[inaudible conversations] >> see all of this event in our video library at c-span.org. while c-span brings live

coverage from around the country of debates between now and election day, november 6th, later today, can adapts vying to become virginia's next senators. watch the debate live at 7 p.m. eastern on c-span. an hour later, wisconsin senate debate where former republican governor is up against tammy baldwin live at 8 on c-span. later, the candidates hoping to represent arizona's 9th district in the u.s. house, democrat kirsten and steven later here on c-span2. >> what is the dinner, and how did it come about? >> so the al smith dinner is the

most famous that presidential candidates show up every four years, and they show up, democrats and republicans -- i mean, it's really a memorial dinner for smith, and i think it's the thing that if anyone heard al smith's name at this point in time, that that's where you heard about al smith unless you hang around these hallowed halls. it's his lasting legacy, the place where the name gets out. it's held every year, not just every four years. prominent figures come in, it's a memorial dinner, a catholic charity dinner. people get together to assess the legacy of al smith and presidential candidates always especially to crack jokes about each other. >> in fact, they show up together most times, show up both the democrat and republican nominees show up together. we want to show you some of the past al smith's dinners.

>> might i ask if senior clark comes up here because either the president of the united states or i am without a seat. [laughter] i have no intention of standing. [laughter] >> i must say i have traveled to banquet circuits for years. i never understood the logistics of dinners like this and how the absence of one individual could cause three of us not to have seats. [laughter] >> vice president, i'm glad to see you here tonight. you said you want to give america back to the little guy. [laughter] mr. president, i am that man. [laughter] >> as i looked out at the ties this evening, i realize i have not seen so many people so well-dressed since i went to a come-as-you-are party.

>> a lot of good news from yugoslavia, there's one less name for me to remember. [laughter] [applause] >> you know what this world really needs? it really needs more world leaders named al smith. [laughter] >> it is an honor to share the dias with a descendent of al smith. your great grandfather was my favorite kind of governor. [laughter] the kind who ran for president and lost. [laughter] >> all of that al smith program at c-span.org/thecontenders, and tonight's dinner starting at 9 p.m. eastern live on c-span. next, a former cia chief analyst joins a group of foreign policy

experts to look at the challenges facing the next administration including how to deal with iran's nuclear program, prospects for an israeli-palestinian agreement, and clashes in syria. the policy council hosts this two and a half hour event. >> now, before we go to the distinguished panel, i'd like to make a few introductions to set the stage, and them the panel will speak, and then we'll have questions. this is about policy choices facing the next administration, whoever's going to be leading it he is going to have some divisions to make. on israeli-palestinian questions, will the next administration resume the peace process in order to seek resolution of this conflict through establishment of the two-state solution?

will he be willing to extend political capital on this? is it a national security interest of the united states to solve this and to get a two-state solution to this? various members of this current administration have said so, and if that's true, it would be good to succeed. there are others who are not so sure that it's achievable or that political capital is worth spending on it. that's an important question, important decision for the next administration if the next president wants to do this. he's going to have to build a constituency to overcome opposition. on the question of the iran, syria, hezbollah actors, the administration will have decisions to make about sanctions, about diplomacy, about war. if the iranian regime comes to

the table with serious intent for any reason, either because the sanctions are biting so hard or because they are worried about threats of military strikes or for any other reason, my question, as app individual -- as an individual, is will the american government take "yes" for an answer, or will the american government have conditions that cannot be met by the other side? will the administration even consider what was previously called the grand bargain which would attempt to resolve outstanding issues between the united states and iran including what should iran's role be in the region and what kind of attitude take towards the conflict and any potential peace agreement, or would the next administration actually engage in military strikes against iran? i would just note there's three studies out very recently. you might want to think about

one by the iran project which is -- has a title of "weighing the costs and benefits of military strikes," and tom pickerring was associated with the report, and as the title suggests, it weighs the costs and benefits. it's fairly comprehensive. one issue it doesn't touch on is covered in another report published by the university of utah going into depth about the casualties that result from military strikes, the deaths and the injuries. finally, there's a report by the bipartisan policy council group which goes into the costs of allowing iran to get a nuclear weapon and the economics, particularly the economic costs they think fall from allowing iran to get a nuclear weapon. it's a big issue for everyone to be considering, especially the next president. when it comes to syria, such a

difficult case in the arab awakening, and one question that is current is if we were to give them heavier weapons, would we promote the down fall of the assad regime and promote the rise of a rebel opposition that would be friendly to the united states, or would they fall into the wrong hands and result in militias with weapons that could do to any western power, to the united states, what was just done to our ambassador in libya? are there really prospects for democratic pluralistic regimes coming to power after assad, and do we have a role in a post-assad transition, or would we put our people in harm's way by trying to do that? when it comes to other cases in

the arab spring, you might want to correct me, but looks like we have a president from a muslim brotherhood establishing a strong executive authority, and there are questions about whether we should be giving them foreign aid, and that's a question they have to wrestle with. in bahrain, for example, we're dealing with a non-nato ally with a record of progressive reform, still attempts to make reform, but has opposition with significant support especially from international human rights organization. how much reform do we ask the regime to engage in, or how much might we be playing into the hands of antidemocratic forces in bahrain? finally, when we come to the gulf, and i can testify to this

from many trips to the gulf, we need to decide what kind of relationships we're going to have with the members of the self-cooperation council, who has security issues to contend with, know very well that american defense industries can provide them with outstanding equipment, but, at the same time, they have questions about the extempt of our security commitments to them, particularly given the way the administration rather quickly called for the mubarak government to step down. they want business ties with the united states, but they see business opportunities elsewhere they are very disstressedded -- distressed by our arab-israeli policies, i hear it all the time. now they are distressed with our

policies with iran and syria thinking we should do more with syria, and worried about everything we might do with iran especially with diplomacy and what we do to provide them with advantages, and they are also concerned about our islamic-phobia and wondering what relationships they can have with us when that thing is occurring here. those are my ideas. i now want to say something about the panel and turn it over to them. on the back of your invitation, you have very extensessive bios of the distinguished speakers. i won't repeat everything that's here, but our first speaker who i'd like to be introduced is scott mcconnel, founding editor of the american conservative to provide a voice

to the neoconservative movement, and he identifies himself as an ex-neoconservative and has written for magazines like "commentary," and he's the former columnist and editorial writer for "the new york post," has a doctorate from american university, and he's written for our journal, and his articles in our journal have been some of the most popular we've ever published. then jocelyne cesari, at advanced national studies directs the initialtive, the director of the international research program called islam in the west at harvard university. she splits her time between

them. she's a political scientist from the french national center of scientific research, wrote several books on islam, globalization, democracyization, and secularism. our third speaker is nathan kern, a friend of the middle east council, provides incisive reports about middle eastern political and economic issues, particularly oil, particularly in the gulf. you can find some of his reports on our website. almost weekly? >> monthly. >> monthly. and i believe was the first foreign student to attend a university in saudi arabia, the university of ria, in the middle of his princeton undergraduate career, spent a year there. the fourth speaker is paul

pillar who spent 28 years in the intelligence community and had many high ranking positions in it including executive directer for the cia, and his final position was national intelligence officer for the middle east and south asia where he provided analytical support, and he was a visiting fellow at brookings if the year 2000 and a reserve officer in the u.s. army and also has been publishing extremely important literature in the last few years since retiring from the government. we have a good panel. i'll step out of the way now, and, again, thank you for coming. when we do finish this, there will be a question and answer session.

thank you. watch the wires. >> i will. >> good morning. what are the prospects of a new president settling peace between israelis and palestinians? i believe, unfortunately, they are not very good, but by a fair settlement, i mean a two-state solution. a palestinian state compromising gaza and the west bank with minor negotiated land swaps, with control of its borders, its water resources, its air space, something similar to the clinton parameters of 2000. i believe this outcome, more than any other al terntive

satisfies the core needs for security and self-determination of both israelis and palestinians. as you know, every american president since johnson tried to stop israel from building settlements on the west bank because they understood that threatened to fore close the possibility of a two-state solution. some presidents pushed hard, some not very hard. at camp david, jimmy carter believed he received assurances that settlement building would stop and that a process leading to palestinian self-determination and atonmy on the west bank would commence, but settlement building did not stop, and both carter and the egyptians, for different reasons, did not make much of a fuss. reagan called for a settlement freeze without making an issue of it. george hw bush made a big issue of it and paid a steep political prize, which may have caused him re-election. bill clinton wanted very much a

viable palestinian state, and he found settlement building continued whether israel was headed by labor and accelerated throughout the 1990s. barack obama made a settlement freeze jumping off point for his peace efforts and smacked down decisively from benjamin netanyahu and the israel lobby. the reason for these failures is over. israel, no matter what coalition was in charge, wanted to build settlements on the west bank more than the united states was committed to stopping them. the israel lobby, which i would describe as a loose coalition of groups and individuals who are committed to ensuring american backing for israel, no matter what israel does, was able to generate enough political pressure to thwart serious american diplomacy to stop settlement building. new--

nevertheless, something important is starting to happen. they are exhibiting cracks and weaknesses. i think we are witnessing the beginnings of a historic transformation in which its power will be considerably diminished. first, the democratic party. on the second night of the convention, roughly half the delegates in the hall, perhaps a quarter of the 6,000, voted no to what party leaders assumed was a routine platform resolution amendment stating that jerusalem was israel's undivided capitol. such planks appeared in both party platforms before, and in practice, presidents ignored them. not much in substance was at stake, but at the spirit and emotion, at the root of political change, a great deal happened. i'm sure many of you have seen the video. three votes, three courses of no as unplanned as they were

unexpected. big parties descended on the television booths to play down the episode. allen described the nay sayers as rogue elements, arab-americans, and anti-zionist jews, 1500 of them apparently. what took place i would call nothing less than a collective rosa parks moment. let me quote a reaction from goodman from "commentary" magazine, now a republican publication. this video, she wrote, should show every pro-israel american to the bone. israel relies on support from the united states, its strongest ally. the floor vote at the democratic convention pretends to have a gay when that bipartisan support

will continue to exist. i used to write frequently for "commentary," and i think this is completely correct that the contested vote doesn't proceed a day. how far in the future? i don't know. it was a decade between rosa park's refusal to move to the back of the bus and the emergency of a sufficiently powerful anti-segregation consensus to pass civil rights legislation. for a major political party to be devoted to fairness between israel and palestine takes at least that long, but the reason that allen and "commentary" found this support alarming is that partisanship lets loose a torrent of competitive debate on the morality and utility of america's special relationship with israel. israel's treatment of the palestinians under the occupation would be subject not

only to academic scrutiny as it is now, but to political polemics. something like the openly expressed behavior -- something like the openly expressed skepticism about israel's behavior now ordered on elite university campuses would be widely deseminated. the special relationship survival depends on discourse. they are self-evident, interests congruent to america's, any criticism has to be deemed marginal, weird, motivated by bigotry. those who question are not debated and often smeared. once the seal is broken, i believe, and i think a lot of goodman believes, that the notion it it is some sort of requirement to treat israel as a touchstone of american mideast policy could unravel with stunning speed.

