>> i think education is not an industry. education is a public institution that represents our country's interest in local communities interest in having kids educated for success in jobs and even prepared for college and citizenship it is not industry. on specific point you've made, to make two different points. one is you mentioned there wasn't a call for reducing formula fund. i've heard even governor romney recently has said he won't respond to but he won't cut them. last night your co-chair said he won't decrease, you said tonight he wants a more incentives before competitive grants. i think yourself, it has to come from somewhere. so that's where my take is, if you're not increasing funny butcher increasing income, on the affordability question, so i think you mentioned there is

again, to decent people to care deeply about the future of america and education. two different views of how to get there. you mentioned the word dialback and you it to dialback certain things, not dialback others. i think what you said and the campaign said you want to dialback the president's focus on supporting federally supported state efforts to raise standards, for the common core, that you want to die about the federal effort that would require state driven efforts, and i think those are difference. dialback federal funding, things like hell come you talked about refocusing held. i think it's some who wouldn't and fit from pell. i think his proposal which would have of the federal role but in a problematic way. so if you any community or state and said we want to try this idea, they should try out ideas. we could get into a discussion about the viability, and try.

i think that the idea of a federal government mandating that as a condition of receiving title i funds and i.d.e.a. funds, mandating that states have not only affordable funding but that states have state dollars, followed kids across district lines, to me is an overreach in terms of a one size fits all policy and i think that the idea of the $700 or $800 or $900 in title i funding support those efforts, leave kids short with a real cost of education are far more that's $900. >> one point. the idea that we can't lend money and the federal education budget to support competitive grant programs and create incentives without moving back core programs like title i and ida is just crazy. you may consider title ii formula fund the program but this is to put $5 billion that goes out annually. not only to support teacher

quality improvement, virtually all of it goes either to class size reduction or to professional development programs with zero track record. the obama administration has highlighted numerous federal programs that it wants to consolidate or eliminate. it hasn't been successful but those are the programs that can be converted into levers to drive reform in what he wants while protecting our responsibilities to the most needy students. >> so you guys, this question of spending which is terrific. jon, back in 2008 the president had pledged he would do what we do with her own family budgets, make sure money is spent wisely. i will go through the entire federal budget he said page by page, line by line, and eliminate programs that don't work and are not needed. what programs have met that criteria and the department of education? what has the president, would have secretary duncan zero doubt because it's ineffective or not a good use of funds? >> the president and the administration have proposed

30-40 programs for elimination because of a lack of evidence on impact. and some of those have been successful, some of those haven't. this is an example worsens when the full-time members, i should note some of those are but some of those are small programs that were critically or three years ago i kept getting funded because of history. i don't even know the names of all those but those are the kind of programs where they don't have evidence of success that should be eliminated. not a all of those have been eliminate by some have. he has also established the principle that actually funding things based on performance. i think the invest in innovation fund which is a signature initiative is a hallmark ever to say let's debate but let's define that to those things that significant evidence and result -- let's find what works and expand the. >> we are big supporters of investing in innovation fund and

a number of things that are attracted. working in combination in partnership with school district the second it did have this approach based on level of evidence that you have to supported. and thirdly, it was the first federal program to my knowledge, education program that specify return on investment as one of the criteria for selection. but this idea that the program, that the president and secretary duncan sort of in this ideology makes decisions based on evidence of the program flies in the face of their decisions regarding the d.c. opportunity scholarships program right here in the nation's capital which is a program where congressionally mandated evaluation shows that students desperately needy student, 1700 of them were served by this program and attend private schools in the d.c. area are much more likely to graduate from high school. but the president has consistently worked to eliminate the program and he's been

effective in capping its growth. this is an end with the federal government i should has much more ability to influence education policy, and one that governor romney would seek to expand spent the president has been a big champion of parental choice in public education and the supposed private funding to support voucher plans. and that is a difference. he has been very aggressive in supporting expanded choice for kids, low-income kids, for significant expansion of high quality charter schools. both in terms of increased funding, and since bunning that and i think the question i think the difference in philosophy, marty, you describe, the signature initiative in k-12 for the romney campaign is the affordability opposed, $700. i think the president believes and i believe the choice is a very smart piece of a broader plan. we've got to focus on high standards, funding and canada and choice. is not a cure-all.

>> jon, let's stay with us for a moment, because you just suggested the president -- in '08 an interview with the journal of milwaukee sentinel, he said let's see if the milwaukee voucher works and then if it does whatever my priest -- you do whatever works for the kids. as marty referenced, the congressional mandated evaluation and 91% is going to the opportunity scholarship program graduate from high school converted its 5% of kids who did not. is the president's -- is the president stands on vouchers changed in the last four years or easy unconvinced the d.c. scholarship program works or how she would reconcile? >> i think the president is going to look carefully at the evidence over time of the impact affairs programs on student achievement and how it both supports kids the benefit and how it supports and strengthens the public education system that it is in. and there are, charter school programs provide meaningful

choice and meaningful flexibility that reflect those programs, that can incorporate the benefits of many of the voucher programs without some of the problematic aspects. i think the president is interested not just in sync x or y program for wednesday but how do have a national strategy to keep a list of charter schools as part of a broader plan are a better approach. >> marty, in the first presidential debate, governor romney promised that he would not cut education funding. but, of course, he is frequently said that he intends to cut taxes and to dramatically reduce our trillion plus dollars annual deficit. hey, why is he uniquely promising to protect education but nothing else. and b, should we believe it? >> so i think you should, steven. and as to why he is uniquely protect education, i think it reflects his commitment to the

issue. i think he would agree with jon to some extent that federal mining can be used -- federal money can be used to drive reform so charges he the federal government driving reform. in fact, the federal funding is the levers of the federal government has to try and drive reform at the state and local level. so we need to keep spending in order to accomplish that role. >> easy suggesting, because he suggested for the title ii might not be effective. but easy suggesting as he would not cut education funding that is going to hold harmless every program? >> certainly not every program. in fact, his white paper that we put forward, it mentioned making changes to the higher education funding system, as well as changes in k-12. one of those changes being taken a title ii dollars and actually consolidating them into a block

grant to the states to drive innovation and human capital. and development. so certainly it's not a program by program commitment. it's a statement that education will be a priority of this admission and it will be protected as we make efforts to address the nation's fiscal challenges. >> on this question, look, i think when you, someone becomes president, the most demand job in the world come you're so busy, you so much on your plate. you can't focus on that many things, as a leader you're so. you've got to focus on a few. i think the things you focus on our one month after month, year after you prioritized. i think the president has demonstrated a relentless focus on education, strengthening public schools. marty, you yourself said having predictability is very important to help, to make it easier for people to do their jobs.

i do think that for governor romney the past week to say for the first time in a presidential debate just before the election, to say that i'm not going to cut education funding, when his own proposals would cut nondefense domestic discretionary funding by over 50% over the next several years. it's hard to believe. i think it contradicts specifically a number of things that he sang and the campaign website, i will mention two or three quickly. your website, there's a proposal that would immediately cut, make a 5% across the board cut, across the board and programs, across the board i think means across the board. secondly, last night your coach or repeat what governor romney said which is he would eliminate the move back the clock on the direct loan program. the president -- said $61 million that praise god to banks and middlemen. and that funding would to pell grants, community colleges, student loan support and

repealing that within leave major cuts and holes in the pell grants, community colleges. the third lasting our mission is language language again in the governor's plan talks about refocusing pell grants on those who need a most. right now most pell grants, families under $30,000. i think the maximum might be 50. if you refocus and cut those i don't know what families, i think in those ways i can call for cuts, i think make the recent calls for not cutting education really hard -- the math doesn't add up and is not consistent policy people need to hear from a candidate. >> keep in mind the context of the president's statement that he was going to cut -- the governor, sorry. the governor's statement. and that was that is constantly being attacked for his supposed plan to cut pell grants, and these are attacks that politifact in every other fact

checking organization, independent fact checking organization out this that are patently false. they are based on projections of the ryan budget plan, not the romney budget plan. of course, right that the vice president attended but this is something he put forth as the chairman of the house budget committee. second of all, we don't know what the democrats plan is to find pell because they haven't passed a budget in more than three years in congress. and the obama industries has put forward no ideas as to how it's going to pay for the fiji billion dollars funding shortfall that the pell grants program faces over the next 10 years. if you apply the same stand you're applying for and ryan, who said just because they have is another going to pay for something that we send their going to cut it, then president obama is proposing cuts to the pell grants program as well. >> the president has laid out a very specific budget that you can go online and look at, the 2013 budget would increase by

two points are%. out specific -- >> for one year. >> the language or an refocusing pell grants on those who need it most, to me, i don't know what students and families are getting pell who don't need. i think thatart of record. >> so, jon, on this question though, the president has touted the respect program that secretary duncan has promoted. he has spoken of hiring 100,000 more teachers. but from the 2010, 2010 discretionary appropriations for education under the president, based on his 2009 budget, or $64.1 billion for k-12. is proposal for 2013 is 69.8. so in four years the president has increased spending at a one to 2% rate a year. meanwhile, for instance, last summer he championed maintaining super subsidy on stafford, the

three-point 75%, which doesn't actually affect any graduates until they enter the labor market in 2016, 2017 at the earliest. so what is the process by which the president is determining which of his priorities are getting funded and which are not? >> i think the process is look at what are the most important investments of the future of kids in a country and into fundamental, significant difference with governor romney is i think you talk about education as an expense. the president believes invest in education is an investment, not an expense. i think he prioritizes because he knows he can help kids not i get a fair shot at a decent society, a decent wage where unemployment rates are doubled for those who don't have a college degree. the way to grab a 10 -- the wage gap is bigger. he's got a targeted focus on the domestic side, and then he looks for say before you can find. on the direct loan bill said $61 billion that we're going to

bank commitment to subsidized loans. move that to pell grants, i think it's a great example and kind of a revenue neutral way of shifting funds from things like banks in the case to support for college kids and access to a good future. >> so jon brings up the subsidy come all you bring up the subsidy, to the stafford loan program, keeping interest rates low pictures to be clear, keeping those interest rates low for the following years if something governor romney supported anti-exercise leadership within the party to get congress to go along with that. but at the same time repeatedly passing these e year funding fixes to keep programs from going bankrupt without a long-term to put them on long-term plan to put them on sustainable fiscal footing is not a model for good policy. >> the education budget, congress works. there is a long-term tenure plan.

