c-span's local content vehicles on c-span2 in three. >> up next, james hornfischer discusses his book, "neptune's inferno." he spoke as part of the 2012 colby military writers' symposium which is held annually at norwich university in northfield, vermont. this is about 55 minutes. >> good afternoon. it is my distinct pleasure to present to you today at our colby symposium, writer and speaker james hornfischer. fisher is quickly establishing himself as doing for the navy what popular historian stephen ambrose did for the army. this quote is from the rocky mount news, and i feel it fits hornfischer very happily, describes them very well. mr. born fish is the author of three works of naval history. the last stand of the tin can

sailors publishing 2004, won an award for naval literature and was recently named by naval history magazine as one of a dozen all time naval classics. his second book, ship of goes, but the cruiser uss houston, was a main selection of history book club and the military to come, and the winner in 2007 at united states maritime literature award. his most recent book, "neptune's inferno," publishing 2011, is a major new account of the guadalcanal naval campaign. a former editor at harpercollins and a president of the literary agency, hornfischer literary management, he has handled a number of non-fiction bestsellers including the number one "new york times" bestseller and colby award winner, flags of our fathers. he will serve as a moderator for

this 2012 colby public session. today, he will be speaking about his most recent book, "neptune's inferno: the u.s. navy at guadalcanal." it is the untold story of the u.s. navy's bloodiest fight of world war ii. considered, and i quote, david and engaging, extremely readable, comprehensive and thoroughly researched, by ronald spector of "the wall street journal," and brilliant, a compelling narrative of naval combat, simply superb, by the "washington times," it is a "new york times," publishers weekly, and "boston globe" bestseller. so once again it is my very great pleasure to welcome mr. james hornfischer. [applause] >> thank you very much. i appreciate everybody coming out. i think this is my fifth colby symposium. it is truly unique, my

experience in terms of a publishing conference that focuses on the craft of military history that celebrates the achievement of servicemen and women, and that hopefully will guide policymakers through the experience of digesting our past. in this case the recent past as we discuss afghanistan. today we're going back deeper. i've written three books about the navy. three books about the navy in world war ii. the navy in world war ii union returned to the pacific because that's where the action was if you were a naval officer or enlisted man in 1942. "neptune's inferno" takes on a six month long campaign that i think most people i think the consensus has emerged that guadalcanal, the six-month campaign for guadalcanal is truly a turning point in the pacific. midway of course was crucial to the battle of midway thoughts to buzz before the marines went on shore that guadalcanal.

blunted the japanese offenses push toward hawaii. for japanese fleet carriers were so, a number of pilots and air group and with those losses japan lost the ability to really undertake the offensive operations and to expand it, the massive pacific perimeter. what it did though for us, for america, is it opened the way for the first time to go on the offensive. now, the joint chiefs of staff, the combined chiefs of staff with the british and american high command faced a number of options of where to take the offensive against the axis. all 31942 there was much talk about the strategy of the so-called worldwide strategy of europe first. president was the committed himself to it i think to strengthen the alliance, to maintain the confidence of russia, continued its fight against nazi germany. but what's going on in back channels into combined chiefs of

staff, especially the meetings on the american side, general marshall and the other american leadership, there's a consensus that we've got to do something somewhere. there's also a driving force as the will, they go and mind of one admiral. commander-in-chief of the u.s. fleet, chief of naval operations, very willful individual. he was significant met anybody considered his intellectual equal. and i think his presence -- to stand in his presence was to feel that ego coming at you. is a very difficult character, but it was his achievement in 1942 to recognize that with a victory at midway and with the japanese seizure of this remote island in the south pacific known as guadalcanal, where they were in may, reported to be building an airfield, he had the means and also the necessity to

take offensive operations against japan. he was able to convince president roosevelt, i guess first general marshall and into the and together were able to convince president roosevelt that the navy and the marine corps would strike in the pacific. this went against everything president roosevelt was saying about europe first. in fact, it was going to be pacific first. it was going to be pacific first because the navy was indeed, the alliance was with the construction of airfield and guadalcanal would find itself in this untenable position of being unable to defend -- unable to send cargo ships in australia, the southern island stood astride us in the pacific. you can see here is how why. here's guadalcanal and here's sidney. the pacific shipping that is coming down through fiji to refuel, around here, this is all in bomber radius of guadalcanal

