment to nonproliferation. a second area is overseas development assistance where the united states, japan and korea are world leaders, and where we share common interests and japan and korea have been very instrumental in promoting objectives common to us including in iraq and afghanistan, and this area can continue to be a model. the third area and moved into more detail on that is u.s.-japan security cooperation. and with korea. and there's been a lot of bilateral activity going on between korea and japan below the rate or screen that can be built and promoted and encouraged, together we can move forward. having cross servicing agreements between the two countries, japan and korea, and also having a sharing of information, assurance between the two countries will go a long way towards promoting the interoperability and cooperative spirit that we share.

in my thoughts and my own life i am really a product of the korean war literally and figuratively. my parents met in japan because the korean war. they were married in japan and i was made in korea. i was conceived in -- i wasn't born there but born in america. but i think i can really empathize with japan and korea with all the emotion that goes on between the two countries over there national interest and i think both sides, both countries have legitimate stakes, legitimate questions involving historical claims, but it's more than that. it is really emotion and feeding. it's really gets at the depth of what it means to be japanese and what it means to be korean. and these are very difficult issues, which the united states cannot get in the middle of an resolve. these are issues that need to be really look at and addressed by the people of south. and for us to expect that the

japanese government or the korean government are going to go against their public opinion and take some kind of an enlightened position on this i think is it a little bit far-fetched, given the media encouragement of these entrenched and very heartfelt and strong positions. at what we are asking for in this report is that maybe we look at encouraging the track to dialogues that exist between the countries where historians get together and really talk and resolve and get a point of consensus where people can talk openly and directly to each other, and broaden this to a public understanding of this. and why are we interested in this? we are interested in this as people that are facing a very difficult future in northeast asia, and we need to go forward together. the united states, japan and korea, we need to move forward together to move these issues. thank you. >> thank you, torkel.

randy, can you enlighten us on the rerise of china, please? >> thank you. just a few comments on china. as secretary armitage noted, up front, it really is the backdrop to everything we're talking about. certainly informs the administration's policies. we probably wouldn't be talking about a pivot or a rebalanced if china wasn't on the current trajectory we believe she is on, and certainly our report would look a lot different. so this is really a central theme that is sort of thread throughout the report. we note that the history of the alliance has been very favorable for china. in fact, in part china's meteoric rise was made possible i see peace and stability and the regional presence that our alliance provide. we played a continued to be the case in the future, so of course this is a rejection of what we hear from some chinese friends that the allies is no longer

appropriate for regional security going forward. we think china can continue to benefit from the alliance, as long as we continue to have the right mix of both hedging and indication. and that's really what our policy has been historically, both as respects of countries having this blend of hedging and engagement, but also as an alliance. going forward, this will continue to be the case, but that means certain capabilities will have to be both maintained and acquired. our policy will have to continue to be closely coordinated. so the notion of keeping this blend appropriate and right, of hedging and engaging means that we need a dynamic process in our alliance to talk about necessary to depose, to talk about policy coordination. i think recently there has been a lot of focus on the hedging part of this, and i think that's largely driven by china's behavior. and some of china's policies. we note in the report concerned

about china's statements about possibly expanding their core interest include not only tibet and taiwan but now possibly south china sea. irrespective of whether or not it's officially a new core interest, we surely can just observe the behavior itself, the more assertive and at times aggressive approaches to some of the sovereignty dispute in the region. of course, on top of that is the lack of transparency in china's military modernization and some of its strategic intentions. so as far as the eye can see, this hedging portion of our alliance approach will need to be sustained. certainly we also note in the report that china's trajectory upward is not 100% assured. china faces extraordinary challenges, and we listened several in the report. these would not be unknown to you, but the energy situation

and increasing demand that china faces, the environmental degradation, the widening income gap, the demographic challenges. and, of course, the crosscutting issue that really challenges china, corruption, all will make china's rise all the more difficult to sustain going forward. the other the question of course is about the economy of china. questions about whether china can achieve its own stated goals of transitioning from and export driven growth model to one that is more driven by internal consumption. the jury is definitely still out on that. and, in fact, more recent signs have really shown that china is taking to the old playbook, the recent moves on the currency of course are designed to increase exports. that's the model that they have succeeded on so far.

transitioning away from that could create winners and losers, could create political tension that china doesn't certainly need right now with its leadership transition coming up. but at any point going forward, it's a difficult transition for china to make. so again, just to close, the alliance we believe will continue to be of benefit to china, and china's own stated goals, as long as this mix of hedging and engagement is done correctly and improperly, and that requires the acquisition of certain capabilities which sak will talk about but it also involves a very dynamic policy coordination. 's. thank you, randy. sak, the security issues, please. >> thank you. good morning. i want to add my thanks to csis for being a big part of this, but also to secretary armitage

and joe nye for having me be a part of this panel. the security section of the report addresses six sections, interoperability, research and development technology, cybersecurity, extended deterrence, prohibition of self-defense, and finally peacekeeping, of which isabella will address following me. i think as my colleagues have made clear, the security environment that japan and the alliance which deal with a significant change. you know, at one time the alliance is focused on the defense of japan. that was a rules review in the '80s, the early '80s that change that, that expanded the thinking for the area of interest for japan in the alliance. and it expanded it north, south, and strengthen or added rules to what operationally the alliance

could do. that was followed up by a review of rules and emissions specifically the guidelines review in the late 90s which added the other roles and missions, especially for regional security, so the trend is pretty clear. and the trend is also that the distinction between the defense of japan and regional security is very thin. i think now, now that, when you look and you consider what japan's national interests and the scope of regional interests are, it goes north, further south, and much further to the west. and we would argue that it goes as far west as the middle east. and if you can imagine that the streets of -- strait of hormuz

were closed, or if they were a military contingency in the south china sea, that would have a pretty significant effect on the security and stability of japan. and so the thinking needs to become more and more a part of the context of the alliance. in that regard, i won't go through all of the recommendations let me highlight some specific ones as we go through the security section. at the first sign of any closure of the strait of hormuz, japan should unilaterally dispatched minesweepers to the region. right now the u.s. and japan, japan's m.o.d. as well as state department are considering proceeding with the roles and missions and capabilities dialogue, that dialogue should include extending and strengthening intel

surveillance, reconnaissance or -- to the extent of going down to and including the south china sea. we also recommend that usf j. should become more operational headquarters the candlestick a look at more about that when we get to the last section of prohibition and collective self-defense, but in that regard usf j. should be given more specific responsibilities. operational mission oriented responsibilities for the defense of japan. and at the base are at the foundation of this dialogue that osd -- limited said that both governments are about to have roles and missions and capabilities, should be addressing more intimate service to service cooperation as we

move forward. i used to be at osd office of secretary defense, japan policy desk with paul, and paul is a navy officer and i was an army officer, and he would lord it over me how close can how intimate, how effective the navy committed relationship was in japan. and as an army officer of course that bugged me, but he was right. and the navy committed relationship in our alliance is a model, and it's been that way for decades. the air to air and u.s. army marine corps and japan's ground self-defense forces relationship needs to be much closer. they need to catch up to the. it needs to be much more intimate, and japan, and especially the usmc, has a lot to share when it comes to things like amphibious operations and capabilities. let me switch now to research

and development. .. we need to become more effective tax alliance partners, and this is one way to do that. japan has recently adjusted its arms export principle and that is a welcome change, but the thing is the alliance has yet been able to figure out how to implement that. how do we move forward with that change that opens up new

opportunities? one way is pretty obvious and that is we should open up the pike of japan exporting technologies and military arms, and we should welcome that on the u.s. side. the days of u.s. concern of japan threatening our military industries in the defense industries, excuse me, are really past and we need to open up that point. but the different area is one that missile defense is really emblematic in my mind. where both sides took a very complicated and very expensive program and found a way to have cody philip mant, production and employment of the system. we need to find more areas for those kinds of opportunities. with regard to sires security, the u.s. side has is published a

cybersecurity command that is not yet something that japan has and we should find a way to establish a joint cybersecurity center where we focus on research and also exchange of information to stay up-to-date with those challenges. with regard to extend it turns, let me make a couple of remarks. deterrence includes koret requires too obvious factors. one is capability. and the other is credibility. that's kind of the standard and concept of deterrence but with extended deterrence and with an ally, we need to continue to work on the assurance that the u.s. provides japan, and they're requires a dialogue of what direction the thinking is going on the u.s. side and we need to continue to do that. with regard to the prohibition on collective self-defense, let me raise a backdrop.

311 and operation how u.s. and japan deploy forces. both sides we believe rightfully recognize that as one of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and specifically did not have a component of an external adversary we had to deal with regard to the defense and swept away the provisions of the collective self-defense and worked much more intimately on how to get the job done. a couple examples are u.s. warships move to the japan soft ground defense forces to northeast japan. another example is how both forces worked to make operational the airfield which became the center of how to

provide a relief and response in the crisis to that area and those are great examples. but it also shows in it also brings an irony and that is we did well in an hhdr scenario crisis by sweeping away the prohibitions on collective self-defense. but in a scenario where it is much more severe where there's an adversary that we had to deal with were prohibited from that kind of internet cooperation and the recommendation as we should find authorities. japan should find authorities to allow both forces to deal more intimately without the constraint provision of collective self-defense brings

to the operational forces and that should apply to the full security spectrum forces must deal with and so that is again another strong recommendation that we raised. with that, let me pass to isabella to address the peacekeeping operations. >> thank you for hosting us and the secretary our message to the tuesday six armitage. one of the most trusted institutions in japan, however, japan is the only country in the world that re weapons use during the peacekeeping operations as a military force. currently there is a bill to possibly revive the peace keeping operation law. the current law doesn't allow sds to use weapons, only for the

case of self-defense or when danger is imminent. the new bill was revised this to include to allow the self-defense forces during a peacekeeping operation to defend civilians outside of the peacekeeping operations. this essentially would supplement the security of the host nations, and it's likely this bill might not make it to the current session and it's likely that it might get watered down. our study group and the participants of the report recommend a more forward leaning revision to the law. we recommend japan not only defend civilians in danger, but also protect and defend with force if necessary other international peacekeepers from

