>> the key for an interim agreement will be to find a package of sanctions, proportionate to concessions offered by tehran, both in scale and in perverse ability. win in interim agreement has been she negotiations can begin in earnest on measures to ensure transparency, resolve questions about past military activities, and on unwinding the sanctions. we need to dwell not on what we most want, but on what we must have. maintaining six-power delegation remains a priority, and we need to spend at least a little time

worrying about how iran's negotiators will sell a negotiated agreement in tehran, not just how it will go over in the u.s. congress. now for the footnote i promised. the military option section includes a thorough list on the one hand great implications for nuclear iran, and on the other hand the dire consequences for a premature military strike on the other. i'm sure i join everyone in our audience today in wishing for neither rather than either. but i personally think the consequences of a nuclear iran are somewhat overdrawn and the description of consequences a little tutorial. why would an iranian success violate u.n. security council resolution shred when north korean relations have not? why should we believe an iranian bomb would threaten the very existence of israel when barack

does not. moreover, i'm not sure what it means to quote ensure that the option military strikes remain credible and go. given the ramifications of an attack that would delay but not even prevent an iranian bomb, i doubt that the u.s. hitting first with unilateral prevent an attack can ever be very credible. and constant repeating the military option is on the table won't make it so. thank you. >> thank you, greg. as i said everyone takes away from this report what they will anyone has contributed various things i think you for this and did comments. ali? >> good morning. thank you for the atlantic council for inviting me to speak. i also would like to talk about the consequences, the possible consequences of an iran armed nuclear weapons.

let's assume that iran has managed to develop nuclear weapons and the simple nuclear weapons. there's several reasons cited as to why we should prevent iran from developing nuclear weapons, and that should be the primary u.s. goal. one of the reasons is that would inflict a blow to the nonproliferation regime. i think -- as brakes and i think it's also a question to some extent. another reason cited for preventing iran from weaponizing its nuclear program is that would create a very unstable situation in the middle east, and iran with nuclear weapons, and there's no communication between the two countries. they don't have formal relations. and so this creates very dangerous scenario, especially in the case of any sort of conflict between israel and iran. i think that's credible. another reason for preventing

iran from weaponizing its program that's often cited is a proliferation risk in the middle east, and we can discuss that at length. i think there's also a question. there's been reports lately questioning the whole notion of a cascade effect. but i want to address the question of whether iran would be emboldened by a nuclear weapons capability, and this is a claim that's often me that if iran develops nuclear weapons, this would lead to an expansion of iranian power, not just in the middle east, but globally. that nuclear weapons would embolden iran to take riskier actions, behave anymore aggressive men in the persian gulf, and i don't necessary think that's evidence and the reasoning for this theory are very sound. first of all, we have to ask why iran is possibly trying to build nuclear weapons. i think number one purpose is

for iran to defend itself. you don't have to like the islamic republic to admit that. it has national security interests. the iraq war in particular really shaped iran's view of its position in the middle east. it was a very devastating war, not just for the islamic republic but for the iranian people. and subsequent conflicts in the region, the u.s. invasion of afghanistan communist invasion of iraq proved to the islamic republic that it had developed the means to defend itself, that it can do so through conventional means alone. so i think deterrence is a primary reason as to why iran may be developing nuclear weapons capability. of course, iran would like to also project power and influence in the middle east, and nuclear weapons can be used to that

effect. a second bush went to ask is what kind of a state is the islamic republic? i would argue it is a revisionist state, meaning that the islamic republic seeks to overturn the american order in the region. islamic republic wants u.s. forces out of the persian gulf. the islamic republic as opposed to israel, and very ideological terms. it's not just geopolitical competition that within the ruling elite, especially the top layers of conservatives. there's a true hatred for israel. i think that's very apparent to the islamic republic is also opposed to the gulf cooperation council. i believe the gcc especially saudi arabia could be foundation for u.s. power in the region. and so iran has had very tense relations with the gcc countries, and they are very afraid of an iran with nuclear weapons. but iran also has no territorial

ambition. iran has not invaded another country since 1789. it does not seek to conquer territories or hold territory. it has some disputes with surrounding countries, but again, it's intention is not to occupy bahrain or the uae or saudi arabia. rather, the islamic republic's goals are revisionist in nature. and you can make the art but that nuclear weapons -- although i have to say these are the goals that have been hampered to a certain extent since the revolution. we can discuss at length because there's a variety of opinions on what iranian foreign policy should be in tehran. but my argument is that u.s. policies effectively containing iran's ambitions even if it develops nuclear weapons. the policy of sanctions has undoubtedly led to a declining

economy, as barbara said. it is affecting iranian's goodwill towards the united states, but it's also having some practical effect in terms of u.s. objectives. as iran's economy gets weaker, its impact tehran's ability to project power in the region. thank you will have less money to fund terrorist groups like hezbollah and hamas. and really maintain its influence in the wake of the arab spring. and it is really the arab spring, the regional dynamic within the middle east that are really containing iran's ambitions along with u.s. policy. let's look at what's going on primarily in syria. syria is iran's key with influence to the arab world. iran is a shield priority country that always faced difficulties and expanding and enforcing its influence in the region.

this will severely impact iran's ability to project power, and the a ring government knows this. they are trying as hard as possible to keep aside an hour or keep some sort -- keep the assad in power. if the syrian regime falls and there's no influence in syria, this would dramatically affect iran's key ally in the region, and that is hezbollah. iran would not be able to militarily physically supply hezbollah in the event of a conflict with israel but it would be very difficult for iran to maintain its relationship with hezbollah. the land routes to has the would be cut off. the air routes could also be potentially cut off. so this would present a severe crisis for the islamic republic's foreign policy. and hezbollah right now is feeling a lot of pressure because of support of the syrian

regime, losing a lot of credibility on the arab streets, if you will. the arab spring is also funded militia in the islamic republic's foreign policy narrative. for years, saying it supports the average man and woman on the street in the face of what it termed to be u.s. and israeli imperialism. support for autocratic arab regimes. by those regimes are falling apart. so what is the islamic republic resisting exactly in the region? mubarak is gone. so broadly the arab spring is weakening iran's position towards the arab spring in general. and also iran's own behavior,

that has led to a decline in its reputation in the middle east. in 2009, the iranian regime reacted very violently toward demonstrations that occurred after the presidential election, and this damaged iran's credibility or had a lot of people in the region tell me that they view the iran regime as a very different manner after 2000. and i think that could be actually fundamentally one of the reasons the islamic republic is in decline. lastly, the internal divisions within the islamic republic should not be underestimated. this is a regime that is facing a severe internal crisis. the very notion, the role of the supreme leaders being questioned, no less by somebody like president ahmadinejad who has very explicitly and aggressively challenged hominy's

position in a system that is laudably with an iran that are unhappy with his will but it's not always public as we see indications that the regime's position within iran is very shaky. as we face upcoming elections, in mid-june with to keep in mind that this is a system that if it's not crumbling, could be on the verge of major changes. and i argue that all autocratic regimes eventually crash. and we could be witnessing a crack in the islamic republic today. so what does this mean in terms of u.s. policy? and the barbara i think said this very well. we shouldn't look at iran as being a nuclear problem, but rather a country that is facing critical vulnerabilities in the region, critical economic vulnerability, and important vulnerabilities at home. and as the atlantic council a stated before, strategic is

important in the u.s. position toward iran. i think there's a tendency to focus on how many centrifuges iran is installing, what is the status of fordow. so when you look at the bigger picture, when you look at the rivalry between the united states and the islamic republic, we will look at the islamic republic, historical positions in the region, the islamic republic is losing. thank you. [inaudible] -- isao profoundly i disagree with the statement by greg and to some extent ali. first with respect to the nuclear issue. i think that there is an underestimation of the massive

defeat for the united states if we in a sense of our iran to slide into nuclear capacity and take a containment policy. it's contrary to what the president of the united states has said repeatedly. it would be seen as weakness by our allies, and in the region. if the united states, after all the effort we've made, after all the u.n. resolutions and all the sanctions, after all the efforts of martial coalition with the europeans to have the most comprehensive set of sanctions ever imposed on a country in peacetime, and i say that from experience of having worked and let the sanctions effort in the clinton administration, it would be taken as an absolute massive defeat in addition and. it would mean that a country could simply thumb its nose at five u.n. security council resolutions with impunity.

what's conceivable incentive would any country have to take either the u.s. or the u.n. security council seriously wrecks likewise, the notion of sort of underplaying the notion that this would lead to a nuclear arms race, are the saudis going to allow iran to have a nuclear weapon without seeking one themselves, or the gulf cooperation council? i think absolutely is clear that they would not do so. nobody relied on a nuclear umbrella protection from the u.s. after the u.s. would have in effect conceded iran's nuclear program. and on issue no territorial ambitions, they view surrogates for the extension of their territorial ambitions. hezbollah, hamas, the

unfortunate additional support they have now in iraq. so it is true they may not have marched across borders, but they certainly have used surrogates in a very effective way to destabilize the region. i also don't think that these conclusions the are the full consensus of the task force. thank you. >> [inaudible] >> it's not working.

