south and the attempts at compromise to avoid war that failed upon the attack on fort sumter in april 1861. this is just under an hour. >> thank you very much. i'm very pleased to be here in atlanta, at the atlanta history center. i've been coming to atlanta for decades, and i still of very strong connections with the city. my wife went to college here. one of my brothers went to law school here, and he still lives in a city and practices law here. older son also went to law school. but he does not live in a city. my youngest son does, however, with his family. he lives here. moreover, my wife has an aunt and cousins who live in the city. so i still have very strong connections to land. now, tonight i'm going to

discuss abraham lincoln stroll, 1860-1861. more specifically, i want to talk about why abraham lincoln rejected any meaningful compromise. following his election as president november 1860, the country the script but a crisis. because many southerners feared lincoln and his republican party. republican party was a northern party, and proudly so. but it did not have a significant southern connection. lincoln was elected without a single electoral votes from any of the 15 slave states, and only four border states, missouri, kentucky, maryland and delaware did he get any popular vote. and they are nearly a handful. for the first time in the nation's history, a party without any notable southern component would be taking over

the executive branch of the national government. but there was more. the republican party, as i said, was proudly a northern party, turning its brief existence found in the mid-1850s, its rhetoric had a song of the south, and the south a social institution racial slavery. their determination, that is the republicans determination, that too well the north into unity that can win a national election without any southern support, republicans repeatedly condemned the south is unprogressive, undemocratic, even un-american. with this party on the threshold of the presidency, southern sexual radicals known as my readers, those people who preached the gospel of this union, they took to the public platform and to the newspaper columns to proclaim that the crisis of the southsouth was and

that the south had to act to protect itself from hatred of evil republicans, cries, filled with the southern air. this was not the first time sexual crisis that gripped the country, however. there have been several sharp sectional disputes prior to 1860. each of these come each of the major ones have been settled by a compromise. here i was specifically to the four critical once. first, the constitutional convention of 1787 in philadelphia. the missouri crisis of 1820 which had to do with the admission of missouri as a slave state and the future slavery in the louisiana purchase, which, of course, agenda was much more than the state of louisiana. it covered almost all the territory from the mississippi river to the rocky mountains save for texas. it was settled by the missouri

compromise. then 1832-33, the nullification controversy between the state of south carolina and the federal government was also settled by compromise. and, finally, the late 1840s, the battle over the future slavery in the territory one from mexico, known as the mexican session, following the mexican war, was settled by the compromise of 1850. thus coming to look at these four examples, another such settlement to take place in 1860-61. the chief issue between the republicans and the south involves slavery. but not slavery in the 15 states where it exists. almost all americans in 1860, republicans included, believed that the constitution protected slavery in the states where it existed. rather, the critical question

was slavery international territories, and the territories owned by the nation but have not yet become states. these territories comprised with you today today as the great plains, the rocky mountains and west of the rocky mountains to california. didn't include california because california as you know was already a state. question was so critical because it had to do with the future of slavery, and the future of southern power in the nation. now, southerners demanded what they saw as their constitutional rights as american citizens to take their property, including slave property, into territories owned by the entire nation. in 1857, in the famous or

infamous dred scott decision, united states supreme court confirmed the southern constitutional view. republicans in contrast, never, no matter the supreme court. republicans would allow no more slaves in any territory. abraham lincoln was elected in november 1860. a month later, the united states congress came into session. members of congress put forth various compromise proposals, a critical portion of all in some way dealt with the division of the territory. most often their was a proposal to extend some kind of dividing line, westward beyond the louisiana purchase all the way to the border of california. now, after this rather lengthy

preface i'm going to get to my main topic of why lincoln rejected on meaningful compromise, which dealt with the territories. but there must be one thing more. i'm going to talk about three different men tonight. one of you, one of them, all of you know, those men, abraham lincoln and we was and what he did. the other two are not so well known. so probably a number of your familiar with henry clay, the great kentucky statesman. probably a cucumber will now henry seward went 1860, the senior senator from new york state and try to lincoln's nomination from the presidency, was by far the most notable and well-known republican in the country. now finally here i am, i'm ready to start. [laughter] henry clay, why am i going to