other nationalities. we believe -- japan is currently on self-defense on peacekeeping operation missions working on disaster reconstruction specifically right now they're containing infectious diseases and this was extended to 2015. they are in south sudan, the youngest nation. they are also in djibouti on an antipiracy mission. we believe that japan's self-defense missions on the peacekeeping operations are making tremendous international contribution and the law should reflect that. with that, we hope the bill does go through and that is a little bit more forward leaning. thank you. >> thank you. let me turn it over to you in just a moment. i just want to make a very brief concluding remarks. it should be obvious to you that in this panel doesn't believe that the decline in japan is a

foregone conclusion. mike has already mentioned several if japan will employ them, still a large economy. an economy that can be made even more robust. if there was more openness in free trade as we have suggested in the report. immigration change, greater participation by women can add a lot. the national brands that might discuss japan is fantastic. let's get some oxygen from that which have some pride. your allies take pride in the fact that japan has such a robust and well-developed national brand. as was alluded, the self-defense force is now the most trusted organization in japan the

operation of this time. we did our duty in the support of our allies to the terrible tragedy. but, it will carry us through the challenges of the future. and about to be clear to all of you that we held a very strong view that the world is made safer and more humane by the united states and japan three robust, strong democracy and we have the greatest possibility of a peaceful rise of china rerise takes place in an area of strong vibrant democracies. and in that regard, we also include the republic of korea, and of course indonesia and australia and india. we want japan and the united states to come to the conclusion that we can share not only the burden but we can share some of the decision making. we want a japanese hand on the

tiller along with us. we know who we are and what we are. we can be very much assisted by a strong and vibrant japan. japan which is a place in which young the japanese can actually dream and not just access to. we've thrown a lot of you. i'm going to bhatia except to try to respond. if someone of your will respond to questions i will turn over to might greenie and he will identify people and we will pass to the microphone and get on with it. >> we have microphones around the room. let me thank make and the staff and ellen and the staff for getting us organized in the middle of a summer. put your hand up and i will call on you. identify yourself and you can directed to the panel in general or someone. microphone right here.

>> my question is the tension over the island rises and to defend japan house is obligated by the alliance, will the u.s. risk confronting or conflicting with china, and if it will, is it prepared for the consequences? >> let me put this in context. we are under the treaty obligations required to defend the administrative territories that includes it's impossible to answer a question like that. the reason is what is the issue? what is happening? is it because japan is acting in a provocative way or change the status quo in a long way? that might prompt one response from the united states. if in the wanted way japan is

under the jurisdiction and attack that might have another response but i can't answer that hypothetically. however, it is very much in the u.s. interest to make sure that we exert every ounce of influence to keep that event from occurring and that's where the diplomatic energy of the united states is going to be applied. >> i'm in the u.s. navy. we've talked a little bit about some legal changes for more expensive definition of what the self-defense force can do. but what i haven't heard so much is on the understand for historical reasons it is a self-defense force, but why not a unified command?

why not take the brakes off the force completely and let them be a foreign military? what a concerns we might have been doing that given our current considerations? >> we make it quite clear as we have in the past that first of all a decision is the japanese decision, not a u.s. decision. but we describe this as an impediment. it's an impediment to the alliance cooperation and i don't think one can argue that fact. we also have an interesting footnote in our report. the footnote refers to the 2006 unai commission put together to study the question of article mine collective self-defense, and they can to the conclusion that a prime minister could by fiat do away with a provision collective self-defense.

the united states would be fine with that. it's not us holding it together or holding it down. let me just add a little that and that is the goal is to have more intimate cooperation so that we can work together better than dealing with the constraints now. that's the goal. we are not seeking changes of constitutional or unified command. we are not seeking for japan to become a more militaristic character so that aim is we need to get rid of the impediment so the forces can work together more effectively and that's a goal. >> i'm from the state department public bureau, state department

public bureau. if japan doesn't choose to step up to the plate and lets the alliance whether order the most plausible consequences that you are concerned about? >> if japan and the united states are not moving forward to give the order of the consequences? >> if it withers what do you think -- >> we are going to have an alliance, because one of the most important features of our alliance is the government of japan, the people of japan allows the use of military bases in japan. without which the tierney of time and distance for our navy would be such that it would make it difficult for us to have meaningful security cooperation. i think as long as the government of japan were willing to allow the use of u.s. bases that our alliance would continue but we wouldn't have the vibrancy, and it's not something i think my colleagues can answer

themselves, it's not something -- if japan doesn't move along, that is not a situation. it's actually supportive of the people of japan. i use the term deliberately we want a japan in which they can dream and not just exist. we want a japan which is not so what would you say inward looking. that's the japan we need. that is the kind that japan should want and need as well. >> i would just add i do not personally think that we are at a fork in the road where the alternatives are a robust alliance or a divorce in. in some ways we are talking about an alliance that models and drifts because there is consensus in both countries that we need each other. so true that path for the robust alliance, and i think if we end up on that have continued model

and drift, several things could happen. one is i think the u.s. and other powers that are aligned closely are going to start hedging and that would weaken japan's's influence and take some of the energy out of the joint ms. and cooperation we need for both of our countries to be more influential say it would be an unfortunate outcome and wouldn't be in japan's interest. the other danger it seems to me you could create in a time of shifting power in asia the impression that there are fissures, cracks and vacuums and at a time when you want to discourage countries from chongging to unilaterally change the order we benefit from and discourage the countries from resorting to the first coercion, and just that time that's the worst possible time to create the impression that one of the most important works of stability and support for democracy and an open and close

of trading system in the region is going wally so it isn't a leveraged choice, it is how much we are able to continue maximizing the benefit to eisel for national interests and stability. >> i don't believe there was any subtext in this report or its predecessors of alliance that some essential risk. i think in this third exercise one thing became clear in our conversation at least to me is among the greatest threat is the failure of imagination on the economic side. to be blunt, we look at the energy spent on free trade agreements and even on the ttp process which has a lot of authenticity and might be the next thing that keeps with the

pacific on track. but i note with interest and frankly i am simply puzzled by the idea of a japan curry at china to the acoustics korea china fta and trying to figure how that would work as my daughter would say. it's frankly puzzling. at a time when shapiro said here i shiver because there are authentic experts in the global trade regime. when there is no next obvious thing for us to be to spend time and energy diverted from the largest free trade agreement in the world nafta and adding and enriching confidence and habits of cooperation for and what this achievement in the bolsters the

alliance that seems an obvious and important bit of signaling that for the rest of the region currently in doubt because of the background about the future of export growth. that could be vitally important signaling. >> on the energy we are a non-answer to wither. one opportunity japan would forfeit and one additional risk it would take on. we are suggesting that we leverage the alliance to remove japan's second-class status when it comes to being a customer for our experts. alliance to whether i think that opportunity would go away. and also with regard to again japan's growing dependence on the stability of the middle east and the secure flow of hydrocarbon from the middle east to asia we are an alliance to wither and we would lose the opportunity to fully utilize all of japan's assets, and would

frankly exacerbate this tension you start to see in the united states, this potential for resource nationalism. as our imports go down, and americans to realize we have all of this oil and gas under our feet, people could believe we would be self-sufficient, our hemisphere any way in ten years starts to revive this sense we don't need the middle east, we don't need to be spending troops and treasurer and prestige abroad, and a weakening alliance would reinforce that sense of resource nationalism and isolationism which could come as the result of the abundant discovery here in the hemisphere and energy. >> good question. yes? >> i'm with the national research analysis. my question is about the nuclear energy. i am a little surprised that you

can recommend the restart of the nuclear plants in japan when we still don't know what's happened and what is happening in fukushima. the u.s. should be more engaged because these are u.s. designs, and some of them are built general electric plants which have all the designs and i think's flawed because the plan fails, nothing else, but the circulation of water for whatever reason fails and then melts down in 24 hours and contaminates the environment for the remaining 30 years. this could have been in the u.s., too. the united states should pay more attention. japan should have a scenario not

that the plants are safe, but what to do showed the plant meltdown of the way fukushima did. this is something - u.s. should also be concerned as much as the japanese accept japan cannot afford the loss of 900,000 square miles of real estate the way the u.s. might be able to afford. >> you're point is well taken, and i did not mean to an -- i hope my remarks didn't sound blight. if you read the report and certainly what i hope to convey a we applauded the cautious restart. only two reactors down. we understand japan the seven appeared regulatory agency that will take on board all the lessons of fukushima and insure that when the cabinet can be done safely, so we very much are just applauding what the prime minister has done some cautious

research is entirely appropriate but again we will go back to the fact that nuclear energy is the only emissions free bass low electricity generation, and we don't see and i think the prime minister noda and his government would agree without a restart of safe nuclear power it's hard to see japan residing its national economy and much less becoming that tier one partner that secretary armitage is talking about. >> mika understanding is none of the reports commissioned by the government or independently and japan concluded that the eg design was the cause of the program. however i do agree with your general point they should be doing a lot more in this space to think about the future of nuclear safety. japan played a big role after the island sending engineers and experts to help us at a critical time you bought of u.s. engineers from the department of

energy and nrc have been in japan we didn't go into detail what it seems in one area we can step up and learning from the experience and then together with other like-minded states, courier for example, pushing for higher level nuclear safety globally at the time we're looking at future most reactors in the world were going to be built by russia, china and other countries that may not have our same standard so there's an opportunity there as we go forward. >> yes, secretary. >> this question is for david asher but anyone else that wants to respond it seems the alliance is in good shape but obviously it can't afford to stand still particularly in the context of so many game changers the military rise of china being first and foremost. with the relaxation of the three

