>> good evening and welcome. i and chairman of the historical society and i am pleased to welcome you here this evening. i think we are about to have a truly interesting evening. i am -- in a most revealing program who is author has put a lot of time in to a particular area of study. in case you have not noticed there is a cottage industry out there populated by a diplomats, journalists who write about their experiences in the middle

east. this has been going on and 30 or 40 years. is fair to say most of those histories, memoirs, will be little noted nor remembered. but not all. "tested by zion" the bush administration and the israeli-palestinian conflict" authored by 89 is sure to go down as the definitive history. mr. abram is educated at harvard college, harvard law school, london school of economics and served eight years during the reagan did ministration by assistant secretary of state and eight years in the bush administration as the white house deputy adviser to the president and national security advisor. eliot's book.

>> "tested by zion" is worth reading and i should note it is worth buying for two important reasons. first this is a presidential advisor at the highest level with access to all involved in the palestinian conflict and there are a lot. the book is filled with answers severally interesting questions that we all have thought about if we had been interested in this region thinking about egypt and israel, palestinians syrians the questions are manyfold but many answers you will receive is how was it that george to view bush from

texas came to the white house with so little experience in the least with israel, and committed to the jewish state. how and why did george w. bush choice of secretary of state colin powell, how does his views differ so sharply from the president's almost from the beginning? why is it that yes -- yasser arafat invited to the warehouse more than any other foreign dignitary during the clinton years years, yet never set foot in the bush white house? how did bush and sure around develop such a trusting relationship? they had never met.

why did connolly's a rice viewpoint change so or abruptly between the first term and a second term of the administration? why and how did it sure drone decided is in israel's interest to leave caused the? and if that isn't enough with is the real story behind the syrian nuclear facility? given what has happened since, it is truly chilling to think absent the israelis attacked what my had been if syria was a nuclear power today. the second big reason to read the book is the light it sheds on the process of

developing a foreign policy. and do all the moving parts work together in what are the best ways? the response to any issue confronting our nation has to survive a complex, it including the white house, state department department, defense department, a justice department and probably others, not to mention the subgroups in each of these establishments we can we counted on to disagree with one another. different world views embedded in the government and so many ways to fail. in essence this book is a primer for a president how he earthy -- she should think about organizing for

policy initiatives and what role the white house had vs. the state department and defense department. we are fortunate elliott will be here and will talk about half an hour. then we will convene in the atrium for cocktails and that will mention once again you have an opportunity there to purchase this remarkable book in our bookstore and i am sure he would be happy to autograph it for you. i thank you for coming and let me introduce elliott abrams. [applause] >> thank you very much. first, thank you roger for that introduction and as well for your support of the

work of the council of foreign relations there are a lot of people i should mention but a senior editor of cambridge university press who got the transcript to say yes, we will publish this. [applause] i should add, i know there many of you in this audience that no longer read books on paper and i will be happy to use sign your candle if you have it with you. [laughter] -- amazon can do if you have it with you. why did i write this book? there is an explanation for much of this history of the bush and administration policy had changed over eight years and it did

change. the story of these events from 9/11 with the fighting in gaza are important events and i thought the story needs to be told and nobody else will tell that other than what has been written of their memoirs they are covering the entire world and with domestic policy as well i thought if i don't do it nobody will. in addition there are too many good stories. if you think of the personalities personalities, bush, cheney, powell, rice, olmert, a sharon, these stories deserve to be told.

i wanted to try to shed light on how decisions are made rightly or sometimes wrongly but the story covers eight years and let me start with the beginning and the and. january 20, at 2001, field president moves over to the new president and when that happens they had teeth and exchange pleasantries and very often hate each other but not january 20th, 2001 he had something he wanted to say. do not go after arafat.

