then you have a cochaired by alan simpson on the deficit a national debt, doesn't pay any attention to that. how about romney. well, which romney is going to a year? with etch-a-sketch will be no quotes at the answer to your question, in my opinion is the primary process has moved the republican nominee so prior to the right that i have to make a shared future, a persuasive one decides a sharp point. >> up next, james hornfischer discusses his work "neptune's inferno: the u.s. navy at guadalcanal." he spoke as part of the toronto called the symposium hold in norwich in northfield vermont. this is about 55 minutes.

>> good afternoon. it is my distinct pleasure to present to you at our colby symposium, writer and speaker, james hornfischer. hornfischer is quickly establishing himself as doing for the navy of popular historian stephen ambrose said for the army. this quote is from the rocky mountain news and they feel mr. hornfischer are aptly describes in very well. mr. hornfischer is the author of three, one samuel eliot wars and the word for naval literature and was recently named a naval history magazine as one of a dozen all-time naval classes. his second book, ship of ghosts about the cruiser uss houston is

a selection of the history books and the military book club and the winner and 2007 at the night to maritime literature award. his most recent book, "neptune's inferno" published by bantam in 2011 is a major new talent of the auto canal naval campaign. now president of the hse hornfischer management can be assembled at number one your times bestseller and colby award winner, friends of our fathers. you will serve as moderator for this 2012 colby public session. today, he will be speaking about his most recent book, "neptune's inferno: the u.s. navy at guadalcanal." it is the untold story of the u.s. navy's bloodiest fight of world war ii. consider it, and i quote vivid and engaging, extremely readable

research by ronald spector of "the wall street journal" and brilliance, a compelling narrative naval combat, simply superb by the "washington times." it is a near times publisher weekly and "boston globe" bestseller. so once again, it is my great pleasure to welcome mr. trent work. james hornfischer. [applause] >> thank you very much. i appreciate everybody coming out. i think this is my fifth colby symposium. a truly unique in my opinion in terms of a publishing conference that focuses on the craft of military history facilitates the achievement of service men and women and hopefully will guide policymakers the experience of digesting our past, in this case the recent past as we discuss

afghanistan. today we are going a little deeper. i've written three books about the navy in world war ii. he said the navy in world war ii and immediately turns the pacific because that's really where the action was if your naval officer or enlisted man in 1942. "neptune's inferno" takes on a six month long campaign that i think most will since the consensus emerge, the guadalcanal is truly the turning point in the 50. midway of course is crucial, the battle of midway fire two months before the race went ashore on guadalcanal. it was a push towards hawaii for japanese fleet carries her son, pilots and air crew and the those losses plus the ability really to undertake new offensive operations into expanded massive civic perimeter. when it did go for ice, for

america isn't open the way the first time to go on the offensive. now the joint chiefs that, in fact the combined chiefs of data from the british and american high command face a number of options of where to take the offensive against the action. all through 1942 is much talk of the strategy, the world by strategy of europe first. president roosevelt commended himself to it, to strengthen the alliance and maintain the confidence of pressure and continue its fight sure many people what is going on a back channel from the combined chiefs of staff in this meaning, especially on the american side is general marshall and matt king of american leadership. but there is a consensus we've got to do something somewhere. there's also a driving force in these discussions done is to the will to the in mind of one admiral ernest jay king at the

commander-in-chief of the u.s. fleet, chief of naval operations, a very willful individual but that never to admit anybody he considered an intellectually will in his presence was to feel that ego coming at you. use it very difficult to, but it was his achievement in 1942 to recognize that the to recognize that the to recognize that the to recognize that the remote island, known as guadalcanal where they were and may, he had to mean some of the necessity to take offense about oration against imperial japan. he was able to convince president roosevelt and the two of them together were able to convince president roosevelt that the navy and the marine corps would strike in the pacific. everything president roosevelt was saying about europe first

and who's going to be pacific purse. the navy was indeed the alliance with the construction of the guadalcanal to be unable to spend a cargo ship in australia. you can see here is hawaii. here's guadalcanal and harry sydney. now the pacific shipping coming down through the g2 refill, and this is all went, radius from where the japanese permitted to establish a working military airfield. it was really split the alliance and two. a study would be cut off in a strategic position in the series are correct. on august 7, 1942, the marines under general r. schmidt griscom