arms export control, david, how can you see that changing as a game changer not least potentially how can you see that changing not only the security relationship, but the economic relationship? >> there is no doubt both the united states and the javanese industrial sector involved in the national security, there's a large need to integrate themselves much more substantially. our budgets just can't afford to be independent and independently minded for the long term. our alliance allows for us to be basically comprehensively involved with each other and we should be, but we are not. we do some limited co-production but we have never really embraced the opportunity of would we call the economy of scale and force between us. it will lower the cost of our

defensive systems procurements which are ridiculously high frankly and it's an increase the effectiveness and show to our adversaries and our potential threatening nations around us that we are integrated for the long term if we are integrated in terms of our military production and national security production that goes well beyond the military and involves economic security which is critical. people won't be thinking they can to get advantage of us frankly. i think it is economic security is something we need to pay much more attention to in the context of the u.s. and japan alliance. >> the reporter of japan is good for think you for doing this today. regarding the trilateral

relationship, this report recommends the united states should not render judgment on his or her issues. that is quite understandable that the same time, as a recommendation for japan, japan should confront the historical issues. i felt there's a judgment their meaning japan official standpoint on these issues do have some programs if i understand this. can you elaborate what this means? >> what is today? what is august 15th? we didn't have this proposal

unveiled today by accident. we built painfully with our historical issues. that's why my comments and my colleague's comments about the difficulty of these issues for heartfelt. and we know how potent a are and how powerful they are. the united states isn't going to make a judgment of these issues but the united states should use in all of our diplomatic energy to try to help the two sides resolve these issues. how they resolve and one man has to be acceptable to people on both sides. right now they are in both japan there's a great matters populism involved in these issues and that is further sort of muddies the water but we have suggested in our report perhaps continued

to step down track to discussions to try to bring the united states not being judgmental as we come to a conclusion and our own painful experience. >> if i could add to that i think it would be useful of political figures in japan and other countries in the region stop and ask themselves before they speak or before they take trips to certain places where there with your doing is in the national interest or whether it is designed to gain domestic political popularity. is it in the interest to antagonize a fellow democracy at a time of the power balances in the region for example? that is probably too tall in order in any country in putting our own to stop and think about the national interest before

they speak for act. but for those aspiring to higher office or to be statesman or stateswoman in the future, the would be a good test and would be a good test for the media to think about as well. >> we can take one more quick one. let me look over here. [laughter] >> since you came all the way from tokyo. >> you did, too. >> i think the report pointed out rightly the problem the alliance faces which is dominance of for the third order issue. the government decided they needed an issue to focus on other important issues but the reality is now we have another order issue which is of spray deployment and japan and it seems to me we can know never

overcome this issue of the fear order issue. my question is why do you think we continue to have this program of this third order issued dominoes? is that a japan problem? >> is this a problem which comes with the nature for the deployment? and how can we overcome this? thank you. >> it's a third order issue. the point being that we start and hope that our colleagues will start from the position of what is in the long-term national interest. we are not virgins appear. we understand that in many cases the military, u.s. military occupation of the bases in japan

is a bird and particularly in okinawa. so the burden is on us to be extra thoughtful about our approach and be very careful and cautious in our consultation with of the government of japan. but for too long these third order issues have taken all the oxygen out of the room and whenever secretary of state for secretary defense of the united states and colleagues in japan would start to talk about the interests of the united states or japan and every rise of china it would be what i called the f word and as soon as the f word came out that's all anybody wanted to talk about. so, what we are trying to do is say let's not let the tail wag the dog. don't let osprey take the place of a larger interest and relationship and larger alliance. in my view there are always ways to work this out, but it's going

to take some real thoughtfulness and probably a little what would you say compromise on both sides given where we are now. >> good morning. thank you for having me. u.s. house. thank you for having me. good morning. let me start by saying i spent a great deal of my years in japan and i lived. thus insulated question how do you think he would do if he felt he had to rewrite his cabinet ministers? how do you think he will pan out as a defense minister? she's known for being more than academe than a politician. my question is in general but to the question to the good gentleman to your statement on iran and being on the sanctions

list recently japan once a of the sanctions list and has been imported oil. do you think that affects the alliance and if so how is japan planning on joining the unified front? thank you. >> i can take the first part of your question. i think he will do fine. the tough part for the u.s. side is how the positions continue to change with prime ministers or within an administration. i think the current defense minister will be fine. we need to have some stability but the report is looking at a longer term and it's not focus on individuals but that is what is the key part and what is important here. as the net with regard to iran

and sanctions, the u.s. sanctions policy requires that importers of the iranian crude make substantial reductions in those imports. the substantial reduction is not to find precisely so the state department decides what this substantial and what is not. europe has completely stopped competing iranian oil but japan and italy made substantial reductions in the view in the first half of this year but also early on in the process showed respect for the sanctions policy itself engaged in the state department to make sure the planned reductions which are coming down year after year would satisfy the u.s. requirement which it did come and in an environment where the imports are rising over all because the shutdown of electric plants it's remarkable and a strong sign of the nature of our alliance in this environment japan implemented these

difficult reductions in iranian imports. going forward there is the issue how to insure the tankers bringing of the crew back to japan and other countries. japan has put in place the ability to make sure because that is withdrawn due to the european sanctions. so the u.s. again is not asking japan to completely halted its imports of crude just to substantially reduce them it has been doing so, and i would expect japan will continue to remain in close contact with the united states and reduce its imports and thereby contribute to the economic pressure being put on the regime. >> thank you all. we did the first of these bipartisan reports 12 years ago. a lot of us had our -- some of us had more hair than. we took the report in 2001 and was the document was used in the situation room and they will

recall when the bush a demonstration. we are not sure what this document will have a role in the situation in the future, but part of the purpose here is not just to get our ideas at what we need to do to revitalize the alliance but to stimulate a debate in the discussion we didn't answer any questions by means and this will spark that and get some feedback some will be - some of the positive but we will generate some attention to the need to add it devotee to the alliance as we have in the past and all of you attending today is encouragement but there is interest in that so thank you very much for joining us. [applause]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

now the soviet may be gone but there are still wolves in the woods, and we saw that when saddam hussein and invaded kuwait. the middle east might have become a nuclear energy supply hostage, so we did what was right and what was necessary and we destroyed a threat to free to people and lost a tyrant in the prism of his own country.

10 million fellow americans are out of work. tens of millions more work harder for lower pay. the president says on unemployment always goes up a little before recovery begins. but unemployment only has to go up by one more person before a real recovery can begin.

on tuesday defense secretary leon panetta accused iran of training process of militias and syria. also this week, president obama signed into law additional sanctions targeting year on's energy, shipping and financial sectors. yesterday in washington, former state department and u.n. officials agreed that u.s. iran relations are at their worst. they were speaking at an event co hosted by the middle east institute. this is an hour and a half. >> good afternoon. my name is daniel serwer and it is a pleasure to welcome you to this middle east institute sais

evin announcing in the least institute scholar publication called prospect around the relations on the nuclear issue in the year ahead. i find this a remarkably clear straightforward and very useful analysis of the situation. one that avoids any of the pitfalls of the journalistic treatment of this issue in washington today. so it is a particular pleasure that i was asked to moderate this panel if i have any qualifications for that role is isn't my time at the u.s. institute of peace that is displayed in the biography but rather, that i spent seven years abroad as a science counsellor at american embassies preventing technology from doing to potential proliferators, and

three years managing one of the energy office is in the state department. we have a wonderful panel today that includes the principal authors of the report, allen keiswetter and roby barrett, as well as abdu who contributed substantially to the report and will be commenting. it's not my habit to do biographical introductions because after all, you have them in writing and you can read them under your leisure but i would like to see something striking about each of the speakers. for allen i read his biography and i said to myself what you really need to know about allen keiswetter is his posts in the foreign service and yemen, riyadh, khartoum, the rate --

beirut, not a bad presentation of arabic speaking. let's put it that way to be really quite extraordinary. i know allen from our service together in the intelligence and research. abdu i have not known well and when i asked her what i might emphasize in this context, she offered me something that isn't in the biography, so i will cite that. it is a book from 2003 called answering only to god, faith and freedom and 21st century iran and i think it is particularly relevant to the issues that we have to discuss today but you can read her distinguished background as a journalist, as the u.n. official genive comes

to us amply prepared. unfortunately we are going to mess melissa who is ill today. but we have roby barrett to finish up. i can't say that i know roby well but we sat together in a number of meetings and when you are in the meeting with roby barrett, you are going to know what he thinks about things. and he has a particularly incisive way and brutally honest way of dealing with military issues which have been a real focus for him over the years. without further ado, i will ask allen keiswetter to do the initial presentation of the report.

>> when i was in the department of state, i describe myself as being the deputy assistant secretary for miscreants, iraq, iran, the arab peninsula, libya. fortunately some have become good guys but we are back to the miscreants today. i also feel a little bit like the head of the corps of engineers who newly appointed was reluctant to make a public speech. however, he saved up his energy until he was invited to speak on floods. he thought this was a topic to which he could do justice, and he did well until he got to the question when he discovered there was noaa in the audience. i would like to do two things. first is to summarize the

reports key judgments overall with a little bit of filling in on israel since melissa can't make it and then my second part is to talk about the u.s. perceptions and perspectives on the iran negotiations of the nuclear issue. first of all in the short run, dealing with diplomacy and u.s. position there are two points the negotiations are still waiting -- stalemated and likely to wait and the longer term there are margins for negotiation and i will turn to that a bit later. on iran it isn't clear to what extent iran is committed to a diplomatic outcome or while thanks to the significant toll it seems unlikely to for

ceramica because iran is prepared to hunker down as necessary, and then in addition to this, therefore strategic pressure and the diplomatic inducements are very important. geneive will expand. on israel, without sufficient diplomatic progress, there was in the group an uncomfortably real possibility of the israeli military action because of the perceptions of existential threats. and i think that since melissa is and here i would like to just read a couple three sentences that they think express her points of view. this expert melissa focused on the military abbas in because this is where we are in the view. the debate in israel now is that they have the capacity to hit

and destroyed unknown nuclear infrastructure with the unknown site have the capacity to sustain and advance a nuclear program after attacked how with the irony in respond, and i think the news over the weekend confirms that judgment. she concluded it would be a serious mistake to dismiss the possibility of an israeli unilateral attack. netanyahu was a leader who thinks he can do whatever he wants despite u.s. opposition. molest you think any group that nei has consensus i have to read the next paragraph, they differed by netanyahu's statements are at least in part blousing intended to press the u.s. to take a hard line stance and to scare the iranians into concession. given israel's military capability he judged there is the more elasticity than one would surmise and netanyahu's

remarks so this is a fair representation. i would like to comment on the judgments on the state's. they have unprecedented unity in response to the fear of the pretensions of the gulf. if we think it likely will hold. still there are new ones is among the states and they might not fully be aware to the extent they risk the irony in retribution. roby will stand on this. next year we think will market turning point in the u.s. iran relations, nuclear issues. without progress towards a nuclear settlement, the trajectory of the u.s., of israel, iran, though they are not settled, could lead to

military confrontation. i would like to go on and talk more about why we've reached these conclusions and i will stick entirely to the u.s. position. what is the current situation? the administration has a two track policy of engagement and pressure and in the past few years engagement has largely taken the form of negotiations and the form of sanctions one might call active measures and obama made clear all options are on the table with one exception and that is containment and he's made clear the red line moves iran to actually weapon - two nuclear capabilities would cross them.