at the japanese were printed to establish the workings of the military airfield. they would really split the alliance into. australia would be cut off and our strategic position would be seriously threatened. so this was the impetus on august 7, 1942. 14,000 marines under the first marine division, to land a guadalcanal supported by three aircraft carrier task forces vectored from all points around the pacific, pearl harbor up from new zealand. they converged in fiji, held rehearsals and planted those marines on guadalcanal shores on august 7, 1942. a store that "neptune's inferno" tells is what follows from this. what followed was a series of really six-month campaign of attrition where japan can slowly came to grips with the magnitude of the situation. the imperial high command didn't attach much importance to this for it by our marine corps until

they realized the larger ambitions of the south pacific offenses, they realized that their base that revolves would be suicide threatened by u.s. position in the southern solomons. and through august, september, october and november the japanese eventually, their main base in the pacific, through a series of hammer blows on our foothold in the southern solomons that produced seven major naval battles, five of them were midnight surface slugfests fought between destroyers, cruisers and battleships often, talking eight-inch main batteries engaging in .50 caliber machine gun range. horrific affairs in heavy casualties on both sides. plus two for the battle of midway style carrier engagements fought in the waters around guadalcanal. the campaign lasted six months, and by the end of it, and those

seven naval battles nearly 5000 u.s. sailors were killed, approximate number, about the same number of japanese as well. those 5000 killed in action with returns the number of men who died in the fighting on the item itself. so it comes to the question of, especially to know something about the pacific war, come to the question of why didn't i know that. and i think it's constantly obscured to the act, the navy sacrifice in this campaign is constantly obscured by the imagery we have when we have been guadalcanal, we think of marines fighting in the jungle, and deservedly so. they fought bravely for the six months. outnumbered, certainly undersupplied, under armed. held a perimeter around the airfield against repeated japanese assaults and saved the day. let's also observe that if the navy did not support them adequately, no amount of gallantry on the part of them

would have saved them the fate of the brothers. they would've been rolled up if the navy failed so supply them and protect them from nighttime reinforcement by the japanese. there was really no chance for the marines tool that i. so the guadalcanal campaign needs to be understood in its fullest context which is fighting on the island, control the ground itself, a test but struggled to resupply the garrison, undertaken by both sides which is really run by c. so see control as well as control of the skies around guadalcanal. this was a new mode of warfare that america never practiced before. we were going it on the fly. one of the themes of the story, a guadalcanal campaign is one of under preparation, rushed schedules that constantly got in a way of planning, forces being asked to do things they never trained to do, new technologies come into the field that are untested and, indeed, unrehearsed, say radar was

coming into the fleet. nobody at first i did really how to use it. there might've been one man. will get to him in a moment, but guadalcanal was crucible with a nuclear to fight the u.s. navy learned to fight. the japanese navy had a good idea how to fight actually, and that's illustrated within 36 hours of marines going to shore. on the night of august night, the japanese since down a cruise a squadron under command of rear admiral mccalla, and the battle of savo island was the result of this engagement between his cruisers and two squadrons of use cruisers, they are defending the waters north of guadalcanal. this is a time of -- tiny island here, savo island. it was a defeat of the first order of the american side. the japanese showcase their mastery, and nighttime close range engagement.

we lost for cruisers, vincennes, quincy and the story went down with about 1000 men. he really could say the battle of savo island was a disaster, even worse in the pearl harbor attack. the so-called defeat at pearl harbor if you will simply a natural resource of the battle ready force descending upon its sleeping navy stationed at it was a surprise attack. there's nothing to say but u.s. combat arms when the rolling out of the box at 7:00 to battle dive bombers screamed down on the. savo island you a combat ready u.s. team, powerful cruiser force under combatant command. not like a man. this proves significant. you had a couple of captains, in command of these squadrons but they were essential in a nighttime patrol disposition, i.e. they are sitting ducks going back and forth like this wouldn't to be picked off into comes the admiral with his very

well-trained crews, specifically and rigorously trained for nighttime combat falling upon them. this laid bare a number of deficiencies in u.s. navy's fighting spirit and there talking to all across the board. there's a lot to be said about that but suffice it to say, it laid there to the extent the u.s. navy was not prepared to fight. it was a world beater. the surface may become the blacksheep fleet, hadn't yet seen the day. so the battle of savo island, a terrible loss, for cruisers, 1000 said, scarcely a scratch on the japanese shows how far way to go. so the thing of the campaign becomes from that point forward how is this hidebound institution is being torn apart by the evolving way of war, you

have the aviator so. no, the battleship sailors over here, nowhere but has a handle on how we will conduct fleet operations as such but how we going to kind of get our feet under ourselves and fight the reigning masters in the world as of 1942 in the craft of naval warfare. the answer is through the emergence of a particular type of combat there, the type of commander who has that kind of forward thinking approach, knows combat is nothing fancy but putting them on target for us, especially at night. because when things get it, things burn. when things burn, they eliminate. when they eliminate they get hit again. that's how the japanese one at salvo island. that's how the americans learned how to fight. the book traces, this curriculum