don't make the same mistake i made. you will be sorry if you do. i tell you the story in the beginning because it is an answer to one of the charges made the bush in a station paid no attention to the conflict until 2008 the un waited until the last minute people are being killed almost every day. and bill clinton just told the president don't ever negotiate with this guy. and then it'll of the only negotiating partner but what bush should have done is to say let's go back to camp

david. that is a surge. the last is january 2009. fighting in gaza the end of that came the third week of january with the security resolution saying both sides need to stop the violence. fe rejected force of presley because of the state of israel and tomas. and olmert and angrily demanded from the president such. but the resolution was written by secretary rice, three of them were in new york and they put

together this resolution. none of their heads of government said they liked the language. i had a couple of conversations with the french national security adviser who assured me if we voted against it or veto the resolution, but it was called the revolt of the foreign minister. what did the president to? you can end the illustration that basically treats the terrorist group equally be

but he did not want to repudiate the secretary of state that was his instruction and i think it is the only time in eight years when i tell you that story because it tells you something else that happened which is in a certain way we never really had the state department pursuing a new and different policy. let me go back to the beginning. at the intifada to start a peace process. then comes 9/11. i don't really think the president had them italy's policy before 9/11. it was the same old same old

he was in charge of foreign policy but then comes an 11 the president had to come up with the explanation why did a group of men including nine saudis come here to kill thousands of americans? he received an immediate answer from the department of state. they hate us because we are so supportive of israel this is the answer i believe you could have gotten from the state department any decade of 1948. [laughter] the president did not buy it because he's understood we had plenty of intermit -- information that they were better about the israeli

government so he looked around and ultimately this led him to the freedom agenda that the problem with the repressive nature that societies came with the doom about the israeli-palestinian conflict? it took the president until 2002 to develop his answer that was to states and to people but only when it is a stable stable, peaceful, democratic , but uncorrupted government of course, that made arafat has to go. if i say to you now that sounds i get a big deal. it was a very big deal

arafat was the single foreign leader who visited the most not tony blair. yasser arafat. people understood arafat was a huge piece so in his june 2002 speech that is not the path to peace comes we can go down and when he is gone but it is the of courageous statement after making that speech he went off to the g8 meeting knowing he would be the skunk at the garden paul -- party. that speech some involving the president himself which

doesn't happen very often people don't go line by line number speeches but he did for that speech and ironically it was secretary powell said you have to set your policy then he saw the final draft in this state department obsoleted not want the speech given. and interest of time i want to jump forward. that was june 2002 by the way he goes back to the general assembly every year with a visit to new york you could not get around manhattan at all for a couple of days. yasser arafat was still the head of the plo.

he was smart enough to realize although we said he had to go he was likely to get a bear hug released a handshake with george bush. colin powell was appointed and told of their fat appears don't let him get to the president we do not want that bono to undermine our policy. sure enough, arafat tried it and walk down the hallway to coffee and not office and out comes arafat to grab the photo and outcomes:: to throw him back against the wall. you never find of pitcher of george to be bush and yasir arafat. we thought we had a way forward to create a decent palestinian government which

the goat -- israelis could negotiate some the forced arafat to fill the minister with the president and in june 2003 we have a summit mubarak, saudi arabia, jordan, president bush, august, and if you google you will find a photo of those men overlooking the street of to ron 120 degrees we built a platform with a magnificent view behind it down to the shore off a cliff there're

air-conditioner condensers piping cold age from the stage as on stage it is 68 degrees off stage it is 120 degrees but nobody is watching. that picture is from the following day of the summit after the king of jordan as paulus. this is where abbas says he wanted and of violence. we thought we were off to the races and thought they could not negotiate with each other the june 2003 and then abbas resigns arafat one we lost and we underestimate his ability to maneuver and push this man aside. we are dead in the water after that.

negotiations will start and by day it is over and arafat is back in the saddle. i would say now what? what do you have in mind? you think your negotiating with the syrians? he said know they are murderers which by the way the this the full supplement i have gotten because the united states thinks they forced him to pull out of gaza. but it was his idea. this view was there was no future for the vision in which there are going to be