in the short term, we think there for the prospects for any movement is not a very great before the u.s. election. the p5 plus one asked for a suspension at 20%. iran shipping of the stockpile uranium that at that level the second condition and of the third condition is the work of the heavily fortified facilities in return the p5 plus one would offer inducements such as spare parts for the airplanes. the response to this has been should we say when wim during low and had a small deal presented in the words of one negotiated grand ideas and issues that are centered on the acknowledgment of its rights to enrich and the lifting of

sanctions. from the u.s. point of view any such broad deal is again in the words of a conference analyst the endgame and from the u.s. point of view we are not even in the game yet. we have the effect of suspension of talks because the west willingness to wait for the full effect of sanctions to come into play and because the insistence is about their right to enrich. we think the prospects for extended diplomacy are better. once the elections are over a second obama administration could be in a position to consider a broad deal and the iranians may have basically felt the effect of sanctions to be willing to negotiate on specific steps. one is an acknowledgment of the right for the limited degree three and half to 5% and in return for the acceptance of

stringent monitoring and inspections. there has not been, quote comedy full throated discussion this possibility in the administration according to a former administration official. there are negatives to this idea and the acknowledgment of the right to make a right to enrich would run counter to several u.n. security council resolutions aggravated the sensitivities i alienate the supporters of israel and allow them to accuse the president of being soft on iran. the risks are not acceptable to the administration in the pre-election period whether they would be acceptable leader depends greatly on one the extent to which these down sides can be indicated in the view of israel and prospects for an arrangement of could actually lead to stem the nuclear development.

what if there is a victory? the specific nature of romney's policy still remains largely speculative and extrapolation from his generally hard-line position on iran if the usual patterns prevail probably the new president will prefer to the to prefer to focus on the organization and campaign priorities that the defense could alter that. whatever the administration is in power of the requisites for success for the extended diplomacy include first establishing a framework for regular negotiations and to broaden discussions beyond the issue. member to establish a private u.s. iran channel to discuss bilateral issues and these are points on which we could make progress now. another prerequisite is the preservation of the five plus one solidarity. and on that, so far solidarity has been strong but the

prospects are uncertain. while russia and iran have cooperated under u.s. leadership, they do not fear the consequences of nuclear iran to the extent the u.s. does and furthermore there are growing differences over syria and other issues that could impair. another possibility of there is troubling sanctions and administration officials described this as true the crippling sanctions and has proposed and congress with iranian imports and exports much like the sanctions now on the central bank of iran. they have down sides. such sanctions might find limited support abroad to cover her to the people with little effect on the decision makers and offered no guarantees that they would be a prelude to a popular base overthrow of the government. it is generally realized a certain level of the every ne

leal exports iranians oil exports to the energy markets. i would like to do a summing up and tell you where the group cannot. it was easy agreement among the conference participants that the best scenario is diplomacy, that there was sharp disagreement as to whether diplomacy had a decent chance of succeeding. one group argued the iranians wouldn't dismantle the program unless the very existence of the islamic republic is at stake. number two, the israelis see iran with even the capacity to produce nuclear weapons as an existential threat that they will not tolerate. number three, the united states stated it will not allow iran to develop nuclear weapons. number four, the leading gulf states are adamant in their opposition to iran's retentions in the gulf.

given these trajectories, the conclusion is potential for military confrontation over the program as hot. in other words, denied a significant risk for military confrontation that believes the margin for diplomacy still exists. a deal that would allow iran the right to enrich stringent safeguards and strict monitoring could be possible later. the margins for negotiations include the fact first the iranians certainly do not want more on their territory. a number two, the israelis best option is not to go alone, but with at least u.s. support. third, the u.s. probably doesn't want another war on the heels of the ones in iraq and afghanistan

and number four, the world's fragile economy would suffer yet another severe blow. and the and there was common ground. it was a realistic view of possible hostilities while acknowledging that there is time for a redoubling of efforts on the diplomatic front and putting one, staving off a bitter reaction in the near term, keeping the negotiations open, moving towards it leased the discussion of enrichment issue at some point soon. this would be probably soon after the u.s. elections establishing a second track where and on the nuclear issue could be assessed, and making clear to the iranians that has to be done for the sanctions to be lifted. i have to say one of my tasks as a diplomat was to find the areas of agreement in this group.

>> thank you, allen. >> good afternoon. hello everyone. as allen explained, i hope that we all don't become somewhat repetitive when speaking but my specific remarks are going to be focused on how iran views the sort of nuclear issue and more broadly its role in the region and how what has changed since 2003 and when examining the position on the nuclear issue it's important to place it in a context where iran was in 2003 when i was willing to negotiate with the united states over afghanistan. and was not only in 2003 there were a few years between 2003 to 2005, when in fact ayatollah

khomeini sent a letter to the then president bush but reformers was ambassador in iran in an attempt to reach the kind of breakthrough that we are trying to reach with iran. so i think that in explaining what has changed fortunately we can grasp how sort of blew me the picture is going forward over the next year. even if we set the minimal goal of simply trustful building exercise with of the nuclear negotiations without even assuming that a breakthrough could be reached, iran now is not in favor of establishing any sort of trust the united states because the way it is viewed over the last several years in the region and also the u.s. policies. iran in fact is convinced that

the ultimate goal of the united states is regime change and that the nuclear issue, regional issues over syria, iran, the united states activities in afghanistan and iraq that all of this was meant to to undermine the islamic republic and this is the way that iran or the regime refused the united states intentions. sweating is that unlike 2003, we are now long way from convincing iran that this exercise is to build trust and i want to be specific don't mean to generalize about the iranian regime because i think it is a mistake to generalize. i am speaking specifically about the supreme leader ayatollah khomeini and the inner circle, the 20 or so people who help him reach a consensus on issues. and i think that this is another point that is often ignored, that if it were -- if he were

president right now we probably wouldn't be having these discussions because in fact political personalities deutsch bigot difference come and the generation that created the revolution, the elites around khomeini think very differently than some of the other political personalities that we have seen come to power in iran over the last 33 years. in a way for the regime change is a self-fulfilling prophesy he has believed this since the founding of the islamic republic and he continues to reiterate this belief. in july, he said for example, the animosity of these arrogant actions towards the islamic republic returns to the principles of the system that they try to make their issue with the nation seemed as it is founded on human rights and the nuclear issue. so he says but of course it's

not. it's not founded on human rights issues or the nuclear issue is founded on regime change. so you have to ask why would he believe this? if you read the media every day as they do and they follow the media very closely, of course every day there are statements coming out of people in congress and there are statements from particularly the republican candidate running for president that we need to launch a military attack on iran. so if you are sitting on iran and you are ayatollah khomeini why wouldn't you think the ultimate goal is regime change? another thing that has changed significantly is iran can no longer continue to hide its long conventional means in the region in iraq and afghanistan and now when syria. as we have seen the revolutionary guard both in iraq and now syria become very active, the iranians have taken

a direct policy towards the region. another significant change that has happened not since 2003 with over a long period of time is that iran's educated middle class, the middle class eletes which were once the basis for the reform movement had been completely marginalized, and this is the sector of the society that is actually very favorable towards americans and the united states. they want iran to cease being a pariah state and when they have political power, they were in the regime looking for some sort of way to break three decades of hostility. even the former president came out and publicly stated that there should be a breakthrough on the nuclear issue. other reformists including a man by the name of abdullah stressed

the need for solid. those voices have been settled in iran now. they are no longer relevant and this is something that has changed dramatically. another thing that has changed since 2009 is the mass movement for space reform in iran. we've seen that the regime has come completely triumph over the position unfortunately so the voices that could put pressure on the regime of it comes from our society were within the system for some sort of breakthrough with the rest are no longer active and no longer have influence. and i think that the -- i was reading just this morning an article on foreign affairs on which he made the argument let's forget about the nuclear issue because a space revolution is coming to iran if we are just patient and i think that although people tend to draw parallels between the arab uprising and iran unfortunately

those parallels shouldn't be made because we are dealing with a completely different kind of authoritarian state and a completely different kind of political culture. you don't have the kind of advancement of the civil society in iran that you have in egypt and that you had in tunisia. that kind of civil society doesn't exist in iran. another thing that has changed dramatically since 2003 is the rise of the revolutionary guard in iran and the political and longstanding economic power that they have built in the country with khamenei assistance is very similar to khamenei to read all the it could be argued that they stand the most to lose from sanctions because of their great economic interest in iran and in their investments, nonetheless for some it would serve their interest if there were a military attack on iran because

