and to take expertise, usually european country usually french ingredient to the united states. another major figure would be savanna fare who sent on a mission to collect information about military education. he collects huge numbers of books and material comes back to west point and with the support of people like scott becomes a prominent general to the war of 1812. he's able to systematize the curriculum in a way that had them in case before. >> host: when was west point? >> guest: 1802. but i think historians still argue about what thomas jefferson was really after when the school was founded. but no one disagrees the school is institutionally weak. it's unclear what the purpose of the institution is. there's not destruction it is

widely divergent cadet some older and younger. to this day, west point is still the father of west point because he's the one who puts it on much sounder and more systematic and that's very important because that's the army that will produce the generals of the civil war. that institution at west point will be where all these -- most of the more generous with their initial professional experience. >> host: the titleist west pointers in the civil war. who have regarded that were generous in the civil war? >> guest: in all honesty, most of the famous. sherman, grant, lee, hood. to give you a harder number, there are a few fitness, wade hampton for example. to get the sense of the numbers,

two thirds of major generals involved are veterans of the regular army. the regular army is dominated by west point. the west point is about -- it not only must officers of the regular army graduate was going, it's just a focal point of much of the army's professionalism. when they do, for example, review boards for type x, these cadets as guinea pigs and they'll be -- to go to west point and how to march around and use the library. west point has the most thorough library available so becomes a place for all the stuff is done. but we think of the big three, lee, grant, sherman, stonewall jackson. there are west pointers to know each other and have gone through that experience. >> host: when it comes to the civil war you fetch of us on the south and the north train in the

same ways. what does that due to some of the conflicts? the most important thing that happened, the most important result is the worst are essentially clones of each other because their leadership models, experiences are similar. what happened is the armies are locked in an equilibrium of competence. since they're fighting near images of one another, that is part of what causes the war to last as long as it does. sometimes the screen is indecisive, many of the does not exceed one. those men and 62, 63. it takes until 1865 and it's a long process present because the army since the start of assemblers to show models, they were is similarly. they both get much better, but they get better at the same pace. so you can still have a

battlefield decision. obviously the north winds. but a lot of times the military has tree when you see the big spectacular but very, destroys the entire army in one blow, you have to have notches superior -- you have disappeared or organization institutions. during the civil war, there's clearly better general submersed generals. the advantage they can get each engagement, we have a crushing victory, but he can't quite truly destroyed the entire federal army partly because these are messieurs though similar -- is such a similar level of confidence and proficiency. >> host: was one of the goals of the state battles we thought, was one of the goals and end-all type focus? >> guest: that really is the

hope. >> host: was that at west point? >> guest: one of the curious ironies about this is west point -- and this is part of the problem because west point because of fears influenced by this french model of military engineering education, west point teaches cadets had to be junior officers. we prepare not to be admirals immediately. we prepare them to be secular tenets. west point to the basic grounding in the most basic fundamental voting lots of military expertise that gives them a lot of engineering, probably more they really need. so the desire for a bit decisive novel comes from more of a cultural affinity for napoleon. mcclellan is likened to napoleon early in his career. he had 10 strikes the napoleonic

pose and his people reading popular history books because there's wars were of course the irony is the point, but there are these battles where he has these decisive victories, with these that segment of the napoleonic war ends. that is in many ways the model of what most west point generals are hoping to achieve, especially early in order. later it becomes increasingly problematic and you people with interesting alternative visions. for much of the public and much of the youngest officer corps and besides is a desire that if you can edit us what you want. you want to completely destroy your opponents in the field. not just make them retreat and not just inflict casualties, but to actually crash them as an organization. >> host: professor hsieh, what about counterinsurgency and

insurgency method? who are some of the more -- those that maybe her up out of the mold by west point? >> guest: ferric guerrillas and they are especially vexatious reading oteri logistics. but the problem with guerrillas for the confederate really is an issue that's definitely got her entries. some of the entries comes from recent american issues overseas for lack of a better way of putting it. i would say that be a mistake to overstate the loan of guerrillas partly because guerrillas can deny conventional military forces could troth and territory. they can arrest logistics, but they can't physically control that terrain in the way the confederacy doesn't want the entire american south to be sorted 18 in chaotic. something like syria is not the goal the confederates

thereafter. they want to control the territory to be the nation nation state government can't and there's a very good reasons for that. social, cultural, some involve slavery. requires the basic level of social stability. as you see in the civil war because waives their property and his regime, but also human needs in people, so they can run away and do things other fading restriction innovative physical properties normally can't. the confederacy is always going to be unable to rely come lately on guerrillas as the main line of after because the endpoint of that is to have jazz and environment of social chaos. you also have -- is disconnected at the beginning of the book. the officers of the regular army have experience of irregular warfare. they had to fighting in the hands. part of the consequence and he

will likely have to chase them to the text says is they actually have a powerful distaste for it. this time it's politically controversial. and he has refused to fight a proper european soldiers. it becomes frustrating. a lot of times the army's methods for dealing with things like indian villages and attacking noncombatants to the site. dma finds it distasteful, although this is wicked usually actually does. so when they get the bid worthy of looking for in many ways, they want to stick to the decor. when it's clear this is a coherent virginia.

