i'm working on that as well as a few other projects, but it's -- i love writing books. i love teaching, and i love doing freedomfest. it's a great way to meet all of these authors and see what's happening in the world. >> we have been talking with author mark skousen author of freedomfest where booktv is on location. "the making of modern economics" is his book, the lives and ideas of great thinkers. thank you for being on booktv. >> thank you.

the first was the crisis over the northwestern iranian area azerbaijan after world war ii. many people believe that is where the cold war actually started. second was the oil nationalization crisis of 1951 to 1953 in which the iranians decided to assert control over their major economic resource. in the end of the effort was frustrated in part because of a cia sponsored coup against the

nationalist leader. the second to occurred after the islamic revolution. the first was something i was involved in personally which was the hostage crisis from 1979 to 1981. and the second was the crisis involving the hostages, american and others, held in lebanon during the 1980's, and part of that an incident that touched this institution here at the naval academy what is commonly known as the iran contra. >> let's go back to set the cold war is often thought to have begun in azerbaijan. what do you mean by that? >> what happened is the allies, the british and the russians in

september 41 had occupied iran and has a supply line to the soviet union fighting for its life against nazi germany. the u.s. joined in that occupation after the u.s. joined the war and the russians did not leave as they had agreed to do it and instead set up a separatist movement in the northwest which first demanded autonomy from iran. that crisis was the first item on the docket of the newly formed united nations and of the first five resolutions of the security council starting in january of 1946. three of the five involve iran

and azerbaijan. >> what role did the cia played in iran in the 1950's? >> well, peter, that's a good question. i don't have many details. many pyrenean friends of mine think i know more about the operations than i do of the cia. people argue over this endlessly what we do know is that the early 1953 president eisenhower inherited a difficult situation from president truman and gave the order to plan an operation inside iran to bring down prime

minister mohsen def and to replace him with someone believed to be more in accordance with our interest. >> so did the prime minister get replaced and did the schulman get through on at that time? >> it's a fascinating story. the shah was reluctant to move. he was presented with a plan to replace the prime minister with a military man. he didn't want to see a military man thinking he might be jumping out into the fire. he was persuaded.

there were stories the way he was persuaded she was told this is going ahead with or without you. if most of death would be replaced if it goes with you so much the better and if it does not. he was persuaded to go along with it. >> professor, when you look up at the crisis, what kind of attitude did that helped develop towards the west? >> the iranians traditionally had a very pessimistic view towards the british. the british after all have participated in dividing the

country into influence in the early 20th century. they were part of the race for tinued their will decide the accounting. we will do the accounting and give you the check for an amount that we decide is due to you. this was the situation. the united states up until that

time was seen in iran as a friend of the national movement. iranian nationalism or struggle for them to become masters in their own house to get control of their own destiny started perhaps late in the 19th century or early in the 20th century, and although it united states wasn't a big player in the struggle when we did play we were usually on the right side. there are several famous incidents when the young american teacher by the name of how -- howard was fighting on the side of the constitutionalist and 1910, 1911 president taft sent a treasury team to help the

constitutionalists get control of the budget and of the country's finances because the new without that, they were nothing and they had no chance. there was also frustrating. the u.s. was seen as playing a positive role in the azerbaijan crisis in helping iran to restore its sovereignty, territorial integrity. 1953 and what happened with the coup unfortunately changed all of that. one can argue why that happened, how that happened. were there reasons for it. but at that point basically the u.s. changed its view from being a friend and supporter of the nationalism to be something of the great britain. >> in negotiating with iran, you talked about misjudgments on both sides when it comes to the

1979 hostage crisis. what are some of those misjudgments? >> well, there were several. one, perhaps on our side, was the idea that the united states and iran could in fact after this revolution rebuild some kind of relationship on our side based on anticommunism and anti-soviet imperative is in that iran's traditional disliked of communism and russian expansion would create a set of interests allowing for a certain degree of cooperation, not what had happened under the shah but a new basis for engagement and

in that case i think we misread what in fact was going on with the revolution, those people in control had no intention of having such a relationship in the united states not that they liked the soviet union very much but they just did not want to have that kind of relationship. fighting granda pyrenean side there was the view that the united states was out to undermine this revolution at all costs where in fact the united states had other interests and as far as i could tell was willing to accommodate whatever the new reality was in iran. >> november, 1979. where were you, what were you