the education increases are what come you put forward proposals that reflect the years games. in 10 years community tenure plan to bring down the deficit which prioritizes education. >> okay. i want to talk -- you reference it a couple of times. jon, secretary duncan has repeatedly said, he said the idea that the standard our nation impose as a conspiracy theory in search of a conspiracy. but, of course, democratic national platform congratulate the president for challenging and encouraging states to raise their standards. so which is it? is the president to be lauded for his leadership and giving states to adopt a common core or is the idea that the administered is involved in this a conspiracy theory? >> so clearly, the people who should be loud for the work on the common core standards are the state commissioners of education, the democratic governors, the republican governors in 46 days you can together and said yes, we want

to replace our dumb downstairs that we are lying to kids about what achieving come with higher standard a better assessment. this is a historic bipartisan effort with republican governors like jeb bush and democratic governors and democratic mayors supporting this but i think this amazing a competent for states. what the president has said specifically. number one, he said look, you come together and set standards and i will give you support. so he has given funding for states, set-asides funding in the senate to go to state that were work on assessments reflect stage of the national standards to ensure the standards be measured. second thing is in the proposal, the secretary and the president put out there, he said yes, he would require states not to do common core. this is are important to the president has said every state ought to have standards that reflect through readiness for success for college and careers. common core is a way to do that. but it's very clear and the

secretary sedney could be a standard -- >> here's the language, here's the link is from the president's beginning in 2015, formula funds will be available only to states and on assessments based on college and career ready standards that are common to significant group of states. >> absolutely. there are states in new england, three or four states in new england who worked together on standards. so specific is not common core. reflect readiness for success for college and careers. >> just to make it clear, governor romney supports better and higher standards. in fact, the governor of massachusetts, as governor of massachusetts he saw the role, the nation's best template. it's not a key driver but it can be a foundation for progress. and he supports voluntary efforts on the part of states to

collaborate on the development of common standards. he is opposed having the federal government coerced even if it's in subtle ways states participating in a particular effort to generate -- >> states agree to do this. >> marty, the governor at education nation declared the federal government should not provide support financial or otherwise to common core. so does this mean, for instance, that he would seek to terminate support for the assessment consortia for smart and better balance? >> that's my understanding. >> i think this represents -- sometimes there's an impression that i think it's important to me there may be commonality between the governor and president obama an education. and perhaps if it were meant as a state legislature, there might be some more. in terms of what they're calling for as president, there are dramatically different visions or and this is one of them with the president said let's invest a small percentage would you

call smart the sense of the stimulus to support 46 states that agree on standards and help to replace the mediocre to fill the bubble. the governor would oppose that, eliminate funny. i think that's a mistake. >> johnny, two questions. one, in your opinion which is a democrat national committee platform got it wrong when they credited the president for his signal role in driving adoption? >> the president challenge states high standards and that's true. he said we will give you more flexibility but we want you to adopt standards that are more challenging. the president and secretary to challenge that. that's very different from saying that the actual is the leader on common core which is a state driven effort to make a higher standard. >> the worst thing that happened to the common core and it has happened senator is where it gets politicized like this. it's happened because -- [talking over each other] >> i don't think that's the

case. if you go around any of commissioners like george is alluding to republican governors and commissioners of education supporting it, mitch daniels in indiana and tony bennett you are getting incredible pushback right now because it is seen as a federally driven effort. it's in a federal prison because, frankly, in fact for the past couple of years it has been. >> when you lead and drive change i think there's pushback and that's part of the president's leadership. he's been consistent in calling for things. in this case it's the stick to our knitting. democratic governors and you just mr. republican kind of with mitch daniels, they are leading this. they are taking pushback on the democratic and both sides. there's bipartisan agreement of the state level is not the federal level. that to me represents a good thing for the country. if there's pushback i admire the people in both parties who are pushing for higher standards for kids, but that's their leadership. >> so you do not leaders bipartisan agreement in support of the common core at the state

at this point? >> it depends on the stage are talking about but there's exceptions. >> okay. let's talk teachers for a moment. we recently all witnessed a teachers strike in chicago, which garnered substantial attention especially to the run up to the election. secretary duncan said i'm confident both sides, referring to the schiavo teacher strike at the best interests of the students at heart and they can collaborate at the bargaining table. whiteboard advise for instance, in a survey of education found at the end of a 62% felt the ctu when the strike and 9% felt mayor ron emanuel one on the revolution. so i'm. so i'm trees, to each of you believe that both sides of the chicago strike had the best interest of the chicago students at heart? >> look, i think was evident around the country is we have kids and parents and teachers and unions and mayors who

absolutely have the best -- i think the al gore while madrid of this country who you believe in education is a part that america is there for helping kids get hit at recruiting our future. so i do think it's much but it gets interesting i think there's a dramatic difference in how you get there. part of that is what you think is happening. >> so chicago though, you would say from where you're standing, that both sides were focus on the interest of the children and equally so? >> look, i'm a representative of the obama campaign. i do think there's an appropriate just to focus on particular local issues like in that context. but what i would say is when i've been in schools across the country, the president has been in schools, whether it's mayors, teachers, principals our parents, there's disagreement but how but there is a deep fundamental tenet about kids education. i think that is the basis, bipartisan a group we're seeing

across the country in many states. >> teachers care about doing a good job, about ensuring the students that there entrusted to them learn. but they also have their own individual interest as employees. one of the ways in which they try to protect those interests is by organizing in unions to try to advance those interests through collective means. and it's no surprise that in some cases the interest of teachers and students are not entirely a line, and in those instances the organizations that exist to advance teachers interest as employees are going to prioritize the interest of teachers. and that's going to lead to conflicts like the one we saw in chicago. >> are you saying the chicago teachers union did not primarily have the interest of children at heart? >> i think they also had their own material interest in mind, certainly when you're asking for a pay increase in order to work longer years -- longer school year, then you know, that's

something that's in their own interest. and when they're resisting evaluation systems, that the obama administration believes are important to be able to drive overall employment and performance nationwide, they're resisting the invitation of the systems then yeah, i think they are protecting the collective interest of teachers as employees. so what we need is we need political -- that's entirely appropriate by the way. it's appropriate for unions to play that role. we need people on the other side of the table, and this gave their emanuel, to stand up to those interests and stand up for the interest of children. in order to get that we need other political officials, other elected officials like obama and duncan not to stay above the fray and say everyone is working to get in a peaceful way but to back people are trying to drive exactly the type of changes at the obama administration has tried to see happen. >> look, i think as president, you've got to understand how to focus, be judicious where you

lead and how you about people of the local and state level, unions, mayors, superintendents. i think the president has laid out some extremely clever, many of which have been embraced by denny's, by school boards, by superintendents, and there are school board to do support some of them. i think the idea that the president should come at the secretary should, every city where conflict comes up get involved and weigh in on the. i think it's not an appropriate use of the presidents' day. >> jon, a similar battle waged in 2011 was a wisconsin fight which affected collective bargaining and effective benefit contribution to the wisconsin legislative fiscal bureau has us by the potential, saving wisconsin schools $600 million over the next two years, now, on that one of course secretary duncan did opt to weigh-in. he said of governor scott walker's proposal for walker to go in the direction after the

leadership the union had chosen to make no sense to me. it was not sensible. so i guess, when, why did the secretary weigh in on that one in wisconsin, and b, what was nonsensical about the nature of the wisconsin legislative reform? >> look, i think that the discussions and debate within education are within broad frameworks should be worked out at the state or local level without comment from the president or secretary. on the question of the chicago case or others, debates about how much, what percent up -- [inaudible] the present executive said it's clear improvement inched achieve it should be one among mulch all -- it's will use to get meaningful feedback our kids, teachers improve and also help hold

teachers accountable and retain teachers but they don't take a position that it is a conflict, that's not an appropriate thing to get into from the presence of you and i think that's right. on the other hand, i think arne waiting because the secretary deeply believes that any effort across the country to eliminate most collective bargaining, and the kind of situation that is happening in wisconsin come in the end is not going to lead to progress. and you see a tremendous conflict that's happened in wisconsin. is not how you get a better education, and not to be where there is collective bargaining. this kind of conflict is not helpful figure out what -- at the expense i wonder what the governor's stance was on the wisconsin reform? >> his stances states have control over the way in which they can -- this is a state matter. however, he is supportive of efforts to narrow the scope of

collective bargaining, which is what's happened in wisconsin for exactly the reason that it can generate the types of opportunity to invest resources in more productive ways. and keep those resources and going to things like excessively generous pension benefits that teachers don't value in their early career, that don't serve to attract people into the profession as effectively as other means of compensation. but which unions tend to support. so the sense that the opportunities that never the scope of collective bargaining, the chicago experience, and the wisconsin experience together show why those can be valuable for states that you to go down the path. >> i think on the question of teachers union, president and secretary made clear we need to put our kids interests first, and school boards and teachers unions and superintendents and parents need to all be involved in change. changes are.

from the way things were done to the fourth two new things. he is comfortable pushing on, all of us, including extremes, we -- we usually the world in education. we no longer do because we have flatlined. we haven't kept up with a dramatic improvements needed. at the same time the president and secretary do not believe -- >> just a few minutes left in this event. we will leave it at this point but you can see it in its entirety on a website. go to c-span.org. live now to the middle east policy council here in washington for discussion on the foreign policy choices facing the next of administration. this is just getting started. >> if everyone is ready, we can begin. i'm the executive director of the middle east policy council and i'd like to welcome you to our 70s capitol hill conference. some of you know the council,

but some of you do not so i would just take one minute to tell you what we do. master we celebrate our 30th anniversary as a nonprofit educational organization. and this summer we published the 30th anniversary issue of our journal, which is our flagship program, and the most recently cited journal in its field of middle eastern policy questions. middle east policy. we have a website, www.mepc.org where you can find archived articles from previous issues of the journal. and our second program at the capital program which i said is, this is our 70th, it's being

live streamed. anyone watching on live stream can ask questions from the website. and within a few days you'll be able to see the entire video of this conference on the website. and then a few days later the entire transcript will be available. and then it will be published in the next issue of the journal, which will come out i suppose in december. in the summer. -- in the summer. at a third program outreach program where we provide information to teachers but it has been primary teachers and as. we are reaching out now to of people such as religious leaders, world affairs council, rotary clubs. and that's in effort to build citizens awareness of the issues that we have to deal with as a government. and, of course, we have experts who provide commentary to the media. that's the middle east policy council. if you would like to see

articles, videos, et cetera, www.mepc.org. now, before we go to this distinguished panel i'd like to make a few introductory marks just to set the stage. then the panel will speak, and then we will have questions. this is about policy choices facing the next administration, whoever is going to be leading it. he is going to have some decisions to make. on israeli-palestinian questions, will the next administration resume the peace process in order to seek resolution of this conflict through establishment of the two-state solution? will he be willing to expand medical capital on this? -- political capital on this. is in the interest of the united

states to solve this and get a two-state solution to this? various members of this current administration have said so, and if that's true it would be good to succeed. there are others who are not so sure that it's achievable of that political capital is worth spending on a. that's an important question, important decision for the next administration is the next president wants to do this, he's going to have to build a domestic constituency to overcome opposition. on the question of the iran syria hezbollah act, the administration will have decisions to make about sanctions, about diplomacy, about war. if the iranian regime comes to the table with serious intent, for any reason, either because sanctions are fighting so hard or because they are threats of military strike, or for any other reason, my question as an

individual is with the american government take yes for an answer, or will the american government have conditions that are, cannot be met by the other side? and with the administration even consider what was previously called grand bargain, which would attempt to resolve all the outstanding issues between united states and iran, including what should iran's role be in the region and what kind of attitude should they take toward the arab-israeli conflict and a potential peace agreement? or what the next administration actually engage in military strikes against iran? i would just note there are three studies out very recently. might want to think about one by the iran project, which has a title of weighing the costs and benefits of military strike, people such as anthony zena and

tom pickering were a soldier without of course, and that title suggests two ways the costs and benefits industry conference. one issue it doesn't touch on, discovered by another report, published by the university of utah, which goes into some depth about the casualties that would result from the military strike, the death and injuries. and then finally there's a report by bipartisan policy council, or group, which goes into the costs of allowing iran to get a nuclear weapon. economic, particularly the economic costs they think would fall from allowing iran to get a nuclear weapon. so it's a big issue for everyone to be considered, especially the next president. when it comes to syria, such a difficult case in the arab awakenings. and one question that is current is, if we were to give them

heavier weapons, would we promote the downfall of the assad regime and promote the rise of a rebel opposition that would be friendly to the united states, or would they fall into the wrong hands and result in malicious with weapons that could do, to the westerner, to the nazis what was done to our ambassador in libya? so, are there really prospects for democratic pluralistic regime coming to power after assad, and we have a role in post-assad transition? or would we be putting our people in harm's way by trying to do that? when it comes to other cases in arab spring, you might want to correct me, but it looks as if we have a president from the

muslim brotherhood was establishing a very strong secular authority, and there are questions about whether we should be giving them a foreign aid. that's the question they will have to wrestle with. in bahrain, for example, we're dealing with a non-nato ally, with a record of progressive reform. still attempting to make some reform is facing very determined opposition. it has very significant support, especially from international human rights organizations. so how much reform it asks that we seem to engage in? or how much might we be playing into the hands of antidemocratic forces in bahrain? finally, when the come to the gulf, and i can testify to this are many trips to the gulf, we need to decide what kind of relationships were going to have with the members of the gulf cooperation council, who have

security issues that they need to contend with, know very well that american defense industries can provide them with outstanding equipment, at the same time they have some questions about extent of our security commitments to them, particularly given the way the administration rather quickly called for the mubarak government to step down. they want business ties with the united states but they see business opportunities elsewhere. they're very distressed by her arab-israeli policy. very distressed by her arab-israeli policies. i hear it all the time. now we know that they are frustrated by our policy towards iran and syria thinking about to be doing more in syria, worried about everything we might do in iran, even diplomacy which they fear might provide iran with some advantages.

and they're also concerned about our domestic islamophobia. and wonder what kinds of relations they can have with us when that kind of thing is occurring. so those are my introductory ideas. i now want to say something about the panel and turn it over to them. and on the back of your invitation need a very extensive bios of these distinguished speakers so i won't repeat everything that is here. but our first speaker, who i'd like -- is a founding editor of the american conservative, which was founded to provide an alternative voice to the neoconservative movement, and he identifies himself as an ex-neoconservative and has written for some magazines like

commentary. he's the former columnist and editorial writer for the "new york post," has a doctorate from columbia university, and has written articles in our journal and his articles been his articles principles popular that we've ever published. then it's like to go to jocelyn, who is senior visiting professor at johns hopkins, where she co-directs global policy initiatives also the director of the initial research program called islam in the west at harvard university where she splits her time. she's a political scientist from the french national center for scientific research, she has written several books about islam, globalization and democratization. and secularism.

and arthur speaker will be nathaniel kern, also a friend of the middle east policy council. president of foreign reports, provide incisive reports about middle eastern political and economic issues, particularly oil, particularly in the gulf. you can find some of his reports on our website, almost weekly? >> monthly. >> monthly. and i believe was the first foreign student to attend the university in saudi arabia. university of riyadh. spent a year there. and then the fourth speaker is paul pillar, who spent 28 years in the u.s. intelligence community and had many high ranking positions in it,

including executive director, director for the cia, and his final position was national intelligence officer for the near east and south asia where he provided analytical support. and he was a visiting fellow at brookings in the year 2000, and as a reserve officer in the u.s. army, and has also been publishing externally important literature the last few years since retiring from the government. so i will step out of the way now. ..

