.. interestingly structured because it has part history and part what i call interrelation michaux. it's from the sketchbook on russia. what are you hoping to accomplish a reading this book and what is the impact you hope will have?

>> i'm glad you didn't say pondicherry. what i let the government in 2010 i have no desire to read a book about in north korea. edited to use issue for three years, involved in the negotiation committee in every day really close to and i didn't have a desire to write then. but five years later and given the situation in north korea was then, it seemed like a good opportunity to read a little bit about my experiences there, a bit about the history of and about the u.s. policy even in a more general audience because they take this as a sort of issue where the educated reader doesn't know a lot about north korea, is history. you see headlines about missile tests, rational leaders in all these sorts of things.

and i just thought it would be good to read about the people people look the sort of a comprehensive assessment of the history, the family commit economic, the politics, the human rights situation of the nuclear problem. the thick of the through every time they had a question about what was going on with north korea. i wouldn't call it a scholarly book, though it does have footnotes. it is really written to a more general audience the ip interested in trying to learn something about this country on the far side of the planet. >> host: the book also has a point of view by your experience in the bush administration. how did you decide to insist that what i appointed you view on the set of arguments really about north korea's future that it's a little bit different from

a space history of its day. the >> guest: i think any history has an opinion and it. and i think in this case the price of vacuous history were informed by my own experiences with the north koreans and the bush administration, but i thought i also try to give an objective assessment in terms of the overall view that other u.s. administrations going back to ronald reagan history to do with this problem. george h. debut pushed it, bill clinton did, george w. bush and barack obama all the. and so, what i think they are surmount personal views about how i thought president bush handled the situation and there's probably things in there that readers might disagree with, but there's also things that readers would be surprised

about in terms of what president bush sought in terms of diplomacy with north korea, which is not really something they would associate with president wishes to send north korea. so that was the natural thing where i could have some thing i miss that perhaps other authors have written on the topic would not be able to. >> you don't necessarily take an ideological or in your evaluation of the other administrations, but you do give kind of critical view of successes and failures of other administrations in dealing with the issue. the basic thesis of the book is worth korea is the possible state because no one inside is same power to overthrow it and no one risks the cost of changing it. in particular, you know, starting with no one is in power to overthrow it, why do you think that has been the case in

north korea? especially from a comparative politics to. this really makes north korea an outlier compared to the soviet union. just go that observation is quite accurate. all of which has leaders in power longer than the farmer recently deceased north korean leader. they have all collapsed and continue to survive. that alone is evidence that nobody with an assist and is empowered to overthrow it. i think it's also because as you know well, it is a society to use a strong state in terms of the control it has on the society, political freedom and

even the way people think. so for that reason it's very difficult that there could be a group within the society that could speak out, that could challenge the view that a party congress thesis makes this happen in north korea. so that is why it's lasted for this long i think because in spite of a lot of goblins come economic problems, food problems, if it's lasted this long. no one within the system is capable of changing it. postcodes are a potential base for change. information flows. you know, this may be post-totalitarian, but were obviously not the place but there's an organized that station. how long do you think it's going to take for us to see the evolution of politics to the

point where it's possible to be expressed. just go as political scientists were supposed to determine whether this happen when you reach a critical tipping point, but i don't think we can. i don't think we can say with any degree of accuracy what the tipping point in terms of one society is ready to act up rather than simply follow the rules of the current political system. in the case of nrea come you see in the book i talk a lot about the element that is new in this picture, which is a growing market in the country, really starting from the famine in the name to name these in which people basically had to sell whatever they could find. a cup, a pen for food. and that's a start of a market system that really never have markets before.