other than signs are pointing in the same direction. boycott divestment in sanctions, resolutioned voted upon in the methodist and presbyterian conventions this summer. the presbyterian resolution fell short by two votes out of more than 600. leaders of main line churches made a formal request to congress to investigate human rights violations to see if israel is violating the terms of use of of the american weapons t receives. protestant churches hesitant on the questions, and they gravitate to warm relationships with mainstream jewish organizations on which they bilt historic alliances on civil rights, vietnam, and church-state relations, and, yet, the churches also have ties to the arab world as educators and missionaries and social

workers and refugee camps and have arab co-religionists seeing themselves as promoters of social justice. historically, the tension was resolved in favor the silence not to upset relations with america's jewish leaders. that period, which has lasted since the founding of israel seems to be now over. thirdly, the very obvious pushback against israel's effort to attack iran or support israeli strike or accept israeli advice on what tables and red lines washington should adopt. this involvedded firm public language. the chairman of the joint chiefs saying we don't want to be come police sit in an israeli attack, and secretary of state, clinton, rejecting israel's red lines, and obama not rearranging a schedule to meet with benjamin netanyahu in new york. obviously, this was not over palestine. it was over an issue with more

immediate and obvious economic and security implications for the united states. it was also the most unmistakable public diplomacy fines of israel's wishes by an american president in a very long time. though i'm assuming the election is now a toss up, the events i refer to are followed by obama's largest lead in the polls this year, and if obama loses, i think we can say with assurance that public disagreement with prime minister benjamin netanyahu had nothing to do with it. i can point to other areas, but you get the idea. discussions of israel and palestine are opening up in historic ways. the congress is a lagging indicator, still rolling out apac sponsored resolutions by the margins everyone is familiar with, but one day, the glass will penetrate up here as well. what relevance does this have for the next president?

unfortunately, i fear not very much. i won't say much about mitt romney. i would love to be wrong, but on the basis of public statements, private statements that are now public, and choice in policy advisers, there's no chance he'll be engaged in starting a genuine peace process. obamaments a palestinian state. he was decisively rebuked in the first year and a half of the administration not persuading israel to have a settlement freeze many less withdrawal from the territory. could next year be different? i fall into the cap of a time of a two-state solution has passed. israel's settlements on the west bank precluded the possibility. there's too many settlers armed and committed to staying there and not clear they could remove them without risking civil war,

and there's mild polling majorities in favor of a two-state solution, there's no significant israeli constituency for giving up sovereignty over east jerusalem and a palestinian state without jerusalem as a capital is a non-starter. there's one state between the mediterranean and jordan river, a state connected by a highly developed infrastructure of roads and water pipelines. i'm not sure when the point of return was passed, seven years ago, my first visit to israel, it was plausible to speak of the palestinian state. now did -- now it does not. a democratic process, appointment of envoys searching for commonground, building on previous agreements like those arrived at under the prime minister don't have chance of success. there's no political majority in israel in favor of withdrawing from the territory and

settlements israel would have to do to allow a genuinely economically viable palestinian state. benjamin netanyahu gave lip service to the idea, but people close to him said he would never offer the palestinians something he could accept. the west bank, areas a and b, cut off from the world without control of the air space, their water will not produce a viable state. what can the next president do to change this? the only intervention that could shake israel out of the current spiral would be if a president made clear where the united states sees this heading. absent a two-state solution, israel is een route to becoming a par tide state. they will not accept palestinians voting or civil rights so we're headed towards a state roughly half palestinian,

half jewish, one group denieded political and civil rights, the other group possessing them. could president obama cite words that previous israeli prime ministers said warning that israel would face the situation in the absence of a two state solution? could obama tell the israelis that regardless of who was president, it will be very difficult for america to maintain a special relationship with an appar tide state in the middle of the middle east, and such an alliance intervene with america's interests and what's the relative question is whether palestinians should have equal voting rights as jews, it will be natural given america's history, it supports voting rights. failure to do so would not make sense to most americans, and in a practical sense, would render

it impossible for the united states to speak credibly in favor of democracy or human rights in the middle east or anywhere else in the world. in other words, the centerpiece of the president's intervention is shifted from the palestinians and their suffering and need for self-determination. i'm pretty sure israelis don't care very much about that. it would be about american values and american interests and where israel fits into them. i'm not sure such a speech, perhaps accompanied by diplomatic measures such as not using america's u.n. veto on israel's behalf or perhaps supporting pro-palestinian measures would change the political calculations in israel. ..

thank you. hope you're wrong. the next speaker will be

joycelyn. >> good morning. i would like to thank the council for gathering this debate. i'd like to focus remarks on the changes needed in the u.s. policy in the country going through what was called the arab we think the revolution of last year i think that we from an american approach see the sign of democracy and after the election we were disappointed by

the victory of islam so we went to disappointment and now we are in the span that recent events led some of the analysts and policymakers through the failure of the arab spurring -- arab spring. to start with democracy of value that is now shared by the majority mostly the majority society. it's a democracy that we experienced in the west and we have to be aware of that and the

element in the foreign policy. in some way the west showed it is a victim of its success and the revolution shows that now the democracy dahlias are not any more. we are not paying attention enough to the fact that democracy is the praise by the members of a muslim majority country with all of the polling is showing that that repeatedly

show in some instances when there are polls some people say that they are more in favor of the democracy than the respondents that you can find any western country. this is helping democracy is still there and i would say the questioning of the skepticism around the new regime so people would disconnect the limits of the regime with hope for democracy, and i think it's important to maintain this positive outlook on what is going on. and we tell them to go very quickly from one statement to another without taking into account the fact the society is in favor of the democracy we knew that the scholars for a long time this didn't come with

the arab spring it was already there in the investigations that are available to everybody. the second point is what kind of democracy we are talking about. and i would like to make a difference between what is a consensus in the principal of the political freedom, freedom of political expansion in opposition. in other words, the fact that the rulers are to be elected that they can change from one election to another is pretty much grounded in most of the majority of this country. does it mean that we are witnessing the sort of secularization of the american sense of this country.

as we have also to disconnect a few elements that we have considered the whole package of democratization and the religion and public space and to be very aware that this is not happening. and in this sense the process is to show is laundryman's a very strong matter of the public space which in the west is always difficult to understand that the beliefs. we have to understand to talk about india in the same way. we are going to have to understand that is mom is not only a country of the leaf.

it's also a question of belonging and being in the national citizen. it is not because i hear every word that islam doesn't develop which is actually looking at the islamic tradition wrong but it is that sense the building of a nation state even though there is the secure elite that we used to work with like mubarak, islam has been embedded. what do i mean by that? it is a constitution, it is also creating connections between the international and being the citizen and these come from islam. what we are witnessing is how the new regime led by es salaam that was already there.

so they were not of the recent regime about how to remove the law that function people that would say something insulting against the prospect of the region. this is already there under the regime. so again, we have to be very careful in how we expect these i would say any more complex picture where instead of looking at islam you look at the challenging secular state. what other situation today that also influences the interaction with the islamists and i think that we have not done that and it requires a very different

outlook on the shared now beyond the west doesn't mean everywhere we are going to witness the american model of democracy probably not. does it mean that we then reject the whole experience? it wouldn't be a wise move. and this brings me to my second point on what this means for the u.n. foreign policy. we are at the time now where we are talking about the promotion of democracy as a very i would say criticize or rejected. and we understand why. because if you look at the popularity of the u.s. in this part of the world and repeated the decline of the positive opinions in the u.s. and there's been lots of assessments for

more democracy. so i'm not going to go there. but at the same time, it doesn't mean that we have to abandon or renounce the promotion of democracy. it means not promoting values, not considering that the west has to teach democracy to the other parts of the world, but to create some kind of partnership and this is because it's been done by the u.s. administration. particularly in the eastern european context. you can see how successful democratization policy worked in the european context by the two elements that may be we can learn from and invest in the majority country. it was establishing a good

communication with the target in the sanctioning marketplace of ideas and i think that this is missing in the way that we are dealing with the muslim majority countries. of course since the arab spring we are aware that communication matters. naturally we are too much aware because now the social media while the social media coming and there been a lot of investments in the current administration to communicate through this channel with different segments of civil society in the world, but what do we communicate? what are we paying attention to? i would say that when we say democracy again, it may not mean the same thing to someone living in the tunis. it doesn't mean what we are

afraid of year which is in position, and again we don't make that fault to clarify this kind of heavy communication with this part of the world. i remember the new transitory regime in libya to cover one of the first declarations in the country and it's very, very worrying from the western i. what does it mean? mabey we can explain ll morrill in detail -- a little more in detail the ten commandments if in the u.s. to fail to the ten

commandments it wouldn't be seen as the backward move towards a religious state. to nisha is a very good example of the move to the principles from the imposition. it takes at face value because there is a lot of relationships of power in the user world. i know this may not sound too realistic and the international relations and we have not paid attention to the aspect of the communication with this part of the world, and so with the situation i would not consider

the movie has something that was talked about on the u.s. foreign policy, but we have to deal with it. and it's an apology that is good, but this is i would say a very reactive approach and we need to be much more proactive in the way that we communicate. if we want to tell the audience is or actors that can promote a vision of the democratization that includes not only free and fair elections but others like the pluralistic approach of society, we have to change also the way that we interact with the multiple set of institutions with this country. we have given too much priority to the leaders and it's true

there is a thought to diversify for using but then eight turns into a very compartmentalized approach with one hand of the administration doing one thing, and a mother and doing something else they do not come into synergy and its for the american point of view in this particular part of the world what comes back is from the society we are doing nothing. again, how do we make this work in a way that is not transparent and is more coordinated in the

population. mubarak and ben ali want the transparency. they want more equal distribution of resources. they may be thinking of another way that instead of doing one thing here and another thing here, create platforms and make a different way that america is with the country need each other to give a concrete example it did happen in the american policy when in sudan you can object at the time of the construction you see the very successful example of the synergy of the multiple administrative and political administration is coming together to help rebuild the

country and also bring in the fall elements but also the civil society movement. and in this sense there is a lot to think of commerce of the plant cannot be to add or increase the aid. it would be more thinking of creating spaces or interfaces the would make this help much more efficient and would therefore change the outlook of the u.s. in this part of the world. focusing only on a state worker is counterproductive because again, the state is seen as the previous speaker explained. but there is a huge resource they are not using enough which in the american society itself. i was very surprised i did lots

of focus groups of american muslims when they are leaving the u.s., and coming from pakistan or iraq the first thing that is difficult is the energy and vibrancy -- vibrancy it is as get in the u.s. foreign policy and the american society. and most of them, all of them are very positive on that and every time they tell the industries we didn't know because we see only the foreign policy aspect, so there is something here in terms of the communication also. so what does it mean? it is not very popular but it may work because also looking at what you're doing in this part of the will of lots of the initiative could be put

together, and especially in libya now or in tunisia. the most resistant actors play on the division had not only of their own politicians but also the division and compartmentalized world of the west in different parts of the world. so again the idf platforms there's something to think of in some cases. to finish up, i would like to say the work is huge because of thinking of how we interact or engage from the very concrete aspects of who does what in the different parts of the world. one, it also means being able to identify locally not only through the internet. the internet is nice, but it is a different approach of what people are doing.