>> [inaudible conversations] >> can you hear me now? [inaudible] >> still can't hear me. you want to give me the mic? okay, now you can you me. all right. i think you can see how much of a challenge it was to put together this report, given the very, very deep-seated views that a lot of people have. i wanted to point out that greg was a member of the task force was speaking in a personal capacity, and ali was not a

member o of the task force by oe to give them each a chance to respond to what ambassador eizenstat had to say before we can do other questions. greg, do you want -- >> let me first express a number of points of agreement with stuart eizenstat. first of all, i think i identified my view as a minority view, a dissenting view, as against the view of the majority of the task force. so that indeed is the case. i would also express some agreement about the negative consequences of iran actually acquiring nuclear weapons. it would be a defeat. it would be a defeat for a major objective of the united states. there's no pretending otherwise. i would say that what has happened in north korea is also a very significant defeat for the united states for the nuclear nonproliferation. so we are really talking about how bad it would be, not whether it would be bad.

and i would also say, my assumption would be if the iranians actually made a move towards acquiring a nuclear weapon, whether or not we launched a military attack or not there would be a very extremely action not to threaten nsa's but by the entire international community to get even more sanctions, even -- even more penalties against iran. i can't see that as being the same thing letting iran having nuclear weapons with impunity. you can't argue the same time this is the most serious sanctions regime we've ever imposed, and then assuming there would be even more serious sanctions, and call that impunity. iran is already in a very unfavorable situation as a result of the sanctions. it would become more so. it hardly looks like the rewards for nuclear weapons with impunity to me spectrum what, if

you want to comment, you can proxy rather than sending -- >> i would like to address all the points regress because i think you make excellent points, ambassador. i would argue yes, it would be a defeat for the nbc, but not necessarily be the end of the nbc. that's why the u.s. should still be to persuade iran from the weaponizing is broken. we'll talk about content, content does not mean we allow iran's to develop nuclear weapons and containment also means that we're containing iran's regional ambitions. so it is possible to dissuade iran. in fact, united states has been content iran since the 197 1970 resolution. containment is a new concept and does not mean that we give up on the goal of persuading iran from weaponizing which i still think based on sanctions and u.s. diplomacy is still a possibility. that iran will never develop nuclear weapons.

and my study, it's a hypothetical. i just want to examine what happens if iran develops nuclear weapons, how we should treat iran and what the policies we should adopt. in terms of iran using its proxy, that's very correct. it uses its proxies not to control territory of course, but to project power to deter some of the so-called proxies. and i have to add, and i discussed this at length in the report, i think the term proxy is a misnomer because when you look at these groups that are allies with iran, hezbollah, hamas, and some of the other smaller groups, each have their own independent objective and influence. even hezbollah interest did not neatly iran with -- neatly aligned with iranians interest. so i wouldn't use the term proxy actually, and i do not in my report. in terms of some the other groups, of course hezbollah has very close relations with tehran, but some of the

palestinian groups like hamas are distancing themselves. really to the arab spring, the muslim brotherhood in egypt. hamas still receives military training and some weapons from iran, but indications are going towards egypt and the muslim brotherhood rather than iran and syria. and those are my main point. >> we could debate among ourselves for the rest of the session but we have a really distinguished audience. so i would like to turn your audience to see if perhaps we have some comments from some of our task force members. not at this point? maybe general hayden would like to say a word or two. >> i would just add that i took a mental footnote to the section that greg pointed out.

just the one mechanical description of the number of casualties that are well organized, strike would create. i thought it was i that i could no question, no doubt that it's a very difficult and bad option. we discussed this in the bush administration, bob gates was very common for them to point out that if we could do this, we will create that which we're trying to prevent and iran will stop at nothing in secret to develop a weapon. but i must admit this thing a spiral down over the last four years. that option if not becoming more attractive, looks worst, at least in my i. >> wait for the mic. say who you are. [inaudible] i'm a bit confused on your

interim agreement versus a grand deal. because you also said that we must wait until iran seal here'e deal. could you explain? thank you. >> i was trying to differentiate the demands of an ultimate agree would be a very comprehensive package of transparency measures, at least additional protocols, very likely more than that, more than countries that are merely members of the npc additionally protocol. they would presumably settle a number of issues on the military dimensions. it would be a lot of things, the ultimate agreement would need to settle and address. what i'm saying is there's some very urgent and drums, matters to attend to. and one of them obviously is this accumulation of 20% enriched uranium, because that allows the option of a dash to

getting a nuke weapon. even if you handle that, there are other problems with iran has a large infrastructure of nuclear centrifuges. even at low levels if you get enough accumulation of low-enriched uranium and if you have centrifuges that are more advanced than the kind they currently have come you can still come up with scenarios in which iran could assemble a fairly large amount of fissile material for at least a limited number of nuclear weapons. so those are all problems that had leaders over the long term. but i say first things first. and in order to stop this race to a red line come we would need to get a grip on the most alarming thing about the status quo. i think that's really what the current negotiators are looking at, to build, to find the

interim measure, and one in which the each side is living up to what it said it has agreed to come it will build confidence and make possible more ambitious ultimate solutions stack if i can add to what greg said, one of the recommendations and report is ultimately there has to be an agreed on just how much low-enriched uranium iran should have. and has to be reasonable and has to have some relation to the number of nuclear reactors iran has. right now iran has one. it's not even functioning very well, and the fuel comes from russia. iran meets its been why it needs it is low-enriched uranium ultimately. >> companies don't also, the plutonium, plutonium route is completely unaddressed and what we are looking at with a 20% enriched uranium. over the long-term that's a very serious concern but we don't want to find ourselves in a situation with north korea, we took care of the plutonium problem we thought and left the uranium enrichment route open.

we don't want to be office in the case of iran. the iraq facility has to be addressed and a long-term solution as well but i don't think it necessary has to be on the table for andrew confidence building thing. >> we say certainly nothing above 5% in the year 235 necessary for iran. -- into u-235. spent thank you very much. i wholeheartedly agree with your suggestion to explore the possibility of an official american presence in iran to an intersection or a variety of other bureaucratic possibilities that might exist. i wanted to ask you whether you see the large iranian american community, many of whom have iranian passport, and many of whom have probably they are and relatives there who go back and

forth, as an asset in making the case to the iranian government for the necessity of such an hospice? that's the first question. the second question similarly is about bureaucracy, and that is, don't you think the position of a special envoy would be more appropriate somebody base in the white house as opposed to exclusively within the large state department bureaucracy? thank you. >> maybe i will take it and maybe ali wants to add on to it. one of the key forces behind this report franklin was our desire to engage the iranian american community, and i've spoken to many members of that community certainly over the years, but especially in preparing district court. the way that iran ultimately will change, will become easier for its neighbors, for the

united states to live, and also perhaps the change in a way that will really make a difference in the lives of the people of iran will be if we can relax the tensions and intensify, fill the bridges that already exist i think between the united states and iran. that's one of the reasons why we stressed having an intersection there. as you may know, if an iranian wants a visa to come to the united states, now they have to go to divide or turkey. it's very expensive, cumbersome. it can open them up to unwanted scrutiny from security services of iran. it's not easy for them to do but if you have iranian students in this country, there was an example recently, i think they were in minnesota where 20 of them couldn't get access to bank accounts, ma local banks shut down the coun account because iw the word iran. and freak out and thought we're going to get on the wrong side of the treasury department or justice department. we want to make things easy and

transparent. you could even have an account at the federal reserve. how transparent could that be? linked to particular bank an event and that could be exquisitely just for food, medicine, remittances. a lot of iranians in this country send money home come what they want to sell property and get the money back year. by now they had to go through moneychangers. it's very expensive. it's not transparent. subject to abuse by all sorts of unsavory actress. so that's one of those main goals of this report is to set up a channel or two that will really be transparent and will promote the kinds of things that we want to promote and that will help iran over time spent if i may just add a couple of points. going back now to the clinton administration when i was -- madeleine albright was secretary. we initiated unilaterally set the steps like, for example, permitting iranians -- to