it would reaffirm their long-held positions about the united states and there is a logical positions about the united states. specifically as ellen mentioned, we are also not very hopeful on the specific points regarding the nuclear negotiations. before the negotiations this summer there were many that are geared the former iranian ambassador that if the united states and the p5+1 would offer its enrichment at 3.5 to 2.5% this could be the point that deals. unfortunately iran now although they had been talking about reducing and richmond a few years ago there is no longer any movement on that issue. iran is no longer entertain the idea of shipping out as alan mengin. making it an easy case for

israel that iran has now entered what they call the zone of immunity, and that is the reason that there is so much discussion now or one of the reasons of a unilateral military attack on iran is they are convinced that iran has reached nuclear capability even if the decision hasn't been made to build a nuclear bombers as they continue to enrich at 20%, this gives validity to the israeli argument of the intentions. this was not the case of years ago. just last week prime minister netanyahu and his ministers said he declared that united states and the west should officially announce the nuclear negotiations have failed so you can see what is being paved that all options have been eliminated

even then during that time which was a lot less intense than now, it was clear to me in the meetings i had with the officials and the national secure council and foreign ministry that they don't, their position towards iran is much more nuanced and much more i would say profound to have a great understanding of the politics that someone like primm and mr. netanyahu the conclusion is still the same which is that iran must be stopped before it is nuclear capable. i will conclude with a few more points. iran has also asked for sanctions to be lifted before there is any sort of real serious talks on the nuclear issue and as ballan mentioned, that is highly unlikely the sanctions would be lifted. i think that for all these reasons it is clear that iran is interested in prolonging the

diplomatic process but not necessarily reaching a breakthrough. both sides with the united states and iran have a reason to go on the diplomatic process. president obama certainly doesn't want any sort of unilateral attack by israel on the iran before the presidential election and the iranians want to buy time. they want to buy time until there is perhaps some unpredictable event that occurs that would allow the diplomatic process to go forward even though all parties realize that there is unlikely to be any sort of concrete brick through. i think the other issue that has changed dramatically is the politics both in israel and the united states and i think that we will be discussing this further in the q&a. thank you. >> before i ask, give the podium i loved the standing crowd but there are a few seats up front and you are more than welcome to

come down and take them. don't be shy. >> roby. .. analysis where the aaron begans are. and i would add that if anyone if you put yourself in the position of db revolutionary and

you look at the current situation and evaluate your interest. i think it leads you to the conclusion that they are pressing ahead with the nuclear program and not really interested in the negotiations. and that's looking at it from iranian perspective. think about it. with that as the backdrop, i'm going to talk about the gulf a little bit. i spent quite a bit of time in the gulf. i think that sense almost the beginning, the last year since the beginning of iraq there's been a consistent theme among gulf leaders and anybody else out there analysts that want to talk about about what the iranian intention was, what the ultimate process doing to have to deal with them is, and a theme that the united states has been somewhat naive in the dealing with this.

it's not this administration, it's past administration as far as you want to go. from the gulf air point of view, they do not believe that the iranians were going give up the nuclear weapons capability and most of them believe that the capability will move toward actual possession. they really have consistently said that the world needs to do something about it, the world meaning the united states needs to do something about it to prevent it. and then almost -- a fairly high number of them have come with at second statement right after that. another war in the gulf would be disastrous. okay. i don't know how you reconcile the two at this point in dealing with it. what's emerged, i think, in the last year or two is a resignation on the part of the more hard-lines stake the hard line on the position that the iran has taken on nuclear weapons that the only

alternative is going to be war. one commentator said almost three or four years ago at mei function, well known in the gulf, he said for the first time i now come to agree with the israelis almost 100% on an issue and that issue is the nuclear capability and the direction that iran is heading with it. all right. if you take that and set it aside and look at and look at the war issue, and the possibility of war for the gulf states does create some difference in the way some of the states view the issue of conflict. you can argue that the kuwait, iranys are hard over and want to see the program stop.

people in dubai, have a slightly different nuance view of it. here's where i think the iran iranians make a mistake. i think the iranians see some possible separation in the position of the various states out there when on the issue of iran's possession of nuclear weapons are iran's prestigious in the gulf, it doesn't exist. and this accounts for mistakes they make from time to time pronouncements by a senior foreign policy adviser in 2008 about bahrain being the 14th province of iran and the storm in the gulf. i thinken hostly shocked people the people in tehran and dispatched the minister of interior to a conference in baa rein to explain that's not what they meant at all. that was the real problem as the american presence.

so i think to a degree the iranians don't understand just how much their policy position and their overall lad attitude be the arab in the gulf is dispiece across the water way. i actually think they may press the issue thinking that not exist. the arab soldly behind a policy to either end or curtail the iranian program in one way or another. that said, i don't think anyone in the gulf has added up what the potential cost for a full blown conflict is. and everybody is buying new a aaaadm system among the arabs but linked to the u.s. or looking at all sorts of options

on keep straits open. i think the impact in the event a war started would be significantly more than most of them have come to view as expected. set that aside, that raises another issue. if they are right and i agree the iranians are not going negotiation seriously over this, if i'm right, they view it in the interest to pursue a nuclear weapon. it goes back, it's not just this regime, it's the position originally bawled off with the best weapons of the united states. it's a historic thing, the iranian view of the role in the gulf. if that's the case, it's difficult for me to understand, never say never, it's difficult for me to understand how the diplomacy is going stop war

which raises the issue of the whole diplomacy and war. diplomacy, i see as a tool in forward your policy. diplomacy is supposed to be used to add to stability as opposed to being used to forward the national interest. war is another tool that is used to forward your national interest and perhaps create stability. it's a far riskier course. given the iranian position and the israeli position, given the daylight between the american and the israeli position, the american definition of capability versus possession and the israeli red line they say capability is the issue, then i think that there is a very high problem ability it will go forward. i think it will be very

difficult for the united states to stop the israelis from attacking the iranians if they decided they had to. impossible, as a matter of fact. just as i think it's very unlikely that sanctions will work and convince the iranians they need to come and seriously negotiate. so looking at the future, i think that we're likely to see some sort of conflict, i think it's very unlikely that you will see the united states enter into a joint operation with the israelis, i think it's very likely that you will see the united states initiate an operation, i think that if a unilateral israeli attack against iran's nuclear facility os curs, it is going to be as much political as it is military. in other words, the israeli, the

one thing is the military officials and security officials are concerned about the limitation. it's a 2,000 mile roundtrip. it's much more difficult than anything else they have undertaken. there is a strong preference that the united states deal with it because we really are the only ones that have a capability to severely damage it. so one would have to assume that a unilateral israeli strike a level of heightened concern on their part with the political objective of bringing the united states into the conflict. most likely by the iranians slashing out at everyone in the gulf. thank you. >> anybody the mid august was a good time cheer the illusion

dispelled now. we have ample time for questions, comments from what i do see as the very well informed audience. do we have microphones, however? we do. [inaudible] >> that's good to hear. who has microphones? there they are. very good. can i ask this gentleman here, in the green shirt, first. stand up so they see you. yeah. and wait, wait for the microphone. i meant the other guy in the green shirt. that's okay. you can go ahead we'll take the other guy next. [inaudible] okay. let's try this one. what do you suppose our policy toward iran would be if they had no nuclear program?

i argue that it wouldn't be very difficult. because the real issue is strategic control of the gulf, and that issue is ongoing and is likely to become more dramatic. >> can you identify yourself, again with the microphone? >> ken meyer. >> thank you. >> allen, it seems like a question for you in part. >> i guess i can -- can you hear me? there we are. i think i agree with you ken. the issues would be separate, but certainly we have had, what? thirty years of negotiations with the iranians on our nonnegotiations struggle with the iranians over issues. but i think the nuclear issue is bringing it to a head. and this is something that we think that actually threatens the our own national interest so

severely that it is the dominant issue. basically i think you're right. >> can we have a microphone down here, please. and please, do introduce yourself first. >> peter humphrey. i'm an intention analyst. the strategic surprise it variably results from faulty assumption. one of the assumptions we are making here are actually continually is that when iran completes the bomb, it will test it. there is a proven design from khartoum car. terrorist is no need to test on iranian soil. that's how strategic happens. there is only way to make sure that iron iran -- iran stops completely the nuclear weapons. that's to promise them that

within 48 hours of iranian use by iran or by one of the surrogates, the city of tehran will be destroyed and the holy city of guam will be destroyed. that announcement now has been kept per pettily as a promise will make the iran nuclear weapon useless. >> indeed we have a proposition to intimidate the iranians out of it. can that be done? >> i don't think so. [inaudible] i think that what we have seen over time is the more that iran is pressurered and threatened the more aggressive and beledge rant the regime becomes. if there's one lesson we should take away in the less decade iran doesn't respond to pressure in a way that is constructive.