start with henry clay had been dead for eight years in 1860? during the first of the 19th century henry clay was a major figure in american politics. he was not as the great compromiser, four on three occasions in 1820, 1832-1833, and in 1850, clay had a major role in shaping such compromise. still, that doesn't bring clay down to 1860. clay comes down to is because abraham lincoln looked at clay as his political mentor. clade was his political hero. he called clay an ideal of the statesman. lincoln's best known remarks on clay, came in a eulogy delivered only a week after clay's death. in these remarks, lincoln

praised the kentucky statesman for his leading, and most conspicuous part in devising sectional compromise. at the same time, lincoln underscored that as a politician statesmen, no one was so habitually careful as click to avoid all sectional ground. whatever he did, he did for the country. showering adulation on clay for his willingness and ability to work with political opponents as was with political allies. lincoln highlighted his main point, that clay engaged his whole energies on behalf of the union. as late as february 1861 in the middle of the crisis of the union, lincoln professed during my whole political life i have loved and revered clay as a teacher and leader. in his permission, lincoln also noted clay's opposition to slavery. for lincoln, that anti-slavery

stands as vital because as the man who was opposed to slavery, and lincoln could never embrace his hero any man who was proslavery. several times and addresses, lincoln made clear look care, to point to place detestation of slavery, and particularly particularly's opposition to the institution spread. lincoln didn't invent an anti-slavery. anti-slavery, clay. yet be overlooked and downplayed his willingness to moderate that stands. without doubt, clay was a slave owner did detest the institution. he even tried unsuccessfully to get his state, kentucky, to adopt gradual emancipation. client also said he would never forced slavery into any area where it had not previously existed here yet, in 1850, referring specifically to the

mexican session, clay declared that if the citizens there placed slavery in their constitutions he would honor their choice, and he did back the compromise of 1850, which gave the possibility of slavery in the new mexico and utah territories. for clay, no other moral issue, including slavery, matched and importance and maintenance of the union. lincoln, too, spoke about compromise and initially did not turn from it. by his own account he treasured the missouri compromise, and he publicly stood for the compromise of 1850. the mid '50s, he sounded like clay himself. he announced i to go for saving the union. much as i hate slavery, he said, i would consent to its extension rather than see the union dissolve.

as i would consent to any other evil to avoid a greater one. in the late 1850s, however, such declarations disappeared from lincoln's speeches. as late as 1850 he did indicate that he still act we just in the compromise of 1850. lincoln received the republican nomination for president in 1860, in large part because he was perceived as more conservative. thus more electable than the much better known seward. yet a closer look webcast considerable doubt on the assumption. in his widely distributed house divided speech of 1858, lincoln had explicitly announced that the country cannot endure permanently, half slave and half free. and substance, this house divided idea and the conflict i didn't associate with seward,

seward said -- [inaudible] between north and south, between freedom and slavery, the two ideas meshed perfectly. one great difference did exist, however. far more prominent than lincoln in 1860, seward had been the emmett spokesman of anti-slavery politics are a decade. as far back as 1850, he had condemned any territorial compromise including the compromise of 1850. he called for a higher law than the constitution. republicans in 1860 hungry for victory passed over seward. he had been in the public eye too long. lincoln got the nod for president. when the crisis erupted after lincoln's election, when that crisis led to a discussion on through public and camp on how to respond to it, lincoln unequivocally oppose compromise even as the union came upon.

he absolutely did not about claylike stance. why he broke so sharply from clay's heritage does not have a simple answer. yet, the historical record does permit, i think, a reasonable explanations to i think the evidence leads to three central motives. first, -- [inaudible] second is vigorous partisanship, and third, his visceral anti-slavery commitment. and want to take up each of these three in turn. first, about the south. in my judgment, lincoln's lack of understanding about the south was formative. dismissing the seriousness of secession and looking on as a conspiracy, by a small band of radicals and be put down by men like himself, lincoln found no

other explanation possible to as he saw it, the drive for secession search had nothing to do with anything he or his party have said or done. that conclusion leaves one unexpectedly -- unmistakably to observation. first, he clearly rationalizes his house divided declaration, for any right because others the future king had no place for them and achieve social institution. moreover, conflicts embraced by republican hard-liners, or the republican left, likewise, could lincoln have been tone deaf? could southerners hear such an assertion? he must have been. 40 told the kentucky and that neither he know any republican have justly made himself obnoxious to the south by