doing and what was the biggest defense happening in your life? >> there was almost 33 years ago today. we were just a month short of that. i was in tehran serving at the embassy. >> in what capacity? >> a political officer. this was still i think my second or food, third to where i think in the foreign service, so i was still fairly new in the service. and our -- what we were doing i think is attempting to figure out if there was some way that the united states could come to terms with a new reality in iran about ten days before we heard the the united states, president carter decided to admit the shah to the u.s. for medical treatment. >> did you think that was a

mistake? >> i certainly did and i was not the only one. that was the end of any chance of a halfway normal relationship it was the end for any chance for any moderation within the new iranian government and perhaps most important personally it was the end of us >> did you know that ed of time that there would be some actions? >> we didn't know what, but h essentially when we heard this and it wasn't just me, the sense was the message was your extended. >> was through the take for a. >> was the first day of the workweek. there were demonstrations already scheduled in tayler on. one of the demonstrations was

from east to west, right in front of the embassy. one of the group's preplanned as we know stopped and shouted slogans. >> students, soldiers? >> students. these were mostly as i noticed engineering students, people from the university of the engineering school and the public technique and the area of the demonstration came over the wall. we were essentially defenseless there was a government in iran which had no power to defend  ere were some people at the embassy in police uniforms wh disappeared since the attack me. because of course it is the

irony in government as it would be true in any country where th host government is responsible for the security of a foreign mission. >> so, professor, the marine guards? >> there were marine guards. >> were they allowed to fire? >> no, fortunately. there was probably one of the best decisions they take. to this day i feel i owe my l to their good discipline and training.?

of pyrenean employees who were also responsible for but once again, let me take my hat off to our young marine guards whose discipline and training really save all of our lives that day. >> john limbert, prior to that were you burning documents, anything like this? >> we had far too much paper in the embassy. we destroyed as much of it as w? ?uld.????????? you've probably seen the???? pictures of the reconstituted?? documents.???????? what happened? is the destruct was a two-stage process in th

days. technology was not as advand as it was today. so what happened, the first age u-turn the paper into linguine and the second stage you turn it into confetti. the second stage broke down so they recovered the linguine with unlimited manpower and time and the skill that has gone into making persian carpets for hundreds of years they wove back together at least what they saw as the most sensitive documents. they also recovered a lot of things and damaged which they published about 70 volumes, both english and persian, index and classified. as a historian i have to ad what they did and is in fact a very valuable source for

students of diplomatic history. students of diplomatic history  see what the embassy was reporting. some of mine reporting is in there and some of the same reporting appeared on wikileaks this is 1979. i read it and i still think this holds up. when you see your reporting 25, 30 years ago sometimes it is embarrassing when you wrote. >> john limbert, how long were you behind the hard line and what was the process of the next couple of events? >> what happened is they got to the hard line. i think i mentioned this in the ?reword to my book. i ended up in a decision that?? was probably one of the worst of my career. i ended up outside the door attempting to talk them down or

slow them down, to slow them down. that obviously did not work. they had a gun on me and on our security officer and threatened to shoot us both if the door was not opening five minutes. i've often pointed to that incident as probably my worst example of the negotiations in my career. >> so that said did the door get open in five minutes? >> it did, i thought fortunately at the time. were they bluffing? i don't know. i can get was perhaps the ambassador who was at the ford ministry or ann swift was the senior person in the area, but they did open the door which was to me at the time quite a relief.

>> how long were you held in th embassy, where were you held and what does that experience mean to you personally? >> we were working for months in various places.qqqqqq q around tehran?qqqqqq q around tehran.qqqqqqq outside of tehran after theqq failed rescue attempt in april of 1980. i was moved to a city about 300 miles south and others were moved to other places. they were obviously worried??? about another rescue attempt. after i came back from -- after th brought us that in august i believe we never went back to the embassy. we stayed in various places. some prisons and other places are not tehran. >> how were you treated? >> not very well.

