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visit booktv.org. >> coming up next on booktv, military historian steven biewd yang sky recounts the use of scientific and mathematical research to aid in the direction of allied forces in world war ii. this is about 40 minutes. [applause] >> well, thank you. it's great to be here at r.j. julia, a wonderful independent bookstore, a dying but essential breed. and i can tell you as both a writer and a reader, stores like this play a role that can't be duplicated anywhere else, so thank you. world war ii was, of course, the first war in which science and scientists played a central and vital role. the manhattan project, the thousands of physicists and other scientists who developed the atomic bomb was the most dramatic illustration of this, i

think probably today almost as well known were the thousands of mathematicians and other sign b terrific work withers in england and washington, d.c. who broke the german e anything ma, cipher and other access codes. the very small group of parish parish -- british and american scientists who really turned the tide in the battle against the u-boats are not so nearly well known at all. but their contribution was, i think, every bit as vital not only in winning one of the most crucial battles in the war against nazi germany, but also for its lasting consequences in revolutionizing the very way military commanders think about war. for that matter, revolution eyeing the way quantitative an access could be apply today a host of practical problems in the business world through the new science patrick plaqueet and

his -- blacket and his scientists created during the war, operational research. so it's their story i've tried to tell in my book, blacket's war. the war of the u-boats was the one threat churchill worried could bring britain to its knees even after the danger of sea borne invasion faded following the raf's heroic defense in the battle of britain during the summer of 1940. britain crucially depended on imports not only for oil, steel, war material, but just to stay alive. the country was a net importer of food, and by the start of 1941, the u-boats had already sunk enough shipping to reduce imports below the 31 million tons a year it needed to just maintain essential food supplies for the civilian population. the crunch of the whole war,

churchill to roosevelt at the end of 1940, rests in the atlantic. the decision for 1941, he wrote, lies upon the seas. and churchill after the war in his memoirs would write: the battle of the atlantic was the dominating factor all through the war. never for one moment could we forget that everything happening elsewhere on land, sea or in the air depending ultimately on its outcome. so in the spring of 1940, excuse me, thank you. so in the spring of 1941 in the face of mounting losses at sea, churchill issued a somewhat grin dill went, i guess you could say, churchillian order to, quote, take to the offensive

against the u-boat, and it was then that patrick blacket was given the job of putting together a small group of scientists to see if he could come up with some ways of improving their heretofore dismal performance in locating and attacking the german submarines that were threatening to cut britain's lifeline. blacket was at this time one of the world's most prominent physicists. he'd been a naval cadet, and as an 18-year-old mid shipman aboard a battleship in world war ii. after the war the navy decided that all of these cadets in britain at that time started at age 14, and at age 18 they yachted and went into the -- graduated and went intobe the navy as midshipmen, but the navy had had to rush this last class right into war with the start of

world war i, so they thought to make up for the loss and interruption of their education, thegd send them all to university for six months just to round out their education. blackett was sent to cambridge, and he said one day i wandered over to the cavendish laboratory to see what a scientific lahr story was like, and very shortly after that he told the navy i want to become a scientist. he never did receive a ph.d., but he quickly became one of the world's foremost physicists for the work he did in the 1930s discovering the positive terror, the positive electron, the first piece of antimatter whose existence was confirmed. he would win the nobel prize in physics in 1948. he was good looking, had an extraordinary combination of hands-on ability and theoretical

imagination. his colleagues remarked they'd never known anyone his equal in his ability to conceive of a problem in physics, write out a few lines of mathematics, design an ap apparatus, build it himse, carry out the experiment, analyze the results. he was also one of a number of scientists in britain and america who had been working hard behind the scenes in the 1930s to prepare for war and to try to make sure that the army and navy made full use of science when it came. he was frustrated no end by what he found to be the typical attitude of military commanders which was not only that a bunch of civilian intellectuals could not tell them how to run a war, but more specifically that the only role of scientists and other technical men was just produce some new gadget or weapon or gizmo, hand it other to the military -- over to the military and then not concern

themselves with anything beyond that. but blackett argued that war itself, its tactics and strategy and operations, was a series of actions directed at more or less definite ends. and so to quote him: the use of these weapons and the organization of the men who handle them are at least as much sign terrific problems as -- scientific problems as is their production. what he was arguing for was what would become the genesis of operations research. today it's a fundamental component of military thinking, something every student at west point and the naval academy studies and, indeed, every student in business school. then-revolutionary. military -- then it was revolutionary. military commanders thought tactical and strategic commanding in particular was an art that was learned through experience and judgment, and they bridled at intellectuals butting their nose in.