anything he had said or done. lincoln evidently never stopped to think how he would have reacted to a responsible southern leader publicly proclaiming that the free states had no future in eating. yet he did react forcefully to what he claimed was a plot by southerners to nationalize slavery. even though on the stump lincoln struck out against this specter, even suggesting that the supreme court intended to make illinois the slave state, no important southern politician ever advocated such a course. it also appears indisputable that he assumes such a stance because he knew so little about the south. yes, at 19 and 22, he had taken brief trips down the ohio and mississippi rivers to new

orleans. additionally, of course as you know he was born in kentucky, and his wife in from a slave owning family in that state, as did his best friend. at that part of the border south was all that he knew. after his two youthful journeys to new orleans, he never traveled in the south beyond kentucky. aside from a few kentuckians, he really did not know any southerners. certainly not any southern politicians. he had in a late 1840s served one term in the united states house of representatives, where he surely met southerners and, in fact, became friendly with a few. but that was almost a decade and a half before the crisis following his election in 1860. in the interval had kept up with none of those men. fundamentally, he had no friends that could educate them about the south and about southern politics. the record indicates that

lincoln's image of the slave south basically matched by common abolitionists and firm in anti-slavery depictions. and the south, this south, dominated society and politics. in 1860, 1861 advocate for succession and towering non-slaveowners but lincoln appears to have had no understanding either of the widespread ownership of slaves among whites, or how deeply slavery had become embedded in saudi society. instead of comprehending that the overwhelming majority of southern whites were committed to their slave society, it seems that lincoln thought of them as conservative unionists with little attachment to slavery. in other words, they were very much like abraham lincoln, except perhaps without his moral outrage towards slavery. perhaps the mass of southern whites could not or would not

act against slavery, but lincoln could not imagine him either pro-slave, nor on their own acting against the union. i south where non-planters, even non-slaveowners have a voice, republicans have actively supported session was both foreign and unknown to lincoln. but a visit to lincoln and springfield, illinois, after the election he earned -- urged his friend -- [inaudible] honestly about the republican triumph. lincoln's reply spoke volumes. there are no such men. with no firsthand knowledge of the south, and having no real friends or even serious acquaintance among southern politicians, lincoln unsurprisingly did not acknowledge the distinctive

between the fire eaters, those zealous advocates of secession, and other southern politicians were fundamentally conservative who had no relish with this issue. men like jefferson davis and mississippi who would become the confederate president, and alexander stephens, here in georgia, who of course would become the president -- southern vice president who oppose secession to lincoln drew them all together to keep is not have understood the political force pressed by fire eaters or southern conservatives and southern regulators. now, while lincoln's ignorance of the south powerfully influenced his opposition to compromise, i think his partisanship also played a critical part. his actions made clear he approached the crisis not as the president-elect of the united states, but as leader of the republican party. moreover, by november 1860, he

has been but a few months as party chief. that brief tenure left him unsure about the security of his leadership, and anxious about party unity. during the crisis many republicans and non-republicans alike urged him to make a public statement addressing the issues, we assuring southerners of the rights and his determination to be president of all americans, southerners as well as northern, time and time again, lincoln refused. responding to this cascade of requests, lincoln embraced a mantra. i can say nothing which i've met aubrey said and which is in print and open to inspection to all. repetition, repetition as he phrased it could only harm his political position. in his in flexibility, he seems not to fathom that the most vigorous rhetoric, some of what he had said, could terrify the

south. additionally, integrated lincoln acknowledged that everyone of those statements have been made as a republican partisan, not as the next president of the country. furthermore, none of those declarations have been made when the country faced the monumental crisis. obviously lincoln never stepped forward publicly in an effort to conciliate alarm to southerners. if he had, given his unmatched gift for crafting of the fitting phrases for particular political moment, one might imagine his been, if not his words, such an address could have noted his resignation that he was not one of them, he was not a southerner, and it represented a party perceived by the multitude of southerners as their enemy.