7,000 jews ever and it is the intolerable strain with the idea it is whether it is wise to get out from the strip that separates from the sinai through which all arms go to home loss. we spent 2004 and 2005 backing sure around in his struggle to get approval from not withdraw from them and chevron -- sharon was convinced the left can wait

and the right does not want to. it is only me. if i fail nobody will even try it so we thought he deserved a backings so people who were elected to try to do something. that is why he did not like schroeder of germany he liked sure ron they had a good relationship and he wanted to help him achieve it it is not true they were intimate friends. they were a generation apart and there was a language barrier. there is a phrase about ariel sharon that said he is the only person i ever met

that speaks english better than he understands it. [laughter] it was true because actually he had us series of set formulas sediments, gaza, a jerusalem, much beyond that he did not and you would get convoluted sentences the then they would explain in hebrew what he was getting at but chevron -- sharon by the way there was one thing that happened in 2004 when the prime minister sharon do not kill arafat.

don't do it. don't kill him. and sharon would never say okay you have my word. let's sheik. he would blush. [laughter] but in the meeting early 2005 after arafat's death at the bush ranch in texas president was asking about arafat and the palestinians and he said by the way thank you for not killing him and he said sometimes god helps. [laughter] we thought after the withdrawal from gaza there was a way for word in greece said this is your chance to show the world and the

israelis with a palestinian state would we like. that did not work out as successful as we hoped but we thought and most thought sharon had in mind, going back to defense to the west bank at of the more isolated settlements to keep the jordan valley and jordan river but, as you recall the end of summer 2005 he had the first joke than the second stroke he went into the. olmert, let me step back. so then was a great plan sometimes guide does not help. know what?

so olmert says i want to do the same thing no to israelis define the same way but they said let's concentrate behind a fence. great. olmert comes to the warehouse as the prime minister and tells bushy wants to do this and bush says try a negotiating. now with this spring to thousand six. but there is a small problem. who'd you negotiate with? tomas has won the palestinian election. so why have an election and let tom moss run? when arafat died they had an election because how you choose a legitimate leader?

very modern and western they did. abbas ran got 65 percent of the boats and he won the election. they were not ready than it was postponed to january. there was a huge fight over whether whether tomas could run and made clearly the wrong decision can a terrorist group run? it is a process to hand in the guns and participate in politics so lesson number one they cannot participate in the government but we thought that was not a portent and not in

parliament but day one. why did they win? first of all, they ran a terrific campaign i remember visiting the west bank all over the place. billboards that are basically know where to be seen the president thought it was culture but in retrospect it was a vote for is long in early sign of what we have now seen at other places in the region as well. so now it is 2006 you have, says the majority in the parliament this is not going to happen that may be olmert can do things on his own.

whenever i would go to israel through 2008 the president would say how was might buddy doing? and. [inaudible] [laughter] so why didn't he go forward? olmert simply made a wrong decision but his decision to go to war, and it was his decision, both israeli military people i have vast think that in response to the hezbollah attack other then bombing for few-- would not have a war. he never recovered from it

politically or in another way. or the of connelly's rice confidence they had a good relationship. they used to call her doctor rice except when he was angry he would call her madame secretary if he started that way we knew it was bad. she lost faith in olmert summer 2006 she was trying to bring an end to the lebanon war there is a terrible accident the israelis bond -- bombed a house where women and children were hiding we were

on the verge to get an agreement to end the war a big achievement for her in the president but instead had to go home and then she felt these guys and not handling their affairs well. and of course, the defense minister she had no confidence in him and also after lebanon so that cost was felt the relations between the state department were touchy and tents for the last 2.5 ears of the administration. i did not think this was

wise and said so on the fifth anniversary of the 2002 speech secretary rice wanted to give a speech of the big international conference i managed to get that off of the agenda. and he announced to be doing a big conference at the naval academy and it would take a year to get the agreement. i did not think then i think the pressure is on him within the palestinian population. he will not sign anything

but i thought they were far apart so i kept telling the president's this will not happen and he said some say it was olmert but sadly i don't think there was a serious chance not even today frankly of the final status agreements. irene just save the lessons that are worth mentioning we learned what bill clinton learned we have more flexibility at of the israelis when we hugged them

rather than distance ourselves. and in those years it you could see is that not the central issue of the of middle east? and one final lesson, it is a mistake to concentrate on the process of the handshake rather than the reality on the ground. there is no substitute basing what you are doing on the reality. the diplomatic activities happens on the ground.