and again, the social media doesn't make resolution. education makes revolution. middle class mix revolution not the social media and for that we need to be more aware of the indicators emerging and who is doing what now in this different civil society, and for that i think it is a better understanding to be able to bring new skills. people in this part of the world and i will finish on that. admiring the u.s. for its capacity of its dictation and a entrepreneurship. of course we can bring entrepreneurs from the middle east to the u.s. and vice versa. it doesn't create the positive

cross pollination. how do we make this work? this would be a very important way to feel more secure as a society because as we know, democracy doesn't fight each other. so, what i am lining up here is some elements are more long-term approach which may be very frustrating especially a type of election, but in the long run, the assets could be used and we could start choosing right now to change interaction in this part of the world. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. my job on this panel is probably a little easier than the jobs others have because it is basically to discuss the policy

choices the next person in the white house could be obama or the governor will face in dealing with saudi arabia and the gulf. the way i like to think of it is a think whatever the outcome of the election there is going to be a new secretary of state i believe, and how what a professional foreign policy official briefed that new secretary before he or she had first substantive meeting with saudi leaders. what would be the issues that we would want to put on the table and say here are the things we have to put on the table, the questions that should be on the agenda. and i think anyone would go back and say it would have the previous interactions between american presidents and the saudi leadership crown prince

and george w. bush in texas in 2005 and the president agreed they would form a strategic dialogue committee one of the reasons for wanting to have a strategic dialogue committee headed by the foreign minister and the secretary of state was clear there were an awful lot of issues coming from all different parts of the government complaining about this type of saudi behavior and there was no overall way to put things in context. the values and cooperation on the peace process and markets and other things into the strategic dialogue did was put everything on the table for once every six months reviewed by the top leadership to manage issue

on the agenda was out against terrorists themselves. terrorist finance had to clamp down on the loose money going wittingly or unwittingly to the terror groups. the desire to join the trade organization peace process and the prices of the saudi plans for expanding capacity. that was in 2005. i think you could say when you look back. you have got a very well admired counter terror operation in saudi arabia where on the image can the public and tracking down

people, identifying tracking them down, prosecuting them, and then often trying to rehabilitate them. i don't know of any american official who thinks that they are severely lacking. they've had a great deal of praise and how they've gone. it took longer for the u.s. and saudi arabia to work together on to her finance. but a year ago the treasury held a sort of september review of where things stood on cooperation in saudi arabia on those two issues, and you had the fellows stuart levy and fred thompson on the current ones and a mud symposium what i was struck with is the unanimity with which all of those officials had been very substantial progress basically these boxes of counterterrorism terror finance had been tipped off and they need continued attention.

but those are no longer issues that you would put on the next secretaries agenda. but they are done. you can kick the box office. the issue which is very contentious and 2005. in 2000 to 2005 you have an average of about 3,000 students sitting in and a united states and of course after 9/11 there wasn't a lot of scrutiny. people were held up, students would often miss a year because the weisel would expire and they would have to go back and wait in line. 60,000 students here. the problem resulting in five-year visa and multiple entries to. and i think it's worked very well. i think the fact that king abdullah has provided scholarships for the 60,000 students is an example of where

he wants to bring the country he once 50,000 people to come back with a good view of american values and i would point out parenthetically among the 60,000 there's a disproportionately high presentation. they identify with you our saudi or shia but as people try to look to figure who is who to double the percentage force shia and saudi arabia scholarships. in 2005 the big question was oil prices and the plans for expanding the capacity. cheney was there, and basically they described this program they

were then wanting to expand production capacity by 2.5 million barrels a day and that's done and we have considerably higher oil prices now than we did in 2005. they have been accelerating. but that is i think largely the result of growing world demand outside of the oecd and unless there is some change in that, we are going to have continued robust pricing. now if your briefing the new secretary, one of the boxes that have been successfully done but what are the new issues that face? and obviously one of them is an issue that is worth discussing because you can take actionable action to get a bit in our country and saudi arabia is the fallout from the arab spring in

egypt and i think that the new saudi arabia held feelings about how quickly mubarak was dumped, but they also played a very crucial role in easing them out. wasn't easy, it was slow but compared to some of the of the changes it wasn't that bad. in april 2011 just as the arab spring was in its full bloom if you will, the finance ministers met in france and formed something called the partnership. their vision was very simple that europe had been through this kind of thing before. after eastern europe's broke away from the pact, you had a

whole bunch of newly independent countries struggling with democracy, but also with economy. how do you go from a controlled communist economy to a free economy and make it work? what eurith had done basically is established the european reconstruction development which was modeled on what the world did to help western europe and japan after world war ii. ..

the qatari finance minister in the turkish finance minister so that donor giving advice side was the g7 plus those three countries and then on the potential recipient side, was egypt, later libya in terms of money and we helped you in planning economic revival. just last month yemen is on the list, tunisia of course and tangentially morocco and jordan have gone through a transition period and will need economic assistance. both saudi arabia and qatar have been quite proactive in extending aid to egypt both before and after mohamed morsi

was elected. and i think it's important to understand what sort of aid. some of the things egypt needed right away was an ability to sell government lawns and treasury bills because it's currently paying 14% interest which is pretty high for a government and in the immediate depth of the summer when things looked terrible the qataris came in and said okay we will buy your one month issue of t-bills. obviously you get pretty good security on repayment and less government defaults on everything but that is how relieved some of the interest pressure and moved egypt out of the debt trap it was then, the worst debt trap since greece, italy or spain.

the second thing the saudis and the qataris have done, they have like the world bank and the islamic development bank, there is quite development banks that helped identify investment projects to make sure they are built without corruption and that they become this. i think it's $4.5 billion that qatar and saudia arabia extended to egypt and that is help is now the imf. lagarde was out there in september and they are working on a loan program, a very easy term low interest-rate forgiveness that would be another $4.5 billion or so for each. if those things are combined in egypt has a fighting chance to get an economy back on its feet. if you have an economy back on its feet that it's easier to talk about division of resources. if the resource base goes down the tube you're in a pretty

desperate situation so again they are starting to talk about doing this with yemen too which is of course the area of the u.s. and saudi arabia cooperate on a lot on counterterrorism, on the gcc initiative to get the transition of power but now really the thing is how to get this desperately poor country running all at once and give it a chance to get back on its feet. we can work together on that. the big issues that you want to brief the next secretary on our of course i ran sanctions and syria. the imposition of the current set of sanctions by the u.s. would not be possible without pre-agreement with saudi arabia last november but if those sanctions led to iran's losing

up to or more than half of its oil, exports, which saudi arabia is willing to step in and make up those exports are, they agree and i think with the caveat that we probably can't make up, the oil can't make up all of iran's exports were there would be some mechanism to totally shut them down because that would take saudi reduction right up and leave it with spare capacity which tends to be a driver for high oil prices. so as the sanctions have come about, we had some bumping us in the oil market particularly in the spring in anticipation but as they have been implemented and i think we have had at least a stabilization of oil prices with lower rates than we expect

and we are going to see whether the these sanctions have an influence on the iranian decision-making. to me the bottom line is you know, is iran really willing to seriously talk about giving up its nuclear weapons program? if they are, i don't see you there is a big problem in resolving it. if they want to prevaricate and have a situation where it's sort of, sort of, sort of talking about their nuclear weapons program, then the sanctions are probably going to remain for some time or at least until some other situation arises. i don't link the next administration is going to have a terribly difficult time with saudi arabia one way or the other. if diplomacy works, diplomatic

relations and fully correct relations with iran. if it produces and into the iranian nuclear weapons program. if not, there are different views about saudi arabia. some feel very supportive of a military strike and others are a little more fearful of it. on syria, we are in a state of limbo where the saudi's and the qataris have been providing more arms to the syrian opposition and i think it's been widely reported that the u.s. has said please hold off in providing the very effective shoulder fired missiles and airplanes and tanks. and we are still sort of in limbo without as some of those were sophisticated weapons.

