pulitzer prize. i believe you said before that this was very important to you in development of mental health as your primary issue as first lady and even now and so i think that connects important couple of dogs between the career of jack nelson and with the carter center today pants today stands for. ..

pulitzer prize winner. i shared that day with her. we'll be reading rosemary mcgee. we'll be reading about jack's former colleague and we have on display example of the nelson paper. and i just want to thank all of you and especially our panelists so much. it was a great event. thank you so much. [applause] thank you. [inaudible conversations] [applause] is there a non-fiction author or book you would like to see featured on booktv? send us an e-mail at booktv at c-span.org or tweet us at twitter.com/booktv. on c-span2, we bring you

booktv. 48 hours of non-fiction authors and books. here are programs to look out for this weekend. at 5:00 p.m. eastern. ben argues that liberals bully their competition discouraging political debate. then at 2:00 a.m. michelle alexander crime policy from the '70s were enacted to push back gangs made during the civil rights movement. on sunday with recent policy debates on congress in immigration rebring you stories from immigrants who share their experiences on booktv. that's at 4:00 p.m. eastern. at 11:00 p.m. on sunday. melvin argues that the government is spending excessively on defense. making us less secure. watch these programs and more all weekend long on booktv. for a complete schedule, visit booktv.org. next on booktv, petered bergen and a panel of contributors discuss the book "talibanistan: negotiating the borders between

terror, politics and religion" which expores the threat posed by extremist who operate in the border area between afghanistan and pakistan. this is about an hour and a half. ♪ good morning. good afternoon, everybody. welcome. i'm steve cool i'm the president of new america foundation. it's my pleasure to welcome do you to the event briefly and introduce our subject, which from our perspective involves the launch of the book that somebody will hold up for the audience. since i don't have a copy. "talibanistan." i just wanted to say a few words about where this book came from and why the subject matter. you'll hear discussed today struck us as worthy of what became really a couple of years of endeavor at new america lead by peter bergen who will be the

host and moderator through most of the program today. peter and katherine who is not here with us today. coed ditted this book from the oxford university press. it's a collection of scholarly and journalistic articles about the taliban and the environment in southern afghanistan and western pakistan. , and it born as an attempt at new america by a diverse group of researchers to get at some of the diversity of the taliban itself at the time when the united states was puzzling over the rejury gent as a movement and a political force in afghanistan. as a military challenge, and really a challenge that had been neglected in the years after the 2001 defeat of the islamic member of the afghanistan. and which revived and presented itself as a grave d.a. lem that

toment obama administration as it arrived in 2009. our effort to cowhat think tanks do. provide ground for it an complexity and granularity about this phenomena. recognizing that the sort of clicheed image of one eyed -- and his band of the devoted and attractable fan net tack was inadequate and falsifying of the problem. so the purpose was not prosecute a particular view of the taliban but just to start to document some sections of the diversity. and some aspect of the characteristic that were otherwise not part of american debate and discourse. i'm really proud of this book. and of peter particularly whose leadership of the national security studies program at new america will be the last five years he's been one of my joys in my office to support him to watch and katherine as well. who worked very, very hard.

the last thing i want to say that the book and the ideas and the research in it is part of a much broader body of work of south asia we have been engaged here in the last five years. the channel i hope you are sub describers and carried out in collaboration with foreign policy and lot of other conferences and public cay i guesses around south ashane affairs. so anyway, we are pleased to have out indication to bring us together and the purpose to have a serious discussion about the idea and subjects that are in the book than are obviously still alive. as d.a. lem ma for american foreign policy. let me introduce peter and welcome him to the podium. thank you. [applause] thank you steven. thank you for all of you coming today and for c-span for covering this.

steve was instrumental in making this project happen. i'm grateful to him. thank you to oxford university press which published the book and did a fine job in terms of presenting the material. thank you also to my coed or it katherine and thanks to people here at the foundation brian fishman, patrick doughty, jennifer i believe you were involved in making the book possible. steve indicated the reason we thought the project was necessary a series of papers not as the command stormed on the stage out of the woods of cambodia in the 1970s had a movement become so important yet at the same time less well understood than any other insurgent movement in the modern era. and, you know, obviously we have the great book on taliban. it seemed that was much the

pre-9/11 taliban and we wanted focus on how did the taliban develop after 9/11? and we have some doesn't chapters in the book six people here on the stage contributed to the book. and a nongroup who is fellow here at the new america foundation i writing a book on afghanistan has the first chapter in the book. and the chapter he'll explain in more detail asked the question in the sense the taliban insurgency inevitable as it relates to the kandahar taliban immediately after 9/11. were there efforts by the movement to essentially negotiate with the afghan government, which unfortunately were not followed up on. we're also have on the stage a professor at national defense university and former professor of colombia and high ranking pakistan police official exams what is now the political scene the frontier proves -- in a sense the political echo system

in which the pakistan taliban is able to swim. while group like the mma went off the taliban they are sufficiently aligned with the taliban to allow it to political space that it enjoyed in the 2008, 2009 time period when it was a lot of denial about the pakistan taliban and the threat it pose to the the pakistan state. the next one is bryan fishman. a fellow here at new america foundation. "issue" a company with which many are familiar. bryan worked twon chapters. one with him. one looking at the networking in some detail aman is probably the on person in the room watching who is actually met the factor of the leader of the networking. bryan worked with him on that chapter and also did a interesting chapter where he stepped back and looked at in a sense the different taliban group u groups and asked the

different groups. do they attack the state or not. do they take direction or not? and very interesting capturing sort of tippology in the different groups. to bryan's right is ken who is one of the leading pollster in the muslim world. he helped us with the first poll that looked a the the political sensitive political questions in the triable region. obviously a polling is pretty tricky for the reasons. we had a good partner on the ground called camp. he helped us think about how to make it purely scientific poll. he'll explain the findings on the poll and written a book "terrorist in love" which is an account of jihady and why they join certain groups and talk about what he learned about

moammar in the process of writing the book. to the right of him is tom lirnlg who served on admiral mullen's staff and is now a national defense university. he has written i think ab absolutely fascinating chapter on the defeat of al qaeda what it means and the united states should do going forward in afghanistan. it's not necessary lay popular view among certain circles in washington, d.c. for instance we want to say they attack in benghazi is proof of al qaeda insurgence. he'll deal with that question. and sameer a fellow here the ph.d. candidate m.i.t. he has an interesting chapter about pakistan counter insurgety operations which has been effective. we had our own problem with counter insurgety in information -- insurgency in afghanistan the

pakistan military did better than -- with that. i'll turn it over. we'll go down the row this way. thank you very much. first and foremost, [inaudible] on the book and the great work done by the foundation on militants in south asia. it's a great contribution and a great source of research for students everywhere not only the u.s. but also in south asia. and i just actually returned from pakistan for 48 hours ago. i was just joking with a friend that my three days in pakistan ab about two and a half days was spent on discussing the new phenomena a religious -- [inaudible] it's become recent and new follow that that. many political leaders holding big rallies with hundreds of

thousands of people coming up with the coming up with new slogans and now with the elections coming in three months or so. there's a lot of political activity. i'm focusing about seven minutes i'm given on not the -- [inaudible] and i want to add to my position in the government opposition that seeing today in my views of my perm views and not representative of dod. the landscape in what was called the -- [inaudible] that's what i focused on. this is the [inaudible] we often focus on the unsettled area which is federally.