>> what are the prospects for a new president achievement anding a peace setment between israelis and palestinians? i believe, unfortunately, that they are not very good. by a fair settlement i mean a two-state solution, a palestinian state on comprising gaza and the west bank with some modern negotiated land swaps with control of its border, its borders, its water resources, its air space. something similar to the clinton parameters of 2000. i believe that this outcome more than any alternative would satisfy the core needs for security and self-determination of both israelis and palestinians. as you know, every american president since lyndon johnson has tried to stop israel from building settlements on the west bank because they understood

that those settlements threaten to foreclose the possibility of a two-state solution. some presidents pushed hard, some not very hard. at camp david jimmy carter believed he had received assurances that settlement building would stop and that a process leading to self-determination and autonomy on the west bank would commence. but settlement building did not stop, and is both carter and the egyptians for different reasons did not make too much of a fuss. ronald reagan called for a settlement freeze without making a big issue of it. george h.w. bush did make a big issue of it and paid a steep political price which may have cost him re-election. bill clinton wanted very much a viable palestinian state, and he found that settlement building continued whether israel was headed by labor and, indeed, accelerated throughout the 1990s. barack obama made a settlement

freeze the jumping-off point for his peace efforts and was smacked down decisively by prime minister netanyahu and the israel lobby. the reason for these failures is obvious; israel, no matter what coalition was in charge, wanted to build settlements on the west bank more than the united states was committed to stopping them. the israel lobby, which i would describe as a loose coalition of groups and individuals who are committed to insuring american backing for israel no matter what israel does, was able to generate enough political pressure to thwart serious american diplomacy to stop settlement building. nevertheless, something important is beginning to happen. the israel lobby is beginning to exhibit cracks and weaknesses. i believe we are witnessing the beginnings of an historic transformation in which its power will be considerably

diminished. first, the democratic party. on the second night of the convention, roughly half the delegates in the hall -- perhaps a quarter of the 6,000 -- voted no to what party leaders had assumed was a routine platform resolution, amendment stating that jerusalem was israel's undivided capital. such planks had appeared in both party platforms before, and in practice presidents had ignored them, so not much of substance was at stake. but in the spirit, in the emotion which is at the root of political change, a great deal happened. i'm sure many of you have seen the video. three votes, three choruses of no as unplanned as they were unexpected. big party poobahs descended on the television booths to play down the episode. alan dershowitz described the naysayers as rogue elements,

arab-americans and anti-zionist jews. 1500 of them, apparently. what took place i would call nothing less than a collective rosa parks moment. let me quote one reaction from anna goodman of "commentary magazine" which is now unabashedly a republican publication. this video, she wrote, this video of the voice vote should chill every pro-israel democrat. scratch that, every pro-israel american to the bone. israel relies on bipartisan political support from the united states, its strongest ally. the floor vote at the democratic convention por tends a day when that bipartisan support will cease to exist. as tom said, i'm a former neoconservative in another life, used to write frequently for commentary. i think iowa hanna goodman is completely correct that the vote

does, indeed, portend such a day. how far in the future, i don't know. it was a did between saw parks' refusal to move to the back of the bus and the emergency of a sufficiently powerful anti-segregation consensus to pass civil rights legislation. for a major political party to become devoted to fairness between israel and palestine will take at least that long. but the reason that alan dershowitz and commentary found the erosion of bipartisan support alarming is that partisanship would let loose a torrent of competitive debate about the morality and the utility of america's special relationship with israel. israel's treatment of the palestinians under the occupation would be subject not only to academic and journalistic scrutiny as it is now, but to political polemics. something like the openly-expressed behavior, something like the openly-expressed skepticism

about israel's behavior on elite university campuses would become widely disseminated. the special relationship's survival depends on its own rules of discourse. israel's value to the united states is held to be so self-evident, it's interests and values so obviously congruent to america's that any criticism must be deemed marginal, weird, motivated by bigotry. those that question the consensus are not debated and often smeared, but once the seal is broken, i believe -- and i think alannah goodman believes -- the notion that it is some sort of metaphysical environment to treat israel as a touchstone of american mideast policy could unravel with stunning speed. other signs are pointing in the same direction. a boycott divestment and sanctions resolutions were voted on in the national methodist and presbyterian conventions this summer. neither passed, but the

presbyterian resolution fell short by two votes out of more than 600. more recently, leaders of several mainline churches made a formal request to congress to investigate israeli human rights violations to determine if israel is violating the terms of use of the american weapons it receives. for a long time, protestant churches have been inhibited on these questions. their leaders instinctively gravitate towards warm, ecumenical relations with mainstream jewish organizations with whom the mainline churches have built historic alliances on civil rights, on vietnam and on church/state relations. and yet these churches also have ties to the arab world as educators and missionaries and social workers and refugee camps, and they have arab coreligionists. they see themselves as promoters of social justice. historically, this tension has always been resolved in favor of silence, so as not to upset

relations with american jewish leaders. that period, which has lasted since the founding of israel, seems to be now over. thirdly, the very obvious pushback against israel's effort to persuade the united states to attack iran or to support an israeli strike or to accept israeli advice over what timetables or red lines washington should adopt. this has involved some firm public language. the chairman of the joint chiefs saying we don't want to be complicit in the an israeli attack. secretary of state clinton explicitly rejecting israel's red lines, obama not rearranging his schedule to meet with netanyahu in new york. of course, this wasn't over palestine, it was over an issue with more immediate and obvious economic and security implications for the united states. but it was also the most unmistakeable public defiance of israel's wishes by an american president in a very long time. and though i'm assuming that the

election is now a toss-up, the events i refer to were followed by obama's largest lead in the polls this year. and if obama loses, i think we can say with assurance that public disagreement with prime minister netanyahu had nothing to do with it. i could point to other areas, but you get the idea. discussion of israel/palestine is opening up in historic ways. the congress is a lagging indicator, still rolling out aipac-sponsored resolutions by the margins everyone is familiar with. but one day the glass northeast will penetrate -- glasnost will penetrate up here as well. what relevance does this have for the next president? unfortunately, i fear not very much. i won't say much about mitt romney. i would love to be proven wrong, but on the basis of his public statements, his private comments which have become public and his choice of foreign policy

advisers, i believe there's no chance he will become engaged in restarting a genuine peace process. obama is a different matter. he clearly wants a palestinian state. he was decisively rebuked in the first year and a half of his administration. he couldn't persuade israel to carry out a settlement freeze, much less withdraw from territory. could next year be different? i've fallen into the camp of those who now think the time for a two-state solution has probably passed. i believe israeli settlements on the west bank have precluded the possibility. there are too many settlers armed and intensely committed to remain there. it is not clear that any israeli government could remove them without risking a civil war. and though there are mild israeli polling majorities in favor of a two-state solution, there's no significant israeli constituency for giving up any sovereignty over east jerusalem and a palestinian state without jerusalem as a capital is a

nonstarter. there is now one state between the mediterranean and the jordan river, a state connected by highly-developed infrastructure of roads and water pipelines. i'm not sure when the point of return was passed. of seven years ago on my first visit to israel, it still seemed quite plausible to speak of a palestinian state. now it does not. so i believe any kind of normal diplomatic process -- appointment of a special envoy, searching for common ground, building on previous agreements such as those arrived at under prime minister olmert and prime minister barak -- don't have much chance of success. there's no political majority in israel in favor of withdrawing from the territory ask settlements israel would have to do to allow a genuinely economically-viable palestinian state. prime minister netanyahu, i know, has given lip service to the idea, but people close to him have said he would never offer the palestinians something

he could accept. an archipelago stands on the west bank, areas a and b, cut off from the world without control of the air space, their water will not produce a viable state. so what can the next president do to change this? the only intervention which might shake israel out of its current spiral would be if a president made clear where the united states sees this heading. absent a two-state solution, israel is enroute to becoming an apartheid state. israelis will not willingly accept granting palestinians voting or civil rights, so we're headed towards a state roughly half palestinian, half jewish, one group denied political and civil rights, the other group possessing them. could president obama cite words that previous israeli prime ministers have said have warned quite unambiguously that israel

would be facing an apartheid situation in the ab -- absence of a two-state solution? could obama tell the israelis that regardless of who is president it will be very difficult for america to maintain a special relationship with an apartheid state in the middle of the middle east? it's such an alliance -- that such an alliance would contravene america's values and interest and that once the relevant question in the one state that exists between the river and the sea is whether palestinians should have equal voting rights as jews, it will be natural given america's democratic ideology and its history that it will support palestinian voting rights. failure to do so would not make sense to most americans, and in a practical sense, would render it impossible for the united states to speak credibly in favor of democracy or human rights in the middle east or anywhere else in the world. in other words, the centerpiece of the president's intervention

would be shifted from the palestinians and their historic suffering and their need for self-determination. i'm pretty sure most israelis don't care very much about that. it would be about american values and american interests and where israel fits into them. i'm not sure that such a speech perhaps accompanied by diplomatic measures such as not using america's u.n. veto on israel's behalf or perhaps even supporting pro-palestinian measures would change the political calculus in israel. perhaps it would have no impact at all, it would have no impact at all. do i think president obama might say something like this, speaking before the knesset, perhaps? of course i don't. if the israel lobby is getting weaker, it is still very powerful. america is not yet ready for a presidential approach like this. a reelected president obama would have more pressing

priorities besides a viable state in palestine and priorities more easy to achieve. but i don't think anything less dramatic and less forceful has any chance of success. [applause] >> thank you. hope you're wrong. [laughter] the next speaker would be jocelyne. [inaudible] >> good morning. um, i would like, first, to thank the middle east policy council for this gathering and for this debate. i would like to focus my remarks

on the changes needed in the u.s. foreign policy vis-a-vis the country's going through what is called the arab spring, now the arab awakening. and i would like to, first, say that we -- [inaudible] since the revolution of last year. we, i say "we" from an american approach, we saw the tahrir protests as the sign of democracy that we thought were not there, then after the elections we were disappointed by the victory of islamists. and in the last six months, we went to disappointment and now we are in the pessimist phase from the recent events like the protest of the anti-muhammad

movie led some of the analysts and policymakers to link the failure of the arab spring with this unfortunate episode. so my talk will really focus, first, on the fact that democracy is a value that is now shared by the majority, especially the young people of all muslim majority societies. does it mean that it's a democracy we experience in the west and especially in the u.s.? probably not. and we have to be aware of that. and based on this assessment, i would like to draw a few elements for -- [inaudible] in foreign policy. in some way the west, and that was the arab spring showed, the

