read . . [applause] >> certainly it's my pleasure to be here, and i think this is an outstanding book, and i am privileged to be able to

introduce dr. george daughn, and it's a very great relationship that we have between the navy memorial cross the street and the national archives. we regularly see and experience people who are coming over here to do research and visit with us and we have an opportunity to respond to their interests and take advantage of their enthusiasm to reflect upon the experiences of those that have served in the navy and the other services the we support of the navy memorial. being on the main street here in the nation's capital is quite a privilege, and we have run the navy memorial across the street since a was dedicated on october 13th, 1987. an awful lot of people don't realize we have been around for 20 years across the street and we are very proud to be a strong component of the pennsylvania avenue corporation and in all of

what has helped to restore that portion of washington, d.c. to the prominence that it has today. certainly today we are going to hear a bit about the history of the navy had the debate over the role of the navy that took place during their early years of the nation's history despite the navy's strong performance during the revolutionary war and some of our founding fathers didn't see the need for the deep water fleet. they didn't see the need for an island nation like the united states to do more to defend the shores but the revolutionary war of 18 will settle the debate for good. author today will tell you how the debate should the future of the navy. they've benefited from that decisive year in the nation's history. our guest today is a little bit unique because george daughn holds a ph.d. in american history from harvard university but his active-duty service was in the air force, so we are

really privileged to have george will and to express his thoughts about the navy with an air force background that contributes to his appreciation for what the navy has to offer. he served in the air force during the vietnam war and ultimately also taught at the air force academy, so he was quite an interesting approach from that perspective as well. he also taught at the university of colorado, the university of new hampshire, wesleyan university in connecticut college, and of course connecticut college is right across the river from the mean submarine base and a place where i as a nuclear submariner had the privilege of learning my first experiences in the submarine force and spend a lot of time they're actually responsible for submarine group in the later years of my career as well. george now lives in portland maine with his wife who joins him today coming and we are very happy that they are here.

please join me in welcoming dr. george daughn to the national archives. [applause] thank you very much, admiral buchanan. that is a splendid introduction even for an air force guy like myself. [laughter] i would like to begin -- i'm going to talk for about 30 minutes or so and then invite your questions if that is okay. i would like to begin where the book begins in in all the plays, paul revere. let me tell you something about the situation in boston on the night of april 18th, 1975. and i will explain why this is relevant to the founding of the

navy. in boston the british had 4,000 troops underhung general thomas gage, and he had orders from the king if to make a show of force against the rebels in massachusetts creating a fuss. general gage had also 24 british warship sent to harbor. some of which were there on that particular evening. and, the admiral in charge of the fleet was someone named thomas graves, and the admiral and the general didn't get along. they didn't -- they had very little communication. in fact, they couldn't stand each other.

the patriots new everything the british were doing. if they knew that general gage had these orders but they didn't know quite when the general was going to conduct his force, so they found out on the evening of april 18th when 700 of the 4,000 started crossing the charles river in rowboats provided by the fleet commander samuel graves. they started about 930. at 10:00 paul revere showed up by dr. joseph koren's house to get hit a reverse to alert the countryside of the british for finally making their move.

we then picked up two companions and they rushed down to the water's edge in north boston and got in a rowboat. so paul revere didn't start his ride by jumping on a horse he started in a rowboat with two companions and he had to row across the mouth of the internals river which was 600 yards wide. but sitting directly in front of him right in the middle of that fair a way was a british battleship. the 64 guns somerset. he didn't think he was going to make it across. a horse rate in charlestown, but he thought the battleship would be running the guard boats and the centuries would be on the alert looking for the alarm riders like himself so he thought the chances for she

would be picked up in that light in the brig of the battleship and he wouldn't have been heard from for a very long time. nonetheless, he started out on his journey. he had a neighbor of his 23-years-old hand to lanterns in the belfry of north church to alert the patriots in charlestown that the british were on the move coming in the fees' lights were for the purpose of getting these patriots going in case he didn't make it across the river. so, you can imagine these patriots paul revere and his friends thinking they are not going to get there but they did. the road right by the battleship

and right to the town in charlestown, and he got on his horse and rode into history. in the meantime the 700 british troops were having a devil of a time getting across the river because the admiral hadn't provided enough boats. what had taken was at least three or four hours it was taking forever. so paul revere had plenty of time and other writers where he had ignited the had plenty of time to browse the countryside. now, the commander in boston had no idea how many patriots would