near the borders of this area but they are not getting to the opposition in syria. that has been a point that i think president romney has been made in favor of working with the qataris to make sure syria gets its weapons for its planes and tanks and as far as i know this is still tied up in the principles committee in terms of what actions we should or should not take in regard being on the one hand we don't want these arms to go to people we don't know, dangerous people, and the other being if you leave us a sodden us saw it in place and he prevails, what kind of their world is that? so, those i think would be the big issues on the agenda. the middle east peace process, if there is something actionable that can be done, the saudi's

would be very supportive. i think it the moment they want to get on with the rest of their lives as long as they can see that this is a riddle that is not going to be solved anytime soon. the final issue is an agenda with oil market instability and that is between the u.s. and saudi arabia since fdr met in 1945. we were in oil exporter at the time but for fdr and the 12 presidents that followed him had a very simple formulation. if you understand the size of the saudi reserves, whether the u.s. intends to import oil or not you don't want those oil reserves to fall into the hands or under the indirect control of hostile elements whether it's the soviet union, saddam hussein

or currently the ayatollah. the world would be very different if hostile powers -- oil resources in the goal. they would be able to control the world economy and that is -- something the past 13 presidents have not wanted to contemplate so that would be the perennial issue on the table and it tends to guide the rest of the relations. thank you. [applause] >> thank you, nate. >> good morning. as the cleanup hitter i have been asked to address iran and syria, which i will do in that order with most of the attention devoted to the first of those two topics and then on both of

them there will be as we head into the new administration next year, pressures on the u.s. president, whoever he is, to do more to get involved more on both of those issues. but on each one, there will either be no good choices for the administration to make, or if there are at least reasonable choices that could be taken it will be politically difficult back here in the united states for the president, whoever he is, that is elected. let's talk first about iran. there are many potentially useful departures that a u.s. administration could make with regard to iran which would involve trying to improve the absolutely awful relationship that we have with iranians and to actually get some benefit in areas where u.s. and iranian interests believe it or not. or intersect like afghanistan and

stability in iraq and so on. but there will continue to be a fixation on one issue above all and that is the iranian nuclear program and that is mainly because of the unceasing agitation on this topic by the current israeli leadership. there will be of course an election in israel too in the first part of the year but all of the prognoses i have seen with regard to the likelihood, the likely outcome of that is that we will still have prime minister netanyahu as prime minister even if there might be some adjustments in the ruling coalition. and that of course means a contingent clinical environment here in the united states at least in the short term, even though we might hope for the long-term prognosis to come through, in which the issue of the iranian nuclear program will necessarily be a political fixation and continue to be won here in the united states. nonobvious constraint for either

mr. obama or mr. romney as president beginning in january 2013 would be that either would be boxed in by their own comments repeatedly stated by both of them that an iranian nuclear weapons would be unacceptable and of course there have been statements here on the hill by congress along the same sorts of lines. now, that would not necessarily have to be a problem, given that there is no indication to date, as our intelligence agencies tell us, that i ran has planned so far to build a nuclear weapons. but certain aspects of their nuclear program including the enrichment of uranium, have come to the perceived in the debate is having an acceptability of their own and of course the israeli prime minister talks about this constantly and about so-called red lines and so

forth. now avoiding having the situation turn into a disaster for whoever's administration it is, is a problem mainly of political constraints here in this country rather than any lack of negotiating space between iran and the p5+1 negotiating group with the united states as part of. you would have to have an agreement, and allowing up some risk probably no more than 5% level. the outline of an agreement are pretty clear. they would involve trading severe restrictions to be negotiated on a medium level or 20% in return for sanctions and bear in mind the sanctions relief is the same reason the iranians have not negotiated at all at this point.

now, on the first aspect about the 20%, there is something that needs to be negotiated, not just ending the 20% enrichment that's going on now but also what would be the disposition of the stockpile that iran already has although happily the iranians have already helped resolve that problem by converting some of that level to reactors where it is no longer usable to be further enriched to weapons-grade. and then there would also have to be negotiation over the sequence of when this does each side live up to parts of its part of the bargain and the iranians reportedly placed a proposal on the table which was unacceptable to the west in that it, their preferred sequence understandably would be to have what they want in terms of sanctions coming first before they give up what they would have to give up with regard to the medium level in richmond.

the p5+1 references of course the opposite and that is a very common situation in international negotiations. naturally each side wants to get what it wants first before giving up anything else and it's also very common that this is one of the most eminently compromise about things in negotiations. it's not an indivisible good and the usual solution is some kind of sequencing arrangement in which at each stage, each side moves and gets. so the outlines of an agreement are that they are pretty clear and i would go so far as to describe our current state of affairs if we were serious about negotiating over it, as a matter detail. exactly how do we handle that 20% stuff that has already been a rich -- enriched and what will be the sequence for implementation? now the sanctions that we talk about so much and they keep getting ratcheted up-and-up and up are supposedly ostensibly a

form of leverage to get the iranians to make concessions on this nuclear issue. secretary clinton not too long ago described the sanctions in exactly those terms. she said if the iranians will make concessions than this is a problem we can deal with in terms of offering sanctions relief. the main problem so far is the p5+1 has not put any sanctions relief on the table in the offer except for the sole minor exception of airplane spare parts. and so the principle problem right now in terms of where the negotiations stand is that the iranians have been given no reason or certainly no assurance to believe that the sanctions won't just continue on and on and on, no matter what they do with regard to the nuclear policy. and that obviously kills any incentive to make concessions on their part. now the problem for the new u.s.

president, whichever one it is come january, will be to find political space to be flexible with regard to the sanctions. prime minister netanyahu will reject sanctions and in fact he has rejected the whole idea of the goucher shins basically out of hand and this of course will continue to have obvious implications with regard to shaping the political climate here in the united states. we also have those who hope, both here and in israel, that the speed of sanctions will somehow hasten regime change in iran. in other words some other purpose besides leverage for getting concessions on the nuclear issue and that is notwithstanding the prospect even if there will was a regime change and i certainly would not advise holding your breath and waiting for it, that it would mean whoever comes into power in tehran would fold on the nuclear issue. not likely given the broad

support that the nuclear, the peaceful nuclear program has in iran. also a lot of the u.s.

on this issue will know that there's a clear basis for an agreement along the lines that i just briefly outlined and with some flexibility on sanctions, an agreement can be achieved. we shouldn't be surprised that this issue, as we move through 2013, staggers on in pretty much the form that we see it today. don't be deceived by talk about zones of immunity and implied deadlines and so on. despite the burst of the talk of the urgency, as talk isn't all that new. it really hasn't changed form for the last several years. certainly since mr. netanyahu has been prime minister in israel. bear in mind that those

agitating most widely on this issue have other reasons to agitate including distracting attention from other problems particularly the problem that scott describes and if anything that is a reason for them to continue agitating about this issue rather than to actually resolve it. although both presidential candidates have boxed themselves in with statements about the m. except ability of an iranian nuclear weapon, there are bases for anticipating some differences with regard to how our own election is going to come out. the main one is that for mr. obama if he wins, he would be a second term president, never running for office again with some more bases because of that for perhaps taking political risk in the interest of introducing the flexibility that would be necessary to reach an agreement. whereas mr. romney would be running for re-election from day

one and on anything involving israel and the concerns of prime minister netanyahu, a president romney would have to wonder what sheldon adelson would say the next time he came to see him. now iran may not force any u.s. president over the next four years event even to come to terms with the nuke their wealth and as an unacceptable idea because as i say, they haven't made a decision to even make one and they could just stick with their declared intent not to make one. so we may never see the true presidential bottom line on this issue on our side. but one final observation on this. the fact that military force would be certainly in my view a counterproductive folly should be clear enough that a second term obama administration would do just about anything they could to avoid it. for mr. romney, the shoe course issue course has been so far,

how shall i put it, an epic phenomenon that the need to show no -- between him and the israeli leadership and what his personal bottom line would turn out to be on the iranian nuclear issue itself if you were in office is anyone's guess. this election clearly would mean a return to policymaking positions of some of those who indeed do not believe war with iran would not be a counterproductive folly. nelson brief observations about syria and here is a segue, and many people size some of what is most important terms of what is going on in syria is the iranian connection and the idea that the assad regime has been the only ally of tehran in the air for old and so there has been this hope to build up if we can get regime change here, this would be a big blow to iran and actually the chief consideration in syria and the problems it will present for new u.s.

administration are not so much about the iranian connection but about other considerations, what's going on inside. two majors factors shape this issue as we think about it in the year ahead. one is there will be continued pressure to do something, to do more. one only has to read "the washington post" editorial page because there's something set on this every other day in this deterrent is led by several things. one is the humanitarian issue about bloodshed very understandable and secondly a desire if assad a push to get rid of their shame partly because they iran -- in the general anti-dictatorial sentiments in the hope it will have something like a democracy that would converge in serious. the other major factor is that there is a in fact very little if anything the u.s. could do right now that would shorten rather than intensify the war.

and that would not run the risk of becoming some sort of slippery slope toward a much deeper u.s. involvement than most americans, the overwhelming majority of americans would want. the main problems that underlie the latter factor are not about that. the cheap one chief one is a pro-assad forces hanging on for a long time, however desperate their situation sometimes seems to get from day-to-day as we read about the opposition doing this or doing that. and i say the main facts behind that is something that makes area different from libya for example is the sectarian dimension which we didn't have in libya and the fact you have the hell hole alawite who sees itself linked for better or worse with this regime and fears with good reason, with what's their fate in what and what their future would be if they largely sunni operation takes control.

there are also big questions and problems on the opposition side in terms of the disunity in terms of the radical influence and not having anything close to something we could point to that gives us confidence that there would be someone or something that could establish stability and order if the regime were to crumble next week. heading into some of the issues that nato john and there was a david sanger article in "the new york times" a few days ago that appropriately got a lot of attention and that has to do with the arms supplies from the saudis to some of the syrian opposition and the concern that was expressed understandable concern, that these arms need to be going into radical hands of militant jihad is. all of this replayed in my mind what was going on in afghanistan more than 20 years ago when we are trying to support, we in the saudi's were trying to support

the fight against the soviets and we had to work with the opposition militias that were in place. the most effective fighters among whom were hardlined jihad is, people like -- who then later came to be considered an enemy of ours. that is basically the kind of situation we have got in syria and it should not surprise us that not only can we not find weapons and have them go only to people who share our values but also that the extreme militants are the ones who tend to be the best fighters in an extreme brutal civil war. that is the way it was in afghanistan and that is the way it seems to be in syria. now, despite the efforts of canada of course to show that they are somehow different, i look at what the current administration is saying and doing and what governor romney

is saying and i don't see difference in the basic positions. the only basis one can have to infer the differences again, this prospect that you will he will have a neoconservative entrée into the iranian ministry should which requires us to take and all bets are off for parts with regard to any new initiatives that regard military force. some of what may shape or force decisions on whoever's the new president would involve how the syrian civil war affects or is engaging in other other states in the region. now i say that even though i don't subscribe to the frequent thing we hear about civil wars spreading across boundaries like molasses the kind of oozes across the map. that usually doesn't happen however we have got some important players in the most important one being turkey.

because it's a nato ally, because the turks understandably have to defend their borders and look what has happened to them lately. mortar and artillery shells have killed their citizens across the border. they have to do something about that. and insofar as they want to make good on their opposition to support the assad regime they also have to force down airliners in their airspace that are shipping material to syria and so there might thing the things that happened to the turks that force their hand which because they are an important ally of ours forces the hand of the u.s. president in some way. there's also the obvious potential for things being stirred up in lebanon because of the special relationship with the geographical facts between syria and lebanon but that could go in so many different directions and not trying to game it out here. then you have the concerns with the arabs and especially the saudis about the fate of their

sunni brethren in syria and i think this is something that the united states will have to deal with and for this reason i would say that it the handling by the new administration of the syrian problem will be at least as much a function of u.s. relations with the gulf arabs and especially the saudi's. except for the optimistic note that i struck earlier that there is negotiating space to be explored and exploited on this iranian nuclear issue that has gotten so much attention, i really don't see many apparent opportunities for the departures and advances in either of these areas by whoever is president come january. thank you. [applause]

