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tv   Book TV  CSPAN  April 27, 2013 12:00pm-1:31pm EDT

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>> now, rashid khalidi argues the united states is far from being an impartial broker in negotiations between the israelis and palestinians. this program is just under 90 minutes. >> you all heard that crack by winston churchill that governments usually do the right thing after trying everything else. i have much less faith in that
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than i did when i first heard it, having work for many years on the issue of middle east peace, and especially israeli israeli-palestinian peace. but in any case we're delighted to join with our other cosponsors, the institute of palestine studies, the georgetown school of contemporary arab studies, and the middle east policy council, and joyce, who edits the excellent middle east quarterly, is here with us today. thanks to all of you for supporting this, and also for coming, and to hear a commentary by rashid about his new book, which is a superb and disheartening analysis, heavily
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documented, called, "borners o deceit." a stunning analysis of this terrible conflict over the last 35 years. and how the united states has been a party not just an observer or a would-be helping hand, to the failure to do what must be done if the palestinians and the israelis and the americans are to protect their funnelmental -- fundamental interests. most of you professor rashid khalidi. the preeminent american historian of the middle east, especially of the written variousian conflict.
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ground-breaking books. maybe the most important is other become called "palestinian identity." others are "the iron cage" which dilemmbes the palestinian the book called "sowing crisis" and another one "resurrecting empire." they are readable and scrupulously documented, and you'll learn a lot from all of these books. his work, the work of the institute of palestine studies, has done lot, i think, over the years to at least begin to reshape the american approach or the american vision of the
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arab-israeli and israeli-palestinian conflict. from a almost universally accepted but deeply uninformed and distorted version, to a new willingness and desire to question, to search, and look for a better american approach so our country can use it vast power and resources and its extraordinary research, extraordinary relationship with the state of israel, more effectively. dr. khalidi has served as adviser to the palestinian authorities delegation. it was not then the palestinian authority but it was the plo delegation, although not described as such during the
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ocess, whi ledo the madrid process. he has a ba from yale, ph.d from oxford, he has taught at university beirut, lebanon university, georgetown, columbia, then he went to chicago for eight years as the director of the center for middle east studies. and then he returned to columbia, where he is now the edward said chair for modern arab studies, and he will speak for half an hour, 45 minutes, and then there will be time for questions. so, again, thank you, rashid, for joining us. welcome, and thank you to all of you for coming. [applause]
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>> well, thank you all for co thank you for the generous introductions. it's always a pleasure to be in our nation's capitol in springtime, especially because april 15th is coming up. it's good to see where all the money is going just before you send in your income tax return, which i have not yet finished. i talk about the book and i'm going to only touch on a few highlights. i hope you all have some questions at the end. in preparation for the madrid peace conference in october, 1991, the united states sent letter of assurances to all of the parties that attended this conference. she letter to the palestinian wa'ted decy to the pla, it was just to the palestinians -- promised the u.s. would oppose actions that were prejudicial or precedential to negotiations, live israeli settlement
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expansion. this as with several other promises in the letter of assurances, was never kept. the letter also promised, and i quote, that the united states will act as a honesroke similarly, during israeli-palestinian negotiations in 2008, 17 years later, u.s. secretary of state, dr. condoleezza rice told the palestine yandle gage she wanted to meet with. the privately -- i'm quoting phloem palestinian documents leekdz by the -- she said i want to meet with you so i can tell you what i think'm of your positions without hurting my role as the honest broker. the letter of assurances sent by secretary baker to the palestinians in 1991, and secretary rice's comments in 2008, reiterate a central myth about the palestinian-israeli
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conflict that the united states serves as an honest broker between the two sides. in this book, "broker of deceit." i argue the united states has act net a thoroughly un-sided fashion regarding the palestine issue. in consequence, it hasn't just operated neutrally. it hasn't just presided over a process. it has exacerbated and prolonged a conflict which, according to yet another of these many myths, is one between near equals. you have the palestinians and the israelis. they just have to be brought to the table. and according to yet another myth, if one party in this conflict is a victim, it's the israelis who suffer the most. you can see this in most speeches by most american poll texass. -- politicians, the suffering of israelis is lovingly detailed. they're the victim. in fact the issue is almost entirely on the other foot. this is a conflict not between two equals but between a
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powerful, dominant, iaelisr st 64 years old this year, supported -- i know how old israel is because i was born in the same year. it's easy for me to remember that -- and this israeli state is supported. and has been supported consistently by the united states, and it is in conflict, not with an equal, not with another state, but with a divided, opressed palestinian people who either live under occupation and have for 46 years in june, or lived disbursed in compile from their homeland and have since '48 or '67. i begin the book with an engraph from george orwell, and i'm going to argue today that language has had great importance in the construction of these and other myths. george orwell float a brilliant essay in 1946, quote: the shove
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slovenliness of our language makeses easier for us to have foolish thoughts. if thoughts corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought. the framing of this conflict in terms of these myths and in particular using terms like, honest broker, or peace process, has masked in my view, a bitter reality, which is one of american complicity in the continued dominance of the israeli state over the palestinians. for decades, this process has made the prospect of a just settlement of the conflict between isel and -- not just the palestinians, all the arabs -- far less likely. the distortion of language i'm arguing makes it critical -- crucial contribution to this process by, as orwell would have it, corrupting thought, and thereby cloaking the real nature of the outcomes. this veil of dishonest language can seals among many other
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things how closely the policy of the united states towards the palestine question has been entwined with that of israel. and it has been more closely entwined. the high degree of complicity between our countrynd israel on this issue was in fact grounded in a secretle 1975 letter sent by president ford to prime minister rabin, where the united states agreed to coordinate with israel and refraining to put fourth proposals that israel would consider unsatisfactory. uponner to those words. the united states is committed -- with te palestinpalestineans are concerned -- to refrain from putting forward proposals israel would consider unsfactory. logically this complicity in trying from a letter to the u.s. to an israeli prime minister and
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which the israeli prime ministers have never ceased to remind american presidents they have to beeld that -- this sh ld hsqualifiedhe unitedtates from playing the role of immediate area between the two antagonists. needless to say it did not. i'm often asked when i'm making this argument, didn't the united states play the role of hospital broker in other conflicts? of course it did. the united states did help to resolve other aspects of the arab-israeli conflict. notably by the sinai and golan disengagement agreements, the camp david accords, and of course the peace treaty in 199. thissings an important caveat. these were efforts primarily -- they achieved peace, needless to say. but these were efforts primarily directed at diffusing potential superpower conflict and at
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stabbing american ascendancy in the middle east. some people in this room served in our government and know this maybe better than i do, but the documents are able. we know what drove president nixon and president ford and secretary kissinger and president carter. these are things they were thinking of when they understood hour important peace would be in service of these vital objectives, u.s. diplomacy was forceful and effective. by way of. contrast, -- that's 35 years ago, camp david. by way of contrast there is no peace between israel yes and palestinians, in spite of 35 years of few tile american initiatives -- futile american initiatives, under what i call an orwellian rubric of a peace process. in this book, i argue that the