that is exactly right. too often we concentrated for those who have the palestinian reality. i missed prime minister sharon who was a wonderful person to work with. i mentioned that trip to see him. it was kind of a secret trip but the security guy would sneak me into his hotel and this guy is a head of government. will try to impress him so we go into the dining room

and out comes the israeli security guy with slabs of meat. [laughter] and sharon was a good eater. the conversation came later. first, we each. the tray is laid down and it is instructed to cut the piece of meat that is nearest to him that it is pink and we are in rome. i thought what else? that hast to be am. so i said prime minister what meet you think that is? he briefly stopped chewing and says sometimes it is best not to ask. [laughter] right now is better to ask. i turn it over to you. thank you very much.

[applause] please come up to the microphone. >> philosophically 75% of palestine jordan to except the responsibility of any palestinians? >> yes. i suggest this at the end of the book it would not be a very prosperous state war naturally have a relationship, called it organic, he would travel to

the airport the economic link with a common currency would be natural. with security and law and order so to'' a palestinian friend of mine, there must be the independent palestinian state, at least 15 minutes. he meant with the right to independence and exercising that right meant quite a different story.

>> i have a question many israelis, like myself believe there can be no possibility for reconciliation because the piece of paper is something else so give fein is long or the palestinian covenant basically says the jewish people of israel do you think this is remotely possible be think they

should separate the arabs from his mom with more moderate government from bangladesh that has recently happened in the middle east. what do you mean by peace and what you mean by reconciliation? the kind of peace after, i don't see that happening in the future. it will take centuries but peace the absence of war even if rivalries and bad feelings is possible. the critical thing is the israeli strength and american strength. is quite obvious to the arabs is the united states all the right now and canada

but we have a larger army. if they come to believe that israel is therefore ever excuse me 2002 is the saudi and crown prince peace plan which he pretty much offers peace with israel not on terms are acceptable but the end result is a kind of peace and added period where it is not coincidental. real reconciliation i don't know about bad the peace

between states i could see that. >> many ms. helen. and what i noticed in your talk is the human element is missing. the road map which was presented the european union, united nations, but no israel. the expulsion to talk about sure drones plan and what about those people that were removed from their homes still living in caravans and destroyed synagogues and communities and schools? today we have president obama talking about a timetable for withdrawal of

today and samaria. that is not 10,000 it is 200,000 or whatever the number is if they leave a few settlements in place. it seems to me your comments at the end about one of the fellows who said you looked at this on a diplomatic level but not that the human level the people involved are the ones who count and i don't understand the compulsion on the part of the united states to make the plants for israel who is a sovereign nation. [applause] >> the compulsion is an interesting phenomenon. every secretary of state the except the obsession immediately upon entering the building and happened to paul, rice and even carry

they want to do the same thing. i agree completely with your timetable but the road map had a time table 2005 there is no point* to set up the timetable because it will happen in life is too complicated to say this will happen next year than the year after that we do that. i think sure drone -- sharon made a huge mistake and knew that the and but it was too late. but he should have said if he decided as a general to pull the settlements out he should have said you 7,000 people are heroes of this date and you have made incredible sacrifices and incredible risks for this

state but now i have asked for a greater sacrifice instead that government communicated they need to go they are a problem the sooner they get out the better i think that was communicated his the people around sharon were fairly secular that would that the effort quite negatively and from the political point* of view at the least that you he never corrected and until the very end he sought it the human element is there but the history of the bush did ministration and upon

administration both far from the united states made by the president complicated many things but fundamentally the policy is made by the president that is the most important human element and when they tried to wrest power from the president most are smart enough and strong enough to make sure that doesn't happen it is a story i would argue of colin powell where the state department ultimately became irrelevant they were marginalized. but it is true after all that what we we're doing in