we often look at adjoining which the british had framed like this. which is about 25 million people perhaps but more than all of them together in afghanistan. so this is very critical. it's the connection between them. if i may call it that. what happened there in the last ten years or so had a huge impact on how taliban, the pakistan taliban came to be. how there was a genesis. how they established their roots. how in a step by step fashion they expanded their space. that's why the area i'll now call kbb that's why it is important. and i read about three or four points to focus on here. one is that one of the -- [inaudible] why the genesis of all congratulation -- [inaudible]

became a reality they were discovered off of all major religious and political parties. in 2008 or stwefn. it is a political life and the political parties which believe in a democratic process. these are no the the terrorist groups of our like the ttp or other groups which we believe in militant sei. these are the groups that believe in a democratic process. nay have been declared -- [inaudible] one positive thing, if i may, that this group of five different religious political parties presented sunni groups in the sunni muslim -- [inaudible] all the different religious political parties are coming

together. and this was the first opportunity this group had to rule a province. their policy created a space. they were not directly supporting militant sei of terrorism. not at all. but [inaudible] conservative narrow minded policies. are looking the other way when the militant groups -- [inaudible] that created the space for this -- [inaudible] between them. [inaudible] if you remember -- [inaudible] stop of connection with the groups what they did is starting

moving to kbb and then -- [inaudible] moved on. it was the responsibility of the kbb problems to -- [inaudible] capability to stop them because the money all the investment was made not in the most civilly law enforcement. all [inaudible] the gap created that provided this opportunity for all of the kbb at any activity three of the points, one is about -- [inaudible] was indeed a successful operation. i think the military deserves credit for that. but i was just reading the latest figure of 2012, and it said they were about 17 major attacks from taliban groups that for -- [inaudible]

105 different fire fights. because some of those militants have gone to afghanistan. and this is a contentious issue. they are arguing some of the taliban are attacking pakistan or from the other side. it's a big issue. the stablization or the con sollization of the peace is not happened. there's a successful -- [inaudible] process going on about 2,000 of these militants are going through the process. it's one steady event. one important factor successful but not fully successful or transition. the history or the modern history of -- [inaudible] cannot be completed unless i salute two people especially. [inaudible] one is leading among a national party. a brave man who survived three attacks. and then he knew fully when the

taliban would -- [inaudible] another icon that has taken a stand. as important as it is. as important it is to put five militant groups it's important to salute and appreciate all of the great and courageous people who are standing up to them. [inaudible] a leader who despite standing up. but the tragic parties that some of the leading police officers and one of the leading very pakistan police officer in the audience and i'm reminded of that. three senior famous police officers were killed in if they were standing up for them one by one. it creates this.

so these are the important -- i think i finished my eight minutes or so. but i want to leave you with the idea. there was a successful case of -- [inaudible] the gains have to be consolidated. among the national party was because ordinary people of the province maa that aligns which i mentioned created that space. all of the people in pakistan -- [inaudible] problematic forces. but without -- [inaudible] without investment in education, [inaudible] will not be able to come out of the crisis it's in.

768 schools -- 58 schools bombed in the province in this period last year, 2012. i have not seen any major effort on the part of him political -- military government to do take up these major problems of education or infrastructure. -- [inaudible] thank you. >> thank you. i'm going focus on the afghan taliban, which is a completely different beast in the pakistani taliban. my chapter on kandahar, the one i'm going focus on that were covers 2002 to 2004 as the major period. the reason i did this, i believe the pattern of conflict we see today were locked in by 2004. and, you know, i went back before this and looked through the chapter and trying to think about what you know what could

we glean from that period relevant for today? but i was surprised to see that in fact most of what most of the dynamics i takes plague on the ground in 2002 and 2003 in afghanistan and in kandahar are completely irrelevant for what is happening today. and what i see is happening today as two key questions that we need to sort of grapple with. the first is what happens with the u.s. leaves? if the u.s. leaves. and the second is, dot taliban want to negotiate? and for both of those questions, i think the chapter in this book, you know, it's useful in this regard. and there's a lot in there. the longest chapter, probably? but i'm going focus on the elements which speak directly to the two issues. and so after 2000, you know, they were routed and, you know, left in shame and defeat and the people of afghanistan welcomed

that for the most part. al qaeda, if you would call it at the time, awent to pakistan and declared jihad and at the time watching this from afar i assumed the taliban had a essentially had the same position. that they were -- with the foreign occupiers. it was only after peter asked me to study kandahar and kandahar insurgency and going to kandahar and gap with what is going on there and i cam to a different conclusion than i originally thought. in short, after 2001, the taliban quit essentially. they had quit wholesale. and what, i mean, by that. the taliban -- the people who today substitute the insurgency from the leadership to the rank and file had quit and tried for the most part to engineer a series of deals with the afghan government are, or in some cases with the americans directly.

and it's interesting because i dug up a quote, at the time in this is 2002. there were pakistani radical trying to drum up support for the fallen taliban and saying we need send money to the taliban so they can fight the occupiers. this is a quote from somebody who is relative a high ranking person in the taliban he said at the time if late 2001 he said we want to tell the people that the taliban system is no more. they should not give any donations in the name of the taliban. if the stable government is accomplished in afghanistan, we will bsh won't launch any action against it. and, you know, on one level it may seem surprising. on the other level if you look at the broad steep of afghan history. it's not surprising. what you see when you look at afghan history is a large number of factions fighting against each other that switch over the years and they're driive by the

-- by survival. with the taliban particularly they took power in 1994 starting in kandahar. they displaced a lot of powerbrokers or war lords and gave them an option in the south. essentially, you know, submit to us and surround your weapons and sit at home and, you know, give up politics all together and we'll let you live. or if not we'll fight you. so some of them fled to pakistan and some stayed in afghanistan. and talking to the taliban leadership, a lot of them expected the same thing. in the 20022003 period. what you had in 2002, 2004 the entire leadership of of the taliban and talking the minister of entire your defense. information justice, foreign affairs. key front line commanders, key advisers for the supreme leader

of the taliban cut deals with the afghan government. and in some cases attempt to cut deal with the u.s. and this hold for even the most ideological people in the taliban. one example is -- [inaudible] who is in the administrate ministry of justice and use one of the idea logs for the most draconian social policy for the taliban. so the whip wielding religious police and the people who check the -- et. even he surrendered and cut a deal with the afghan government in 2002. along with them are thousand of foot soldiers who did the same. and so there was ab opening there for a broad political settlement. unfortunately it didn't come to pass. this is why i think the years from 2002 to 2004 are relevant for with a is happening today. today is the question is whether the political settlement is in the cards or not. but what the taliban leadership

found in 2002 and 2003 was that a settlement not in the cards. and instead every single deal that was engineered was at some point overturned. various different reasons. i'll give you an example. i mentioned the guy who is idea logs of the draconianism that took place. he turned himself in january of 2002 to the governor of kandahar province. and they did it arranged a deal through the triable intermediary. which is how it usually works in afghanistan. and the terms of the deal were that he would give rights to political life. he would surrender whatever assets had in terms of vehicle or et. cetera. he would retire to the home village, he would publicly pledge support for the afghan government, the karzai government and the american governments and he would agree to be sort of monitored by the afghan government. they would have somebody coming

every week to the village. he retired to a life of preaching. now news of this came to d.c. and rumsfeld, familiar particularly and he was furious. you can look at the archives and see what people in the administration were saying about this. and the conception making deals with terrorist. that's unacceptable. so a loot of pressure was placed on the afghan government who engineered the deal and he went or his people went to him and said, we're under a lot of pressure. and cannot guarantee your safety here in afghanistan. you should go pakistan. he fled to pakistan. and this sort of -- this instance, this case was played out again and again in kandahar and around the country. another example which is particularly pertinent for today's -- [inaudible] he was former entire your minister under the taliban and

also very important governor. and he was also a pub -- a triable hammed karzai. he had triable links to the karzai. after 2000 he had repudiated the taliban and seeking to find a way to join the afghan government and the karzis, essentially. and so he contacted hammed karzai's brother and he wanted to engineer a deal to see if there was a way to join the government. the meeting scheduled to take place on the border between afghanistan and pakistan. the pakistanis caught wind of this and they were none too pleased with the idea of taliban joining the karzai government and so they told the americans that he is in such and such place. and i believe they arrested him. handed him over to the americans and the americans have sent him to guantanamo. he's in guantanamo today.