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reasons for these failures are illuminated by what call three moments of clarity in the histor of american policy on the palestine question. the first of these moments of clarity came in the late summer of 1982, when it appeared as if there might be an opportunity to implement the palestinian autonomy provisions of the 19789 camp david accord. they had an egypt-israel provision and a palestinian autonomy provision. they were still part of the accord because israeli prime minister begin insisted on denying palestinian -- and insisted on control of water and insisted on a continuation of israeli settlement expansion. he was not ready to accept any form of recall awe toni as anyone would lodgely define the word autonomy. another example of ore orwellian
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double speak in 1982 the reagan administration perceived the occasion to revise the according following a cease fire that halted the israeli invasion of lebanon which produced a number nobody ever mentions 50, thousand palestinian and lebanese casualties. washington viewed this dramatic change in cold war terms as a great victory for the united states and as the appropriate occasion f the release of a peace plan that president reagan announced on september 1, 1982, the so-called reagan plan. particularly revealing in this context, i found, was a recently declassified confidential cia memo, redacted. i can tell you who i think wrote it. which predict that begin would react to any u.s. attempt to refrain the aton my accord by
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absolutely refusing to budge from his own narrow interpretation of these accords. the cia memo stated nat begin's view, the accords -- i'm quoting the unnamed cia analyst -- guaranteed that under no condition can a palestinian state be created. in practice, i'm still quoting the memo -- in practice, begin rules out any exercise of 'palestinian self-determination except one that continued israels where preeminent nation the west bank, and obviously a palestinian self-determination in the situation where israel is preeminent in the west bank is not self-determination. another example of begin's use of orwellian language. i found this highly revealing. i found i was reading not just the -- reality. what begin said or what this analyst described as begins
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progression was -- i thought that was revealing but equalry revealing is the fact that subsequently president reagan was completely unable to hold firm to the positions he had publicly enunciated on september 1st in the tase of begin's outraged response. this was not the first time that american policymakers were to acquiesce in the israeli position on palestine palestine nor was it the last in deed in the negotiation office the camp david accords in 1978, president carter had capitulated in a similar fashion to begin's intransgenerals over palestinian autonomy, happening at the same time the united states was putting pressure on leaders to peace with egypt. we have documents. we can see the kind of pressure
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that secretary kissinger -- the second set of events the book examines occurred during the negotiations that started in madrid and continues here in washington over, in the state department, following the mad peace conference in october 1991. as we all know these talks were superseded by the secret oslo accords negotiated betweenly between the plo and israel. the confidential palestinian documents produced in madrid and washington to which i had access as an advisor to the palestine yandle gage, and which incidentally are available for anybody to look at on the institute for palestinian studies web site, all 15 document is quote in the book are available. you can just go on the web site and have a look at them. these documents expose the high degree of discretecourt nation
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between the united states and israel. they expose the timidity of the u.s. diplomats involved in not being willing to go beyond what they mistakenly believed were israeli red lines. and this is one of the most striking thingness my experience ex-and very visible in the documents. this reached a point that in a so-called bridging proposal in may 1993, the united states produced a document that was less forthcoming than had been the last israeli position communicated to the palestinians. in other words, the american madors were more israeli than the israelis themselves. what use is such a mediator one might ask ones self. i wasn't surprised to find the palestinian documents leaked from later negotiations under president bush show a similar case of american mediators being more israeli than the israelis themselves. in other words putting forthpositions that are less
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forthcoming then israeli positions. another striking feature was the remarkable continuity in the restrictive israeli position on palestinian aonomy. in essence, i argue in this book, this position has remained unchanged in its core features from the days of begin to those of rabin, in spite of refusing to negotiate direct live with the plo, saying there isn't such a thing at the palestinian people. these were all major shifts for rabin, but he did not shift on the core issue. and i would argue that until this day, the core positions of all subsequent israeli governments have not really changed in opposing genuine palestinian independence. not a palestinian sta which doesn't have control of its borders. not a so-called state which doesn't have full sovereignty, air space, what we know is
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sovereignty. these things, genuine independence, genuine self-determination, a genuine toned israel's effective control and colonization of the west bank, and east jerusalem, and no israeli government has fully accepted. the document is cite reveal the -- not just that this is the israeli position but there's been continuity in, more or less clear, i would argue. they show the acquiescence of american policymakers in the israeli positions oseveral decades, willingly or unwillingly. that's the second moment i examine. the third emerged during the last two years of president obama's first term. over this period the president, as we all remember, vividly, i'm sure, faced relentless pressure from israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu, acting in concert with the run republic leadership in congress, and with the potent congressional lobby for israel. this 'pressure forced the president into humiliating retreats from positions on a settlement freeze, on the
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potential borders of a palestinian state and the urge for such a state he staked out in his first two years in office. as anybody who has followed this conflict knose were positions that had previously been taken by a succession of u.s. presidents. but this president was obliged to abandon them. it was not palestine on which he had focused almost entirely during his first two years in office but the question of iran's nuclear program. netanyahu's preferred subject, which is predominated in exchanges between the two governments ever since. obama's climbed down this is complete and i would argue that is seen in the bulk of his speech recently in jerusalem. these three moments of clarity provide a clear sense of american policies which are thoroughly obfuscated in most of the writing on this subject. here again, corrupt and deceitful language played a crucial role. for decades the eposes sently repeated mantra about a peace process has served to obscure reality, and this is the reality
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that whatever process the united states was championing, it was not i fact capable of or perhaps even directed at achieving a just and lasting peace between palestinians and israeli, i argue, most people in the world argue, almost everybody outside the beltway and some quarters in israel argue, that a just peace would -- that would bring this conflict to a final conclusion on a fair basis, would have looked very different than the ends the united states pursued for decades. such a peace would involve a complete and immediate dismantling of the 46-year-old israeli military occupation and all of its -- and of the colonization enterprise in the west bank and east jerusalem, would involve natural self-determination for the palestinian people, which is an inillennable right, nothing depep don't you have to do this or that first. it's a right. and it would involve -- this would have to take place within
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equitable borders, not some kind of jerry maundered first congressional district in south carolina that goes up and don and around. finally, i nothing against south carolina, but -- new york is very compact. another congressat district, and a just resolution for the majority of palestinians who are refief jews or descendents of refugees. instead of trying to asheave cheese goals the process undertaken by the united states in mill view, was primarily aimed -- this comes through very clearly and my 0 own experience and the document of before and after -- was primarily aimed at pressuring the weaker palestinians into conforming to the stronger israeli side. i think israel's aims were set -- were those set out by begin in service of his ideal of a greater land of israel, to maintain permanent effective
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control some of the west bank and to prevent the palestinianss from achieving genuine complete self-determination and fully independent statehood. in the been oslo accords the palestinian leadership made a terrible mistake in accepting a deal that was in its main outlines was that set down by begin in camp david. bays include the palestinians in 1993 signed what we have now from the israel state archives begin's notes. he was trying to do, as the cia analyst described, it was what down in oslo in my view, and this is a terrible mistake from the palestinian perfect. so those are the major objectives of the united states. not peace. but forcing the palestinians to accept something the israelis want them to accept. another objective was to avoid lasting differences. on this issue, with americas inflexible israeli allies. american diplomats are perfect live willing to go up against israel on other issues.
