professor o'connell, when was? the marine corps established? >> guest: the marine corps was established 1775, but the birthday to something of the? net. they always claim november 1775, but that is actually just the date they authorized. they never raise the battalion? the department of commerce to live for. post to wonder the italian spac? >> guest: the job originally was to be the guards on ships. they protected the officers from the crew. it was a pretty difficult thing to sail a ship in the 18th century, so they had two people there to enforce discipline. but the bird's principal was to be ship cards and would serve as boarding parties and snipers.

but they were very small part of the navy. >> host: the marine corps is completely separate from the navy now? >> guest: they are. they are a separate service inside the department of the navy, but this became can tensions throughout the history. the core would claim when they served aboard ships that they should follow the rules of the navy, regulations of the department the navy. and eventually in 1832 to become properly a separate service inside the department. >> host: how did their mission change? >> guest: domitian didn't change so much that. they remained all the way to the 20th century, but they were something of a jack of all trades. they would do other jobs as well, most often serving as landing parties when the navy would send sailors and marines ashore in punitive expeditions. the marines for anticipating that. and the start of the 20th century they took on a variety of other nations, calling out infantry in haiti, philippines and nicaragua and just before

world war ii, they started creating amphibious landing forces. they became experts in landing against suspended islands. ? host: what was the marine?? corps' reputation throughout ?ch of its history??? ? guest: not very good quite?? honestly.????????? everyone thinks about the marin? corps today ?is the most???? prestigious or elite of the major armed?? services.?? that has been validated by numerous polls over the last 12 years routinely the american people say most prestigious service. it wasn't that way even at the start of world war ii. at the start of world war ii, the enlistment age found them to be rough and rowdy. parentscome into because desirable associates and they're ranked last. they were the least popular service in a nationwide study. it was pretty similar to that in the years prior to that. these were pretty big, thuggish guy serving as the cops of board ships in the navy didn't like them, armageddon like them and they had problems getting quality manages service ever since their beginning, really until world war ii.

>> host: what happened? what changed? >> guest: a couple things change. the most important is probably world war ii. once the marines gained some initial fame, right at the start of the war when they hold out wake island until christmas day basically, against repeated japanese attack, president roosevelt makes a mention of them in a state of the union address. the marines reputation is really re-created because of active intervention by the core and then just the nature of the fighting against japan. so the first major land operation in the pacific, the operational guadalcanal, the marines really come through some horrible fighting and they hold the islands and their reputation is really re-created from that moment forward. >> host: now coming to their mission change over the years organically, or was that something that was legislatively done? >> guest: yes, the mission changes organically with the

active planning of the marine corps, really in the 1950s until something really interesting happens here. after world war ii, all the other services and the president and anyone who's qualified to speak on national defense argues nuclear weapons has changed everything. will never again have another amphibious landing. the canvas man from ship to shore and the army uses this as an argument to radically reduce or perhaps even abolish the marine corps. the marines fight back and they? win. and as early? as 1947, they st? arguing that the good war was?? nuclear weapons was probably not ?ing to happen.???? they say, how are you going to? keep stability in the cold war periphery if all you have???? something is something that can? atomize people?????? no, you need forces that can do a wide range o?f things.???? humanitarian or they've come th? peacekeeping, disaster relief comic and a small stability??? operations.???????? they start arguing that some 47?

by 56, the height of the cold?? war, they argue explicitly??? ?ward the soviet union will not happen. you need very? capable, nonnuclear forces that can arrive? immediately and do lot? of things. we are that jack of all trades? service.????? so by ?the late 40s, early? 50s, they are building what are called? the marine air grod task forces culture today called the amphibious force in readiness. today, at all times, there are several thousand marines floating around the world on navy ships with their own planes, their own tanks, their own engineers, their own supplies, the water making machines. and they are ready to land on any foreign shore with anywhere between 46 and 96 hours. once there, they can do things like how the existing?????? government, or skill of the two? combat operations. to receive any further right at the start of the cold war. to build the forces for it. that remains the primary