and that has been going on now for 15 years. i think what we can say is there is this element here that was not there in the past that has created more than independence of mind by the people in north korea and not being solely reliant on handouts from the government. but when exactly that's going to reach a point where the system will pick is very hard to say. >> host: how do you think the state is adept into some of his changes? >> guest: i'm part of the way there, trying to crack down. certainly on the unofficial markets, some of the officials. there have been efforts at reform which you might call the form in north korea. some of the economic cooperation projects of the affluent south korea. but these have largely been aimed at bringing hard currency and to help the regime, not so much to create real market reform in the country.

so i think that what we're seeing now is efforts at economic engagement with the outside world. the north korean leadership is doing this because they seek are currently coming up because they are seeking necessarily to create a better life for their people. >> host: in what ways do you think pockets of protest could emerge or do you think is going to be a case where it will be stamped out quakes do you see any possibility for the elites tolerating certain forms? >> guest: the question as to whether and what point we will see that the toleration of dissent or the emergence of dissent. a social scientist, we can predict that. but we can do is point to preconditions that exist that could lead to that.

and certainly the market mentality is one. but it's very hard to say. there's not a lot of evidence that this regime is tolerant of any sort of dissent. there's not a lot f evidence that they have tried to listen to the content of whatever a protest had taken place. and of course it goes without saying that this is a country is very hard to get any information on. when we talk about the sense of protest coming year and the jokes, stories of things that might have happened in this military, this figure of that city, but we really do know the nature medically skilled country. did i think of the day comes where hoping for, if it

collapses, nec unification, i think we'll learn a lot about what sort of political consent existed within the country. and loan site that today. >> host: do you see the regime as really rigid and therefore more like a collapse? or do you think it flexible and muddled through despite incredible global changes in the international environment. you know, how should we evaluate the character of the regime in order to have a sense of what might come later on quakes >> guest: i think it is when you post the spectrum, it's more in the brittle of this vector and in the regime that will crack rather than one that has been valuable and manage to muddle through. the reason it has been able to muddle through this because the second factor we talked about at the outset of the conversation is its manage to muddle through

not because of anything in terminal and the system, but because of what is happening outside of north korea and that is this dynamic or nobody wants to put in the effort to change it or solve a problem. there is one that wants to ensure there's no big changes for recurrences up in the country. >> host: and i guess that is the second part of your observation about north korea is that nobody cares enough to risk the cost of changing it. and really bad i think is quite striking when we look at the history, especially of how human rights can print that motivated desires for international intervention and many other parts of the world. you think rwanda, kosovo, bosnia. and yet somehow north korea has sent been subject to that same

international activism despite the fact that arguably the human race conditions are just as bad, certainly for large portions of the population. you know, how was it that this is the case? what makes north korea and the into that sort of focus of the international community? >> guest: will be same international community we have to be clear what we mean the mets in the developed west and their certain issues that developed west has taken a in terms of human rights. yet you mention some of them. we very clearly have taken up these causes. there are others, sudan, tibet, others out of bed taken into a great extent by the international community. the north korea is just not one of the issues. for two reasons. the first is to very successful efforts by the north korean

regime to ensure that this remains a nameless and faceless policy issue and not a personal story of personification of a story that the average american, if you go, will somehow be influenced by or take up a cause for. many of the north koreans to defect to the border with china are set back by the chinese on buses at the curtains drawn so there's nobody that could associate a name or a face with this terrible human rights situation in north korea. just by example, so korea during the economic dictatorships have this person in the name of kim dae showed who later became president of south korea and became a space for democratic is

that -- at this time. you have these personalities to be identified with a problem. north koreans have been very good at not allowing that to happen in the chinese have been complicit. it is certainly one of the reasons why it hasn't been taking a. the other i think is that it just hasn't captured the imagination of some major personality in the west. i know this may sound a bit catty, but practically i think it's true when somebody like richard gere takes a tip that were mia farrow takes that cheney's ocs in darfur were. this gives residents to the issue that she would not normally see. and the case of north korea we just really haven't had that. we haven't had an individual to do that.

