the apply to everybody. everybody has to work their way through those pages and understand what they mean and they disproportionately affect small institutions and that is very important. .. >> there are no more payday len dorees or options for people who don't have the best credit scores, but still need credit of some sort. well, they're going to go to loan sharks and other unsavoring institutions, and they will be hurt the worst in this. it's not the big guys, it's the little guys. >> let me just say a couple other things. i don't think anyone -- i mean, i'm not defending payday

lenders, but payday lenders, i mean, did they cause the crisis? did our bank in big springs, texas cause the crisis that never syndicated a loan or sold one? what's the deal here? less than 18 hours after they filed -- we filed suit on their behalf, the -- their examiner from the office of control of the currency, which is in the treasury, called up the ceo and said, what are you doing? why didn't you tell us? people upstairs want to know. who are you talking to? who in the press have now interviewed? this is pretty chilling stuff, i think. >> could you go back to the issue about taxation, and

particularly, relating to the iptb, essentially appropriating their own funds? one of the way succeeding congresses have often -- have often dealt with laws that they can't amend, but they don't like is to starve the beast and deny appropriations. how does that work in the case of both the ipab and the dodd-frank bill? >> well, it doesn't. that's because the statute allows the secretary power to appropriate to her own agency. i argue that starving the beast doesn't work very well at all because we've been trying that. the exception of a small interruption in the 1990s for 30 or so years right now, and the size of government doesn't -- or government spending doesn't seem to be growing -- or curtailed by the fact that we have human

deficits, but in the case of ipab, where the secretary has the ability to appropriate funds, not just to maybe siphon off medicare funds, but appropriate funds to her own agency spelled out in the statute, what else do you need? >> you're right about -- what's in the dodd-frank bill, and to repeat what i said earlier with the consumer agency, it's funded by the fed, so the fed just prints money and gives it money. that doesn't mean that congress is prohitted in the future from appropriating money for it, but that's not happened, and if they are smart, they won't let it happen or ask for it. with the financial resolution authority, again, the bridge loan and the temporary funding which could run for months or years comes from the treasury, comes from a loan, which is to

be paid off by assessment of those in the financial services industry at large, and it's not controlled by a congressional authorization or appropriation, so, again, the congress -- congress is really cut out, can go in, change the law, but fat chance, at least with the president who certainly will veto it. >> okay, i think at that point we can conclude. we will be having a reception upstairs, it's up the spiral staircase in the lobby. restrooms are located on this level, turn right when you reach the bottom of the stairs, and they are down the hallway. thank you very much for joining us. we appreciate it. thank you very much to ambassador gray and also to trevor and michael, and i hope you've had a good afternoon. thank you. [applause]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> the sequester will reduce our grants by about 5 #% does not equate to 22 million or so, which will be districted -- distributed among various licenses and stations i described, so we have, in fact, taken about a 13% cut in our overall federal funding over the last two years, and if the entire federal government has to stay in the cuts that we've sustained, the budget would be $500 billion smaller than it is now, so we feel like we've made a significant contribution to deficit reduction and retirement of the federal debt within our own context. >> the impact of spending cuts on public television tonight on 8 eastern on on "the communicat" tonight on c-span2.

today at the white house, they hosted the 135th easter egg roll, and people from all states attended, and president obama made some remarks. >> it is wonderful to see all of you, and i just want to say welcome. you guys brought the great weather. it was a little shaky this morning, but all of you did a great job sending a message upstairs, and now we have beautiful weather, and i now want to introduce the star of the obama family, my wife, the first lady, michelle obama. [cheers and applause] >> thank you, mr. president. thank you, kid president, roib novak, isn't he wonderful? [cheers and applause] robby, we're proud to have you here, so inspiring. i can't imagine that there's

anyone whose not seen your video; right? you make us want to work hard and be better, that's right. you're going to spend a little time in the oval office just fixing things up for this president, around you? all right. well, good to have you here, and it's great to have everyone here this morning. we are so excited. the easter egg roll is thee biggest event that we have here on the south lawn of the white house each year. today, we're going to have more than 30,000 people who will pass through this yard in celebration of nutrition and health and activity, and we could not do this if it were not for all our wonderful volunteers, our staff, all of the terrific performers and athletes who have taken time out of their lives and busy days to make this important. we have to give all of them a round of applause for all their hard work. yes, indeed. [applause] so, today, we want you to have a

great time, run around, thee the white house garden, learn about making tasty, healthy food, do some easter egg roll, read stories, but overall, we want you guys to have a good time and keep moving and be healthy, and, kids, eat your vegetables, okay? all right, y'all, take care. biel see you down there. thank you. [cheers and applause] >> tonight on "first ladies," anna harrison, whose husband, william henry harrison, dies after a month in office. she passes away just a year and a half later, and julia tyler, the president's second wife. >> julia is the madonna, you know, of first ladies. she loved publicity. she posed as a model at a time when that was frowned upon. she was professionally known as

the "rose of long island," and by all accounts was bewitching, certainly bewitched 57-year-old john tyler who married her, and he loved being first lady. she had the job for less than a year, but it was julia tyler who ordered the marine band to play "hail to the chief" whenever the president appears, and it was julia tyler who greeted her guests sitting on a throne on a raised platform with purple plumes in the hair, almost as she receded to that more queenly role that martha washington deliberately rejected. >> include your questions and comments about these three first ladies by phone, facebook, and twitter tonight live at nine europe on c-span and c-span3, and also on c-span radio and c-span.org.

>> next, iran's nuclear program, the brookings institution hosted a talk ahead of meetings between iran and the u.n.'s p-5 plus one group meeting this week in kazakhstan. among the speakers, president obama as coordinator for wmds. this is about app hour and a half. >> well thank you very much for inviting me to participate in the debate. i was in charge of the negotiation for a long period of time, and in 2009 from 2003 when i was the first -- the first visit to teheran, we said the plan at the time, the plan of the european union so from 2010 to today, i have been less in

charge, but i follow closely, and i'm on the lines of communication. i don't have any responsibility from thereon. let me start a little reminder how these started because i think it's very important to have perspective of how the whole process has gone. what, to my mind, has been the most important moment in which iran may have taken place? why was it happen? the last moment i will say how i see the next step to my mind could be taken in order to approach the change, and with all the difficulties, all the difficult -- many difficulties that we have in front of us, but let me start by 2003. 2003 was the first time that three foreign ministers, myself, went to teheran, and we signed and important agreement at the

time -- with the president, and disappear from the picture immediately, but he was important that we sign what we called the teheran agreement that it had two points, basically. tehran -- at this time, we stopped little, and their capabilities, and we will give the facilities for whatever they wanted peaceful use of nuclear energy, and also on economic, economic help. they -- the commitment of iran was to sign something important with the additional protocol and a number of treaties. that went for a year, and everything went okay, but the elections to the general elections after he came to power, was little change. they denounced the agreement, and they denounce an agreement,

they didn't sign at the end, the initial -- the additional protocol, and the whole thing was not effective. now, jobs went to power, and it was a long time, some time, a couple year, year and a half, we felt much in the country, and we had with the pristine leader, appointed somebody with whom we did most negotiations, the chief, the present, the actual president of the parliament, called ali, and it's somebody which you can talk, talk to him well, you can get engaged, for me, was a difficult part of the negotiation, but to extend a rational part of the negotiation. now, to make the long story short, i will tell you that it started from what you had to suspect, and we will offer you something, and with that being

possible, and it is why they had numbers of treaty to be maintained, gain their dignity, and remember two words which are important with iran. one is the word in person, which is dignity, in a way it had significance, but the most important significant thing, and the other which is self-interest, and you have to find an agreement between dignity and self-interest, and in those two words, you listen to them over and over again, and the question that have not. able is to find a division between the two cultures, and with dignity, we could not give it to them. today, they accepting something against the self-interest, we don't give enough dignity, ready to act, and it's something against that, so keep that in mind because we were coming to

talk about that. now, the two most important moment, and i said, "two," and when we offer a new proposal, freeze for free. you stop your center fiewj, and we will not take the sanctions out, but we maintain the level of sanctions on the same level. that was an interesting proposal that was understood at the beginning, but at the end, as you know, that failed. it failed why? they didn't want to take a position that is a tumble of the top leaving, giving up the right, and they were not ready to give up any rights, so when we continue with that, and in the most formalized freeze for free program, and today we said

another from energy, and the most important thing is that that proposal i took with me was signedded by everybody. for the first time was signed by condoleezza rice, the minister from the european union, signed the letters, but this very letter was signed by condoleezza rice only, and that was certain shock that the mens get into the picture in the much more clear manner with a signature from the secretary of state. we thought that gives alter to the process, but, you know, that was a failure. president pudin saw the supreme leader taking this proposal, my proposal, and, as you know, sort of along that was not a failure, not jus on the proposal, but the proposal, the negotiator who is -- was forced out of his position, so we found a

solution, and found a negotiator. a pretty good moment for all the effort we have done. they appoint a new negotiator, the acting negotiator still, which that comes to my mind the capacity of negotiating. he's just somebody who tell you what he received the morning before he goes to the meeting, but he doesn't have the flex the -- flexibility of going into real negotiations, so we went into geneva, 2009 was a very important meeting for the first time in the company -- i mean, in the negotiations, under secretary of state today, and that was the very good meeting, and i provided for a meeting, a bilateral meeting, and that it was not matched. we thought we agreed on the swap of enriched uranium to 20%, take

it out, and reach it outside the country, but at the end of the day, much more information about that because the continuation of that, it was already out of it proficient, and it was a failure, but i do think that that time was a moment in which i've seen a closer possibility of an agreement, and i think you amize -- analyze that period of time, even in iran, was the sentiments that that was possibly to get an agreement. we agreed formally on that referendum for 48 hours, and in 48 hours, the whole thing was broken, but, again, it was in a moment of being close. let me tell you the problems i see in front of us, i see in front of us several problems. one, it's full of characters. we can have elections in iran

before this happen. it would be very difficult to get something going before the presidential election. at the same time, we have pressure from israel that, well, and we don't know -- i don't know exactly how the agreement between benjamin netanyahu and president obama, but whatever time is left will be short. it will not be very long. the second big problem that we have is i don't think it will be possible to move from iran and syria. syria has relation with iran really, really deep. i heard somebody in syria tell me our relations with iran is deeper, even between two members of nato, so they really have a very intense relationship, and we felt solving that problem would be very difficult to get a negotiation moving. for iran, syria is a very

important actor. for that, we need to get all the pressure possible with russia. russia is a player, can't get out of the situation in syria. but, remember, we have two problems which have linked iran and syria, and we have the p-5 together in one, iran and separated in the other, which is syria. we have a pretty bad situation. that is what i think we have in front of us. the other thing that i would like to mention, the third thing i'd like to mention is sanctions. sanctions has to review before the end of the summer, and, today, we have. able to put the top sanctions on iran that hit in their economy, but we still maintain the price of oil at 11 which is plausible, now, that is because the 4% of