the navy faces in the south pacific. the japanese in the early days and role of master and teacher, and the first figure it really comes to chose the american fleet how to fight, again how to fight in the context of service action was a man who was kind of sidelined the night of august night at salvo island, where admiral norman scott. he had a small cruiser group that was patrolling away from where the fighting was taking place on august 9, but as september rolled around and the american command kind of recruit, really so bored was have a confident knife fighting squadron, cruiser squadron, norman scott who was quickly seen as the guy who is the man of the moment to make that happen. he was given the command, flagship uss san francisco, and the job was to intercept the japanese so-called tokyo express, these nighttime runs and japanese were launching from the forward base, again running

applies was not as the slot, this chain of islands here. the resupply run to go at night. the americans had the airfield on guadalcanal. we had a forward airbase here. it really wasn't ready for action for a few weeks, but by august 20 when uss long island comes in with a couple squadrons of marines died bombers and wildcat fighter bottoms, they are ready for action. by day the atheist at a radius of control. a perimeter that reaches really up, you know, all the way up here. japanese ships will come down in daylight at their peril. they will be hit by dive bombers and torpedo bombers, no fun to the japanese operate, therefore at night. so what happens is we have a changing of the watch as it will. when the sun goes down the

japanese are preeminent. our fire -- our firefighters don't fly. the dive bomber stay home and sleep and rest up for the coming days action and the japanese move down to reinforce their beleaguered garrison. when the sun comes up, the situation changes 180 degrees. this is the dynamics that the bill. japanese realize they have to get in and out under the cover of darkness before the guadalcanal base can hit them. and so what admiral scott comes to realize is the japanese are in an operational straitjacket your to bring down ships that are suitably fast, in and out of course after dark, before the sunrise, they've got to leave their base at a very predictable time. that got to arrive at guadalcanal pretty much shortly after midnight to unload and high tail it 200 miles north of henderson field before the pilots fly. so scott realizes okay, my

mission is to defend guadalcanal, but we've seen what happens when cruisers stand by on a patrol course, steaming in a box at 11 knots, and the japanese see them first and opened fire and register the first hits. we are going to do it differently. admiral scott puts together a battle command and he says we're going to play defense and offense mode. we're going to sortie. we know when the japanese are going to arrive, and, therefore, we're going to be at battle speed in colmer at for action when they come. we're not going to be passively standing by. he adapts this new approach, and offense if i minded, battle minded approach. on the night of october 11, the japanese come down, again attempting to bombard the airfield and put out the business. admiral scott is ready for them with the seven cisco, the salt lake city and a squadron of destroyers, a couple of destroys.

it was by no means a rousing victory. scott executes his plan just as he wrote it up. there's inevitable fog of war situation spelled during maneuver. there's plenty to fix after the battle was over but by the end of it, by the close of the battle of cape esperance the japanese had lost a heavy cruiser. i think it's the first heavy crucial loss of the war. you can say the americans actually for the first time could say we have done it, we afflicted the japanese, we can do this. this is the way forward. and admiral scott had a real feather in his cap. so now we go back to that the navy learns its lesson, that the navy does its business to what does it now do with his victory it has under its belt. naturally you think admiral scott would stay in command and acquire more ships and stronger taskforces and expand his operations. but as you move through october,

we find changes up the line from his level, have a very powerful impact on how the campaign develops. there's a chain of command at the highest level because, well, first the command of the south pacific force from u.s. naval force in the south pacific, vice admiral robert gorman was found wanting were a number of reasons. he had been brought in to lead the charge in the south pacific having been stationed in london. uses special naval observer as the blitz was going on reporting directly to the president was a. he was a natural choice. but as the campaign began unfolding, it really became clear he wasn't the kind of leader that exactly conspired to speculate to complain the law. them a little bit of a panic or. a premier strategist, marvelous

diplomat and a planner. but when you find -- fighting started, he found himself just obsessed with detail. he never left his headquarters but he never went forward to seeing the marines at guadalcanal. never conferred with the command. never size forward naval base. he was very aloof from the fighting front. it quickly became clear that no minutes that admiral gormley was having a nervous breakdown in command of this crucial operation. they were old friends for years. very close friends. this was the conclusion the ad will reach very reluctantly but he knew what was mr. picking on october that a change is going to be necessary to relieve his old friend in command. it arranged have admiral halsey had been sidelined with shingles