and he's a particularly interesting case because a lot of of the sort of talks about talks or negotiations sort of negotiations that are taking place are about prisoner releases from guantanamo. he's one of the five taliban prisoners that the taliban are seeking to release. so these are two examples. but, you know, you can go across the board and the chapter goes to a lot more detail. as it was happening on the leadership level, we also had on the rank and file level night raids, the afghan government was has been implicated in torture and human rights abuses, not just torch former toward taliban members and people whom the of afghans or the americans perceive to be the in the line to the taliban. clans, tribes, or communities which they have drawn recruits from. and through the processes, again, in some detail in the

book, in the chapter on this. you a sense amongst people who either were once in the taliban or people who had been in communities which it was drawn. there was no space in the system in the post 2001 political system. the people like this and others relocated to pakistan and taliban was reinstituted. essentially. and having talked to a lot of these people what is striking to me is how relevant it seems to me today trying to understand whether the taliban are open to negotiations or not. in my ens, there's broadly speaking two camps in the taliban. one is people who are mostly

political by political, i mean, they're not front lined commander on the ground in afghanistan leading fighters. there are people like former ministers of education. minister of culture, religious ideologues or people who in moammar's inner circle who recognize today. they tried to reconcile in 2002 and 2003. they recognize the tsh are not going to win the war. i think, you know, to me it's clear the taliban are not going win the war. they recognize that. and therefore coming out of the very practical need. there's an opening or they have sort of orientation trying to find -- and ten or fifteen people today who are taliban leadership and there's, you know, a dozen people who are in -- [inaudible] open a couple of people in turkey and anemia pakistan right now. and so that's, to me, institutes

one sort of click, very informally. a click of taliban leadership. and a second grouping is i think the military side. people 0 who are actually they themselves not be on the ground in afghanistan leading fighters. they are the ones directing insurgety on the day-to-day level. these are people who either for the most part distrust the u.s.' associations and negotiated settlement or in talking with some of the them, they freebtly pointed to 2002 and 2004 period and say look what happened the last time we try to reconcile and some of the people are people who try to cut deals with the americans in 2003 and 2002 and rebuffed and now on the military side. there's a sense among the people that we'll wait out the americans in 2014. and talking to them, there's a sense they believe they can reinstitute the '90s taliban.

i think that's a "fantasy," they believe they are close to that and, you know, they hold on a little bit longer. they can do that. and so i should say the cat gore -- [inaudible] you shouldn't -- [inaudible] ways to understand the different position of the taliban. and talking to all of these people in the taliban and ordinary afghans. these are heavy focus on numbers. and, you know, karzai's probably landed today. in the u.s. and going to be talk about whether it's 6,000 or 9,000 or 3,000 troops in afghanistan. that's important and a lot of rural afghans in the villages where the war is being fought would say we want zero troops. but there's another question that i would like to raise. something i think in my discussion with the taliban. they don't think about it. nor with most other people who are actually thinking about

these in afghanistan, which is we're facing today in afghanistan is a question of state formation. it's similar to the question we're facing in 2004 to 2002. i think some of these findings in the chapter are useful. and what, i mean, by that is i believe that the u.s. has never seriously attempted to build the afghan state. if you look at the 2002 to 2004 period, what happened is on one hand they poured money, expertise in to the center, in to kabul to scar -- karzai's government. at the same time we had a number of independent and unilateral agreements, people -- this would be for example, the governor of kandahar in 2002. or, you know, there's a serious of private maliciouses that were funded and supported. while we were putting money in to create the afghan police, we were also giving money to the governor of kandahar for him to maintain the private militia.

they don't answer to the afghan government. they answer to the governor alone. you can't create state in -- you usually think a state in the basic definition of the body that has the monopoly. there's a serious of actions that exist around the country from 2002 to today which include the formation of viable state. to give an example. there are probably 100 maybe 200 military bases scattered u.s. military bases scattered around the country in afghanistan. each of those, or most of those, require afghan militiamen to guard. these are not afghan police or army. these are irregular militia man who we caught private security contractors to guard. to supply each of the bases we require a convoy that need to be protected from insurgent attack and the people who protect them are again militia men war

lords. each much them are being paid directly by the u.s. military or being paid indirectly by the department of defense through the various sub contracting regimes. so there's been various estimates how many people are actually exist. we're talking, you know, if you include the privacy security contractors in kabul maybe 50 or 60,000 young men who are have arms. who do not fall under the afghan's government purview whatsoever. they owe the excision ens entirely to foreign patriot. the question is what happens when the money stops going? along with them, the afghan state itself. the afghan state doesn't collect the revenue through taxation. it connects there through foreign patron patronage. what happens when the money stops? we have one case that we can look to, which was in the '80s, this is very already to what the russians or the soviets had. they had militia or afghan

government had mash listsha around the country. they flowed from mouse cow to kabul to the procheses. the russians left afghanistan in 1989. but the civil war started in 1992. and it started? 1992 because the money stopped flowing in 1992. these are the question i think we face. you can draw the questions out i think from the chapter. tounge thank new america and steve. i do want to reemphasize the point peter made when you read any of the chapters that aman has written. you center to read look at the references more so than with your average chapter. they are incredible.

my task in this effort was to step back and look at the bigger picture. and one of the things that came out of that process when we were originally pulling together the chapters and these chapters hold up over time as a aman said. i think some of the basic dynamics are still there even as conditions have changed. the individuals and permits have been killed. some of the political dynamics have changed a little bit. but fundamentally you see the same issues that play. and so semantically when we were pulling them together there was a decision we made between the afghan taliban and pakistani taliban. that's something that the i thought at the time was a sort of false construct that gave us that created a false detics that

on secured the cross pollination between the groups and didn't sheet shed a lot of on the strategic differences between them. you see a new version of that in the last couple of days where there's been reporting in our newspapers about the drone strike that killed a taliban commander. so if you look at the headline he's been referred to as good to be. whether or not it's a taliban figure they tacks the taliban state. it's a critical question. it is important. it's ignorement of judgment also obscures a lot of complex ity we need to be considering when we think about the folks. after all, smart people in the u.s. government decided that he wasn't all that good of a taliban.

whenever you sit on drone strikes there are smart people that think he deserved one. what are the questions should be asking about the groups. i'm going run through the six we identified when the chapters were written. i think they still hold up. the other thing i would point out is that a slight tweet of the questions should be used in all settings where we have militants associated with al qaeda. and taliban is not al qaeda. they are associated with al qaeda. i think that when we have local groups that are associated with a transnational militant organization there is a aversion of the questions needed to be asked whether it's in syria, north africa or mali or whenever. the better solution, six questions. the first one is the key strategic question that the good versus bad taliban gets. does the militant group attack

pakistan. the reason why it's fundamental are local environment and fundamentally frameses how they are going to be interacting with the organization that has the most power on the ground which is still the pakistani military. if we look at the governor, for example, this is somebody that did over time generally have a more positive relationship with the pakistani government than ore militants. he came to power in 2004, only after a previous drone strike killed the primary rival, at the time he was in a pakistani prison, which i don't know how to put it. allows for a lot of negotiation with the pakistan state. he was released and sort of took a leading role among the -- [inaudible] so, you know, he was ended by a

drone strike. the leadership started with the drone strike as well. second question is what are the groups triable and social roots? right this is aquí question. while we tend to look at conflicts in term of how these organizations and how these networks face the united states, oftentimes they are not the most credible question to the troops on the ground. it's very difficult to understand exactly what the histories are. as they build relationship and negotiate the politics of the region. those are the questions that they ask. what are any associate roots. who can i trust or not trust? and so we're going understand the organizations and develop a policy toward the organizations, those are the questions we have to ask. the third, what are the mill about it groups relationship with foreign fighters? well in the case of it varies. you have to ask what kind.