coming. there was some reciprocity on the iranian side when then president khatami talked about an exchange of civilizations, and there was a beginning of some student exchanges and cultural exchanges. i think those are certainly worth trying and they are worth expanding. second, although i think the president, president obama was criticized in 2009 for his efforts to reach out to iran, i think far from criticism, the fact that it was rejected enable the president to have the moral high ground to put together this quite extraordinary set of economic sanctions. so in all of the areas we're talking here, including intersections and more exchanges and so forth, it would sort of build on that and test whether or not the iranian regime is

willing to reciprocate in any way. and if they are not, it simply underscores the rigidity of the regime and would reinforce the fact that sanctions and other measures are the only legitimate way, ultimately, again and took it to military options to i think these are certainly worth trying. and if they are rejected then the onus would be on track to. >> let me point out that actually exchanges have been going up again. they went down for good after 2009 but there have been no scientific exchanges, a number of them, some of the mind iran, some event in europe, and there were 7000 iranian students studying in the united states last year which was a major increase over the previous year. so iranians and iranian government have a tremendous -- for the technological prowess of this country, and there's been a long tradition of iranians standing here. this is something i think the iranian government does not want

to lose if possible because they know it's important to their future and to the future of their people. >> i think in theory that sounds good in terms of having a diplomatic presence in tehran, increasing people exchanges on the united states. asked for and the regime will rejected and the onus will be on them. but then we have to see that the problem is really the iranian regime that it does not want iranians to travel abroad. it doesn't want iranians to engage with outside world. it does not want iranian americans to shape her home country. a lot of iranian americans are afraid to go to iran if it's not just because of sanctions or difficulty in traveling to the country. it's that the iranian regime doesn't want a certain set of people to reside in iran and decide that country's future.

so i think in theory, yes, ideally one day iran and the united states will have normal relations and the kind of the diplomatic presence in iran. i just don't see it under the islamic republic. >> jim moody in the front. >> first of all, excellent report, and i congratulate the efforts of stewart, and barbara. i lived in iran for two years. let me ask you this. if we do the things that are in get or suggested, without possibly affect u.s.-israel relations? i know that many parts of the middle east thinks that israel and u.s. are blocked together point for point, and that would not necessarily be true if this were implemented. >> well, i travel extensively to israel several times a year, and i sort i can't speak for the israeli leadership. i think that, jim, one of the

things that was achieved by the president's visit and by the extraordinary statements by former heads of the idf and the intelligence together have aligned at least on a timetable the u.s. and israel have given some breathing space or sanctioned uncertainly deferred any military action. at the same time, there are potentially different in games. -- into games. for example, it's quite clear as greg was indicating and i think it's quite obvious from the negotiations that from the european and u.s. and p5+1 standpoint, quote unquote acceptable at least greg's interim agreement if not permanent would be to permit some degree of uranium

enrichment. unless they were very high degrees of transparency, even for that interim agreement, i think israelis would look at that in a very suspect way. i think that they recognize, and again the very healthy into the debate, that to some extent the military auspices are more limited. both at distance by the assets that they have compared to the united states, and that the threat of israeli military action has induced the comprehensive sanctions to some degree, and that that's an asset that can only be used so many times. so my sense is that there's more alignment between the two, but at the end of the day, if, indeed, somehow we suffer a defeat and we find that iran is willing to take the heat from

the sanctions, willing to take the economic trauma that it clearly has happened with over 50% depreciation of its currency and inflation over 25%, a lot of their oil transactions have to be done by border. 70% of their government revenues and they're only able to export half of what they did. if they are willing to suffer that, i think you would see public opinion and military and intelligence opinion in israel shift back to where it was. but we are not there yet. that's another reason why i feel so strongly about the fact that we need to really keep the sanctions up. we need to have credible military threat because i think the prospect of unilateral israeli military action would have all sorts of -- including to israel. but if they're left with no other choice, that's something

that would have to come back on the table. right now i think our policies are better aligned and the maven for a very good while. >> ed berger. let me ask a not entirely hypothetical question, the authors of the window just been asked. and that is suppose, i think there's some reason to think this is possible. suppose israel were persuaded, speaking broadly, to join the npt. would that not change the environment in the middle east, change the adversary relationship that was pointed out between iran and israel? >> greg, maybe you want to take that? >> well, that certainly is a hypothetical. [laughter] i think that strains my brain so

much to imagine. let me offer a couple of thoughts that would move in that direction think would help. and, obviously, this is something we thought about in connection with the middle east, weapons of mass destruction free zone conference which was agreed to, but which hasn't happened yet. that, too, seems like a complete stretch that he would even have the israelis and the iranians at the same table discussing these things. but there are things like the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. this should not be a dealbreaker are either iran or for israel, and both have signaled an interest in this solution. there are other things like even limits on certain categories of missiles that i think the two countries could agree to. so i think there are steps that could be taken from that direction, although i think as israel, as the israeli

government says, it is going to keep various options, including its nuclear forces there until it sees a difference, political relationship in the middle east. i think it's not productive at this point to imagine israel as a member of the npt but it's more productive to think about israel taking steps in that direction. >> let me just give two quick additional thoughts. the first is that if israel were to join the npt, i do think we have any affect on a rant because i think iran sees this new program as enhancing its tolerance of power and helping to change its balance of power in the middle east. but second, israel is not going to join the npt. it's a hypothetical. it's not even worth addressing. so i think it's, you, those would be my two comments.

>> the gentleman right behind there. >> and certainly given the instability in the region, growing instability in the region, israel sees its nuclear a bit of the as its ultimate harder to defend itself from an extraordinarily turbulent regi region. >> i'm with the institute for defense analyses. i think this is a question for ambassador eizenstat. you certainly emphasizes the importance of sanctions but i would bring you back a remark that is also in the support, and that's the notion of graduated -- intern for verifiable terms. would just ask you to address some of your thinking behind two issues. one, is our political system flexible enough to differentiate

and to act in a timely way to get sanctions relief in exchange for verifiable curbs? and, too, editing probably closely related, how would you differentiate that sanctions relief from what i suspect would be the course of public -- chorus of public criticism, which is to say well, we've been down this route before, since the 1994 agreed framework with north korea. they say they're going to get back. we give the benefit. how would you differentiate what's being called for in this report from what largely is -- spent a very good question and i think there are two parts of the. one in effect is what legal

flexibility with the administration have without going back to congress and getting amendments which be extremely difficult. i mean, there are wafers built into -- wavers built into many of the sanctions legislation which i think gives enough elbow room, at least on an interim basis, not the core sanctions but those at the margin so the president could do it. second, i think the difference with respect to north korea would be that even this, the 21st option for example, would have to have a verifiable, the iaea would have have questions and to do it would have have access to all the facilities. it's interesting that on the 20%, its own in the last i guess year and a half or so that they've extensively gone to a 20% enrichment. and the russians, to some extent

although it certainly hasn't been reflected in their public attitude or on their support for broader sanctions, have certainly been aggravated by the fact that they did offer to we process, along with the french, the 20% enriched uranium so they could be sent back any form that would meet weapons grade. so there is i think a fairly broad international consensus on that piece. and if that could be internationally verified with the iaea, i think the president has enough flexibility that exists in the law to make that offer. but clearly that's the key issue the iranians want to know how much we are willing and able to put on the table, and in return for what. it would have to be very carefully calibrated. >> could i just add, the framework worked reasonably well until the bush administration came in.

the iranians did not build bombs during that time. they did not turn out more plutonium. and neither side really kept its part of the bargain but the u.s. was supposed to build civilian nuclear reactors for north korea, and it never, it started but it was a very, very slow process, never was concluded. they were delays in heavy fuel oil shipments that were supposed to go to north korea. so it was an agreement that sort of worked for a time and then when george w. bush came in, he refused to let colin powell pick up where the clinton administration had left off. and the whole thing started to unravel. we discovered with north korea cheating and so on. these agreements are not meant sometimes to be permanent. sometimes their sentiment to buy time, and the framework bought a lot of time spent also some of the more devastating sanctions are the european sanctions. for example, european boycott of iranian oil, the european, the

eu refusal to ensure iranian tankers. those sort of sanctions average sold and iran's inability to export its oil for other countries to purchase its oil. so that's relaxed and that's very doable i think. once iran shows that it is willing to halt some of its nuclear activity, then there is a chance for sanctions to be relaxed. i don't personally buy the theory that the iranian government is afraid we can't lift sanctions the they know there is a path out of the current crisis. >> i'm looking at an article in the arab news, saudi newspaper, published a few days ago. the recent arab summit, it explains, should be understood within the context of arab-iran rivalry. and it concludes, the summer of