now i think one of the things we are seeing more of an there's stories of this in the book is americans are learning more about the stories of some of these defectors that are getting out of north korea. there've been several books written recently about defectors who have left, and manage to escape from north korea telling their stories. and i think that certainly helps, but still compared to other cases of human rights, we just don't see the same sort of resonance with regard to the issue. >> host: another distinctive feature of north korea that could have an impact on the human rights observations by the international community's is described to be a nuclear weapon. it's particularly interesting when i look at iraq. you are in the bush administration for part of the

time that this issue is playing out. and you know, it turns out that we decided to attack iraq and overthrow saddam hussein who didn't have them and who arguably have just as a regime we decided not to pursue that course of action with north korea. i do see the difference between the two? >> guest: you know, it is a tough question to answer without recounting the whole history of why the bush administration went into iraq. that was not my area of responsibility, so i'm not really capable of commenting on that. but i think in the case of north korea, i think there are two issues. the part of why there's iraq -- not by iraq inside of north korea, but if in iraq, not also why in north korea.

i have two answers. the first is that you have china. china sits right on the border with north korea. the last thing the united states or china want is some sort of confrontation that was somehow constitute two but has. that was in 1953. anytime there is serious thought serious military action, this is constantly at the top -- not even the top, but even halfway up the escalation ladder. it is constant concern that every u.s. president has had to think about seriously. so i think that is certainly one of the reasons, the china factor. and the other is that the united states and into iraq or went into afghanistan because it became the platform policy issue on which the administration

sought a resolution, a final resolution. we can debate whether that's the right or the wrong thing. many think it is about being. many americans think nothing was resolved their. and that's a completely different question. i mean come with a for korea as i don't think the north korea issue has slipped into that priority for the administration. it has been a crisis that she wanted to solve the least in the sense of preventing it from becoming a bigger crisis through diplomacy. but the united states historically when it has sought to solve a problem has been willing to use both force and diplomacy to really try to solve the problem. i think in the case of north korea, that that is just a registered like that and that is not specific to any administration. we've had crises in north korea with success at the administration in every

administration has made the same calculation. but we reach a crisis with north korea, are we willing to go all out to the end to solve this thing or do we want a solution that will least park it on the terror they come the diplomatic track, freeze it, cap it and move onto the other issues that most concern us, whether it be domestic economic situation or iraq or afghanistan or serious or the middle east peace process. these tend to be the more important issues traditionally in u.s. foreign policy. >> host: the other issue that makes iraq different from north korea is the u.s. north korea alliance. so how do you see the dynamics of the alliance plane into our ability to address the top concerns that the u.s. has religion north korea's nuclear program? >> undeniably look at the situation, the alliance of south korea is clearly more important than any policy we have a north

korea. you know south korea is a key ally for the united states, a major partner in international initiatives around the world. big trading partner. all of these things may south korea extremely important for the united states in terms of the position in asia. there's always been a tension in the u.s. south korea and the venetian when it comes to north korea because we have different governments in a democracy in south korea, some which tend to be more progressive would seek more engagement and others tend to be more conservative, which i willing to follow a test are packed with regard north. and so for the united states, it's a question of sort of sinking a with whichever government is there at the time as they do with the latest north korean crisis. so for example when i was in government during the bush

administration with progressive government and set korea is really quite engagement oriented ms willing to count the deal of behavior in order to fulfill its mission on trying to seek long-term reconciliation with the country in the north. and the bush administration does not have been hampered with that particular strategy. i think currently you have an obama administration and lee myung-bak in the south right here which tends to be engaged when it comes to north korea and south korea because both of them after having been born earned by north korea provocations are in the night to hold tight, hold firm to require the north meets certain preconditions before we have another round of diplomacy. so i've always said that started 75% of our north korea policy is a south korea policy in the