turn out. he knew that the militia was there and that they would turn out, but he was hoping that nothing would happen. she was hoping that no shots would be exchanged so he had given no orders to the commanders of the 700 troops as to what to do if he got into a fight with the patriots so is lieutenant colonel smith was the head of the 700 going out with no orders if the fighting broke out. it wasn't long before colonel smith realized that the countryside was alerted, so she sent back quickly for reinforcement so general gage said that digital hundred but it took forever to get the 1200 going so smith was more less on his own. guess how many patriots turnout? to begin with, there were 4,000, then 6,000, than 10,000, than

14,000 by the end of the day, 14,000. in 72 hours, 21,000 turned out. this was more soldiers than the entire british army in the world of the time. these were not young man grabbing muskets from their fireplace and just running to lexington and concord. these were young men who were formed into a well drilled militias. the patriots had been exercising these men since the fall. this is now april. the patriots had taken over the town politically in the fall of 74, and because of that of the reorganized the town militia so the kings offices were replaced

who were elected. who were these guys? they were veterans, they were battle tested veterans from the french and indian war. so the patriot militia that showed up were organized at their town levels. they were well organized at the regimental level. but beyond that, not. but they certainly had more experience in the british counterparts. here is where the navy came in. you know what happened that day. these overwhelming numbers dealt a crushing blow to general gage troops and if it wasn't for general percy who was the head of the reinforcement, the british would have been defeated and captured. but anyway, i began here because the patriots didn't have the

militia like the head the land alicia. there was no attempt to organize anything on the water coming and we know from reading all of the documents that are available but the british admiral in boston expected nothing from the patriots that might. he experienced what he expected which was nothing. but what if the patriots had been organized with the militia? what if they had taken all those boats, hundreds of boats that were scattered in the creeks and all-around boston harbor and attacked his worship that might? what would have happened? he wrote to the ad for all saying they would have taken at least of the somerset. they probably would have taken

his flagship. actually if you think of the members of the soldiers that turned out, they could have captured his entire fleet. now, i say this because this big battleship that he rode past was asleep. the commanding officer had no reason to stop the writers from going into the countryside. and so, he was right in the middle of the action with of the 700 troops going across. even he wasn't paying any attention. so they all could have been surprised. the patriots of course had no intention of attacking the ships. they were defensive. they were not offensive minded. they were responding. they were not initiating any action. in fact, with the patriots wanted was a settlement with the king. it was the camel that was forcing all of this upon them.

it wasn't until much later that they declared independence after a great deal of provocation which followed the history much of which you know. now, the navy in my mind starts right here because of adams and ben franklin and john hancock and all the familiar patriotic leadership that you know. they were thrilled by the turnout of all of these troops and how well they did. and they thought well, we've got nothing on the water just think of what we can do on the water. we can build a substantial fleet that will challenge the british. and if you read their correspondence, you will see they began to think about the continental navy right here. and it was their thinking starting at this point that the

idea for the navy develops. what kind of navy did they want. they wanted a british navy in miniature. they wanted to decide the army from the navy just like the british did coming and they wanted to build the ships just like the british had come and they thought that we could certainly do that. they were not at all concerned about the kind of thing that the admiral was concerned with which is those small boats attacking the british and organizing anything of that type of business and they didn't think in terms of having the army coordinating with the navy. so, in my book i show that these great patriot leaders worked very hard throughout 75 a did by

the ferocity of the british attacks to create a british style navy and miniature and this succeeded in october of 1775 when the congress responded to a number of things but most immediately to the destruction, the burning down of falmouth maine in earlier that month by admiral graves in boston. they decided they were going to build a navy and the converted immediately 12 merchant ships to warships and then in december they decided to build for 13 frigates making 25 ships and the appointed someone who was an

admiral but he wasn't an admirable, he was a relative of the chairman of the committee that said that the navy of rural ireland. now, this navy was an effective throughout the war because it never operated under washington. it was never involved in any major battle of war except in charleston and 1781a performed miserably. it was engaged for the most part in the reading of commerce and of carrying supplies to the continental navy in carrying important persons from this country to france. it was doing everything except being in involved in the theater of action where the