2013 shirley will be extremely hot for all in the region. now, we haven't we discussed the arab iran rivalry. two weeks ago they rolled up with him was an iranian intelligence operation, which presumably was meant to provoke some sort of subversion, i would guess. i see barbara nottingham. does this suggest they are saying two can play this game? which would be an additional new dimension. >> i think that's an excellent point, because the iranian nuclear issue is also framed by the tensions between iran on one end and its allies and saudi arabia on the other. and its allies but i think air spring has become much more of a sectarian fight between she is and sunnis within the middle east. i think this is a fight that the

united states can't always grasp or understand very effectively and cannot shave always to the best of its interests. their stuff at a rivalry between iran and saudi arabia societies. rightly accused iran of playing on them and vice versa that iran bravely accuses saudi arabia of helping ethnic succession is an opposition groups, so this is nothing new. it goes back to the 1979 revolution, creation of the islamic republic. what's happening right now with the syrian civil war and before that, the strife in iraq, those in several each of the rivalry between iran and saudi arabia. and so, that certain extent shaped u.s. foreign policy. having said that, too, although the gcc countries are valued, u.s. allies need to keep in mind they are also some of the most

-- government in the middle east. so when you look at the iranian nuclear issue, there's a series of trade-offs that we sanction iran, we are hurting the iranian people but if you rely on the gcc statement in saudi arabia contain and deter iran from we could be entering democratization in the region. so when we talk about u.s. grand strategy, i just want to say that it's really come up. it's hard to come up with a grand strategy. we have criticized the united states for having tactics instead of strategy, but given the vast amount of interest and allied interest at stake, it is will difficult to come up with a grand strategy despite all these different issues. the rivalry in the middle east in a primary one of them. spee-1 at the reasons that i so fundamentally disagree with the argument, the consequences of a nuclear iran are overdrawn is just the point you're making.

we already have diminished influence in significant parts of the arab middle east as a result of the arab revolution. we see that in egypt, which was our primary arab ally. if we are perceived as losing on the iranian nuclear issue standoff, then those allies that we do have, particularly in the gulf and saudi arabia, would profoundly see the balance of power shifting against us and them. and i think the consequences of that would be extraordinarily negative for us. it would be a real victory for iranian influence in the region, even with a sectarian issues. and that's again why think the nuclear issue has much broader implications on the future of the region. spent if i could just add to

that. and i raise that iran developing nuclear weapons would damage -- but there's a host of other factors that is shaping u.s.-arab relations. for example, there's been a lot of tension between the united states and the gcc countries, including saudi arabia, bahrain, not over the iranian nuclear issue, but over the u.s. or the perceived u.s. treatment of the mubarak regime. the u.s. probably towards the arab spring in general. so my point is we shouldn't look at the nuclear issue in isolation. there's a host of other tensions between the united states and its arab allies that potentially supersede the nuclear issue. >> the gcc countries are petrified of an arena bombardier also petrified of the american military action against iran. they have no solution to this problem. they know that if the u.s. were to attack iran, that a lot of the fallout, literal and figurative, might come on them.

atlantic council a good publication a few months back about incredible -- and the strains between the gcc and the united states. were iran to develop nuclear weapons, with all due respect, ambassador eizenstat, where would those countries go? protect them against a nuclear iran. it's certainly a terrible blow to american prestige they could be a terrible blow to the npt. but for better or worse the united states is still the old ally come important ally that these countries have and there's been a lot of efforts to improve their missile defenses to get into coordinate among each other on things like missile defense with some limited success under the u.s. umbrella. >> diane perlman.

it seems that the primary emphasis is on pressure and sanctions, and that the fact that sanctions are hurting doesn't necessary mean that they are working and seem to be having the opposite effect in one study of 100 cases of sanctions, they failed 86 times and are often -- you mentioned a little bit motivation, iran's motivation to feel like they need a deterrent from us. and that actions that we take for our own security make them feel more insecure, and that's more dangerous and they are free. we are talking with some positive inducements and relationships, but i wonder about emphasizing that more come in doing more tension reduction and also israel is a pretty good player if iran wants to nuke them, so i think would be helpful, this is the type of more reassurances to israel.

so could you talk about recognizing that a lot of our actions may be provocative and having the opposite effect? >> the positive inducements are the ones that seek to make it easy for iranians to come to the u.s. for humanitarian transactions of all sorts so that we are not, we're not put in a position that we were doing the run up to the iraq war where you remember the government saddam hussein and they play the sanctions in such a way even when he finally agreed to the oil-for-food program, a lot of it was siphoned off in corruption. iraqis starved. iraqi children starved. it was a horrible experience, and so we don't want that to happen again. it's possible from we will at least make sure that the iranian government, that it's harder for them to blame the united states if there are consequences for the iranian people in terms of

health and so on. on. >> plus the recognition of great a financing mechanism so that the central food and humanitarian in medicine can get in as we're trying to prepare for a broader strategy if we can get over the nuclear issue. >> i'm glenn schweitzer from the national academy of sciences. i'd like to react to the skepticism about exchanges, and some of the recommendations in the report. having just come back from our regular meetings with iranian scientists, i'm not quite as negative as you are, ali. first with regard to the role of iranian americans. in the field we deal in any way, it's not whether they are iranian americans, it's the quality. without arena americans and bald, widely applauded. we've had others who were sort of, the nod was welcome we tolerate him because he was born

in iran. the second one, with regard to the intersection in iran, they have been around for 15 years, and it's just, too much smells of spying, very frankly and i don't think it's got a chance. now, with regard to the specific recommendations of virtual cultural section to match the virtual domesticate, i think it's a terrific idea. we are all very cautious of what we sent television. but if it's done carefully i don't think, i think you can avoid getting our iran colleagues into trouble. and, finally, with a proposal for 10 on 10, 10 universities in iran and 10 in the united states, that's doable. and i am just pleased, the first discussion of heard about iran in the last three years in

washington that's talk about something positive. every meeting i go to, starting with the syndrome is dominated i the bad things were going to do to each other. but every poll that has been taken in iran for the last 10 years has given low marks to the us in everything except iranian education to accept science in education. we hate you but how can my son get a green card, you know? thank you very much. >> thank you for those remarks. glenn has written an excellent book which i cite in the report on the exchanges that have gone on, and you would be surprised. identified u.s. laureates have gone to rent and have met with rapturous responses. people couldn't into the lecture hall to hear them speak. there is a tremendous amount of respect that remains between our two countries, between our two peoples, that we really want to preserve for the future. and so i think you for your remarks. on the report about the

intersection, you're right, this has been bandied about for ever. the bush administration came very close, lease on two occasions that i know to asking for an intersection. one time in the fall of 2005 i believe, it was written about on the front page of "the wall street journal" and it embarrassed the bush administration so they stuffed it back under the mattress. never going to do it on their way out in the summer of 2008. and burned was all and ready to ask for this. -- bill burns was already. the georgia war broke out and was decided it would look soft on a rogue state and so the bush administration once again put this idea a way. i don't know frankly whether the obama administration has ever thought about it seriously, but i don't see the problem in trying. yes, of course the iranians would think the americans are spying. but they think all americans who go to our spine whether

journalists or students or tourists, it doesn't matter. so if you have a american diplomats there and people like to talk to on the record basis instead of having to go through this list of past messages in some of the convoluted way, i think it would serve a purpose and it certainly would help iranians who are applying for a visa to come to this country. >> i would have office with the iranian intersection in the united states spent it's been here for all these years spent having diplomats in washington for example,. >> we have had -- >> that's what i'm talking about. so there's always been concerned. the nest of spies, to use and a running expression, but i would not give up on an idea of official government representation in country. the arguments are so persuasive in terms of getting information in the normal course of events between diplomats right cables back, talking about the conversations both within iraq

and with nongovernmental people. it's extremely important and it's sort of shocking given the importance of iran that we have such little contact between government. so i can understand how maybe we would be pessimistic if iran and it seems to me we should be pushing very hard spent i think we have pushed. iran has rejected. if you want an american intersection in tehran coming up to go to ayatollah harmony, and good luck in having them agree to having an american intersection right smack downtown tehran. spent you could put it up in the north may be. >> we talk about not having positive discussions about iran. there are a lot of positives about iran but it's a great country. it's a great culture. great people. the issue is the negativity of the regime that has a choke hold

on that country and society. so we can push as much as we want on having engaged in iran at intersection, but unless the iranian regime is willing to concede some serious changes, that's not going to happen. .. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> state department

undersecretary tara sonenshine spoke thursday about issues facing women in the arab world. she also spoke about egyptian president morsi's comments about links on u.s. embassy web pages to criticism of egypt by comedian jon stewart. see her remarks on our web site, c-span.org. >> as a recovering journalist, i know that people love to focus on two things. one, journalists love stories about media, and they also love when things go wrong. and so in the hundreds of thousands of tweets and facebook pages that in the last year i've seen built, created, disseminated, distributed, people have gone out from embassies and for the most part for hundreds of thousands of

bits of information it's gone well. on a couple of occasions, it's not, and no surprise, feeding frenzy by folks focusing on, oh, this looks like a glitch between this tweet and that twitter. and some of it can, as we know, go viral and be very serious. so it's a no-joke area, but we are encouraged and encouraging people at embassies to be out there, that you cannot hide under your desk or under your computer, because the conversation is going on around you. >> and in a way even when there are bobbles, it's an opportunity to engage honestly, right? sometimes most important diplomacy is not going to be the stuff that's carefully managed. it's going to be the stuff that breaks out. >> and if it goes wrong, what i encourage officials all the time is own it. if it was a glitch, say it was a glitch.