contribution to national defense today. >> host: was very strong, not to push this exchange? >> guest: there were quite a few that were important. rather than focus on the leaders come the argument of underdogs is that the marine service culture is really an understudy causal factor in all these changes. mission changes, public relations successes and political lobbying, which is a fascinating story. deserted main argument here is that the way the marines thought about themselves, the way they thought about warfare and the way they thought about other services is really unique. it was different from the way the other services did. and it gave them a cohesion and a sort of energy not seen in the other services. really come at solid elaborate proof of the claim by dr. samuel johnson that when a man as he is to be hanged, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.

the rowers who fought in world war ii and korea had a lot of experience with thinking they had a fortnight to live. the result is when they came home and they thought the rest of their service, institutional threats inside the defense establishment, they mustered an extraordinary amount of cohesion and focus to push back those attempts very successfully. >> host: first of all, professor o'connell, was the marines roll and korea? >> guest: the marines were the first forces -- they were the first forces content, but they were sent as conventional combat troops to push back the north korean advance. they thought alongside the army doing the exact same thing as the army. but they got there early. and the reason they got there early was because as soon as the north koreans invaded on 25 june june 1950, even though the marine corps had no orders to the president or the joint chiefs, they immediately started mustering troops, which gunships arrived in korea are less than a month. and these guys came with their own aviation.

so what this meant in the critical first battle to stop the north korean advance that the marines were doing what is called combined arms operation. will the virtuous living, they had their own planes in the aviation plane overhead. that ability to arrive immediately and be ready for combat right away was exactly what the marines said was important after world war ii when the other services or say no, no, nuclear weapons will do that anymore. >> host: you mention political lobbying on behalf of by the marines. how did that occur? >> guest: is extraordinary. after world war ii, all the services reorganized to do away away with the navy as principal cabinet positions that create what will become the department of defense. in the start of this process can the president and all the other services were more or less on board, radically reducing the marines will national defense. they didn't want a second land army, which is what he thought? the marine had come to that?? world war? ii.???? the marines took some of their

smartest and most well-connecte? officers and they really became? insurgents inside the defense?? establishment.??????? they broke rules.? they stole top-secret documents? they copied them. they get them out to the? pres? they directly violated orders o? the president and almo?st got? there, not relieved.??? and they did all of this becaus? they believe the court is at?? risk and the only way they coul? think of us out by working within the rules, but working outside those rules.?????? and it was an extraordinary success. not only did they defeat the ?rst round of legislation, but? by 1953, they get there, done on the joint chiefs.? he goes from being a two? star major general to a four-star?? general and the role of the??? joint chiefs of staff. and make it a special protectio? by congress to set the marine?? corps will not be any smaller than three divisions in prayer? ways.??????? mr. president, you can change?? that. it's a remarkable achievement for military service to?? get? congress to reach into the

president's prerogative of how we shall structure the armed?? forces.? and they did it through backdoo? lobbying. >> host: was president eisenhower fan of th?e? marin? >> guest: neither truman or ?senhower friends of the???? ?rines.???? both are army veterans.????? eisenhower's chief of staff of? the younger women to?????? restructuring, which the marines ? back very? successfully.?? president truman was famously?? said in a letter of really??? incautious haze that the marine? have a propaganda machine that ? almost equal to stalin.??? biscuits and in so much trouble that he is to make a huge publi? apology.??????? that is the day they mobilize?? their congressional coalition to get their special protection fo? three divisions in response to? ?uman's? blowout.???? >> host: are you a marine?? >> guest: i am.?? >> host: manages her become? aware? >> guest: i joined in 1895? straight out of college. actually trinity college in? hartford connecticut and graduate work at yale.?? i? served on active duty for f? years and have been in the???

