political correctness as the professor bordo, the religious symbolism, they didn't even want to discuss the real ideology behind certain terrorist attacks. the fact that we have here in america taken to call into fort hood a case of workplace violence, yet we will call what happens in wisconsin an act of domestic terrorism. i'm alarmed and really raise awareness here in this committee of some of the things that i hear going on within our pentagon and within the military where servicemen and women are discouraged from pointing out things that they see such as what happened at fort hood with soa on the card and just signals that are very clear for people going through their daily routine that should raise a red flag for us.

but yet they are still there will be labeled as an islamaphobe. i think when we have hearings within this hearing addressing fort hood or addressing the radicalization of muslim youth, it's not an address of islam. it's more of an address of an ideology that is really encouraging folks that practice islam as religion to embrace a certain set of ideals and ideological values that lean more toward the attacks that we see. i think that's what happened, major hasan was caught up in the. but as americans we can't be afraid to speak out. i want to thank the professor for having the courage, the moral courage to speak about those differences, that's where her today about the difference between islam and your practice of islamic religion, but also the fact that, and there are some folks that do practice that religion who have gone in

another direction and another part of their life, or political ideology and what their world vision is. so one thing i want to ask all of you is, following the findings and recommendations of the webster report on the fort hood attacks, how would you categorize the attack that occurred at fort hood? mr. winter? >> we discussed this question at length. i speak for the commission in our unanimous view, and our view was that we saw evidence, but we did not have the opportunity to investigate on a criminal basis as the u.s. military is doing -- >> let me as this question a different way. >> we don't know -- >> workplace violence or a domestic terrorist. >> i've heard that, both of those characterizations. and we reef use to reach a find

on that. and i have to say the reason is that we don't have the evidence sufficient to know, we don't know what kind of standard department of defense is applying certainly in their investigation was not into department of defense activities. it was not into the criminal investigation itself, which was to a great degree hands off to is because the military is pursuing a criminal case against major hasan. so we were unable to reach a decision on those issues. we do believe, and really would like to see justice done for the victims, their families. >> professor manji? >> domestic terrorism, home-grown. >> mr. leiter? >> congressman, the analysts within the week as i said dean to it to qualify as an act of international terrorism under the statute we used. it was a sub government of group, political violence called terrorism than.

i call it terrorism today. >> i want to refer back to the chairman's opening statement, the men and women who stood at fort hood at that ceremony, ones who were wounded in that attack, the families of the victims of that attack will tell you this day, this was an act of domestic terrorism and the war against terrorism. i think we as america need to set aside the federal correctness and really be able to discuss the real threats, exit central threats to our way of life. and with that, mr. chairman, i yield back. >> the gentleman from illinois, mr. davis, is recognized. >> thank you very much mr. chip in. i certainly want to thank the witnesses for their participation, and especially for their insights in their answers. i was thinking back, unicom we can always know what happened. because we have the information.

it's obviously far more difficult to determine why it happened. or the causes that made generated or caused it to take place. mr. winter, let me ask if i could, you indicated that policies are that investigators and agents have 90 days to work on leads. and that sometimes individuals have more call for activity been time, or there's not enough personnel. there's so many leads, trying to follow up on all of them.

are their thresholds that will jump out at you? i mean, if you are reviewing tips and information and allegations that a person can just kind of see that this appears to be over the line and we need to try, check it out as quickly as we can? >> yes, there's significant amount of training on many different levels on how to deal with tips, information, intelligence of different kind. here at the san diego, agents recognize the methods deserve some form of action. under fbi policies that then existed they can set what was called a routine discretionary action league, because it was not, they're so indication of anything imminent, something that required a 24 hour or 48 hour response.

that meant it was a routine lead which was resolved in the ordinary course of business. it also meant a wf oh would exercise its discretion on how to handle the lead. a 90 day period that was in existence was an informal fbi practice at that time. we recommend that the established trade within which leads must be acted upon. the fbi in turn has also eliminated these discretionary action leaves and has required actual colleagues that are set out from other offices. >> let me ask each one of you if you think that we do as well as we possibly could in making assessments of individuals when they're going to be placed in certain kinds of positions, relative to evaluation, as

people seek employment, as people take assignments and have access to certain kinds of opportunity. do we assess their personaliti personalities, or do we glean enough information where it gives the comfort level in terms of where they are and what they might be doing. >> congressman, i'll answer onto pieces. first, i think we probably all you needed some, give them a job, made glowing recommendation and then they come to work for you and the performance ain't so glowing. so it's a pretty broad problem and, obviously, the manifestation in this situation is absolutely tragic. the second piece though, more specific to terrorism is, the fbi does have an incredibly difficult job of distinguishing those people who are radicalized and have radicalized views, and

those who become mobilize and actually take a terrorist action. again, that's why you want people to and interview them and try to make a determination but, frankly, the fbi with all its resources, they couldn't watch everyone who is just quote unquote radical. they've got to prioritize. and making a determination is very hard before this, and looks very, very easy after the tragedy. >> won't even people who might think to become members of the fbi to be in a position to carry out their ultimate aim? and so all of them really think -- i know it's tough trying to do with motivation all of the time. i mean, we could answer that, we would be in very good shape.