revolutionary was being decided. so, in my mind the reason it was an effective is because it was the wrong kind of lesson. they didn't learn the lesson of that early episode in boston harbor that what you needed to defend the british attacks new york, the lafayette, charleston, savannah, virginia. what you needed is a navy that the british feared we would produce which is a navy have gunboats and small ships in great numbers and that was closely allied with washington and in those major battles lie detailed how in the book how washington could have used this kind of force. he was never permitted to. he was never permitted to have a

navy. one of the greatest of the naval heroes in the revolutionary war was john paul jones. john paul jones was an example of the many great leaders that this continental navy despite all of its problems produced and they were role models for the navy that followed, so i point out in the book that although the navy was an effective on the battlefield because it never was in the battlefield, in those battlefields they produced a cadre of offices and hear those -- heroes that were offense importance that would follow. so, john paul jones at the end of the war when the battle of yorktown was just forming up and

was about to be fought road to washington asking if he could possibly find something for him to do, and washington said i can't. the navy has never worked for me. there isn't anything for you to do. jones went to see washington and a guest for use in those days the revolutionary was being decided, he was in portsmouth new hampshire, and it was killing him, so these great heroes that the continental navy produced for i think i point out if misused, and washington agreed with that. despite its failures, the continental navy was

indispensable to the navy that followed. after the revolution ended in 1793, the country had no navy and we didn't begin that maybe not until 1794 in washington's second term but when he began coming he could look at all of the problems at the time and that navy and try to rectify them. he also had a great body of experience to work within the country into the building of the warships and the manning of the ships, so if he had to start from scratch it would have been a much for difficult problem in creating the federal navy if we hadn't had the experience of the continental navy to show the

wonderful men who fought in that service and under conditions for harvick coming in a pilot to point out the greatest patriots but for much maligned sailors and officers of the continental navy. when washington wanted to start his new navy in 1794, it is the purpose of supporting neutrality. washington believed that the united states could not be respected if a policy couldn't be successful if it wasn't reported by a 64-cent, and he thought if you didn't build a successful see force, we would be involved in war. our weakness would involve

content. we wouldn't be able to remain neutral. so, the purpose of the navy right from the very start was to keep the peace. he certainly didn't want to go through another war. having the united states involved in another war would be ruinous for the constitution and the making of the new institutions of the republic. as a, a strong navy in his mind was instrumental of keeping the united states out of the war. now, he was opposed vigorously by a big group of people led by jefferson and madison and faugh they were a pretty articulate bunch politically, very powerful but of course fighting washington, and washington was a unique political figure in the support he had run the country

but they were good themselves, and because they were great political support in the country, washington could never get all of the navy that he wanted, and a great debate developed between the supporters of the navy and the opponent's, and this debate carried on through every administration until the war of 1812. jefferson and madison as i now have a number of items but the chief argument was a navy is going to embroil us in the very war we are trying to prevent. in other words, they would point out it's good to be too easy for the president to use and the other arguments as well but that was the chief one, so all of these people were interested in keeping the peace and they have a basic disagreement about how

to do and what role of the few plant it and so the navy's existence was in doubt. they wanted to do away with the navy. they didn't want one at all, sort of the coast guard and a larger scale to the triet of this debate goes on. when ann adams becomes president he had support of washington all the way through and washington supports him and because of the political situation adams was able to get a substantial navy going again fought every step of the way by jefferson and madison. when jefferson becomes president in 1800, adams fears it is going

to be dispensed with but it can't be because the napoleonic war is going on and we have an ongoing war with the mediterranean pyrite states and so jefferson can't literally do away with the navy but he keeps them the art of his term and so does madison and we go into the war f-18 dolph unprepared. we have 16 warships and going into the war of 1812 not a single forget has been built since washington and adams' de. that's what we had going into the war of 1812. miraculously in the first six months of that format, the u.s. navy frigates won a series of victories against british ships.