the barrel production that is acrylic is there, but imagine that for a moment the economy goes a little bit better, global economy, there are more needs of oil, still, as you know, iran is selling gas, in particular, to china at a very low cost. if the economy grows globally, it will be very difficult to stop the most important thing we have to stop. it is iran that not export any oil at all, and then we can relate to china. if china acts not to keep on buying gas from iran, so we have a really complicated picture in front of us. i think that iranians confirmed

and know they are going against self-interest as part of the economy is concerned, but it is they have not found the manage to give them capacity to save their face and to come out of the negotiation with dignity. they keep saying always and always the same. we don't want to be a nuclear power. we want to be recognized as regional power, and this is the line they really continue to say whenever you meet with them, and enter into the debate. i'll stop here. we have many, many more things to say, but there's many more things from the white house that i can want speak on behalf of. >> thank you, javier. well, javier, i think, has done a good job of describing the ups and downs and frustrations and the difficulties of trying to negotiate a nuclear deal with iran over the past decade, and

my expectation is that those ups and downs and difficulties and frustrations continue for the foreseeable future. why? first of all, there's just a fundamental difference among the parties on what the objective of the negotiations are. from the stand point of the united states, working through the p-5-plus one, we're trying to limit iran's capacity to produce nuclear weapons by physically limiting their ability to produce fissile material and by increasing means of monitoring future program so we detect efforts to cheat and build future facilities. from iran's stand point, the objective is the opposite. they want to create the capacity to produce nuclear weapons with an up restricted program to end rich uranium with little monitoring as possible, you know, whatever's required by the

npt so both sides have a different view and national interest in terms of what we are trying to achieve. secondly, there's a fundmental disconnect in terms of the, what i call the legal frame work that they approach the negotiations. from the stand point of the p5 plus one, the erroneous is on iran to demonstrate the program is peaceful complying with the various u.n. security council resolutions and iaea resolutions calling on iran to do certain things like so possession of the nuclear program and cooperate and so forth. from iran's stand point, this council and iaea acts are not considered legitimate. from iran's stand point, they are not requiredded to comply with any of the resolutions. they should be treated like any other party in terms of enjoying

and extensive nuclear program under iaea safeguards so from the legal perspective the two sides approach this negotiation for very different standpoint. given these fundamental differences, interests, and perspective, the theory of the p5 plus one has been to have a theory to have modest measures to eliminate iran's nuclear program in some way in exchange for limiting sanctions, and in the hope that that would create confidence and create a context that would make it possible to try to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement. at the same time, slow down the nuclear program, but even in this modest area, the two sides are very far apart in terms of the quid pro quo. both sides accept -- they say "concept" that we're talking about, limits on the nuclear program in exchange for limits

on sanctions, but when you get down to the details, they are very far apart. the p five plus one ask for substantial actions for iran in limiting the nuclear program, stocking production of 20%, shipping out a large portion of the 20% stock part-time iran has in exchange for modest, but concrete sanctions. in exchange, the iranians demand total listening of all sanctions in exchange for stopping production of 20%. something they could reverse overnight so in terms of the quid pro quo for a modest step, there's a long way to go before the two sides could come to an agreement. i don't expect an agreement, certainly before the presidential elections in iran in june. nonetheless, both sides have interest in keeping the process alive, so i would expect the talks to continue, and there may

be some, you know, incremental progress in terms of the slight narrowing of the big differences among the parties, but i don't think there's an agreement. at the same time, i think even if there's not a former deal, i think the iranians exercise some con trapts on the program for political reasons, mainly because, in my view, the supreme leader is focusing right now on managing the presidential elections and does not want to have to deal with a foreign policy crisis, so, for example, the iranians are deliberately converting enough of the 20% rich uranium to oxide form to stay below the line that benjamin netanyahu identified last sent in the u.n.. for the time being, it appears, for political reasons, they are deliberately slowing down those parts was program they fear could trigger, you know, more

sanctions or even a military strike. now, that may change after the presidential elections, but for now, there's limits on the program of the for the future, i think the most important question is whether or not it's possible to increase the level of sanctions by cutting even further on the market that iran enjoys in terms of the oil exports, in terms of the oil exports, and that's a real question. up until now, the sanctions have been remarkably successful in terms of limiting iran's oil exports because there's been alternative sources of oil, and so iran's main customers, china, india, japan, korea, have been willing to cut back with a substantial impact. ..

for trying to negotiate a comprehensive agreement even if that negotiation fails, it still creates breathing room in terms of living in the program and slowing down the nuclear clock and making the nuclear attack. >> let me put one question to both of you. there's been times where you referred to 2,009 where they did agree to basically transfer

their stockpile to 20% in return for getting fuel for the research reactor in. but they walk back a couple days so it appears that there are differences in how to engage this question. are these visible were -- >> yes. >> it was reported for many reasons. remember in september of 2009 it was discovered. it's not declared to the agency and the international farms and what is going on which we had information about that from september, but it was made

public at the general assembly of 2,009. a that was a big shock for iraq their peaceful etc., etc.. was discovered it hadn't been declared. that led to some of his friends frustrated with that discovery. the second thing is for the first time obama was already in power for the first time the united states allowed the american to be detained and we had arranged to have been a bilateral talks in the meeting in geneva and it was a very good

and we agreed on something very important. at that time they were running at 20% to put it into the reactor which is to create. they had in the country that was put in the uranium to the reactor to produce isotopes. that was a difficult moment for them and we accepted to get out the country. there were two elements that were leading to the facilitation and the relationship. within an agreement that wasn't

going to contradict each other. it happened two days after the big battle inside tehran and the supreme leader. with that i can maintain some talks and it's not the best friend as you can imagine. he is now running for president as an portent figure. let's see how he behaved if he was elected president but at the end of the day the supreme leader is the one coming and one of the big problems negotiating in the structure of power for

civilian, etc., is the and director we have a system of naming interrogative some and the interlocutors so this is another added complication for the negotiation. >> i agree with that. the decision making process inside of tehran as very obscure. i think that probably makes it much more complicated than trying to reach an agreement especially because the political competition among the various figures in iran becomes intertwined and the nuclear negotiations and so the 2,009 example is a good idea where the president was clearly in favor of the deal, and i think to some extent the opponents for motivated and the merit of the agreement they were motivated by

the desire to try to prevent him from taking credit for making progress. but the 2009 deal i think was a critical turning point at least in terms of what the administration perceptions were to read it demonstrated how difficult it would be to get a modest agreement if this were an extremely modest agreement and shifted the president's policy to one that emphasized increasing pressure as a way to gain leverage and purchase and of course we then embarked on a very difficult six months of negotiation for another u.n. security council resolution. brazil and turkey and iran announced an agreement of which was in the white house really has a pretty transparent effort to try to delay the sanctions so we went ahead with the sanctions and since we and the iranians

have been locked in this spiral we keep increasing sanctions as the negotiations make no progress they keep going ahead with their nuclear program and both sides are trying to build up a bargaining leverage we have reached the point where some kind of an agreement that would relax the sanctions in the nuclear activities is possible. >> if you can state your name and affiliation. >> start right here. >> i am a washington correspondent in the agency. good to see you here. i have got a question for mr.

mr. garrison. today the "washington post" reported about speculation on nuclear ties between iran and north korea. what is your assessment and let me ask you about north korea tests. whether it was plutonium or uranium what is your opinion about that? thank you. >> well, as to what kind of material was used in the test i don't think that we know. there was no way to measure whether it was plutonium or highly enriched uranium so it could have been either. we know there's an extensive cooperation in the missile area and we can imagine that they could provide substantial

assistance to take on the answer to the terms of assistance and i suspect that they are considerably more advanced in terms of mastering the centrifuge technology savitt is something that we have to keep a very close on on and we know that north korea has been willing to sell the nuclear material such as the reactor that they were building in syria >> what is our rationale for threatening against north iran to perpetuate the israeli monopoly in the east and why is the middle east not a part of the discussion? >> it has been partially discussed. if you remember in 2009, they

reached -- it was made clear that of the facility that was, it was the first time the prime minister was in the country's for the summit for the first time and i don't know how many years. one of the agreement of the summit is to try to work hard and two years to the possibility of the inning the discussion about free trade in the middle east. as you know, the general had somebody to prepare the summit and it has now taken place. in 2009 it was a moment in which the motion in that direction was started. i think that we continue both in 2013 to have the second phase to take place for a lack of the agreement among the most

important players that help to follow. but if something is already on the table for the first time and in 2009 he put it on the table the first third general and the assembly because we set for the first time that it was a meeting at the highest level of the signatory the treaty. >> i would bet i think president obama has explained in speeches and interviews why he thinks that a nuclear-armed iran is not accessible from the standpoint of the u.s. national interest and the risk that it would lead to the further proliferation in the region, the risk of a nuclear-armed iran would threaten our allies with israel and others the risk that the nuclear-armed iran might on purpose or inadvertently provide weapons for fissile material to terrorists so he has on his mind

very clear basis as he said to use any means necessary including military force to stop iran from having nuclear weapons. the fact that israel has nuclear weapons as a separate issue and has caught the said to achieve the nuclear free within a least isn't going to bear fruit any time soon especially given the circumstances in the region. but all countries at least in theory support such a nuclear weapon free zone including israel and the question is what kind of conditions would be necessary before you could actually put in place and the conditions in the middle east are not right for that now. barbara for the atlantic council. good to see both of you gentlemen. i have two questions and i would like your view on both. as long as we are talking to the iranians we won't be bombing of

them and in that sense talking has value and also, the stucnet virus that was inherited from the bush administration was it a legitimate use of force against iran? >> thank you. >> very difficult questions. on the virus how would i say i think the most important mistake of the virus is to recognize who had done it. i think that for a long time nobody knew who the father or the mother was of the virus and suddenly i don't know why for the sake of prestige somebody decided to claim the company, who had put it in, etc., etc.,

etc.. that goes to the heart of your question because the illegitimacy is your the first to put a virus cyberspace come into our lost to the do recognize they have an attack rate and that is a mistake. the second thing i would like to say is -- and i am convinced of this -- i think that the level of consistency and coherence of the p5 is diminishing, and diminishing first. in russia they are not the same place. it's not a minor issue because as i said before, iran -- syria is in terms of the important relationship and in that we will

be more difficult to solve the truth. i am very concerned that as time goes by, it is less action in many issues not only syria. i was surprised the everyday in south africa the level of sustainment, and for the first time i felt they wanted to play not only the economy but also the international affairs. it was very clearly stated. i see that for the last question of global in the markets is going to be very important. they are called into the later estimation in order to have the

action to be maintained at 4% of the total action and the global economy grows a bit at a level to maintain. it would be very difficult to be maintained without the spike in prices. it's true that part of it has been maintained but he's told very much in order to maintain the market and maintain the prices. but, the economy grows as a point that this one that nobody wants but for that to take, the chinese will have to stop. >> i would say the primary factor that determines whether the military force is used is not what is happening around the