>> well, thank you for your great presentations. i have an idea of how to ask just one question that came to me as i was listening to all the speakers, and it starts with a manic about going to an official at the state department in a late 1990s when i was writing a book in interviewing him, and actually quoted him in my book which you all know i didn't name him. i can't remember his name at the moment. i would have to go to my file. but he said, and i cloke, we do

not make our policies toward iran based on our national interests. period. we make our policies toward iran based on our domestic politics. so, paul served in government and had to think about our national interests all the time. thinks that there is an opportunity for diplomatic resolution of this issue. scott has talked about the importance of the lobby, although it may be cracking and

there are consequences, which i think everybody can talk about. so i think my question is to everyone. what can the next administration do to change that? i remember being a graduate student and here is another anecdote, and sitting in the draft detention listening to ronald reagan's 1982 address to the nation from the oval office about what was occurring in lebanon when israel had intervened and we had either just deployed marines or were just about to deploy marines to. would it make a difference for a president to do that today, to talk about the way in which our

failures, the arab-israeli affairs, have led to anti-americanism in the region, and even how popular government emerges from the arab awakening reflects that attitude towards american followed -- american foreign policy as they make their foreign-policy and how there is an opportunity for diplomatic resolution and i think probably many people in this american audience would not know the difference between iranian conversion and iranian enrichment and the sign of a warhead and how long it would take and what it would require too distributed ackerley and how long that would all take so that is my question for anyone who wants to take it. can i'm an american president educate american people quickly enough to bring about the

domestic constituency that supports a different kind of american foreign policy in the region? >> i will take the first step. admittedly it's very difficult to translate some of the things we discussed in this room to the sophisticated audience in a way that is going to play -- though there's no question about it but i think even on some of these issues, with the appropriate simplification and i don't mean oversimplification perk i don't mean dumbing down but simplification and some of appropriate quite frankly appropriate aureus is -- you are right what does that mean to the man on the street in peoria? but let's suppose the president in speaking publicly about this emphasizes the theme again and

again. we have been putting the sanctions on and we have ratcheted them up again and again. they have a purpose. the purpose of sanctions is to induce concession by iran's nuclear issue. repeat that again and again and using sanctions that way means we have to be willing to lift them or reduce them if indeed we get those. a pretty simple message i think that even john q. public can understand. it's got to be repeated a number of times or just take one other example of some of the issues that scott has talked about. challenging the lobby. let me offer a slogan to whoever is the white house political director. america first. should we put america's interest ahead of any other country, any other country? america first. keep repeating that and applying it to the problems that scott

talked about. i think that would have some effect. >> there is still a window for the two state solution in what you think the president could do? >> i think the window for a some sort of détente with iran is more open than four two-state solution and that mostly the domestic opposition would be easier to overcome a and i mean, the example that keeps coming to mind is nixon going to china which was considered hugely weird and he could've never campaigned on it and the chinese were killing american soldiers in vietnam by transferring weapons and they had a regime that was considered a crazy state and ready to use nuclear

weapons because they would come out with several hundred million people and the west would not. and yet they also had chill in my and that government that was very businesslike in terms of being able to reply to kissinger's and nixon's outreach. i think that situation may exist with iran and i think that would change a lot in the region if you get off this mindset that all muslim states except the most docile ones potentially have this area. that seems to be possible and in a way, in an opposite way than the israelis saying that i think is route to a palestinian state may make up for tehran, but not after wiping them out at after finding common ground with them.

>> the only thing i would sort of -- is this on? the only question that i would raise with paul on how easy it would need or potentially easy to negotiate, i can't figure out what earthly purpose iran gets, the value wickets for a peaceful nuclear enrichment program. there is a nuclear power plant in busheir could be renewed for $60 million a year with nuclear fuel. what is accosting them if this is purely a peaceful program? that is what apples may. >> i was in the emirates a couple of years ago on the same question came up and the uae with all of its oil.

>> that's different because they have attracted by all of the fuel they will need for their nuclear plants for the equivalent of $60 million if it has more nuclear plants but they will be enriched outside by canadian, british and then shipped them. they don't want to do the enrichment so it's a separate question. >> there is no question that there is an iranian interest and they have even done design work in the past. >> but is that a peaceful program? >> the know, those are two different things to say that there is an interest in potential future decisions with regard to weapons and weaponization versus no peaceful purpose. 's be a billion dollars of losses on an annual basis to protect a 60 million-dollar -- >> former pakistani prime minister talked about being grass to satisfy his prestige

ambition and he was talking specifically about weapons but the nuclear program as a whole if you look at what communications we have the public iranian attitudes toward it, distinguishing between weapons and a peaceful program is that there is strong support of a peaceful program. it would be of major political hazard for any iranian leader including a supreme leader to say we are just going to give it up program. it's just not going to happen. >> i can't believe the iranians are backing a 60 million-dollar program. >> the iranians like a lot of other decision-makers haven't made all the national security decisions that will cover them for the next 10 years in advance. this is a decision that is not yet been made. it is a decision that will be of lame plots by what the west in the united states in particular does. the decision can still go either way. the ratings can decide to build a nuclear weapon. they would almost certainly decide to do that if for example they were subject to military attack but they haven't done

that yet and whether they do it or not depends. >> i might ad in addition to the questions about pride or a and responding to popular sentiment and maybe stubbornness to would the potentially a fear that the supply of enriched uranium could be cut off from a country that has been subjected to sanctions for a long time and even in the 1950's it was boycotted so maybe it is a concern that they can't count on. however, however, however i think in the back of their minds the options of weapons is something that they want to have. certainly. >> we want them to give up that

option. >> other concern is more of a general security concerns where you have a nuclear state to the north into the east and to the west and to the south and an american military presence. that is why spoke earlier about a grand bargain which i know saudi arabia and some of the other gulf states are concerned about. if you negotiate not only about nuclear weapons but also about what kind of arab-israeli agreement are they going to accept and not try to disrupt and what their role should and shouldn't be, vis-à-vis the gulf arabs, they negotiated all the issues. maybe you would have, be providing them with more incentives to give up these dreams of weapons it would have to be constructed in a way that guaranteed both arab states that their security interests are not going to be compromised and that

we are not going to recognize an iranian rule that is a dominant role vis-à-vis the gulf arabs states. >> the fallback position if they don't capitulate and diplomacy doesn't work as containment. we know how to do that. 18,000 nuclear weapons pointed at -- we know how to do that. >> that is right. they are rational regime and most people think they are irrational regime. >> how many thousands make it a rational? >> are wondered panelist to ask each other questions before we go to the audience. >> i would like to make two comments about what can be done short and long-term? i think the point of making the public aware that the reinforcement of sanctions against iran needs again the interest of the u.s. and a we

will not weaken the sub eight -- assad regime, quite the opposite. they think within iran that -- so if this could be advertised in a way that, limiting the sanctions is not putting out the whole challenge of the weapons in the long-term and so on. so this is something that can be done. the more we attack iran the more we reinforce -- domestically and this leads to a second which is the new administration will have two speakout of what i call the -- paradigm. doesn't exist anymore so indeed we can address iran and we can

address saudi arabia and we can address syria but what is really needed is the geopolitical balance of the region and also with other partners including turkey and i think you mentioned turkey. and all of the gulf states. you can't just be we solve iran and we solve the palestinian issue and we saw the syrian issue. we need a regional vision because all of these political actors, we don't have an alternative vision. that is what i wanted to say. >> one comment. ahmadinejad will be gone soon from the regime. >> exactly, yeah. >> i would like to ask god a question. if obama wins the election and

if he makes the kind of speech that you outlined, a speech that would satisfy your fondest hopes and maybe even before it the election what would be your fondest hope in terms of the israeli reaction given that the said you are among those who believe we perhaps passed the limits of the two-state solution but, and i agree with you on this, the overwhelming majority of israelis would not want to grant the vote so what would be the hope for israeli reaction of that kind of speech were made? >> pretty simply i think the israelis would vote or have a change of government, perhaps headed by -- or somebody like that who understands israel's current course is under great peril and that having a secure recognized across the middle

east dynamic respected state would satisfy the core ambitions of zionism and to go back toward something like the clinton parameters and assume you would have palestinian interlocutors. i think you have some obviously because of hamas and things like that, but my hope is that a speech like that would change the political balance within israel and it would make the israelis realized that we are going in that direction here. >> i invite questions from the audience. we have a mic over here. for the sake of the tv -- go to the microphone. >> yeah, i would like the questions from the mic so he can be picked up.

>> my name is paul gallagher with eior new service. i would like to raise the question of controlling the war policy including the drone war policy of the current obama administration, which completely ignores the congress and the war powers act and the constitution and leaving aside what romney is going to do, which is bringing about a kind of 9/11 -- represented by the calamity in benghazi and the possibility now of a bombing retaliation to that calamity. it has gotten into the election campaign only to the extent that al qaeda is not being defeated by the strategy but appears rather the opposite. but the saudi's are in the middle of this 9/11 take to

support from london and -- is in the middle of this. there is a resolution in the congress by representative walter jones of north carolina who is militarily connected representative, to make the further waging of war by any president without congressional authorization without going to congress impeachable, a shot across the bow resolution. i would like to ask the panel how can this war policy, a drone war policy unconstitutional, completely ignoring the congress, how can this be controlled? >> that is a very important set of issues. i am not a lawyer and i'm not going to pronounce in any specific way on issues of

constitutionality but the question very appropriately raises the fundamental issues of limits on the use of military force. basically all of the forceful or lethal actions referred to in the questions and much more are still being based on the single resolution passed by congress in the first week or two after 9/11 back in september of 2001. in my again nonlegal professional view that is an awful the thin reed on which to base continued justification for use of lethal force outside our borders. that resolution made reference to al qaeda and to the perpetrators of 9/11. one of the bad things about this is the term al qaeda has certainly come over these last 11 years to be used in such a loose way to refer in general to violent minded -- in which the

term does not correlate well with all with any particular organizational reality out there that describes a sort of enemy in which the laws of war would be appropriate and for which a continued use of congressional authorization really can be considered sound. so other than agitating on the issue as your question implies, and taking the -- devoting the other careful attention to this on the hill i don't have a secular solution but certainly acknowledge it's a major and appropriate concern. and.