it was an incredible. madison went into the war and thought the u.s. navy would be wiped out very quickly just like it was in the revolutionary war. and in that our strength on would lie in privateers. but when these victories were won by the great ships like the uss constitution medicine quickly changed his mind and started praising the navy and thought that perhaps it might be something here. also these victories were wonderful and increasing morale among the people and the particular president's for all, they were not critical to warning to the car running the war bouck the following year all

they had was perry and his victory was important winning the war and then the following year in the battle of lake champlain, thomas macdonough, one of the great heroes of history of what i would call the saratoga and the yorktown of the war of 1812, so it was the navy here who performed so well and so indispensable the miss war that changed everybody's mind. it certainly changed jefferson and madison. he is still alive at this time coming and a big consensus developed on the need for the needy. washington who wasn't alive at the time i must have been smiling hearing them, these long opponents of the navy. hearing them now strong supporters hoping everyone had forgotten all those years when

they were against the navy, so washington advocated back in 1794 and it wasn't accepted by all of the country now was accepted and it's this consensus, this broad political consensus that the navy now rested on its place in our national defense was never questioned after that. yeah, the size of the navy and all the arguments would go on about the navy would never its existence as was questioned during all these years and so i'm going to end here by saying this is why i spent on this book 40 years of telling you what went on in order for the navy to tell you this story of how the u.s. navy got founded. i will end of their and invite your question. [applause]

>> you mentioned that the american army was experienced based on the war for mengin v m war debate and i know the french and indian war was the global war but we usually think of it in terms of land battles. was there much in the way of the navy involvement in the french and indian war that would have infected people perception of the navy and help solidify or d solidify the navy's need in their mind? >> i don't spend time in the war of 1812i mean on the french and indian war other than what i mentioned to you. but sure, the british won a substantial navy victory over

france and the seven year war. it was known as the seven year war and of the war mchugh was known as the french and indian. the french won a tremendous over that period of time tremendous battles against the french and defeated them. the united states, as far as the united states was concerned, the colonists were involved that they were serving on some of the ships against their will many of them, some are not. but to my mind coming and i mentioned this a little bit in the book come to my mind the key importance for the navy and french and indian war mike is the of building of privateers. we built some really good for ships by the end of the war they were pretty darn good. and so when in 1775 the congress wanted to create a navy they

wanted the navy to appear just like the militia of here miraculously. when they wanted to do that they looked at people of that experience building the privateers and the seven year format. that's able why they were to produce the marchant minn which stated, the 12 original navy ships and then the frigates and some of them will never actually got to see. they were pretty darn good because of the experience they had building them earlier. it's a very good question by the way. thanks very much. yes, sir. >> what grade would you give medicine for his conduct of the war of 1812, and why?

>> f. i'm an old schoolteacher. fy fy -- tridata f and the chairman said and i said i know but still, what can i do. anyway, madison and jefferson had neglected the navy. they thought the navy was useless against the british. they never expected anything from that. it was because of the people in the navy, the professional fighters in the navy who had been shipment under adams during

the clause i war and had been involved in and then the war against tripoli it was because of them that the victories were one. at the end of the day of course madison took credit. he was a politician after all. this isn't to say matheson wasn't a great man. madison was a great man he just wasn't a great war leader coming and that happens sometimes. we were extremely fortunate the british were preoccupied with napoleon at the time, and we were fortunate in the offices who were leaving the navy all those years and how they stuck it out is one of the great

stories in american history. the patriotism of these people, they were not being paid anything. they were being shortchanged and here they were when the guns went off. so it is an incredible story. and i want to mention also that the navy played a part in battle of new orleans that nobody knows about and that is in the book. if a guy that was the head of the navy and charleston or new orleans, of course he was given nothing come his name was patterson and patterson had his crews in condition to fire their weapons. the american gunners in the world, the british found the not was the gunnery of the american cruisers. the british never encountered

that before. patterson had with them in new orleans he had a good for nothing ships down there and one of them was sent but jackson when they took the guys from the ships and put them on his line jackson had a small number artillery pieces. if a man of those pieces, so when you had those 2,000 british soldiers marching towards that line, just think of it? these were veterans and guys that had beat napoleon. this was a pretty fair some crowd. it was these navy guys shooting the guns that won the battle of new orleans along with jackson

sharpshooters and so on, so it wasn't a naval battle but they were participating in a critical way and anybody that participate us to acknowledge the decisive role of the u.s. navy. so all of these stories were a part of the great public consensus that devah looked around the media ought that time. madison to use credit at the end of the day when it was all over he accepted credit and he then told the congress from now on we need a navy and a permanent navy and a strong navy and we have to plan for that and it is a permanent institution so he changed his mind. >> at the battle of laden