diplomatic table in the ground. you can imagine a situation where the diplomacy continues without making any progress but they are cautious and careful to avoid taking actions that might trigger a military strike and i think that is actually the situation we are and now. the question is whether or not the supreme leader can do to exercise caution and whether or not he accurately anticipate what kind of actions might trigger a strike. >> i will say this is a game where the very high a national security stakes at play and both sides are using all of the power that they have available to them in order to try to achieve their interest. >> let me follow-up on that question about negotiation and military action hincapie echford

is there some sort of thing you want to see coming out of the negotiations this weekend that might be in fact a decision on the part of tehran to actually try to find a solution as opposed to try to use the talks? what would be your sort of minimum take away from the almighty discussions that may be there is an indication of the solution. >> i have such low expectations i think it is a mistake to try to set the bar. if they agree to another round of meetings, that would be the process continuing. but i think that it really is unrealistic to expect that there would be some type of a breakthrough in peace talks. look both sides are using the diplomacy for their own

purposes. they use diplomacy in an effort to try to show that there is progress and therefore no further sanctions are justified and to the extent that it looks like there is progress and it helps maintain the value, the u.s. and the p5 plus one joost diplomacy to demonstrate that iran is intransigent and reasonable and therefore more sanctions are required to begin that process is going to continue. at some point if the talks do not produce results, the u.s. and the e.u. will be looking for additional sanctions to increase pressure. >> i have a question for gary. you mentioned the restraint that they are pursuing. can you address the new centrifuges they are also pursuing and what the strategic implications are for the breakout scenario in the

military and also what policy challenges the pos in the sense that iran can get to a place where they can take action faster than the international community could respond. >> it's a very good question and there's lots of different ways of looking at these scenarios but basically there are two ways that iran could produce highly enriched uranium. one is to use a facility under the iaea inspection and that is the so-called breakup scenario they would either deny the inspectors access or they would kick out the inspector and they could produce enough highly enriched uranium for the nuclear device. right now there are probably at least a couple of months away from being able to do that once a decision is made. as the increase could have capacity as they put in more centrifuges like this new generation, they might be able

to squeeze down the breakout time to a couple of weeks or even less. and in that case it is at least theoretically possible they could move and producing enough highly enriched uranium for a bomb before the international community could act. i think we're still probably a couple of years away from having that kind of capacity because they need to put in a lot more of these more advanced centrifuge is in order to do that to get the other scenario i think is much more plausible is what we call the snake out that there would be a secret facility and produce weapons-grade uranium taking their time and then once they have enough they would be in the position to confront with a fait accompli. we know the second approach is the one that iran favors because twice now they've tried to build the secret enrichment plants. my guess is at some point in the future they will try to build another plant because that approach from their standpoint

poses fewer threats if they try to break out using a facility that is under safeguards they run the risk that would be detected and the u.s. or israel or others would act against it with, you know, they would destroy the facility before they could achieve -- before they could produce enough weapons-grade uranium but the point that is raised is the right one. if we continue for a couple of more years in the current pattern, the iranians can get closer and closer to having a credible break of capacity and use that as a threat. they would threaten that unless certain things are done unless the sanction is lifted they would be forced to take action, and that would become a more credible threat. i don't think they are there now. i think they are still too far away from being the ultimate quickly for that to be a credible threat. >> it is not a simple thing to do. the one thing is to have 90

present or 80% and then it's not a trivial thing to do. we are working on the organization even if you have the 90% achieved therefore it would be a crossing point but we expect. >> i agree with that and the only thing that i would add is that we probably have greater capacity to detect and prevent the production of weapons grade material and weaponization to be it's not to say that it is impossible to detect that but it's much more difficult because a would be done with fewer number of people and facilities that are harder to hide. >> if you want to go for the basic nuclear weapon that we used it was never tested, but if they want to go to be put on a

ballistic missile, then it is much more sophisticated and they would probably would it be fair it would tested before they would actually believe that key devotee existed? >> my sense is yes. they have to test. they may be done etc. but i don't think that they have the capacity. the country that has already the capacity for the next level we've out during the real tests, but the first or the last example but we have in north korea and pakistan they had to the text. today it was a level of information that we have in the capacity of intelligence that we have, i think that is in partial to my mind. i think that this is the capacity of intelligence you have the number looking at iran, etc. once you have the -- it would be very difficult to talk

to the test. they have post political constraints on the program. they had a very expensive comprehensive weaponization program which was detected and which was revealed and the stock in 2003. in both points in the future i could easily imagine them starting that program again in the hopes they would be able to achieve a lot of the preparation work for the nuclear test and i agree that ultimately it is likely that they would conduct a nuclear test to demonstrate that a credible nuclear capacity. >> a question in the back. >> washington correspondent for politics. i am just wondering what all of the heating up of the rhetoric in north korea and the military

maneuvers what impact that is going to have on the iran nuclear talks because north korea was more of an urgent threat of the mowing or cut it, you know, have a positive effect? >> they are capable of dealing with several different problems at the same time so i really don't think it is likely to have a big impact. i think to some extent, korea is a good example with the cooperation. we want to avoid a military conflict on the peninsula. but i don't think that necessarily translate into greater cooperation on iran. former senate staff member. if the supreme leader is getting

iran to agree to sensible negotiations, and if he has a particular concern for your non-'s dignity as the word was used what paz has been given to enlisting help from some third party whose presence would accord some of the dignity to iran and also create a channel to the supreme leader? >> that had been tried the replete are relevant in the p5 plus one. i've been talking to them a lot and have been used that as you know, it was supposed to be a

little that that wasn't going to succeed. maybe now it may be another moment to be used but i cannot imagine another country the supreme leader doesn't talk to leaders on the balance with one exception he met with putin at the moment in 1997 and for the freeze in front together it was a failure. he was thrown out from the organization and putin could not

convince the freeze so why cannot imagine any other person to have a good relationship in the supreme leader. the leader in turkey continues to be the most. don't forget that turkey now has difficulties for their position in the city. it is a country with supporters so it is difficult to find a person to maintain with the one we had. it's to my mind two precipitate as much as possible the united states and iran for a long period of time it's very difficult.

.. we are seeking economic sarntions which could potentially post a threat to the regime. if there's unhappiness with the -- and also through the mismanagement.

>> hi, thank you. laura jakes with associated press. javier, you spoken about how syria about negotiations are intertwined. i'm wondering what effect u.s. military intervenges in syria might have on some of the negotiations not on recognizing it would be hostile by tehran but also the affect that would amount to a proxy war with russia and the chinese would likely follow the russian lead. if you could talk about that, i would appreciate it. gary, if you would like to chime in. i would be interested. >> i cannot be -- i'm [inaudible] i'm not an office. the only information we have is information through friends which are engaged in it. i think that the united states

has not taken an more active role in syria to begin with. they didn't want to disturb the possibility of -- give them the space. the review that -- [inaudible] contribute to the break of the potential -- [inaudible] nowadays, the situation may be different because the situation -- [inaudible] much worse than what it was to begin with. i happen to -- [inaudible] coming from -- [inaudible] of syria and coming through new york and -- [inaudible] secretary -- [inaudible] come here. he was telling me the situation is really catastrophic. both should sides should view -- he told me he didn't think the

chemical bombs were -- [inaudible] that's what he told me. very good nerving in the country. but thuation on the -- [inaudible] way worse probably. how big has to be done? [inaudible] let me be very --ic we -- i think we have not played the russian card. remember that russia a move to the street of syria that justifies for the excessive use of -- [inaudible] military action. remember that. but also they said that the topics to be discussed one of them was missile defense. and it has been -- [inaudible]

forward to the how many years. i don't know. so that has not been blamed i think with russia. i think with russia, we need to be much more engaged in order to do so -- [inaudible] the question of tehran. that is a concern they have. i wasn't in moscow the week before this, -- no two weeks before this, i met with piewten and i see a sentiment -- [inaudible] it's not better. the united states to see the -- et. cetera. and my fear that make it cooler with the relation to tehran we make in agreement be 500 miracle really. for such a long period of time

in agreement. now the moment of -- [inaudible] we have together which it was very difficult, but i don't see that the how this the level of constructic work together. i think it diminished. >> i would say you can argue it either way. in the end, i think the collapse of assad makes a nuclear deal more likely. the supreme leader will feel more likely to make tactical concessions in order to relieve further isolation of pressure. of course that's not going to change fundamental interest in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. i think it will confirm for him the best way to defend himself against countries like the united states is have the capacity. at least in the inerm term tactical, you know, tactical

decisions, i think the more he feels isolated and threatened or likely it is he'll make modest concessions in order to have interim agreement. >> [inaudible] how serious do you take the anti-missile -- [inaudible] is it real or a joke? did antinuclear. >> antinuclear. >> i don't know. >> well, i mean, i don't know much about shiites theologies. it would certainly provide a useful political basis which the supreme leader and the iranian government could justify some limit on the program. i think we would certainly -- we, i mean, the p5+1 would welcome if they want to construct a theory for why they

are accepting some limit on the nuclear program because it's consistent. obviously that would be welcome. whether it constrains activities, i doubt i think my impression is it can be changed pretty easily. >> thank you very much. i'm mr. mitchell. i wrote the "mitchell report ." i want to pose questions to both. and beginning with an observation that the made a few questions ago i thought two very suck observations is the interest of the leader is not dignity per se. he believes that iran should have the bomb. and the second, he sees the bomb

question as only one piece of the frame in the relationship for the united states which is that we what we are really after is regime change. given those two factors, one excepts them for what it's worth, i do, what -- what possible factors lie out there, you know, ambassador said that the road to tehran may run through damascus. there's the presidential election, there's the prospect of some point he doesn't live forever. knowing the two things that the doctor has stated, what is that keeps us in the game? and why is it that president obama continues to make

statements that appear to be in defense about what we will go whatever it takes to prevent iran from having a bomb? >> well, let me take a crack at that. what you said, you know, is exactly right. i also think it's true that the supreme leader wants to avoid going to war with the united because he knows he'll lose. that will probably lead or could lead to the end of, you know, of the islamic republican. he's demonstrated over and over again caution in terms of limiting the nuclear program in order it avoid what he believes is a red lynn that can trigger a military attack. i think the value and everything we have done in public pressure, sanctions, threat of war, all of that helped to reinforce the caution and has lead to constraints. the iranians could be moving forward much more quickly in

term of acquiring a nuclear weapons capacity if there was no constraint on the program. they have imposed self-imposed constraint in order avoid the risks. so i think, you know, i think whatever happens at the diplomatic substantial we have an interest in continuing to make clear we would not accept iran having nuclear weapons and we would use military force if necessary and keep on increasing economic and political issue. that has a positive impact. >> a con con try diction which is the value and -- [inaudible] intimate -- it's really difficult to imagine -- [inaudible] and tough to history -- how it interactions -- nobility -- [inaudible] how is it -- [inaudible]

[inaudible] we don't have -- [inaudible] it will be quite difficult to -- [inaudible] and what quite difficult to have international community together. if there's not a trflial thing. it's not a trivial thing. after the effect of libya and syria and -- [inaudible] and very, very questionable if it was to -- [inaudible] [inaudible] i think we have a lot of problems. i think we have a lot of problem i mentioned suppose that -- [inaudible]

and that is not by -- [inaudible] we have a still some other problem that have to be completed or made problem very dell cant and difficult. >> hi, dianne barns, secure city news wire. you mentioned earlier both the possibility that on the other side if the iranian election in june iran will have greater flexible in dialogue as well as possibly lifting off the brakes it's been putting on.

production of 20% enriched uranium as well as other sensitive activity. i'm wondering whether you see an outcome of escalation or deescalation being more likely and what factors you see cling to that most might be interested in the ambassador's take as well. thank you. >> yeah. i would say either is possible. one could imagine the supreme leader feeling or confident if he shores up the domestic situation, manages the presidential elections, make sures that the candidate is not elected and has somebody who is president that he thinks is compliant and more confident in managing the economy. and the supreme leader might feel he's in a stronger position to take the next step in the nuclear program whether it is. prudencing more than 20% or

producing higher level of enrichment for the navel reactor program, for example. one could imagine later this year there would be a confrontation or one could imagine on a stronger position he has greater flexibility to make some tactical deal with the p5+1 in order to relieve pressure. i don't know which way it will go, but i do think that as long as it's more likely they get a positive outcome if he believes there's more sanctions to come. if the supreme leader believes that the p5+1 reached the lymph what they're capable of doing. i think it's more likely he'll feel he can weather the storm and doesn't need to make any concessions. >> i tend to agree with that. >> thank you -- [inaudible] two questions.