quickly, counter however that we're all still americans entering his presidency neither he nor his party would in any way try to harm the south. not once did lincoln ever said publicly that he would be president of all americans. and letting himself to the open platform and claim he could not deviate from it, he acted like a partisans partisan, not the leader of the country. of course the critical question, the critical question focuses on the why, underlying his legitimacy. the evidence strongly suggests he feared alienating his party's hard-liners, of the left of his party to lincoln constantly expressed concern that miniseries compromise would fracture his party. he meant drive off the left. if that segment bolted because of sectional compromise, lincoln

worried the republican party would disintegrate. [inaudible] the right clearly outnumbered the left. a suggested approach to assess lincoln scored concentrates on seward. seward had been passed over because he was perceived as too radical. but in this crisis, stewart became a man who aimed at compromise. early on, considerable before lincoln, stewart received the union to be in mortal danger. above all, he wanted to present -- prevent its dissolution if possible. he had been in washington entire decade of 1850s and knowing many southern politicians, he had a much better grasp than lincoln of the political force of secession, and the political reality facing moderate southerners, like davis and stevens. then he believed that the, this

adamant opposition to territories had done its work with republicans, only elected one of them president. this award, and was chiefly a political matter. he said the united states was never going to read any more territory without republican conference. didn't need to put in place these four model obstacles to settlement. stewart also sought the republican victory in no small part as result of democratic invision. he judged the normal proclivities of american voters as democratic. but as you know in 1860, the democratic party divided. a known candidate and a southern candidate. that division which clearly edited republican. so would've felt, the democrats would reunite and cause republicans massive trouble and

less the party could expand. seward want to reach out to the anti-secessionists and the upper importer south. seward bring these people to the republican party was not impossible, but essential. without a question, a number of them were quite willing to become republicans, coming to a party that emphasized the union rather than sectional antagonism. no evidence suggests that lincoln conceded any republican future the on the border of the 1860 artie. he did later on, but not, after the war started but not in 1860. as for the unity of this republican party, seward occupied different ground than lincoln did. since inception of the party, even before when seward had been a major spokesman for the antislavery northern wakes, he

had been evangelists of the irrepressible conflict. he had the stand to repel and soften republican left which surely would have. moreover, the party i think -- distrust the hard-liners seward asked where could they go. and even at the most radical did go, the appearance of the southern unionists would offset their loss. thus, for seward the republican party would become the great union party. a solid presence in the south, particularly in the upper south and along the border, as i said just a moment ago lincoln did turn this union party idea, only after the shooting started. before hostilities he absolutely did not. yes, lincoln was leader of the south, and jesse viewed the crisis from a partisan perspective. but there was a third fundamental reason. and the evidence suggests much

deeper more visceral hatred of slavery and its seward. seward without question did -- never get a moral equality, convinced however that the population growth and geographic expansion, of the free states along with her economic power that this would naturally overpower slavery. he was willing to let the institution and southern political straight they saw become casualties of what he foresaw as america's inevitable progress. thus, after the territory, he a conscious purchase in 1860, elected a republican to seward was quite willing to shell that. not so lincoln. to him, the territorial issue was never about politics alone. to him, it spoke about the

nation. even if primarily as a symbol. in his mind, the nation must be about freedom. never about slavery. that servitude had informed his important and well-known cooper union speech that he gave a new city in february 1860. this speech help repelled into the top of the list of possible republican candidates, and made him a known figure in northeastern republicans. in this address, lincoln made opposition to slavery in the territories and the power of the federal government to enact a such a policy direct legacies of the founding fathers. of the men who had formed the country, during and after math of revolution. focusing on a discrete group of this generation, manufacture signed the constitution. lincoln argued in his speech that they were overwhelmingly

anti-slavery. including the southerners. they intended to lincoln, insisted, and anti-slavery future for "the new republic." in his version of history, this noble goal had somehow been set aside, to restore it as primary was the duty of the republicans. as a political pronouncement promoting himself, the speech was enormously successful. as a legal brief it was indeed effective, but as history, and lincoln defined his remarks as history always emphasizing what he called facts, it was decidedly one-sided. the founding fathers had not circumscribe slavery at all. for three decades after the ratification of the constitution, slavery and freedom had marched westward side-by-side. with powerful support from some notable founding fathers.