>> i i am and affiliated scholar at stanford university, and my question has to do with nuclear issues in the middle east. we have talked about short-term resolutions possibly with the iranians with some kind of an agreement being done where the iranians would give up some measure of their nuclear program in return for relief on sanctions but i want to ask the panel about a longer-term issue. is it possible to have long-term nuclear stability in the middle east as long as there is a monopoly nuclear power? can we actually get something done in that area without talking about israeli nuclear weapons and what their role is in terms of israeli policy in the region, and if it is the case that you have to talk about israeli nuclear weapons, shouldn't the united states and the american president in particular be willing to talk

about them even though the israelis don't want them to? >> i do agree that it is not a stable situation or are perceived as stable for israel to have the only acknowledged nuclear arsenal. i can imagine that the psychology in which you say to you now a billion muslims, israel can have weapons but you can't. it just doesn't make sense. as you mentioned before i used to read and write for commentary magazines and in 1974, robert w. tucker, an extremely eminent and hawkish political scientist, wrote an essay in which he said that nuclear proliferation in the middle east would probably lead to, more likely lead to stability and peace between

israel and its neighbors than the current situation. and that article is still available on the web site. i think it is very provocative and informative. >> i would add to that, on the issue of whether to speak openly about the israeli nuclear program there are people who believe it would be in israel's own interest to be open and not to pretend that this arsenal doesn't exist. the foremost historian of the israeli nuclear program had an article in foreign affairs a couple of years back in which he argued exactly that argument. >> this article by robert tucker, you could argue that with no other nuclear power in the region this nuclear power has given it a tremendous amount of flexibility with regional

policies to use force without thinking about the consequences. and that there is another eminent political article from kenneth waltz who wrote in foreign affairs that if iran obtains nuclear weapons you would have -- in the system because the concept of deterrence would remain. it's a very controversial argument but the same general concept. yes. >> hi. edward with congressional research service. the question i have my guesses for dr. pillar but would welcome comments from anyone. specifically with regards to syria, my question is, in the long-term, say in a year or two, the countries surrounding syria or at least involved in the conflict otherwise --

i mean i read your blogpost on the afghanistan analogy and so i was wondering what you would recommend even the theme of this panel, what would you would recommend in the future as far as how the u.s. should the interacting with those countries to try to prevent another afghanistan scenario and also the possibility -- i mean hopefully we won't be intervening anytime soon directly, however what i'm curious about is if that intervention does not happen, what would be the ideal scenario given the other actors in the region and how they are influencing events on the ground? >> the reality is this is one of those situations where there is no ideal scenario or even a good scenario. that was what i was alluding to in my opening comments by saying there are some situation where there's just there is just no good solution. i would commend by the way some

of you read the piece by my friend and colleague that was in the post this post this weekend which basically makes the point the world and especially the middle east is an awful messy place and many ways the united states can't be expected, no u.s. president can be expected to solve and resolve everything. the bloodshed in syria makes all of us shudder. that doesn't mean there are some u.s. policy options that will bring it to an end or even reduce it and most of the options i see in terms of trying to do more if anything would probably exacerbate it. the only other thing i can say as your question implies it's not just the u.s. but the other players in the region and is jocelyn was mentioning with regard to the iranian issue the same thing applies with syria. you know we will and we should continue to work very closely with their syrian allies, with

the jordanians. jordan, iraq, syria, jordan iraq and turkey all have something like 100,000 refugees each in the country, at least. we can't do it all ourselves and i wish i could give you a 90 -- ideal scenario but there just isn't one. ..

are going to these people and a disproportionate way. at the beginning of the david sanger article, the maturity weapons are going to extremists. if you read deeper into the article, business intelligence communities are having difficult time determining who the rebel leaders are. well if we don't know what they are, how do we know of the majority is going to be militant extremists. but if they are, the problem as -- >> the problem as the militant extremists come to the floor the more the rebel opposition in general feels abandoned by the west because the failure to get the weapons they've been promised. that opens space. so in a way, it is one of those problems it has gotten worse

attorney than blocking and that's why it's sort of a conundrum if you're thinking a next president takes office in january 20th, what's going to happen in between. overall you've got a problem of unpalatable choices, the lesser of two evils. in my book, to the extent that the soviet union's fall had something to do with the defeated asking us and, didn't you than all the repercussions we had from what then going to jihad us in is better. it's better that the u.s. and soviet union are not so threatening to demolish the earth compared to the other

fallout. we've had tough decisions like this in the past. the second major recipient of the u.s. armed during world war ii was soviet union. we might not have won without that. it did leave that consequences. so those are the choices. and you know, just eyes wide open. >> a former member of the parliament detained during the uprising. my question is -- [inaudible] i'm looking to hear about the challenges from neo. in fact, if we are looking to the gulf, i think the safest bet

for ability and interested the americans and the citizen and the gold, the safest test for requirements by support and encouraged by the americans. what do you think it's feasible for the next administration to play a positive and overall that we saw in the past. there is silence about the human rights violation in the region. there is a silence about all calls for reform. there is a sense that the secretary and impact and the policies in iraq area. so what is feasible in the administration? things. >> cannot question is is for who? >> scott. >> it is far from a field of

expertise, but i'm inclined to think that the united states can't do a lot about the internal politics of the gulf states or other errors date, that is beyond our knowledge, history and its variants. i think we can be an example. i think we can speak out. i think we can encourage students to come here and study. i think we can be a good trading partner, but i don't see the american policy saying all right, this is how you deal with your carrion issues and the role of islam in your public life. it's just beyond us i think.

>> will actually come and there's a related question here from someone watching the lives, which is commissioned the next administration put more emphasis on human rights violation by the islamic republic of iran in order to promote their crisis of legitimacy. >> i would like to say something about that because i completely agree that the discourse on values like human rights does the work. and we did that already. it would e. a bad idea to get the idea the u.s. is here to teach something to the country. but again coming and you need another approach that is working with the people in the region. so there is no tailored

solution. you have to let what is a state could you can't just say i'm going to come and solve the question of human rights is the carrion divide because this does know is who fled what are the relationship of power and on the ground. and if the u.s. cannot get that, and i agree, we cannot do domestic cleaning or correction. but again, we can't have a geopolitical vision. and that was in her question about the whole dynamic that is beyond the high notes on the question of sunni shia and iran plays and not, too. this is something we can do. but doesn't mean the u.s. and all the questions show that it can get out of the mentality that the u.s. has to do something. there is much more.for generally

grounded and it you gave an example that this can happen. it did happen for the u.s. in some parts of the world and for other political partners to. so i think it's about time to see that the u.s. cannot solve everything. but it doesn't mean that the u.s. is a diminished role? i don't ring so. it's another roach. i'm not buy-and-hold acclimate the u.s. i think there's lots of things very positive going on, but it cannot be the full actor and some very complicated issue and we have not taken -- paid enough attention to the regional actors. one of the mistakes in afghanistan is not only the chapati. not to take into account the regional balance because we were still in the cold war framework.

i think this is something we have to learn. >> i would just comment that trade-offs abound from a u.s. interest multiple. with a limited number of diplomatic and political chits to use a and the more you concentrate on one of active, less just to mayhem and some other object is. so if are all tied up in knots about this nuclear issue in iran, for example, toilet to get something done on not, the human rights issue come a genuine issue on which we have to make our preferences and principles clear, nonetheless to try to do something about that may not only ran into the inherent limitations that jostle once mentioned, but also may work against our attempt to advance other interest or achieve their objectives.

>> the case in bahrain is to encourage talks between the u.s. from the u.s. point of view, for soul as i said it's a non-nato ally. over the past 10 years, it looks like they've introduced more forms than a lot of other countries in the neighborhood. so if we lack the capacity to do more, at least we've asked for negotiation and both parties have to be realistic about what they get out of these negotiations. yes. >> my name is joshua jacobs, analyst at the jamestown foundation. my question is for mr. kern. it seems to me when you talk about the goals of the problems and challenges the next administration has to deal with, one of the biggest questions is

what kind of leadership is the next administration going to deal with? at the 91 euro can, it prints' 86, it's almost certain workers present next will face a leadership in saudi arabia. my question for you is who do you think that might be and you think it's someone will have a significant impact in our relationship with saudi arabia and on the region at large? i guess whatever tack on their as there has been a twittering inside -- i'm sure you're probably familiar, who has been releasing obsessively inside information from the inner circle at the royal emily confirming a lot of rumors people had heard about sort numbers how come a certain member submission. i wanted to watch her thoughts were this. thank you. >> i think you've tacked a few years onto the kings age. >> and a few on the crowned prince.

were in a better place now than we were two years ago when you had an incompetent crowd print in intensive care. i was not so good. and although opinions vary about the late prince knight, by comparison, saw mom is certainly a more worldly and more open. nevertheless, there is a pressing need, and i don't believe i would be telling anything new to the saudi leadership and nice, to move to the next generation. rechristened terribly capable people in their 50s and i

think particularly if the guy who's been running the counterterrorism thing was kicked off, but also very good politician, very well-rounded person, very sensible. and i'd love to see him elevated to a position of greater responsibility. as a policy matter, you've got to wait to it happens. there's nothing we can do. it are some changes, then the next president, next secretary of state has got to be apprised of what they are. but there's not any particular policy choices it can make about how the family regulates its affairs in succession. >> annalisa from a physician in bahrain.

i want to ask a question about the credibility of the u.s. values. i know that the complexity of the geopolitics of the region, i understand the concerns about how does this have an impact on the policy in the gulf. but as taxpayers and as intellectuals, what would be your advice for the administration for the long-term interest of the u.s.? and don't you think that is what has happened in the last couple of years, the arab spring and was happen in bahrain in eastern saudi arabia. i mean, does it raise a question about the stability of the government and how these monarchies are going to buy for the long-term and hot dispute on this region were to see the

united states, especially if they see the united state on this side of their repressive regimes. i come in bahrain and i know that iranians look up to the united states as a model that they are seeking. they are looking for is poured. i think the united states has obligations towards them because of the navy prisons. but the destination is growing and the disappointment is growing. and in bahrain, we have a majority that are misrepresented and a majority that is repressed and goes by a minority. and that dislikes not only the shiite imbibing. there are shiites in eastern saudi arabia and iraq and kuwait and the whole gulf region. in this image of the united states is not only in bahrain. it will be in every place of

this region. so don't you think that it's not only a moral obligation to his game at the calls for the advice, but also in the interest of the united states? so i would like to know, what would your eyes about the united states should react to these people's demands. >> i would like to respond to the very important question that shows exactly the vision that we are not paying attention to other changes that have been in the last two years. we are not made i.d. act or that we are discussing on this part of the table. and we are not paying enough attention to the different elements. it can come from the changes in the balance of power within

saudi arabia, in connection with other countries. and as long as we are not ready to change and include elements of civil society, integration of our strategy, we can miss the opportunity to have elements of talking differently to people. and again, it's very interesting to see what the whole angle is still and remains on how to write do with this later? and if we have fun lesson learned from the last two years, the changes don't come from the professional politicians. they will come because this is globalization. they will come from movement within society, you know. and again, i don't have any model for that, but it's already a completely different outlook and how we interact in the region, yes.