memory division supported by three task forces from pearl harbor at from new zealand. they convert to fiji, hauled reversals on august 7, 1942. and destroy the internet tells his buddies from ms. couric what follows is a series of a six campaign of nutrition, where japan has slowly came to grips the magnitude of the situation. they did not command much importance by the roaring core until they realize the larger ambitions and realized that they are basic profile would be threatened by the u.s. division into raucous, said tom burke, november, the check means maine-based track enabled in the central pacific and caroline

island three series of humor in her foothold in southern solomon purdue seven major naval battles. five of them remain a service for a more attacking the eight-inch main batteries in cajun and 50 galler machine guns, heavy on both sides. five satisfactions of that nature in the battle of mid file and the waters waters were guadalcanal. the campaign lasted six months. and by the end of it, and the seven naval battles, and approximate number. those 5000 killed in action or three times the number of men who died on the island itself. and so we've come to the question of them associate the know something about the pacific war, why didn't i know that?

i think it's obscured the extent of the navy sacrifice in the campaign is constantly up screwed by the imagery we have when we hear the name guadalcanal. they sought relief for those six months, outnumbered, certainly undersupplied come underarmed. they held the perimeter around the airfield and saved the day. but let's also observed that if the navy does not force them adequately, and no amount on the part of clifton casey vandergriff or chesty poller or any of his men are any of their men in the faith of their brothers. they would've been rolled out that the navy failed to comply them and protect them from a tamer enforcement. there's really no chance for the marines to withhold that island. so the guadalcanal campania

spender said were fighting on the island is a desperate struggle to resupply the garrison undertaken by both sides, says the control as well as control the skies. america had never practiced before. it is one of under preparation, rush schedules for constantly got in the way of planning, forces the nasa do something they never trained to do. new technologies in the field that were untested and indeed unrehearsed. say radar was coming into the sleep. nobody at the first idea how to use it. there might have been one man what a two-minute moment. guadalcanal learn to fight. the japanese navy had a pretty good idea how to fight. and that was illustrated within 36 hours of the morning going ashore. on the night of the 19 states

have done a under command of admiral mccalla. the battle of saddle island was the result of this engagement between the cruisers into u.s. cruisers depending. saddle island. it was a defeat of the first order of the american diet showcase the craft of besting homes of torpedoes and gunfire and nighttime close range engagement. we lost for cruisers, the incense, quincy and is tori went down with about a thousand men. you really could save the battle was a disaster even worse in the pearl harbor attack. with the so-called defeat at pearl harbor we simply in the

navy installation. there's really nothing you can say about the combat arms when you ruling out a their bunks at 7:00. you had a combat ready u.s. green, powerful cruiser for his under competent command. not flat command. this pretty significant. when a couple cat dens with the two squadrons defending the sound but they're sensing a nighttime patrol, i.e. sitting ducks going back and forth like this waiting to be picked off. there was her a well-trained crews and specifically rigorously trained frenetic combat. this lays bare a number of issues and these fighting the spirit and doctrine all. there's a lot to be said about all that. suffice to say increasingly be the extent to which the u.s.

navy was not prepared to fight. the naval air corps was a world leader at this point. we won the battle of midway. admiral halsey's carrier for us all the rage at the shores of japan at tells, launching airstrikes. but the circus maybe, the black shoe flea had its day. so the battle of data and, for cruisers scarcely a scratch in the japanese. and so the theme of the campaign becomes to not put forward, how is the institution, this type of institution by the evolving web for. you've got the aviators over here, battleship sailors over here. no one has a handle on how we conducted operations as such. how do we can get our feet on ourselves and take the reigning masters. well, the answer is through trial and error and the

emergence of a particular combat leader who had the forward thinking approach and combat is not the really sensitive about putting for the target first, especially at night. because when things get it, things burn. things i would've been if they get hit again. that is how the japanese won the island and the americans eventually learn to win the battles followed. cruz and inaction of friday the 13th and others the brilliant rear admiral lee. so the book traces this curriculum that the navy faces in the south pacific. the japanese in the early days in the role that master and teacher. and the first figure comes to the four inches the american fleet how to fight in the context of service.