new territories open to slavery had been acquired or organized under every president since george washington to james monroe. and, of course, that included john adams, thomas jefferson and james madison as well as washington and monroe. for slavery, the founding fathers bequeathed a more complicated legacy than lincoln reported, and evidently wanted to believe. in the crisis, lincoln never spoke publicly to the south, but he did write some private letters to a few southerners who had written to him. in these letters lincoln would talk about slavery and talk about right and wrong, telling the southerners that they thought of it as right, and he thought of it as wrong. this is not new language for lincoln. as early as 1850, he told a former law partner that the slavery question can't be compromised.

that was a logical statement from a man who -- shackled slaves as a continual torment to me. lincoln compared slavery and freedom to to wild beasts in sight of each other, but chains held apart. someday he predicted these deadly antagonists will break their bonds and then the question will be settled. a key reason for his opposition to stephen a. douglas, the great democrat from illinois, lay in what he saw as douglas' view on slavery. lincoln said douglas don't care whether this latest go up and down, by god, cares and humanity cares and i care. to his past in springfield, lincoln described slavery is evil as which all other evils and dangers have come. it must be stopped, he vowed. thus, faced with the decision to accept the compromise that in his mind attacked slavery even

more secured than even permitting its expansion them lincoln said never. lincoln's stance now did not signify that the a line with abolitionists. he never advocated any move against slavery and the states. time and again he declared that the federal government possess no such power. this deep commitment to the constitution he could say nothing of. lincoln even supported by one measure aimed at compromise they came out of congress that admission, the original 13th amendment. which would have made the prohibition of slavery in the states almost impossible. it did pass the congress and would undoubtedly would've been put in the constitution. even in his inaugural address, lincoln expressed his support for this amendment whic which yn would've made the abolition of slavery almost impossible. he simply could not count a

direct assault on slavery where it existed, but by the waiting territorial expansion with the institution of slavery itself, lincoln found a way past the constitutional barrier. slavery he pronounced must remain within its borders, and that fashion he could place the evil in a stock a. thus -- stockade. free reason, lincoln's ambush of the south, his partisanship, is -- [inaudible] on the slaves of the deny states, abraham lincoln was a new. he rejected meaningful compromise. in that rejection, he certainly rejected henry clay's legacy. and with his rejection, compromise had no chance. it failed. when compromise failed, secession triumphs. thank you very much.

thank you very much. [applause] >> if you have a question, please come to the microphone. >> who is talking to lincoln about compromise, other than seward? >> lots of republicans. lots of other republicans, as well as non-republicans. efforts in the congress, i don't want to bore you with all this kind of details, but there are congressional publicans who oppose some sort of compromise and they would write lincoln and as going to please women are second and, and lincoln would say no. anti-secessionists in the upper south and border states wrote to lincoln, urging them to accept

compromise and lincoln said no, he wouldn't do it. so there were some republicans, many more than seward, and union is an upper south and border. also northern democrats. the republican party itself was invited -- was divided. it was an up and down vote on compromise and undoubtedly any compromise forces would have been on top. most other republicans were in the middle. they didn't know what to do. the republicans in congress, and they would say and public leadership, they are waiting for a signal from somebody what to do, so lincoln made clear where he stood. steward realized that lincoln was the president-elect, and he couldn't buck lincoln and he felt like it even after seward fell in line with lincoln he reminded to keep the south the border with you but i think it's fair to say without sorts effort it would have been more than seven states in february 1861.

[inaudible] >> he asked what were the terms. there were very distinct. wonky issue was always the territory. some way to divide the territory of the united states. and the most common proposal was to draw a geographical line west, once you get past kids which became a state, in the winter of 61, to the west, beyond the rocky mountains to the border of california, freedom on one side. now, the language used daily from one proposal to the next proposal, that was the key, somehow divide the great territory out there, and make part of it open to slavery and prohibit slavery in part of it. that was always the key.