basically since prior to midway, this was where bull halsey makes his return in the guadalcanal campaign. if ever you wonder about the effective leadership, i think the case of halsey's release of gormley, its power. the simple fact, simple transmission of the word from one man to another, gormley is out, halsey is in, that was simply astounded but it changed the spirit of men from the lowliest marine grunt in guadalcanal the captains of ships. they felt like they're going to get their chance. they felt like a new fighting spirit was come to the south pacific. it may sound like redrick but it is true when you interview them in the the worth of halsey was coming changed everything. he took command from gormley and october 25, in time to confront what was up to that point the

largest concentrated effort by japanese naval forces to retake guadalcanal. you can say he got there in the nick of time. he got there in time to order his task force intercepted japanese forces coming down, talking about transports, cruiser squadrons and carriers, and what develops on octobe october 25-26 is known as the battle of santa cruz. it was a carrier battle really at midway in terms of number of pilots and planes involved. holsey never the riverboat gambler, throws all his forces in the free. the enterprise and hornet, to carriers, and they both went forth and intercepted japanese and we lost the hornet, the enterprise is badly damaged. that left the south pacific forces with a single aircraft carrier. so you could say, and even she, the enterprise was badly damaged.

you can say this was a reckless gamble on the part of halsey. but that was his topic and back anytime when you say japanese have generally held the initiative at the most part super yorick, i think you could make the case that a leader who is given the gambling was the kind of leader you needed, to turn the tide to launch, to change the vector if you will. and halsey was that kind of man. he immediately visited a guadalcanal. he sat down with general vandegrift and said what you need from me. i think the fact that he was in the physical presence of general vandegrift asking that question was the most important demonstration he could have made, to his commitment, to the marine position. and so general vandegrift said i need you to give me everything you got. and all the looking in the eye and said you've got. and it's always like that work leadership bears fruit began to trust between commanders.

you have a obligation that affects the decision that commanders me. holsey from that point forward never hesitate to send carriers to intercept japanese forces coming south and he committed himself to a very regular and rigorous resupply effort up from new mail to bring crucially needed supplies and ammunition to guadalcanal. i should say from the outset the supply situation was very grave for the marines in guadalcanal. this is backing up somewhat, but there was a terrible sort of prior to halsey's arrival in theater there was a terrible, terrible state of relations between the marines and the navy. in fact, it's really one of the first thing somebody will often say when i say i read the book about the need at guadalcanal and will say oh, you read how they dumped the marines often hightailed ayn rand. and that seems to be the perception. i mentioned earlier 5000 sailors killed in action. clearly that's not the case but

the perception arose from the fact, in the very beginning of the campaign that the navy only agreed to stand by with its carriers for two days to support the marines landed. when the carriers hauled out on d-day plus two, there goes the air cover. admiral turner who was in charge of landing area realized the cargo men would be vulnerable without air cover, so there goes the cargo been. he pulls them out. so there's some bad blood going on so holsey really repairs a lot of that they'll will that existed in the navy and the marine corps. i think from that point forward, it very much is the case of the two services at side-by-side. and did everything that against the japanese. so i hope i'm not losing it with all these sub themes and shifts of gear and jumping back and forth in time. guadalcanal is a complex

campaign, telling the story in one book was a trick because we had to account for the changing of the card, the coming and going of the ships and officers and men of every rank, every battle had a different order of battle, different commanders on both sides. and so the store is really one of the institution of the navy learning how to fight. so i told you about norman scott about how he wins the battle of cape esperance. the japanese don't quit. in fact, two days after that battle was won, the effect of that battle you could say was almost negligible. the japanese are able to get have a large cache to a couple of the marchers battleship on guadalcanal. work over the cactus air force for about two hours on the night of october 15. and the marines on the island, i don't believe in the annals of military history there's a ground force that ever endured a heavier bombardment of the first marine division, and the cactus

air force took the two battleships. the japanese left i think after the handiwork was done, there were five working aircraft left on guadalcanal. so this sets up the battle of santa cruz, which was wanted by policies aggressiveness. we have one carrier left in the south pacific. fortunately, the japanese, it takes a tremendous amount of planning and a tremendous amount of resource management to make a push, essentially the japanese are making. they've got to marshal the troops to transport them the fuel. they've got to get the combat shaping together, the air support. basically what emerges is the japanese are able to make a push against guadalcanal, really wants every three to four weeks. and so there's this period of regrouping and recapturing as both sides lick their wounds and plan for the next thing. santa cruz, long story short,