heat a small cruiser group that was patrolling away from where the fighting was taking place on august 9. you have a competent knife fighting squadron, cruiser squadron. norman scott was quickly seen as the guy who is the man at the moment to make that happen. and their job was to intercept the japanese but tokyo express from the japanese launch in, running the resupply, the chain of islands better here. they would go at night because the americans had their field and guadalcanal. they have a massive forward air base here. it really wasn't ready for action for a few weeks, but by august 20 from the uss long

island comes in from nice couple squadron of the learning life bombers, they're ready for action. and by day, aviators have a radius control, a parameter that reaches really all the way up the slot. japanese ships will come down and daylight after peril. dive bombers, torpedo bombers, no fun. they operate therefore tonight, so what happens is you have a changing of the watch is about when the sun goes down, the japanese are preeminent. fighter pilots don't fly. dive bombers stay home, asleep, to rest at and the beleaguered garrison. when the sun comes up, the situation changes 180 degrees. this is the dynamic that develops. the japanese quickly realize

they have to get out of the cover of dark menace before the guadalcanal base it on. as to what admiral scott comes to realizing the situation is japanese on operational straitjacket. to bring down ships that are suitably fast to get in and out after dark before sunrise is, they've got to leave their base at the very predict of all time. this guy to arrive at guadalcanal pretty much surely after midnight to a mode and hightailed to the 200 miles north of henderson field before the pilots fly. so scott realizes okay, my mission is to defend guadalcanal , but we see what happens when cruisers standby on a patrol of course at 11 knots and the japanese see them first and opened fire. we see what happens if that happens. were going to do it differently. admiral scott pulls together his commanders and says we're going

to play defense and offense is to. you know when the japanese will arrive and therefore we're going to be at battle speed and column, ready for action when they come. were not going to be passively standing by. the offense is mind to the task of defending against the tokyo express. the japanese come down to bombard the airfield and admiral scott is writing for them in salt lake city, couple of the cruisers. the battle was by no means a rousing the jury. scott executes his plan, just as a writer that there's an inevitable inevitable fog of war situations developed and how the ships maneuver under his plan to fix after the battle was over. by the end of that, by the clothes come in the have lost the heavy cruiser.

i think it was the first of the war. another cruiser was heavily damaged and you can say the american at shoe is the first exhibit uneconomic the japanese. we can do this. this is the way forward. admiral scott had a real feather in his cap. so now we go back to having navy learns lesson in how it does its business and what does it now do with the victory it has under his belt. naturally you think admiral scott would be come the send command and stronger taskforces with operation, but as they move through october, we find changes that the line from his near -- i'm sorry, a plane from his bubble have a very powerful impact on how the campaign develops. so the change of command at the highest level because well, the commander at the south pacific

mode vice admiral robert wormley for a number of reasons have been rodman to lead the charge the south's essay, having been stationed at london he's a special naval observer in the blitz was going on in reporting directly to president roosevelt. he was the natural choice to serve as commander, but as the campaign began unfolding, it really became fair that he wasn't the kind of leader that exactly fired up the troops. he liked to complain a lot and might've been a bit of a panic are. groomer strategists and marvelous diplomat, but when the fighting started, he found themselves obsessed at the details. he never left the headquarters or went forward to see the marines have guadalcanal. never saw the naval base with the cruisers and destroyers

refueling. he was very aloof and fighting crime. and it quickly became the admiral minute eventually concluded with the break down in command of the crucial operation. there were other friends for years, very close friends. this is a conclusion reached very well at only, but he knew what was necessary. he knew in october it would be necessary to relieve his old command. and prior to midway this is very the policy makes his return. he misses the guadalcanal campaign. if ever you wonder about the effective leadership, i think the case of policies relief of gormley illustrates his power.