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they do it and effectively but not on this issue. this book shows, i try and show, other books have shown as well, the core dynamics that work in american policymaking on palestine in particular, are ones in which domestic political calculations have been paramount and they have in fact been remarkably stable since the truman administration. in the introduction i go back to truman and i show why and how that has been the case. what this country has done for decades on palestine was, at best, conflict management. in fact i think it amounted to conflict perpetuation. it was not in effect an toast bring bat or that was capable of bringing about a sustainable and lasting palestinian-israeli peace. and i argue in the book that by contrast, where vital urgent strategic interests were seen in washington to be in play, these domestic political factors that are so important on palestine, and the reluctance to confronted
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israel and its american allies, were much less salient. in fact they were not major considerations. during the colored war, the united states repeatedly, overruled israeli preferences in order toed a chief advantage over the soviet union, again and again and again. the united states did this in order to produce the three disengagement agreements, did this to produce the egyptian israeli part of the camp david accords in 1978 and to produce the peace treaty in 199. i had not read some of these documents and it was a revelation to see how much arm-twisting american presidents and secretaries of state were perfectly willing to do where major vital strategic advantage was at stake in the cold war, the biggest game in up to. -- in town. policymakers were able to shake off the protests of the -- you should read some of these thingses about what she regarded as doing to israel.
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and that went off their back like water off the back of a duck. the american presidents and secretaries secretaries of state who were subjected to thiof abuse. they did this because of the vast strack strategic advantage to the united states in the colored war equation which is represented by winning israel from the soviet union. and where strategic issues are at play with arms deals with saudi arabia u.s. administrations have been willing to override the strong opposition of israel and the american supporters. given the short-sighted belief in this town, in particular, that no major american strategic interests are involved, u.s. policy has been made almost exclusively witch an eye who those, in president trumans words are anxious to zionism. said i have lots of constituents who are action for the success
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of zionism and that's what american policymakers have look at. meanwhile, this may seem like a diversion but you'll see it's not. meanwhile, what about the arab countries? talked about the united states, israel, the palestinians. what about the arabs? my view, the arab states, the arab regimes, can be compared to sherlock holmes dog that did not bark. in fact, the pillar of american policy in the arab world since set 33, since the oil deal, which created aramco, saudi arabia, has played a highly equivocal role as have most of the air -- arab country. while the kingdom and countries have paid lip service to the palestinian cause in public in private, the diplomatic record shows that saudi diplomacy has taken quite a different tact. for example, in 1945, after meeting with the saudi monarchs
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aboard an american warship, president roosevelt wrote him in letter in which he promised the united states would do nothing that would harm arab interests in palestine and would consult with the arabs before it did anything. the united states has betrayed this promises systematically in the decades ever since and this has brought no significant reaction from saudi arabia or other arab countries. truman and his successors could ignore president roosevelts pledges in 1945 without fear of losing the considerable strategic and economic advantages provide evidence by the american-saudi relationship. saudi's dissatisfaction over the truman administration's hostile policy over palestine was so muted that secretary of state george marshal in 1948 wrote to thank the saudi king for his, quote, conciliatory manner regarding palestine. it is clear that ties with washington are far more important to most arab countries
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then they're proclaimed attachment to the palestine cause, and i think it has to be understood that given this reality, given this unwillingness of most arab governments to push on this issue, the united states' alliances with israel and arab countries like saudi arabia or egypt, are not contradictory in any way. they can be seen as complimentary. this is thanks to the extraordinary come comeplace sense of a ran countries towards the united states' unflagging support of israel. the united states has always been able to align itself firmly with basic israeli -- what sustains this unequal equation? we all know that for decades this country's interests have determined washington's support for -- in particular the ruling families in the gulf.