sense that we need to stay synced up with our allies and the japan also another ally in asia whenever dealing with the north korea problem. >> host: you know, in other aspect of the book you talk about this president pushes own interest and use match in pyongyang have been a major influence on his thinking. and of course the idea out there that book in the white house and at other refugees in the white house, the appearance of the object d. and the kumamoto and so he took a bully pulpit approach, but my impression was that the human race envoy that was appointed really was not a major part of the picture in terms of the policy. now we have the abundant

ministration. we haven't seen any refugees in the oval office, but we have seen the human rights envoy that went to north korea and talked with the north koreans, raise human rights but the north koreans, even of those probably relatively short conversation. what do you see as the merits and demerits of each of this approach is quite >> well, i think it's great that robert kane has been able to make a trip to north korea the more that we can open a dialogue, the better. admittedly part of what he was doing well was to negotiate a humanitarian assistance package for north korea in terms of food within a place to talk about human rights abuses, but the fact that he was there was very

important. you know, the dialogue with the north koreans and human rights is kind of a ridiculous dialogue as you can tell them you need to improve your human rights situation and there is on cu will be how much have this conversation at the official level. the response will be used united states is human rights problems, too. and that is not a comparable discussion. and so i think the president bush wanted to do was he wanted to make this an issue that people knew about. and he wanted to, as he put it, he wanted to do something. he wanted the presidency by the time he left the oval office to do something that could help the measurability and improve the lives of north korean people. and so i think there's two things. the first was he helped to create the first reset on the

program for north korean refugees in the united states. none prior to this. of course there's a big program and south korea that it says and that would be to an extent expected. but for another country outside of south korea for a country like the united states to say we are going to take north korean defect pursuant to settle in the united states. the administration didn't try to to thorn publicly. look at us, were doing this big thing. but it was a big and important step that sort of set an example to other come up with a marker in the crowns fade the united states is not just talking about human rights improvements in north korea. it's trying to do something. the second thing is you mentioned was he brought attention to the issue by bringing in defectors, people who spoke used for, story he's known from the intimate details he's known very well about all

of these folks and talk to them about the situation and then gave press statements saying he met with these people then want to see the human rights situation improving north korea. again, giving names and faces to this problem helps to give it a broader reference. so when the boat i go through some of the experiences of monday's defectors came into the oval office, walking them into the oval office them much in them responded president bush respond and it was really a truly memorable experience. so in the end these things obviously did not solve the human rights problem. they're not opening a prison camps and allowing the u.n. commissioner, but when you are limited in terms of what you can do, i mean everybody respects

going into the country. these are tangible concrete steps to try to put this on the radar screen and create more international attention because that is, you know, creating that sort of knowledge base and the assertive advocacy environment was the first step to trying to address the problem. >> of the book also goes through and illustrates some of the long decisions north korea made in trying to build its own economy and this is quite striking because as you noted in the coming north korea was the most powerful economic heart of the peninsula compared to south korea for a long time until the 70s. the menu also talk a little bit about north korea's police attacked dvds. and this was also an area of focus during the bush administration that we don't really care that much about these days.

and so i'm wondering, do you think that the fact dvds are continuing? are we succeeding in succeeding north korea in terms of customers for some of its military and muscle sales? deweese t cell activity in north korea in terms of trying to counterfeit cigarettes or counterfeit u.s. money, where do you think the stands at this point? >> guest: this is sort of a fascinating story. the notion that you're in the country basically one third of its economy is based on a list that kennedy. as you mentioned, counterfeiting drug, counterfeiting cigarette, counterfeiting the u.s. currency. the north koreans counterfeit the bills. it is known in the profession if you will as the supernode because north koreans manage somehow to acquire the printing

press, the ink and paper that is used for the production of 100-dollar bills. the difference is the printing place they manage to acquire our brand-new, so they're the ones the u.s. uses a fairly old. so the imperfections you see in a treasury note you don't see in a north korean know. that is what is called the supernode. and so this is a part of their economy. so during the bush administration come after us was taken to try and stop this three series of sanctions that were aimed at trying to target the accounts of companies known to be involved in illicit activities. the reason we don't hear more about it today is because the site to the days have successful in the north koreans probably do