[inaudible] my second question, if we have reached a deal with iran, we have to sell it here in washington and given the relationship with iran. it would be very hard. -- [inaudible] how to you think we can still deal domesticically? thank you. >> i think you have to sell any agreement on the merit. if the agreement actually achieves the intended result, which is to limit iran's ability to produce nuclear weapon. i think you have a very strong basis on which to convince congress and the public worthing. if the deal doesn't have a dramatic impact if it's cozmatic and allows the iranians to continue on the course of --ic that the deal won't be supported. but of course we have to keep in

mind that any agreement that is reached will be subject to vary young strict monitoring. iran demonstrated it's not shy about cheating on the international obligation and very long record. of, you know, violating the npt and safe guards and agreements it reached with oh parts. one could imagine the situation where there was an agreement. and some ways downtown road it was revealed that iran was violating that. >> they would have to convince -- [inaudible] vawb, for instance has to be convinced. [inaudible] you understand -- [inaudible] >> dave campus, george washington university. can you explan on the nuclear collaboration between iran and russia?

are they legal under the npt? >> yes the collaboration with iran and -- [inaudible] is believable. the p5+1 accepted that the enrich of uranium was placed -- [inaudible] some product of that -- [inaudible] produce the reactor taken by russia. that was you remember russia was caution in moving the -- [inaudible] and then it was a even encouraged to finish and -- [inaudible] >> i think -- [inaudible] the only thing i would add there have been instances where russian scientists have provided unauthorized nuclear assistance

to iran. and president bush, for example, confronted president pew twin a fact that a russian substitute for helping with the heavy water research reactor being biment in iraq and the russian government stopped that. i think there's a good record of a russian with iran to the reactor, you know, which is something we have accepted. >> hi, my name is -- [inaudible] and i'm at -- [inaudible] university. i had a question about why the military strike is even on the table. because haven't we learned our lesson from iraq? we killed so many people. they harmed our military, drown our economy. why would we consider doing that

with iran? why can't i buy oil from iran? why is that such, i mean, the oil prices were, like, at 99 cents a gallon in 2000 and now at $4 something. it we go to war with iran it will probably be $8 a gallon or something like that. why are we hurting our own economic interest by preventing somebody from pursuing their defense strategy like any other country does. >> i see as a clash of interest, the iranians for perfect understandable from their standpoint think having nuclear weapons with a capacity to produce nuclear weapons is necessary. for their defense and to assert their position in the region. the u.s. for reasons that are perfectly understandable from our substantiate stand point we want to stop iran. it would be a threat to our interest and the interest of the friends in the region. there's a clash of interest.

i'm not saying anybody is right or wrong. usually an international politics if you have a clash of interest, and you can't reconcile them then the ultimate recourse is the use of force. , i mean, clearly president obama is not looking for opportunities to attack iran. he obviously made the case we're not at that point where we have to make the choice. there's still room for diplomacy, room for sanctions of pressure and possibility that will achieve results. but at the end of the day, he's saying that the matter is so important to the united states that he would be willing to use force if necessary. i mean, you know, i mean, people may disagree with the judgment. that's the judgment that he's made and explained publicly. >> [inaudible] my question is largely for

gary. do you think the u.s. is prepared to acknowledge the right to -- [inaudible] 5% at some point? >> i think if you had an agreement that satisfied our goal of limiting iran's capacity it's ability to produce, you know, nuclear weapons, i think some limited enrichment, this is obviously my view. some limited enrichment as part of satisfying iran's dignity. as some part of face saving outcome should be acceptable to us. i don't see any evidence that iran is prepared to accept the kind of limited enrichment we would, you know, really require in order to, you know, in order achieve the results of physical limiting with their capable of doing. >> allow me to say it.

i don't think it's imaginable in agreement with -- [inaudible] enrichment by iran. that is the tricky how that's -- worked. i i can't imagine -- [inaudible] that takes the program to be an example. one of the -- just to add one of the complications in this negotiation is that the iranians are insisting that the so-called right to enrichment be recognize bid p5+1. they are not prepared to acknowledge they are obligations imposed on them by the u.n. security counsel and the ieaa to take certain actions to demonstrate the program is peaceful. it's hard to imagine a deal where we accept their principle and they don't accept ours. if you had a mutual acceptance,

where, you know, we prepared to acknowledge that once confident is rear toed, they could pursue a civil program like in the other party including enrichment. one would expect an return they would acknowledge that there are obligated by the u.n. security counsel to take certain actions which includes a suspension of the enrichment program until confidence is restored. >> [inaudible] from university of new york -- [inaudible] my question is about the negotiations and details weren't there other topics other than the nuclear program with iran talk about like the iran's stablizing role in the middle east in supporting terrorist groups in iraq, lebanon? and other issues internally for

iran like the horrible human rights violation on democracy? >> well, in the negotiations it was first an negotiation of iran is then the possibility we get engage is -- [inaudible] and the negotiation with them. there are many other top i thinks that would like to -- [inaudible] remember that iran was at the table in the agreement not vanished. those negotiations were -- [inaudible] at the given moment of both administrations was thinking about putin and pakistan now -- [inaudible] but nothing we felt having created the climate prowpt

appropriate to -- [inaudible] to other potential topics. >> yeah. the p5+1 talks were created for the purpose of addressing the niewng already issues so that's tended to be the primary focus certainly in terms of what the p5+1 would like the agenda to focus on. it's true the iranians periodically said we want to have a broader discussion. we want to talk about syria and buy rain. that's generally been resisted by the p5+1, in part because we don't want to create anxiety on the part of the other countries renegotiating some kind of regional iranian -- [inaudible] >> we have about five minutes left. we have way more hands. i'm going take three questions and we'll give you a chance to add to those, if you want.

>> as we approach -- as we approach this very, very interesting discussion. i would like to move for a second to the frame work of perceptions. the statements, gary, i think lead to a perception that this year or next year really critical years that we don't, quote, solve -- quote unquote the new berry shooter. we will be moving toward the war conflict. we seem to be discussing this with the israelis although in the last meeting they walked back on the -- [inaudible] at the u.n. on the other hand, as i think this discussion very well brought out the weaponization has a long ways to go. and true weaponization might not at all occur in the presidency

of president obama. so are we running a risk here of perhaps being too smart -- we are creating a perception of imminent danger and conflict and discussions about that? or fact weaponization is not progressing as far as we know. if it did it would take some time. we talk about something beyond the next three years? >> the second row here. >> my name is hasan. i was born in tehran. i am global bridges for humidity. it seems for many years america has been engaged in persuading iron to come in line what

america thinks is right for iran. we have up to this point seen that the as they said is hard not to -- yawn iranians are not that easy to be pushed over. as he knows when the turkish proposal was done for the 20% and the agreed -- [inaudible] but fine line give us the 20% and we'll tell you when it is ready. you can get it back. that was unacceptable to them. when you are negotiating you have to have some kind of principles. we are coming to a point to recognize that iran may be a regional power. why don't we get iran and see what our interests are in the area see if iran can protect our interest in that area.

and interest our interest without money to give them to other people in the area. and the question is that after all of these discussions it goes beyond a certain point -- [inaudible] in solving the problem that is very important to the world. >> over here. gary and ambassador, is there any price that you think that the p5+1 will be willing to pay that iran could accept for the 20% for a small deal? and if not, in some reasonable amount of time particularly i'm interested in gary if what you

think about the kind of -- go big idea or offering them a more comprehensive -- [inaudible] okay let me take those. on the time table as i've tried to explain. i think the time table is determined by political decisions and calculations not by physic. the supreme leader does things that brings this matter to a head, this year and there are lot of things he could do that could force president obama's hand, then in fact we may be facing a military conflict in the near future on the other hand the supreme leader may clintly avoid actions that would enforce the united states act in which case the diplomacy, the sanctions, the, you know, nuclear creeping all of this will continue for years. so i think it's remains to be seen. whether it's critical or will current for the next pattern for

the next couple of years. on the question of other issues in the region. the truth is, the u.s. and iran are at lagger heads on almost every issue where it's syria, and, you know, i agree with, you know, with him this really has cast a shadow over of the negotiations whether it's peace process hezbollah, you know, u.s. forces on the persian gulf. on almost every issue the u.s. and iran are really, you know, enemies and that obviously makes it much more difficult to deal with a nuclear issue and isolation. finally, laura, you know, i think it's possible that iran could decide after the presidential leks to accept a small deal on the table. in fact i think it's a pretty good deal from iron standpoint. if they're looking far way to create some respite from pressure and sanction. the offer might do that.

it might not lead to a comprehensive deal. it would slow down the sanction train. the trouble with putting forward a big idea. i think it's guaranteed to fail. anything we would accept in terms of -- what their nuclear program would look like, i just think it's fundamentally unacceptable to the iranians. it would take away the nuclear weapons capability. that's the whole purpose of the program. let me comment. the first thing i would like to that the level of mistrust between the united states and the western world is difficult to convey. you cannot imagine as -- [inaudible]

[inaudible] this is a difficult situation. number two, in the most candid moment of the negotiations -- [inaudible] the moment which -- [inaudible] there is no interpreter, speak english -- [inaudible] if i ask and i ask what would be your -- [inaudible] an i think not the complete answer, but the very important direction of what you want. we look very much --

[inaudible] what do you look to -- [inaudible] the regional power. the nuclear reactor which is nuclear -- [laughter] and they have not produced anything. they have been allowed to have certain capability which has not been used, et. cetera. they can't -- [inaudible] they want to be a regional power to recognize in order to be original power recognized, they need to have some level of -- you -- [inaudible] you have japan, brazil, argue teen -- argentina, and some other with some capability. so not? this is a question that --

[inaudible] the an is -- [inaudible] the situation. but -- [inaudible] a good model for them. i don't know if it answers you. it was original power of recognition class eight. it means that you are at the level of capability in nuclear -- [inaudible] [inaudible] it's going to be difficult very difficult. [inaudible] that's what i really think. with apologies to those where i couldn't get to their question. please join me in thanking our speakers.