they're always other things evolved like return of fugitive slaves. because could you have federal slaves -- slaves on federal property? but the key was always the territories. because that was the future. over the south and north saw it as the future. [inaudible] >> he asked that i believe the civil war -- [inaudible] i do nothini donot think the civil ws inevitable. that's what my book is all about. could lincoln make it happen? no, lincoln didn't make it happen by himself if there were lots of people involved. now, instead of compromises not mean that war has become because lincoln becomes president a month before. there's no war for another six weeks. war becomes because of the crisis at fort sumter in charleston harbor which would have nothing to do with the

compromise attempts in congress. the failure of compromise in congress ensured that it would be a number of states out of the union. but the whole question of the war itself at fort sumter is another question. i do talk about that in my book but that's another question. yes. >> in november of 60, the people of atlanta loaded plurality pashtun vote plurality to compromise. they didn't vote for the secession. and then in january, when it came time to elect a delegate to the convention, they voted of secession. in that timeframe, [inaudible] there was a fire. i'm wondering if a compromise proposal, it seems to me with the election of lincoln it was

over. [inaudible] >> let me give you an example for the state, george. i won't talk about atlanta% but i will talk about the state of georgia. innocent there's a special committee to try to come up with a solution to this problem. one of its members was a georgian by the name of robert tuned countr. when the compromise proposals came before the senate committee known as the committee of 13, because the 13 members, he said he would accept such a proposal, even though he personally didn't like it because he knew georgians would accept it. if such a proposal had been accepted by the committee of 13, and robert said i will stand for. george would never sissy. it wasn't george the secession convention, the initial vote on

the secession ordinance in the georgia convention was a narrow vote. and in the election for those delegates to the secession convention in georgia, one of the problems be at the secession people had was that leadership like stevens, for reasons that are very difficult to understand, never really made much of a campaign for their site. but even so, it was a narrow margin on the first vote. and if compromise have been moving in the congress, when have happen. i'm convinced of that. not in this day. south carolina is another better. that's another matter, but i think get any kind kind of compromise moving through the congress and he would have had a reprise of a notification process. because once you get georgia going out, in louisiana which was very divided, it took other states moving first fo for the states to come out. so i think compromise, if it

been going to the congress would've made a big difference. [inaudible] >> as forests others were concerned they can think of anyway to nation of slavery because they thought that a state would have to decide for so. it could not be a federal decision. if illinois want to be a slave state, illinois itself would have to make that decision. the supreme court in the dred scott decision said that american citizens to take the property into any state, i'm in any territory. that's not in any state. and what the supreme court might have done in some constitutional scholars argue this that over time the court might have said that a southerner could take his slave property through a state like traveling from illinois, through illinois to someplace

else, many of the northern states had laws against the. that had been the case at the beginning of the country, but get to the 1850s most northern states have laws that would free any slave who comes into the state if their master would allow them in. some scholars argued that they some dred scott the court might have gone on that road. that's a fried -- that's a far cry from nationalizing slated to i don't think it could have been done. few if any node in states would've ever voted to put slavery in place. [inaudible] well, my view of questions like that, stories tend to get --

historians can get questions like that. i have enough good trouble, explain what happened in the past. the future is beyond me. the president is beyond me much less the future. >> thanks for being here, professor. i was wondering, henry clay or daniel webster lived long enough to lincoln's election, might they have swayed him to police because that's a better question for me because that's about the past. you know that's what we call counterfactual questions. who knows? and yet i will say that there was some republican hard-liners who would write letters in this crisis and say, we really couldn't take the kind of stand we needed taken to clay and webster were gone. they valued the union more than anything else and they would've compromised anything to keep the union together.

whereas lincoln of course on the union coming apart before his very eyes. the confederate states of america was established almost a month ago linda became president. he became president with a truncated union. of course, no one knew at that time was going to happen to the separation, nobody knew. i can't say that they could've persuaded lincoln but the would've been more forces for compromise then there were. [inaudible] to the book stops when the shooting starts but i go to fort sumter. i talk a lot about fort sumter. [inaudible] what do you think would've happened to the south if they chosen to take major anderson's compromise, letting them know that in today's they would run out of supplies?