but several astonishing insights that blackett's small team proved early on changed their minds. probably dramatic was a calculation the scientists made showing that the tactics the navy had orders its air crews to follow in attacking u-boats -- even though it seems like a perfectly sensible approach on its face -- was, in fact, unlikely ever successful in sinking a u-boat. the navy commanders had actually done a somingly reasonable calculationing themselves. -- seemingly reasonable calculation themselves. they knew how much time typically elapsed between the moment a patrol plane spotted a u-boat and the u-boat spotted the patrol plane and dove beneath the surface. they knew how fast a u-boat could dive. they knew it was of 45 seconds that a u-boat had been out of

sight by the time the patrol plane got into position to develop a depth charge, and they figure a u-boat could have gotten to about 150 feet below the surface at that point. so they said, okay, 150 feet, that's the best average. the trouble was, as blackett's scientists realized once they started sifting through this data, was that a u-boat that had been out of sight for 5 seconds also -- 45 seconds also had time to take evasive action left or right. so even though the depth charges were probably exploding at the right depth, they were almost always in the wrong place and so were missing their targets and, in fact, the results with positively dismal. fewer than 1% of all sighted u-boats were being successfully attacked. the scientists proposed an incredibly simple change that involved no new equipment or new

be manpower or anything else. they said change the depth setting on the depth charges from 150 feet to 25 feet, only attack u-boats that had been out of sight for less than 15 seconds. that would insure that when they did carry out an attack, the target would be both at the right depth and the right place because u-boats caught in this small 15-second window wouldn't have had much time to take evasive action and zigzag left to right. the scientists calculated this would increase the successful kill rate from 1% to 10%. now, imagine if you had approached a military commander at this time and said we've got this incredible new wonder weapon, this incredibly more powerful explosive, and it will increase by a factor of ten your success. it would have been astonishing. here there was no new weapon, no new gizmo, it was change the depth setting. and sure enough, when the

results were implemented, excuse me, it was almost exactly a factor of telephone improvement -- of ten improvement that ultimately occurred. astonishing. well, it took some convincing, of course, to get this change introduced, as you can imagine, but when it did happen, these results were just undeniable. that change alone transformed the anti-subsubmarine air campan to one of almost complete ineffectiveness in 1941, as i mentioned, to the decisive battle and war-winning operate it would become by 1943. and by that summer of 1943, it effectively knocked the u-boats out of the war. repeatedly blackett's group and a team of scientists that were established by the u.s. navy produced equal results, doubling or tripling even more the

effectiveness of existing weapons and forces in hand. again through fairly simple analyses and just by asking the right questions about tactical and strategic decisions that had often been made by tradition, history, circumstance rather than rigorous analysis. their most powerful piece of new technology was the back of the en re-- envelope. one time blackett literally wrote out an equation that led to a dramatic outcome. the british command overseeing all of the convoys that were crossing the atlantic bringing vital spries to britain -- supplies to britain. they had a large map where they were also tracking what they believed were the known positions of u-boats. and backett knew that u-boats

mostly traveled on the surface, he knew how many hours the patrol planes were flying, so he was able to figure out how many u-boats should have been spotted by them per hour. of when he compared them to the actual numbers that were being spotted, they were only finding a third of a fourth the number it seemed they ought to be. so apparently, in other words, the u-boats were seeing the approaching patrol planes before the patrol planes saw the u-boats, giving the u-boats time to dye and escape -- dive and escape detection altogether. the answer turned out to be very simple yet overlooked. one day an air force officer asked blackett, well, what color are coastal command aircraft? turned out most of them were painted black because they'd opinion night bombers that had been pressed to serve for anti-submarine duty. black is a very good color at

night, it's the worse possible color if you don't want to be seen against a light or cloudy sky in the north atlantic by day. repainting the underside of the wings white of these planes led to a doubling of u-boat sightings from one every 700 hours to one every 350 hours. again, imagine if you were a commander and you went to chief or to the prime minister and said we'd like to have twice as many airplanes as we've been assigned. you know, you wouldn't have gotten it. but here was something which produced the equivalent effect simply by analysis asking the right questions and a relative simple change. now, blackett after the war, in fact, took pains to emphasize it wasn't really the case of a bunch. of brilliant scientists telling, you know, showing how stupid the military commanders were as much as i might have sounded line