the simple fact, the simple transmission of the word from one man to another, is in the fact, simply astounding that the changes. of the lowliest guadalcanal two captains of ships. they felt like they were going to get their chance and a new fighting spirit was coming. this may so much rhetoric, but it's true to interview the man, that it changed everything. he took command from gormley and october 25th and time to confront a receptor that point the largest concentrated effort by japanese naval forces to retake while canal. you can see that they're in the nick of time. you got there in time to order his taskforces to intercept japanese forces coming down from attacking transports, battleships quatrains, cruisers and carriers and what developed

on october 25, 26 is known as the battle of santa cruz. it is a battle, really the battle of midway in the terms of pilots and planes involved and never the riverboat gambler through some of his carrier forces in the fray, enterprise in the horn of the two carriers and they both intercept japanese ever last a hornet and enterprises badly damaged. not that of the south pacific versus basinger carrier. even she the enterprises badly damaged. you can say this is iraq w-whiskey and one part of policy. but that is his style and in fact at a time when you can say japanese have generally held the initiative and for the most part material superiority, think you can make the case that a theater was given to the kind of literacy needed to to turn the tide to launch the stroke and

change the doctor review well. halsey was that kind of man. he immediately visited guadalcanal, st. thomas jenifer vandergrift and said what you? i think the fact that he was in the physical presence asked him that question was the most important demonstration he could've made to his two demurring position. and so companies that i nietzsche to give me everything you've got. he looked to many ion that you've got it. little bit insight of what leadership really barrister. you have the trust between commanders. you have a felt obligation that affects the decisions commanders may be a policy from that point forward never stated to send carriers force the south and he committed himself to a very regular and progress resupply effort up front then i had to begin crucially needed supplies.

i should say from the outset to supply situation is very grave for the marines have guadalcanal. this is backing up somewhat, but there was a terrible sort of prior to the arrival, a terrible state of relations between the marines and navy. in fact, it's really one of the first thing somebody will often say when they say effort to book and you've written about how they dumped the murray's and high tailed it. and that seems to be the perception. i mentioned earlier the 5000 sailors killed in action. clearly that's not the case, the perception existed. it arose from the fact in the beginning of the campaign that the navy only agreed to stand by with carriers for two days and support the marine landing. when the carriers hauled out, there goes the year cover. admiral turner who's in charge of the lead area realizes the

cargo man would be vulnerable, so there goes the cargo. he pulled them out with half the marines stewarded ammunition. so there's some black going on. so it really repairs a lot of bad ill will that exists between the navy and the marine corps. and i think from that point forward, it's very much the case that the two services five side-by-side and did everything they had to give the japanese. so i hope i'm not teasing you with all the sub themes and shifted gears and jumping back and worth in time. guadalcanal is a complex campaign. telling the story of one boat was a trick because we had to account for the changing for the coming and going at the ships and officers and men of every rank. every battle had a different order, commanders on both sides and said the story as one of the institutions of the navy learning how to fight.

so i told you about how he wins the battle. the japanese don't quit. two days after the battle was won, you can save is almost unwatchable. was able to get gorgeous battleships on guadalcanal, the arena and the congo to work over the batteries on the night of october 15. and marines on the island -- i don't believe in military history there is a ground force that ever endured heavier bombardment than the first marine. the japanese last after its handiwork was under five working aircraft left a bottle canal. so they said that the battle of santa cruz, which was blunted by the aggressiveness, one should nearly as fake catastrophic costs at your santa cruz has been carrier left in the south

pacific. fortunately, the japanese takes a tremendous amount of planning and nature medicine on a free service management to make a push like such that the japanese are making. they've got to marshal the troops in the transports in the field. they've got to get their combat shipping together, air support. so basically the japanese variable can make a push against guadalcanal really once every three to four weeks. and so commentaries the spirit of. if regrouping a great gathering as both sides their wounds and plan for the next thing. santa cruz, blog story short, blunt. the first major japanese stands. the next one comes in november. now, admiral scott, because of the cascading effects of gormley's release, the brilliant and aggressive admiral scott is no longer in charge of the cruiser wars.