i think the worst thing is when you try to craft an answer that's nonglitchy and that might be glitzy, but what you really just want to say is that was an oops. [applause] >> wednesday president obama was in colorado speaking about stricter gun control laws. later that evening nra president david keene criticized the administration for limiting choices in the aftermath of the school shooting in connecticut. this event, hosted by the franklin county, pennsylvania, republican party is half an hour. >> i want to say that it's a real pleasure for me to be here with you in pennsylvania. i have a soft spot in my heart for pennsylvania. rich was talking about the pittsburgh annual meeting that we held a couple of years ago here. that's where i was elected president of the national rifle association, got to know rich. you know, i can't think of anybody that i'd rather have

introduce me. this is mr. gun rights in this state. [applause] and it's a particular pleasure to be here. but pennsylvania's a great state personally and from the standpoint of the national rifle association. many of you probably know this, but there are more nra members in pennsylvania than any other state in the union. [applause] texas does -- my wife's from texas. texas sans don't like to hear this, but it is true. [laughter] and, you know, pennsylvania's support of second amendment rights is a tradition that goes back a long way. pennsylvania's understanding of the constitution and the folks who live here really seem to get it regardless of what part of the state they're from, but marley those in the middle -- particularly those in the middle section of the state. i remember some years ago being on a panel with james carville.

you remember him. [laughter] and he infamously described pennsylvania as pittsburgh and philadelphia separated by a third world nation. [laughter] and i said i peg -- beg to differ. it's pittsburgh and philadelphia separated by america. [applause] so i can't think of any place i'd rather be this evening. i have to tell you, i was with the ceo of cabela's not too long ago, and he said, dave, i've got a question i have to ask you. and i'm going to have to tell him about this dipper tonight. he -- dinner tonight. he said how come wayne r pierre gets to go to the mule deer dinner, and they send you to harvard? [laughter] and i said i guess that's what happens when you get second choice. but tonight i've had a chance to meet many of you.

and i thought when i was invited up here, i thought it was a lincoln day gattering for the republican party. i see it's actually a meeting of nra members, and i truly appreciate that. [applause] you know, the national rifle association is not a partisan organization in the sense that republican party is. i happen to be a proud republican. but in terms of the second amendment, the second amendment and the right to keep and bear arms in this country is not, never has been and should not be a partisan or ideological position. the nra has had its support over the years and has had its influence not because we're a conservative organization, not because we're a republican organization, but because we're an american organization. nra members include democrats, factory owners, union members, farmers, businessmen, lawyers -- yeah, lawyers too -- and people from just about every walk of life that one can imagine.

and the influence of the nra, this is a lesson, i think, for politicians in general. the strength of the nra stems from the fact that those who believe strongly in the values that we all share have something in common that goes beyond party, beyond whether they're a liberal or conservative, beyond profession, beyond class. it's something mr. obama understands. and that is a dedication to american values and constitutional principles and freedom that gets them to step forward whenever they're challenged. you know, this is a country that's strength derives in large part from the fact that americans have never been obsessed with politics. i have been, some people if this room may have been -- in this room may have been; but most americans are not obsessed with politics. they're obsessed with their families, living their lives, paying their taxes, educating

their kids and enjoying themselves. and the american spirit was all about creating a society in which they could do that without having to devote all of their time to political activity. if they wanted to do that, they could have been in france. they won't have to be here. but the one thing that has distinguished americans over the centuries has been our willingness when those values are threatened, our willingness to step up to the plate and do whatever's necessary whether that threat comes from abroad as it has on occasion, or whether it's here at home. and that's what's marked those who believe so strongly in second amendment and constitutional rights, is our willingness when our values are threatened to do what we need to do to step forward. and politicians, many politicians -- i was told by someone i won't name out of courtesy but whose name you would all be familiar with some time ago that the only reason

for a party to exist was to get hold and exercise power. and my response to that was that's not why any of us got into politics in the fist place. that's not why we got active in the flit lal atmosphere. -- political sphere. we got active not so we could hold a job, not so we could exercise power, not so we could aggregate power to ourselves, but because we believed in things. we believed in a view of america that goes back hundreds of years, and we believed in preserving the values that we've inherited, and we believed and do believe that we want to pass on the nation and the society to the next generation that we inherited from the last. that's why we're here tonight. not simply because we're republicans, not simply because we're conservatives, not simply because some of us are running for office or some of us hold office, but because we believe. and a successful party, aingful

political movement -- a successful political movement has to be based on principles and belief in values and tradition and be willing to talk to orrs everywhere with -- others everywhere who share their views and tear values. that's been the trent of the national rifle association. that's the strength of a successful political movement, and it's something we must all do all the time in every way that we can. no political movement worth its salt changes its values to suit the whims of the day. but any successful political movement knows how to communicate its values effectively with the people it needs to achieve the policy goals that those who associate with it desire. you know, before this last election the nra was criticized particularly in the media because wayne la pierre and i chris cox and others went around and said we thought if barack obama actually won a second

term, that he would threaten the second amendment rights of the american people. we were told that that was a ridiculous view. in fact, one of the more level-headed journalists in america, chris matthews -- [laughter] suggested on the air that wayne la pierre was clinically insane for suggesting president obama had any designs on our second amendment rights. after all, during the campaign the president said rather famously i will never take your rifle, i will never take your shotgun, i will never -- [inaudible] what was it about that statement i didn't like? except that it went against everything he'd ever said in his life and every action he'd ever taken, there budget anything wrong with it. the only thing wrong with it was i didn't think he believed it.

i received letters from members who said we step up to the plate when our values are threatened. i received some letters who said i listened to the president, he sounded fine. what's with you guys? i saved all those letters until election day, a day i hoped was going to turn out differently but didn't, and i sent all those folks a note noting that within two hours of barack obama's victory speech in chicago, his state department notified the united nations that they would like a small arms trade treaty on the president's desk for signing just as soon as humanly possible. the negotiations that were going on in the u.n. at that time to come up with a treaty that the u.n. voted on this week were coming to a conclusion in august, and at that point the white house and the state department contacted the united nations and said that the american administration would like those negotiations put on

hold ip definitely -- indefinitely. somebody at the white house had noticed that if things were progressing as they were at that time, a small arms trade treaty would appear on the president's desk in early september and would become an issue in the presidential campaign. and the one thing that the obama campaign wanted to do was avoid second amendment issues in that fall campaign, because if they weren't able to avoid them, a lot of people would step up to the plate and do what they needed to do to make sure that their rights were safe. right after the election the president said i want that treaty, today he got it. i wrote to those members, and i said, you know, the fact that it only took two hours to the united nations is a clue that this guy is going to look for an opportunity to go after your rights. and in newtown, connecticut, they thought they saw that opportunity. the tragedy that took place

there in the minds of people at the white house and in the minds of the people in the city hall in new york was an opportunity, an opportunity to change the debate and to achieve policy goals that they had been seeking for decades, to put second amendment rights pack on the table -- back on the table, to begin taking guns if they could, registering if they couldn't and limiting the choices that the american people had in purchasing firearms if they had to be limited to that. right after the tragedy the president and others suggested that we needed to ban a whole list of guns, that we needed to have all kinds of measures designed to keep honest americans from exercising a fundamental constitutional right all in the name of saving the children. but, in fact, when the president named his vice president to head a task force and invited various people to meet with him, we sent our federal affairs director, and he closed the door. and the vice president of the