and so i think that this approach would be very counter productive. >> that makes the question, what was the iranians respond to? >> well, i think that awhile ago, they were responding to collaborative efforts in afghanistan, and there have been several commentaries written over the last several weeks that corporation over syria could be some sort of entry point into improving relations. i think it's an interesting and constructive proposal. i don't know if that leads us to a breakthrough on the nuclear issue. that's probably unlikely. but obviously if we go back to sort of the beginning of the whole trust issue, and what i was mentioning a few minutes ago you have to start somewhere. i think that if there could be another issue upon which there's collaboration, that's not about

the nuclear issue, that could be a trust building measure with iran that might be one way of eventually getting to the nuclear issue. this proposal was considered by the u.s. government for many years. i mean, that we would try -- the reason we were negotiating other afghanistan was to great some sort of broader relationship, that in which we could discuss many things not just the nuclear issues. i think that the reason we're at impact now there's far too much focus on the nuclear issue, and not enough focus on maybe on issues in which there are some commonality between the two countries. >> rove i have? -- rovey. >> i think you're a situation that already exists. the thing postulating saying for you do this, i'll do that. that already exists. if something bad enough happened in downtown tel aviv or even in the gulf, the iranian republican

would be attacked in comes rate fashion. thing is all -- i don't think it's very constructive to make threats like inspect the iranians are not stupid this they understand that a nuclear in downtown tel aviv will be the iranian republican. it will be responded to request according toly. you think for one minute on the attack on downtown tel aviv won't end up with 200 israel short range missiles? >> enough to do that, you won't be heard. yeah. >> here's my point, though, he's my point. the issue -- what we're trying to do is figure how it doesn't get to that point. where somebody can make a mistake the iran -- having go on a launch warning basis because

it's five minutes flying time. this is what we're trying to do here. it may very well be, the idea that the diplomacy -- as i was saying the idea that diplomacy and war are separate. it may be the only way you arrive at negotiations at this point and diplomacy and something meaningful to prevent the war. it may be through war to negate that effort. i mean, it would be nice if that weren't the case. but, i mean, we're pretty pessimistic about that right now. everybody. and so i hear what you're saying. but i think that's already understood. it's -- and the idea that the iranians are some kind of mess yab begannic crazy people that don't understand this is utter nonsense. that's people that don't understand what sheism or how -- i think the iranians are aware of it. i think it's a huge risk because

with you get people in that launch warning cycle and you don't know how to control it then you can have that happen. but i think there's no doubt in my mind whatsoever that if the iranians unloaded had a bomb unloaded it, by the way, whether you have the design or not, and i spent a lot of time in the nuclear weapons strip. whether you have the design or not, you do not know what the whether it work or done it right until you put it in the ground and pop it. >> could i have just this gentleman right in back. >> [inaudible] research annalist at the national defense university. from studying the iraqi case after the 91 israeli attack. it hindered the program and started military program. with the israeli attack might lead to a crash [inaudible]

that started after the innovation of kuwait that was intended to build a nuclear bomb -- device in six months. is that a trigger -- [inaudible] iranians do that after the israeli attack. what would the u.s. response to that would be? >> allen? >> i think i'm going deer have to robe on this one. he's a historian who specializes in the period. i actually believe this time the knowledge, the no hoe, and the technical capability is disperse enough iran. the likelihood that an israeli strike could do anymore more than temporarily curtail it. maybe not even that. is probably not very likely. eni think that the iranians learned something from '91 you don't put all your eggs in one

basket when you're doing it. i was recent afunction in the germany. the germans have good relations with iranians. a lot of their analytical people are trained and educated at university of tehran and other places. and we had the exact same discussion, and as one person frustrated fashion why pointed out the sanction had come too little too late. i was hoping it wasn't the case. i thought it was. nobody has any idea where they blurt this out which is of course is true. and so i don't think a question of if that happened, i think that people virtually be exist on from the beginning, which leads you to the question of is it going to look like the know fly zone over iraq from '91 to 2003 where you're constantly repeating this trying to do it.

i think that short of the fracturing of the entire iranian states or what happened to iraq by accident we didn't intebd by 2003 by accident you're not going to see the capability go away. that's a huge, that's a huge issue right through. because it is so ingrained in their perception themselves of coventy of national rights even people that oppose the current regime and might replace the current regime believe it's iran's right to have a nuclear program and do with it what they want. >> i have to ask you not conduct conversation without the microphone. >> what [inaudible] the russian appeal they already have. almost like 80% what if they use

that lo launch a crash program similar to the iraqy program to produce a single poem and -- bomb limited bomb. >> i thought i agreed with you. i think it would be an ongoing thing. i'm not sure we would get all if we went after. are you seeing what i'm saying? >> i want to add. you raise an important point. i hope that no one misunderstands that even though we're in agreement that it's seems more likely now than before there could be a unilateral military attack. this is not something that any of us believe is a solution. i think you raise the most important question, which is what happens the morning after. i think, you know, if you read all the statements coming out from israeli military officials, and politicians, they openly acknowledge that unilateral attacks will not set back the iran's nuclear program.

they said they would maybe have to have isolated attacks on the iran's nuclear facility every few years. i think it's safe to assume that unit lal would hassen the -- everything from we know about iranian society it is an issue that is a point of national pride and if the country were attacked, simply on the basis you can assume there would be far more support for the government than exist today which is completely counter productive to what the united states said the interest -- where the united states believe the interest lie. >> let me take the gentleman in front of you there. >> thank you. my name is jer regard. i'm part of the treasury department. you talked about sanctions before. we hear that the sanctions are multilot i are. the european union sanctions

different country sanctions things such as that. i'm waiting to see one case outside of the united states where a financial institution, where individuals, organization, where anybody either paid a fine or was in prison. when i usually ask that question, it's very embarrassing in the government circles, i think what happens is there is no example. nobody has been there. what i often say sometimes is there's an old italian proverb that many pair of shoes is worn out between say and doing. i think it's wonderful we have and we have a plan anything that will cause diplomacy is a good thing before war. as general said even silence is a weapon. so i'm just wondering what your views are on sanctions, laisk i -- basically. >> maybe i should respond to that. first of all, as your work for

treasury, you may be better positioned to answer your own question than i am. but i think the retribution for violating sanction hasn't necessarily been imprisonment and fines but have been diagonals to the market that has been a powerful incentive to discourage doing business, buying oil from iran. there have been incentives and punishments and as to the exact answer to your question, i can't answer that. but to some extent, it's not the most relevant answer. because the effect of the sanctions are very well known, and there has been a drop of some 40% or more in iranian oil exports. and there has been an inflation rate that has not about doubled and beginning to be shortages response i think the effect is there. the question is, does this

effect have any political, economic any political effect. the ants is unclear at best. >> the gentleman down here. enter i'm . >> i'm johnathan [inaudible] i noticed you mentioned the political constraints around the administration right now to get into a serious negotiation with iranians. [inaudible] my question is, given that one of the key iranian demands is recognition for the right to enrich. even at 3.5%. if your view -- [inaudible] is it politically impossible for

any american administration before or after the election to recognize that kind of right? >> good question. and the answer, again, i don't know. but let me tell what i think. it's certainly politically impossible for an election, and after that, it's conceivable that i think an administration could come to some sort of agreement based on this basis and what are the alternatives? are you willing to attack periodically, or are you willing to send in the troops or willing to absorb $8 00 barrel of oil for a month or two or three or six months? so you have to look at it from those possibilities. and if you do, i'm not as pessimistic as i believe the

other two on the panel are about the possibility of war. frankly, the results are too horrendous. i see this as a chance for renewed efforts of negotiation, and it's in some ways it reminds me of the peace process. people know the answer but can't find the political will to get there. there is an answer forward by tom pickerring and others who are experts in the area, and it's a question of coming up with tight enough controls so the people can have -- that they will work. and so politically, that's different problem that deals with the nature of american politics, and we'll have a better idea after november. >> maybe i can add a word to what allen said. which i agree completely.

that is so you to realize there a quite a few country sha's have reached the point that iran has reached in terms of cape ability to enrich. who have stepped back from getting nuclear weapons [inaudible] because brazil the equation there was burglary simple. they had one motive to develop nuclear weapons. that was argue teen that. and a mutual standout was possible. how does the iranian situation dirnt differ? in several important ways. one is, complete lack of confidence between iran and the people at threat. or who they might threaten. another is sister it's a multiparty situation. it's a much more complicatedded

situation. one which building confidence is much more difficult. but if you have what allen is pointing to strict safe guards that eliminate for all practical purposes, the possibility of enriching above a certain level, you really -- an agreement is conceivable. it's not -- we're not imagining something that can't be imagined. it's something quite possible which has equivalence has been done in other cases. let me take this gentleman here. [inaudible] my question relates to the previous question and that is that we are hear a lot [inaudible] mentioning today that iranians are not seriously negotiating with -- [inaudible]

but from from the summary that was mentioned i heard that -- [inaudible] that americans are waiting for the sanctions to have the course and perhaps influence their [inaudible] action. so you see, i'm baffled at some point americans are moving on full speed with their pressure [inaudible] and why they are having their diplomatic track also mentioned. yet no one criticize the rest not seriously negotiating with in the talk. [inaudible] always mentioned [inaudible] i want to say that there's no excuse for iranians inwillingness in the past. what i know what i have observed from the [inaudible]

in iran, this time, i mean, beginning from negotiation iran for the own various reasons is seriously committed to the their negotiations. unfortunately, it's the political call year of the election and it's the american side hoping to perhaps the sanctions and dynamic of directions they are not going -- that is one, you know, making their [inaudible] second one is mrs. abdul i appreciate your comments. [inaudible] you said [inaudible] mentioned proposed [inaudible]

changed course. i would like to get your evidence on that because i don't see that. i don't see the comments by the -- [inaudible] or anyone else thank you. >> do you want to start off,. >> i want to go back your specific point, i do think that

the west makes greater demands. that's why i'm not optimistic any longer about the 3.5%. however, if somehow we can turn the clock back after the presidential election, maybe there are talks over syria. maybe there is some completely unrelated negotiation process that goes on unofficially. perhapses that could be a confidence-building measure to get us back to where we were six months ago. i think also on the issue of sanctions, you know, the sanctions are hurting the regime. people who say the sanctions aren't hurting the regime. that's somewhat ludicrous. and i think though, it's important for us to also realize to what degree the capings are hurting the population and we should never forget that. and it sort gets loss. people can't afford to buy

chicken anymore. the price -- inflation the evaluation of the -- has tremendously hurt people's buying power. and the middle class is suffering the most according to a lot of renowned economists that are studying the issue. i think we have to keep it in mind as we talk about the effective sanctions. >> americans negotiating seriously or not. >> i think they are negotiating seriously. maybe i differ a little bit we are not able politically to reach a deal in a grand way and that the iranians would regard satisfaction. the essence of confidence-building measures that the american view could lead to serious negotiations big issues along the lines they

suggest. it's the old adage, you have to walk before you can run. in this case, crawl before you can walk. and so the iranians have to -- not been willing to deal with the level. you have a mismatch. i guess my own thought that is eventually, the fears that come -- the come from the fear of war will perhaps lead a little to all of this. i adopt see that happening before the us election. >> thank you. george from the u.n. press corp. in new york. i'd like to address this to any of you. i think particularly to pl's --

what is really going on and what do the people think inside iran? do the people at large, the majority of the people really support the government on develop of nuclear weapons or do some of the really believe [inaudible] only for purposes. do they support the government or does any significant percentage of the population look at this and say, we have one of the world puddles and we're spending all this money on development peaceful alternative sources of energy. does nobody realize this is costing the government, and therefore, you know, it's costing us and the government can't spend this money on social service needs or educational needs or whatever. >> thank you. >> i think that i would like to

turn that question over to the iranians in the room it get some sense of public opinion. and there are a few familiar faces. maybe we can get a sense of public opinion in iran. i think it would be helpful. where are you? i think it's a very difficult. >> can you stand up please. >> i think it's a difficult question to answer. i personally am not brave enough to represent, you know, the public opinion or claim that i know what 75 million people in the country think. it is also very difficult. when you talk about polls and public opinion polls have been conducted they are usually very difficult judge given the restriction that the society

experiences from the government. for the most part, i think i'm going defer to a lot of scholars who have written about public opinion and what the iranian public believe the nuclear issue. i think it's one thing that the public does support the government on. now the question is, after sanctions how is it going to affect the people if the cost are actually increased for the people? and the impact of sanctions actually felt the public will the iranian public want to be changing their opinion on this? and at some point saying enough is enough. it's not worth it, you know, it would be a good thing to have, but we can't buy chicken. we would rather go along with our every day activity and livelihood. i hope that -- [inaudible] there was a second part to the question.