alexander proposes to basically going to friday's guerrillas and we basically rebukes him, politely but never mess with the same. the countryside will be filled with chaos and on these disciplines start and you can do this, but i'm going to surrender to see what happens. he describes himself never mentioning the ada can. you do have guerrillas. as far as that occupied of hostile civilian. they are federal logistics blockhouses protect railroads. the army becomes occupation duties with maintaining civil order. but it is very much the civil

war is still predominant war of large battles. >> host: professor wayne hsieh, civil war 1861, page 61, did the u.s., the north has professional armies? >> guest: is very small and very successful in the mexican war, the crucial place where you see it have its the problem is in 1861 the army is a little over 16 and officers thought there is strength. the officer corps will split. so there is a professional army at its core cadre small and it has to be dispersed again. for that reason, the early american armies during civil war are quite poor in their proficiency. they learn quickly, but they learned the hard way really. that's one of the reasons why

west pointers are catapulted to prominent because they are the only people of any expertise in a relied on quickly and therefore give a disproportionate amount of an. the irony again is that scott conquers mexico city during the veracruz campaign with an army usually ranges about 10 or 11,000. this is a third of the size of first paul rudd and much smaller than the armies of places like gettysburg. the only person with much experience with this thing and is too old to take the field. other features civil war generals are officers who their only experience with major combat operations is funny so much smaller scale and after that of a deadly was take an infinite frontier. so their expertise is in many ways also terribly deficient. but it's better than what everyone else has, which is

nothing. so there is a very small professional army. the union of the confederacy produce will -- cannot be at all described as professional. so i'd say 1832 at the earliest. >> host: if you teach this book at the naval academy, ap teacher on both, what he wants to dance to leave with? >> guest: i don't teach the book ecosphere you never want to be the professor who so obviously trying to slowpokes of a captive audience. i think for me the biggest thing i try to get across is the civil war -- the big picture theme and this is especially important that there is at times a collision between the way country wants to fight a war, how it prefers to fight a war and how it actually have the doing so. in 1861, the police in the united states and the union

confederacy aceto- a professional expertise. in times of crisis, good citizen soldiers full text our country their native virtue and curse will find a way end of the professional military forces because they have freedom and courage on their site. what happens very quickly is the shortcomings of view become increasingly clear. in fact, war and military affairs retires the body of systematic special expertise in issues of competence not directly related to justice or perceptions are even free very. west pointers are the only people who have the concrete military expertise and therefore have to build it on the fly. in the north it causes problems because west pointers are politically left to see us take

a lot of terms of emancipation. political leadership ignores becos increasily suspicious partly because they know their politics are different, but also wedded to the idea that we don't have professionals because we just rely on the native virtue of americans. ..

>> the author of this book, "west pointers and the civil war: the old army in war and peace." booktv is on location in annapolis, maryland. >> and now a couple of interviews from booktv's college series. first, booktv interviewed professor john l. jackson jr. about his book, "racial paranoia." the interview was conducted at university of pennsylvania's annenberg school for communication, and it's about 25 minutes. >> john l. jackson jr. is a professor of communication, anthropology and africana studies at the university of pennsylvania. of and he is the author recently of this book, "racial paranoia: the unintended consequences of political correctness." dr. jackson, when you talk about racial paranoia, who's paranoid? >> well, i would argue we're all paranoid when it comes to race. and probably for good reason. i mean, one of the points i make in the book is that race as a

category itself is about the embedding of paranoia into the way we look at social life. so, for instance, the whole point of race is to say some differences are so paramount, so biological, so hard wired that we have to be on the lookout for them at all times and that they explain all the other ways in which we differentiate between uses and themes. and so race thits is about fear and social paranoia. all i argue is when you think about a country like the united states that's trying to work through its own history of racial antagonisms, we can have two models of postrace. one model is we're transcending, we're really trying to build a multiracial community. the other one is sort of postracialty by repression. we don't talk about it, don't think about it, don't say a word and, hopefully, somehow we'll also move beyond it. i think those are very different projects, but they both fall under that umbrella of postracial possibilities. >> well, let's go to that second example that you mentioned, this

ignoring or not talking about race. >> yeah. >> why is it important that we talk about race? >> well, i think it's important not to make a fetish out of race. but the danger is to imagine that to not discuss it means somehow it isn't always already in the room. so the only reason why i feel like we have to be very careful about bracketing out serious discussions about things we feel uncomfortable about is it's an ahistorical position. we've been through all of this stuff, we've made it to a certain version of the finish line, and now the only way to move forward is pretend we haven't run this far already to know where we want to go, what we want this community to become, we have to understand where we've been and make sense of the differences that still divide us. and that's why i feel, again, it's a fine line between making too much of racial difference, right, making a fetish out of it, but also trying to be serious about pushing to a moment when we can really feel like everyone has a vested interest in being part of what we imagine in american society.

>> professor jackson, what's the role of political correctness in our views on race? >> so part of the point of the book, it's almost like it's easy to take a pot shot at political correctness, right? so what's nice about political correctness is it's trying to place a premium on civility. we don't want to offend people, we don't want folks to feel uncomfortable. the potential downside, though, is when that is connected to an aversion to any discussion about race at all and to flimsy social relationships. so the point i make in the book is, you know, when you're not talking about race and your social networks aren't racially diverse, you tend to have a very limited sense of what the social other's life is actually about. you get those images from television, maybe from books you read, from magazines, but you don't have real relationships. so it means to not have people in your life that represent very different ways of being in the world puts you in this very precarious position when racial conflagration flares up because

you don't have an investment in folks across the racial line. even if someone says something you don't like, you care about them, you're invested. if you don't have a relationship, you write them off. i didn't like you anyway, and i won't talk to you. and i think political correctness is about saying it's really dangerous to combine a lack of substantive engagement across all kinds of social differences with a kind of commitment to civility at the expense of talking seriously about the issues that concern us. and the difference we have on those issues. and so i think it's important to remember we need to find a way to talk about things that are uncomfortable to talk about, but we shouldn't pretend that we're always saying things we mean just because we're saying things that we know we imagine won't affect -- offend our interlocutor in ways that are negative x. so that's what i'm trying to argue in the book. political correctness becomes, if we're not careful, a way to double down on repressing any expression about race. >> what's an example you use in "racial