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these monarchies were in pressing need of american support, given the inability of their countries to defend themselves against external enemies and with the exception of kuwait, all of these monarchies lack legitimacy. in consequence, even episodes of the economic upheaval including the arab oil embar go of 1973 did not change the equation. henry kissinger says, the rhetoric of saudi diplomats on behalf of the arab cause was impeccable and occasionally intransigent but behind the scene almost always helpful to american diplomacy. this is a basic pattern. i think it explains why it is not only the israel lobbiests that drives u.s. middle east policy; rather, since there is no contradiction between the american strategic interests involved in alignment with these arab oil-producing awe
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tookcraciescracy awe tooks, the support for israel is relatively small, and you know who in the cities thinks in at the long term. the next election is a long term consideration. >> we -- whatever the government pretends to themselves about how the united states is even-handed, people in the arab world know this is not. however, as we also know, most arab states have traditionally not been democracy and many of their rulers are heavily dependent on american favor. as a result washington could safely ignore anymores of these countries. so when general petraeus or sect gates would say this issue harms us, its possible -- yes, we have these pliable, weak, dependent
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governments, we can push them around and do as we please. it follows, however, that if -- this is an enormously big if -- if fundamental and lasting dedemocracyization take place, as it has in other countries, it begins to happen in the arab world, and i'm saying fundamental and lasting democracy. a day of reckoning could come for the united states policy. we don't know if it will happen. we can seal the precarious situations in yemen and few nyeshia and sarah and bahrain. it's clear that there have been almost no impacts on most of the oil awe tomcracy -- autocracies of the arab gulf. if the policies of the arab states reflect the strongly pro
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palestinian reviews, -- i'm arguing in this book that a distorted set of american priorities, largely directed at catering to the demands of israel and its vocal american supporters, rather than doing anything to actually resolve the conflict over palestine, has helped to produce a broad range of intractable outcomes in palestine. it's not just isn't bystander stuff. we are involved. one of this outcomes has been the increased, 1990, of the israeli settler population from somewhere around 200,000 to somewhere near 600,000. prime minister netanyahu speaking to aipac in 2011 since 650,000. i think that's a little bit exaggerated. it's in the hive 500,000s. settlers are one in ten of jewish israelis; these and other
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facts on the ground were explicitly intended by israeli planners to make impossible the option of a two-state solution. i'm amused when people talk about settle. locks those of were but there by'em whose intention was to achieve prime minister begin's vision. theyjust sprout like mushrooms. they were planned by strategic planners, like sharon, people who knew what they were doing. they intended to make a two-state solution impossible. these settlements and the rigid matrix of control they necessary tate over the four million people of the occupied territories now in my view, constitute obstacles to the prospect of a two-state solution. this outcome has not just been made possible by american inaction. this country has been actively involved in crafting this outcome. as policymakers and politicians
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have willfully ignored the role in producing this outcome of three billion dollars in annual military aid to israel, $115 billion over the lifetime of israel. most since 1970. hundreds of millions of tax-free dollars that flow actually to the settlements, money we have to pay in taxes the donors don't have to pay, and assiduous diplomatic protection for these violations. you have to take it to them table and negotiate with the successes that tell we're we, the -- these policies howl the policy grievously harms the us policy are screened from the u.s. public. we are bombarded instead with dishonest and debased rhetoric about what is described as
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progress in a so-called peace process. which ostensibly consists of negotiations between near equals under the impartial gaze of an honest american broker. all of this supposedly intended to create an independent palestinian state. i am arguing this is not what is actually happening. this is not what has happened for 35 years. what has happened is the continuation and the intensity and the colonization of the palestinian people and their homeland. united states in fact has never really operated as an honest broker between the palestinians and israel. i've never talked to an american diplomat, especially a former american diplomat, who thought it did. one of them, away david miller, who is one of the people we dealt with and has been involved for difficult candidate, described the united states as acting as israel's lawyer. he was in fact quoting henry kissinger, who should know. the documentary record i cite in
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this book shows that american diplomats time and again took positions as a result of careful prior coordination with the israeli side. how you get to a solution in that situation is hard for know understand. as i've said, sometimes these positions were more proisraeli than those of israeli diplomats. thes. from okay. david onwards the united states posed as an unbiased intermediary but generally operated in israelis interests and to desystemic detriment of the palestinians and in my view, systemic detriments to the possibility of just and lasting peace in the region. in, let me say that a number of broad patterns contributed to this skewed american poise. palestinian weakness i have not talked about. i wrote a whole book about that. the iron cage. i you're interested in my
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critiques how badly the palestinians have performed. the other reasons were these. there was no real pressure on the united states in particular from the oil-rich arab gulf states or the arab world as a role. the arab world has played a negative role. there was exaggerated attention by american possession simakers to domestically driven political concern as ably articulated by the israeli lobby. another element i talk about ills the deto which the israeli narrative has been adopt by the americans as the real narrative. in spite of occasional simple this tick and undoubtedly send sear noises from presidential leaders, sub as president carter, secretary of state baker, or president obama, at the end of the day american policy has had little or know real concern for the national or human right of the palestinians. very little concern for the
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palestinians. this meant that while israeli governments usual live got what they wanted well will have noticed a peaceful resolution was not the result. indeed i organize we're much further away from such a result than when we naively walked into the state department here in the fall of 1991, to negotiate. in consequence, i argue in this book, long-standing american policy on palestine has not served the long-term u.s. national interest, insofar as as the into we be served bay just and lasting resolution of the conflict 0, policy as disserved our national policy, i am remained my father worked in the political security council affairs in the unite nations and he told me before he passed, more than half of the work hoff the security council relates reo the middle east and most of that is palestine-israel, israeli-arab. stability is affected by many
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thingness the conflict but it's an enormous part of international conflict, and our policy has not served the resolution of this problem. finally, it has not served the palestinian people. those are the realities it. it has taken a great deal of what george orwell called corrupt language to conceal these realities. thank you very much. [applause] >> i went on much longer -- >> no. thank you rashid for a great and challenging and -- depressing? >> analysis. plenty of time for questions. would you identify yourself, please, and your work. >> there's a microphone coming. >> yes, aberdeen local business man here in washington.