reserves are present, are? present, so i'm 17 years in now? i am incognito here at the nava? academy till summertime and then ?get my haircut.???? ?ster would be served? >> guest: i served in afghanistan just about a year?? ago and in the pentagon in quite a few different positions and?? then also at camp lejeune,? noh carolina and in the little independent duty station in south and from indiana.  host: what are some of the? tensions that the marines currently have with the navy? because there is a dependent relationship, isn't there??? just a guess, although i???? wouldn't say they're a major?? tensions now.???? one of the benefits of an???? historian as he can hide in the past and own up to be too much? work in the present.?????? really the modern marine corps? today is a remarkable success story. the tensions are very?? low.? it's interesting that? in the 40s the navy spent a lot of??? time telling the marines that?? had, we take care of you.???? we provide the ships. prepare for your ?airplane. prepay for one of the equipment?

you use and you should be happy? we are? here.???????? after the creation of these??? amphibious forces after korea, after world war ii, the story?? changed somewhat and other navy? says hey, don't cut money for the? navy.??????? you don't have these very task? forces that can land all? over? the world into a biscuit tins.? so the relationship is a little? reverse.?? the institutional power of the? marine corps is radically different now than it was wh?e? 1840s for a few examples.???? then there were 3% of the???? active-duty in 1941 from their circuit dozen men.????? today there's 200,000.????? 14% of the armed forces.???? then they had no???? public-relations apparatus nat? and 40 decorated officer for ?ople of four people in 1941.? now they have a rather elaborate.???? i don't? think i would disagree to have been incredibly????? ?ccessful brand.???? by all accounts in more videos? and television shows than you

could? possibly mention, this ? all evidence of their ability t? create powerful civilian military alliances that protected their interest in times of war and times of peace. >> host: the term marine is??? misleading, isn't that?????? >> guest:? nowadays -- began?? commissure is a great proof of the marine institutional???? ?ccess. the words are inherently tied to ?e navy in their explicit??? expertise is moving from ship to shore. if that's true, why is general? john allen of the united states? marine corps the top? commander of all nato and coalition troops ?? afghanistan??????? perhaps the single most landlocked country in the world with the possible exception of? chad. the reason is the marines have? expanded their missions and??? their role in national defense. so yes, it doesn't seem right. why are they called the reason for fighting and not??????

afghanistan?? posts go wide underdogs????? ?at you call this doctrine? t? >> guest: the marines have a nickname for themselves, which is double dogs from world war i. but really the best term to describe how the marines thought of themselves as underdogs. they were always a minority culture. they were just a very small institution instead the larger defense establishment of the always felt from the beginning to be persecuted and under threat, under siege by the army and navy. i'm very worried would attempt to reduce the numbers can reduce their funding or even abolished on our right. so the single most important characteristic of the course culture is this notion that if they don't do everything they can to win allies face, when friends and protect their interests, they'll be wiped out. >> host: suppertime, is that underdog feeling reinforced the marines? >> guest: it is still alive and well today. i must be clear. there's very positive elements of the cultural trade.

it's made them focused, energized and cohesive. but even today in a time when they have protections they are questionably prestigious, popular and important, president don't dare insult them as they did in the 40s and 50s. riesel still say, watch out. better take care of our own. if we don't, no one else will.? at the public stops caring abou? the marine corps, the marine? corps will cease to exist. >> host: what you teach at the marine corps academy? >> guest: i teach marine corps history, naval history, classes off afghanistan and civil military relations.??? >> host: so, can the?? midshipman transition into the marine? corps?????? ?ende midshipman transition??? >> guest: it's a very?????? competitive process. there were more than want? to? become marines nr slots? for? them.?? ?ey can? transition quite wel. we have a number of points at the naval academy, both in the

classroom and in their company staffs, to give them shall we say familiarization with marine corps culture. ..??????????????? from the students to bring it back then there was in the faculty but the faculty did not resist it in any way and my old? dissertation committee members? now teaching the naval history

class after paul kennedy. >> brand new book out on the market "underogs" is the name of it the making of the modern marine corps, marine and professor aaron o'connell as the author. >> book tv recently spoke with wayne hsieh to discuss "west pointers and the civil war." the professor was interviewed as part of book tv college series. it's just under 20 minutes. >> u.s. naval academy professor wayne hsieh "west pointers and the civil war" the name of your book. the old army in the war and peace is the subtitle. first of all, what you mean by the old army? >> the old army is a term commonly used by historians. actually from the time period referring to the indian army, the indian fighting army. there's a joke he told army is the army before every war. there's a bunch of old armies. my book actually starts really with a professional was asian of the american army after the war of 1812 enzus.