commands a task or 64 compassing the contest for 67 devolves to gormley's chief of staff, cap didn't come in our admiral callahan was about to see his career go down at the responses. please give me back to see. i'm a fighting sailor. the policy was also a command of task for 67. he comes in and because hallahan has 15 days our dear frank overy scott, scott effectively is removed from command because of the operation of rules of seniority. so now we have admiral callahan and charger cruisers in the chat needs come calling on the night of september 13. the so-called battle of friday the 13th is almost impossible to track and to break apart,

tracy marry once the main forces collide north of guadalcanal that night, november 13. you have a japanese compartment for his consisting of a battleship can assure a shame the, 42,000-ton monsters. the americans have nothing like it to oppose him. callahan has three -- i guess two agents gone heavy cruisers about 12 dozen tents east. give a couple light cruisers and quadrant destroyers. callahan nostrum air search reports what is coming and he realizes that there's only 11 way out of that and that is true through it. because if he fails to engage them in the japanese will overwhelm cactus air forcecome only in troops an party is over. if callahan engages, all the ships will probably be last, cruisers versus battleships.

it's not a happy order of battle. one of the men i interviewed as a callahan is coming for months because once this battle begins, there is no evidence as if there ever could have been. because he didn't to behind a nifty battle plan admiral scott had prepared for historians to read and admired. the last order he gave was straight out of court nelson as the forces are engaged in his last command is odd ships fired the star word, even fired, i suppose you're a captain in engaging the new pinstripe with the fire to starboard. so people -- the core, the lost

blood that falls on both sides of the knife is really to the credit of neither commander. but what was the alternative? callahan knew he had but one alternative analysis sacrifice. at one of the great interviews they did for this book comment by the way the opportunists interview sections of these battles is diminishing rapidly, but i feel like this is the last some of the history. the 92-year-old man of berkeley, california, an african-american man which meant he would never go further than captains cook. he was captains cook and the uss san francisco tonight the bottle spots and he recounted to me how a around the worker of inheres officers talking. here is admiral callahan saying something like a know we have no choice, but we have to do it. we also had these words of a younger officer in this conversation within.

chloe from the somewhat fragmentary evidence he's a smart man. clearly he knew what he he knew what he was up against, cruisers versus battleships. he knew it was his job essentially to intercept and do what he could with what he had. the only way a cruiser beats the battleship is to get enclosed. most are denying designed to beat their corner price. so they're armored to protect against its own batteries. cruisers are armored to protect against teenage men battery at a 10 come 15-yard. it's a similar protection schemes to defend against the 14 or 15 battery. okay from what is a cruiser going to do against the battleship? do realize there's no way any inch cruiser takes down the battleship a standard range. but what if they getting close? this is exactly what happens. this is the brilliance of o'callaghan and it's frustrating

to know he had the very latest radar that can seep through the night and cast out their little microwave and find contacts through smoke and fog and darkness and very precise ranges and bearings. so you admiral callahan in san francisco but the old radar and effective radar. it's a brand-new microwave set radar was transmitted to admiral callahan, contact. 325, 22,000 yards. every 30 seconds is a new report. the callahan is here none of it. he's an old-school fighting naval officer on the radio with the single radio. if you're on the radio to not hearing anything else. so he's clearing the destroyers in the lead. he would use see now?

bush parker in the cushion was one of the best fighting the strong and the fleet back in the campaign. callahan had trusted this man. he didn't trust the newfangled radar nobody knew how to use. i interviewed a radar officer and one of these destroyers and a salad was good for, really we were trained to use, but it was a black box and it was the pilot house and it had a flat surface and it got pretty hot but is working so we put our coffee on it and that's really all we were able to use it for a 1942. they had been written yet, much less distributed to the fleet and trained on. set radar is really, for the average naval officer function is the speech toast radar and a strength of a field day, criticizing him for not doing adhesive technology hadn't been trained to use. is that fair? only that to the judge. he had to get enclosed with this cruisers to be for teenage battleships and that's exactly what he did.