like that. he said, in fact, most of the time it turned out the military was doing things the best way. but by going back to square one, they again and again turned up small points that had been overlooked. phil morse who was the mit physicist who headed the american anti-submarine research effort after the war wrote a textbook, actually, where he true on a lot of the experiences from the or war to show how these same ideas could be applied to business and many sort of everyday practical problems. and his favorite example, he cited, he said it was a trivial but very good illustrationing of what operations research could do. one of his scientists was out in the field visiting some base, fairly rough conditions, and he noticed after every meals thrfl

a huge line, soldiers waiting to watch their mess kits. so being a good operations researcher, he went up and started timing what was going on. apparently, what was going on, they had four washtubs, they had two for washing and two for rinsing. and there would be this huge back up. so he timed how long it took each operation, and he noticed, well, it took three times as long to wash the mess kit as to rinse it, so he finally said, you know, if you had three tubs for washing and one for rinsing, it will, um, speed things up. and not only did the line shrink, he said the line vanished completely. and, actually, that's a common phenomenon with these sorts of operations analyses of not diminishings, -- diminishing returns. if you could find the bottleneck and remove it, often, you know,

it's the seemingly miraculous result. now, one rather more important illustration of this was the work carried out by cecil gordon who was a quite brilliant, very eccentric british geneticist. his civilian expertise was fruit fly genetics. but he managed to triple the number of flying hours that the coastal command air quadrants were able to carry out each month, again, not adding a single airplane, not adding a single additional man to the ground crews, but simply by looking at where the boltnecks were many routine maintenance operations, looking at what components broke most often and rearranging procedures and routines. one raf wing commander who was asked about gordon's work and was full of praise though he, i think, also showed exactly what the scientists were sometimes up against when it came to traditional military attitudes. he said, gordon, a marvelously

efficient chap. then he added, of course, he was no gentleman. [laughter] but it was an extraordinarily diverse group of men and a few women who made up up the british and american anti-submarine operational research teams. there were physicists, chemists, mathematicians, insurance actuaries, zoologists, astronomers, botanists and one expert on the sex life of the oyster as he was described by a colleague with, i think, no exaggeration. blackett was actually the only one i'm aware of who had any military background at all. but what they shared was a scientific mindset and no preconceived notions. it was also crucial, i think, that they were outsiders. they were not military professionals. they had no career on the line in their work, only the results mattered. blackett advised one of his colleagues who was offered a

naval commission to turn it town. he said it was far better to remain a civilian so he could talk back to admirals, he told him. but i think being civilians also meant -- and this was a quite important factor, i think -- that they could more easily talk to and associate with the enlisted men who as everyone in the military knows are the people who really know what's going on. one of the operational researchers recalled how his colleagues got most of their useful information by hanging out in the pubs where the ncos went which led him to conclude 90% of operational research is beer. [laughter] i found the sociological aspects of what blackett and later his american counterparts did actually every bit as fascinating as the technical and scientific details. it took an incredible amount of tact and understanding to

bureaucratic politics on the part of blackett and phil morse to obtain permission in the first place to be embedded with operational squadrons, tock allowed -- to be allowed not just to see secondhand data but to see for themselves and to be able to ask questions. blackett, i think, very shrewdly decided his group was not going to stake its reputation by going to the mat to fight for small or incremental improvements. he said if it was going to require some complex scientific statistical analysis to prove that they had actually made things better, they were never going to persuade the admirals and generals that they were worthwhile. he said, rather, they had to concentrate on the things that produced results that were so dramatic that they would speak for themselves, as, in fact, he did with that example of the changing the color of the camouflage, changing the keepth charge setting -- the depth charge setting.