[applause] [applause] [inaudible] [inaudible conversations] the sequester will reduce our grant by about 5% which roughly equates to $22 million or so, which will be distributed among the various licensees and stations that i've described. and so we have in fact taken about a 13% cut in our overall federal funding over the last two years, and if the entire federal government had sustained the the cuts that we sustained, the budget would be $500 billion smaller than it is now. we feel like we made a significant contribution to

deficit reduction and retirement of the federal debt within our own context. >> the impact of spending cuts on public television tonight at 8:00 eastern. on the communicators on c-span two. tonight on first lady. tyler who becomes first lady as her husband, vice president john tyler assumes the presidency. she passes a away a year and a half later. and juliet tyler who becomes the president's second wife. >> she was the madonna of first lady. she loved publicity. she actually posed as a model at the time when it was to say frowned upon.lw she was known as the rose much long island. by all accounts was bewitching. certainly be witched 57-year-old john tyler. who married her, and she loved

being first lady. she -- [inaudible] but it was julia tyler who ordered the marine band to play hail to the chief whenever the president appears. it was her who greet her guests sitting on a throne on a raised platform with purple plumes in he hair. it's almost as she recede to the more queenly role that hair that washington had deliberately rejected. >> we'll include your questions and comments about the three first lady by phone, facebook, and twitter. tonight live at 9:00 eastern on c-span and c-span three. also on c-span radio and c-span.org. at the white house today, the first family hosted the 135th easter egg roll. about 30,000 people estimated to have attended representing all states including families from

sandy hook elementary school. children were read stories including one by the president himself and other activities on the south lawn. ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪

♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪ next how international law applies in cyberspace. and when and how it's appropriate for a nation to respond to a cyberattack.

the atlanta counsel hosted the event, last week. it's an hour and twenty minutes. [applause] >> i guess i'll begin by reminding you that i'm here in my private capacity. i normally forget to say that. in light of the trust account over the last week or so. i'm anxious to tell you i don't represent anything. i don't represent france, nato, or anyone else. i'm here as a scholar. let me tell you a little bit how the project started. actually i begin to look at cyberspace at the implications for warfare in the mid '90s. the first conference on international law and cyberspace was held at the war college. it was held in 1999. but then what happened is of course 9/11 and all of the international lawyers turned their attention from cyberspace to counterterrorism myself included. we were looking at issues when you cross the border or conduct drone strike. what is the basis for being in

iran and so forth. as you know in 2007 the massive cyberattacks against estonia represented by the ambassador. thank you for coming today. and the following year there was cyberattacks that took place in the conflict between russia and jordan in the 2008. so quickly attention focused on cyber. what the international law community found was nobody was doing very much thinking about the roles that governor cyber warfare or conflict between states or states and demonstrated active in cyber cyberspace. in any event the dod was accomplished. they hold a wonderful annual conference held this june. they asked me to speak at the conference. but about a year passed and i told the nice woman thank you for inviting know speak, however, cyberspace thing is boring me. and the reason is because all of the lawyers come together and they say, wow, this is hard. i've got all the questions and all the academics are trying to

develop a new theory. nobody is trying to answer the questions. i'll tell you what, you give me a call when you're ready to start answering. questions for those know her she's aggressive and called me three months later and said we're ready. ready for what? to do a project? what project? anything you want. they really ease estonia and the nato center gave us a blank sheet to write the project on. it was an important time as we were tounge the project cyber took center stage. it wasn't justice tone that and -- ease tone that they claim they brought down american drones during the project on and on. it was a rich time in which to look at the issue. now the center of excellence allowed me to bring together a family. there were went from around the world. they were collars and practitioner's. there was many that weren't

included. inured to get on the team you have to be a first rate international lawyer. top of the field. there was another criteria. that was you had to have ban legal adviser. we had no trust what corvee in producing the product for the academic community. we wanted to produce a product -- because this group of twenty people acted in the private capacity were very, very sensitive to the fact that we don't make laws. scholars do not make laws. states make laws. what we were trying to do in the vacuum in the vacuum what we were trying to do is create a tool that many of the folks could use use in their private practice. the problem was that the task was vast.

the law of war and conflict, international humanitarian law. a number of other experts said we need to do more what states are interested in when they are victim of cyberattack. they're not interested on what can happen on the battle field. they are interested when ease estonia experienced in 2007. they are interested in situations which they are suffering massive cyberattacks. what can they do in response? we broadened to another area. the international law that governors the resort to force by states. when can state lawfully resort to face. we started off it and became apparent we were going to have to deal with a number of other related topics if we were going

to understand the two body of law. so for example if you look at the manual today you'll find captions on sovereignty and just diction you'll find section on neutrality. we became very important. we had no intention of going there. it became very important. during an armed con flingt the cyber operations will cross through neutral territory. we want to decide what type of product we wanted to produce. this is not the first manual that's ever been very famous for producing oxford manual. there was recently a manual on-air missile warfare.

in our field we knew that the manual were something that took hold of use to legal advisers. there was a problem in the air and missile warfare project which ran over five years, the harvard project. the law had to some extent already formed in 1923 there was an effort to write law. additional protocall to the goo knee have a convention treaty it had law that talked about air warfare. here in the cyber context there was nothing. not a single word. how do you write a manual when there doesn't appear to be any law on point. there was law professors primarily. we were not fright end by the prospect and so we set out to write our manual. what we ended up with was a manual that consistent of black letter rules. as you open it up there are literally black letter rule.

they may not use force against state b. it includes cyber force. we quickly found there was lots of problems. what does -- i'll talk about that in a moment what does the use of force mean. we with agree it's unliewfl unless self-defense. what does it mean in cyberspace in and so the bulk of the manual indeed clearly the most important part is found the common tear. we decided we can't possibly answer that for stakes. what we can do in a closed, rich environment with lots of smart people we can think through those problems and give the legal advisers options. for example, in terms of use of force, we discuss at lecht and come up with a couple approaches to the use of force.

swam a-- we went down through that level of granularity. it is for the audience you should understand it is in the common tear the meat is not to be found. the rules are unexceptional. now we brought together twenty people. i forgot to mention there was three individuals who were not there in the private capacity. the first was gary browne. currently representing the international community of the red cross and representing cybercommand. we knew that cybercommand had the greatest capability in the world. we. ed them to be in the room in the official capacity concern in the area and of course they were funding our project. and then the third group that we invited in was the international committee of the red cross. in the fairnl capacity. we wanted a red cross observer

throughout everything we did. why? the red cross, "the guardian" of the convention. i worked with the red cross for a measure now in decade they probably have the best lawyers in the world in one small place dealing with the topic. i want to bring their brains to the room. however, they did not get to vote on the black letter. they there were throughout. in fact they engaged in drafting. there was not version fights. friendly fights over that. we often gave in to what gary had to say from the cyber perspective or what one of the represents had to say. at the end of the day when we came down are we going adopt the rule in the open jeption of any of the three observers didn't count. now let me move to some of the tough issues. there were -- excuse me there was lots of issues.

in which they said the law that existed applied to nuclear weapons even though nuclear weapons came later they took the same position of cyberspace. this is the position of humanitarian law. which requires new weapons receive a legal review. if the law doesn't apie my. you don't have to do a legal review of new weapons. you are reviewing them against

standards in play. our first hurdle was applicability. we decided that applicability we turn to the first major topic. it was very tough. it's without the slightest doubt the most unsatisfactory part of the manual. why is that? well, it's a volume of law that is fussy. when states can use force. they like to retain the discretion in the area. states aren't always very clear about what the legal standards are. the very first rule we look at was the rule found in the u.n. charter. state a. may not use force against state b. a very simple rule. the problem in the cyber context was we have to determine whether or not or when cyber was a use of force.

clearly if state a. bombs state b., that's a use of force. clearly if the worship of the united states navy shot at the country that's a use of force. what about if someone shoots at you? we couldn't simply adopt an approach that says you have to break things or hurt people. it has to be the same effect. as operations. the formal name is para military activity. they are looked at the very issue the army trains was a use of force by one country against another country which told us that we simply could not adopt a principle of law that said it has to stwaild be he nettic in

nature. at the same time we looked at the negotiating history of the charter and it meat very clear that they weren't talking about economic and political warfare. when they set forth this article two. what it meant is it was less than what you would think of as a use of force. it was high order coerce. very unsatisfactorily we said we can't answer the question. it's too hard. the best we can do for legal advisers is not give them a bright line rule. but rather inform them, help them think through whether or not their operations are likely to be viewed by the international community. the cyber options has a use of force, and whether or not if they characterize the operations of another state as use of force whether or not the international community will support them. what we did is we looked at a state practical and so forth and came up with eight criteria

which are simply indications of how states may react to uses was force the easiest is verity. if people are killed, that's a use of force. another one was is measurability. if a cyber operation creates effect you measure you can say x dollars or gone from the treasury from the united states that's quite definable. states more comfortable calling something a use of force because it had these specific consequences. we looked at the military character of an operation. an oarpg conducted by united states cyber com we would be very different viewed from the international community's perspective than one conducted by other organ of the government. we looked at these eight criteria and said these are some of the things you may want to think about as your determining whether or not you want to launch a sign ore operation without ruling a foul of the use of force of the use of force

prohibition. now the big question wasn't that. the use of force means your state did something unlawful unless it's justified international law. the big question for states was what can i do in response? now i've been the victim of this bad cyber thing, can i strike back in most of the law there is found in article 51 it is the law of self-defense. tells us that in the event that you are the victim of and the term is important, arnled attack, -- armed attack you get a "get out of jail free card" without the force of response. you can't use force. if you are responded with force of an armed attack. it you're not in violation of the norm. this presented a problem. the problem was we defined use of force or tried to define use of force. now we are using a different term. our theory was do they mean

different things? is every use of force an armed attack? -- does it cut the other way? we have a difference of opinion. the majority of group of expert the prevailing opinion it's a higher standard. not every use of force merits a force for response in self-defense. and generally we came to the conclusion that an armed attack is a cyber operation that causes destruction or injury of some sort. i must tell you, it's not the position of the united states government. the position of the united states government is that the two standards use of force and armed attack are roughly the same. and the legal adviser to the state department former legal adviser has given a speech on this. it's reprinted in the harvard international law journal along with my analysis of the speech in the light of the -- it's an interesting play between

professor and myself. what we eventually came up with, as i said, looking at situations where you harm people physically physically harm people and physically damage things. we anonymously ruled out cyber espionage. we anonymously ruled out intelligence gathering, if you're gathering intelligence that's certainly not an armed attack such at the victim's state can respond forcefully. the big question we had is what can do you do -- the consequence are dramatic? and of course what i'm thinking about here was a massive attack on the economic system of a country. not only an attack against the economic cyber infrastructure but an attack that may cause a collapse of confidence in the economy. there the group was split. we came to no conclusion. my personal view is that in my personal capacity is that we're not there yet. certainly we will move in the direction in the next decade. ten years from now i'm sit agent

the table i'll be telling you that economic warfare that is very, very e grege use will be an atomorrow -- an armed attack that a nation may respond with the use of force. i want to highlight the fact that although the manual talks about self-defense, almosted a nauseam, i hasten to add there are other things a state can do in response of cyber operations directed against it. ..