>> if you'll allow me one quick intervention. i've written exactly about this question of what to ask in order to conclude within the muslim communities of this country where people stand on the continuum of reform, moderation, extremism. and i would be very pleased to submit to the committee the specific questions that i recommend be asked. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i thank the gentleman, and let me close by first, let me thank you for this excellent testimony, and i do think, i agree with you, mr. leiter, the fbi, jttf, has an enormous challenge. so much information is coming through and you miss one thread and your held accountable. i think this case though, i would make the art and is a little different. you've got a major on that base, fort hood, who was talking to a

cleric, who, there was some evidence that may that ties to the 9/11 hijackers for god's sake, and is really rising in stature to becoming the number two in the world, next to bin laden. and i think, you know, unfortunately wfo only gets two e-mails. they don't give them may 31 e-mail backlog outlines what is intense are and what he's planning to do. you're right, professor, san diego has though. and they have dod employees on these task forces. you know, why didn't one of those at least contact fort hood? why didn't anybody contact fort hood and so, you know, what? there's an issue. you've got a problem. you've got a guy they could actually kill somebody. and i don't think any of you really have the answer to the. i don't have the energy to do. it's just unfortunate it didn't happen in this case. and so with that again, let me

thank you for your brilliant insight and your excellent testimony, and i will dismiss this them and move on to panel number two. thank you. >> [inaudible conversations]

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>> [inaudible conversations] >> let me introduce mr. kshemendra paul, program manager for the information sharing environment at the office of the director of national intelligence. as program manager mr. polis governmentwide authority to plan, oversee the build up and

managed use of information sharing environment. he also co-chairs the white house information sharing and access inner agency policy committee. picture now recognizes mr. paul for his testimony. >> chairman mccaul, ranking member keating, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. my name is kshemendra paul. i am the program manager for the information sharing environment. by training and profession i am an information technologist. formally i was the chief architect of the federal government. my office works with mission partners, federal, state, local, tribal, private sector and internationally. together, our focus is on improvement of the management, discovery, fusing, sharing delivery of and collaboration around terrorism related for me.

the role of my office is planning oversight and management. we span a variety of communiti communities. law enforcement, homeland security, defense, foreign affairs and intelligence. as my office and our partners continue to implement responsible information sharing practices, we reflect on the progress we made across the nation as well as recognizing that work remains. in january, director clapper spoke of a national responsibility to share information. he encapsulated our vision. he said, and i quote, the right data, anytime, anyplace, usable what in the authorized recipient, preventable only by law and our policy and not technology, protected by a comprehensive regime of accountability. this week we marked the 11th anniversary of the 9/11

terrorist attacks. the national security community has achieved numerous successes as they pertain to my office these include improving interoperability of our sensitive but unclassified networks, enhancing the capabilities of the fusion centers, state and local fusion centers, expanding the application and impact of the nationwide of the nationwide suspicious activity reporting initiative, strengthening industry and government adoption of our interoperability and standards framework including the national information exchange model. and finally integrating our nonfederal stakeholders, particulars to a local enforcement into the national policy conversation through the inner agency policy committee mentioned. but we are not without challenges. these include the continuously evolving threatened environment, the tsunami of data faced by mission partners, and the constrained fiscal environment. my office continues to convene partners and lead efforts and responsible information sharing

innovation. this is a journey. the evolution of threats against us, the integration of our resources, and the efficient use of technology require constant vigilance and leadership. the threats to our safety do not stop at jurisdictional or agency boundaries. our information should not. three core ideas of the drivers of the mission of my office. we are grounded by an enduring purpose to advance responsible information sharing to further the counterterrorism and homeland security missions. we're focused on responsible information sharing to enable decisions to prevent harm to the american people. and finally we are building capacity for responsible information sharing across our midst -- mission partners at all levels of government. we are also strengthen protection for privacy, civil rights and civil liberties. this work makes us stronger. let me elaborate. every fusion center in the country as a privacy policy as