2005 when we were helping sharon was to say we recognize you need a majority in your cabinet and in the senate representing the people of israel. we will do what we can to lend prestige to get the majority, but you need that people have got to be with you if you take the steps. i don't think we neglected the human element and i have to say to give you an example, when the mitchell report came out in 2001 and said settlement free including national roads chevron said immediately that is absurd and i reject it. what you mean? no one can have babies? natural growth? were you telling me?

i have come back to the idea to marry and have a family and settled down but not too far from the parents the because no settlement expansion they reject that he did explain it to us and did understand but i have to move to the next question. >> i have not been able to read your book yet but i want to know your opinion how it shaped the current policy? >> i am looking at my watch because that is a very big question. [laughter] but with the current

structure to begin with palestinian mandates setting the borders and also for the israelis they still rely on some british positions and british law. but the most biggest defect was the declaration which lays the foundation for the jewish state and then mixups the activity of that state i think it is true and i will stop at this there are very few natural kenji is in that

region there's turkey and iran but most are drawn by the colonial powers and were they will remain as a good question whether it is syria >> i am curious about the title how did you come to it? >> i'd did that once the subtitle to be the title i had a somewhat argument because i thought it was too broad so i wanted something to three words but cambridge has a policy the title catchy or not have to tell you something that what it is about to.

you could not have the title the test, hard times, negotiations, it has to be related so my wife and i went through a bunch of names and try them out on our kids and even mailed back and forth and that was the winner a reasonable title in this sense for every president this put the region and conflict is a test very good question why do americans feel compelled to resolve it? i think it is a mistake to feel that we can't bet that we are a global power to help them to stop fighting each other with a better motive is reasonable. >> seems our experience with

gaza shows lessons to be learned is there any reason to believe god forbid the creation of a palestinian state is another arab terrorist state? >> here is the problem. what is the odds of one state solution? i don't know many israelis who want that demographically. gaza west bank the others in jordan. they could have had gaza. they all wanted. they are aware of what is going on in gaza even the muslim -- brotherhood does not like what is going on so

the idea to give the territories fact of the two-state solution to say we do not wish to govern millions of palestinians. those in a peaceful democratic state which we have not created yet. but the problem is precisely when you are confronted with that fact and peaceful state does not exist yet what do you do? we wait? or let's go forward anyway? i was a critic of the clinton administration policy to create the state to give it to yasser arafat concentrating on the borders but what was the nature? bush starting with a 2002

speech did not do that. estate is more important than the border. once you set a timetable you say it doesn't really matter just create the state and hope for the best. most every government in the world has that policy. >> jim shriver i'd like to ask a question about the israeli withdrawal from gaza arafat died after announced they would withdraw and sharon, if i recall correctly did not coordinate that withdrawal with his successor and sickies over the of the offense --

through the keys over the fence. it was that a mistake? we have seen the consequences in what might we learn from that? >> it is remarkable and noteworthy that november november 2004 that we don't change a policy nor does sharon and you can envision saying okay. start from scratch. started thinking about what new ways to work with the palestinians. sharon did that do that. we did not do that. it was full steam ahead i think the reason was sharon wanted to move forward but he lost momentum nobody would ever move on anything ever how long would it take the palestinians to get legitimate leadership?

so we did not change the policy. i think it was a mistake not to coordinate. if it was so obvious, why didn't they do it? this was controversial which ultimately broke apart when of the ways he sold it was i am i doing this as a favor to the palestinians, or the americans, i have concluded concluded, a man even talking to the palestinians. i am not coordinating. i am not helping. this is for us and by us which i think was an effective political message which was we did not coordinate.

they did not coordinate. one price they paid was a looks like a home loss victory they wanted it to look like the fatah victory but instead wire the israelis getting out of gaza? why are we shooting at them? they cannot take it. just like south lebanon. so that became the legend or the proof which is why a few months later, lost one the election there is a second question if they coordinated wooden everything have gone better? i don't know about that. the corruption and incompetence of many pieces are such i am not