west is a victim of its success. it is said that the jasmine revolution and the tahrir protests show that now that democratic values are not anymore i would say western, and this has not been thought through sufficiently. i mean, we are not paying attention enough to the fact that democracy is persistently praised by members, citizens of muslim majority countries. there are tons of pollings showing that, multiple pollings that repeatedly show that, actually, many some instances when they are polled, these people say that they are more in favor to democracy than the average respondent you can find in a western country. and this hope in democracy's still there despite the, i would

say the questioning or the skepticism around the new regime that came from elections. so people also disconnect the limits of the new regime with this hope for democracy. and i think it's important to maintain this positive outlook on what's going on. and we tend, unfortunately, to go very quickly there one assessment to another without taking into account indicators that are there, the fact that muslim societies were in favor of democracy. we knew that, at least as scholars, for a long, long time. this didn't come with the arab spring, it was already there in facts and investigations that are available to everybody. so this is the first thing. the second point here is but what kind of democracy are we

talking about. and in this regard i would like to make a difference between what is showed as a consensus which is the principle of political freedom, freedom of political expression and opposition. in other words, the fact that rulers that have to be elected, that they can change from one election to another is now pretty much grounded in most, the majority of these countries. does it mean that, um, we are witnessing the sort of secularization in the american sense of this country? probably not. probably not. so we have also to disconnect the few elements that we have considered as the whole package of democratization which is democratization goes with

secularization and goes with decline of religion in mix space. and this we have -- in public space. and this we have to be very aware that this is not happening. and in this sense the protests against the anti-muhammad move show us that islam remains very strong marker of the public space which from the west is always difficult to understand because we think that religion is private, that religion concerns only our beliefs. we're going to have to understand, and it's not true only for muslims, it's true i talk to you about india in the same way. we're going to have to understand that for muslims islam is not only a question of belief, it's also a question of belonging and being a national citizen. what do i mean by that? it is not because as i hear everywhere that islam doesn't separate politics and religion, which is actually looking at the

islamic tradition wrong. but it is that since the building of the nation state even by very secular elite that we used to work with like mubarak or -- [inaudible] islam has been embedded in the building of nation state. what do i mean by that? it's not only mentioning islam in the constitution, it is also creating connection between being the national and being the citizen. and, again, this didn't come from islamists. what we are witnessing is how the new regime led by islamists have to work within the framework that already was there. so again, the blasphemy laws were not an invention of the recent regimement they were already there. today's major debate in tunisia about how to remove laws that sanction people who would say something insulting against the

prophet of the religion. this was already there under the secular ben ali regime. so, again, we have to be very careful on how we assess this kind of event in a more, i would say, complex picture where instead of looking at islamists as a separate entity challenging secular states, we have to take into account what are the state institutions, what are the situation today that also influence the interaction with the islamists? and i think we have not done that, and it requires a very different outlook on what's going on meaning accepting that, indeed, democratic values are shared now beyond the west, but does it mean that everywhere we're going to witness duplication of the american model of democracy? probably not. does it mean that then we reject

the whole experience? it would not be a wise move. and this brings me to my second point on what does it mean for the u.s. foreign policy. we are at a time now where talking about promotional democracy is very, i would say, criticized or rejected. and i understand why, because if you look at the popularity of u.s., of the u.s. in this part of the world, you see a consistent and repeated decline of positive opinion vis-a-vis the u.s. and there have been lots of assessment of previous attempts to promote democracy, so i'm not going to go there. but at the same time, um, it ce ro tion ofthat we, we have to

democracy -- pmotion democracy. valu not proting not considerin t w has to teacto t demo hepa the wor, but to create some kind ofartnership. and this is possible because this has been done by u.s. administration. particularly in the eastern european context. you can see how successful democratization policy worked in east european context by two elements that maybe we can learn from andnvest in muslim majority countries. it um, establishing a good communication with the target audience in a functioning marketplace of ideas. and i think this is missing in e way we are dealing with muslim majority countries. of course, since the arab spring we are aware that communication

matters. actually, we are i would say too much aware of it because now the social media becomes a -- [inaudible] to solve everything. why the social media, and i know there have been a lot of investment in the current administration to communicate through this channel with different segments of civil society in the muslim world. but what do we communicate? what are we paying attention to? and i would say here that when we say democracy again, it may not mean the same thing for someone living in tunis. when we hear the term "sharia," it doesn't mean what we are afraid of here which is, you know, the imposition of a medieval, barbaric code of law. and, again, we don't, we don't make enough its fault to clarify

this kind of, you know, heavy, loaded terms in any communication with this part of the world. i remember what the new translator regime in libya to call one of the first declaration was we're going to impose sharia in the country. and this was, you know, considered as very, very worrying from the western eye. what does sharia mean there? i mean, maybe it means -- and i can explain this a lit motle in detail maybe in q&a -- it may be simply principles like, you know, e ten commandments. if in the u.s. some politician would refer to the ten commandments, it would not be seen as, you know, backward move toward a religious state. so maybe sharia is used this way, and in this particular context tunisia is very good

example of this move from reference to principles from imposition in concrete law of what would be sharia. i think this is also important and does not take at face value what people are saying. because there is a lot of relationsh of power in the user world. i know this may not sound too realistic in terms of inrniona relation, but symbolic matters. and we have not paid attention enough to the symbolic aspect of the communication with the this part of the world -- with this part of the rld. and so incidents are adding up, you know, from the quran desecration to i would not consider the anti-muhammad movie as, you know, something that was part of u.s. foreign policy, but we have to deal with it. and i's -- apology is good, but this is outsid very reactive

approach. we need to be much more proactive in the way we communicate. so what does this mean? e want to target audiences or actors that can promote a vision of democratization that include not only free and fair elections, but other elements like pluralistic approach of society, um, we have to change also the way we interact. multiple set of institutions and -- [inaudible] agencies with this country. we have given too much priority to the leaders. and it's true that in the current administration, also, there is a -- [inaudible] to diversify, and they've been faulted for usi it comes into a very compartmentalized approach with one hand of the administration

doinone thing with ngos and the other hand doing something else with the state. and sometimes these two elements do not, do not add up or do not come into synergy. and it's, i think it's in many some way very -- in somey very heartbreaking from an amican point of view. because we put a lot of money through all this action in this particular part of the world. what comes back is from the society is we are doing nothing. so, again, how do we make this work in a way that is more ansparent, that is more coordinated? and this goes with vote, and we should ask the population. you know, they toppled mubarak and ben ali because they wanted ansparency, because they wanted more equal distribution of resources. so means also maybe thinking

of another way that instead o doing one thing here and another thing here, create platforms and make, you know, the different way that america is involved with a country, meet each other to give a concrete example, it did happen in american policy when in sudan -- you can obje and i would take the objection -- in sudan at the time of reconstruction you see the very successful example of the convergence and synergy of multiple administrative and political units of the u.s. administration coming together to help rebuild the country and also bringing different elements. not only state institutions, but also civil society movement. and in this sense there is a lot of to think of. so the point would not be to add or increase the aid, it would be

more about thinking of creating spaces or interfaces that would make this help much more efficient and that would also change the outlook of the u.s. in this part of the world. i think that focusing only on state work is counterproductive because, again, the state is seen as biased, and our previous speaker explained why the bias is there. but there is a huge resources that american are not using enough which is the american society itse i was very surprised, i did a lot of focus groups of american muslims when they live in the s. and coming from pakistan, egypt or iraq, the first thing that they discover is the energy, vibrancy of americans.

and they tend to dissociate between, you know, the u.s. foreign policy and american society. and most of them, all of them are very positive on that. and every time they tell in this groups we didn't know because we see only, you know, the foreign policy aspect. so there is something here in terms of communication also that could be, um, helpful. so what does it mean? it means, also, multilateralism. i know this is not very popular, but it may work too because also looking at what the e.u. is doing in this part of the world, a lot of publishtive could -- initiative could be put together. and especially in the libya now or in tunisia. of and, again, the most extremist or resistant actors play on the division not only of their own politicians, but also of the division and

compartmentalized work of the west in the different parts of the world. so, again, the idea of platform here is something to think of, and it has been working in some, in some cases. to finish up, um, i would like to say that the work is huge because it means thinking of how we interact or engage from the very concrete aspects of who does what in these different parts of the world, one. it also means being able to identify locally and not only through the internet. internet is nice, but it gives a very deceptive approach of what people are doing, you know? and i know it's, again, the social media doesn't make revolution. education makes revolution. urban middle class makes revolution, not the social media. and for that we need to be more aware of indicators emerging and

who is doing what now in these different civil societies. and for that i think that the need is better understanding to be able to bring in skills. people in this part of the world, and i will finish really on that, um, are admiring the u.s. for its capacity of education, for its capacity of entrepreneurship. i do not -- i mean, of course we can bring entrepreneur from the middle east to visit the u.s. or vice versa. it doesn't create the positive cross-pollination with state institution. how do we make this work? and this would be a very important way to build more secure societies. because as we know, democracies do not fight each other. so what i'm lining up here is

some element for more long-term approach which may be very frustrating, especially in time of election, but on the long run there are sufficient assets that could be used and we could start using right now to change the interaction with this part of the world. ank you.>> you thank. [applause] nate kern? >> thank you very much. um, my job on this panel is probably a little easier than the jobs others have because it's basically to discuss the policy choices that the next administration, the next person in the white house -- could be obama or the governor -- will face in terms of dealing with saudi arabia and the gulf.

the way i like to think of it is i think whatever the outcome of the election, there's going to be a new secretary of state, i believe, and how would a professional foreign policy official brief that new secretary before he or she had a first substantive meeting with saudi leaders? what would be the issues that briefer would want to put on the table and say, hey, here are the things you've got to discuss, here are the questions that should be on the agenda. and i think any good briefer would go back and say, well, what have been the previous interactions between american presidents and the saudi leadership, and you would start really with the meeting between then-crown prince abdullah and george w. bush in texas in 2005. when the crown prince suggested and the president agreed that they would form a strategic

dialogue committee. and one of the reasons for wanting to have a strategic dialogue committee headed by the foreign minister and the secretary of state was prior to that there were an awful lot of issues coming from all different parts of the government complaining about this kind of saudi behavior or this, and there was no overall way to put things in context. what was the context of religious freedom, human rights, democratic values versus cooperation on peace process, oil markets and other things. and one of the things that the strategic dialogue did was put everything on a table for a once every six month review by the top leadership. back in 2005 the main issues that were on the agenda were counterterrorism, how do you go against terrorists themselves, terror finance, how do you clamp down on loose money going to, wittingly or unwittingly to terror groups, the issue of

visas for saudis, saudi arabia's desire to finally join the world trade organization, peace process and oil prices and saudi plans for expanding capacity. that was in 2005. i think you can say if you look back pretty much tick the box on counterterrorism. you've got a very well-admired counterterror operations in saudi arabia where they vote on educating the public and tracking down people, identify them, tracking them down, prosecuting them and then often trying to rehabilitate them. i don't know of any american official who thinks they're severely lacking in that. they've given a great deal of praise in how far they've gone.

it took a little longer for the u.s. and saudi arabia to work together on terror finance, but a year ago the treasury held a sort of a september review of where things stood on cooperation with saudi arabia on those two issues, and you had the fellows stuart levy and fred townsend from the previous administration and current ones, and during that symposium what i was struck with was the unanimity with which all those officials felt this'd been very -- there'd been very substantial progress and, basically, these boxes of counterterrorism, terror finance had been ticked off, and they need continued attention, but those are no longer issues you would pulse on the next -- you would put on the next secretary's agenda. they're done, you can tick the box off. the visa issue, which was very contentious in 2005, is pretty much done.