these were dramatic examples that really convinced initially disbelieving officers that these civilian intellectuals did have something to offer. likewide, he said, they needed to stifle the natural tendency for offices to sit around intellectualizing about a problem for its own sake. he told his colleagues this was not at all like the situation in their own labs. their job was to improve things if they can and if not, to keep quiet. on the american side, phil morse from the outset, i think, showed an arguably even more skilled understanding of bureaucracies and military bureaucracies to make it an absolute rule, in fact, he required everyone read this every single month, the same standing instructions. he said we have to be able to get permission to go out and talk to the operational squad

rants, we have to be able to talk to everyone from high to low to gather the facts. but we can't be seen as some sort of spies who are going to tell on them that they're doing something wrong, and even more important, the credit has to go to the commanding officer. we report to the commanding officer. and he's cautioned all of the scientists. he said don't ever try to claim credit for yourself, even when you deserve it. he said our job is to help win the war, not to run it ourselves. well, i wanted to mention just one other point that fascinated me in the course of my research before i get to your questions. and while i definitely set out to write the story of the nerds who won world war ii, i was not at all expecting that i was going to be also writing the lefties who won world war ii. but it was a very striking fact that emerged that blackett and

many on the scientists who pioneered operations researching and who helped to win this very crucial victory against the u-boats were hard left marxists and even in a few cases card-carrying communists. it turned out there were several important reasons for this which i think it's interesting and important to understand. most basic scientists until the 1920s or so were actually, as a matter of principle, not political at all. ernest rutherford who ran the cavendish laboratory in britain actually told his students it would harm your objectivity and your detachment as a scientist if you were involved in politics, and you should not be involved in politics in any way. but two things changed that. one was the great depression. finish blackett was one of many scientists in the 1930s who was furiously frustrated by what

he saw as this almost incomprehensible disconnect between the incredible discoveries that were being made in the laboratory -- this was the golden age of physics. incredible break throughs and discoveries and understanding were being made. so there was that on the one hand. and on the other hand, it was the miserable poverty of the working population. i think that was particularly true in britain. you know, britain in a sense the stock market crash of 929 and the great depression here was less -- which did become a worldwide phenomenon -- though was less something new than just a continuation of the same slump that had been afflicting the british economy since the end of the first world war. so they saw a situation in which the fruits of science and progress were not benefiting science concern society as a whole, and they concluded that

the rational organization of science and society was the only way to change that. the other important factor was that scientists had far more international context than almost any other segment of society at this time. and so far sooner than most were very aware of the terrible evils of nazi germany beginning with the persecution and dismissal of all jewish scientists from german universities in 1933. blackett himself was involved as many of these british and american scientists were during this period in finding positions for refugee jewish scientists from germany in universities in britain and america. but i think their politics was far less important than their or brilliance, their commitment and their true fearlessness. the scientists in britain and america who would be involved in this effort included no fewer

than six or past future nobel prize winners in chemistry, physics and medicine. and what they fundamentally showed is even in something as uncertain and tradition-bound as war, scientific thinking was crucial to victory. the official history of scientific contribution to the war effort observed that hitler fundamentally had a romantic conception of war, a belief in the power of destiny, individual heroism, even magical thinking and mysticism at times. hitler and his generals wrote the official historians failed to produce any operational research comparable to the allied development. if they had, they probably would have won the submarine campaign and the war. well, thank you very much. thank you for coming. i'd be delighted to answer any questions, and it's been a pleasure. [applause]

and if you do have questions, please wait for the microphone so we can get your question heard and recorded. >> how did you research these topics given that most of it happened 70 years ago? >> yeah. well, there was a very interesting array of sources available. the -- i went to london and spent some fascinating days looking at blackett's papers which the royal society has. the public record office in london has a lot of the reports done by the anti-submarine operational research groups, a lot of memos. all the way up to churchill. it's interesting, you know, churchill had a very strange relationship with science. he was a real enthusiast which

was wonderful. he also sometimes got carried away with these pet ideas of his which were a terrible waste of time and effort. but there was, i mentioned cecil gordon and his work on aircraft maintenance. in the british archives there was this memo from churchill the same month this work ban fully aware of it, fully supporting it mentioning, i understand this is going to be able to triple the number of flying hours simply, please continue with the study. it was very interesting. on the american side, similarly, the national archives here in washington has a lot of the reports, a lot of internal memos. and a number of the sign terrorists -- almost all of them are dead now -- but in the 1970s some of the professional societies involved in operations research did some oral histories, so there's some nice rem -- reminiscences.