>> now, i agree with that. i don't want to say too much why. i don't think the united states -- i think it's american interest to not get too involved, but clearly we are involved and i think it's pretty obvious that in two generations, the gulf regimes won't be monarchies. i think probably we can agree on that. maybe one generation, maybe 10 years. >> actually, i disagree with scott a little bit on that last point. jack goldstein at george mason has a thesis about this, what he calls the soul thomistic regimes, even if their monarch local effects like the asides in syria, they don't have the historical legitimacy that royal families have in the coffin jordan and rocco.

and so, those circular dictatorships adorably call themselves monarchies are inherently more fragile, whereas the monarchies have a more of a potential. and here what this fix has done in morocco provides some examples of more making the concessions in seeking the sort of partial political power of forces, while still been on the throne. in the biggest, most recent change to mohammed and morocco change was to see an awful lot of power, to basically a government representing an elected assembly. but he still sitting more or less happily in his seat as the king. >> the united states has a strategic interests. it has ideological interests. sometimes extremely difficult to pursue them both at the same

time. the ideological interests in the long-term we favor a more popular participation. but how much strategic interests can you jeopardize in the short-term? that's a dilemma for american government. >> lewis had to make a distinction between making principles clear what was for versus mocking him and messy now. i'm a strong believer in the hippocratic principle that's first do no harm and unfortunately come despite noble object to is in a lot of places, we wound up doing harm. but that doesn't mean we have to retreat at all for making it clear what principles we believe in an overall but the herbs bring in arab awakening in my view is a good thing from the standpoint of american interests and american principles. >> to other brief comments. jocelyn, you might be interested in this one.

i met a saudi woman, pretty prominent in jeddah. she said i hope we don't get one man, one vote here. because if we get one man, one vote, i'm going to lose all these gains women have made. so actually this came performs gradually while yes the population. lawyers are told never to ask questions. he has let me ask you a question. in the negotiations between the government and the opposition, is it true that the opposition asked for the legislature to have power to name the cabinet?

is that a reasonable negotiating point? you know here come the legislature in united states is not a named by captain is for the cabinet is named by the executive branch. >> actually, i think this is detailed and i might not be the right person to answer, but i will answer. this is a detail. it's happening now and by rain is there's no tax, no dialogue to engage with the opposition and actually there's no pressure on the regime to engage the opposition. opposition's declared very clearly that they are ready for dialogue and they're ready to sit and discuss issues and draw a road map. they don't want a democracy to happen overnight. they are ready to discuss the steps on how to get there. but actually if we will be in the place of this regime,

whether they do so? they have all the support from their allies. okay, they don't have any like kind of pressure. people are unharmed. even that they are in authority, care. i mean converging defenders, political leaders, physicians, ngos, journalists, lawyers got tortured and intimidated because they spoke out and said we need more rights. we have a prime minister on his seat for 43 years that there is then no other prime minister since it was established in by rain. i mean, we are not asking or a full-blown democracy tomorrow. we are just asking for a fair representation for another good government and even this can be

negotiable, but at least a talk. this is not as what is happening. even the repressive measures say that the security is going on and people are getting killed and locked up day after day. this is the reality and this is what's happening. >> can i say something quiet >> yeah. i think what you are pointing out is exactly this low-key that may not be on the top of the news, but about the relationship the u.s. can have with not only the states, the state actors, but the different elements of civil society. how does that work? is not telling people what they have to do, but to put some kind of challenge of accountability

and what can they do. how do they walk the walk? and the u.s. is going to say this is the right and sometimes opportunities ended up being this kind of selection. if we bring everybody to the table, and this is something we have never really tried. exception again from 2004 to 2008. >> i decide to make sure -- do they question? are used handing? because we have about five minutes i want to get a question. >> when i was saying that the united states doesn't want to engage, actually it is perceived by people of not doing anything, is perceived as doing a favor to the regime.

so choosing not to do anything and is actually doing positively support to the regime. this is a perception. >> excuse my english. i just came here. i just have one question. has there been any sectors for sanctions in history? howser also been in a and regime? why did the united states call for sanctions? i'm from iraq with the teen years of sanctions and i think that they empower the regime. it's really, really weak. we are trying to survive and that's happened in cuba, and

it's happening iran in the 1980s and you are doing it again in iran. is there any reason for that? >> one has to be absolutely clear first of all with the purpose of sanctions are. you know, squeezing the regime to topple it is one possible purpose. getting the regime to make conceptions to make policy is an entirely different purpose and part of the reason was the reigning sanctions is we've got people who believe those things are object doesn't work against each other. if you thought the sanctions are going to squeeze the regime to the point would fall, that be absolutely inflexible, don't concede anything, whereas if you're going to use that as they extensively are as leverage to get change in iranian policy on this nuclear matter, that argues for something entirely different. it argues for flexibility. i am aware of no instance where sanctions could really be credited with toppling a regime.

if you're going to use them to get policy change it very clear example is libya with gadhafi. and they worked that way, and we should remember the change that gadhafi made, drastic change in policy can only give up his unconventional weapons program, gave up his terrorist programs and that was after he gave up, coughed up one of the three suspects and the lifting of sanctions was a big part of that. if he was under sanctions for several years yet they were brought sanctions. they stop short of an oil embargo so they cannot sanctions fatigue on the part of the countries they were imposing. that was a successful example and it worked because it was coupled with the author and the negotiation to having a relationship, to lift the

sanctions. unfortunately a few years later, said we want to get rid of them anyway when the opportunity came up. and that damages the liver credibility. but that the only way in which they do work and housework is to induce, to help induce change in policy by regime, but has to be coupled with the negotiations and the carrots as well as sticks. >> are there any more friends -- i mean, let's say in iraq. when you impose sanctions, did that make them friends to united states? >> i think a very appropriate to make the point that there's a further downside to just how populations will react to this pier we want to comment more specifically on the iranian case. but that is definitely has it that has to be taken into account. >> yeah, just on the iranian case, the regime as it is now

may not be strong, especially in areas. the sanctions are used to the current president are or are not all iranians. and to feed the outsider of the threat from the outside. so instead of weakening, what we are witnessing is the sort of persistence of the region because people are not going to protest or underline the power at this moment where they see iran as a community under attack. and so it's helping him. we know that and i could elaborate more to sanction as a tool for controlling the domestic country.

>> canal, as a domestic political utility and away, i mean, if you're not sure what diplomatic you know you want, if you're not sure you consult the diplomatic go to the public and you think the cost of war to high, sanctions as a way of showing people which are doing something while you wait to figure out what she wants out of diplomacy or way to find out if you can avoid a war. it's interesting that you were from iraq because there's a report coming out from the world health organization very soon that's going to document how many miscarriages or have a name solution and how many birth defects or have been in falluja since 2004 ms because of the depleted uranium. we don't even talk about that very much. a lot of people will die.

[inaudible] >> no. [inaudible] [inaudible] >> actually, yeah, the bahraini ruling family asked for support from other members of the gulf cooperation council. saudi sent members of the national guard -- or which unit was that quite national guard and varieties sent police. not a whit to protect major restructuring by rain so that if bahraini security forces can deal with the demonstrations

they did not do what the demonstrations themselves. but from their point of view, this is the dilemma from the united states. you know, iran has exploited situations before. it has exploited situations before. and that is why we do not know what to make of this group and where it stands on questions of democracy and participation we have concerns about that better and bring our decision making. is there another question? is 12:00. we need to close because of the cameras. i guess i will say at this point, thank you very much for

coming. thank you to the panelists. [applause] and again, with a website, it www.dot any pc.orc. i hope you visited. [inaudible conversations]

>> what is the al smith dinner and how did it come about? >> so, the al smith dinner's most famous as the place presidential candidate show up every four years and they show up, democrats and republicans. i think it is the thing that if anyone has heard outside its name at this point in time for that is where you probably heard about al smith, unless you hang around these hallowed halls. generally, it's probably his most lasting public legacy, the place where his name could tout your but is held every year. not just every four years. your public figures coming in and it's really a memorial dinner. it's a catholic charity dinner. it's a place where people get together and assess the legacy of al smith and presidential candidate always especially try to crack jokes about each other. >> and in fact, they show up together most times, with the

democrat and republican nominee show up together. we want to show you some of the past al smith dinner is. >> i ask asked if my senior clerk will come up here because he's the president of the united states arrived and without a speech. and i have no intention of standing. [laughter] >> i must say i have traveled the banquet circuit for many years. i never quite understood the logistics of dinners like this and how the absence of one individual can cause three of us to not have seats. [laughter] >> vice president, glad to see you here tonight. he said many, many times in this campaign you want to give america back to the little guy. mr. vice president, i am that man. [laughter] >> as i looked out at all the cite tag, i realize they have it in so many people so will address since i went to, sewer

party. >> winter sets in really good news out of yugoslavia. especially please mr. you local rich has stepped down. one less polysyllabic name for me to remember. [laughter] you know what this world really needs quiet and needs more world leaders named al smith. >> and is not a tissue of dais with the defendant of the great al smith. and al, your great-grandfather was my favorite kind of governor , the kind who ran for president and lost. [laughter] >> again, our coverage of tonight dinner featuring president obama and mitt romney gets underway at 9:00 p.m. eastern on our companion up work on the c-span.

>> top law-enforcement officials of the federal government today for the best thing to do if you receive an illegal robo call is to hang up and file a complaint. the discussion was part of a conference on robo calls hosted by the federal trade commission and a new ftc report says nearly 4 million people filed official complaints about telemarketing mushy or about 1 million from the previous year. this portion of the event is about an hour. >> good morning. my name is lois greisman.

it is my honor to moderate the second panel of the morning in this law-enforcement, questions of one person or party every senator which is no surprise whatsoever. a very distinct set of panelists. the interest of the priests into autobio biosphere to my immediate left is greg zoeller from the state of indiana, while not as a passionate consumer advocate. to his immediate left is well maxon come but do-not-call program manager and industry scientists at the turn in a division marketing practices. to his left is eric bash, who will refer to as an entity recidivist because he's been in and out of the agency a couple times. now he is associate chief at the sec's and ftc's enforcement bureau. were going to do a slightly different format for this panel. but i'm going to do is ask a series of questions and ask each of our panelists responded and

nl event preview for you exactly where we're going to do. but we want to do is let the nuts and bolts, what the state of the law, what are the legal parameters in which robo callers legitimate and illegitimate operate under. then after talking about that and we'll talk about complaints, what we see in that front. and then were going to really spend the bulk of our time talking about enforcement challenges than what it is we can do about them. so let me start off and ask will to kick us off, what are the legal parameters we operate under?