that is below the armed intent so that stuff is happening but it hasn't reached the point where you could call cybercom and say take out that state. power measures are discussed to some extent in the manual. we will be addressing them in great depth because they are in my view, they are the type of action that states are most likely to engage in if they are facing cyberoperations. then finally the other body of law jus in bello the law of armed conflict, the big topic took three years to resolve and we did a lot of backroom negotiating in that resolution. the big topic was what about the rule the international humanitarian law article xlviii of the additional protocol which by the way we are not a party to but the americans have this

customary law. what about the rule that says you can't direct military operations at civilian objects? during a war, shoot electrons at civilians? many of us with military background say that's crazy. we do that all the time. that's psyops. we have the whole military operation which we do that so we dug down deeper into the additional protocols and practice and we came to the conclusion that when they set operations what they really meant to say was attacked. we said that in part because this treaty defines attack and defines it as an act of violence so we said what we really can't do in their express rules on this is you cannot attacked civilians and you can't attack civilian objects and you can't attack hospitals which then begs the question, what is is an attack? i just told you it's an act of violence and cyber is not a violent act but it has violent

consequences so we said anything that harms people, physically harms people or makes them ill or causes them serious suffering and anything that causes physical damage to cyber infrastructure you have committed a war crime. however you should probably find that unsatisfactory. i will tell you i did when we were talking amongst the experts. because my little voices telling me that can be the rule. you can do all sorts of bad things with cyber during an armed conflict where surely humanitarian law must stop that. so we had long negotiatinegotiati ons and we came up with what we are calling, the majority came up with it -- that this was not unanimous with what is known as the functionality tests. we said let's think about the word damage.

you can't damage civilian objects. to me, i am sort of a cyber idiot, village idiot in terms of its cyber. damage means i have my computer here and it doesn't work and i can't get my 24-year-old.her on the phone. tell me what's wrong with it. it's damaged, it doesn't work. hence the word dysfunctionality. the majority of the group of experts say not only mike schmitt's but critical infrastructure and it requires repair then that lies at the local of attack and you can't do that against civilian objects or harm civilians in that area. some said i think it's more than that. if you do something to the system and you have to reroute the operating system i would include that as well so i would say probably a majority agreed with that as well but i have to tell you it doesn't satisfy everyone. there were some members of the group that said no simply

directing operations against civilians or civilian objects is unlawful however everyone agreef you do break something or harm someone that is a violation of the law of humanitarian international law. the last point which is that we didn't really struggle with that i keep hearing about it has to do with civilians on the battlefield. fortunately a fair number of a group of experts had participated in an expert process that took five years on what is known as direct partition responsibilities. what about civilians that are directly -- so we spent five years thinking about and i was one of them, we spent five years thinking about that very issue of what about the civilians on the battlefield? the conclusion that we drew was that there is no law that prohibits, no law at all that prohibits civilians from taking part in hostilities but if they do then they lose their

protection from an act for such time as they are participating and so that is where you are hearing this on the news. someone misread the manual and they think that we said he may attack hackers. no ,-com,-com ma no we didn't say that. what we said is you are civilian and there is a war going on and you are using cyber to attack. in other words material affect the capability then you are direct participant and if you lose protection of that law provides you for that time. so those are just some of the many issues we dealt with during the manual and there were lots more i could talk about. i will tell you there a number of systems some fair and not very fair. the first criticism is that we often say this rule reflects customary international law and the criticism is golly who are you to say what customer international law is?

we spent 10 years, decade trying to figure out what customary law is. they produced three volumes of law and then they were attacked by everyone. who are you guys? that is a fair criticism. this representrepresent s our view of where the customary norms are and we have referenced to in my view the excellent customary law as well as a number of other projects like the warfare study. second no international representation. you are of -- bunch of westerners. absolutely right. that is because this is such an area. when i was putting a team together wasn't trying to put a team together to negotiate a treaty. i was trying to put real smart teachers together that had experience with legal advice and take the best shot at what the law was. and so we ended up with the group we ended up with which is not -- and finally the last criticism is that you guys didn't tell us

what the law was going to be and you didn't tell us where we were going. the answer is we never intended to. we just wanted to define the lot today and where it is a decade from now, who knows? thank you very much. >> thank you very very much. [applause] thank you and in a very brief time i will explain the manual. the rules of engagemenengagemen t for this afternoon is first let me introduce the panel. the panel is gary who is the executive advisor, the international community of red cross and as michael alluded to he is -- has held military positions and served for 24 years as a judge advocate for the u.s. air force retired as a colonel and has had a number of positions in the air force and his final assignment was that

they not euro senior legal command in ft. meade where he served for years. to his right is jason healey who is the director of cyberstatecraft initiative on international security. jason is a board member and lectures and cyberpolicy and has written a number of books in this area, cybersecurity policy book. he helped in u.s. efforts for u.s. cyberspace clinical structure. he also has had experience in the private sector and his career also a period of time with united states air air force. he has had a distinguished public service career and also served as a founding member of the joint task force computer network and join the cyber warfighting unit.

i am howard rishikof in the cochair of the american bar association national task force on cyberinsecurity and we want to foster events of this nature so this is why when jason approached me i was very excited about it and the panelists are all friends. i think estonia and the ambassador being here. let the records say. [inaudible] so what i would like to do, the rules of the game will be i'm going to pose questions to the panelists. they will respond and then i'm going to open up the form quickly to gather some questions and then we will engage in much more of a dialogue over the next four or five minutes because when i look out at the audience icy many experts who will be

able to post fascinating questions to the panel. let's begin first with jason. what is your sense of or your initial reaction. [inaudible] c. it's funny when harvey looks out he sees many subject matter experts. i look out and i see a group roomful of lawyers and i'm not really sure what to think. what i like about the manual so much is it puts in context the u.n. council we are putting together the first cyberconflict history book so we are looking back over 25 years of health cyberconflicts have actually been fought. and then seeing what lessons we can take from that. that is what we like so much about it. this isn't so new that we have to start fresh. and you hear that again and again. cyber is so different that we all knew, all different so let's

start with a blank slate and that will be the best way. if that were true then we wouldn't be able to look 25 years and find that if you took a cyberoperator from 25 years ago and put them in a case today they would find themselves entirely natural situations. it's just that you can take a fighter pilot from nearly 100 years ago from world war i and have a fighter pilot from today from any country and they are going to be talking to one another and talking about how great it is. and they are going to get along because there is history, because the dynamics of air conflict haven't changed that much. we find them a look at history the dynamics of cyberconflicts have not changed very much or as much as we have been told for the last 25 years. therefore it is in sony that we can't take these things from the past and apply them. as a matter of fact when we look at the dynamics of cyber

conflicts we find the more strategically significant the conflict the more similar to us to the conflict of the air land and sea. attacks on estonia, of course some of them happened in network space but what domain of warfare doesn't the technical engagement happen very quickly? in air warfare you can get shot down before there's a dogfight. so we don't find cyber is that much different. cyber conflicts themselves takes place over weeks, months or years. the more strategicstrategic ally significant the conflict the more likely it is to take place over a long time and again it brings us back to this that has great implications for your rules of engagement and you don't necessarily have to know how to shoot quick read because you will have more time to deliberate more often than not. it also means that things like the tallinn manual that says

let's take lessons from other kinds of conflicts and apply them are going to be much more successful than we have been told. much more successful than the geeks have told us and they will hand wave and say you don't get it, cyber is different. it turns out they think that is far less like week to be the case. you are also more likely to have warning time because of the strategically significant attacks will happen as a nation-state and they don't happen out of the blue. what happened in estonia? they had indications weeks ahead of time. if you are with china over an island and the south china sees you are going to be able to guess a couple weeks beforehand that he will be in a cyber conflicts and you can see it coming so therefore i'm happy someone who has been involved in this for 15 years and looking back over 25 years of history the tallinn manual has started to take this on.

too many conflicts over that the teen years, to listen to that cyberexpert that says this is an interesting question. and i'd listen to that same guy for a lot of years now. and do you know what? professor schmitt started writing these answers along with many others like tom wakefield and others. 10 years ago professor schmitt's article was 99 so between 1999 and now if you heard someone asking these questions and pretending to look wise it's just because they were ignorant answers that have been produced. so the next time you're in a meeting or a concert venue have someone who says -- cut them off and say whether they thought the tallinn manual got it right or wrong, and pin them down because this happens in law and it happens in too many other so

please don't let it happen again because now we have the tallinn. >> thank you jason. as you know i'd laid out the background of the panelists. you should be quite prepared for a lot of wild metaphors from the panel. gary, you have been on both sides where there is fervor and you have been going to the icrc. what do you see a sort of project calendar? >> thanks harvey. it was a great opportunity in the project because we were working on many of the same issues and our little cloister at cybercommand so it was very gratifying to determine the project and see that some of the same issues were being discussed. in fact one of the most heartening things that happened when i joined up as we were zeroing in on the definition of

cyber attack which is one of the things we have struggled mightily with that cybercom, the definitions that we reached in cybercommand were almost identical. that was so critical because for 15 years before that, the united states really i think the policy had sort have been frozen because we were heard and with this overly generous definition of computer network attack that the department at defense put forward and it really hadn't changed much except or a couple of words in the late 90s. that made it very difficult and it made it extremely difficult to move forward because i think folks were reluctant to say the international humanitarian law applies to the situation when we don't know what the situation is good for everything we do in cyber that denies disrupts of or destroys the cybersystem. it's a very broad range of cyberactivity that would be governed by ihl so there was a

rumor. now just in the last few months the united states has come on board much more strongly to say ihl does apply cyberwarfare and everyone including the icrc said that was very gratifying. the one, i guess i will talk about a couple of challenges in the manual. one of the challenges and we talked about this a lot in in my kids already addressed face to coming up with the manual but one of the big challenges is we have drawn that line in the sand where cyber attack is and what might constitute armed conflict in cyber. that leaves unanswered most of the issues that have to do with what actually happened outside the context. most of the things you read about in the paper fall into the second category which is it's not part of an armed conflict and not part of an ongoing war.

it's just something that looks like espionage or something that looks like what we call cybercommand cyberdisruption. in other words the system being messed with in its and convenient perhaps or maybe beyond inconvenient and makes life much more difficult. but these are things that aren't really addressed by the rules of cyberwarfare because the does not fall under the definition of warfare but the manual is incredibly important because it finally drew the line. all those years went by without anybody as jason pointed out everybody talks about the line but nobody would draw the line particularly and is so critically important project for that reason. what the icrc is interested in is the conduct of hostilities and i think it's a fair assumption or a fair conclusion that we can all draw, the future armed conflict that we experience will all have the cyber-- cyber capability.

