"economist," awe though res "big data: a revolution that will transform how we live, work, and think." we thank the add -- audiences here and on the internet held by the commonwealth club technology forum exploring visions of the future through science and technology. we also want to remind everyone here that copies of the guests' new book are in the lobby on sale and pleased to sign them outside the room immediately following the program, and we appreciate you letting them make their way to the signing table as quickly as possible. i'm host of tech nation on npr, and now this meeting of the commonwealth club of california, the place where you're in the know, is adjourned. [applause]

[inaudible conversations] >> the study releases a new report today analyzing the future of u.s. military ground forces. panelists discuss the impact of automatic defense cuts on ground forces as well as the reorientation of forces from afghanistan and iraq to the asia-pacific region. it's expected to start in a moment. live coverage here on c-span2. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> all right, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. those of you at the chow line, stock up and head to your seats. we generally try to have enough food here to make it through till lunch, keep you awe live for a short period of time here. yes. so, good morning, and on behalf of our ceo and president, dr. john hamrail, i welcome you all to the center for strategic

and international studies, and i also welcome our viewers on the web. i don't know if my mic is loud enough. are you guys picking me up okay? all right. i have a couple administrative detail, and then i want to outline what we are doing today. we have a really wonderful timely report and topic to discuss this morning. administratively, we're going to be here for about 90 minutes. if you're viewing on the web, you should be able to download a copy of the report and follow along at home. we probably won't refer you to page numbers as we go, so you'll have to do a little work on your own. i'm not sure, but you also may be able to download the view graphs that those in the room will see, you'll be able to see them from the web as well. this is on the record. we are recording this. there will be an archive of both the video and audio posted to csi afterwards. if, at the end of this, you look at it and say what the heck did

frank say? you can go back and pick up on it, okay, afterwards. >> [inaudible] >> so it's -- what a time we're in; right? we have -- we're in the middle, as all of you know, our fourth downturn in the last 65-70 years. we have no idea how low or how far it's going to go, ect.. we got very important questions about what do we need the military for and how do we size and shape it properly. how do we align strategy and programs and policy and resources going forward? you had in the past week lively exchanges, i would urge you to watch the videos, if you have not, between the chief of staff of the army and members of the arm services committee. it's a robust example of the difference between article 1 of the constitution and article 2

#. you can look those up on your own time. [laughter] we wrestle with likes like do you -- are we looking at the force we can afford, or are we looking at the force we need here? are we preparing for a world we try to make it come out a certain way, or are we preparing for a world that is what it is, and we'll have to deal with it? of course, it's a complex set of questions. i'm making it look like by their issues, but they are not binary issues at all. traditionally, the military has assessed the adequacy of the fore structure including readiness, training, equipping, and so on against a set of threats and war plans designed to meet those threats, but that's probably not the approach that we're going to need in the future, or rather, it's that and a lot more because we have a complex set of future scenarios, and we call them in this report vignettes because we're not

quite ready to distinguish them with the acronym or the name scenario because that implies, then, that you have to build a plan to deal with it, but from a vignette point of view, it allows you to scope against a huge set of issues, if you will, and we have an assessed in this report the budgetary and resource requirements to deal with these vignettes, if you will. that's work that still has to be done. this report is focused not only the whole world, but on the parts that are -- have primacy in the defense strategic guidance that was issued january, a year ago, so very strong focus, middle east, counterterrorism, so on, paycom focus, rebalance to asia, counterterrorism, ect.. of course, the theaters don't mirror one another the way they did when i was growing up in the system where it was pretty

fungible to have forces relevant for one set of plans and one theater be relevant to another. all that adds to the complexity. yesterday's wire services comes word, in fact, one headline says army seeks to compliment air, sea, battle. secretary mccue says the army's moving forward, and we heard this word, and i think the general talk about this office of strategic land policy here in this very room november of last year, you know, to deal with ideas about forcible entry, power ejection, and involvement of ground forces in antiaccess and aerial denial areas. we have a robust conversation here this morning. leading this is our senior fellow, nate fryer, a career army officer, spent time at the army war college, spent time in osd, a lot of time in theaters of operation, especially iraq, and has been a senior fellow at

csis for six or seven years. he's joined by a great panel that he'll introduce. i want to ask you all to, please, join me in welcoming nate fryer, csis. [applause] >> well, thank you very much, david, that's a kind introduction to what has been a very, what i think is been an exceptionally challenging report, study in a time of great change inside the department of defense. before i begin talking about the substance of the report in the first take an opportunity for thank yous and also introduce my panelists before proceeding. first, i think this report would not have been possible without the support of the army ga and