launched the first major japanese attempt to take guadalcanal back from the american site. the next one comes in november. now, admiral scott, because the cascading effects of the gore release, the brilliant and aggressive admiral scott is no longer in command. the japanese come knocking again in november. command of task force 64, soon to become 67, default to gormley's chief of staff, captain, now rear admiral callahan, wasn't about to see his career go down with his boss, went gormley is released, the chief of staff goes to halsey is as please send me back to see. i'm a fighting sailor, give me a command. so halsey is also a falling -- fighting sailor goes along with him and gives him the command of task force 67. he comes in, and because callahan had 16 days and you rank over scott, scott

effectively is removed from command under the operation of the rules of seniority. so now we have admiral callahan in charge of the cruisers when the japanese come calling on the night of november working. the so-called battle of friday the 13th was almost impossible to track and to break apart. once the main force allied north of guadalcanal that night, november 13. you have a japanese bombardment force consisting of a pair of battleships, these are worried 2000-ton monsters. the americans have nothing like it to oppose them. callahan has two-eight-inch gun crews, a couple of light cruisers and some destroyed. callahan those from reports what's coming. and he realizes that there's

only one way out of this, and that is straight through it. because if he fails to engage, the japanese will overwhelm the cactus air force complained the troops and the party is over. if callahan in cages, well, all his ships will be lost. it's not a happy order of battle if you're on the american side. but one of the men i india, callahan is coming for lunch because once this battle begins, he comes in for lumps because he didn't leave behind and if he battle that admiral scott prepared. the last ordered callahan gave was straight out of come you know, straight up of lord nelson, as the forces are engaging, his last command to

his column is on chips are to starboard, -- suppose recapping engaging a ship and you just instructed to fire starboard. okay, find a new target, swing around. so people, the core, the loss, the blood, the death of also by both sides this night, is rude to the credit of neither commander at what was the alternative. callahan knew he had but one alternative and that was a sacrifice his force. one of the great interviews i did for this book, by the way, the opportune -- the opportunity to interview men of this battle is diminishing rapidly. there's a 92 year-old man in berkeley, california, an african-american man which meant he was never going to go farther than captain scott, 1942 era fleet. he was captain scott on the uss

san francisco, tonight this battle was fought. he because to me, i was milling around the boardroom and here's officers talking and here's admiral callahan saying something like, i know we have no choice but we have to do it, and there was a resigned sense of fatalism about these words. we also have these words from a younger conversation was ithis conversation with them. clearly from somewhat fragmented evidence, callahan was a smart man. clearly he knew what he was up against. he knew it was his job to essentially go intercept and to do what he could with what he had. the only way a crucial bt battleship is to get in close. most chips are designed to beat the equal, the equipment counterpart. so they're armored to protect against its own battery. so an eight-inch quiz is designed to protect against an eight-inch batter at a standard 15,000-yard range. i battleship smr protected schemes to defend against a 14

or 16-inch main battery. but what is a crucial going to do against the battleship? if you do all that math can you realize there was no way an eight-inch cruiser takes down a 14-inch battleship at the standard range. but what if they get in close? this is exactly what happens. this is the brilliance of callahan's kind of, it's frustrating to know that he is chips in his conduct at the latest radar that could seek through the night and cast out their little microwaves and find contacts through smoke and fog and darkness. so here you have admiral callahan in seven cisco, the old radar, just good for brought searching, kind of ineffective radar. behind is a uss callahan with a brand-new microwave set callahan. they captain is transmitted to captain callahan, contacted bearing three to five, 22000-yard, every 30 seconds to

a new report. i callahan is hearing none of it. he's an old school fighting naval officer. he's on the radio, essentially a single channel tactical radio but if you're talking on the rated you're not hearing anything else. he is clearing his destroyers in the lead. bush, what you see now? a., butch, what do you see now? butch parker, callahan had trusted his men. he didn't trust this newfangled radar that nobody new how to use the literally i in good a writer officer on one of his destroyers and he said really all it was good for, all -- we weren't trained in its use but it was a black box and it was behind the pilot house, and it had a flat surface and he got pretty hot when it was working for put our coffee on and that's really all we were able to use a fork in 1942. and manuals hadn't been written yet much less distribute to the fleet, and trained on. the radar is really, you know, for the average naval officer