he a good relationship with al qaeda. i imagine that the target tiers guiding the drone strike would point to the relationship over time. but he clashed repeatedly with -- [inaudible] associated with the imu and the iju. as a result he crashed with other taliban elements in south that had allies with the militants. when we look at, you know, somebody like his relationship with the other organizations, we really have to sort of get down to fine points how he's framing the politics. fourth, how aggressively do the folks target international troops in afghanistan. it's another obviously key strategic question. he worked with the network over time to do so. but that's not the case for every militant networking.

and in -- [inaudible] that fought other militant organizations. it's a key question. it's a key question for you also policy going forward and a key question for understanding how the pakistan state is going to look at the organizations. right. obviously this is important to us. it's not as important to in term how they're going define the relationship with the organizations. does the group engage or attack support on western civilian target. the reason why it's important is because it obviously defines a relationship certainly with al qaeda and al qaeda's globalized condition and attacks on civilians. he was never publicly implicated in a global i tack which distinguished him from the other pakistani militants that were. they told him, for example, pointed to for a plot that would have taken place in barcelona, spain.

wasn't disrupted bit spanish police. but that was a really interesting one. you had a fundamentally local pakistani militant looking to attack abroad in al qaeda-style format. right. to my knowledge, he was not implicated in the way. it was total speculation. one of the questions that i would ask about somebody like this somebody a long close relationship with the networking. they intervened on his behalf as he was negotiating with relationships with the taliban pakistan in 2008. whether or not some of the other militants engaged and supported some of the network terrorist style attacks in the heard of kabul over the last couple of years. that's kind the question i think change the way people thought about the organization. and the last one is does the group take operational direction from him?

everybody supports him. i think one of the things that we need to be very careful especially as researchers that don't have the kinds of source networking and access that aman has, is to be careful with what the guys say. that goes for the taliban and also for al qaeda. right. the heart of being a terrorist organization, or an insurgent networking that needs to create a lot of power out of relatively little on the ground force. is that you have to create myths about itself. at heart of terrorist to create myths and political power out of, you know, relatively small amount of force. and so you do that with strategic communications. you do that with attacks that are going get a lot of attention and attacks that are going generate a lot of publicity and you do that they by building a sense of coherence and cohesiveness within a arrange of

organization that are really running in all sorts of different directions. right. i think that's one of the things you see see with the taliban is that you have a lot of different sub organizations running in all sorts of different directions. and why that's important is because understanding those networks and understanding the internal tensions within these within gives us tools for undermining them. right. i've heard it said in sort of a, you know, been criticized at times for saying look look, we need to dig deeper and understand -- i don't want to use the word empathize. we nude need to put ourself in the shoes of them. the reason e why we need to do is not understand why they are able and how they are able to exploit the drone strikes in order to recruit. it's so that we can understand how they operate so we can undermine them. right.

we understand what they're afraid of. so we can undermine them. the last thing that i'm going say and right. this is a model that is not just applicable in pakistan. he had close relationship with omar and he reportedly intervened on his behalf again in 2006 to keep him in a leadership position. so that looks like a close operational relationship at least as far as it goes. the last thing i want to say just going forward is on the future of afghanistan, i could not agree more with what aman was saying about the money issue in afghanistan. i wrote a paper called "russian roulette" i forget the subtitle that runs through and does the comparison of the russian with where we are today. i don't think there a sustainability of the afghan government standpoint rate that

much better. and that's depressing. i think that's the case. we may have done worse. because in a lot of ways you could make a strong argument that it was a more dynamic creative leader than hammed karzai. where do we going forward? i think spes herbally -- we have a strategy of effective tactics meaning the drone strikes. they aren't going defeat the taliban. they're not going to fundamentally defeat al qaeda in my view. i think they will suppress the taliban and al qaeda. and i think it's possible that al qaeda in particular will sort of, you know, defeat i.t., you know, the last ten years yards or so. -- [inaudible] because they have lost at love really important people. and the ideology is

fundamentally conflict with itself. i'm not as optimistic as aman. i'm quite pessimistic about the afghan government. i had tonight that what we'll see is the taliban rushing with armoned colins back to coble. i think that civil war in afghanistan is a possibility in the years after an american withdrawal particularly if the money stops flowing in the way it did after the soviets left. and, you know, that's how the taliban got there in the first place. they didn't defeat them on their own. they rose after the afghan government had been shattered by civil war. i think the danger comes not in the first three or four years, the danger from the taliban or some reflection of it comes out in the first three or four years after the american withdrawal. in the next five. and if you can get through that

first, you know, five years, without civil war, maybe you make it. but i worry very much that that's not going to happen. so. thank you. thank you, peter bergen for both the book and the presentation. as pert mentioned to you, i will talk about two things. one the poem that my organization conducted jointly with the new america foundation. and this will compliment what hassan addressed about the nearby -- [inaudible] province. while much focus on they deservedly has been on the militants there, as well as the united states drone strikes in the area, not as much attention has been paid to the actually people who live there and their point of view. in our public opinion survey,

while not startling in some of the conclusions, i think gives it insight in to where future policy might head. here are some of the key findings and set forth in the book and detail. nearly nine out of every ten residences in the region oppose u.s. military operations. this is not a view that is lightly held. it's passionately an intensely held. and here's one measure of why. while only one in ten people one of ten residences of the triable areas think that suicide attacks are ever justified against pakistani military forces. almost six in ten believe these attacks are justified against the united military. much of the an tip think toward the united states steps from one cause and one cause really only. and that's against the cia

directed syndrome strikes on militants living in the area. more than three quarter of the residence oppose the strikes. however, this opposition to american military policy does not mean that the people embrace the taliban or al qaeda. in fact it's the opposite. fewer than 10% of the people in the area supported the presence of al qaeda. and less than 20% supported the pakistani. and here's a telling finding we asked this question. which was peter bergen's idea sprip to give him credit for it on previous polls we conducted not with new america in --s a brilliant one. question the people to pick for who they would vote for.

they said they would vote for either one. the support for the groups is quite very limited to a very small minority of people. instead of supporting the militant, interestingly enough, nearly seven out of ten residences of the place want the pakistani military, the pakistani military alone and without u.s. help to come in and pursue the militants and take care of them in the area. so pretty stunning finding. the popular support the militants draw from is limited largely to response of american actions in the area. so as bryan alluded to it's a tactic. this is with the fascinating finding. the antagonism toward u.s. policy was not coming from any kind of general antiamerican feeling. in fact, almost three quarter of

the people in the triable area said their opinion of the united would improve most by a great deal if the united provided humanitarian aid, and, believe it or not. these are the working study of the united. this is not some generally antiwe hate america they are bad or this. it is related to the presence of drones in the military policy in the united and the area. so while hating the drones above them, the people would welcome the chance to have the ground of america beneath their feet. as i said, the detail are set forth in the book. i'll just take another minute or two to outline what i found out which was kind of complimentary what aman talked about the taliban. this is any book terrorist love based on my interviews with many

taliban both leaders and foot soldiers and the role of moammar. according to the taliban leaders and fighters i interview. event in securing the establishing ho mar's authority undisputed leader or guy they called it of the taliban occurred in april of 1996. in kandahar. there he took from a religious shrine the holly real relic of the prophet mohammad. simply by standing there in the presence, walked mute have walked out speaking. the behind seeing by only when a true leader from god stands before the holy. this is what a taliban leader told me. in fact, in the past 100 years, the cloak only came out, if you will, i know we have another

association with that term. anyway, the closest thing i could translate it legendary king were to save afghanistan in 1929, and in again in efforts to stop a cholera epidemic in 1985. the prophets can be only when touched by a true leader of the faithful and other taliban told me. he had the right touch. so, so he opened the chest for him to wear the cloak worn by the prophet mohammad and be a leader. as aman talked about after the initial american victory in afghanistan, end of 2001, he and the top leaders were treated in pakistan. now i received what aman said they didn't fight and lot trying to do deals. and likely i received a

different explanation for this. you can take it for what it's worth. recounted to me he was devastated by the taliban's defeat. he was parollized with -- par real lose paralyzed with inaca. he couldn't decide whether to launch a war or not. the reason he was waiting patiently for true green from god to tell them what to do. now that is what caused him to go to kandahar to begin with to wear the cloak of prophet mohammad. he had a dream. only after the taliban deputy leader of the taliban are sitting in the room and the taliban deputy recounted to me told of his dream and his dream was that he saw the beard of omar turn a blinding white.