not feel they can do so in certain things we can do for many years when it came to making money through this sort of activity. >> okay comes to the international community in the u.s.a. getting better at eliminating those markets over north korea. >> guest: i think so. i think that is why we are not hearing much more about it today. i also think that for many of the financial institutions they've just become much more weary handling north korean account and north korean money and so that is also caused the north koreans themselves to think about whether they want to be seen as being financially vibrant asset that every bank regulator doesn't want to see in their institutions. >> and one of the other cases related to that issue had direct

experience with the said bank of delta asia situation, where the u.s. treasury issued an advisory about that bank of the possibility of engaging in money laundering or handling some of these counterfeit notes. how do you see -- and of course this occurred at a point in time but it looks like there would be some progress in negotiations and then everything stalled out. to think that's the case that has stalled diplomacy and as we look today to more satellite launches, possibly at her nuclear test by north korea come seems like a lot of people are calling for re-examination of the financial area. you know, is media replicable?

so basically did a work from your perspective in his replicable today? >> guest: jack, the first thing i would point out is the irony in the description you just gave is that on the one hand when the u.s. government pursued this financial sanction in 2005, 2006, it was widely criticized as something that was both an effective and hurting the diplomacy. and yet today, as he said in the people are clamoring for it as a way to sanction north korea because they see it as a powerful tool in terms of trying to influence north korean behavior. but in 2005 come of this particular action was camassia said can said connie treasury department advisory. the u.s. financial institution to beware of doing business is a particular bank in macau because accounts and that related to

north korea were believed to be involved in money laundering. this and the end was a law enforcement action. it is something the u.s. government had to do. if a country is counterfeiting currency, that is to plan at the ward. so they were obligated to take action with regard to prediction of the u.s. financial institution. now it's many people who follow this know the effect that was a that had a ripple effect. this was next against a very small bank in china that then cause every other bank regulator and bank president and financial institutions around the world to say wait a sec and, if the u.s. is not dealing with me at the bank, maybe we should look at the north korean accounts and our bank. so you had this nature and the fact that this will impact on north korea.

now, this is meant as an action to submarine the diplomacy taken place? i really don't think so. like i said it was the law enforcement action, something happening on a parallel track with the diplomacy. all of us were participated in the diplomacy, also participating in the decision-making process on this particular action. so in the end of the something that had to be done and it did cause a delay in the negotiations. as we saw later negotiations eventually came back online and does lead to two very important agreements, one of which we froze the north korean program and the second agreement for actually led to the dismantlement of important pieces of the nuclear program such that it's pretty safe to say today that the plutonium

program, plutonium-based program young young is no longer functional and that is one of the accomplishments that the united states made in terms of diplomacy when it came to stopping north korea's nuclear program. now we have a home now, as you know, a whole new program various concerned about. much as the plutonium program, but the iranian program. but in terms of, you know, the accomplishments made through these distinctions at the time, these distinctions i think were quite effective at getting north korea to give up at least pieces of the program. >> host: do think there were replicable as today or is that time passed? >> guest: is a hard testament there. i'm obviously not as close to it as i have been in the past, so i don't know. i don't know, for example, if the north koreans have adjusted.

i presume they have too two but i thought in the action in bda in 2005. so i think i'm the one hand the north koreans are probably testing and training to work around so they are not subject to the same sorts of sanctions. on the other hand, when the united states pursued those, it was an advisory to u.s. financial institution. it wasn't something supported by the u.n. and supported by the u.n. security council resolution. on the other hand, today after the first nuclear test against the obama administration in may may 2009, we now have security council resolutions they give authority for pursuing the source of financial sanctions. so i think on one hand the north koreans have probably tried hard to find workaround so they can avoid being subject to the same sorts of sanctions. on the other hand, the united states now has the international

authority to pursue these things in the way they do not under the bush administration. >> host: one other question on this. they talk about the resumption diplomacy. the first as part of that we gave back the money that was being held under the law enforcement action that had occurred. i'm sure the north koreans probably looked at that as exoneration for what they had done. how do you view the fact the north koreans got their money back? >> guest: the main lesson they learned and again it evidenced in the fact that we don't hear much about these activities that they were undertaking. the main lesson they learned from the whole episode was they can't continue to do business this way. they can't continue to counterfeit other countries currencies or to sell fake drugs or fake cigarette.