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i think i read somewhere said said the biggest front should be here in washington on capitol hill. what can be done by people because -- to change capitol hill policies. >> should we take a couple questions questions and i'll answer them serially. >> thank you, my anytime is said from the -- you articulated clearly the situation for the palestinians, their leadership is weak, the arabs are weak, the united states us duplicitous. what should the palestinians do in terms of step one, step two, step three to liberate themself themselves from the shadow of -- >> let's take one more. >> this gentleman with his hand
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up in the line. the mic is coming sir. >> i am here -- what do you see the road ahead? the see see anywhere -- scenario you describe is leading to a greater israel, and unless the 21st century accepts the west bank, it may turn out to be greater palestine ultimately. that is one scenario. what scenario do you see? thank you. >> let me start with the last question. what do i see? what i see starts from what i think we have today. nobody would describe it this way but we have juan-state solution. one state between the river and the sea. it's not the state that anybody wants maybe but it's what we've
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got. there's one sovereignty, which has absolute, complete control over every aspect of security and that's the key aspect of attribute of sovereignty. how you get from this state to another state is the thing people ooh be trying to look into,s' people talking about the two-state solution have to talk about enormous on stack tells to checking realities and changing a dynamic. there's a dynamic that has nothing to do with the fact that most people in the united states favor two-state, most people in israel favor two-state solution they don't control the ministry of housing or the ministry of defense in israel. they don't control the al location of money to the settlements. the bulldozer and cement mixers and funnel of money going to the settlements, hundreds of millions of dollars from this country has to be stopped and that process reversed if anybody is going to talk seriously about a two-state solution. one-state solution is change this thoroughly run-state setup today, where you have one silt of citizens with few rates,
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israelis, another set of citizens of the state of israel, the 20% of israelis who are not yous who have severely restricted rights. most of the land in israelis state-owned. arabs can't buy it, sell it, lease it, rent it. what kind of citizen are you if you can not have access to most of the land in your country? it's reserved for the jewish people. this is an example of the restricted rights of 20% of the citizens of the state of israel. one tiny example. and then below them descend circles of heal, some rights no rights and completely deprived of anything. i would argue in answer to your question, where are we going with this? this is an unsustainable one-state solution. it's unsustainable not because you can't make apartheid work. you can call it what you want. that's the reality. the gradation of rights for
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arabs inside the territory of israel and the occupied territory. it is this state and this status quo is -- the rest of the world ejects it. enough european governments are let is continue. when if becomes clear that this is unsustainable there might be a problem for the status quo, down know. i'm a historian, i can't tell you where we're going. whoa what should the palestinian does? the first thing the palestinians have to do as the weaker party, is to recognize they're the weaker party and they can ill afford division. this is a destructive, irresponsible, unacceptable situation for the palestinians, and any leadership that is responsible for it, which i think both of them are -- has done a terrible disservice to their people, and deserve to be
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hardly judged for that. the this is a crime against the palestinians by the palestinians and nobody else can be blamed the second thing that has to be done this palestinianss have to decide on a strategy. how do wet gut of this situation in i'm not going to prescribe a strategy. i'm just an individual, an american, one guy on a lecture podium. but you cannot achieve liberation if you don't have a clear strategy and if you don't have tactics adopted to to that extra. i would suggest that while certainly international law says that people under occupation, which the palestinians and the occupied territories -- have a right too resist they should be very naval thinking about what ways they resist. they're not resisting a colonial occupation a la the french occupation in algeria, where they could end up winning over the metro.
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you're dealing with a society which sees itself as a victim, profoundly, deeply, general winly. i argue against that whole perception in the book in the introduction but that's not the point. the point is not what i think that israel is not a victim, it's what the israelis thick and if they think they're a victim a lot of forms of violence reinforce exactly the wrong tendencies so in order to be effective have to be moral and legal and not violate international lieu law and not kill civilians, and that's a hard argument to have with people who are suffering as much as the palestinians are, but they have a choice. they can continue to be ineffective and emotional or be restrained, disciplined and effective, and the first thing -- one of the few marginally positive efforts in the whole of modern palestinian history. people should look at that and then think about the second anti
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catastrophe. before you do capitol hill you have to do grassroots. i have no option to spending anytime washington. i come here all the time. not my favorite city but i come here all the time. not capitol hill. i recognize the importance of talking here, and that's why i'm doing this, for god's sake. but it's not just an audience of 100 something people in seiu who have to be reached. it's the grassroots the politicians who are being pushed in the other direction and that has begun in academia, campuses, churches, and unions, and a bunch of places where the discourse has changed in many respect but has not yet percolated up to the political level where we live in an unreality zone. unfarm. and before you can get that i think you have top get to the
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grassroots. >> lady in the second row? >> wait for the microphone. >> i'm glad you mentioned hack -- academia. now that i've been here two years, i'm worried that on campuses they're not changing so much. there's a lot more interest in the arab world but there's less willingness, at least from my vantage point or what i hear or see to reflect on american foreign policy. what do we do about that? >> yeah. okay. >> gentleman in the second row. >> from jaffa. i'm away from my country 65 years. i have just a little question. >> make it one. >> i can't make it -- just a small one.
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the united states gave sadat $76 million. gave israel 36 billion last year. our people in the gaza. -- before president obama went to the middle east, he sent the message to netanyahu, ask him, tell me the date which you are going to withdraw from the west bank, but he ignored that. when he went there, he said, i want to make two states. one jew, one palestinian. but he came back again -- >> do you have a question? >> yes. then the united states also to withdraw from the occupied land but they ignore that also. how can we police this state to take our --
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>> the lady in the back. >> thank you, doctor. i'm an iranian american journalist, you spoke about different players in this -- on this issue. what about the role of iran? do you see the role of iran as positive or negative or -- and do you think that netanyahu's insistence and israeli -- there's a constant talk about attacking iran or the nuclear issue. is that a way to evade from the real issue, which is the israeli-palestinian issue? >> uh-huh. yeah. let me answer them in reverse order, starting with your
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question. iran is a major actor in the middle east. it's a large country. it's something that sooner or later we have to come to terms with. doesn't have to agree with everything iran does but this is a big, important country and has some legitimate interests and sooner or later we have to come into recognize that, while not necessarily agreeing with what they do. i think that there has been an enormous inflation of the so-called iranian threat. i thing some of this has been conscious, wilful and deceitful on the part of both some people in this country and some people in israel. and some of it is a result of real legitimate concern, because of iran's capabilities of power projection, which are not inconsiderable. i think that on the nuclear issue a lot of it is smoke, and i frankly think it's worth going back and reading everything
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netanyahu if said about the iran yap danger and how soon it would become acute. go back 15 years ago, 20 years ago, before he was first prime ministership and read the stuff he say about iran. if you believed him then, he was wrong. he has been wrong for decades on this issue, and that's -- that provides us with a lesson about how one should take this kind of alarmism, frankly. i am deeply comforted by the fact that our security establishment, our intelligence community, our military, our diplomats, as well as the bulk of the israeli security community, are completely in disagreement with these alarmist views. they don't think that iran constitutes the threat that some of the american and israeli politicians say it does, and they understand the complete and utter suicideal folly of going to war with iran. fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately, we have been ungauged in two major milled eastern washingtons, cup which