in particular, the army of quadriennial review office under the leadership of general john, with the able assistance of jim and with respect to the report, there's assistance that's invaluable. we received a great deal of support from u.s. pacific command, u.s. central command, service component commands underneath them, the joint staffs, osd, ect. in the process of this, and their contributions to the substance of the report have been both invaluable and many times ground breaking in the ideas arrived at through their assistance. we had a great working group and great senior review group who spent time with us going over ideas, flushing things out, and testing things. they, too, deserve some credit. you can see who was involved in that when you read through the report. we're indebted to some several

csi senior scholars who also helped us a great deal in guiding the report and arriving at, in particular, regional insights we came to. finally, let me publicly mention the research team who worked very hard at getting a report, i think, that will be very influential going forward in the defense review season, stephanie sannick, senior fellow and deputy director of the international security program, jack guy, jp, our military fellows, sammy and megan loney also interns with the program, they have been absolutely great teammates in the process, and i wanted to thank them publicly. as for the panel, i'm going to spend about 10 minutes talking -- ten to 15 minutes talking about the report itself, but i'm joined on stage by this panel that will bring a great

deal of insight and experience to the discussion. on the far right is mr. barry, direct i have of the center on international security of the atlantic coup sill, spent 18 years inside the department of defense in various positions in the senior executive service, and, also, was a special assistant to the president and senior directser for defense policy and strategy in the white house from 2008 to july of'10. to the right is james duvaik, senior fellow at the institute of study of war, a career infantry officer, if i'm mistaken. i'm sorry to hear that, i'm app arian artilleryman. [laughter] spent years in the army, commanded the 25th infantry division, fort louis, and the multinational security transition command in iraq. on the left, an old friend and colleague, mr. frank hoffman,

senior research fellow at national defense university's institute for national strategic studies, a former marine officer -- sorry about that as well -- >> also an infantryman whose walked, carried a pack, and driven everywhere. >> led readiness, widely publicized, a prolific commentator, hybrid warfare in particular, and we had been coconspirators on a lot of ideas many times. before i begin, i remind everybody to turn all cell phones, pages, blackberries, ect., off so we're not interrupted in the process. all the panelists will make a presentation, and then after the presentation, we'll have time for questions so just let us run through the discussion, and then we'll open it up to the floor for questions. there's microphones present throughout. just raise your hand, and i'll moderate the q&a and ensure you're called on in an orderly

fashion. talk about the report chartered by the army da ob -- on the future potential wide scale deployment of u.s. ground forces, u.s. army marines and special operation forces in the u.s. payco oars, and we were charted to evaluate what the department of defense calls steeper risk associated with the deployment of the forces. with that, we started the process in october of, really, right around the beginning of october as the previous year of last year going through the process, and what you see here today is really the culmination of that effort, so, if i could, the next slide, please. here's the study's purpose, all in the past tense now, thankfully. this is what we did.

we identified core interest in the core regions identifying ground hazards in the region most likely to threaten interests over the next few decades. as i said, before we developed the frame work and assess the risk against a set of what became 20 regional vignettes that grew out of the assessment of the trends and insights in the two regions of concern of the report. finally, we compared the risk assessment for the current director of strategy and policy to arrive at certain judgments on general risk mitigation policy risk measures that the.department of defense might make going forward. a few qualifications because i think they are important. ..

do that specifically the extent to which the force might be asked to do it. that is, really a follow-on i think to this effort. and then finally we accounted to what we labeled and the question has been very interested in, we tried to counsel the call disorder for the failure of confident authority to control territories, changes, resources, et cetera, as was unfavorable order which would be really what it sounds like, regional beer,

another great power -- peer. threatens u.s. interests in a way that forces us to respond. next slide if i could, san. i'm going to cut to the chase. we can do a lot of finally, some very big report. but really there's for what i would call themes, findings, themes that rolled out of a report. the first is a u.s. does face future contingencies, u.s. policymakers will want the option to consider the large-scale employment of ground forces. in a lot of conversations that may appear to be imam and apple pie conclusion frankly, but our view was in the contemporary debate where you really do have this perfect storm of resource challenges inside the department of defense, along experience of the wars in iraq and afghanistan, the trend in strategy and policy is to discount a large number of