so it's about how that process occurs and the old army how that plays out in the civil war. >> give us a snapshot of what the old army prior to the war of 1812 was like. >> the old army before the war f-18 12th and this is going on the historical literature, the army before the war of 1812 was nonprofessional. the officer corps is mostly obtained positions through political influence at part of the american political patronage system and as a consequence they are not because they are not professionals who for went through a body of education and were promoted by this system of merit the don't perform very well in the war of 18 false a washington, d.c. is burned and the early attempt to vacate canada don't go very well. they are all catastrophes. it's an example look at the war of 1812. they are part of a big victory of repelling american invaders and so after the war of 18th of,

you have a big movement that starts during the war and their needs to be a more systematic way of selecting and preparing officers to be in the army to the commanders. >> who spearheaded the change after 1812? >> the crucial figure is winfield scott who was a wonderful figure because the carrier begins before the war of 1812 and extends right up until the opening of the civil war when he finally retires, but there are a few other officers but scott is the most important. they become very much their agenda very much is to build a proper professional the institution and to take expertise, usually european or french and bring it into the united states and another major figure and france basically to collect information about military education and he

collects the numbers of books and materials and comes back to west point and with the support of people like space, he becomes a prominent general during the war of 1812. he is able to have though west point experience and how to move forward. >> when was west point found it? >> 1802. >> and it always -- i think historians still argue about what thomas jefferson was really after when the school was founded but no one disagrees that the schools were weak. it's unclear what the purpose of the institution is. there is not, there is widely divergent action and to this day it's still the father of west point because he puts it on much sounder and systematic institutional footing and that is very important because that's the army that will produce the

generals, that institution at west point is going to be where most of these generals that their initial professional experience. >> well, professor the title is "west pointers and the civil war." who are some of the west pointers we've heard of the board generals and the civil war on both sides? >> sherman, grant, lee, could to give you a charter member there are some famous non-west pointers, but there are still. to give you a sense of the numbers, two-thirds of the major generals are the veterans in the regular army dominated by west point, so it's not only that most officers in the regular army are graduates at west point

is the focal point of much of the army's professionalism so when they do review boards for things like new tactics they will use the cadets as guinea pigs and they will have the march around so west point has the library available so it becomes the place. we think of the big three, grant, sherman more than the big three west pointers know each other and they've all gone through that experience. >> so when it comes down to the civil war you've got generals on the south and on the north that have been trained in the same ways. what does that do to some of the conflict? >> for me the most important thing that happens, most important result of that is the war is fighting essentially clones of each other in a sense because their leadership models,

their experiences are similar. what happens of the armies are locked in the equilibrium of competence. in one another that is what causes the war to last as long as it does and described as being indecisive the war doesn't end at 61 but a battle doesn't end at 62 or 63 it takes until 1865 and it is a long process and it is partly because the army since the start out with very similar institutional models, they learn the similar rates so they both get much better at about the same pace so you can still have battlefield decisions. but a lot of times in military history when you see the big attack like napoleon where he destroys the entire pressure army in one blow you have to have not just superior, you also

have to have superior organizational institutions. during the civil war you have clearly better you do become better generals. the institutions are similar at each engagement at of chancellorsville. that is a great example. and we have a question for the chancellor's but he can't quite truly destroy the entire federal army. partly because these armies are so similar come at such a similar level of competence and proficiency. >> was one of the goals of the big battles was one of the goals and end all types of focus we are going to end of the war? >> that really is the hope. >> was that taught at west point? >> one of the curious ironies about this is west point -- and this is part of the problem because west point is because of the influence by the french