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ills now a peripheral war, afghanistan, on the periphery of the middle east, and the american public in its enormous wisdom, as early as 2004, just around the time of the elections turned against one of those, iraq, and the american public turned against this one, too. nothing right or wrong i'm saying americans don't want these wars. they don't warrant a war with iran. and i think that, therefore, the likelihood of it is probably pretty small, and i think that's a good thing. 0 on the other hand you have a problem of potential nuclear proliferation. how that is to be dealt with i do not know but it has to be seen as a regional problem, because the extent to which iran moves closer to getting nuclear capability to that extent will the middle east become an uncontrolled region of nuclear proliferation and that would no about a good thing. it's already happened the indian -pakistani conflict. i have two more questions to answer. as far as the question from the
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gentleman from jaffa, my grandfather retired in jaffa and my dad lived much of his early life there the question how you punish israel is not the question in this country. it's a question that in many part thefts world you can ask. you can't ask in this country people think israel is the victim but you have to make people understand what the real situation is. see the way in which international law and un resolutions are almost single of one sidedly opposed to actions that israel has taken, including resolutions our government has voted for, and see how you change the political reality in this country so some of these things can be implement and that's a hard thing to do. i've been -- since i was a college student in new haven in the 60s i can attest to how difficult it is to change opinions in this country, and the question about academia
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changing and reflect only foreign policy. there are two answers. the first is that, for a lot of students, i think that they're very mature in their reflection on u.s. foreign policy. ones i encounty -- encounter in my courses, when i give lectures all over the country, are very aware of some of the flaws of our foreign policy, or at least their open to thinking about our foreign policy. fine that's a lot less true in policy schools, and i think this is the capitol of that unreality, frankly. the people who may be attracted to universities in the d.c. area are people who want to work within the beltway and have to adapt themselves to some extent, to views which are not entirely in my view in accord with reality. variety of things. but the middle east is at the top of that unreality list.
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so that may be the reason. i don't know. i actually find that american academia has changed on some of these issues for the better. [inaudible] >> my name is bruce and i was the diplomatic correspondent for "newsweek" in the whole beginning of this and for "time magazine" after this. >> i remember power byline. >> that was a brilliant presentation. and you happen to agree with me all the time. but aside from that i have 42 questions which i've reduced to one tactical question. what did you think of obama's pressuring abbas to drop the precondition on settlements when he was there?
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abbas has -- the palestinians have nothing else to negotiate, and he takes that away. >> gotcha. >> thank you. aim from maryland. assign full membership in the united nations and america's role in it so far. ...
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>> i don't know what's going to happen. i have no pipeline for this administration, do not now, never have. i don't know what they are thinking. my reading of the open sources that you have access to is that the president is up likely to be very adventurous on this issue, but that the secretary of state wants to try to do something. the secretary has an interest. the palestinian division, this as eelly government, and, frankly, our situation with other issues, but they always are. it takes a president to decide this is important. and i'm not sure this president, at this stage, thinks there's
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anything to be done. he's a practical man, a reading of political realities that's pragmatic, no radical heat, is not now, every was, and i don't agree with his readings, but i think that may be his reading, there's not much to be done, but i could be wrong, no way of knowing. will the united states continue to be bond by this commitment. it's up to any individual american president. it's been turned into a civil act, no daylight, no surprises, i mean, what started as a letter from an american president has cock a principle of american political life. it was repeatedly reaffirmed in the campaign by the republicannings. this is a president throwing israel urn the bus, should have no daylight. we have to tell them everything. we can never surprise them. tell them ahead of time. you know, any president can do anything he or she wants.
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i don't know. i don't see this president necessarily abandoning that, however. palestinian ben fients in the united pageses. the palestinian national movement is in one of its lowest moments in the entire modern history of the people, and the fact there's divided leadership and ineffective leadership means that you're not seeing the kind of effective use of the tool that you could see, but in order to use something like u.n. membership or going to the international criminal court or any other diplomatic or any other tool at your disposal, you have to have a strategy. what are they doing? i see nothing in anything they say or do. i mean, if it were up to me, i
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would be trying to increase resistance on the ground to the gripping annexation and occupation process, trying to increase pressure externally, by, i don't know where you would go or what you do, but there's a million things you can do, and i would say that this is a process that was supposed to, according to the letter of ashurpses that you have right here, u.s. letter of assurances, right here, the tattered copies that i used back in 1991. this process was supposed to end in 1997. the interim period was to end in 1997. final status to be concluded in 1997. this thing has 16 years smoldering behind the sell-by date. if you're a palestinian leader with any self-respect, you say this interim period failed. we are under occupation. we have to start again.
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we will not negotiate on this basis, inzigs on international law, u.n. resolutions, whatever you want to go back to, and we are, in the meantime, going to hand over the keys of this controlled in any case by the israelis, two steering wheels, israelis are the one who drives the car, to the real driver, and start from square one. that's what i would do. obama, well, i mean, i sort of answered your question, bruce. once again, the united states is pressing the weaker party to conform to the visitor, stronger party. now, has tolerating israeli settlement expansion since president carter improved the situation or not? not. is it a good thing? no. are we doing it? yes. there you are. is forcing the palestinians to not use the tools they have has the weaker party to write the balance with israel as the president apparently always tried to press, not using the
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criminal court, is that going to improve the situation if they are stronger in dealing with the palestinians? are they going to be warm and fuzzy? i doubt it. par top me? >> [inaudible] >> well, you can't stop them from building settlements. what you can possibly do is say this use of u.s. money either tax free dollars, ie, 50 11c3 miewn, most is military money, but that we will not allow. >> [inaudible] >> well, you could do anything like that, if you're willing to pay the domestic political price of going up against that buzz saw. where's east? capitol hill, that way. >> time for at least three more. >> [inaudible]
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[inaudible] >> me, hi. >> hi, sorry. >> i agree, the reality on the ground is a one-state solution, it's a one state, that's what it is. i think maybe talking all the time about peace settlements, two groups, which side do you side with has made it more difficult because i think -- i was very active on the movement to cut off aid to latin america dictatorship. we used to call the congress every time a vote came up on a loan to chilly saying, you know, we're not allowed to lobby, but calling for education purposes to tell you what human rights violations have occurred, and you know that under the harkin amendment, u.s. is obligated to funs toountries tt
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exhibit a pattern of violation of gross human rights. it was eventually effective. we put pressure on dictatorships. why can't we do that op israel to sidestep, you know, are you siding with who, this is a state that is involved in massive growth violations of human rights, and it's illegal for us to continue under u.s. law not only massive aid, but even loans, and maybe that's, you know, a mr effective way to approach it? >> uh-huh. >> hi, professor. >> i can't see you. where are you? there you are, hi. >> hi. >> a research consultant for the middle east institute in singapore. >> uh-huh. >> in your research, did you find any voices of dissent or internal debate in the higher
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levels of the u.s. government against he policies, especially considering it, as you say, a disservice to the long term contracts? >> uh-huh, yeah, good question. where's the last one at? oh. >> thanks. jerome, president of jewish peace lobby. >> uh-huh. >> given the sorry state that we're in today, beyond what you already said about the issue of settlements. >> uh-huh. >> if somehow you were in charge of american foreign policy -- >> that'll be the day -- >> and decided that this was a top priority, what policies, in fact, would you enact? >> on the palestine issue? >> on the palestine issue. >> well, that's a great question.