it was made of the threads of the prophet's holly cloak. this was greeted with cries of the praise god and as told me this is what the taliban took up holy war against the united states. this reverend -- reference i found among all the taliban i spoke to -- i'm not sure about the political implications of it. ..

as i go forward. in that context i think the book is special this time as has been alluded to already because it is very relevant and important in terms of our understanding of this region. now i'm going forward. so thanks again to peter bergen and catherine tiedemantiedeman n for the inspiration for this work in the opportunity today. as i mentioned i'm a research fellow at the national defense university so i'm must make this comment. the remarks need to represent the position of my host institution and defense but in fact were represent my own research and conclusions and i'm

thankful for the opportunity for that academic rate them and the freedom to publish here in this book. in the text of the chapter inside entitled the 80% solution and the death of bin laden's al qaeda and the invocations for south asian security i make and work hard to justify several points regarding al qaeda as constructed by osama bin laden and the status of south eastern -- to the essence of what al qaeda was, global al qaeda is a threat of international and catastrophic nature. as a consequence we miss appreciate that bin laden the personality was no less relevant to turning ideology of salahi blobbyism which had been a locust -- locus of approach into a cogent threatening movement

and he was no less important than mr. lenin was to making a marxist old chavez him globally relevant in the cooperation of communist ideas and. bin laden was unique visionary combining charisma and ability to communicate and fuse disparate and if these factions of the selassie's jihadi predisposition into something galvanized and therefore a menacing threat to the west and outer regional areas. the unique and acute problem posed by al qaeda was as credible effort and is one substantial progress of call option was brought together largely in most significant ways in the region we are talking about here talibanistan. so i think that's important and a marker as to why this is so important. in the chapter established and assess the five elements of bin laden's al qaeda and made it historically unique and conspicuously severe threat and

then go on from there to argue about why that threat has receded and what implication that has for us to better appreciate the dynamics and the regional dynamics that underlie the present and the future and salafi asia. first i argue that the five elements of bin laden's al qaeda was one that it aspired to be a core organization dedicated to planning recruiting and training and organizing and this is an important word here catastrophic global terrorist events. americans and other westerners that they refer to as zionist crusader targets especially in western homelands and this was for a specific purpose. that purpose was to drive westerners out of muslim lands. second al qaeda's core element of rentable was to serve as a vanguard for organizing and coordinating already existing regionally focused and locally focused groups towards acts of violence against what they refer to again as the american zionist

crusader. and bring it to a level that was unacceptable. again for the purpose of driving westerners out of muslim lands. third, and although a lesser aims the goal of al qaeda as a core was to serve as an inspiratiinspirati on and focal point for disaffected lone wolf muslims worldwide to act out on their frustrations and do violence against the civil oppression against islam and islamic world or the western world again for the purpose of driving westerners out of muslim lands. the fourth and fifth also very important that at a lesser level irq and indeed many scholars have argued about al qaeda's core was to serve as a brand name. al qaeda representing the highest level of selassie jihadi ideology and bring successful violence against so-called crusader governance in which the senior al qaeda of the jihad remain free from serious punishment penalty or harm. this was the mystical lotion --

notion that was the notion of impunity that bin laden and zawahiri were immune and could hide out and that all qaeda would serve and this is also important from the notion of this talibanistan service of a certain for the conquest of afghanistan and included in the notion of western pakistan in the name of local jihad. this was important because of the mystical origins about where al qaeda had come from and how did elves of in the end in the anti-soviet jihad period in afghanistan. i guard unit piece the five essential elements three of them are completely devastatedevastated devastated by the raid and elbow that in the passing of time is eroded by 50%. first the notion of al qaeda as a brand name that was free from retribution or punitive against being attacked and captured was exploded literally in the matter and the finality of which bin laden met his end.

to most of us to follow jihadi web sites we saw after bin laden's death certainly for a period of time three months that this notion of how could this have happened was by the claim of direct desire to have revenge in many places never been served up at the notion of al qaeda as a disputed leader living with impunity above and beyond the law came crashing down by way of this raid and other selassie regional groups that exploited that with their own benefit for their own standing within this wider movement. second the essential idea of al qaeda as sal alosi -- to recruit and conduct terrorist operations overseas that have been already eroding really came down on the heads of the organization. indeed we can show in our intelligence that pakistan was the locus of al qaeda and appointed many plot since 2006 but the western governments

marginally through their own efforts and we can talk about that in question and answer in terms of understanding identifying al qaeda really were very successful in taking would-be plots and disaggregating them into unsuccessful plots. indeed since the attack in the northern subway system in london england in 2005 there has not been a commensurate significant and substantive attack in western countries yet there have been dozens of dissembling's of of terrorist acts and i talk about some of those here in the chapter and talk about how that has led to a delusion of the credibility of al qaeda as a global catastropcatastrop hic movement. finally there's this critical motion of al qaeda said the certain for conquest. that is a long-standing and critical motion to the base at the core. this too was dashed and i think it's important here for the work in the piece about south asia to understand this is an argument in the chapter that the relationship between bin laden

and mullah omar as well as the haqqani network and several talabani's was personal in terms of the relationship between the leaders. i lay out in detail the fact that they never swore a similar buyout and to this day's zawahiri is elliptically referred to as respecting mullah omar and is never swore in the same kind of -- and a linkage to al qaeda matters far less tomball omar and folks like haqqani are these days then divide the strategic link they have to pakistan and its military intelligence establishments. indeed what i argue has occurred undisputably with the death of bin laden is that pakistan's national objectives don't align with al qaeda and indeed they don't align even with the pakistani taliban's aspirations to eliminate the pakistan government itself and as a consequence he has incentives to constrain a limit the effect of

the afghan taliban going forward in manners that do not represent the wider silagy jihadi movement. the loss of the elements and the erosion by 50% of the other two due to the u.s. campaign in the continuous pressure change what i define an 80s% solution to the problem of al qaeda terrorism. where does that leave us in south asia? here the latter two-thirds of the piece i discuss in detail how it leaves us with an under appreciation of the need to rethink our strategy going forward in south asia. almost a year ago i finished this piece and i argued in three areas for the lighter region for afghanistan and for pakistan a proper understanding of this schism between the taliban aspirations and al qaeda making it important for us to adjust the way in which review moving forward with the quote endgame in afghanistan is which i argue should be an interim game and hear the points i make and the reason why i think they should

be adjusted adapted specifically when the last year. the war in afghanistan needs to be reconsidered as it's always been viewed in afghanistan-pakistan india and circles and that is has a pakistani supported rebellion in afghanistan against the tajik uzbek and islamic republic of afghanistan was significant links in new delhi and tehran and only a fig leaf of pashtun representation in the form of hamid karzai who is completely mistrusted in pakistan and too cozy with india. that point i don't think it's yet resonated in the west and has not resonated yet several states down this government. i think there is a grudging and slowly evolving understanding but not yet one that puts us in a policy frame of mind to address the subsequent points. the second is again to state that with bin laden dead the critical mass of al qaeda score in western pakistan is eliminated and compromise the essential dynamics in afghanistan are those with