spurred they were salvaged by the navy gunners. >> one of the hero's was joshua bonnie and he was leaving the navy troops at this battle that he describes, and he starts out in the continental navy, so i followed him all the way through and here he appears and he was willing to -- his navy guys were the only ones that fault and the rest of the americans ran which is why washington got burned. the british treated him like a prince. they admired him and his

courage. i beat upon the british walton this book but they were guys that attribute to military men of courage. >> hello. listening to your comment today about the night navy -- [laughter] >> you are very brave. i congratulate you. dimension of them wanting to create the war. why do you think it was that they made that strategic error?

it seems obvious that what they need is a defense force or sort of small liberal where force. were they carried away with something greater or were they advised by other people with the considerations, what do you think led them to that initial mistake and perhaps put back the growth of the development for a few years? >> i spent a lot of time trying to figure audience church that. and so if you look at the history of what happened between lexington and concord in the end of 1775 just that period when the original continental navy

actually got in the water fell leadership is full of optimism coming and they're full of optimism because of how well they had done. they had done very well at lexington and concord and they will at the bunker hill. they'd done very well on lake champlain and benedict arnold during the spurt of gained control of your action plan. we had done well in boston harbor. washington was holding his own against the british in boston he had then trucked in boston. we're mad as hell of the british were doing. the king was committing one atrocity after another. and people were just be leaving this stuff in the battle of

bunker hill for instance. admiral graves burned down charlestown, burned the whole town down to the it was 400 buildings in town older than boston. and the king wanted him to do that in order to. later on in october, they burned down, the same guy burned down from f. mayne. he had about the same number of buildings and 4,000 people it was done almost without warning and you have all these people with other refugees these are the kings people we haven't even declared independence. you have a combination of excess

burton's doing well because of all those troops that we potentially had an dillinger -- and anger that we can show this was the answer. sam adams write in december of 1775 writing to john adams said we voted to create 13 new frigates. i wish it was three times this number but so and so when congress will go along with me. so, it was those things. had they been able to read the communications between the british captains on the scene they would have had a different view because the british captains knew where our strength lay, what sort of a force we ought to have and they were forever were read the we were going to do that and that carried over into the following

year so the british knew what we should be doing. then it is surprising that few we did build and did get to see and what was even more as a prisoner people like john paul jones turning up and there were a lot of others besides john paul jones who were as good. the british knew well they were as good as anybody they had. where did these guys come from. it was a combination of all of those factors. thank you very much. you are very brave. >> if anybody else has a question and they can't get to

the microphone we will get the microphone to you. >> can you tell us more about st. mary's that's mentioned in other words and some of the notes on the look? >> you're from florida? >> yeah. >> i really can't. i mean, i don't want it to seem more important than it was. british -- dung war matt. of the british base at st. augustine have some importance which i am not blind in taking georgia and literalists of carolina, and i go into some detail on the lack

of a small boat force of the kind of felt we ought to have on the inland waterways that would have helped protect savanna impleader charleston and st. mary's list trans essentially involved in that. when i went to st. mary's, i was hoping to find more, but not really about the navy. spec what evidence have you found how washington would have used the navy for the battles? stat as far as the media that i'm talking about is none. washington of course xl the when the french enter the war and

1788 she knew how exactly to use them. this smaller navy of gunboats and smaller craft a defensive force that could operate on the inland waterways no, he wasn't aware that this could be useful to him. although at various points he solid examples of it being used on a smaller scale in boston, in new york and the metal from a philadelphia. but he never -- he would have loved to of the navy under his control but he never thought about coordinating the navy with the army in the sense that i talk abut. part of the reason is that he is

immense, people as me who is the father of the navy, it's washington. part of the reason is that he never tried to take over responsibilities the congress didn't give him. he never reached for power in the play and so the congress didn't want the army and the navy together. they wanted them separate and this is a part of the theology. they were afraid of military people getting powerful, and washington was always very respectful, it was one of the great masses of the man so that as part of it as well. he just didn't want it to get out of that from. but i go through that in the bucket but there is no evidence that he advocated the kind def,

not me, the british captains of the then in charge of the navy. i should mention one other thing this reminds me talking about the burning of falmouth. they burned down the whole town except for one tavern release tallman tavern was owned by one of the heroes of the american revolution. she was there, her relatives, her neighbors, they could grab a hold off with water buckets for throwing them filled with water on the flame as they came up and she saved her tavern one of the great heroes of the revolution. [laughter]

>> is their anything else? are we done? anything else? thank you pure yet [applause] >> with a significant occasion that happened that week in history. for more history program, check out american history television. we feature 48 hours of people in the sense that help document and the american story. what american history tv on c-span3 or visit c-span.org/history.