>> good morning, everyone. so i went out for just a minute about what the telemarketing sales rule says about our do-not-call rule and a robo call rules. some marketing sales rule is a rule reinforce and when mr. bash speaks, he'll talk about what the fcc enforces and there's a lot of overlap. just three basic retractions in the telemarketing sales rule but our related, but a little bit different. the first turn as the national do-not-call that dates back to 2003 and that's what everyone generally thinks of when they think of the do-not-call list generally speaking, businesses can't make sales calls to consumers whose phone numbers on the national do-not-call treat. as you've heard there's over 200 million phone numbers on the registry does include cell phones, home phone from any phone can be registered, as many as you have. when businesses make phone calls to those number, generally

speaking those violator to not call rule. an entity specific portion of the rule, so if your name is not on the do-not-call list, you can ask the company not to call you again. if they do and make other sales call, that violates the entity specific portion of our list and that is true even if you have established business relationship. even if you buy something from the company and they try to call you again, under that exception to the general come you can tell them don't call me again. if they do come if the violation or entity specific role. third part of that is the robo call rule, which is generally speaking, businesses can't make sales-based robo calls to consumers. those calls are prohibited even if your phone number is not on the national do-not-call treat. the only exceptional type but in a second if the consumer has provided the business of express written as commission. so there's a handful and types

of calls not covered under the telemarketing rule. business-to-business calls are generally not covered. that collection calls generally not covered. customer service and customer satisfaction calls, survey calls, but only if they don't contain a sales pitch. it was a survey call and then the dems are trying to sell you a chirp or cruiser some sort of product, then that's covered. political calls are not covered under the telemarketing sales rule. again, if they don't include a sales pitch. there's some special exceptions to ftc jurors diction and those types of calls are not covered. banks, phone companies, insurance companies. and there's also a separate exception that deliver health care message made on behalf of a covered entity has defined by the hit the privacy rule. so what calls are covered? the vast majority of calls.

the calls that are part of a campaign or plan to get consumers to purchase a product or service is the most general way to say it. so if there's any part of that call designed to end up with a consumer purchasing something, do not collect covered under a do-not-call rules are robocall rule or entity specific role. it also includes charitable solicitation calls, for-profit fundraiser on the hybrid calls that i mentioned, survey calls and thinks like that, with a pitch it as a political survey or some sort of survey about whatever topics they are interested in in in the end was the sort of sales pitch. and even companies that which you have an established business relationship can't robocall you with a sales message. the established business relationship exception does not apply to robocalling. also, companies that assist or

facilitate those that place illegal calls are also subject to liability. and this is the growth of the care about and are all here for today. the robocall rule prohibits initiation for consumers for a sales call. it is a type of call that follows in the ftc's jurisdiction, the only exception is if they have written permission from the consumer if that specific seller, and as you see here, there's several requirements for what they've written permission has to obtain. it has to be clear and conspicuous disclosure by the feather that the purpose is to authorize the seller for calls. it has to show the consumer's willingness to receive calls delivering prerecorded messages via on behalf of the specific seller. it can't be a general, i'm agreeing to give robo calls from anybody in some generator salsa

to telemarketers and nail in the them. that doesn't count. it can be required on the condition of purchase and have been exception has to -- i written permission has to include a telephone number and signature. if they don't have all of this, it is illegal. >> banks, well. eric, georgia pick up from the sec's viewpoint? >> yes, so just to start at beginning, the source said the fcc's rules in this area comes from the telephone can demur protection act of 1991, which you've heard people refer to this morning. and then the fcc has adopt the implementing rules viewed not long after that statute was enacted and the rules have changed somewhat over time in the last, what is that, 20 years

and in some cases come including the most recent changes that have been adopted, i think just after valentine's day those were designed to harmonize the fcc's rules as closely as possible to the ftc's rules and i would get to some specifics on a minute. one thing to highlight for you at the beginning though as you heard will mention that certain entities are not subject to the federal trade commission's telemarketing sales rule largely because the jurisdiction of the federal trade commission under the tsr, telemarketing night but this jurisdiction, the federal trade commission act. the fcc's rules are not limited and not way. to some of the exemptions you heard will refer to those entities are not exempt from the fcc's standard that i'm about to mention. so the general standard and

prohibition that in the name from the telephone consumer protection act, which is codified in section 227 of the communications act is that there can be no auto dialed or prerecorded voice calls to an emergency number or numbers that are really designed, basically foreleg emergency purposes like a doctor's office, law enforcement, that sort of name. you can't make these calls to emergency numbers. you can't meet these calls to cancer patients at hospitals or nursing homes in that type of facility and you cannot make these kinds of calls to mobile phone numbers or other numbers for which it can sumer might be charged for having the need for call. and the only exception to those prescriptions i just identified are if you are making the call for an emergency purpose or you

have the prior express consent of the calls party. there's also restrictions on prerecorded calls to what we call residential line that me state this in the other way. calls can be prerecorded calls initiated to residential phone lines, residential landline if they are made for an emergency purpose or for a commercial purpose that does not include telemarketing. if they are made for -- if they are not paid for a commercial purpose, if they are made to a person within the caller has an established as this relationship work they are made by her forayed tax-exempt nonprofit. for those kinds of calls to sit within the legal requirements that the fcc enforces come it's

also the case that certain disclosures have to be made to the call party, namely the person who is initiating the call has to identify who they are at the beginning of the call and during or after the call they have to provide an actual phone number at which they can be reached. so just to state these requirements in a different way, sort of a distinction between landline to mobile, again come you can't make an auto dialed or prerecorded call to a mobile phone number and muskets for an emergency purpose or you have the prior express can vent of the calls party. and i wanted to mention when a prerecorded political voice caught would be okay because it's something we've heard people refer to this morning and when those can be okay as again the other major residential line that can't be made to a wireless phone number unless you have a

call party can send any make the required disclosures of the identity of the caller is also telephone number at which the called party can be reached. you've heard me refer to the established business relationship exception. this is one of the things that is being changed to harmonize more with the ftc's rules that says and doesn't have the prior express written consent to be except it will. and as i mentioned, the fcc's has adopted the rule to be consistent with that on february february 2012. and the review and budget were not approval comes thereafter

will be a governing role in the edr exception i mentioned earlier will not be available. i should also just say to close the loop on the legal standard with respect to robocalls, we also had a fine future role for business calls. you are not permitted to make auto dialed calls to multi-line businesses. you can't engage two or more of those lines at the same time. and that is a basic overview of the fcc's rules in the area. >> thank you, eric. >> well, the state's experience and all speak specifically about indiana, but the numbers dates are all together on these issues. in indiana we never had the established business exception, so we maintained a little stronger version of a do-not-call list.

a lot of the states did fold into the federal do-not-call since they had the same established business exception so it was identical. but their numbers states that still has stronger do-not-call statutes. so we maintain a do-not-call working group. i have margarete sweeney from my office who's the chairman of that, so a lot of state still pull together and some of these issues. so were very active with her national association of attorneys general. when it comes to robocalls, indiana has another unique experience. we ban the use of autodialers since 1988 and recognizing the growing -- let's say the opportunities for scams. we've even banned the political calls so you won't get political calls. that has engaged a number of legal challenges as you might've guessed. but it has been successful up to the courts and the supreme court

of indiana, successfully arguing that the rights of privacy in the home trump the political free speech to blast out tens of thousands of calls to hoosiers. it is subject to a federal case. we want the district court on the seventh circuit court of appeals. so i do think that there's opportunity say that indiana and other states have shown to have stricter do-not-call and no one robocalling kind of operation. some of the work we are currently doing though is going to again be subject to additional challenges them all look forward to many more days in court. >> thank you. so let's shift gears slightly and talk about targeting. how do you identify entities that you might choose to sue or investigate? what do you know about complaints, volume and trending?

let's stay with the state of indiana. >> let's see, think of that aside appear somewhere. what we've really found his nci band of the d.o. ip in the cloud-based robocalls, our volume of complaints has doubled just in this past year and was now gone over 17,000 just since september 30th of this year. so again, since we did have a much stronger at that shoot, then the federal statute, we were blessed with really a decade of i would say peace and quiet. i think hoosiers still have a greater sense of expert patient when it comes to privacy in the home particularly. so when the voip and cloud-based

calls began and rachel was working her magic in the hoosier state, despite these complaints really is kind of geometric growth on the complaints. and some of them really, the real shock, so i want to express the righteous indignation that i received in letters every day. but again, i think a lot of it comes from the relevant peace and quiet we've received in the past and now they're not used to having these calls and wonder, why can't you keep people from calling me. so i think a lot of state didn't have the same experience in indiana. they always had a little bit of the robocalling, so they kind of got used to it. in indiana, it's come as quite a shock and i've got 17,000 complaints that i can share where they fully express the righteous indignation of my

state. i think on the break down of the complaints are really coming out a number. the largest bulk is clearly the robocalls, but we do have complaints about text messaging, which is only 17% and 33% commotions everything from collection calls to all the rest. there truly is the robocalls that incite the most, the most passionate complaints. and again, sharing the fact that drivel on decade of peace and quiet, why can't you in the federal government do something? is a pretty loud and clear message. i've got a picture of some of the handwritten -- my favorite. i'll have to share the favorite

from what i assume is a grandmotherly hoosier rights that can't we stop the calls because she can't even take a nap. >> thank you. fcc? >> so, and i'm sorry i don't have a graphic to put up on the screen in front of you, but i do have some complaints volume to report to you. in 2010, let me just say at the outset if you go to the sec's website and you want to file a complaint with us about robocalls, there are a variety of forms that are available there for you. i think they're self-explanatory , that he would choose from depending on the particular type of problem you've experienced and it's

collated and looking at those different kinds of complaints that has enabled us to pull together the types of statistics to give you. but across sort of complaints involving prerecorded calls to residential line, prerecorded calls to business clients come to prerecorded calls to cell phones and text messages to cell phones, and calendar year 2010, we had about 50,000 complaints across this for topical areas. you can see the growth in the figures i'm about to give you. in 2011, 36,000 complaints across those areas and the sirens went off anonymously we've still got the balance about tober bundle of november and december to go through. we have received my guess is through october 1,198,607 complaint. 22 for this year, thus far of 22,000 of those are complaints about prerecorded calls to rede