united states said let's begin by making one thing clear, the president and i know what we want to do about firearm, and we're going to do it, so let's talk about something else. that didn't shock us, it didn't surprise us, it was what we expected. and it was our position, and i think the position of the person people, that the president and his folks were asking the wrong question. in the wake of the tram at newtown -- of the tragedy at newtown, they were not asking how do we protect our children, how do we prevent another tragedy of this sort, they were asking what do we do about guns? isn't this a chance for us to do something about guns? and the nra and a lot of others suggested that that was the wrong question. and as a result of that, we asked asa hutchinson who some of you may know, a former congressman from arkansas, former united states attorney, former head of the drug enforcement agency and a former number two man at the department of homeland security to put

together a task force to ask the right question, and that question was how do we protect our children. that task force included experts like a former director of the united states secret service, and this week they came forth with a series of recommendations, one of which was and is that one of the ways you protect your children is by providing armed security to them, because there are people in our society who are, quite frankly, so mentally disturbed that they're liable to do anything. and we can't screen all of them out. it's interesting, because the day after the newtown tragedy i found myself in israel. by quips dense, touring -- coincidence, touring a facility where school security officers in that country are trained. back in the '70s, israel had a whole spate of school shootingsings. as i put it at the time, their crazy people listen to different voices than our crazy people do, but the result was the same. and at first veterans and others

rallied to the cause as volunteers and provided security in their schools. over the years that system morphed into something for institutionalized and so that today israel's schools, each school hires in some way through the school budget or local financing private security to protect the kids in that school. they don't use the military. they don't use the police. they use trained, often veterans, but trained people, especially trained to provide security in the schools and solve that problem. when i came back, we suggested that perhaps that was something that should be looked at in this country. and a number of people said that we were crazy. and then they looked at it, and they realized that out of 130 some thousand schools in this country, over 30,000 of them already have armed security, so they didn't want to suggest that the people running those schools were crazy. and finally the president said, well, he was skeptical about this idea. but we put together this task

force, and the task force pretty much agreed with what the american people have said. the gallup poll shortly after newtown asked people what did they see as the problem that created these. the number one problem they saw was the mental health system that doesn't work, because the kinds of people that involve themselves in this sort of thing are invariably crazy. they're not criminals in the classic sense, they're people that are severely mentally ill, and can they're looking for some place -- and they're looking for some place to vent their fantasies and their hostility, and invariably that's some place that is not protected. among those places are theaters and schools and shopping malls and the like. and secondly, the american people said the problem was we weren't giving security, we weren't providing security to our schools. we provide guards at meaningless office buildings, we have armed guards at banks and at jewelry stores and just about every place else you can imagine, but not at our schools. perhaps because our children aren't as important as those

things. but we decided we ought to look into this empirically, and that's why that task force was put together. this week they came back, and they said among oer things every school in the country with every local law enforcement agency, with teachers and administrators and parents should look at their facility and look at the various things that they could do to protect the children under their care. that one of the things that they should look to is providing the president -- the presence of an armed security officer. and those security officers could be financed through federal grants, state grants, local grants, school budgets, they could be volunteers, they could be members of the school administration as it exists today. but they all should have the training necessary to do what they need to do. we're not talking about arming every teacher. we're not talking about arming every principal. and we're not talking about simply relating these -- letting these folks have firearms to do with what they will, but

providing them the real training nets in a shooting -- necessary in a shooting situation in a school. and the empirical evidence suggests in shopping malls and schools and elsewhere that when there is summon there who -- someone there who's armed, that school shootings are stopped, shootings in malls are stopped. because the people who engage in this are not looking for a battle. they're looking for a killing field. and when the killing field is denied them, they go away. and so we made those suggestions, and those suggestions are on the table, and we think we'll be taken seriously. interestingly, one of parents of a child that was killed at newtown called us and asked if he could come to that press conference with asa and his task force. and we said he could come, he could say what he wanted, we didn't, we did not urge him to do so. he came, and haid specifically that he wanted to thank the nra because we have taken the problem that resulted in what happened in fewtown

seriously -- in newtown seriously and have really taken a look at what can be done to prevent future tragedies of this sort. and that's what we're doing, because we take our responsibility seriously. we take our defense of the second amendment seriously. we take the concerns of our members and citizens of this country as seriously as any organization that any of you have ever seen. most of you here, many of you here are members of the nra. many of you are life members. many of you have been members of the national rifle association for decades. and those of you who respect -- who aren't and even some of you who are, now that when you ask somebody on the street about the nra, they think of us in terms simply of our advocacy mission. we are the organization that defends the second amendment. that's a core part of the mission of the national rifle association, but it's only part of it. the nra was formed in 1871 by a group of former union generals who saw during the civil war

that the american understanding and facility with firearms had decreased as people from europe moves in with no firearms background, from cultures that didn't use guns. and the nra was the answer to that, to make sure that americans in the future would have the same skills and the same familiarity with firearms and the same appreciation of the second amendment as those who had founded the country. two of the first presidents of the national rifle association were generals phillip sheridan and ulysses s. grant. and the interesting thing is that between 1871 and 1970 the national rifle association never endorsed a candidate. we didn't have a lobbying organization. we didn't have a lobbyist. we didn't need a lobbyist. we didn't need a political operation. because there was widespread agreement in this country that the founders knew what they were doing when they included the

second amendment into and the bill of rights in the constitution. life members of the nra included even from john 236789 kennedy to -- f. kennedy to dwight eisenhower and hubert hutch friday. there was no ideological or partisan divide between gun opens in those days. that changed as the cultural wars of the '70s broke out, and all of a sudden hostility to the second amendment became an ideological card in the hands of many in this country. and it was a democratic member of congress, a man who's still serving from michigan, who came to the nra at that time and said you can teach as many people as you want about gun safety, you can teach as many people as you want about gun handling, you can train as many shooters as you want, you can provide as many shooting instructors as you can train, but unless you defend the second amendment, there aren't going to be any hunters, there

aren't going to be any competitive shooters, because it's going to be gone. and as a result of that, the institute for legislative action was founded in the early 19 70s. because of that the nra got into the role that most people see as key to our efforts today. but in spite of the importance of that, 90% of our funds and our resources and our effort go into the traditional things that the nra has always been involved in. we're intimately involved with the boy scout, the girl scouts, the 4-h, international competitive events and the like. we have 92,000 shooting instructors in this country. one of the things that we're going to do as a result of what asa hutchison and his group suggested is we are going to take seriously onto ourself the development of a best practices set of training for people that will be involved in school

security whether they're police -- and we train a lot of police today -- whether they're school resource officers who are often police that are assigned to schools funded by government at one level or another, whether they're private security people or whether they're school personnel. we're going to develop and provide to the extent that we can the training that these people need to be certified as having the skills mess to protect our children -- skills necessary to protect our children. the nra has always been interested in all of these kinds of things and always will be. we will never, and i say this before a partisan audience, we will never surrender our principles. somebody criticized me because i met with someone during the course of this current argument. i said i'll meet with anybody, i'll talk to anybody, i just won't surrender. because we do need, all of us, if we believe strongly in what we believe in, we need to meet with people, we need to talk to people, we need to try to

convince people and educate people. but the one thing we don't need to do is surrender our principles. and the two things are mutually exclusive. you can meet with those who don't always agree with you, you can talk with those who don't always agree with you, but you don't have to surrender. members of congress don't have to surrender, members of state legislatures don't have to surrender. here's an example of a guy who would never surrender principle to expediency. when i talk to partisan groups, ideological groups, when i talk to gun groups, that's what i tell them. if you're involved because you believe never, ever surrender your beliefs. think about ways to get other people to join you. think about ways to increase your numbers. think about ways to win. that's what a party does, a proper party does. that's what a movement does. that's what people interested in affecting the future of the

country do. you know, i'd like to -- and i'm often accused of going on too long, so i'm not going to do that. but i want to tell a story. i was, we are in a position today -- and i know in this room probably 99% of the people here feel as i do about the second amendment. i was talking to a group of congressmen last summer, and i was asked by one, it was at a breakfast, and he asked me what would you say is the greatest accomplishment of the national rifle association. i said, you know, i can't take credit for this for the nra, and the nra can't take credit, but the spire second amendment community -- entire second amendment community and the sports community can take credit. because we live in an era, and people will talk to you about how american culture is deteriorating on one front and another. but in terms of the second amendment, the american culture has changed over the last few

decades for the better. if you had asked somebody in 1968 after the passage of the gun control act of 1968 under lyndon johnson's administration or two years later under rich around nixon's administration when his attorney general proposed the confiscation of all side arms by the early 908s, if you -- 1980s, if you had suggested then that you and i would have the rights under the second amendment that we have today, people on both sides of the aisle would have laughed at you. we have those rights because we stood up and demanded those rights, because we organized. the congress today is not doing what the president wants it to do on second amendment issues because thousands upon thousands upon thousands of american citizens have been calling and contacting their congressmen and senators saying don't you dare. i talked to a very good friend from a very gun-friendly district, a member of congress who's always been a-rated by the national rifle association. you know what that means.