>> well, that was not a compromise major anderson's proposed to he did two things. first, early march he inform the war department in washington he was running out of supplies and he could only last six more weeks. he had never said that to them before. but at the same time he said he is running out of supplies he said the defense and batteries and such the confederates have built around fort sumter were so strong that it would take a massive force to relieve him successfully, a force that was far beyond the ability of the united states army and navy to provide at that time. so anderson really said look, i can't maintain myself fear, but there's no way you can, help me. anderson fully expected he would be told to withdraw. now, when you come down to the final crisis when lincoln decides what he's going to do is to send an expedition that will provide supplies to major

anderson, though he did not send troops or munitions, when the confederate commander in charleston sent his delegation out to anderson to kill anderson that you've got to surrender, or we will reduce you. anderson at the point told them, look, i've got to leave in two days, by the 15th of april, so that's a factor he said if you come at me i will fight back. ball regard census information to my comment because he relies this is a question of peace and what the the work in the coming as conduct for modern, look, if anderson was this what exactly is going to leave, then you don't take them out. otherwise you reduce the ford. anderson said to them, i will leave at noon on april 15, unless, unless i was a different borders from my government are i

am reinforced. at the time the confederates knew the relief mission was en route to charleston as a matter fact that very night it was off charleston are. of course, the answer would not be because he didn't promise unequivocally he would leave, and so he was told that the firing would commence promptly, and it didn't. yes or. so anderson, he never made the proposal budget suggested, not exactly those terms. [inaudible] just speculating that abraham lincoln knew what was going to happen. basically tricked this others into attacking first. >> he didn't take anybody but if you think he had every reason to expect that the southerners would react with force but he had been told that directly. by just a few days before by a

13. even told that by suing. he had been told by others. that any use of force, the word they use was coercion. any use of coercion against any part of the confederate states would result in war and the secession of others southern states. and after the fact, lincoln told the man who had devised this relief plan, which lincoln altered, the person who first proposed in committed, is that things had worked out fine for them even though it hadn't gone exactly as this command had no. he also told his best friend that he been thinking about some for all along, and things worked out for the best. it's hard for me to believe that lincoln didn't expect southerners, the confederates to shoot, but, of course, he could've hoped that they wouldn't. and i think he probably did hope that they wouldn't. but to say he expected them not to i think is too much.

and he didn't take anybody. he told the governor of south olympic what you think he wouldn't tell jefferson davis because the confederate government wasn't legitimate. he told them, i'm sending in food and medical supplies, there will be no troops and no munitions and no guns will be fired and less my relieving force, not relieving, my recent life force, force is used against. but there was no chicory. they knew what was coming. now, they might have believed he was claiming to send just supplies and it troops in there, too, because too complicated right now, don't have time, diplomatic mission, davis, the confederates decided been misled, but that wasn't lincoln's doing. that was her friend, mr. seward. [inaudible] many people think that one of

the worst presidents in united states was president beginning. -- president buchanan. [inaudible] to prevent the onset of the civil war. is that correct? >> beauty and did some things. he didn't do all, someone might want them to do he did a good many things. for example, major anderson and late december 1860 transferred his force on sullivan's island, a place of south carolinians could have easily taken no terribly to fort sumter. the carolinians were upset. the powerful democrats in congress were upset, southern democrats in congress were upset because buchanan promised he would take no action at charleston harbor and they saw anderson's move to fort sumter as action. they pressed buchanan to force

anderson withdraw. divorce anderson to withdraw. but buchanan wouldn't do that. his decision to maintain anderson at fort sumter, and a decision he held to remain of his presidency, gave lincoln cars and lincoln would have had. on top of that, you can told major anderson at fort sumter that if he needed help, if he needed any help he had it read to come. they had an expedition ready to go. now, of course, if buchanan had been faced with what lincoln was faced with, overwhelming force is required, the army didn't have that much strength, buchanan in my judgment probably would have ordered withdraw of anderson. but buchanan did more than people give him credit for doing. and we didn't do as much as he probably could have. on the other hand, he had a terrible problem because he couldn't anything out of the congress. the republicans opposed everything. he couldn't get anything out of the congress.