hopefully -- [inaudible] [inaudible] did not see what it's doing do they support it -- [inaudible] do they support it only as development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. do nay not realize what the real intent of the government is? >> the real intent of the government is assumed by anyone you speak to. the real -- the government says that they're going to be, you know, -- the as far as the government is concerned they're not developing any sort of weapon. it's for peaceful energy purposes. it gets tricky. it depends on the population government tells them. what segment the young more educated who have access to social media ways of getting information have other doubts i think it's very difficult to answer your question very simply

and say, yes, the people do realize it. i think the cost have been increased. the sanctions sanctions are impacting son-in-law of the -- i think it's early to say if that's the public opinion against the government or not. and [inaudible] >> if you have a question, just pass the microphone. can you stand up, please. introduce yourself. >> my name is jessica she'der. i had a reaction to the comments that -- [inaudible] made on the two-track system. obviously incredibly politically dangerous to reach an agreement with iran. [inaudible] give the republican something to gnaw on for awhile. with regards to coming to negotiations maybe after elections to some degree of credibility, it would be important for example, to have actions released on the table.

and your comments to cripple sanctions versus truly crippling sanctions earlier, i kind of like you to respond to we continue to up the military presence in the gulf. if we don't [inaudible] additional sanctions we targeted everything how do we between now and election season should there not be almost a form of trust exercise on our side to demonstrate willingness to negotiate afterwards. not that they are or really a sis before the election we are genuinely not interested in negotiating. >> i think to answer your question, perhaps the biggest element of trust is the -- i think intensive u.s. effort to convince the israelis now is not the time to attack, and the rest of this is sort of beyond the administration's control at this point. and that would be my answer.

[inaudible] you made a point earlier and that's something i want to address my question or comments to. [inaudible] there must be something that would make the iranians to agree to it and i if were an iranian negotiator, my position would be to dismantle's israel's nuclear capability. destroy the nuclear stockpile. number three, we want to get to russia and chinese position is with respect to an unilateral attack by israel iran. i think they should take the courage to come forward and say they would neutralize israel just as the united states would

say if israel was attacked with a nuclear weapon, suddenly the iran would go up in flames just like [inaudible] france and england attacked jint if you don't -- london and paris go up in nuclear flames. there should be a counter threat in order to stop israel from unilateral attack. i don't -- obama's cajoling israeli to stop is to not going stop. it's has to be a counter measure. >> anybody want to take that one on? >> it was addressed to you, dan. [laughter] ..

because the problem with we talked iran else would put it is not going away to be on the other side there is going to be continued diplomatic sanctions, so i think seeing these things as alternatives is wrong. they are all a part of the same continuum, and there's parts of it that are much higher risk

than other parts of it. any time you start thinking that you are going to solve the problem with the war and you better think about it again because you are going to create another problem. any time you think you can absolutely prevent a war and create a stable situation for negotiations when the tensions are running as high as they are and the positions are as hard as they are, then you are also being naive about it and so i think is much more productive to view this on a continuum. one more comment about the iranians, if i were an error on ne or were devising a iranians, what the past ten years and say the united states has destroyed our enemy, the taliban and afghanistan. they have done everything, accomplished every policy goal that we had in the iran iraq

war, got rid of saddam, the baathist party and placed the shia in control of iraq. okay. the united states has come back and is willing to have a relationship with us. the label us the part of the axis of evil and then do nothing about it. we are not talking about this administration. and then and now the united states is trying to get the israelis to back off the sanction. i don't believe they were serious or anybody was serious at this point, so i think they are making a big misjudgment about just a serious the situation is right now. >> i have three comments. one is i take your attention to the quotation that some a cover of the paper second about israel and its nuclear weapons beginning along these lines of a

u.n.-sponsored conference on the middle east but it's also generations away from anything happening. >> let me take this gentleman in the bright blue shirt. whenever you come to a meeting like this -- >> from human-rights watch some members said commanding general for all of you, it seems the last three months and last few weeks how much the sanctions are actually harming the civilian population. so it seems to me the only good option with iran may be a 1% chance of working would be the regime to fall and opt out of what may be beyond the nuclear capacity but wouldn't have the kind of rhetoric that makes america fail, so if the sanctions are harming the mill class so much to the extent the visible society structures are collapsing with reports telling us that they are. and the sanctions are inviting

enough to really harm the regime because as we both know, this regime wants us to in power so they won their nuclear program that is where they are going to put all their money. so if the sanctions aren't doing much to prevent the regime from doing what it wants and it's doing a lot to stop the people from building a civil society to actually do something in the future, then what is the kind of the sanction and why are we doing them? thank you. >> well, one answer is that they have 40% less income to do things, to spend, for whatever activities they have in mind, with its nuclear or otherwise. and i think that it's not right to argue there has been no response. it just hasn't been concentrated enough of the political level. whether it will ever reach that is another question. i don't know if you have seen the movie the green wave, but i recommend that it comes away making quite a point which is the regime is now so cruel and

brutal that it's provoking a resistance that may take some time to generate that there is a reaction to the very severe reaction that they have, and i was very strong buy one of the tweets saying the greatest threat is in terms. >> i'm going to take one last question. let it be this one. and then i am going to ask the panel to make final remarks if they want to. >> i would like to hear the panel on the argument to an estimate for the audience why don't you tell us what kenneth falter's vardaman is. >> let it go. having a nuclear iran would create security and stability in the region, and give them enough self-confidence.

>> well i'm sure he will want to comment on this. my own reaction is it's much like what's his name. thank you very much. what we need is more nuclear weapons in the world. and so, my reaction is maybe in fact we end up with a policy of containment, and i personally think would work, but i don't think it should be our intended policy. there are better options. >> i think it opens the door. i think this is one of the arguments that they have been making is probably correct. it opens the door to a whole series of countries. turkey, because if you think field competition between turkey and iran is dead, then you don't

understand what the geopolitical dynamic has been for 500 years or maybe even longer, probably a lot longer than that. turkey, egypt, saudi arabia. i think all of them in the middle east consider the nuclear option, because none of them -- i mean, they as a whole at a very fundamental level they despise the iranians and it is a historic thing. but the other thing is i think it is totally impractical. i don't think that -- i don't think there is any way this administration or the next administration or any other administration can agree to that because they will be pummeled by the opposition, and it's a political limb at station on our part. so, they are underestimating the obama administration because militarily in the use of force

the obama administration has been far more aggressive in many ways than the bush administration was. far more aggressive. if you look at -- i mean, remember it was the republicans that castigated him for saying that he found out that osama bin laden or in pakistan that he would go into pakistan unilaterally. what happened, right? so, i think people are assuming somehow obama is going to be easier in the long term. they will come around to the view that this is serious, but i also think there is a very realistic view that it's not likely and then we have that ignition point that we have to look at what happened at that point. so that makes sense. >> i think we need to think about it. it is very destabilizing situation not only because of proliferation, but because the

israelis reduced to choosing between the long-term warning are taking a big risk and i don't think they would want to check the big risk because at wasn't morning. this is one of the reasons there is a negotiated solution because i think when the irony in israeli think of what the implications of their actual possession of nuclear weapons would be, they wouldn't be in iran's interest, and so maybe i can ask the panel going in reverse order to make any final remarks if they would like. >> i'm afraid the path of some sort of meaningful arrangement, and don't kid yourself of there being no conflict in the gulf, there will always be a conflict between iran and the gulf arabs and their neighbors. it's just the nature of the

thing, candidates backed. i can give you example after example. i don't see that changing. but i think going to a situation where you have a simmering conflict where there is no strategic issue where people feel like they have to do something. the only path to convince the iranians at this point that everybody is really serious, unfortunately it might take a conflict. it might take a conflict >> i would like to go back to what we were talking about which is i don't think that will result the issue, and i think the story is far from told. a lot of what happens with u.s. iran relations will depend on what is helping in syria and it will depend upon eventually what happens in bahrain. and i think that we are likely

to see or have some sort of unintended consequences of the arab uprising in terms of the power and influence of the region. estimate is the common ground. the primary goal of the moment has to be the conflict, because i think it would be devastating economically. i don't think the u.s. public wants another war in this part of the world. i don't think the countries are wanted and there has to be some options. so the primary job to do now is to stave off the conflict, and then you think about how you can negotiate seriously and a new american administration. >> in concluding let me just

thank the staff mei and sais for their supporting of this and thank the really good panel. [applause] [inaudible conversations] but a number of primaries yesterday, several republicans and survive conservative challenges in last night's primaries including former

wisconsin governor tommy thompson who is running for senate and ten term represented john mica of florida. we spoke to capitol hill reporter for an update on the races. >> we want to rap up primary night last night across the four states to help us wrapped that we are joined by alexandra jaffe of the whole newspaper. alexander jaffe, thanks for joining us this morning. >> guest: thanks, john. >> host: the headlines out of the state of wisconsin last night in that senate race gives us a wrapup of what happened there. >> guest: so, former governor tommy thompson was able to beat back a couple of competitors. he was by the establishment, but tea party was insurgent in that state he was able to kind of overcome those challenges, so it is looking to be a competitive race in the future probably favoring in at this point. but we will see.

now that hampson kind of took the nomination. >> host: how are democrats feeling about this race? it's an important race for the control of the senate come election day. >> guest: right. as, tammy baldwin took the nomination there. she was definitely the favorite for democrats. but it is a state in which republicans have recently been insurgent because of the kind of recall election and ryan is such a big star, so it will be one of the states in which paul ryan plays a very large but it's also a state where a lot of money is going to be spent for the republican presidential race is going to play a role there as well. so democrats are feeling good about their nominee, but it remains to be seen how much strength republicans will continue to have. >> host: one last question on the streets, to permit candidates were looking at this race as another place for a big win. what does this do for that he party hopes in general?