comprehensive as presidential privacy guidelines. the bulk of federal departments from the same position, and we are well the way to finishing the job here in washington, this means that when citizens see something and say something, when police officers submit reports to fusion centers and joint terrorism task force is, when analysts worked to connect the dots, the work proceeds across agencies and levels the government in a standardized and efficient manner that handles information a program. gaps challenges and opportunities for improvement exist. we have traction, clear and compelling opposition and away to accelerate responsible information sharing. you have our comprehensive annual report, and for the record is located o on the website, ise.gov. in summer i believe there's no higher priority and the nexus between national security and public safety than responsible information sharing. on a personal note today, as would talk about the attacks at

fort hood and also reflect on recent events overseas, i just want to say that my thoughts and prayers go out to the victims and their families. mr. chairman, ranking member, thank you for the opportunity to be you and i look forward to your question. >> thank you, mr. paul. thank you for recognizing the importance of the information sharing, fusion centers. mr. keating, my ranking member, we have both worked with fusion centers. sometimes they are given a bit of a bad name and i think that privacy protection peace is important to preserving integrity of the work they are doing to make sure that privacy is protected. so with that i just to give want to focus back to what this hearing is all about, and that is fort hood. my question medical outside of your expertise, your ability to comment, but again in this case i think you have a huge

breakdown in information sharing. not only between the fbi and with himself but also with the department of defense. if you can speak to these issues i would like to know how to fix this. first you've got an agent sitting at wf over who sits on this matter for the maximum amount of time possible. looks at the lead on the very last day. and i understand the fbi is swamped. up a lot on their plate. but when you have a major at fort hood who's the subject matter. i think that would take a little higher priority. but they wait until the very last day, and within four hours makes an analysis. based upon two, 18 e-mails, because this analyst doesn't know how to access the database that would give him the other 18, or other 16 e-mails. one of which as i mentioned previously telegraphs what he's getting ready to do.

so you've got that break down. and then finally within these task forces you actually have department of defense representatives. why, i decide both from washington or san diego, in your opinion, and maybe you can speak to this, but why didn't one of those dod representatives on the jttfs contact fort hood and say you had a problem? >> comment on this specific operational aspects of fort hood are fort hood are a little bit outside of my lame but what i would like to come to is some of the comments that were discuss on the earlier panel that relate to this question, things like doing a better job of enterprise data management. that was a key recommendation coming out of the webster commission. it's a key focus of my office. right there is a recognition that goes back to the 9/11 commission, a series of reports from the foundation that is codified in intelligence form

terrorism prevention act. so we can knit together all the different aspects of national public security to keep the american people safe. think about 800,000 police officers in this country come 18,000 police departments, needing that together in a coherent national architecture requires a focus on policy and data stands but we had success with actually. i mentioned in my opening comments about the national information exchange model. it's not widely understood is that originate with state and local law enforcement. it's state and local innovation with a doctor of the federal level was a basis for counterterrorism data sharing enterprise. so i think the focus on meeting together all these different component into a coherent architecture really is key. >> someone has worked on the application, i understand

restrictions when, in this particular case, with mr. awlaki. i think that may have something to do why, after so much apprehension when you get in that world. in so many restrictions on legal restrictions that that may have been counterproductive enemy that in way of these department of defense employees or official sharing information with fort hood which is something, ranking member, maybe look at joined as to how if we have to reform it or somehow just have some sort of reporting lay which that would clarify that that can be shared. i can't imagine why, if the federal government has this information with its hands it can't share with united states army, the united states military, you know, on one of its bases. to me that's just incomprehensible.

so i thank you for your testimony and with that i recognize the ranking member. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. leiter and mr. wicker had said that although the chances would've been less likely, the circumstances, this tragedy at fort hood could indeed occur again today. could you reflect on your thinking whether it could occur today, and also what would you give for your recommendations to try and not have -- the greatest legacy we can give to these families that have lost loved ones are, i think the greatest legacy is this wouldn't happen again to another american. could you comment on what you think in that regard? >> is difficult to answer a hypothetical about specific events as occurred at fort hood but what i will say is, highlight the nationwide suspicious activity reporting initiative. one of the things that we are really successful on with this

initiative is able to bring together a lot of different voices across levels of government and outside the government to identify a process for doing suspicious activity reporting that addressed privacy civil liberties concerns but also operational effectiveness. through the process were able to attend by 16 behaviors recently indicative of terrorist activity, so that functional standard is in place nationally now. coming back to the question about policy and things like that, when we started by turning a lot of folks were concerned that we wouldn't be able to rationalize how folks would look at these kind of issues because of the level for government and the privacy issues that we were able to work to do successfully. and so i think there's a model there, and i go back to that, to energy question about what's the highest priority. from where i sit, accelerating responsible information sharing practices as cham