his brilliant plan recognizing the simple fact of the six and the crucial moment, the night of friday the 13th, callahan's column from the san francisco and the portland stern fall about 2000 yards apart from these two battleships ambitious with bank on brad said. he was mortally wounded as of this is the moment of truth. cruisers was supposed to be battleships like this in the japanese point of view, americans weren't ever supposed to tightly is. they didn't think we have this kind of salvor gms. and this certainly appears and attacked a number of people including richard frank is probably the preeminent of the guadalcanal campaign really seems like the japanese were stunned by this exhibition of american fighting well. they didn't agree how did ms to sacrifice our ships. admiral callan is struck on the bridge by japanese.

norman scott was in another ship, killed by friendly fire from services go. both admirals killed in action on friday the 13th. i don't think i've ever happen again. i think that might've been a first and last. so you know, we have this incredible battle, which once again stops japanese bombardment force from hitting henderson field and therefore stopped the convoy from coming down and landing its troops on the beaches, therefore stays guadalcanal yet again. the significance of the sacrifices that the following day the air force was able to fly in another bombardment from 14-inch shells. they fly out, find the japanese =tranfour and of circling in the northern part and worked them over and they send down at the

four out of six/japanese transports with most of an entire japanese entry division. suppiah sacrifice that night, and guadalcanal is once again saved. two nights later the japanese gathered remnants of the massive onto task force order of battle they've assembled nhi again. they circled that the one battleship has survived. the kirby schama comes back with a number of cruisers. they are determined to put henderson field out of the mess. callahan's forests have been rendered combat and affect good. and so now here is add bohol t., the riverboat gambler again. all he has got now are the battleships that he's been jealously holding with his carriers. the uss enterprise, he's got two battleships in her screen, the washington and south dakota.

these are magnificent battleships. the reason the old pearl harbor should, and the reason they're not here is feel. admiral minister that the tankers and feel stores to operate carriers in all battleships simultaneously on the south pacific. so this is the cruisers, destroyers and carriers came to win until the new more fuel-efficient battleships come in. so little back. two battleships holding close to the enterprise. as the japanese come back, his only choice to oppose the rendered attack wishes for a releasing these 29 ships and send them into these confined waters. no ships are supposed to fight and couldn't find, ireland waters like this. these are massive ships that have huge turning radius, but it's the only choice policy has

that night. he releases the washington and south dakota under command of the one naval officer in the south pacific who knows how he is radar control gunfire. he comes from naval training center and helps install the hardware and ships. he wrote the first manual that had to be distributed to the fleet. and around the south pacific, blissfully, a champion pistol shooter, olympic medalist with a pistol and a rifle, master of every kind from a 45 caliber to 16 inches than anyone in command for a fight like this in to take these two capital ships into harms way. so that night, that night of november 14 to 15, blissfully goes for the washington flagship and south dakota and make sure work of the last japanese battleship and with this, the japanese psychological route is

not material route entirely committed psychological route is complete from the japanese point of view. they have lost two battleships in action in close range combat this fighting range against an american squadron. and never again -- remember this is 1942. it won't be until the end of 1944, almost two years the japanese battleships come forward and engage american forces in a meeting away. i think the psychological effect of this campaign was crashing for the japanese. one final battle that's happy for the japanese, essentially sees major combat operations to reinforce guadalcanal. i treated sort of ruefully in the book. probably part of the wondered if they stay in the interest in yet another slugfest, five in a row here. but it's frustrating because after the exhibition of his mastery on the night of november

think team, you want there to be an exclamation point of u.s. performance. but we don't get that. we get another abject u.s. defeat. we have u.s. cruisers under command of a new naval officer. he's got the playbook from scott. he's got the example of callahan and those ideas is radar. he's got all the images. his texts are loaded with supplies coming down to jump off the waterway just north of guadalcanal for the troops to haul ashore. so here comes admiral kanaka and here comes aggro right. opens fire, all the ships concentrate on one ship. the lead destroyer blown out of the water. the japanese react their mastery of nighttime torpedo warfare pays a huge dividend here. the commanders react in a split second gunfire torpedoes, reversed course and of course the long mr. peterson to the u.s. cruisers lined and

eviscerate three of the heavy cruisers inflicting a shameful defeat. the virtue for the american point of view of the situation now is that this simply doesn't matter. the trains are running, so to speak. the supplies are coming in. the logistical infrastructure, cranes, letters to bring material ashore from partnerships and is now know as beating the americans from guadalcanal by the time the japanese inflict this last kind of defiant victory on a superior american forests. so he goes down. the south said that forests can insert the defeat and by february, the japanese are attempting to around dunkirk if he will. they're able to evacuate the last of their star out of the guadalcanal.