international import. fundamentally the one at that afghanistan is a proxy war between nations that have fought each other in shooting wars and several other martial conflicts and 1947 and these are layered on top of the cleavages and i afghanistan and the boys for action between them as brian alluded to and in my estimation is great and growing ever stronger in each day passes going forward and i think too little u.s. attention to the applications for a residual u.s. diplomatic and military presence to try to cleave together that which we have now armed and put in better footing is important before it breaks apart and goes in separate directions. implications in afghanistan and i will skip two of the three that i had to save time for questions. the critical notion is that led by the united states the coalition in afghanistan must now shepherd reconciliation talks among the afghan

government and representatives from the intelligence services to show how a more federal system in afghanistan can meet pakistani and taliban games as opposed to return to emirates and here i think there is some room for cautious optimism although there is a great blowback in a backlash about the recent high piece commission in afghanistan's roadmap to 2015 plan which in me in this framework that i've developed and i really believe and is encouraging because it shows there is a recognition that the taliban pakistani leaders and afghan leaders in each whole different aspirations and ideations must come together and produce a more -- structure that allows for southern pashtun representation not all of that which is taliban but some of it which is that allows that conclusion in order for us to have a peaceful future. with respect to pakistan because pakistan is a country is the full brick of the issues that

present themselves moving forward in afghanistan. first american policy must do better at resolving unilaterally attacking al qaeda's remaining core leaders or mid-level afghanistan taliban figures to their last rep in pakistan specifically with drone strikes. i think there's still too much using drone strikes in their western region of pakistan and indeed i have called -- hold them and restructure them although my next point is that i think we are in fact starting to see a limited recalibration of how drone strikes are being used not in the manner that i think is over at an exclusive enough to dampen the unhappiness within pakistan but rather in a manner where for the first time since back in 2008 and 2009-based activities unless five or six months with drone strike starting to converge around pakistani interest in hibbe being tehrik-e-taliban pakistan and american interest in dampening the international forests -- forces of talibanism.

with the elimination of people like haqqani and mullah omar and specifically the same event that brian talked about and subs of almonds which have to do with the death of commander nazir in south waziristan on january 2. the long-standing tribal ally of the isi relations between nazir in the pakistani state have soured despite their importance over the last year. indeed nazir undertook a november 2011 alliance with tehrik-e-taliban and that is detailed in one of the chapters in this book, chapter number five about pakistan's taliban and therefore puts pakistan in a position of actually and coincidently being willing to allow assistance in eliminating this era from his role, is critical role. indeed subsequent to that several members of the mehsud tribe in pakistan including

supposedly the suicide attack coordinator a cousin of -- must suit having killed over the weekend and those attacks and killings would not be happening without more than pakistan acquiescence at this point. so i think that's important so some cautious optimism in retaining the relationship and moving in a direction by common cause. finally and most importantly diplomatically help pakistan's work with india and find the necessary combination afghanistan to inhibit the possibility of a reckless proxy war between two nuclear-armed states that good serious threatened calamity in the region and in the port and i fear unfortunately they're still at -- too little movement and not enough focus on that is a critical dynamic. as a consequence progress in understanding by the u.s. in the west and some of these areas in the critical dynamics that exist after the 80% solution to the

global catastropcatastrop hic problem of terrorism from bin laden's al qaeda and the growing problem of the looming proxy war and civil war in afghanistan is evolving since my time of writing but not fast enough and not in their enough and i really worry and i'm concerned that we do very diligent work in the next weeks and months to craft a residual diplomatic and military component in afghanistan that is sufficient enough to show concern, strong enough to show bonding in an otherwise fractious military and strong enough to provide the presence in south asia which faces a very difficult security future that is quite independent of actors from the jihad. thank you. see i will try to be brief so we can get to questions quickly. based on the chapter that i wrote trying to address the question of why pakistan military strategy during -- since 2002 has either been

limited gori nay at certain times and you know i go through that the bit in the paper to essentially explained an answer to the question that secretary of state couldn't pose in 2000 minus two y. exact lease the pakistani government willfully advocating to the taliban. there have been a lot of explanations have been offered. i think one that is used a lot is the strategic utility of militants and another is outright -- and pakistani interests in maintaining a certainty to attract resources from the outside world from u.s. nato allies. i think there is also a possible simple rational explanation for this and that is the costliness of such of venture of having a conference of strategy to tackle all areas of militancy in both tribal areas and in the rest of the country. it comes down to what i think his is money manpower and matériel and i outlined the cost borne over the last 10 years in

the chapter and i think it is because of these costs absorb particularly since 2007 that shaped the anticipation of future costs and fears of what the future might hold should they go whole hog into fata north waziristan and future operations. it's just worth paying attention to what pakistan says or what pakistani military leaders or state leaders say about the cost they abhorrent because i think we are not attained to this. i thought it was striking when there was a news report saying they had lost two brigades of manpower just outright manpower from their military and the operational equipment -- equivalent of two divisions which is dramatic. this might be it inflated but based on the retraining costs and the replacement of cost and the reorganization caused that we have applied to patch up these divisions. that was pretty significant and

not for military that is a hostile border and a western one as well. it doesn't talk about it a lot in the united states in terms of assessing what pakistan can afford afford to do in lacossa can bear. another cost that goes unnoticed i think is the level of violence that hit the urban core centers of pakistan post-2007 especially the siege operations. the numbers are staggering. i was looking through some of the date and if you look at the six month pre-and post-bad operation the amount of violence that hit the urban areas and not just fata but also punjab and islamabad and the number of attacks increases two to three times but the amount of casualties goes up maybe 20 to 25 times within a short period of time and pakistani military

and emirates states believe that these attacks are likely to come again in the future and should they take on certain other operations like in north waziristan against the haqqani network which was this profound concern right after admiral mullen statement in 2011 about the pakistani government not doing much about the haqqani network and the arm of the isi. the explanation i routinely got in again this can be taken with a grain of salt but nevertheless competent pakistani military did go to that end he described a hornets nest they were being alliance and bring that same level of violence that have pakistani in 2,072,009 which crushed the pakistani public and military and that would return again and that was something that they greatly feared so there's a degree of calibration as to how much you can do given the cost you have to absorb or the cost to have to bear that i think motivates the limited

strategy of the pakistani stasis utilize. another question that comes up a lot is the issue of selectivity. distinguishing good taliban versus bad taliban. selectivity is not just about the target or the insurgent group but also about the territory being contested. i believe hassan referred to the distinction between unsettled areas and this is something that resonates in terms of how pakistan calibrates territory. unsettled areas are expected to be lawless. there is a degree in which militancy or armed militias or the lack of state control and the lack of area control which is a non-term is acceptable and this is something we have a hard time grasping in united states or in the western world because our concept of the way -- is meant to be totaled and throughout the entire territory of the country and this doesn't exist in most areas of the

world. it doesn't exist in india which is our democratic ally and a much more capable and stronger states of dispensing with that idea will help us understand where pakistan's state goes big for example in swat in terms of the man powered their concern about civilian casualties etc. versus in south waziristan and other operations which is far more limited in scope and strategy. i think a the third thing that we need to bear in mind is the pakistani state even though we think of it as the musharraf area and not as authoritarian one there is still a cause that every leader has to pay whether they are authoritarian or a democratic one and in terms of utilizing the force against their own people is something we don't have to think about because we authorize force to be redeployed elsewhere and the only cost to the american public there is in terms of operations or fiscal cost and obviously the loss of our troops and our loved ones but in pakistan assault --

it's not just the strategic cost but the political path -- cost. the base in the militancy is the pashtun community which is not in a significant community of pakistan in a key stakeholder in military and so the idea of trying to utilize forces against it is harder to stomach both for politicians as well as military leaders as well. i will leave that so we can get to questions. >> thank you for that very stimulating conversation. we have a time for a few questions. if you have a question, a statement on the -- a question not a statement and if it's directed to a certain person say so. here in the back.