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first thing is look over my shoulder and look the the political domestic realities. anything to do with money goes through congress. the president, whose or her advisers when there's a female president, finally, and all the experts can suggest this or that policy, but anything regarding, as you know, spending money, so on and so forth goes through congress. laws are passed through congress. there's atrocious laws on the book that forbid this and join and prevent and harass this, that, the other, wayses of dealing with this issue, and i guess the first thing that i would do was to -- would be to treat the presidency and our government as a bully pulpit, the way that the president did a little bit in his talk to israeli students. now, the first two-thirds was what they wanted to hear in their wildest dreams. i mean, you no, the pages of exodus did not contain such rapturous zionist vision as what was wrote in the first two-thirds of the speech. the third part, or the third,
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the last third, spoke over the heads of israeli politicians to israelis, and you to do that, i think, in this country. president bush, i went back to look at president bush senior, the way he tried to do this, unfortunately, all too little, and it is what has to be done. i mean, you have to argue what the u.s. national interest is. you have to argue a different narrative than i'm afraid most american presidents argued in order to get public opinion and media and congress, which is hard to move, as anyone who tried to do it, can say. that's the first thing. sexed thing you -- second thing you have to do is see what's doable? what's in the power? one of the things suggested, bruce, or a couple people suggested here, are within the president's power. i -- if i'm not mistaken, i mean, we're all about too deal the irs has power over what is
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tax deductible and not. the u.s. policy institute charitable purpose. may i ask? i would love to see a bunch of justice department lawyers, and i think it's to the tunes of hundreds of millions of dollars, either illegal or american presidents used to call it illegal or obstacles to peace in one of the most obnoxious situations i can think of, which are violations of international law in the view of everyone other than the people who cop cocked the theory they -- concocted the theory they are not. i'm sure there's many other things, but each involve huge domestic political battles. i want to see a political battle on settlement, not force an israeli government to do something, guaranteed with these governments we have these days in israel to lead to defeat, but
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do things in this country for the american people. keep your nose out of our affairs, we'll stop money going through taxfree -- i mean, i dot know what i'd do.er things something that fitfully of the administration tried to do, which is trying to get out ahead of changes in the arab world because if the united states is going to, in the end, see the interest as remitted to a just, lasting, sustainable, fair solution of the conflict, they have to make it clear to the arab countries it's trying to do this and get ahead of this, so that is something else. we're so far away from any -- i mean, not going to happen that 24eu7b with -- that with my views would be involved in foreign policies. that would be the case. i've never spoken, with maybe three exceptions who didn't
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disagree with an aspect of his or her policy. i think they recognize that it's domestic political reality. it's the way in which the strategic situation of the region is perceived, by policymakers here in washington that drives it, and those are mistaken perceptions of the situation, ie, palestine's not that important, and any diplomat knows how important it is. they say the same thing, they know. th sand know. it's a former military, all students who go and i think there's a great deal of sense within our government. the problem is that's not what is determining the policy. >> a grassroots campaign like
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the ones around sout frica and central america andlatin america dictatorships, if it's sustained, this thing takes ages. the first time i came to live in dc was in the early 80s when we left in 1983, and the campaign around was at its height, and some of the central american stuff was ramping up under president reagan. i was impressed with two things. i was impressed with how widespread the grassroots efforts were, and i was impressed by the degree of which people have a long term vision, understanding this is not shotgun that works in this direction or that section, or election, and they understood they were long term things, taking two, three, four, five congresses before you get a change. i think that has to be the case here. let me say something. there's no lobby for -- there was no lobby for in sut africa for the united states. there were a few strategists in the reagan administration who
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had anticommunism world view within which, you know, south africa was a bunch of good guys, but ther was no grassroots support in this country or european countries. similarly, they were not popular guys here. you know, not that popular, powerful interests, yes, but that's gist not the case with israel. i understand. i understand. that enabled the mobilization of a certainly amount of opinion on both of these, but no real lobby for them, and i'm not just talking about a lobby. i'm not just a capitol hill lobby. there are people who work on culture aspect of this and will show you how the american understanding of this is rooted in long standing views bibleically generated, driven by cinema, television, by racism
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towards the arabs, driven by a number of things that are not really political, books, abooks like exodus, probably have a bigger role than any of the political polemics put together in shaping how generations think about the conflict. sorry, that's the truth, that and the terrible movie with paul newman. put him in anything, and it's going to, you know, it's going to convince people. nobody pays attention to it. it's the bode rock. where is the bedrock for the got maul la or other torture squads? it doesn't exist. i think it's a long, long way to change. i think you have more on capitol hill to talk to than 30 years ago, frankly. >> [inaudible] >> uh-huh. >> [inaudible] >> uh-huh. >> [inaudible]
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>> cold war's over, we hve no strategic interest. could you draw an outline of the telling -- [inaudible] >> yeah. >> [inaudible] >> well, i've been arguin with tom friedman. i don't think it achieved much, but i disagree with him of the interest. the united states didn't depend on middle east oil when saudi oil was the greatest strategic prize in history. it's not because we imported it but it was important to the world economy. we are the world economy. in 1945, 65% of the industrial
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production was in our country. we'll be app exporter in 20 years. it's dominated by american companies. the world company comes to us and the chinese now today, but oil is going to continue the importance, petrol chemicals are important, and it was there before the far rows and the first state, from the time the first states existed, this was the most important region in the world. there are many others that are important. this is e mostimportant in the world because of where it is. red sea, indian ocean, black sea, europe, asia, africa, i needn't say that to an audience like this, and that's the case tomorrow and the day after. now, arab-israel stuff, palestine are not middle east, they are not energies, but they are eted, -- related, and so as secretary gates and as general petraeus, as admiral mullen, as has said, this affects the way the united states has seen, ten it's seen