whether it's gps-guided weapons or cyber-based communications capabilities or whatever it is. everything has a cyber component just like in civilian life. so the way we draw the rules then to apply inside armed conflict is critically important and of course there are couple of things that the icrc is looking at. one of them in and out will just mention a couple. there were many are many more and obviously more questions than answers. one of the ones we have talked about is that functionality test but mike and i talked about. i know i've experienced the same thing mike has. i have been attacked by the help desk as well just like we all have but you know there's a problem. and i guess jason and i have a little bit different opinion on this. i think those analogies tend to break down rummy tried to apply

them sometimes. we try to apply them from the it's a color world into the cyber world and it's very difficult to draw those analogies. one of them would be for example i would like to say that hey this looks like something impressive that is happening in the cyber world versus something that might just be espionage or drawing information. it's much more difficult than in the physical world to tell what the intent is of somebody being accessed to a critical -- someone might be sitting on the system and hit one key that will export information as critical just traditional espionage and hit another key on the same program that might destroy the system or set off a series of actions that would damage the system. so very difficult to tell what legal position is that pre-position would be. it's just a very difficult question and i think more difficult than cyber in the physical world and the second i

will talk about is the whole idea of means of warfare when we talk about cyber so again in the physical world and the connecticut world we talk about it as a means of war. it's very simple when we look at rifles were bombs or ships or tanks or planes. they are pretty too easy to look at and determined whether or not they are used for warfare but in cybercan be much more challenging because again the same set of capabilities might be used in espionage or disruption and what is more it's also difficult to conduct a review on a software package that might change at the drop of a hat and a practical problem of doing legal work for example that is required under initial protocol. see thanks, gary. mike i will give you a chance to respond. i have unbelievable admiration for the academics from australia

or potsdam or amsterdam and even texas. but one of the issues is this threshold triggers you. i think it would be helpful for the audience to a elaborate your reaction and how your group tries to deal with that problem. >> harvey the problem is there's not one threshold. there are three thresholds and i'm going to sound like an international law geek which would be accurate. the first threshold is use of force. use of force is a threshold where if you cross that threshold you violate international law and the most fundamental full principled international law. mushy good and justified as an act of self-defense or authorized by the security council. the second threshold that we are concerned with in international law and cyberspace is the threshold of an armed attack.

armed attack is completely different threshold and has nothing to do with an operation that is unlawful. it's about can you the victim respond with your own use of force? and then there is the threshold that jason just mention that is at war and the lawyers don't use at the board. if you ask has an armed conflict commenced and the reason that is important is because if you cross that threshold than the entire body of law knows the law for kicks in. so this whole issue is dramatically complicated by which threshold they were talking about. you try to figure out if the state to launch it violated international law and try to fashion a response? are you trying to decide whether night at the law that calls for combatants he and protection of humanitarian assistance? which threshold are you talking about? i will tell you that we struggled with all three and

it's my personal opinion we have some guidelines. certainly in the case of armed conflict we have clear guidelines. we have done a lot of work in that area but we have guidelines and my guess is that all three thresholds will change. i anticipate as does mike schmitt that we will quit looking at as hard at the nature of the cyber operations and the severity of those consequences. whereas today we talk about the damage or destruction i think in the future but we will be asking is in all three cases, we will be asking how severe are the consequences? the holy grail for those of us is to figure out how you come up with a standard of severity? how do you articulate that standard of severe to? really bad? really, really bad? warble? it's very difficult only

accomplished under state practice. >> vary analogous. let's open up the audience. why do you say who you are for the record. [inaudible] >> are we out of time harvee? >> thank you so much. it's been a wonderful event. [inaudible] >> and entitled to respond. [inaudible] >> i will let the panelists review their thoughts. another question? right over here.

see my question is and i have not mentioned it here before so could you please? >> one more. >> stuxnet attribution and the gentleman in the back. >> good afternoon. i'm a private citizen. i've washed and regarding civilians on the battlefield. specifically anticipatory self-defense in cyberspace. let us suppose that i knew there was a civilian hacker who is going to unleash a cyberweapon of mass destruction at some point in the future and have incontrovertible evidence of that is going to occur. does the manuals. >> to that at all and if not what are your thoughts on that? >> thank you so much.

why don't i start with jason and we will work our way down. >> great, thank you. let me look at this as history because we were all told that oh attribution is an issue in neshaminy can never figure out where it's coming from. again that is more chew the more you are looking at the tactical and technical level and this would be my response. also on the issue that just got brought up about not knowing their intent. the finer you look the more difficult is to know where the attack came from and what they are actually willing to try. when you look at campaigns and conflict, when you pull yourself up as we are paid to do and as policymakers are paid to do, as senior officers are paid to do when elected officials and government executives are paid to do, when you abstract up a lot of those things that we have been told are true about cyber conflicts are not longer true.

look at estonia. technical people will tell you you can't say who was responsible for the attacks on estonia because it traces back to over 170 countries. it's a point where facts obscure the truth. if you are in the united states in the white house in 2007 and having told the president don't worry about 176 of 178 countries. we care about to, attacks on the united states because we have an obligation to our treaty ally and possibly even a convention responsibility to make sure attacks on the united states but also if you really want to attack an affiliate stop and called the call the kremlin and put the pressure on the kremlin. at our level we should never say the word attribution because it implies technical. it implies starting at the technical level and solving each layer of of.

in the beltway you should be thinking, who is the nation that is responsible for this and we find that is a much more intractable lancer. >> mike is always pretending he doesn't want it but he wants the iran question. >> no. let's see what he has to say about that. >> that's so generous of you, gary. >> hello talk a little bit about civilians on the battlefield and i guess it would depend on the status. if they're actually engaging at two goodies that would qualify as part of an attacker part of an ongoing armed conflict and they are direct week participating by their activities than they would lose their protective status as a civilian under the icrc guidance and they would become lawful targets just like the military member would essentially because they are not direct week

participating in the hostilities. the question would be exactly what they do in? it wouldn't change change the status and the collateral casualties or anything like that regardless of the situation. it depends on exactly what they're doing. i once touched lightly on the attribution question and i will put my old hat on for a second because this is a question we talk about a lot at cybercom. i think they're different ways to use the word attribution. we can talk about machine attribution and individual attribution but the important thing that everybody wants wants to know sponsor education. probably could trace an event to a particular machine and you can have a hot point to that machine you might trace it back to an individual sitting at a computer who could trace it back to the keystrokes. that doesn't answer the ultimate question as who is sponsoring that and who is taking the action? i will throw it out there as a historic analogy in cyber time.

it took place as part of an armed conflict that the people who are responsible for many activities that took lace in georgia were hactivist or patriotic activist. i guess you might call it plausible deniability if you want to look at it that way but there some question of whether or not a country can sponsor the people or whether they have a loose -- with them. not unanswerable but challenging. >> we can just say like right now south korea, i would start that debate. >> i will get michael to come through at that. section 2 of the manual. that is a theme that i think will come back and first i think michael and know you would really like to respond to the question. >> hello actually tell you a story.

i was doing after all of this stuxnet, nato says that the americans and israelis committed an act of war. oh my god. bbc calls on the nightly news. i'm a professor so i said you bet. i finished the nightly news and they said we stay on for another broadcast and because i understand the system i knew that it bbc world or bbc america so i'm ready to go on the neck show and i'm waiting and waiting and i hear the voice come on and it says welcome to bbc persian service. [laughter] the first question is -- >> shocking, really shocking. >> it's like brain don't fail me now. it's all over the newspapers and the reason is all over the newspapers is because we thought long and hard about doing this. we decided to say that this stuxnet operation if, if, if met

by state was the use of force because the prohibition on the use of force applies only to actions attributable to states. so if it was a state that conducted that operation than it was in fact a support. why? because across that first threshold and caused physical damage. i hasten to add that we specifically said you should draw no conclusions on the lawfulness of the operation because there are grounds, there are international law conducting use of force that work for the united states navy or use of force organization. that is what we do. obviously there must be a legal basis for doing that so the legal basis for that would have to be either self-defense or authorization by the security council. clearly it was not the latter. the second threshold i mentioned was armed attack. they're the group is split teary-eyed i'm of the opinion that if a state is behind this

or a nonstate actor than it was in fact an armed attack unless and i know i'm sounding like a lawyer here, unless the action was taken in self-defense because your defense of action cannot qualify in and of itself. and then the third threshold i mention earlier was armed conflict. and they are, i think probably everyone would agree and i speak only for myself that operation would have launched an armed conflict one state against another state because of the extent of the damage. but all that means, doesn't mean we have done an act of war. all it means is internatiinternati onal humanitarian law, international humanitarian law applies. so the big question here is who did it and if it was a state, if it was a state does that state

has a colorful claim that it act did in self-defense? a colorable claim, a good claim. >> a colorable claim, it's a legal term. it's lawyer. >> we charge you for the stuffer secretaries do. it is a good claim. it's a administradministr ative claim. i can certainly come up with a scenario in which the state makes an argument that they have a right to engage in such an operation as a matter of self-defense. i am sorry, ellen nakashima of "the washington post" is not your turn. [laughter] >> lets you control here. a very good question, a very good question. a very very good question. >> i have a follow-up to that. >> i want to answer the question

because i'm asked that question a lot. you are bright if the was an armed attack, non-use of force that was not attacked because an armed attack, by the time it was discovered by the armenians the right of self-defense had vanished and the reason is because international law does not recognize retaliation. it recognizes a defense of yourself so once an attack is over international legal regime or prior shoe to resort to other means to resolve the situation. the fact that wasn't discovered until, until the attacks were basically over it creates a curious position that if it was a rose to the level of an armed attack than the victims they would have to look for other remedies in the international law. >> article li also involve security measures.

this is a matter of law. >> i guess the other advice i would give you is we talked about -- short, nasty and brutish. [laughter] >> i am frank grammar. i wanted to propose a question. first of all i think it's a triptych panel. i want to suggest that maybe in this area of looking at customary internatiinternati onal law is not enough and we have to be thinking about a creative new law. it's not always just deriving from it but it is actually making the law so that, there's nothing wrong with what he did because i think that is step one but in 2.0 i think we might think about how do we look at this in new ways. i'm going to put three questions to you. one is espionage.