>> hi. my name is christine vargas and i am a reese recent graduates and program. my question is most pertinent to brian and it has to do with stratcom. what can we do effectively these days to interrupt taliban stratcom and insert messages of our own? >> not a whole lot i think. you know i think it's really important when we talk about strategic oftentimes you get this dynamic where we think about operations in the me think about strategic communication and that is clearly wrong. actions speak louder than words and no matter what we say if what people are responding to our drone strikes and that is what they're going to respond to

and i'm not convinced actually the drone strikes are as important as sometimes people think they are. but, i think the most important thing that we can do is to eliminate any sense that there is a gap between our actions and our words even if our actions aren't popular. we just need to explain what we are doing, state clearly why we are doing it. peter bergen wrote an op-ed in "the new york times" a long time ago saying that we should acknowledge drone strikes at the time i thought he was crazy but i came to actually agree with him. and this is the point, that we have a story. it's not going to be popular a lot of the time but we need to explain that very clearly. militant groups try to create myth and what that means is that we counter those myths when we tell the truth.

fundamentally when we tell the truth we tell it clearly and we are in encountering the myths that the terrorist organizations tried to create to enhance their own power so when you objectively state the truth that is a strategic communications policy and that is what we have to be doing about these guys. at the end of the day certainly al qaeda and major elements of the taliban has very little to offer from a sort of government standpoint. they are not that popular as canon indicated so what we want people to be doing is assessing those organizations on their own merits. and we don't want to get in the way of that process that we want to sort of set ourselves aside to keep the onus on the terrorists, the onus on the militants to establish their own credibility because they have a hard time doing that. >> in front of you jennifer. >> thank you very much.

i am a pakistani journalist. my question is to dr. a bus. a new strategic counterinsurgency plan. can you speak more about it and what it means for the -- and whether it's a policy of appeasement or operations against the taliban? >> i think this new statute doctrine that has been talked about in the pakistani media and the chief of the pakistani army has given three different statements and he has talked about the doctrine. what is believed and what is -- is that pakistan and the pakistani military and intelligence is actively supporting u.s. negotiations with the taliban at one level. the general 12 afghanistan and

invited some of the leaders there. taliban leaders -- it was 10 or 11 but i heard a figure of 15. 15 leaders to return to afghanistan. there are some rumors about a meeting -- but he refused to go back and in fact was quite aggressive. the point i'm making is this small effort seems to me to be genuine. i'm not saying that something contrary to this was proved that strategic thinking has come to this conclusion that the taliban and the pakistani militant -- indeed i would argue is a little bit late in the game. i really wish this would have happened in 2007 at 2008 and it was partly delayed.

everything is much more complicated. i would like to believe that this is an honest effort. we have seen many other related developments as well. the meetings increased between the united states and the government of pakistan at the senior level. this was a façade or not a well coordinated well thought out policy. but from the previous developments we have seen again which will empower many of the militants, that could be problematic. i think there is a flawed belief if we think a negotiated settlement with the taliban will make it easier for pakistan to deal with the dtp and militants in pakistan. the reason is empower taliban or

mullah omar in kandahar or taliban in the public coalition in afghanistan, that has been inspired by militancy. so i don't think by dealing with negotiations in afghanistan it will automatically make it easier for pakistani military intelligence to deal with the pakistani taliban. that will remain there and military action and policy has not delivered good evidence. the military option has absolutely failed to deal with taliban on the afghanistan side. i hope that this military strategic change -- maxim new vision and some notes thinking also with the ideological space taken over by the militants.

only the continuation of democracy, the only progressive religious discourse and education can do that so even if the pakistani military assumes its doctrine it can only have a limited impact. i would like to see a much broader effort on these issues. thank you. >> three questions here. we can bunch them together because we are almost out of time. make your question sure to make the answer short. thank you. spain i really thank you for your presentations. i have actually two questions in one is to mr. -- one of the main arguments is today is a good environment for pursuing negotiations of a similar situation you describe in 2004. i want to know.

[inaudible] how the government is perceived by the taliban and the americans. why would you say that the talabani's would find -- [inaudible] could you please elaborate more? the other question is in passing i heard something about india and iran. i would like to hear some more on that to see whether iran and india together has a role it would play in this? thank you very much. >> okay. the lady next to you. >> katie from the department state. mr. abbas you kind of reference to the growth of ttp to the lack

of support received by the pakistani civilian law enforcement bodies. i just wanted to see to it kindly clarify whether the support you have been looking for there was financial for domestic and political will and why don't you think that is provided? >> and the gentleman behind you. >> hi. this is a question for professor abbas. this role of religion in the narratives of the afghan taliban offer and the pakistani taliban offered in militant terms, does that play with the populations of talibanistan and is this something that brings people closer to them or is it just political verbiage? >> the answers will have to be 30 seconds please. because we have to wrap it up. >> the reason there was not

investment of police in pakistan is because of sheer incompetence it is of course that lack of political will and i also criticize the u.s. government as well as the pakistan government. the reason being from 2001 to 2008 the u.s. -- and by looking at it as an important institution. all these organizations contra terrorism as a law enforcement issue. >> good point. >> there are elements of the taliban who believe that this is the right time to negotiate a cause they don't think that the 90s taliban will be reconstituted. there are others who dispute that but that is essentially why. they think they want brand. >> a quick follow up to that.

did the search worked at least on that level in getting taliban to think there is no chance that military success? >> yeah. the surge successfully halted the taliban. it did not reverse it that the united states or any other actor in afghanistan position to win whatever that may mean but i think it did hault momentum and that informs us position i think on the role of religion with the taliban and the ideological battles that have played out in the countryside are very much couched in terms of religion so the taliban are rooted in the countryside as mullahs and as people who sort of have a monopoly and this is why the afghan government and other actors try to sort of compete with the taliban on that ground. >> just quickly ask a question about india. i refer you to the chapter in the book that india has a critical role to play in my

estimation and that is because the narrative of what afghanistan is has played in a south asian lyric is that afghanistan is in play between india and pakistan and the individual tribes in the country of afghanistan a lie in one way or another rightly or wrongly, with either indian interest or pakistani interests and pakistan's military intelligence apparatus not wishing to see india advantage either to perpetuate mr. from afghanistan against its ethnic minorities within the country or to gain decisive advantage geostrategically mistrusts fundamentally what is he is presently in kabul as the new delhi leaning government -- not government and western efforts have been either intentionally or more likely inadvertently because of sheer naïveté instrumental in giving india a

leg up in the country and one that cannot be tolerated for the long-term. >> i would argue that iran matters in the country but nowhere near as much to the continuation of violence as to the pakistan india dynamic. iran will play and iran and western afghanistan is pretty heavily invested in embedded there are as it is with some of the community in afghanistan but i would argue that is nowhere near as significant in terms of the hating the level and the degree of violence as is the interplay between india and pakistan interest in the tribal relations. >> any final observations? thank you very much everybody for coming. thank you to all the panelists. [applause] [inaudible conversations] booktv is on facebook.

lycos to interact with booktv viewers. watch videos and get up to date information on events. facebooked.com/booktv. >> good morning. stacy schiff was a wonderful biographer among others of cleopatra recently observed biographers all have two lives. okay in the back? can you hear me? in one round, she says the biographers you are moving forward in ignorance and in the other you are moving backward with something resembling omniscience. and what she doesn't say is that along with the illusion of something like omniscience, the biographer usually has a lot of

attitude felt is on display. one can be worshipful, hagiographic, feely o. pius or one can be a debunker, and unmask her, a muckraker. one can defend or defame, expose sensationalize sentimentalize. one can be a myth buster or a myth maker. not many generalizations can cover that whole spectrum. but marcel pruest could do it in did when he wrote an early book before the big book combat a little book called -- and there he says what intellect restores to us under the name of the past is not the past. in reality and reality as soon as each hour of one's life has

died it embodies itself in some material object and remains captive forever unless we should have been on the object, recognizing what lies within, call it by its name and so set it free. as each hour of your life has died it's embodied in or under some material object which explains why it's so hard to clean out the attic. it's not stuff. it's your life piece by piece. it also suggests the power of the central role of the senses and connecting things. you have to see it to know it's there to get it out. and the idea that writing can restore something to us that biography is an act of recovering as brenda wineapple so wonderfully argues both to

biography into fiction. here's another thing that the two forms have in common that has been splendidly put by phyllis rose who wrote in parallel lines. we are desperate -- that's the word -- desperate for information about how other people live as we want to know how to live ourselves. now for me that is certainly true of biography but it's also true of fiction. and i want to give just a single example. it is from dostoevsky and it is from a chapter called -- which comes right before the grand inquisitor. the oldest brother is giving ali usha his views on the christian idea that there is an all powerful, all-knowing benevolent god and that things will all ultimately work out for the best ivan makes his argument through stories and this is one of them.