[laughter] [inaudible] [laughter] >> thank you very much. [applause] >> and we will carry on with the counterfactual history out in the lobby with a couple of drinks. so thank you very much for coming, and we'll have a book signing out there as well. thank you. >> c-span throw to the the white house coverage continues today as -- >> the book starts out with a combat mission in 2003, with a combat mission 2003. north of the town in iraq called nasa reappeared you have marin marines. there was a marine unit that got cut off, the biggest sandstorm i've ever seen in my life had rolled into saudi arabia and iraq, cover the whole ton except that wonderful little corner

where we were. and some had to get down underneath that stuff and try to save these marines. so that's what the book opens with. i talk little bit about the history of most of what i did, i was a wild weasel. you guys are air force, right? cadets? okay, good. you glory been there, done that. i was a wild weasel but the wild weasel is a very unique and screwed kind of person whose job in life is to go and get shot at by surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery. and if you survive, when you survive you go back around and you remove those threats so they don't bother anybody else. i'm not going to tell you what the first guy said when asked them to do this back and did not. you can read about in the book. we have young sisters i won't go into that. but is really a screw job. and that's most of what to do. toggle that about the history of how all that came to pass.

is not a textbook. when i learn i like to learn without knowing that i'm learning. i learned a lot and i didn't even know i learned anything so it's kind of what i tried to do with this. you get some history and then you start out with what happened when i was commissioned as lieutenant and the process that takes to become a pilot. and then a fighter pilot after that. i talk a little bit about, again, the first gulf war prefers funds hundred and -- there's some funny things in there, too. my first combat mission was a very, very long day of culminate in the officers club in turkey, and there's some amusing stories in the. again, i won't ruin the book for you. and then i did an exchange tour with the egyptian air force or year and a half. i had to go off to school and learn how to speak arabic and learn about them and how they

think and how they operate. got to go do that for a year which was pretty interesting. the chapter in there about that. it's called fly like an egyptian. anybody here old enough to remember the egyptian -- okay, good. walk like an egyptian. again, some amusing anecdotes in that year that i spent and some not so amusing. i think it opens with a morning when i was doing a test flight. and as soon as i racked the airplane up to do a climate, thinking how cool is this, the engine quit and it was something so cool anymore for those 50 seconds it took me to get the airplane back down on the ground. so that's kind of fun. i will tell you how that went the. sitting on the ground and it catches up with me. and the start to sweat a little bit. and i'm grateful to be back down on the ground. this peasant, this egyptian peasant walks across the runway. u.s. airbase is locked down tighter than fort knox.

you don't get on airbase, much less on the fly by without all the pieces of plastic and everything else you need. so i was not expecting to see this peasant qaeda plot along in front of my airplane. he was 20 feet in front of the check leading a donkey. i thought, what am i doing here? a donkey probably relieved himself right in front of it witwith a nipples, shook her hed at me and walked off. so there's some funny things like that. it basically traces then the path of at least my path as it fight about. i've been overseas for six years with the good life. you guys were intimately you get in trouble, you get to do things. it's almost the capital cities, a lot of neat things you don't normally see. you to keep a horse by the pyramids. how cool is that to go riding a look over and see the pyramids. but i wanted to come home. i hadn't had a sonic burger in a long time, and hadn't been into

a store that was open past 8:00 at night for a long time. i wanted to come home. and they did. got selected to attend the fighter weapons school, which is the air force version of the navy school. i had already done the navy school, kind of abbreviated exchange but it was okay but they're not half of what we are. so you guys are air force lieutenants, right? a good. nevermind the football game today. that's irrelevant. that whole taking off and landing on a carrier thing, they can keep it. it wasn't anything like ours. ours is six months long and utterly miserable. i may, i came out of that, changed human being. some say for better. i lost almost all of my cockiness, quite a few tailfeathers. and then spent the next decade being a weapons tactic officer at different levels in the fighter wing to i was at khobar towers when the police blew up.

do you customer that? you may not went -- you may not want to sit too close to me. i'm always in the wrong place at the wrong time. we hadn't really, i don't think any of us were thinking about terrorism than the way that it's thought of no. it wasn't something we were prepared to fight. we were geared up, my generation was get up to fight the soviet union. i asked my teenage daughter, you know, what's wrong with russia? she said what's that? but it was a big thing back there in the late '80s and early 90s before it toppled. we were geared up to fight in but most of us have never really considered iraq or knew saddam hussein was taken after that war was over, which when was a foregone conclusion, you know. the terrorism thing kind of took us all by surprise. we just thought they were rabble-rousers, never given too much credit to interestingly enough, although billed as a