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as important. i, with all do respect, i disagree with tom friedman as i have for decades. two more. >> two more? >> okay. it's almost 1:30. >> [inaudible] >> sir, my question is, well, first of all, just let me say i fully been involved in teaching most of the career, and i agree wholeheartedly with your view that we are at a one-state solution that the president signed. question is have -- well, go
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back to nvember when there was the threat by the israelis on gaza, hillary clinton left southeast asia, went to egypt, came to a very quick agreement about something. >> i remember, yeah. >> my question is, did that agreement involve egypt taking responsibility for the gaza strip? >> okay. good question. >> good to see you. >> pleasure. >> as you know, i'm a believer of what you said, and forgive me what i'll say, but i'm a from thed middle east peace activist. for those who know me, i've been involved for 23 years trying to organize the churches, educate
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the main line churches in this area, and have spoken in other parts of the country as well. >> uh-huh. >> with that in mind, forgive harsh qon. >> go ahead. >> i'm asking you and everyone in the rule. i think you're all living in a fantasy, and i am too. here's the problem. >> uh-huh. >> in your presentation, you talked about the arab street and how disconnected you are with the leaders, absolutely right, but you didn't talk about public opinion in this country. >> you got to. we are a democracy. we are not disconnected from public opinion. >> right. >> when you look, as i did, as i have done, at public opinion on israel-palestine, for the last 20 years, guess what? over 50% of americans support israel. >> right. >> less than 10% with a few exceptions, the 82 war wasne of them, all right, less than 10% support palestinians, the rest are knew rail. >> right. >> okay.
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despite all great work all done in the room, beginning with my good friend, phil and others, middle east peace, jay street, and so on, we have not made a didn't in that. >> uh-huh. >> at the same time, the other side that claims they have a two-state solution, in my opinion, really are not, but they are clever, right, and using that; right? not only the quote-on-quote jewish lobby, the apac people, but more so, the christian zionist, my fellow christians are enormously powerful. when they have a conference here, there's 6,000 or 7,000 people with apac, there's 12,000; right? when i we have a corchtion, there's 200 people, so on and so on. my point is how do we crack that public opinion? slongs it's that overwhelming, you to be an idiot as president or a congressman to go against that lobby and go against public. >> okay, got you. >> let me take the sec question first again. i mean, numbers are right.
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i don't disagree with them. i suggest if you wanted to do a more in-depth survey, do one by age and get different numbers. if you take people under 30, under 25, you get another set of numbers including young evangelicals, young orthodox, including everybody. i bet you get different numbers than their elders. we have people with a fossilized view of this that was in my generation growsen in 1967. they thought they were in danger of extinction. we know it was not. everybody knew it was not, but people believed them. this was a country in existential danger. it is not, but everybody believes it. kids don't, or fewer do. this is not just one of many, many, many core bedrock myths that younger people are at least beginning to be somewhat more skeptical, they don't believe
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the news media, never watch network television or cable tv. they watch john stewart, colbert, stue'v never heard of. that's what they see and know. i mentioned what's in the "new york times" in a class larger than this in the morning, and at most, 5% of the class know what i'm talking about. i mention the joke cracked in the night before on i daily show, and before finish it, half the class is laughing because they remember it because they saw it, not on tv, but on their laptop, ipads, whatever. okay? i would say that's the first thing. do an age thing. now, whether when th t older and more conservative as we do, they'll change, i don't know. the second thing i say to you is it's a brittle situation in
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terms of some key issues where they break down, especially with regards to age, and there's an almost his hysterical fear to te who cling to control of the institution of the community. they do surveys. they talk to the youth. they have leadership seminars and so on and so forth, and they have a sense of some of the changes that are taking place, and they are fighting back with all the money and assets and resources and intelligence and all the organizations at their disposal, and it's not working. i'm not saying that, you know, the millennium is at hand. itst not going to change, but, actually, it is changing a little bit. in certain regards. they changed a little bit, just a tad. it is impossible. my sop is the playwright. impossible if you're an actor or any role except as a terrorist. okay, why? because all midder easterners
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are terrorists. we know that. that is a perception in our society. you got to deal with that before you can change anything. okay. we're not talking -- it's culture. it's not just lobbying and poll politics. >> [inaudible] >> young people know this. >> [inaudible] >> yeah, but they are not the oning who control casting in television or hollywood or laste. question is ron's question. about gaza and secretary clinton. it's an interesting question. i don't any egypt would accept speedometer for gaza. i go to egypt audiotape l time and i talk to people all the time, not at the top, top, top, but connected in various ways, and impressions i get there's an egyptian -- phobia on the part of people connected to egyptian officials against any sense of having the tar baby of gaza
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shoved into their arms. they are willing to do certain things and not willing to take responsibility. partly for enlightened reasons, this is is a problem you creating and you have to solve it, but partly for self-interested reasons because they understand what a close sal burden it would be if they were to be responsible. i actually don't think this. i don't know what the deal was. i'm knot not privy, but i don't know what happened between the secretary and his people and the hamas people, but what i read, what i heard indicates that, no, egypt did not, and i think will not. in fact, if you look at what's going on in egyptian poll politics today, the trowels are blamed in the opposition press on the brotherhood's over solicit for fuel mass. there's no oil because it's sent to gaza according to rumors and opposition papers. the way it plyis in a different direction. >> thanks for a wonderful lecture. [applause]
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>> thank you. [applause]
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