between 2000 and 2005, you had an average of about 3,000 saudi students studying here in the united states and, of course, after 9/11 there was an awful lot of scrutiny of the visas. people were held up, students would often miss a year because their visas would expire, and then they'd have to go back and wait if line. now you have 60,000 saudi students here. the visa problem has been solved, they get five-year visas, and americans get multiple entry visas into saudi arabia. and i think it's worked very well. i think the fact that king abdullah has provided scholarships for those 60,000 saudi students is an example of where he wants to bring the country. he wants 60,000 people to come back with a good view of american values. and i would point out parenthetically that among those 60,000 there's a

disproportionately high representation of saudi shia. saudi id cards don't identify whether you're sunni or shia, but as people look and try to figure who's who, um, yeah. it's considerably, perhaps double the percentage of shia in saudi arabia are getting scholarships here. i think that's good. um, again, in 2005 the big question was oil prices and what the saudi plans for expanding capacity were. oil minister knew i didn't meanmy was there, cheney was there, and basically they described this program that they were then launching to expand production capacity by two and a half million barrels a day. and that's done. we still have considerably higher oil prices now than we

did in 2005. they've been accelerating. um, but that's, i think, largely a result of growing world demand outside of the oecd. and unless there's some change in that, we're going to have continued fairly robust pricing. now, if you're briefing the few secretary, you could go over what are the boxes that have been ticked and successfully done, but what are the new issues that we face. and, obviously, one of them, an issue that is worth discussing because he can take actionable action together between our country and saudi arabia is the fallout from the arab spring particularly in egypt and yemen. i think we know that saudi arabia had mixed feelings about how quickly mubarak was dumped, and -- but they also, the saudis played a very crucial role in

easingally abdul as sala out of yemen. it wasn't easy, it was bloody, but compared to some of the other changes, it wasn't that bad. in april of 2011 just as the arab spring was in its full bloom, if you will, the g7 finance ministers met in france and formed something called the doeville partnership. their vision was very simple, that europe had been through this kind of thing before after eastern europe broke away from the yoke of the warsaw pact. you had a whole bunch of newly-independent countries struggling with democracy but also with economy. how do you go from a controlled communist economy to a free economy and make it work?

um, and what europe had done, basically, was establish the european bank for reconstruction and development which was modeled on what the world bank did to help western europe and japan after world war ii. and the ebrd basically provided capital funds plus the things we've all learned about how to do things right rather than wrong in building a new economy. what laws do you need, what structural reforms do you need, what's the best place to put money not just throwing it down black holes. the doeville partnership, again, the g7 finance ministers which is the g8 minus russia, then they included in their meeting the saudi finance minister, the qatari finance minister and the turkish finance minister. so the doeville partnership the

donor giving advise side was the g7 plus those three countries. and then on the potential recipient side was egypt, later libya in terms not of money, but can we help you in planning and economic revival. just last month yemen's on the list, tunisia, of course, and tangentially morocco and jordan. they haven't gone through a transition period, but they also needed economic assistance. um, both saudi arabia and qatar have been quite proactive in extending aid to egypt before and after mohamed morsi was elected. and i think it's important to understand what sort of aid. some of the things egypt needed right away was an ability to

sell government bonds and treasury bills, because it's currently paying about 14% interest which is pretty high for a government. and in the immediate depths of this summer when things looked terrible, both the saudis and qataris came in and said, okay, we'll buy your one-month issue of t-bills. obviously, they got pretty good security of repayment unless the government defaults on everything. but that has helped relieve some of the interest pressure and tried to move egypt out of the death trap it's in. in a worse debt trap than greece or italy or spain. um, the second thing that the saudis and the qataris have done, they have -- like the world bank, there's an islamic development bank -- there is quite good development banks that help identify investment projects, make sure they're

built without corruption and that they become effective. i think it's $4.5 billion that qatar and saudi arabia have extended to egypt, and that has helped now the imf, christine lagarde was out there in september, and they're working on a loan program, very easy terms, very low interest rate and forgiveness that would be another $4.5 billion or so for egypt. if those things are combined, then egypt has a fighting chance to get an economy back on its feet. if you have an economy back on its feet, then it's a little easier to talk about equitable division of resources. if the resource base is going down the tube, you're in a pretty desperate situation. and, again, they're starting to talk about doing this with yemen too which is, of course, an area the u.s. and saudi arabia have cooperated on a lot on counterterrorism, on the gcc initiative to get the transition

in power. but now really the thing is how do you get this desperately poor country running out of everything all at once, give it a chance to get back on its feet? at least they're working together on that. the big issues that you want to brief the next secretary on are, of course, iran sanctions and syria. um, the imposition of the current set of sanctions by the u.s. and e.u. would not have been possible without free agreement with saudi arabia last november. but if those sanctions led to iran's losing up to or a it -- or a little more than half of its oil exports, would saudi arabia be willing to step in and make up those exports so the price wouldn't go through the roof?

they agreed. and, um, i think with the caveat that we probably can't make up, the saudis can't make up all of iran's exports where there'd be some mechanism to totally shut 'em down because that would take saudi production right up to their -- and leave no spare capacity, which tends to be a driver for higher oil prices. so as the sanctions have come about, we had some bumpiness in the oil market, particularly in the spring in anticipation, but as they've been implemented, i think we've had at least a stabilization of oil prices at somewhat lower rates than were expected. and, um, we're going to see whether these sanctions have an influence on iranian decision making. um, to me the bottom line is, you know, is iran really willing to seriously talk about giving

up its nuclear weapons program. if they are, i don't see there's a big problem in resolving the whole issue. if they want to prevaricate and have a situation where it's sort of, sort of, sort of talking about their nuclear weapons program, um, then the sanctions are probably going to remain for some time or at least until some other situation arises. um, i don't think the next administration is going to have a terribly difficult time with saudi arabia one way or the other. if diplomacy works, that's fine. they have full diplomatic relations and full correct relations with iran. if it reduces an end to the iranian nuclear weapons program. if not, there are different

views in saudi arabia, and some feel very supportive of a military strike, and others are a little more fearful of it. on syria we're in a state of limbo where the saudis and qataris have been providing more arms to the syrian opposition, and i think it's been widely reported that the u.s. has said, please, hold off in providing the very effective shoulder-fired missiles that can hit airplanes and tanks. um, and we're still sort of in limbo with that. i think there are some of those more sophisticated weapons near the borders of syria, but they're not getting to the opposition in syria. that's been a point that i think president romney has made that he would be in favor of working with the saudis and qataris to

insure that the syrian opposition gets the weapons it needs to hit assad's planes and tanks. and as far as i know, this is still tied up in the principles committee in terms of what actions we should or should not take and with arguments being on the one hand we don't want these arms to go to people we don't know, dangerous people, and the other being if you leave assad in place and he prevails, what kind of world is that? so those, i think, would be the big issues on the agenda. middle east peace process if there's something actionable that can be done, saudis would be very supportive. i think at the moment they want to get on with the rest of their lives as long as they can see that this is a riddle that is not going to be solved anytime soon.

the final issue would be always on agenda would be oil market stability, and that's been an issue between the u.s. and saudi arabia since fdr first met the president in 1945. the u.s. didn't import any oil, we were an oil exporter at the time, but for fdr and the 12 prime ministers that have -- presidents that have followed him, if you understand the size and importance of saudi oil reserves whether the u.s. needs to import oil or not, you don't want those oil reserves to fall into the hands or under the indirect control of hostile elements whether that's the soviet union, saddam hussein or currently the ayatollahs. the world would be very different if hostile powers held the oil resources of the gulf. they would be able to control the world economy. and that's something that,

again, the past 13 presidents have not wanted to contemplate. and so that would sort of be the perennial issue on the table, and it tends to guide the rest of the relationship. thank you. [applause] >> thank you, nat. finish paul? >> good morning. as the clean-up hitter, i've been asked to address iran and syria which i will do in that order with most of the attention devoted to the first of those two topics. and i would say on both of them there will be as we head into the new administration next year pressures on the u.s. president, whoever he is, to do more, to get involved more on both of those issues. but on each one there will either be no good choices for

the administration to make, or if there are at least reasonable choices that could be taken, it will be politically difficult back here in the united states for the president, whoever he is, to select them. let's talk first about iran. there are many potentially useful departures that a u.s. administration could make with regard to iran which would involve trying to improve the absolutely awful relationship that we have with the iranians and to, actually, get some benefit in areas where u.s. and iran in interests, believe it or not, parallel or intersect like afghanistan, like stability this iraq and so on. but there will continue to be a fixation on one issue above all, and that's the iranian nuclear program. ask that's mainly -- and that's mainly because of the unceasing agitation on this topic by the current israeli leadership.

there will be, of course, an election in israel too in the first part of the year, but all of the prognoses i've seen with regard to the likelyhood, the likely outcome of that is that we will still have prime minister netanyahu as prime minister even if there might be some adjustments in the ruling coalition. and that, of course, means a continued political environment here in the united states at least in the short term even though we might hope for scott's long-term prognosis to come true in which the issue of the iranian nuclear program will necessarily be a political fixation and continue to be one here in the united states. now, an obvious constraint for either mr. obama or mr. romney as president beginning in january 2013 would be that either would be boxed in by their own comments, repeatedly stated by both of them, that an

iranian nuclear weapon would be unacceptable. and, of course, there have been statements here on the hill by congress along the same sorts of lines. now, that would not necessarily have to be a problem given that there is no indication to date, as our intelligence agencies tell us, that iran has decided so far to build a nuclear weapon. but certain aspects of their nuclear program, particularly enrichment of uranium, have come to be perceived in the debate as having a degree of unacceptability of their own. and, of course, the israeli prime minister talks about this constantly and about so-called red lines and so forth. now, avoiding having this situation turn into a disaster for whoever's administration that it is, is a problem mainly of political constraints here in this country rather than any lack of negotiating space

between iran and the p5 plus 1, the negotiating group that the united states is part of. you would have to have to have an agreement an allowing of some uranium enrichments, probably at the no more than 5% level. the outlines of an agreement are pretty clear. they would involve trading severe restrictions to be negotiated on median level or 20% enrichment in return for sanctions relief. and we should bear in mind that sanctions relief is the main reason the iranians have negotiated at all at this point. now, on the first aspect about the 20%, there is stuff that needs to be negotiated not just ending the 20% enrichment that's going on now, but also what would be the disposition of the

stockpile that iran already has. although, happily, the iranians have already helped resolve that problem by converting some of the fuel at that level to fuel plates for reactors where it's no longer usable to be further enriched to weapons grade. and then there would also have to be negotiation over the sequence of when does each side live up to parts of its part of the bargain. and the iranians reportedly placed a proproposal on the table which was unacceptable to the west in that their preferred sequence, understandably, would be to have what they want in terms of sanctions relief come first before they give up what they'd have to give up with regard to the median level enrichment. the p5 plus 1 preference is, of course, the opposite, and that's a very common situation in international negotiations. naturally, each side wants to get what it wants first before giving up anything else. and it's also very common that

this is one of the most eminently compromise bl things in negotiates. not an indivisible good. and the usual solution is some kind of sequencing arrangement in which at each stage each side both gives and gets. so the outlines of an agreement are, as i say, pretty clear, and i would go so far as to describe our current state of affairs -- if we were serious about negotiating over it -- as a matter of details. exactly how do we handle that 20% stuff that's already been enriched, and exactly what will be the sequence for implementation. now, the sanctions that we talk about so much and that keep getting ratcheted up and up and up and up are supposedly, ostensibly, a form of leverage to get the iranians to make concessions on this nuclear issue. and secretary clinton not too long ago described the sanctions in exactly those terms. she said if the iranians will

make concessions, then this is a problem we can deal with in terms of lifting -- offering sanctions relief. the main problem so far is the p5 plus 1 has not put any sanctions relief on the table as an offer except for the sole, minor exception of airplane spare parts. and so the principal problem right now in terms of where the negotiations stand is that the iranians have been given no reason or certainly no assurance to believe that the sanctions won't just continue on and on and on no matter what they do with regard to the nuclear policy. and that, obviously, kills any incentive to make concessions on their part. now, the problem for the new u.s. president -- whichever one it is come january -- will be to find political space to be flexible with regard to the sanctions. prime minister netanyahu will reject any loosening of sanctions, in fact, he's rejected the whole idea of