was pretty much useless. callahan fails to use his radar and historians criticize him for not using his technology. what apple callahan did though was yet to get in close with his eight each cruisers to be 14-inch battleships and that's exactly what he did. is brilliance lay in the simple facts of physics and is a crucial moment in the night of friday the 13th. callahan's column fall about 2000 yards apart from the japanese main body, but to battleships i referred to, and they disarray them in the water line. the japanese flagship was mortally wounded. so this was the moment of truth. this was the moment of truth the cruisers won't -- weren't supposed to be battleships like this. they didn't think we had this kind of savagery in us. and it certainly appeared, and i

talked a number of people, including the preeminent best one of the guadalcanal campaign, it really seems like the japanese were stunned by this exhibition of americans fighting will. they didn't think we had in us to sacrifice our ships the apple callahan was struck dead on his bridge. norman scott was in another ship and callahan's like the he was killed by for us live from the seven cisco. both admirals killed in action at that, friday the 13th. i don't think that has ever happened again. i think it might've been a first and last, is that right? so we have this incredible battle which once again stops a japanese bombardment force meeting henderson field. therefore stops their convoy from coming down and striking and landing its troops on the beaches. therefore, is it into yet again.

the significance of callahan's sacrifice is the following day cactus air force is able to fly. having been spared yet another bombardment. they fly out and find the japanese transport circling in the northern part. they send down i think it's four out of six large japanese transport, most of the entire japanese infantry division. so by his sacrifice that night, guadalcanal is once again safety. two nights later, the japanese gather their remnants of this massive multi-task force order of battle they've assembled and try again. they circle back, the one battleship that survived, comes back with a number of cruisers. they are determined to put henderson field out of business. callahan force then rendered combat ineffective, and so now

here is admiral halsey, the riverboat gambler throws the dice again. all he has got now at the battleships he has been jealously holding with his cares but he has the uss enterprise, the last carrier in the south pacific. he has to battleships, the washington and the south dakota. is our magnificent battleship. the reason the old battleships were not there, is fuel. admiral nimitz didn't have the tank, fuel storage to operate simultaneous on the south pacific. so the old battleship stay on the west coast. this was the cruisers, destroyers and carriers, until the more new fuel-efficient come into theater. little background. admiral holds has to battleships they're holding close to the enterprise. as the japanese come back the night of the 15th, halsey, only choice, is to release these

two magnificent ships and sent them into these confined waters. battleships are not supposed to fight in confined kind of island shoal waters like this. these are massive ships that have huge turning radius. but it's the only choice that halsey house that night. he releases the washington and the south dakota under command of the one naval officer in the entire south pacific and knows how to use radar control gunfire. he comes from naval training center. he has helped install the hardware on the ships. he wrote the first manual that hadn't even yet been distributed the fleet. and on route, willis lee, a champion pistol shooter and olympic medalist with a pistol and a rifle, master of every gun from .45 caliber to 16 interviews the man you want in command for a fight like this. for a man to take these two capital ships into harm's way.

and for that night, the night of november 14 and 15th, willis lee goes forth with the washington as flagship and the south dakota and makes short work of the last japanese battleship, the original. and with this, with this the japanese psychological route, if not better route and tyler, a psychological route that was guadalcanal was copied from the japanese point of view. they have lost to battleships in action at close range, this fighting range, against american squadron. and never again, remember this is 1942, it will be until the end of 1944, almost two years, the japanese battleships come forward and engage american forces in a meaningful way. i think the psychological effects of this campaign was crushing for the japanese. there's one final battle that is fought before the japanese, essentially ceased major

operations. there's one final battle, the battle of tassafaronga. i treated briefly in the book, part of me probably wondered if i could sustained interest in yet another midnight slugfest, five in a row, that tassafaronga was frustrating because after willis we exhibition of his master on the night of november 15, you want there to be an exclamation point on the u.s. performance. but we don't get the. we get is another abject u.s. defeat in the battle of tassafaronga. review is cruisers under command of a new naval officer, he's got the playbook from scott, the fighting example of callahan, he knows how to use his radar. is all the advantage and he surprises the force of japanese destroyers whose decks are little with supplies, come to dump off in the water which is north of guadalcanal so troops can halt the shore. so here comes the ad will come here comes admiral right. he surprises him, opened fire

and all the ships on one ship, the lead to star, tanaka japanese react, their mastery of torpedo, any split-second a fire fired for peace, reverse course and, of course, the world beating long glance torpedoes entered the cruise line and at this rate three of the heavy cruisers and flicking just a shameful defeat. the virtue of an american point of view of the situation now that is this defeat simply doesn't matter. the trains are running, so to speak. the suppliers are coming in from the logistical infrastructure, the cranes, the lighters to bring material ashore, cargo ships, all of it is in place and there's really no defeating the americans of guadalcanal by the time the japanese conflict this last defiance last victory on a superior american force.