it doesn't really apply but there should be something out there with respect to that or should there be? and second what about crack at response is? we have a lot of attacks and the banks and various other kinds of things. does the pregnancy have a right to respond and then the third question which relates to when can you respond and you were saying if with respect to stuxnet goes to eminent and do we need to rethink the concept of eminent and do it arguably just need to change it? my real question is don't we need to think of cyberas somewhat different? it somewhat the same as jason said that it's not all the same in my kenyan and should we be getting out of the box? >> i think frank has raised core

issues about how we understand the concept in this arena. >> it's interesting especially on eminence and i will let the panel think about it but it is curious on eminent based on what the administration has said there description is for targeted killing. eminent is you can't always know where the next fall will strike. i know i am not saying that correctly but it's the looser definition of eminent than most of us would use and any of the same things are said about cyberand you can never tell -- in based of the history that too much is made of that. if we do choose the same kind of definition for eminence for cyberon not convinced that it follows armed conflicts. of course that could change and

history tells us what could happen. i think you raise that point jason. do you want to take a shot? i will talk about a couple of them. one of the things common about customary law by custom and practice of nation would build customary international law because that is happening so we are in effect making new laws if you look at it that way at. it's challenging and cyber because what nations have been doing in cyberthey have done brother exclusively so it has not been publicly available to study. although one might draw conclusions from what has been happening and that is the people are doing a lot and getting away with what they can get away with

so i don't know whether or not that would calcify and to customary law but it is in fact the custom and practice right now. maybe we haven't done a lot of representative law but that is what is happening. >> it's interesting it's difficult to know what custom is it is much easier to see with the custom is and what nations are not doing. if you are looking for cases over the last 25 years for a capable cybernation has unleased cyberforce out of the blue it hasn't happened so it's very interesting and helps us think about deterrence in a lot of other areas. what you're not seeing his nations will do things under certain ceiling. perhaps we is use the same internet or their suspicion even though we have a tallinn manual that countries are guessing if i do things that kills people and

breaks things are probably gone too to far so we do have a customary -- be. [inaudible] the tallinn manual is not a free ride for mischief. >> the tallinn manual does not address it. we never intended to do so and that is the follow-up question. let the address each of your questions. the first one is espionage. espionage has been going on for a millennia. to believe that now states will come together to outline espionage i don't think is realistic but, but international contract incidents of espionage and that is where i think you will see movement. we were clearing the manual and we addressed espionage in that context. we need to be careful.

there are lots and lots of things associated with espionage that will be unlawful. so i take your point and i happen to agree with it. i think this is an area that is rife for treaty law. we understand espionage isn't unlawful but we want to make these acts contributes i think that's a good point and i happen to it read. the second, the tallinn manual dealt with sponsors by states and states have international law and a monopoly on the ports issue no but you can outsource the use of force to private companies and interact on behalf of the state and statement becomes the state act. i'm sorry? that's exactly the case. for those of you that have been here it's chapter 2. giving someone authority to chase pirates and so forth. you can do the same thing with cyberspace and that would be consistent with current international law so i can see that happening as well.

the interesting question you asked and the big question is state immanency probe -- immanency question. i believe there has been confusion about the concept of immanency and it was confusion started with the 2002 security strategy when they talked about definition of self defense. it was my view at the time that we didn't need to redefine self-defense because the law itself defense allowed us to defend ourselves against acts of terrorism and so forth. what do you need for imminent self-defense and anticipatory self-defense which stretches back to a famous case. unique confluence three factors. before you can defend yourself they have to develop the capability or be in the process or be in the process of developing capability in a way that you won't be able to turn the clock back. the second factor is the other side has to intend to attack

you. if they say they're going to conduct an attack and then the third i made was you have to be in your last window of opportunity to defend yourself. this is the most important. this means you have to give other means of response an opportunity to work economic sanctions before you can respond forcefully but if you get to the point where you don't ask now, then you won't be able to defend yourself. you are there. it's imminent that you may use force. interesting the administration is recently adopted last window of opportunity standard and a number of speeches that they have put out so i'm delighted because it works in cyberspace. the old temporal thing did not work. this work works i think the administration is on the right track. >> you pointed out prevention. >> that's exactly right. >> this involves an analogy that comes from the naval security.

is part of the analogy that is a bit more complicated. let's gather some more questions. >> to change the tack a little that i was wondering if he coulu could speak to perhaps have a manual and/or some of the key things you are talking about here may influence the u.s. military's development of cyberrules of engagement and where they may all intersect? >> in the back, thank you. >> i'm sean with delta. professor schmitt you mentioned with the finished product here that there was discussion of things in the physical world

that constitute physical force including the armed training of forces. was there any examination of the analogous side of tech knowledge he that could reflect on training and would they tend to categorize them or enumerate them? >> there is a gentleman right there right behind you. >> i work in the news business and study here in the city. my question actually goes to the young lady there about since cyber in the military. at what degree does the manual manual -- and to what degree does the manual -- to the destined doctrine on cyberas an adjunct to military force? general dempsey talked about it more than a year ago. the second question is a retired

four-star and we were talking about the lack of political will on the hill against cyber espionage and protocols against espionage and in the traditional sense but nothing about cyber attacks. could you guys speak to that also? by the way michael at trip down memory lane and measure -- [inaudible] >> thank you. okay general. >> i would be very interested in the rules of engagement. we have already heard some hints about the way the u.s. has gone. it seems like the military feels more more confident that they are getting the rules of engagement right. we have been reading that in "the washington post" and other places so that can make us seem like it's good. because we don't know what they are, of course there are many of

us that wonder if we have gotten things right. they don't want to release the rules of engagement because the well let the bad guys know how far they can go but a little bit of transparency would make us feel a lot better and especially having looked at history the way that i have and seeing how much warning time we have, seeing how much response time that engagement and complex take weeks, months and years. i'm personally cautious that the rules of engagement will be built by people that have been dealing tactically and saying do you know what? a strike could come at us from nowhere and we have to respond quick the. this is absolutely true but again all the other types of warfare are also. under concern that we'll be focusing focusing in on the tactical and technical rather than the strategic which say we have more time. >> gary. >> i will talk briefly about the

rules of engagement as well. the roots of engagement are classified and will continue to be classified for a good reason. do you know how the tallinn manual will affect rules of engagement is this. it will have effects on advocacy and try to comply with international laws so law so i'm sure they will comport with the rules as presented in the tallinn manual but we have seen the u.s. and the dod struggle with are we. some of that is made it into the press and some of the terms that have come out that they had have been bandied about like things like active defense which will raise a lot of eyebrows and now recently again we don't know what the rules of engagement are but just this month the cyber-- cybercommander revealed there would be teamed so one wonders what the rules of engagement will be that we'll govern these.

so there must be something there but we are not quite sure what it is at this point. i certainly think the manual can't hurt. >> i agree with gary on the rules of engagement. i think they will have greater influence in the battlefield because there is a lot more granularity in the humanitarian law and i think that will feed into the battlefield rules of engagement. the day-to-day rules of engagement. the army training question, we have given an example of that and on what we say is if you provide malware for example the provision of nowhere in the training necessary to provide that malware to a group of hackers it would infect the use of force under the principles set forth in the nicaragua case zoe specific address that. i guess i'm the only honest guy appear. i don't know what the dempsey doctrine isn't that what met

that so i apologize. i just don't know. >> i guess one of the issues that has come up is the nuclear analogy there is always -- destruction and their doctrine so stop things from happening. do you guys see any analogy from your experience with cyber that helps control and understand what's going to happen with these issues? >> i'm an international lawyer and the concept of mutually-assured destruction doesn't play into international law. we did not address it in the tallinn manual. [laughter] >> i am the policy guy. i can jump in and it gets to the question asked earlier about the two kids in their basement about to unleash a cyber-- cyber warren it's one of the smith makes that is persisted how easy

it is to have a strategic affect in cyberspace. what what we have found this is just not true. the kids in their basement or in their garage and the locations differ, can certainly do things that can be scary and they can do some espionage things. they can get people riled up like the solar sunrise in 1988 but it's still true that having a real strategic affect is the purview of nations themselves. and it seems to be for a long time because cyberspace is easy to take a whole lot of stuff down. but you can't keep it down. like in estonia or south korea. fair backup and a couple of hours. and nonstate actors, the kids in the basement can can do a lot of that. they can take down a particular target for a long time. but they can't take a whole lot of things down for a really long

period of time. that is still a plausible statement and we went through the same thing talking about air warfare where folks said you only need a few bombers to knock everything out. it didn't work then either and you still up go-round saying that's probably going to change them or reduce smart grids and put medical devices on sign -- on line. it's not just silicon that gets cyberattacks. >> i just want to let you know the organizers are the high side and. [inaudible] what i would like to do is give the panelists to have a brief time to summarize and michael i know you want to adjust certain myths that are out there for the record so i will let you go back but gary anything in summary? >> just briefly and as i said before i think the manual has done a great job at laying out the baseline rules and

essentially has defined a piece, that piece of ihl that should have been a relatively easy line to draw some years ago but never got drawn to form the incredible valuable function by doing this. as we go forward the important part is to develop those rules as they apply in the context of armed conflict because that is where we are like you to to see the application of cyberin conjunction with armed conflict and we know we would see it as we flesh out those rules. it will be critically important. >> there were three points and i want to answer a question for standby. first of all it's not a nato manual. nato funded the project and it's not nato opinion. it's 20 guys in a room that know a little bit about international law and secondly we answer the stuxnet question.

that is all nonsense and i don't know where that came from. the third is the attackers question. i just want to emphasize that we never said they can attack hackers. what we said is exactly what gary said, given armed conflict and someone chooses to get into the armed conflict that affection or military capability from long-standing that person becomes a target. it has nothing to do with hackers during peacetime and has nothing to do with hackers during armed conflict, nothing. but i wanted to address your question because you and i talked about this before. i believe as a lawyer that i could probably come up with a legal justification for making the argument that it are to kill her state could have acted in self-defense in the face of the emerging iranian activity,

because for example it's no surprise that they were engaging in the sack 70's and they made public statements that are threatening to that particular state and in international law i'm very sorry but you have to take those statements at face value. you don't listen and say they don't really mean it. so i think i could give an argument and as a lawyer i could fashion an argument. i don't want to go any deeper than that. [inaudible] >> absolutely, absolutely in the imminence would be the systems getting to the point where they were going to cross the threshold of not being able to get there because imminence is not only i have acquired the capability, it's about i'm bout to get to the point where i will acquire the capability and that capability will absolutely -- and of course it requires the other two fact others.

the last window of opportunity and i want to hasten to add that but i think you can make a colorful argument for that action but again this is all speculation. i have no special knowledge. i gave it to my students in law school and that would not be a wrong answer. >> i think we will move on. >> i am going to have to pass the mic over to jason but i just wanted to say how we knew this would be a wonderful panel and we knew we would have a great crowd and we would able to engage people in. we are committed as a group at the aba with the president to have more of these forms with our partners and i can't thank the panelists enough for being here. it was fascinating and intriguing. so i will let jason close at up the event and thank you all very much for being here.

>> i will first leave you with a caution. we are new to the cyber era and we are 25 years then and it's tough to know what cyber complex are going to let be looking like 25 years from now so we really think the experts, the tallinn manual for helping us pin down how the law looks right now and we think this coe for making it possible and thank ada for making this possible. our next event at the olympic council will be our cyber912 and this will be april 12 at the newseum. thank you all for being here. we will have a no host social immediately after this to your left. thank you very much everyone for joining us. [applause] [inaudible conversations]