and he said, you know, and this was some weeks ago, he said in the last three weeks i've had my staff count, i've received 5,000 phone calls from my own constituents, and their general message was we know you're a-rated. we want the know what you're going to do to do and tomorrow. and he said i'm going to do exactly what i did yesterday. at the end of the day, politicians listen to the people that elected them. they listen as long as those people make their or opinions known, and that's our job as people that are involved in the political process. that's our job as people who have a vision of america that we want to see realized. it's to let those who work for us know what it is we expect of them and what it is we want them to do. and if we do that, we'll succeed. but at any rate, i said in answer to this question i said, you know, nobody would have guessed that it would be today. when we faced the last great

challenge on second amendment grounds during the clinton administration, the nra had 1.8 million members. by the time we get to houston, we'll have five million members. when the current battle started, we had four million members. the greatest day of new membership came the day that president obama delivered his statement of the second amendment. 58,000 people called and joined. we didn't put him up to that, i want you to know. [laughter] but the fact of the matter is it's so many americans out there share our values and share our concerns, they're willing to step up. and i said what's happened over the last few decades is more and more americans are involved in the shooting sports. for the first time in three decades, a federal government study of outdoor sports found more hunting licenses were sold by about 8% in this last five-year period than in the recent memory, and a lot of those were to young people. that hadn't happened before. more people are going to the range to shoot than ever before. high school shooting teams tarp

abolished in the 1-9d -- that were abolished in the 1970s and '80s are coming back. we know, because we provide grants for uniforms and firearms and transportation and the like. and so i said there's a big difference between now and then. and that is that today firearms are cool. and people are enjoying the shooting sports as they never have before. they're buying guns not just for self-defense purposes, but to take to the field to hunt, to go to the range to shoot, to have a good time. and different groups are coming in, 10 or 15 years ago could i have go to, could anybody have gone to a gun store and found a pink gun? [laughter] think about that. gun manufacturers don't just get up some, one morning and say i think i'll make a pink gun. they do some market research. and our biggest growth up until this current spurt that's a result of what's taking place now over the last few years has been women who have been taking to the field, taking to

competition, buying firearms for personal protection, getting involved in the shooting sports. i talked to the organizers of a gun show in virginia that do a lot of these east coast gun show, and they keep track of these things, and they said five years ago 8% of the people who attended their shows were women. last year it was 38%. go to an nra annual meeting and see how many women are there. that wasn't the case 20 years ago, 30 years ago. when i finish this presentation, this was during the summer, this young lady came up to me because all the members had their interns at this breakfast. and she said, mr. keene, she said, you know, you are absolutely right. she said i'm going back to school, and she said at my sorority every friday we all go out to the range and shoot. and i looked at her, and i said, you know something? 45 years ago at the university of wisconsin if i'd called up some sorority girl and said, hey, it's friday afternoon, why don't we get our guns and go to the range, i don't think i'd

have gotten that date. [laughter] so the world has changed, and it's changed in some ways for the better. and we're not going to let a group of idealogues financed by a crazy mayor from new york roll back those gains not now, not ever. [applause] i'm here tonight for the same reason you're here tonight, and that is because the folks who you organize for and you all participated in their campaigns and helped knock on doors and provide the funds for tear campaigns believe -- for their campaigns believe as we all do, they believe in these principles. they deserve your support. they deserve all of our support. and if they get that, we are going to be able to pass on to future generations the nation that we inherited from those who came before us. thank you very much. [applause] >> all of us here in the

colorado river basin or watershed, and we're talking about somewhere between 35 and 40 million people now in the united states and mexico as well, they all depend, we all depend on the colorado river as our basic water source. we need it for everything. we need it for municipal use to drink, we need it for our house, we need it for our industry, we need it for mining, and most importantly and the biggest water user out here is still agriculture. we can't grow anything without it. it is considered to be the most litigated river in the world, and that is probably very accurate. more lawsuits, compacts, laws created to regulate what is collectively known as the law of the river. there's probably 13-15 major laws that have spanned the whole 20th century really up until the present time that talks about who gets how much of its water

and who can take it, how much every year, how to share it and our relationship with mexico and the water as well. >> this weekend booktv and american history tv tour the history and literary life of mace saw, arizona -- mesa, arizona, saturday at noon ian on c-span2's booktv and sunday at 5 on american history tv on c-span3. >> where's the predictability in judge bork? what are the assurances that this committee and the senate has as to where you'll be given the background and the history? >> the fact that as a teenager and into my early 20s i was a socialist ardly seems to me to indicate fundamental instability, because as winston churchill i think it was said: any man who's not a socialist before he's 40 has no heart, any man who is a socialist after he's 40 has no head. [laughter] and i think that kind of

evolution is very common in people. >> on those two characters that you saw, one was the einstein of the law, bork, and the other was called the einstein of the senate. you had two trains passing in the night. specter was one of the toughest, hardest senators to lobby on anything, let alone supreme court nominees. he did his homework, he studied. bork, on the other hand, he was smarter than rehnquist in a lot of ways, a brilliant judge and a brilliant -- he taught antitrust law. he wrote the book up at yale. and so here are these two guys meeting, and they were passing like two trains. never did they ever come together on anything. >> more with former deputy assistant to presidents nixon and ford, tom korologos, sunday night at 8 on c-span's "q&a." >> well, u.s. employers added just 88,000 jobs last month, that's the fewest in nine months

and a sharp retreat of after a period of strong hiring. the slowdown is a reminder that the job market's path back to health may be uneven. the labor department reporting the unemployment rate dipped to 7.6% from 7.7%, that is the lowest in four years. the late fell only because more people stopped looking for work. >> we planned to go live to the national history center this morning for an event on u.s. immigration policies there i the years. they're having some technical issues, so we'll record it, and we hope to have it later today on the c-span networks and on c-span.org also. later this morning we will continue with our live coverage of the society of american business editors and writers' conference focusing on issues facing the business community. live coverage of that gets underway at 9:45 eastern here on c-span2. well, federal reserve vice chair janet yellin said yesterday the fed's recent monetary policies

and purchasing assets and lower interest rates have contributed to improvements in the economy. she made her remarks at the society of american business editors and writers' spring conference happening here in washington. [inaudible conversations] >> good afternoon. my name is randy smith, i am the chair in business journalism at the university of missouri and also the past president of sabu in 92 and '93. over the last 40 years of my

career, i can't imagine a worse time as far as covering what happened to the economy in 2007-2008. i was in the industry at that time. i don't think we saw things go any further south as fast as we did at that time. to put some of that in perspective and also to look ahead a little bit, we're very lucky today to have two great guests with us, janet yellin, the vice chair of the board of governors of the federal reserve, and alan sloan who, i think, all of us know is the senior editor at "fortune" magazine and also a seven-time winner of the loeb award. janet has a long and distinguished career which is in your program, but very quickly she was president and ceo of the federal reserve of san francisco beforer current post, chair of the white house council of

economic advisers under president clinton. and she's also been a professor at the university of california at berkeley. i'm going to turn it over here to alan. our time is short, to make a few remarks, and then we'll hear from janet. thank you very much. >> thank you, randy. when you said two distinguished guests, i looked around figuring there had to be someone else up here. [laughter] there is one aspect of janet's bio that is not in there, and ask i'm furious and so, i suspect, is she. [laughter] >> i'll bet. >> it turns out that she and i are both from brooklyn, new york. [laughter] [applause] >> and it turns out -- yes. it turns out we both had speech therapy for accents -- [laughter] and it turns out that these therapists are 0 for 2. [laughter] so since she and i being here is brooklyn's revenge on the world,

i'm hoping that you guys will be very nice to her, because when she gets up here, she's our guest. and if anyone yells and carries on, i'm going to cut you off at the knees, and i'm not going to be myself. i'm going to be polite. [laughter] and so i present to you, dr. janet yellin, proof you can take the woman out of brooklyn, but not brooklyn out of the woman. [applause] >> thank you very much, allan. i've lived for almost 30 years in california, but it really hasn't made a difference. [laughter] well, thank you for inviting me here and for offering me what i can a perfect opportunity to speak on the topic at the heart of the federal reserve's efforts to promote a stronger economy. the vital role in -- and growing use of communication in monetary policy. i know some of you covered the

federal reserve and are familiar with how it sits monetary policy through the federal open market committee. you nona the fomc pays very close anticipation to what it says in the statements to these issues after each meeting. this communication is supplemented by chairman bernanke's postmeeting presence conferences and by providing detailed minutes of the committee's meetings. getting this message out to the public depends a good deal on the work you do in reporting on the fomc, analyzing its statements and actions and explaining its roles and objectives. so i want to begin by thanking you for those contributions. but let me also say why i'm particularly pleased to speak to you today. as writers and editors, all of you are prodigious consumers and producers of communication.