so tassafaronga goes down. the south pacific force can absorb the defeat. and by february the japanese are attempting their own dunkirk if you appear the effect with the. .. of the starved garrison out of guadalcanal, and those men, you talk of their starvation victims. that was the state of the japanese infantry in guadalcanal because the constrictive force of our naval forces stopping the tokyo express from reinforcing figures and it is not pretty sight. it took six months campaign, frankly it is ghastly. what happens to shape when it hit like this, what happens to the men on board that ship. but it was necessary because there was only one way to beat the japanese and that was to step up and smack them in the mouth. we did at midway with her naval air force, in quality know it old-fashioned way with surface navy.

it's the story i tried to bring together comprehensive link and we to believe. certainly after writing the first book, "the last stand of the tin can sailors" was about a single naval engagement that lasted about two hours and it goes in close for one battle. extraordinary victory font late in what the my second book was "ship of ghosts" about the uss houston. with "neptune's inferno" i've try to tackle an entire campaign that frank i never understood in toto like this but the last book to attempt with "neptune's inferno" does, was to take the whole naval experience of guadalcanal campaign, and it's really crucial i think to illustrate the success here because it says something about how america fights when provoked. the extent, the losses and the

sacrifices they will undertake to win when it knows that there's only one way through, and that is to win. all these questions will be on the table tomorrow with a panel on afghanistan. is a new era, a new day, but things sure seem clear seven years ago. them into one the south pacific, i think there are still a few camera and they've got my undying gratitude and my admiration. it's been a privilege to be able to interview some of them in the san francisco and the uss atlanta, admiral scott flagship, and to capture their story. and so i appreciate your interest, come to you about it. and if we can't i be happy to take any questions you might have. [applause] thank you. >> take a couple of questions. i have to run up to the northfield end, but jim, can you

manage -- >> absolutely. >> take as many questions as you want. >> okay, sounds good. >> thank you. >> of the 80 ships, you mentioned there were 80 ships at the beginning of this campaign, how many were seaworthy after? >> well, the 80 ships was the size of the initial any force and that would've included the carrier task forces as well as the supporting ships. roadsides, the americans and japanese sustained about equal losses and camping but each side lost 24 major warships. and so, i mean the losses were so great they eventually coined

the nickname for savo sound, the body of water north of guadalcanal where all the fighting took place ironbottom sound. and the fact the man who discovered the titanic wreck followed up that feat by taking one of his submersibles and accrue with cameras, went out and found the wrecks into guadalcanal. there's some stunning photography of the wrecks of the quincy. these wrecks will not be with us forever. nature is reclaiming all that metal. so being able to grab history like that, i think it's valuab valuable. >> coast watchers all down toward, giving us some advanced warning what was coming? >> we did. the question is about the coast watchers.

these were brave souls in the. if you look at this chain of islands, there were essentially rogue agents equipped with radios. these were australians, these were men who had been working, they might've had kind of administrative role on one of the islands. this was basically a british protectorate of most of these islands and soviet agents of the ground. you had people who were attached to one or another business, such as the pineapple trade or what have you, maybe some kind of a government role as well. when the japanese invaded the headed to the hills and they supply the crucial function of up serving movements of the japanese ships up and down the waterways. and with their radios, signaling, usually signaling to australia to eventually get word to allied forces in a very quick way when the japanese were coming.

without warning, usually a loud the cactus air force, to sortie into three combat altitude by the time the japanese ships funny came within striking range. so without those coast watchers we would've been relying on her own air search which was fraught with all kinds of unanticipated will problems, whether, you know, this communications, that kind of thing. coast watchers were crucially important to the allied success. >> versus what john keegan said in price of -- >> about what? >> just the course of combat and -- >> well, i think i'm not sure what argument you are think i'e what argument you are referring to or what -- >> could be almost like you're saying, almost fatalistic being

in the battleship fleet. >> they're certainly a sense of fatalism i think. the fatalism seemed to be most evident on the japanese site. they kind of felt like somehow it was going to materialize this decisive battle where their fighting spirit which carried him to victory and all of a sudden the war would be over because they one this big battle. they had this faith that such a thing would come to them and that they would be this decisive battle. [inaudible] >> the losses as i said were about equal, about 24 ships. the losses in battleships were in our favor, cruisers world a bit skewed to the japanese psycho but by the end of the day they were about even. the japanese were slow to realize that guadalcanal was, in fact, a decisive battle. they had always, the japanese to the command always had a certain idea i think drawn from world war i that it would be, that he was slowly whittle away american naval forces, and at a moment of