negotiations, basically, out of hand. and this, of course, will continue to have obvious immy cases with regard to -- implications with regard to shaping the political climate here in the united states. we also have those who hope both here and in israel that the squeeze of sanctions will somehow hasten regime change in iran. in other words, it's some other purpose besides leverage for getting concessions on the nuclear issue. and that's notwithstanding the prospect that even if there were regime change -- and i certainly would not advise holding your breath and waiting for it -- it would mean whoever comes into power in iran would fold on the nuclear issue. not likely given the broad support that a nuclear program, a peaceful nuclear program has in iran. note also that a lot of the u.s.-imposed sanctions as embedded in legislation have had other issues besides the nuclear

one stated as rationales; human rights, that sort of thing. relations with terrorist groups. and so it would be very difficult here on the hill to get back down on that even if the negotiations went well with the iranians. all these constraints put together do not auger very well for taking advantage of that negotiating space that does exist, and showing flexibility and using sanctions for what they ostensibly are to be used for, that is leverage, which requires you to be flexible, it requires you to put offers on the table, that you'll get relief if the other side makes concessions, something we haven't put on the table so far. rather than as some kind of unending punishment which, as i said, gives the iranians no incentive to concede. perhaps the only offsetting basis for optimism i could cling to is that anyone who is even halfway briefed on this issue will know that there is a clear

basis for an agreement along the lines that i just briefly outlined and with some flexibility on sanctions an agreement can be achieved. we shouldn't be surprised that this issue as we move through 2013 staggers on in many pretty much the form finish -- in pretty much the form that we see it today. don't be deceived by talk about zones of immunity and implied deedlines and so -- deadlines and so on. despite the bursts of talk that suggest urgency, you know, this talk isn't all that new. it really hasn't changed form for the last several years, certainly since mr. netanyahu has been prime minister in israel. bear in mind that those agitating most loudly on this issue have other reasons to agitate including distracting attention from other problems, particularly the problem that scott discussed, and if anything, that's a reason for them to continue agitating about

this issue rather than to actually resolve it. although both presidential candidates have boxed themselves in with statements about the unacceptability of an iranian nuclear weapon, there are bases for anticipating some differences with regard to how our own election is going to come out. the main one is that for mr. obama if he wins, he would be a second-term president, never running for office again with some more basis because of that for, perhaps, taking some political risks in the interest of introducing the flexibility that would be necessary to reach an agreement. whereas mr. romney would be running for re-election from day one, and and on anything involving israel and the concerns of prime minister netanyahu, a president romney would have to wonder what sheldon edelson would say the next time he happens to see him. now, iran may not force any u.s.

president over the next four years even to come to terms with the nuclear weapon is unacceptable idea because, as i say, they haven't made a decision even to make one, and they could just stick with their declared intent not to make one. so we may never see the true presidential bottom lines on this issue on our side. but one final observation on this. the fact that military force would be, certainly in my view, a counterproductive folly should be clear enough that a second-term obama administration would do just about anything they could to avoid it. for mr. romney the issue, of course, has been so far -- how shall i put it -- an epic phenomenon of the need to show no daytime between him and the israeli leadership and what his own personal bottom line would turn out to be on the iranian nuclear issue itself if he were in office is anyone's guess.

but his election clearly would mean the return to policy making positions of some of those who, indeed, do not believe that war with iran would be a counterproductive folly. so that's a huge fudge factor. now, some briefer observations about syria, and here the segway is that in many people's eyes some of what's most important in terms of what's going on in syria is the iranian connection, the idea that the assad scream has been the biggest ally or the only ally of tehran in the arab world and so there's been this hope that's built up that if we can get regime change there, this would be a big blow to iran. actually, the chief considerations in syria and the problems it will present for the new u.s. administration are not so much about the iranian connection, but about other considerations, ones going on inside syria. two major factors, i think, shape this issue as we think about it in the year ahead. one is there will be continued pressure to do something, to do

more. one only has to read "the washington post" editorial page where there's something about this about every other day can, and this in turn is driven by two things. one, the humanitarian concern about the bloodshed, very understandable. and secondly, a desire to give assad a push to get rid of this regime partly because of the iran alliance consideration and just because of general, you know, anti-dictatorial sentiments and the hope that we'll have something like a democracy that could emerge in syria. the other major factor is that there is, in fact, very little, if anything, the u.s. could do right now that would shorten rather than intensify the war. and that would not run the risk of becoming some sort of slippery slope toward a much deeper u.s. involvement than most americans, the overwhelming majority of americans would want. the main problems that underlie the latter factor are not about

to go away. the chief one is the prospect of the pro-assad forces hanging on for a long time, however desperate their situation sometimes seems to get from day-to-day as we read about the opposition doing this or doing that. and i'd say the main factor behind that and something that makes syria different from libya, for example, is the sectarian dimension which we didn't have in libya, and the fact that you've got the whole alawite community which sees itself linked, for better or worse, with this regime and fears -- with good reason -- you know, what their fate and what their future would be if largely-sunni opposition takes control. there are also big questions and problems on the opposition side in terms of the disunity, in terms of the radical influence and not having anything close to something we could point to that gives us confidence that there

would be someone or something that could establish stability and order if the regime were to crumble next week. getting into some of the issues that nat touched on, and there was a david sanger article in "the new york times"es just a few days ago that appropriately got a lot of attention, and that has to do with the arms supplies from the saudis and qataris to some of the syrian opposition. and the concern was education pressed, understandable concern, that these arms seem to be going into radical hands of militant jihadists. all this kind of replayed in my mind what was going on in afghanistan more than 20 years ago where we were trying to support -- we and the saudis -- were trying to support the fight against the soviets, and we had to work with the opposition militias that were in place. the most effective fighters among whom were hard-line jihadists. people who then later, you know,

came to be considered an enemy of ours. and that's, basically, the kind of situation we've got in syria, and it should not surprise us that not only can we not fine tune who gets the weapons and have them go only to people who share our values, but also that the more extreme militants are the ones who tend to be the best fighters in an extreme, brutal civil war. that's the way it was in afghanistan, that's the way it seems to be in syria. now, despite the efforts of candidates, of course, to show that they're somehow different, you know, i look at what the current administration's saying and doing and what governor romney is saying, and i don't see much difference in the basic positions. um, the only basis one can have to infer a difference is, again, the prospect that you'll have a

neoconservative entree into a romney administration which requires us to take an all bets are off approach with regard to any new initiatives that involve military force. some of what may shape or even force new decisions on whoever is the new president would involve how the syrian civil war affects or is engaging other states in the region. now, i say that even though i don't subscribe to the frequent thing you hear about civil wars spreading across boundaries as if they're molasses that kind of oozes across the map. that usually doesn't happen. however, we've got some important players, the most important one being turkey. because it's a nato ally, because the turks understandably have to defend their borders and look what's happened to them lately. mortar and artillery shells that have killed their citizens across the border. they have to do something about that.

and insofar as they want to make good on their opposition to support for the or assad regime, they also have to do things like force down airliners in their air space that are shipping material to syria. and so there might be things that happen to the turks that force their hand which, because they are an important ally of ours, forces the hand of the u.s. president in some way. there's also the obvious potential for things being stirred up in lebanon because of the special relationship and the geographical facts between syria and lebanon, but that can go into so many directions, i'm not going to try to game it out here. then you have what nat was talking about, the concerns of the gulf arabs and especially the saudis about the fate of their sunni brethren in syria. and i think this is something that the united states will have to deal with, and for this reason i would say that the handling by the new administration of the syrian problem will be at least as much a function of u.s. relations

with the gulf arabs and especially the saudis. in sum, except for the optimistic note that i struck earlier that there is negotiating space to be explored and exploited on this iranian nuclear issue that's got so much attention, i really don't see many apparent opportunities for productive departures and advances in either of these areas by whoever is president come january. thank you. [applause] ..

i had an idea come to me as i was listening to all the speakers. it starts with an antedote going to an official at the state department in the late 1990s when i was writing a book and interviewing him and actually quoted him in the book, and although i didn't name him, and i can't remember the name at the moment, i'd have to go to my files, but he said to me, and i quote, "we do not make our policy towards iran based on our national interests."

"we make our policy towards iran based on our domestic politics." so paul served in government, had to think about our national interests all the time. thinks there's an opportunity for a diplomatic resolution of this issue. scott has talked about importance of the lobby and although it may be cracking, and there are consequences, which i think everybody can talk about so i think my question is to everyone. what can the next administration

do to change that? i remember being a graduate student, and here's another antedote, and sitting listening to ronald reagan's 1982 address to the nation from the oval office about what was occurring in lebanon where israel had intervened, and we had either just deployed marines or just about to deploy marines. would it make a difference for a president to do that today, to talk about the way in which our failures in our israeli affairs is led to anti-americanism in the region, and even how popular government emerging from the

arab awakening will reflect that attitude towards american foreign policy when they make their foreign policy, and how there is an opportunity for a diplomatic resolution, and i think probably many people in the american audience would not know the difference between iran you conversion and end richment, the design of a warhead, how long it takes to deliver it accurately, and how long all that takes. that's the question for anyone who wants to take it. can an american president educate the american people quickly enough to bring about a domestic constituency that supports a different kind of foreign policy in the region? >> i'll take first stab. admittedly, it's very difficult to translate some of the things

we may discuss in this room to this sophisticated audience to another, there's no question about it, but i think even on some of these issues with the appropriate simplification, and i don't mean over simplification , but dumbing down, some things can be done. on the iranian nuclear issue, tom, you're right. 20% enriched uranium, what's that mean to someone in peoria? not to pick on peoria. emphasize the theme again and again, putting sanctions on again, ratcheted them up again and again. they have a purpose. the purpose of sanctions is to induce concessions by iran on this nuclear issue. repeat that again and again, and

using sanctions that way means we have to be willing to lift them or reduce themñhr if, inde, we get those concessions. pretty simple message, i think, that even, you know, john q. public can understand. it's got to be repeated a number of times. take another example, issues that scot talk -- scott talked about. challenging the lobby. let me offer a slogan to the white house political directer. america first. shouldn't we put america's interest first before any other country? any other country. america first. keep repeating that and applying it to the problems that scott talked about. i think that would have some effect. >> well is there still a window for a two state solution? what do you think the president would do? >> i think the window for a --

some sort of day taunt with iran is open in a two-state solution in that mostly the domestic opposition would be easier to overcome and -- i -- i mean, the example that comes to mind is nixon going to china which is considered hugely weird and he could have never campaigned on it, and the chinese were killing american soldiers in vietnam by transferring weapons and had a regime that was considered a crazy state and ready to lose nuclear weapons because they would come out with several hundred people and the the west would not and yet they also had a government that was, you know, very business, in terms of being

able to apply to kissinger and nixon's outrage. i think that situation may exist with iran, and i think that would change a lot in the region if you get off the united states with this kind of mind set that all muslim states, except the most docile ones are adversary. in an opposite way, the israelis say that i think the route to a palestinian state may go through teheran, but not after wiping them out, but after kinding some commonground with them. >> the only thing i'd sort of -- this on? whatever, i can speak loud. the only question i raise with

paul on how easy it would be or potentially easy to negotiate is i can't figure out what earthly purpose iran gets or value it gets out of a peaceful nuclear enrichment program. there's nuclear power plant of the share that could be fueled for $60 million a year with nuclear fuel. what is it costing them if this is purely a peaceful program? that's what baffles me. >> that's interesting. i was in the emirates, and that question came up why the uae with all its oil is producing nuclear energy. >> they contracted dubai for all the fuel they need for their nuclear plants for the equivalent of $60 million. they'll have more nuclear plants. they will be riched up by

countries, fab by kateed by korea, and shipped in. they don't want to do the enrichment. it's a separate question. >> there's no question there's an iranian interest in nuclear weapons. they did design work tbht past. >> but it's a peaceful program. >> those are two different things to say there's an interest and potential future decisions with regard to weapons and weaponnization versus no peaceful purpose. >> why would you have $60 million in losses to protect a $60 million a year program? >> a former pakistani prime minister talked about eating grass to satisfy his prestige fuel ambition. the nuclear program as a whole looking at iranians' attitudes towards it is there's very, very strong support for the peaceful