very spotty, of course, but a few nice, personal, telling details come through. >> you mentioned that one of the important aspects of operations research during world war ii was that the scientists and mathematicians weren't part of the military. >> right. >> is that the case today? >> well -- >> and how does that affect -- >> yeah. it's been a fascinating question to me, and i've been thinking about it 6789 -- it. i think part of the lesson of world war ii in a sense that we forgot was that our entire society was mobilized. the most brilliant scientific minds, the most brilliant legal minds, people who had no interest in a career in the military, in some ways people who were almost, you know, the opposite of the kind of person who would even stand being able to, you know, have a military career. i don't mean that in a disparaging way, i just mean, you know, it isn't -- wouldn't have been the kind of thing that

was part of their personality. were brought into the war effort. there was a sense of urgency, there was a sense of breaking the rules when necessary, of improvisation. that was true certainly in the code breaking effort as well, it was true in special operations and espionage. and i think on the one hand we can say it really is an accomplishment that scientific understanding is now, you know, second nature in the military. it's been professionalized. so that's good. but, you know, we've lost something too, because the greatest minds many science are not play -- in science are not playing this role in the military today. the greatest legal minds, the greatest math mat call the minds are not. and, you know, you've got to keep these people under control. i'm not saying scientists are the solution to everything, but i think we have lost something

that you have people who are making it a career, who are part of the chain of command. and, you know, you saw this, actually, was i tried to follow -- because i tried to follow through just a bit at the end of the book, sort of what happened with operations after the war? be it was a great triumph and a success. it's now part of standard military thinking. but, you know, in the '50s and early '60s in particular you saw a lot of cases where the o.r. researchers who are now often civilians but employees of the-and-a-half or army were -- of the navy or army were giving the answers that generals or admirals wanted. you know, it's a very interesting question, and years ago i was talking to general bill odom who had been the nsa director. and it was right at the time the berlin wall fell and all kinds of, you know, new thinking about things.

and he said, you know, he said we ought to have the ceremony, run down the flag in front of the cia, say we won the cold war, we're abolishing the cia and start a completely new agency from scratch because, you know, he was of pointing to the same thing. we've lost something when, i mean, pure rock says, you know -- bureaucracies, you know, become complacent. >> how quickly after the war did operations research move into industry? >> oh, yeah. very quickly. it's interesting, phil morse who headed the u.s. anti-sub/o.r. effort very quickly decided we're going to establish a program at mit. and i think it was the mid '50s this had begun, they had students, they had founded the

operations research society of america which was very much focused on civilian problems, you know, everything from schedule -- excuse me, scheduling firefighters' work shifts to water flows on dams to problems of managing bottlenecks in warehouses and factories. so these guys, i think, were keenly aware of the larger possibilities. and, again, interestingly, some of that was because of their politics. they thought, well, we proved what central planning and scientifically-informed central planning can do in the war with the victory against the u-boats, and so we're going to have, you know, scientific socialism, organized industry -- particularly in britain, this was tried in america and there was much more resistance or just lack of interest in that. and, of course, it didn't work out that way. civilian economy is vastly more

complex than the problems of defeating u-boats. in the war existence against the u-boats, everyone agreed what the measure of merit was. of it was how many merchant ships you saved and how many u-boats you sunk. when you're dealing with the economy, it depends on your political views. so those efforts were much less successful, but certainly in terms of as a discipline that could be applied to practical problems in industry, i mean, very quickly it was -- yeah, follow up here. >> the reason i asked the question is because when i got out of college and went to work for eastman kodak in the summer of 1953 -- >> okay. >> -- i think what i was doing as a young engineer was operations research even though we called it time and motion studies. >> with yeah. well, you know, it's funny, yeah, you get into all this sort of zoology about the terms. time and motion studies went

back earlier, and i think tended to have a somewhat, you know, narrower focus. and they were at least making broader claims for how much this approach could be applied. particularly when you got into things of analyzing work flows through a factory and scheduling and analyzing where the bottlenecks were. that was -- and i think they were probably right. it was, at least in concept, a much broader application. >> [inaudible] >> oh, okay. yeah, yeah. you know, and, look, the critique, there was this great memo from one annoyed british bureaucrat from around this time you're talking about in 950 saying -- 1950 saying, well, we seem to be making this big deal about operations research. it just seems to be ordinary common sense, sensible things that are given this fancy name. so, you know -- [laughter] but i think, you know, just

getting back to the anti-submarine score of world war ii, they really did something, i think, fundamentally new though which was to say basic questions about military strategy, tactics and operations are even amenable to a scientific analysis. and there have been, you know, it had only been done piecemeal before that. it was a real revolution. yeah. >> there was, i wonder if your research came across a guy named johnnie walker. >> johnnie walker. >> not the -- >> not the scotch. yeah. no. who was he? >> he was one of the most successful anti--submarine guys in the navy -- >> but he was an officer. >> he was. he was a maverick. he was fortunate, some people wanted to sack him a few times, but he actually produced the results.