at first glance the fomc's communications may not seem so different from what you've heard other government agencies say about their policies. or businesses what they say about their products. i hope to show, though, how communication plays a distinct and special role in monetary policy. i'd like to offer a comparison that may highlight that difference. suppose instead of monetary policy we were talking about an example of transportation policy , widening a road to ease traffic congestion. whether this road project is announced at a televised press conference or in a low key press release or even if there's no announcement, the project is more or less the same. the benefit to drivers will come of after the road is widened,

and it won't be affected by whether drivers knew about the project years in the advance. at the heart of everything i'll be explaining today is the fact that monetary policy is different. the effects of monetary policy depend critically on the public getting the message about what policy will do months or years in the future. to develop this idea, i'll take you on a tour of past fomc communication, the present and what i foresee for the future. until fairly recently, most central banks actively avoided communicating about monetary policy. month giew norman, who is governor of the bank of england in the early 20th century, reputedly lived by the motto never explain, never excuse the

importance of transparency shaped fomc communication in the years before the financial crisis. next i'll relate have the financial crisis brought unprecedent canned challenges for monetary policy that required the use of unconventional policy tools including some that were barely contemplated before the crisis. communication was the centerpiece of these efforts. finally, i'll look ahead. i'm encouraged by recent signs the economy is improving and healing from the trauma of the crisis, and i expect that at some point the fomc will return to a more normal approach to

monetary policy. at the the conclusion of my remarks, i'll discuss the communications challenges the fomc will face when it comes time to make that transition. fomc communication has long been the topic of great interest to me, and it's one i've worked on more directly since 2010 when chairman bernanke asked me to lead a new fomc subcommittee on communications. ..

>> he's pretty modest in comparison. i mentioned the chairman's quarterly first meeting press conferences which were initiated 10 years ago these events are televised and streamed live most of the communications is decidedly old school. it is the printed word. the committee's most-watched piece of communication is the written statement issued after each of these meetings which are held roughly every six weeks. it may seem quaint by my colleagues and i continue to spend many hours laboring over the few hundred words in this statement. which is extensively analyzed only minutes after greece.

the revolution -- after its release. it isn't about technology or speed. it's a revolution in our understanding of how communication can influence the effectiveness of politics. think it will help if i start the debate. the foc can -- fomc consists of seven members, and five o of the 12 president of the regional federal reserve banks. all 12 presidents participate in the fomc, but only five do they vote. that's what the roche the changes e.g. the fomc's job which is assigned by congress is to use monetary policy to promote maximum employment and stable prices. these objectives together are known as the federal reserves do a mandate.

in normal times the committee pursue these goals by influencing the level of a short-term interest rate called the federal funds rate. that's what banks charge each other for overnight loans. when the fomc pushes the federal funds rate up or down, other short-term interest rates normally move in tandem. medium and longer term interest rates, including auto loan rates and mortgage rates, those generally adjust all so through a mechanism i'll return to in a minute. by pushing the federal funds rate up or down, the transport seeks to influence a wide range of interest rates that matter to households and businesses. typically, the fomc ask to lower the federal funds rate with the intention of reducing interest rates more generally when the economy is weakening, or

inflation is declining below the committees longer run objective. the fomc raises the funds rate when -- rises above its objective, or when economic activity appears likely to rise above sustainable levels. raising and lowering that federal funds rate was long the primary means by which the fomc pursued its economic objectives. now, it's hard to imagine now but only two decades ago the federal reserve and other central banks provided the public with very little information about such monetary policy moves. the spirit of never explaining was very much alive. there are a number of different justifications for that approach. one view was that last disclosure would reduce the risk and tamp down suspicions that

some people could take advantage of disclosures more readily than others. some people believe that markets would overreact to details about monetary policy decisions. and there was a widespread belief that communicating about of the fomc might act in the future could limit the committees discretion to change policy in response to future development. in some, the conventional wisdom among central bankers was that transparency was a very little benefit for monetary policy, and in some cases, could cause problems that would make policy less effective. while communication and transparency steadily increased elsewhere in government and society, change came slowly to the fomc. actually, it wasn't of februar february 1994 that the committee

issued a post meeting statement disclosing that there'd been a change in monetary policy. even then it only alerted the public that the committee had changed its policy stance, and it offered scant explanation. something big was changing though, and it would soon be the force driving major enhancements in the fomc's communication. by the early 1990s, a growing body of research challenged widespread assumptions about how central banks, such as the federal reserve, affected the economy. that we evaluation starts with a question that puzzles many of my students when i was a professor. how is it that the federal reserve manages to move a vast economy just by raising or lowering the interest rate on overnight loans by a quarter of

a percentage point? the question arises because significant spending decisions, expanding a business, buying a house, or choosing how much to spend on consumer goods over a year, those decisions depend on expectations of income, employment, and other economic conditions over the longer-term, as well as longer-term interest rates. the crucial insight of that research was that what happens to the federal funds rate today, or over the six weeks until the next fomc meeting is relatively unimportant. what is important is the public's expectation of how the fomc will use the federal funds rate to influence economic conditions over the next few years. for this reason, the federal reserve's ability to influence

economic conditions today depends critically on its ability to shape expectations of the future, specifically by helping the public understand how it intends to conduct policy over time, and what the likely implications of those actions will be for economic conditions. to return to the example i used earlier, contrast this effect on expectations with that of a road project. today's commute, alas, will not be improved or changed at all the news that a road will be widened one day. but the effects of today's monetary policy actions are largely due to the fact that they have on expectations about how policy will be set over the medium term. let me further illustrate this with some history.

starting in the mid 1960s, the federal reserve didn't act forcefully in the face of rising inflation, and the public grew less certain of the central bank's commitment to fighting inflation. this uncertainty led expectations of future inflation to become an anchored and more likely to react to economic development. in 1973, an oil price shock led to a large increase in overall inflation. expectations of higher inflation in the future affected the public's behavior. workers demanded raises, and businesses set prices and otherwise acted in anticipation of higher costs, and all that helped fuel actual inflation. the fomc's occasional efforts to reduce inflation in the 1970s

were ineffectively -- ineffective partly due to the expectation that ultimately it just wouldn't do enough. by contrast, most of you probably know about the federal reserves successful inflation fighting in the early 1980s. the fomc raised the federal funds rate very high, causing a deep recession but also convincing the public that it was committed to low and stable inflation. anchoring inflation expectations at low levels help ensure that jumps in commodity prices or other supply shocks would not generate persistent inflation problems. this was eligible i the effect of an other escalation in oil price that start in 2005. unlike the 1970s, these price shocks did not result in a broad

lasting increase in overall inflation. that's because the public believes the federal reserve would keep inflation in check. the fomc was forced to raise interest rates that soften the blow of higher fuel costs on households and businesses, and it wasn't necessary to do so because of the credibility the federal reserve had built since the 1980s your it's the public expectations have always been important, you might wonder how monetary policy had any effect prior to the transparency revolution. as it turns out, with the notable exception of the late 1960s and '70s, the wednesday -- the fomc usually respond to any systematic way to economic conditions. in 1993, the economist john

taylor documented that fomc policy changes since the mid '80s had fairly reliably followed a simple rule based on installation and output. changes in the federal funds rate were usually made in several small steps over a number of months. in practice, the federal reserve's approach was never explained, but behave predictably. a close analysis of the fomc's past behavior was a good guide to future policy, that it had to shortcomings as a substitute for transparency. first, he gave an advantage to sophisticated players who studied the fomc's behavior. something that's arguably inappropriate for a government institution.

and second, while a policy rule such as the one developed by john taylor explained the course of the federal funds rate much of the time there were cases when it didn't come and even when the experts failed to correctly anticipate the fomc's actions. the trend toward greater transparency accelerated during the early 2000s. starting in 2000, the fomc issued information after every meeting about its economic outlook. it also provided an assessment of the balance of risks to the economy and whether it was leaning toward increasing or decreasing the federal funds rate in the future. such information about intentions and expectations for the future, which is known as forward guidance, became crucial