there was in those days a general of aristocratic connections, the owner of great estates. our general settled on his property and 2000 souls and lives in pomp and dominators over his poor neighbors as though they were dependents and buffoons. he has panels of hundreds of pounds in nearly 100 dog boys all mounted and of uniform. i'm sorry to put us all through this on a sunday morning and a beautiful day in key west. [laughter] i really am. [laughter] one day they child of eight threw a stone and hurt the path the generals favored pound. why is my favorite dog lame? he is told that the boy threw a stone and hurt the dog's paw. so you didn't?

the general look the child up and down. take him. he was taken from his mother and shut up all night. early the next morning the general comes out on horseback with the hounds his dependent dog toys and huntsman on the ground him in full hunting parade. in front of them all stands the mother child child. the child is brought from the lockup. it's a gloomy foggy autumn day. at j4 hunting. the general orders the child to be undressed. the child is stripped make it. he shivers and him with terror not daring to cry. make him run commands the general. run ron, run shalt the boys. the boy runs. and sets the whole pack of pounds on the child. the hounds catch him them and tear him to pieces before his mother's eyes. that is it.

like i said, i'm sorry. i then goes on to explain how there may indeed in all powerful benevolent god and how there may indeed finally be a future harmony which is achieved through human suffering but even if this is so and of course is -- ivan says he would personally reject and a harmonious conclusion that required the suffering of that 8-year-old. ivan doesn't say there is no god. he just says that if his plan for us in falls such horrors, he cannot and will not accept it. he hands back the ticket. i was 18 when i first read this and my anger brother john, 15, had just died a short three weeks after being diagnosed with acute leukemia. for me then i then had it right. and this fictional encounter had more influence on my life than

all the condolences and family support and help in the world. i loved reading it and i quickly found myself looking for help in everything i read. i liked ron ski in anna karenina for his devil may care attitude toward paying bills. for ron ski throws them all in a drawer and he sits down to pay them three times a year. i learned that the telephone company did not a trichet this point of view. still with or without the filled paying his life is more vivid than mine and more vivid than the lives of my friends and he seemed as real as any character in a biography. and so it was. i fell in love with small boats and sailing through swallows and amazons. my friends and i learned holding

caulfield from "catcher in the rye" and of course there was poetry. i had more than one teacher whose religion was elliott's four quartets and we learned attitude from yeats and from the greek anthology. we wanted to come proud open eyed and laughing. and i love this epitaph of an ancient greek sailor. it's in a greek anthology translation by deadly fits, a wonderful teacher. tomorrow the wind will have fallen. tomorrow i will be safe in the harbor. tomorrow i said and death spoken out little words. oh stranger this is the nemesis of this open word. fight back the daring tongue which say tomorrow. we marveled at keat' ability to imagine what it would feel like to be a billiard ball rolling across a smooth table. we hungered for lives that had

emotional range of shakespeare's sonnets and if we were going to be saved we knew it would be by literature. and it was the french historian jules michelet who put it best for me as i tried in my mid- mid-40s to turn biography to life writing. history said mr. lay and you could think that he meant to include biography and fiction, history he said is not narrative. it is not analysis. it is resurrection. this is some of what brenda wineapple has in mind. but how you do it is another and more complicated matter and i will not try to get into that this morning but bringing your subject back to life is a great and worth the gold so if i may quickly wrap up, to ezra pounds excellent advice to make it new

i think we might also want to add and make it live again. thank you. [applause] we seem to be running a little early so we have time for a few questions. >> not a question but a huge appreciation for you and what you just said. thank you very much. >> well, isn't that sweet? [applause] >> i think i'm scooping myself but the question i want to ask you about a section nest

weekend. the first time ever saw u.n. met you was 2003 in boston. i think on the 200th birthday in fact of ralph waldo emerson of whom you have written an absolutely marvelous book but it was a gathering of scholars, historians, critics, writers the whole continental gang of appreciating emerson from a whole variety of particular angles and lo and behold he stood up in the middle of this meeting and you said, i am bob richardson and i just wrote this book on emerson. just for the record you don't analyze him and you don't do chemical tests on paper or his soul whatever. you said i take him straight. i read him as a kind of uncle waldo and when he says trust

thyself, you can admire the line and give credit to any number of tests but you said i think he is telling me to trust myself. and follows the beam of light in your own mind etc. etc. etc.. it seems to me that cuts through a lot of the stuff we have been talking about and hearing about this weekend in the sense that when all else fails we can -- >> it's an extreme remedy but it's possible. [laughter] they do talk to you. thank you. [applause] one more? >> this is the most moving lecture i have heard and you

have really push the right button. i have read all the books that he suggested that i read them as a teenager as you did and would certainly read them again. do you have any other wonderful suggestions on books we should read? [laughter] >> he if you haven't read them all read my wife's books again. american childhood. [applause] thank you. [applause]

>> what really i have never seen in any rape port in the u.s. or any news has been the story of these people that live with the constant sirens that go off every time -- and they have 15 seconds to get into a bomb shelter. i want to visit some elderly people. they were some of the founders and they were probably 65 plus,

many of them in their 60's. they hadn't slept through the night. this was in 2009 during the operation but in the months preceding that and what triggered it was this constant bombardment and people hear about this any way that is backwards. they hear that israel has made a strategic strike on a particular person or a particular target and that was responded to with rockets. that is the way it's reported most of the time when in fact the rockets -- there have been over 12,000 rockets in the last about two years. and some of them are small. a lot of them are no longer small. a lot of them are iranian or larger graphs which are small. these people have to get up and learn every time there is a

siren and they do it because they know people are killed whether they are killed in great numbers depends on where it strikes. these people were taking antidepressants and the children in the area were all bedwetters. the people that i went to see were being bused for a three day weekend to sleep in a hotel where there was no disturbance. these are old people. one of them said to me how can you come here? aren't you afraid to be here? there were explosions going off nearby. i didn't even hear sirens. i just heard an explosion. these people live that way. the mother said have to get their babies into the shelter. there is a little piece that i quote in the book written by a mother assess which child should i grab? she has five children. which one should i take first? every time she is making these

decisions so that is ongoing. it's quiet right now because of the so-called truce with hamas. everyone knows it will start up again. i went to the north after the lebanon war. we were and israel during the 2064. there are the north was bombarded and these were larger rockets. please saw some of the places that they had struck. half the house was gone and the people at gone to jerusalem or somewhere else and most of them are not living there. some were in shelters, living in shelters. this data for in israel is such that is such a little country and it's the size of new jersey so even if it's a south everyone has a relative there. everybody's kid is in the army there. it's not like america. this is everybody's problem and

the phone starts ringing when things heat up. even my phone and particularly recently when we had sirens in jerusalem for the first time in 30 years. that was an interesting experience because you find yourself saying, okay should i take a shower or not take a shower? or you know am i going to sleep in my normal pajamas because i'm going to have to go see my neighbors in a bomb shelter and i don't think i want to put on pajamas. so the state of war in israel is an ongoing danger and an ongoing threat and it's also a consciousness, but it's also a way of going on with life no matter what and that is what the israelis are best at is that they just go on and they celebrate life. ..