they just can't do that anymore. and so i think that was the main lesson they learned and the fact that they come back to this diplomacy and back to negotiations in earnest freeze their program to dismantle them to me was a function -- was a function of the circuit courts of diplomacy. i think it was the concerned about their financial reputation and everything that came with that that brought them back to the table and lead them to make these agreements. now they certainly got things in return. they got energy assistance. take a discussions with the united states, a variety of assistance from south korea. they got things in return for this. of course that is the nature of diplomacy, that the driving force behind it. i know there were some who

disagree with this. the driving force behind that were the sanctions they really put a bite on that. >> and of course they are still driving for a nuclear saw this, even though the apparent agreements designed to do with the plutonium part of the north korean program. but let me go back and ask about the north korean prospects. they're still cash hungry. did we don't see any immediate evidence of course the chinese are always there suggesting the north koreans should follow their path. what is really the way to cultivate an entire german for north korea can move any reform direction. at this point, so obviously looking for cash, but is there a

way of drawing them into a positive path rather than pursuing the negative activities we've been talking about. >> guest: well, the positive path on the table for the successive administration. i know there's always discussions about the extent to which the current administration is different from the obama at restoration, but in the end, the packaging may have been different, but there is a positive path but as you know well, which is that in return for giving up their nuclear program the united states, the international community would provide security guarantees, economic assistance, energy and assistance and political normalization, will provide money. it would provide a regional security environment in which north korea could feel safe and

secure. all this oeste things in return for giving up their nuclear weapons. but that has now worked. it has failed. it has failed for every administration going back to george h.w. bush. and i think that the obama administration, we've really reached the end of the rope in terms of those because i think many would argue the obama administration in terms of its initial intention was probably the most forward leaning u.s. and most ration to come into office but it came to the north korea problem and it is now in a position indistinguishable from the heart are aligned that even the clinton administration took its time during the two terms. so that's a positive path and they don't seem to want to take it. what can be done in the interim? the most important thing done is to get more information and to north korea. more information and terms of

what's going on in the outside world in terms of marketization, in terms of the internet, in terms of cell phone. this is the only way to really make inroads into seeing any change should in the country. from the perspective on the one hand they need economic reform is to say they need money, food producers of things. on the other hand, were machines that this open up, it releases all source of political forces that inevitably lead to a loss of legal control and even possibly the collapse of the regime. that is not a bargain at the leadership, particularly new leadership that is inexperienced and is just coming into power and the prizes political control. that's the last thing they really want to consider at this

moment. so not very optimistic with the prospects for reform at this time. >> host: but the way you framed it is pretty much a u.s. way of framing basically a deal by which the nuclear issue is resolved. the chinese may have a different idea about what would be necessary about quick grow close. it's about the question for you follow us and you can find a sustainable path basically the argument. the question i have in china has not necessarily has not been necessary to produce toe in the water. how would we know if we began to see the north korean leadership moving in that direction and put a north korean deng xiaoping

succeeded? >> guest: jeanneau, scott, i have many friends who were china scholars and when i talk to those friends, they are always optimistic about north korea, prospects with north korea. i never understood why. you know, when you ask them, they say it's very clear whether optimistic because they have to study china and it came from where the chemical trail resolution and a sink and a big country like china and certainly north korea can do that. but there's two big differences here. first is china had deng xiaoping annecy said, deng xiaoping was a charismatic leader, larger than life figure. there is no deng xiaoping in