the armenians themselves many have a narrative that says we re treated well. we were not.  the 14 months i was nine months in solitary with very little communication with the outside -- with the al-sayyid world. obviously i wasn't killed, but i wasn't beaten up.  was very clear this was not about us. this was an internal iranian matter of factions in the revolution. the hard core was using us to go r its rivals, particularly the nationalists, the liberals, the intellectuals, religious intellectuals. those who might not be hard cor enough for this revolution. they did it. they used us to get, to

marginalize their enemies and throw them out of the government. reflecting back on it, i've often said this publicly th the main victims of this whole affair were the iranian people. what happened to us was difficult, uncomfortable, frightening at times, particularly for our families. you didn't have word. but the long-term victims i think were the iranians. because what this whole incident did is create a climate of government without rule, anarchy

and simply laws, procedures did not apply. and anyone who could organize a street mob would prevail. and even today the authorities cracked down and feel they coul in prison anyone who questions what they are doing. whether that be a lawyer, a urnalist, a filmmaker, a translator, a member of the intelligentsia. and was this particular action which set the kind of climate that allowed this repression. it also gave the green light i think to saddam hussein for the surgery -- to start this very destructive war against iran using poison gas with tremendous

affect. >> you mean the green light because he thought america would support this? >> not just support it, but he thought that iran isolated itself. when saddam hussein invaded in september of 1980, iran had no friends. the arab countries in the region with the exception of syria, the united states, other western countries either actively???? supported iraq or sat on the side lines and a shameful???? incident. i? say this with all candor ev? when he used? poison gas again? the iranians there was very??? ?ttle protest or reaction.?? we cozied up to saddam hussein? during? all this.

this was all a climate set by this, why these events. we were willing before the embassy was taken, the united states was willing to continue some kind of a military to military relationship. maybe not as it was under the shah but we sold or had in the pipeline vast quantities of military equipment training, spare parts, all of these things. and we would have liked to continue it. the embassy seizure obviously stop all of that and iran consequential lee was a much weaker position in the invaders. >> iraq invaded september, 1980. you were not released until

january, 1981. >> that's right. >> what did you know what that war? did you know anything and what did you remember about the release in coming back? >> here is the chronology as best as we can strike. this was after the shah died. late july. >> 1980. >> in august the ayatollah khomeini calls and his advisers and says we need to settle for hostage and a sign of people to do it i believe it was early september when did he secretary of state warren christopher meets with an iranian counterpart a relative by marriage of the ayatollah khomeini's son in germany and

?ey have a deal, the outlines of the deal are there.??? the war comes into the contract? is lost.?? originally the germans had been? the? intermediaries.?????? eventually the contact is???? reestablished, but it takes??? months of difficult bargaining ? team led by deputy secretary?? christopher with the very skilled mediation of the?? guf algerian to bring about our release. the release came just after jimmy carter left office and just after ronald reagan had taken his oath of office. >> was that the incident all? >> of course not. obviously this was the last slap at jimmy carter.

they figured it cost him his presidency know they were going to deny him this satisfaction of seeing our release while he was still president. there is a conspiracy theory that says there he was in fact coordination between the iranian side and the republican ronald reagan campaign of 1980 to prevent us from being released before the election. it's an interesting theory. i've never seen anything, any documentation. i would think after 30 some years something, if there was anything to eat something would have come out. >> where did you fly out of on what kind of plane? do you remember seeing your fellow hostages and what was your reaction? >> these things i remember well. as i get older sometimes i can't remember where i left my car

keys but i can see things of 32 years ago i remember well. they took us to the airport in tehran. in buses i think i was blindfolded, but i think they shoved me into the bathroom of the bus not out of any site, just because that was the only room that was there. but it didn't matter to me. i was happy to ride on the roof or the baggage department. >> did you know you were leaving at that point? >> yes. when you don't know until you are actually out with algerian medical people and so although they tried to convince us that only some of us were going to be

of how happy and how treated we were would determine whether we would stay or win but the algerians gave that away and said no, no, you are all going. so, we knew. we got to the airport. there were the algerian 727i believe which were there on board. when i got on the plane i saw the ambassador for the first time in 14 months. i saw the swiss ambassador was checking our names of his list making sure everybody was there. there were some reporters there,

but after awhile they closed the door and we took off. i am a great fan. >> so, john, given all this history from 33 years ago, what have we learned about iran and negotiating with iran to the current situations we find ourselves in with iran? >> i would like to say that we have learned something, but i'm not sure -- i'm not sure what we've learned. if you look at our relations today, they are not very good, and we are right now in a very -- when the iranians are in a very dangerous place there is a lot of talk of the war and a lo? of talk about air strikes and??