>> any other questions? all right, well, thank you very much. [applause] >> for more information, visit the author's web site, budianski.com. >> here are some of the latest headlines surrounding the publishing industry this past week. publisher henry holt and company announced that former secretary of state donald leads saw rice is writing a new book on democracy. a new release from the publisher said ms. rice will recount, quote: stories from her career and personal life to shed right on the essential questions of contemporary democracy. the book is set to publish in late 2015. senator elizabeth warren announced this week that she's begun writing her tenth book. the book titled "rigged" will be

about the freshman senator's experience following the american financial crisis and her fight for the middle class. senator warren said she anticipates the book to be published next year. this week the supreme court decided in a 6-3 ruling that foreign buyers of copyrighted materials such as books and movies can reis sell those -- resell those materials without permission from the copyright holders. the major decision stems from a case brought by publisher john wile hi and son where a former university of southern california student was buying cheaper textbooks from his home country of thailand and selling them for profit in the united states. the supreme court decided that copyright holders' rights terminate when their materials are resold in another country. stay up-to-date on breaking news about authors, books and publishing by liking us on facebook at facebook.com/booktv. or follow us on twit wither @booktv. you can also visit our web site,

booktv.org, and click on news about books. >> are you interested in being a part of booktv's new online book club? each month we'll discuss a different book and author. this month we'll be discussing michelle alexander's "the new jim crow: mass incarceration in the age of color blindness." pote your thoughts on twit -- post your thoughts on twitter and write on our facebook page. and then on tuesday at 9 p.m. eastern, join our live moderated discussion on twitter, hash tag btv book club. send your suggestions on which books you think we should include in our book club via twitter, on facebook or e-mail us at booktv@c-span.org. >> here's a look at some upcoming book fairs and festivals happening around the country. the virginia festival of the book began on wednesday, march 20th and runs through sunday the 4th.

24th. this annual charlottesville event features douglas predictionly and congressman john lewis. also this weekend the 26th annual tennessee williams new orleans literary fest value in louisiana -- festival in louisiana featuring its third annual poetry contest, live one-act plays and highlight presentations by authors william j. myth and patricia paradety. florida will host the venice book fair and writers fair during the first week in april featuring author presentations and readings in the historic venice theater. the 11th annual annapolis festival will be held op april 13th. authors jake tapper, gary crist and hannah roadsen are all scheduled to present books. on april 20th, montgomery, alabama, will host the eighth annual a alabama book festival featuring vendors and exhibiters

and has about 45 authors scheduled. that same weekend booktv will be live from the los angeles times festival of books. checkbook tv.org for updates on our live coverage. and please let us know about book fairs and festivals in your area, and we'll add them to our list. post them to tour wall -- to our wall as facebook.com. >> you're watching booktv on c-span2. here's a look at our prime time lineup for tonight beginning at 7 ian, fiona hall to ran profiles thomas mast, the man responsible for associating the elephant and the done can key with our political parties. and then booktv is live from the 2013 virginia festival of the book. georgia congressman john lewis and john carlos will sit down to discuss their experiences during the civil rights movement. at 10 p.m. eastern we'll bring you our weekly "after words" program. this week david burstein, author

of "fast future" sits down with host s.e. cupp. and we conclude tonight's prime time programming at 11 eastern with sandra day o'connor. her book is "out of order." visit booktv.org for more on this weekend's television schedule. >> here's a look at some books that are being published this week. bioethicist ezekiel emanuel recounts his upprescriptioning and how his immigrant parents produced three successful children including his brother rahm emanuel and ari emanuel, a hollywood agent, in "brothers emanuel." in "those angry days: roose svelte, lindbergh and america's fight over world war ii, lynne olson recounts world war ii.

jeff chu presents his thoughts on religion and gay rights in "does jesus really love me: a gay christian's pilgrimage in search of god in america." in "forecast: what physics, meetology and science can teach us," mark buchanan explains how the ebb and flow of markets and the economy can relate to numerous fields of science. look for these titles in bookstores this coming week and watch for the authors in the near future on booktv and booktv.org. >> betty friedan's "the feminine mystique" was published in 963. it's a book that would play an integral role on feminism in the united states. a panel discusses the impact of the book 50 years after its publication. this is a little over an hour. >> um, well, first i want to