their choosing say of the philippines or somewhere they would finally commit the battleship force and there would be a majestic engagement over the high seas and they would crush us. guadalcanal didn't look like that. guadalcanal wasn't quite that dramatic. it was a stinky, lousy, disgusting place, the island to sell. the waters around it were confined and hazardous and left themselves really to be used by smaller ships. none of that told the japanese this was a decisive battle. i think they realized it too late. all through the campaign, i pointed out, trucks earlier, the great battleship, was anchored, was never sent into the combat area. were before lack of fuel. but i think the japanese never saw the urgency of it. a number of major naval balance other force whenever committed to the battle. it was to our good fortune

fortunately. both sides were fighting so far from home. look out for guadalcanal isham tokyo and pearl harbor. the logistics train to sustain naval operations. it was far more than anyone could imagine. these constraints of fuel and supply. the japanese suffered as we did. thing else? well, if there's nothing else i thank you for your attention. even a great audience, and i'm very proud to be with you here. so we will look forward to hearing what others have to say as this symposium rolls around. thank you. [applause] >> many of you might not have been born in 1973 and four, when watergate took place. but richard nixon, and one of

the biggest landslides in hash of the united states, which meant most americans who voted in that election voted. yet when facts came out, laws were violated, the american people, including the overwhelming majority that supported richard nixon said congress can have to investigate. you have to have a special prosecutor. a loss have to be enforced no matter what. and in the in when the house judiciary committee acted on a bipartisan basis to vote for impeachment of richard nixon, the country overwhelmingly supported that verdict. and what did that tell us? that more important than any political party and more important than any president of the united states, and more important than any single person, and more important than any ideology, was a bedrock principle of the rule of law and

the preservation of our constitution. and americans united on that theme, regardless of having voting just about a year and half before that but we are not talking about ancient history in that vote. people put behind them their own partisan views and said what is good for the country, and the rule of law, and one standard of law is critical. so i said gee, you know, that's really important principle, and i believed in it, too. and then we got the bush years. accountability principles pretty much work. i won't say they were perfect, hardly. doesn't operate in a perfect world, and then we got to the bush years, and things changed. and so i and my co-author, cindy cooper, wrote a book about impeachment. i am not an expert.

had the experience of dealing with the terms of the constitution and impeachment proceeding, networked, the nixon impeachment proceeding. but we saw and what a book, and we saw, however, that there was no accountability through the impeachment process. so then we said, let's look at what else can be done, because we knew the framers of the constitution understood, and it's clear in the debate that once the president leaves office, or maybe she, can be prosecuted. there was nothing in the framers debate that said oh, you've been president? free. you get for ever free jail card. not sent to the framers understood that presidents could do very bad things. i mean, they were human. they created checks and balances because they understood presidents could be bad. they also understood congress

could do bad things. they were not idealistic about people. they were very practical and they were very pragmatic. so we said okay, let's do this book about what kind of accountability can exist. and to our surprise we begin to look at what the criminal statutes were. what we saw was not just the possibility of accountability, but that the bush team was excruciating santuary to the possibility of prosecution, and had tried to erect barriers in a variety of ways, including slicing and dicing and rewriting criminal law to protect themselves from accountability, and to protect themselves specifically from criminal

liability. >> you can watch this and other programs online at booktv.org. spent coming up today on booktv in just a few moments, hiv to the late author and journalist christopher hitchens. then brad meltzer present a collection of men and women to inspire and guide his daughter on her journey to adulthood. a little later, the authors of all in discuss the life and for a general david petraeus. >> spend a weekend in ohio's state capitol columbus, as booktv, american history tv and c-span local content vehicles look behind the scenes at the history and literary life of ohio's largest city on booktv on c-span2 rows the rare book collections at ohio state university. >> published between 1918 and december 1920 in an american periodical called the little review. we have copies of all those as well. the reason i brought this out

today is not too sure this first edition, but they showed a later addition that is extremely rare. 1921 the american government declared ulysses obscene and pornographic. and the book was banned. people still wanted to read it, however, and we actually have a copy of one of the pirated issues. if you notice the spine, alice in wonderland, and the little minister. >> throughout the week and and saturday noon eastern, let of his life in columbus, ohio, with booktv and c-span local content vehicles on c-span2. >> up next to trick a author christopher hitchens who passed away on the summer 15th of 2011. this event hosted by "vanity fair" magazine includes a to hitchens family, friends and colleagues, including salman rushdie, sean penn, his younger brother peter hitchens and his widow. attribute takes