>> guest: yeah, so there were a couple of tea party candidates that were kind of beaten back by thompson. she was a very self funded businessman doing well in the financial, but the fact that tommy thompson was able to pull it out and the kids kind of a strength of the establishment, and that was actually proven in a couple of other races last night. >> host: take us elsewhere last night. in michigan, any other big races? obviously the race to fill tammy baldwin's seat. >> guest: right. so, michigan was an interesting kind of state. it was a state in which we were not really sure what was going to come out of it, and the republicans look like they were going to remain insurgent, but it's still going to be in the maximum of the states that often turns blue, so we will see what happens. it's likely to get a large influx of the money now that it's kind of been decided. >> host: another senate contest people are closely watching this fall.

the connecticut race to replace joe lieberman. what happened their last night? >> guest: the connecticut race kind of got its expecting results. chris murphy will be running for the republicans, and that is then expected for some time now. expecting to be attacking each other in the general election, and right now it leads for them but there is still so much money she can really make a big impact at the race. so, we will see how that turns out after all of that closes out. >> host: linda mcmahon, a candidate that ran before. she gets her money through the -- through her work with the world wrestling federation or world wrestling entertainment; is that what it is? >> guest: right. that was her business. >> host: how much did she give up spending on this primary? she spent millions last time around. >> guest: yes, she already spent a couple million this time around, and that's likely to

increase. but now that she has kind of taken the nomination, it is a wide open door for outside groups outside republicans to come help, although they will probably be wanting to spend their cash also where there's not candidates that can kind of self fund at the same level she can. >> host: i know the late night last night can you take us elsewhere in the country, other surprises and big headlines from last night? >> guest: one of the things that kept me up is florida, it was florida's fifth district where there was an upset. they were the incumbent or whether the district, sorry. cliff stearns is an over 20 year incumbent, and he was actually probably taken down by a tea party insurgent so that is one of the district's that she did kind of play a large role. it's a local veterinarian whose name is tom. i spoke with him last night and he said he's kind of thinking of for his accomplishments and will

run on constitutional principles. so he's running against another democratic opponent as also a political newcomer so it will be interesting to see how that plays out because it is an example of the tea party insurgents and we didn't really see that last night. >> host: when you talk to him last night how did he do in terms of the guidance and the several million dollars in the bank accounts and over half a million dollars on his primary race and most people thought she had this in the back. >> guest: he had something like 130,000 cash on hand over 12 million. he said, his campaign manager said that it is true. he won a couple and he did have a multi-party support. that shows kind of the power of the tea party in florida. and conversely there was a race between cindy adams, who was a tea party backed candidate and john mica who is more of the establishment candidate on the

incumbent race in the seventh district of florida. and he pulled it out over cindy adams, so i don't think it is a foregone conclusion that they have the strength they had in 2010. it's just it can be a game changer in certain areas. >> host: like stearns cos a member of congress. was the race ever in doubt? >> guest: i mean it's hard to say. adams of course wanted it to be and she was kind of running a very fierce campaign. the polls have been showing a large lead over the past couple of months so for the most part it was expected that he would pull it out and she thought as much about it as she could but she really couldn't. >> host: alexandra jaffe from any of the reasons that kept you plus? >> guest: florida, other than that, i mean most things were

expected in the 26 the district. democrats got their cony garcia but he's already run before coming and -- >> host: who is he running against? >> guest: he will be running against david rivera who was actually preferred in that race. so, that isn't likely to be that competitive. also, rivera is under some scrutiny for controversy and he may be under federal law investigation. we will see if it plays a larger role in the race going on. >> host: that is that the district going on in miami. alexander jaffe from the whole newspaper, thank you for joining us after a long primary night last night. >> guest: absolutely. thank you.

hosted by the calvin coolidge foundation tonight i actually think however that re-ride fiscal cliff, and horrified as almost everybody in washington. but i will tell you why. there is no chance that we are going to go back to the clinton tax rates on as we do that, and we need to go back to the clinton tax rates. secondly, there is no chance we are going to cut the defense budget as we do that and we need to cut the defense budget. it hasn't been cut in 30 years. is there will be things that are painful for those of us on the progress of sight, and it will send us, tip us into a recession according to the congressional budget office that is a non-partisan people of the country as far as i can tell that look at the budget. and we will see 1.3% decline for

two consecutive quarters, and then 2.3% increase over the year. it's a very tough price, but it's the only way if there is good to be no agreement in washington, these people will also agree with roger completely out to lunch. but the fact is we need to do these things. we cannot go on with the kind of deficits we have come and people have been saying that since the collision was put together. that was a long time ago and it was the exception of bill clinton and the regime got worse and worse and worse. we cannot afford it. i'm telling you that as a liberal democrat. the reason we get so many programs and what i was running in a state, success, all fiscal changes and all these things. the northeast kingdom, because we have a stable budget and these things or not treated as of expenditures there was somehow going to go with magically. when we raise the expenses we raise and cut taxes and expenses, and we also played a framework for the gradual expansion of the roles of things that i thought needed to be done

particularly in health insurance for our children. you can't do that if you don't care where the money comes from and if you are fiscally irresponsible. you can only do that if you have a base of fiscal responsibility to pay attention so that when you do these things programs are sustainable. i think it is important and we cannot continue to run these kind of deficits and i don't think anything is going to get done without harmoniously doing it and i don't blame the democrats for doing this. they are not meant to cut -- they're not went to continue to allow billionaires' to have tax breaks while we are cutting social security and medicare. diaz density last month posted its annual security forum in color of focusing on issues ranging from counterterrorism to sever security. coming up we will show you several parts from that event beginning with a discussion from intelligence and law enforcement officials on what's going on in the agencies since 9/11.

then in an hour, national the bushofficials from and obama administration talk about the role of the white house and counterterrorism. predentmorning everybody. i am david hiller and have a great privilege of introducingie this amazing panel that is going to be discussing law enforcemena agencies at all different levels and the work they do to keep our country safe. country se. and what an amazing panel what is. t.will be going from left toromh right. brad becky as for corporate toward the disputed -- target corporation and assets and national business and business reputation of target globally. next part, the executive director of the international association of chiefs of police.

he he has 21,000 bosses, and members in that capacity. and over 100 countries. he also served as the principal undersecretary for analysis the department of homeland security, and the director of homelandsec. security law enforcement in the office of the director of national intelligence.o sean joyce was named fbiover director with all the fbi operations. prior to this role, sean oversav the fbi's counterterrorism counterintelligence weapons of mass destruction and all other weap intelligence programs.ntelligenc next, tennessee williams'siams r stricter of interpol washingtono and in that capacity represents the interregional in the united states and all interpol related activities. prior to this, he served as thes chief of technical operations with the u.s. marshals servicelt where among other things, hee we oversaw all of the nationwide

surveillance operations. and the honorable william webster, who is a former judge of the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit, for murder of the fbi come direo marward rector of the cia making him the only american to have served as having both of those agencies and is currently the ii chairman of homeland security advisory council for the department of homeland security. our moderator is dena temple-raston a correspondent with bloomberg news and works as a counterterrorism correspondent for npr and we will all have the pleasure of hearing herpleasureo frequently on the radio. in addition to that, the in internet is an award winning -- dina is the award winning author turn itbooks i commend to you. succumb dina let me turn it over to you. great.ha [applayounk very much. [applause] and thanks for coming here thisn

morning. what we are going to dorning. what we are going to isbout this panel is it offers a real spectrum about people who get involved with terrorism cases. very often have trouble figuring out where they are in the process of investigating the case. this is a rare opportunity where we can get an idea of what is going on step by step by step. at every case is the same, but this will give you an idea. we thought the best way to do this would be to use specific example. some cases may not get involved with the specific example, but they can give us a good hypothetical idea of what they would have done in a particular case. how many of you know the new york subway case? let me give you a tiny synopsis

so that you will understand what it is we are talking about. this case happened back in 2009. at the time the fbi thought it was the most serious case in the united states since 9/11. the reason was, an afghan native who actually used to have one of those cards from new york city, went to afghanistan and pakistan and basically wanted to fight with the taliban. instead he added that getting recruited by al qaeda because he had a clean at passport and was able to get in and out of the united states. what makes this different from all the other people you talk about is he actually built a viable bomb. he tested one in denver. he was able to make the detonator. i have steady bonds a lot. apparently that is the hardest part to do.

he made the bomb with here by boiling it down to a particular ratio. he went to a big hair salon outlets in denver and bought massive amounts of hair dye. so much that even the guy at the counter said, what are you doing with all of this year die? for the purposes of our panel having set that up, let's assume that he is a thrifty guy. instead of going to this owlet he went to target and bought a lot of hair dye. let's assume for the argument that a clerk at target said, wow, that is a lot of hair dye. he reported it. in what would happen. >> some quick context because