?d iranians nuclear program.?? being the eternal optimist that? ibm, i didn't think that we??? would be in ?such a bad place? even after what had happened in? ?79? and 1980.???????? when we flew out of tehran on?? ??planes if you would have?? asked me, i would have said in? five years, seven years, ten?? years at the most, tempers will? cool.??????? we and the iranians will realize that w?e have the mutual inter? that we have things to talk about with? each other, not?? necess?arily his friends, but ? countries, as states do because we talked to many states with?? which we are not friendly.??? from time to time we talk to?? north korea, we talk to syria?

and many places.??????? but it hasn't happened.????? it's a very unusual and almost? unique situation that we are in? with iran where this?????? estrangement, this inability to? talk to? each other has gone o? now for 32 years, and despite?? efforts to change the?????? relationship to? break it i th? this? president, president oba? made a very sincere effort to?? ?gin a process of engagement?? and to begin some kind of talk,? even without -- even if we don'? ?prove or we don't like or??? don't agree with many things?? with t?he islamic republic, he? made the effort starting at the? very beginning of his???? administration, spoke about it?

during h?is campaign of 2008,? during 2008, took a lot of criticism from it including the current secretary of state, mrs. clinton, but it hasn't gone anywhere, and we seem to be just about where we've always been. i compare us to two sides on opposite sides of an abyss, glaring at each other across the abyss, calling each other names? insulting each other, threatening each other, and this has been a very difficult pattern to break. but i see today and what i hear today is that both sides have fallen into patterns that are

familiar. we know how to do this. people in tehran know how to bash us and we know how to bash the islamic republic and we are good at it. both sides have gotten good at  over 30 years. what we do not know how to do is to break out of what is the late richard, professor, very knowledgeable professor at the university of pittsburgh about iran who said that back in the 80's the u.s. and iran is in a downward spiral. and what we don't know how to do it apparently is to break out of it. so, we are unable to do that. rhaps it's too hard for us. perhaps it's beyond the capabilities, the diplomatic capabilities of either side. perhaps the current downward

spiral or threatening situation perhaps it suits the intere rious parties. but whatever it is, it's familiar and it's comfortable. and when we encounter difficulties as we always do, it's very easy to revert back to this traditional dysfunctional kind of action, which if not productive is at least familiar. >> have you been back to tehran? >> i have not. >> have you thought about it? >> i have often thought about it. i have not been back since 1981, january of 1981. i would very much like to go back. not giving back is not by choice. i am not welcome. inside iran there are many iranians who are prevented from?

leavin?g. i think i know a smaller???? ?tegory of people who are??? prevented from entering.???? perhaps what i would most like ??o is to take my children an? grandchildren back there. we have two children that were? there, iranian-american.???? their mother was? iranian. >> so you are married to an anian. >> yes, 46 years now. >> did you meet her in tehran?  i met her many years ago w i was a peace corps volunteer and we were both teachers there so, at the time of the revolution, we had been married -- we had been married for 13 years and had two children already. and the children remember iran and they have wonderful memorie of the good times there. and now they have their own???

children who are one quarter?? iranian, and probably about the? only relation they have now is their? grandmother's cooking,  i would like to rematch for the to see that part of their origin. >> john limbert, was your family there in november of 1979? >> unfortunately it was not. some of my in-laws were there and were able to get out. my wife and children did not come to tehran. it was what in the foreign service we would call and accompanied post without families. they stayed -- we had bee saudi arabia before, and they stayed on in saudi arabia which is a very good place for them and was a great relief for me being captive and knowing that they were safe and in a secure place. >> finally any ptsd issues for

u? >> not that i'm aware of. i know it hasn't been easy -- i is not easy for some people. as far as you can tell, probably, peter, my therapy is talking about it and talking about these issues. once in awhile things come back about the incident. but as i said to you, the damage done to us i think is much less than what was done to our iranian friends and relatives. >> we've been talking on booktv with professor john limbert come author of this book, "negotiating with iran rustling the ghosts of history." you are watching book tv on c-span2.