north korea. there's an inexperienced 29-year-old who's running the country now. he is no deng xiaoping. that's the first problem. the second problem is when the cheney said to give rich and making money is okay, even if it meant giving up the degree of political control. and for the current north korean leadership in the lease for foreseeable future there is nothing more important right now than political control and that looks to be the case for the last leadership and looks to be the case of the current leadership. there's a new leader of north korea who spent part of his life in switzerland, a secondary school, that people are hopeful that he may be deng xiaoping. but then again given the recent crisis and the missile test

coming to know that the obama administration try to reach of north korea adult think there's a lot of hope right now that he shows signs of being a future deng xiaoping. maybe there's a military general somewhere in north korea that is unhappy with the current situation, that is unhappy with the young leadership that is making the bad decisions, as a different different view on things. maybe there is a pop junkie in north korea, but we don't know. and so right now, the prospects don't look very good for that reform that leadership. >> host: some people point to kim jong il's uncle as one former. certainly he's had some international experience. it's hard to judge whether he missed the direction of earth warmed. let's say that somebody or somebody else emerge to place in a pox on the role, but within

the same system. how do you think that the u.s. government would be response to that circumstance. >> host: is certainly welcome somebody like that. but the obvious problem -- first, we certainly welcome some unlike a senior figure who's interested in reform and interested taking it to a better place. if there was some unlike the generals we see today in north korea better looking to make a big turn in terms of their own system and the way the united states would welcome that. but the 800-pound gorilla in the room, even if that were a scenario still remains the nuclear issue. when it comes down to a score whether the chinese in the u.s. really did her because the

chinese certainly what reform a right to promote reform as you said, but they're also willing to say in order to promote reform we should do things like give them a peace treaty in a normalized relations with the united states in dprk s. precepts if you will, to try and promote reform. i think the problem for the united states is that that is not just possible and every administration going back to george h.w. bush has made pretty clear that the number one priority is the nuclear program in the united states welcomes reform, absolutely in north korea, but it must come with the nuclearization. we have alliances in the region. our position is laid to rest classes and i don't think any of our allies, japan, south korea, let alone the united states

abused account is normalizing relations, full political elections with a country that remains a nuclear weapons state completely outside of the npt regime. it would basically destroy the non-proliferation treaty regime and would have a tremendous effect on our alliances in the region. so this is the rubik's cube that is very difficult to match up and has been the basic problem every time we talk about a big deal, getting a big deal with north korea. >> let me go back and ask about that because in the book you spend a lot of time related to nuclearization and a lot of people thought of north korea conducted a nuclear test that would constitute a paradigm shift in the region. of course you were there with north korea conducted its first nuclear test. was there something about china's reaction in particular the surprise to? how did you see the response to

that playing out and how did the response that you were involved with company and now, in the bush administration, what should we draw from not, for instance, in the context of a possible additional nuclear test by north korea in the coming weeks or months? >> guest: in the short-term it was a game changer in the sense that we move to a new level of international unity in terms of punishing the north are the sorts of actions. in a sense that we had u.n. security council ablutions really for the first time in which china and russia were to sign onto these and unanimously condemn north korea and sanction north korea further action. in the short-term i think that was a game changer. and since then, every time north

koreans have done something egregious, for the most part the chinese and the russians, certainly when it comes to nuclear tests. but in the longer term, in retrospect that was about the only guilt change. it didn't create this a game changing mentality in the way the chinese do with earth korea. you know, i think there is a lot of debate in china as to whether they should simply drop this ally, dropped this legacy of the cold war and really help to end his regime. but clearly it does not have been. if anything, the chinese have drawn closer to north korea over the past two years, both economically in terms of politically supporting the leadership. so that he had it didn't create the sort of major change people thought it would. and again, part of it i think is the fact that the status quo bias if you love in terms of dealing with north korea and the