program. it would be a major political hazard for any leader to say we're going to give up the program because of pressure. that's just not going to happen >> yeah, i can't believe they back the program unless they believe it's going to provide them the weapons. >> the iranians like other decision makers have not made all national security decisions that cover them the next ten years in advance. this is a decision not yet made, but heavily influenced by what the west and united states in particular does. the decisions can go either way. the iranians can decide to build a nuclear weapon. they would almost certainly decide to do that if subject to a military attack. they have not done that yet, and whether they do it or not depends on things we do. >> i might add in addition to the questions about pride and responding to popular sentiment

and stubbornness would be potentially a fear that a foreign supply of enriched uranium could be cut off, you know, the country that's been subjected to sanctions for a long time, and even in the 1950s, its oil was boycotted, and maybe it's concern they can't count -- >> however, however, however i think in the back of their minds the option of weapons is something that they want to have. >> certainly. >> so -- >> we want them to give up that option? >> the other concern is a more of a general security concern with nuclear concerns to the east, to the west, to the north, to the south, and even the

military presence. that's why i spoke earlier of a grand bargain which gulf states are concerned about. if you negotiate not only about nuclear weapons, but also about what kind of arab israeli agreement are they going to accept and not try to disrupt and what their role should and shouldn't be vis-a-vis the gulf area, you negotiated all those issues, maybe you'd be providing them with more incentive to give up dreams of weapons, but it would have to be constructed in a way that guaranteeded gulf arab states that their security interests are not going to be compromised in the gulf region. we are not going to recognize an iranian role that is dominant role vis-a-vis the gulf arab states. that has to be clear. >> the fall back position, if they don't work and diplomacy

doesn't work is con tapement. we know had to do that. we had 18,000 missiles pointed at the soviet union. we know how to do that. >> well, that's right. if they are a rational regime, and most think they are, 18,000 makes you rational. >> can i say something smit >> yes, i want the panelists to ask each other questions before the audience. go ahead. >> what can be done longer term? i think the point of making the public aware that the reenforcement of sanctions against iran is against the interest of the u.s., and it will not -- it will not weaken the ahmadinejad regime, quite the opposite because what we witness now is a reenforcement, even by people who can want stand the regime how it is now

because they think within iran, iran is attacked so this could be, you know, advertised in a way, you know, and limiting the sanction is not putting out the whole challenge of the weapons in the long term and so on. this is something that can be done. the more we attack iran, the more we reign for ahmadinejad domestically bringing me to the second point which is me, the new administration will have to think out of what i call the paradigm. it doesn't exist anymore. indeed we can address iran. we can address saudi arabia. we can address syria, but what is really needed is a version of the region, a geopolitical balance of the region to be discussed with other partners

including purr key. i think you mentioned turkey, all the gulf states. you can't just be we solved iran, the palestinian issue, and the syria issue. we need a vision, but regional vision because all of these new political actors, they think eternity. we don't have an eternity with the visions. that's what i want to say. >> just one slight comment. ahmadinejad will be gone soon, but strengthening the regime. >> exactly, yeah. >> another comment? >> you invited questions? >> yeah. >> i want to ask scott a question. if obama wins the election, and if he makes the kind of speech that you outline -- a speech that would satisfy your fondest hopes, what would be your fondest hope in terms of the israeli reaction begin that you

said you've -- you're among those who believe that we'd perhaps pass the limbs of the two-state solution or -- but, and i agree with you on this, the overwhelming majority of israelis would not just want to grant the vote to palestinian arabs. what's the hope if that speech were made? >> pretty simply i think the israelis would vote or have a change of government, perhaps headed by one who understands that israel's current course is under great peril and that having a secure recognized across the middle east dynamic respected state recognizes the core ambitions of zionism, and to go back to the clinton parameters and assume -- which will not be easy that you have

palestinian interlockedders. i think you have, but it's not a done deal because of hamas and things like that. my hope is a speech like that changes the political balance within israel making israelis realize we're going off in a bad direction here. >> can i invite questions from the audience? we have a microphone over here. we'd like now to -- for the sake of the tv and the recordings to go to the microphone. yeah, i would like the questions from the microphone so it can be picked up, yes. >> i'm paul gallager with eri news service. i want to raise the question of

controlling the war policy including the drone war policy of the current obama administration which completely ignores the congress and the war powers agent and the constitution leaving aside what romney's might do which is bringing about a kind of 9/11 take two represented by the calamity and in benghazi and the possibility now of a retaliation, a bombing retaliation to that calamity. this has gotten into the election campaign only to the extent that al-qaeda is not defeated by this strategy, but it appears rather the opposite, but the saudis are in the middle of the 9/11 take two support for terrorism, london's in the middle of this. there's a resolution in the congress by representative walter jones of north carolina, a militarily connected representative, to make the

further waging of war by any president without congressional authorization, without going to congress impeachable, a shot across the bow resolution, and i'd like to ask the panel how can this war policy and drone war policy unconstitutional, completely ignoring the congress, producing terrorism, how can this be controlled? >> that's a very important set of res. i'm not a lawyer. i'm not going to pronounce on any specific way on issues of constitutionality, but i think the question very appropriately raises fundmental issues of limits on the use of military force. basically, all of the forceful lethal actions referred to in the question and much more are

still being based on the single resolution that was passed by congress just in the first week or two after 9/11 back in september of 2001. in my, again, non-legal professional view, that's a thin read on which to base continued justification for use of lethal force outside our borders. that resolution made reference to al-qaeda and to the perpetrators of 9/11. well, one of the bad things about this is the term "al-qaeda" has come certainly over the last 11 years to be usedded in such a loose way to refer in general to, you know, sort of the violent minded sunni militants in which the term does not correlate well at all with any organizational reality out there that describes the sort of enemy in which the laws of war

are appropriate and for which a continued use of congressional authorization and military force really can be considered sound so other than, you know, agitating on the issue as your question implies and taking other -- devoting other careful legal attention to this on the hill, i don't have a particular solution, but i acknowledge it's a major and appropriate concern. >> yes, sir. >> i'm lynn weiss, an affiliated scholar at stanford university, and my question has to do with the nuclear issues in the middle east. we've talked about short term resolutions possibly with the iranians with some kind of an

agreement done where the iranians give up some measure much their nuclear program in relief of sanctions, but i want to ask the panel about a longer term issue. is it poll to have long term nuclear stability in the middle east as long as there's a monopoly nuclear power. can we actually get something done in the area without talking about israeli nuclear weapons and what their role is in terms of israeli policy in the region, and if it is the case that you have to talk about israeli nuclear weapons, shouldn't the united states and the american president in particular be willing to talk about them even though the israelis don't want them to? >> i do agree that it's not a stable situation or perceived as

stable for israel to have the only nuclear arsenal in the middle east. it would be -- i can't imagine the psychology in which you say to a million muslims, israel can have weapons, but you can't. it just doesn't make sense. as we mentioned before, i used to read and write for a commentary magazine, and in 1974, robert w. tucker, an extremely imminent and hawkish political scientist, wrote an essay in which he said that nuclear proliferation in the middle east would probably lead to a more likely stability and peace between israel and its neighbors than the current situation, and that article's still available in the commentary website, and i think it is very provocative and informative and valid.

>> the only comment i'd add to that is on the issue of whether to speak openly about the israeli nuclear program. there are very thoughtful informed people who believe it would be in israel's own interest to the open and not to pretend this arsenal doesn't exist. the foremost historian of the israeli nuclear program had an article a few years back that argued that argued what i just said. >> you could argue with no other nuclear power in the region, israel's nuclear power has given it tremendous amount of flex the -- flexibility and the force without thinking about the consequences and that there's another scientist that just wrote in "foreign affairs" that

if iran obtainedded nuclear weapons, he would have stability in the system because, you know, the concept of deterrence would pertain. it's a controversial argument, but sometime general concept. yes? >> hi, edward wayne, congressional research service. the question i have, i guess, is for dr. pillar, but i welcome comments from anyone. specifically regards to syria. my question is in the long term, say a year or two, the countries surrounding syria, countries involved in the conflict -- i read your blog post on the afghanistan analogy, and so i was wondering what you would recommend begin the theme of this panel, what you recommend in the future as far as how the u.s. should be interacting with

those countries to prevent another afghanistan scenario and also the possibility -- i mean, hopefully we won't be intervening soon directly; however, what i'm curious about is if that intervention does not happen, what would be the ideal scenario begin the other actors in the region and how they influence events on the ground? >> well, sad reality is this is one of those situations where there is no ideal scenario or even a good scenario. that's what i was eluding to when i opened comments by saying there's some situations where there's no good solution. i commend, by the way, some of you may have read it, a piece by my friend and colleague in the section of the post this past weekend basically making the point, you know, the world, and especially the middle east is an awfully messy place in many ways in which the united states can

be expected, no u.s. president can be expected to solve and resolve everything. the bloodshed in syria, you know, makes all of us shudder. that doesn't mean there's some u.s. policy option that will bring it to app end or even reduce it, and most of the options i see in terms of trying to do more, if anything, would exacerbate it. you know, the only other thing i can say as your question implies, it's not just the u.s., but the other players in the region, and as was mentioned with regard to the iranian issue, same thing applies with syria. you know, we will, and we should continue to work very closely with the syria ally, with the jordanians and turkey, they have a hundred thousand refugees in

their country at least. we can't do it ourselves, and i wish i had an ideal scenario, but there just suspect one. >> can i ask you because you were talking about it. how did the saudis and qataris and others view the possibility of militant extremists coming to the floor in syria when they have to fight mill at that particular time -- militant extremists at home and do a good job of it, but what if the money in the arms go to the people in a disproportioned way? the beginning of the article says the majority of the weapons are going to militant extremists, but if you read deeper into the article it says intelligence communities have having a difficult time determining who the rebel

leaders and factions are. if we don't know who they are, how do we know the majority is going to militant extremists? but if they are -- >> well, the problem is the militant extremists come to the floor the more the rebel opposition in general feels abandoned by the west because of a failure to get the weapons they were promised. that opens the stakes. in a way, it's one of the problems that's got worse with time if you're doing nothing or blocking effective weapons, and that's why it's sort of a conundrum if you're thinking a next president takes office january 20th, what's happening

in between ti? over all, you got the problem of, again, unpaletteble choices. the lesser of twos. in my book, to the extent that the soviet union fa had somethinto do with afghanistan,hen even all the weapons in to jihadists i afghanistan was better. it's better that theu.s. and soviet unionre notstl threatening to demosh the earth compad to the oher fallouts. we've had tough decisions like this in the past. the second major recipient of u.s. arms during world warii was stalin's soviet union.

we may not have won without that. that leaves bad consequences. those are the choices. you know, eyes wide open. >> former member of the parliament detained during the uprising. my question was for mr. stock -- in fact give bright images about the situation in the gulf and relation with u.s. government. i'm looking to hear about the challenges from you, and, in fact, i think the safest bet for stability and the interest of the americans and the citizens in the gulf, the safest bet for reform is by support and encourage by the americans.