and you talked to their starvation fake guns. that was the state of the japanese infantry in guadalcanal because of the constructive force of our naval forces. it's not a pretty sight of the six-month campaign of attrition is frankly ghastly. what happens to ship an event like this and the men on board that ship, you know, but it was necessary because there is only one way to beat the japanese and i was to step up and >> them in the mouth. we did it with our naval air force. and it's a story that i try to bring together comprehensively and readably. certainly after writing -- my first book was about a single naval engagement to last about two hours and doesn't close for one battle. extraordinary victories victory violated the work of the second book was a story of one ship

about the uss houston must early in the war at the sight of her crew in captivity, but with "neptune's inferno," try to tackle things i never understood in toto like this. the last book at times, what "neptune's inferno" does is to take double naval experience of the guadalcanal campaign. it is really crucial i think to illustrate -- to illustrate the success here because it says something about how america fights when it's been proven out about the extent, the losses and the sacrifices they will undertake to win when it knows that there's only one way through and that is to win. all these questions will be on the table tomorrow for the panel on afghanistan. a new era, a new date, but things sure seems clear seven years ago. and the man who won this up is

that that guy thing are so a few of them around. i've got my undying attitude and aberration. it's been a privilege to interview some of the manfred and sandy cisco, uss alanna can admiral scott flagship and to capture their story. and so, i appreciate your interest in coming to hear about it. if we have time, i'd be happy to take any questions. [applause] >> will take a couple of questions now. i have to run up to the northfield in, but jim, can you manage? >> absolutely. okay, sure. [inaudible] >> sounds good. thank you very much.

>> of the 80 ships coming think you mentioned there were 80 ships, how many -- >> ackerman 80 ships is the size of the naval landing force that would've included carrier task forces as well as the supporting ships. yeah, both sides -- the americans and japanese sustained equalizes at the campaign. they last major warships. glasses are so great they eventually coined the nickname, the body of water north of guadalcanal or other fighting fighting took place, i went in town. and in fact, robert ballard discovered that feed by taking one of its submersibles in a crew with jamison went down and found a number of direction the

guadalcanal campaign. it's illustrated category well-written history with stunning photography of the racks at the quaint tea. and they are still down there. and they will be with us forever. you know, they are nature's reclaiming that metal. so being able to grab history like that is valuable. >> it does not have post-rockers and who can build an all-time choice of five, even some advance warning of what was coming. >> is about coast watchers. these were brave souls indeed. if you look at this chain of islands, the gentleman mentioned bougainville, georgia, monday. they were essentially wrote agencies. these were australians, men who had been working. there was an administrative role

and one of the islands. this is basically a british project this is basically a british project this is basically a british project this is basically a british project you had people who were attached to the one or the other business such as the pineapple trade or what have you comment it may be censored of a government always file. the japanese had it to crucial function of observing movements of japanese sheds up and down the waterways, signaling come usually signaling to us to and a very quick way when the japanese were coming. and with that warning, it usually allowed to get it to a combat altitude by the time the japanese ships finally came within striking range. so without those coast watchers, you would've been right on your own air search, which was brought with ulcers of unanticipated will problems,

miscommunications, that kind of thing. coast watchers were crucially important. >> you say in your about versus what john keegan said in the price of admiralty. >> about what? been matches the course of combat. >> i'm not sure what arguments you're referring to. >> it can be almost, like you're saying, almost fatalistic in been in a battleship fleet. >> well, they certainly send the fatalism. it seems to be most evident in the japanese side. you know, they kind of southlake they were going to materialize this decisive battle where there fighting the spread to carry them to victory in the world he over because they won this big