crisis is to try and just bring it back down, to try to lower the temperature. it is not to try to solve the problem. and that is a political choice i think that administrations and washing 10 in seoul and tokyo and beijing and moscow, these are choices they make because in the end, at least for now, it equates to peace and prosperity. the status quo equates to peace and prosperity of east asia are the most economically vibrant region of the world anti-people want that or do they want to go down this violent path with north korean, potentially violent path of north korea where you try to solve the problem. it's very clear with every government wants to do. they want to maintain the status quo. >> host: and that really brings us to the question of creating unification words seems there is a big between the u.s. vision and the chinese vision

and also it involves the south koreans want in the future. my impression was you were pretty bullish about the prospects for achieving unification. you also doubt to some degree with some of the challenges that would emerge. at this point, you know, how likely do you think it is that korea will achieve unification and how do you see that process playing out in terms of basically a contest or china's influence continues to rise? >> guest: i mean, your question is right. i don't think the united states and south korea on one hand and china on the other hand. the united states has said it was silly in the joint statement that the past two presidents with their south korean counterparts that the uss proration is a single korea free

peace. that is the natural orderof things and the international relations of this part of the world, unified korean peninsula. and that cheney is coming out. the chinese don't want to see unification. they just don't. and i think that's become clearer and clearer in the past couple of years. so there really is a conflict of interest between the two sides when it comes to that. and terms that the future and unification, it is impossible to say i would have been, just like no one can predict power and unification fender which would have been, but i think that we can focus on is the question of whether countries in the region are ready and willing to take on the task of unification. and i think 10 years ago that was not the case. 10 years ago i think the general consensus was unification was too difficult, much harder than that to germany's.

too dangerous and should be something that should be pushed off as far as you can into the future to come in three generations you will. basically not my problem. no one wanted it to be their problem. as i talk about in the book, the attitude on that is slowly changing now. in part because the weather situation with north korea is getting worse and worse. the human rights situation is worse and worse and while no one wants to try to push north korea over the edge, there is a growing feeling that it is coming and that we must be prepared. they think are seen a change of attitude in south korea. i think you even seen in places like japan, where the north korean threat is the biggest existential threat in japan today. and while on the one hand japanese are always concerned about the resurgent nationalism

in one korea, they see the current situation has been quite dangerous, potentially very unstable. and i think their attitudes are changing on this, too. so when the book we talk about those at the things we to watch because they will predict unification, no one can say exactly when it's going to happen, but the question is are you prepared for a? and that is the operative question for the society and the government in the region nsb for nautilus to talk about it at all. there is more willingness to talk about this now. >> i was like to ask you to close. after kim jong il dies become the ready piece "the new york times" and said north korea as we know it is over. so far we see a fair amount of continuity. i guess the question is, how durable is the impossible state?

>> guest: well, you know, it always depends how you define >> guest: well, you know, it always depends how you define >> guest: well, you know, it always depends how you define at the death of kim jong il is over in the sun that is to talk about in the book are entering a new phase where you have a young untested leadership with immense challenges in terms of maintaining his own position in the system. that is also dealing with a crumbling economy and an acute food problem. and at the same time, the society is increasingly influenced by market mentality. it was like it was not. last time you had a leadership transition in 1994 when the first leader died in the speculator came into place. so in that sense, it is not like the north korean path. and sure, it has not collapsed board has not changed since the

death of kim jong il comment that we are only talking a few months. i mean, this new regime in north korea has only been in power for a few months. and the broader scope of history, there's been many transitional regimes that lasted months, years before us in the majors have been in terms change. so i think the verdict is still out on this. i don't think we can simply assume that everything will go smoothly and be able to muddle through forever because prior to the death of kim jong il and december 2011, she would ask any expert, including you, scott, what will be the most important variable that can create major change in this country? i think everyone would've agreed the sudden death of the north korean leader. so i think we have to respect what we thought before and they think we all have to ask carefully whether it's going