what do you think is feasible for the next administration to play a positive and proactive role in stead of the passive role we saw in the past? there is silent about the human rights in the region. there is a silence about all calls for reform. there is a silence about the sectarian impact and the policies in iraq and syria, so what's feasible in the next administration? thanks. >> that question is for whom? >> [inaudible] >> it's far from my field of exper -- expertise, but i'm inclined to think that united states can't do a lot about the internal politics of the gulf states or other arab states that it's

beyond our knowledge, history, and experience. i think we can be an example. i think we can say -- we can speak out. i think we can encourage students to come here and study. i think we can be a good trading partner, but i don't see -- i just don't see the american policies saying this is how you deal with your sectarian issues and the public life and it's just beyond us i think. >> well, there's actually a related question here from someone watching the live streaming which is should the next administration put more emphasis on human rights violations by the islamic

republic of iran in order to promote their -- expose and promote their crisis of identity. >> i want to say something on that because i believe a discount on values doesn't work. we went through that already. it would be bad to give the u.s. a chance to teach something to the countries, but there is, again, you need another approach working with the people in the region. there is no, you know, no tailored or fit situation or solution. you have to look what are the protagonists at stake. you cannot just say i'm going to come and solve the question of human rights or sectarian divide because this doesn't always reflect what are the

relationship of power on the ground, and if the u.s. cannot get that, and i agree, it's not -- we cannot do domestic, you know, cleaning or correction, but, again, we can have a geopolitical region, and that was in your question about, you know, the whole dynamic that is beyond the high note of the question of tunisia and iran plays a role in that too. this is something we can do, but it doesn't mean the u.s. and all the questions -- it's hard to get out of the menialty that the u.s. has to do something. there is much more thought to be in a regional grounded, and sounds like it didn't mean anything, but you give example where this can happen. it did happen for the u.s. in parts of the world and for other political partners too, and so i think it's about time to think that u.s. can want solve

everything. i know, i mean, but does it mean that the u.s. has a diminished role? i don't think so. it's another approach on what is the leadership. i'm not buying the whole decline of the u.s.. i think there's lots of things very positive going on, but it cannot be the sole actor in some very complicated issue, and we are not paying attention enough to the regional actors and one of the mistaking of pakistan is not the jihad ji, not taking intoing the the -- taking into account the countries because we were killing the cold war frame work. this is something we have to learn from past. >> u.s. interests are multiple. we have a limited number of diplomatic chips to use, and the

more you want to cop sen trait on -- concentrate on one objective, the less you may have on another objective. if we're tied up in knots on the nuclear issue in iran, for example, and we want to get something done on that, the human rights issue, a gene new win issue, one we have to make preferences and principles clear, nonetheless to try to do something about that may not only run into the inherent limitations that was mentioned, but may also work against our attempt to advance other interests or achieve other objectives. >> what the u.s. has done in the case of bahrain is encourage talks between the government and opposition so first of all, it's a nonnato ally, our fleet there, and second, over the past ten

years, is looks like they introduced more reforms than other countries in the neighborhood, and so if we lack the capacity to do more, at least we've asked for negotiations and both parties have to be realistic about what they get out of these negotiations. yes? >> i'm joshua jacobs, analyst of the jamestown foundation. when you talk about the gulf, the problems and challenges that the next administration's going to have to deal with, the biggest question is what kind of leadership is the next administration going to have to deal with, and with the 91-year-old king, a prince who is 86, seems certain whoever is president next will face new leadership in saudi arabia. the question for you is who do you think that might be? do you think it's something that has a significant impact on our

relationship with saudi arabia and the region at large? i guess what i would tack on there is there's been a twitter insider, i'm sure you're probably familiar, releasing a lot of extensively inside information from the inner circles of the royal family concerning rumors people have heard about certain members' health and ambition. i wanted to know what your thoughts were on this. thank you. >> that would be you. >> yeah. i think you tacked a few years op to the king's age. >> and a few on to the crowned prince, about ten on to the crowned prince. >> yeah. we're in a better place now than we were two years ago when you had a -- an income tent crowned

prince in intensive care, but yet he was going to be the next king. that was not good. although opinions vary about the late prince knight, i think by comparison solomon is more open. nevertheless, there is a pressing need, and i don't believe i would be telling anything new to the saudi leadership in this to move to the next generation. we got some teshbly capable people -- terribly capable people in their 50s, and as the guy running the counterterrorism thing huhammed would have been nice, capable, sensible person, and i'd love to

see him elevated to the position of greater responsibility in the not too distant future. as a policy matter, you have to wait until that happens. there's nothing we can do. if there's some changes, then the next president, next secretary of state has to be apprised of what they are, but there's not any particular policy choices we can make about how the family regulates its affairs in succession. >> i'm a physician from bahrain also. i want to ask a question about the credibility of the u.s. values. i know the complexity of the geopolitics of the region,

understand how all this impact the policy in the gulf, but as experts and as intellectuals, what would be your advice for the u.s. administration for the long term interests of the u.s., and don't you think that what's happened in the last couple of years, the arab spring and what happened in bahrain and eastern saudi arabia, does it -- i mean, does it raise a question about the stability of the gulf region and how the east monarchies survive in the long term and how the people in this region were to see the united states, the united states, especially if they see the united states on the side of their repressive regimes? i come from bahrain, and i know bahrain looks up to the united states as a model that they are

seeking. they are looking for support, especially that they think the united states have obligations towards them because of the navy presence and the fleet, but the frustration is growing, and the disappointment is growing, and baa rain, we have a majority that are not represented, a majority that's repressedded and ruled by a minority, and that has -- that deflects not only the shias in bahrain. they are not alone. they are in eastern saudi arabia, kuwait, and this image is not just in bahrain, but will be in every place of the region. don't you think it's not only a moral obligation to stand for the cause of the democracy and right, but also in the interest of the united states? i would like to know what would be your advice of how the united states should react to these

people's demands. thanks. >> i would like to respond to that because it's a very important question that shows exactly the vision from all this civil society, we are not paying attention to. all the changes that happen in the last two years were not made by the actors that we are just seeing on this part of the table. the society -- we are not as power paying enough attention to the different elements. the change can come from the change of power within different countries, and as long as we are not ready to change and include elements of civil society in the vision of our strategy in this part of the world, we're going to need the opportunity to have

elements of talking differently to people, and, again, it's very interesting to see the whole issue of dealing with this leader and this. if there's one lesson learned in two years, the changes don't come from the professional politicians, but they will come because it is globalization. they will come from movement within society, and, again it's about how we interagent in -- interact in the reink, yes. >> now, i agree with that. i don't want to say much more. i think it's in america's interest not to get too involved, but clearly, we are

involved, and i think it's pretty obvious that in two generations the gulf regimes won't be monarchies. i think probably we can agree on that. i don't think they're eternal. maybe one generation, maybe ten years. >> actually, i disagree a bit with scott on that point. jack goldstone at george mason has a thesis on this. even if they are monarchy in effect bake assads in syria, they don't have the historical legitimacy that royal families have in the gulf and jordan, and so those that don't call themselves monarchies are more fragile where the monarchies have more potential and what was done in monarchies --

morocco is an example in making the sort of concessions, seeding the political power to popular forces while still being on the thrown, -- throne, and the biggest change was to seat an awful lot of power to basically a government representing an elected assembly, but he's still sitting more or less happily in his seat as the king. >> well, you know, the united states has stray -- strategic interests, ideological interests. sometimes it's extremely difficult to per sue them both at the same time. the ideological interest in the long term is to favor more participation in government, but how much interest can you jeopardize in the short term? >> you always -- sorry. >> that's the dilemma.

>> we have a make a distinction between what we stand for clear versus walking in and messing up. i'm a strong believer of the principle first do no harm. despite noble objectives in places, we wound up doing harm, but that doesn't mean we have to retreat at all from making it clear what principles we believe in, and overall, that the arab spring and arab awakening, in my view, is a good thing from the stand point of american interests and american principles. >> two other brief comments. joselyn, you might be interested in this one. i met a saudi woman, and she said i hope we don't get one man, one vote here. if we do, i'm going to lose all the gapes that women have made

under this king. actually, this king reforms gradually while he has a population that's more conservative than he is so he walks a tight rope in a way. lawyers are told never to ask questions that they don't already know the answer to, but let me ask you -- i'm not a lawyer, so let me ask you a question. in the negotiations between the government and the opposition, is it true that the opposition asked for the legislature to sl the power to name the cabinet? >> that's -- >> is that a reasonable negotiating point? you know, here, the legislature in the united states does not name the cabinet. the cabinet's named by the legislative branch. the legislature -- >> actually, i think this is a

detail, i will answer if you will allow. this is a detail. what's happening now in bahrain, there's no talks, no dialogue, no incentive to engage with the opposition, and there's no pressure on regime to engage in a dialogue with the opposition. opposition declared very clearly they are ready for dialogue and ready to sit and discuss issues and draw a road map. they don't want democracy to, like, happen overnight, but they are ready to discuss steps in how to get there, but actually there's not incentive, and, actually, if we will be in the place of this regime, why would they do so? they all the support from the allies, okay, they don't have any, like, kind of pressure. people are up armed, even though they are a majority, they don't care. we have -- i mean, human right

defenders, political leaders, physicians in jail journalists, lawyers, all kinds of life, all professions tortured, intimidated because they spoke out and said we need more rights. we have a prime minister that's on the seat for 43 years. there's been no other prime minister since the state was established in bahrain. is this something then to be proud of? we're not asking for a full blown democracy tomorrow. we're just asking for a fair representation for an elected government and even this can be negotiateble, but at least to sit and talk. this is not happening. it's not only this. the repressive -- i mean, the repressive issues of say the security first is going on, and people are killed and locked up

day after day. this is the reality, and this is what's happening. >> can i say something? >> yeah. >> i think what you are pointing at is exactly this low key that may not be in the top of the news, but of other relationships that the u.s. can have with not only the states and state actors and one, but different elements of civil society. how does it work? it works not telling people what they have to do, but to put some kind of also challenge of accountability of this countries, and what do they do? if they talk the talk, how do they walk the walk? the point is not that the u.s. says this is the right interlock for you or not.

sometimes it ended up being this kind of selection. it's we bling everybody to the -- bring everybody to the table. this is something we never really tried. exception again was the case from 2004 to 2008. >> i just want to make sure that -- do you have a question? are you standing? >> i have a comment. >> because we have five minutes so i want to get that question. >> saying that the united states doesn't want to engage. actually, it is perceived by people as not doing anything, but perceived as doing a favor to the regime or being decided of the regime. choosing not to do anything or being neutral is actually doing positively support to the regime. this is the perception of the people. >> yeah.

>> excuse me english. i just came here. i just have one question. have there been any successful sanctions in the history? has there been any change in regime? i mean, why do the united states usually focus on sanctions? i'm from iraq and tested 13 years of sanctions, and i think they did em four the regime and made us poor, made us, you know, really, really weak. we couldn't fight the regime because we were trying to survive, and that happened in cuba. that happened in iran in the 1980s, and you are doing it again in iran. is there any reason for that? >> one has to be absolutely clear. first of all what the purpose of sanctions are, squeezing the regime to try to topple it is

one possible purpose. getting the regime -- inducing the regime to make concessions or change a policy is an entire different purpose. part of the problem with the iranian sanctions is we have people who believe each of those things are objectives and they work against each other. if you go off the sanctions were going to squeeze the regime to the point that it would fall, that means keep them in, be flexible, don't concede anything. if you use them as leverage to get change in iranian policy in the nuclear matter, that's different and argues for flexibility. i'm aware of no instance in which sanctions could be credited with toppling a regime. if you use them it get policy changed, a clear successful example is libya under gadhafi. they worked that way, and we should remember the change that gadhafi made, a drastic change in policy, where he gave up the

unconventional weapons program, gave up the terrorist programs in association, and that was after he gave up the, you know, coughed up the pan-am 103 suspects and the lifting of sanctions was a big part of that. he was under united states sanctions for a number of years, broad sanctions shorpt of an oil embargo so there was not sanctions fatigue on the part of the countries they imposed them on of the it was a successful example that worked because it was coupled with the offer and the negotiations to have a new relationship to lift the sanctions. unfortunately, a few years later, we want to get rid of him anyway when the opportunity came up, and that dodges our credibility. that's the only way in which they do work and have worked is to induce -- to help indeuce

change in policy with regime coupled with negotiation and the carrots as well as the sticks. >> say in iraq when you impose sanctions on 13 million iraqis, they starve. does that make iranians friends of the united states? >> i think you very appropriately make the point there's a downside with regard how populations react to this. perhaps you can comment specifically on the iranian case, but that is a hazard to be taken into account. >> just on the iranian case, absolutely right. the regime may not be strong, especially in certain areas, but the captions are used by the current president as a way to reenforce cohesion among all

iranians even o -- opponents to face the threat from outside. instead of weakening ahmadinejad or either regime, what we are witnessing is the sort of persistence of the regime because people are not going to protest or undermind the power. at this moment, they see iran as a community under attack, and so it's helping him. he uses, and we know that. we could elaborate more. the sanctions as a tool for controlling domestically the country. >> thank you. you know, this has a domestic tool in a way here. if you're not sure what dip