battle. they have this faith come to some as doctrinal faith is such a thing would come to them and they would be this battle. [inaudible] >> the last as i said it all. they're about 24 shares. the life and battleships were 20 peered cruisers were a little bit skewed on the japanese side. at the end of the day they were about even. the japanese are slow to realize the guadalcanal was in fact a battle. it the japanese naval commando is that a certain idea of being drawn in world war i that there would slowly whittle away american naval forces as they lured across the pacific. at a moment of their choosing, say in the philippines or somewhere they would find they commit their battleship but this majestic engagement on the high seas and they crush our spirit guadalcanal does look like that. guadalcanal wasn't quite that

dramatic. it was a stinky, lousy, disgusting place in the atlantic south in the waters around were confined in hazardous and not themselves really tedious by smaller ships. none of that told the japanese this is a decisive battle. i think they realized it today. all through the campaign, i pointed out a track earlier, the great battleship yamato was ever sent into the combat area, really for lack of fuel. he never saw the agency of it. a number of other and major naval elephants was to her good fortune ultimately. but it's also important to observe. both sides but far from home pages look how far up while canalis from tokyo in pearl harbor. the logistics train to sustain naval operations was far more than anybody could manage easily. the constraints of fuel and supply and the japanese,

certainly as we did. anything else? well if there is something else come i thank you for your attention. you've been a great audience and proud to be with you here. well look far to turn with some other authors have to say at the symposium goes along. [applause] >> as you can see this as a short introduction to a big subject, the u.s. supreme court. it is not the kind of but cannot bear is going to do a reading from. it's not a germanic novel, but it's a dramatic story when you step back and think about the supreme court over the centuries. and i know many of you probably hear the supreme court today, this very day or next week, three days of the health care case being argued, the court is

more visible and american life than it's been for quite some time. i'd be happy to chat about that in answer to your questions. but i want to tuck a little bit and kind of frame the story of the supreme court. and brady misspoke, but i try to do was put myself in the possession of understanding many of you before myself before had the chance to attend the law school on a daily basis for "the new york times." somebody who's interested in public affairs interested in the civic life of the country, just doesn't happen to be an expert on this particular topic. so what would a person like that, a person as i was and maybe abuse some of you need to know to get it personally

satisfying handle on the court. so with that as a kind of framework, what i propose to do is really me a series of observations that i'll elaborate on and then turn it over for what i expect will be a fruitful and fun conversation among us. so when you step back and think about the court, one thing that jumps out at me as i was organizing the material to write this book is the extent to which the supreme court is really the author of his own story. it was that given very much to work with. i said i wasn't going to read, but i'll read the first sentence of article iii of the constitution, which says, the judicial power of the united states shall be vested in one supreme court and such inferior courts the congress may from time to time ordain and establish. and that is as article iii goes

on and talks a bit about the jurisdiction of the court and so on, but many, many unanswered questions, including for instance no mention of the chief justice in article iii. we only inferred that are supposed to be a chief justice because he is given in article article ii, the presidential article, the right to preside over -- not the right, the duty to preside over the impeachment trial in the senate of the president of the united states. and remember, william rehnquist did that in the bill clinton impeachment trial and when he was later asked what it had amounted to, he said i did nothing in particular and i did it very well. so the duties of the chief justice are undefined. and much about the supreme court initially with undefined. so it really had to create

itself and it's done so not in a straight line progression, but it's done so true askew says some of the cases that in the early years had to decide because it had very little discretion over what to hear and the cases these days that he chooses to decide. and even not with this choice by the supreme court. you know, most appellate courts today in this country have to take what comes. and saturday at certifies chorus of review, courts of appeals, chorus of error correction. and that was the supreme court's initial state or so it seemed, but william howard taft, the capstone after his presidency would become the chief justice said the united states. and he says to the set and that the corporate greatly benefit

from the ability to write some ticket can create its own dock and not have to take every case the camelot. so under his leadership, his urging that congress passed in 1929 what is known as the judges though because all the judges of the country got behind this effort and gave the court for the first indiscretion we have a supreme court that is capable of an data set its own agenda. and in doing that, it really set the legal agenda for the country. >> watch this and other programs online at booktv.org. >> during the republican and democratic conventions, we ask middle and high school students to send a message to the president as part of this year's c-span student can