>> money comes to thinking about running and politics and the national security state what used to be called foreign policy but is now more acutely felt as global military policy. we definitely need some in the room with a very small. we need people willing to try to step back, ready to make their way out of the massive trees and actually take off. my book the united states is really what one guy can produce in reading, writing, talking and doing my best to consider the world and the absurdities in it that are accepted as ordinary

reality. as those of you that redirect long myself and i like to run pieces of this fight to the coesite despite what others think of tension from the internet beat. i'm going to read pieces from the book both however on the shorter side. the first is life of about guys in rooms. i wrote this back in march 20 tell-all before the military was out of iraq and just after the supreme court issued its citizens united decision but before it was utterly clear the floodgates had been open so wide that what might be called the politics in america soon becomes simply american politics. i call that being a critic of the world as a stage for us. in march 2010i wrote with a bigger but abundance and warrior journalists not to see the u.s. military leave iraq. that appeared on the op-ed page

of "the los angeles times" and in a longer version at thomas pashtuns, and began wandering the media world. some of its stops was the military newspaper stars and stripes. for a military man came this e-mail response. read your article in the stars and stripes. when is the last time you visited iraq? a critique in the well chosen words so much more effective than the long pingree e-mails i get and his point was interesting at least it interested me after i wrote back i was then a 65-year-old guy who had never been anywhere near iraq and undoubtedly never would be. i have to assume the e-mails are had spent time possibly more than once and disagreed with my assessments. firsthand experience is not to be taken lightly. what after all do i know about iraq only the reporting i've been able to read from thousands of miles away from on the blogs

of experts. on the riverside even through the thousands of miles away i was one of many that could see enough by early 23 to go into the streets to demonstrate against an disaster of an invasion that a lot of people theoretically far more knowledgeable than any of us considered just the cat's meow whether they are armed or not that is a deficit if you want to write about the american experience in iraq. it's also true i haven't spent hours sipping tea which the iraqi tribal leaders inside the green zone set foot on one of the american bases with the pentagon private contractors built in that country if nor did that stop me from writing most of the people of visited didn't consider places with multiple

bustlines and the ugandan mercenary guards and who knows what else to be particularly noteworthy structures on a landscape so with rare exceptions would come. i'm certainly no expert on the shiites and sunnis and i'm a little foggy on my geography and i've never seen the euphrates rivers. on the other hand it occurs a wealth of condoms government officials and military types have done all of the above to spend time on close to the american version of the same couldn't have arrived at the conclusions valuable reporters for the "washington post" and now the new york time or patrick independent sometimes being far away and not just from iraq but from washington and all that goes on from the claustrophobic

world of american global policymaking has its advantages sometimes being out of it experiential the speaking allows you to open our eyes and taken the larger shape of thing which is obviously the obvious even if little noted to be a can't help thinking about a friend of mine on the u.s. commission on the list, but the commanders that they would attract an american made box capable of seeing beyond its boundaries of that is seeing afghanistan. i have no doubt that being there is something to be desired. but if you take a personal blander with you. thinking about my stars and stripes question that conclusion i would come to is this it's not just where to go it is also how you see what's there and who you see that matters which means that sometimes you can see more by going nowhere at all. an iraqi tragedy.

when american officials, civilian and military open their eyes and check out the landscape no matter where they landed all evidence indicates the first thing they tend to see is themselves that is as an american stage and the conduct what might be called semi war and the players in the american trauma. this is why both in iraq and afghanistan military commanders and officials like secretary defense robert gates and james jones continue to call unconsciously for putting in iraqi or afghan face on whichever war was being discussed that this to follow the image to the logical to some conclusion they recognize as american.