potential contingency events in the future as not necessarily reaching a threshold that would have us employ ground forces that we think the future is somewhat different than that. we envision general-purpose, general purpose forces a special operation forces in both regions. one of the things we found is the more conflicts and crises involve challenges between people, the likelier that ground forces provide a qualitative advantage and the u.s. military response. second, after looking of the vignette do we develop, which i will talk about and a bit, so looking at the vignettes we found the large-scale ground force responses in the future really fall into what we think are five basic archetypes. humanitarian response, distributed security, enable and support action, key operations are limited campaign. i will talk much more about

those as i go forward, but we found it to be, over the next two decades ground forces are more likely to respond to foreign internal our cross boundary disorder, natural catastrophe, third party complex, or finally some kind of large-scale enabling effort. than they are to respond to over a cross-border aggression by an adversary of the united states. in this whole construct of the five there are two really, there are two were fighting real war fighting focused missions which are the distributed security in a limited conventional campaign archetypes we found to distribute security to be the larger cluster demand. over the next 20 years, and, therefore, potential identify, we identified as the war fighting focus for the ground forces going forward. perhaps the most controversial finding that we can do is that classic major combat operations for the extended post

destabilization of the kind would expect over the last 12 years are likely -- the next two decades. i will talk more about that in the future. regional shaping we found to be a dominant demand for all the ground forces across the board going forward. some would argue should be a force driver but we certainly see it as a dominant nation going forward. but important we found in, the most important shaping efforts are those with partners that are most capable that appear to be most capable and most willing to participate in future contingency operations with the united states going forward. that's number one. and second, they should focus on preventing the most dangerous outcome in preparing to respond to the more disruptive outcome in each one of the regions. finally we found the current defense priorities and really service priorities may not really a line well with what we see are the future demands for

the ground forces. i'll get into that more in the future, in a few moments, but suffice it to say that we have six basic risk categories. we found future challenges, risky be either increase in static and all six of those categories. we found strategies and policy really hard to focus on the most evident state these challenges are not really focused enough on consequential disorder. distributed security itself is really inconsistent with the current direction of policy and we found the idea of enabling and support actions to run somewhat countercultural to service culture. finally i think one of the biggest contributors to this problem is the fact that the force itself has become conditioned to respond to one contingency type in particular, which is counterinsurgency in sort of fixed, a fixed and very sophisticated support architecture which we don't think necessarily will hold true in the future.

let me go to the next slide. is just a pictorial of the five archetypes to address the first question we always get. note that we have a large circle just talk about the fact that the army in particular as a very large theater setting bill, really the army provides the foundation for all major operations in the areas of communication, logistics, et cetera. and that on top of that all these operations would occur. you can also see we have placed the distribute security vignettes are the distribute security architect in the center of his chart largely because it's the greatest reservoir for future capability. its success draws on the capabilities necessary to conduct other operations. and, therefore, we think is kind of the centerpiece of future capability. next slide, please. really what we want to debate in this chart is the way dod assess this risk, in four major

categories. institution of us, sports management risk, operational risk and future challenges risk. and borrowing from a friend here frank hoffman, we borrowed this idea, what we call the fulcrum chart. the bottom line is, institutional goals -- provides the foundation upon which the other two can be assessed and rest. in the current, in the current sort of structure the way dod assesses risk going forward is operational risk in sort of over the next 24 months can we perform our work. it is heavily favored and more formalized and is this a view of future challenges risk. what we try to do is take a crack at rewriting the bounds of the charred looking more holistically at future challenges risk. one thing that's important that we see is really it is operational risk is tomorrow's future challenges risk. they really are a continuum. one assesses the ability, the

ability of the force to respond to problems it sees now. the other sort of assesses the forces ability, the problems we see in the future. so they really do have similar characteristics and, therefore, are joined somewhat. next slide. as a context for study wikified five core interests. i'm not going to go into great detail but it was one of our charters in the study. we think that these five core interests that we directly from an assessment of 25 years of national security policy sort of public announcements of interest on the part of u.s. policymakers. we think these provide a foundation and overly translatable across combatant commands. you can see their individual sort of implementation or manifestation of those combatant commands. said these provided a foundation upon which or through which we could look at the challenges in

the particular regions and arrive at conclusions on what the likeliest demands would be in those regions. next chart, please. >> in the process also as we came up with interest we also developed a set of insight. we have 10 basic insights that we worked awful. these insights like the interest became a bit of a lens for us to look at the region and determine what the nature of the challenge in those regions will be. let me just go over these a little bit. these insights by the way sort of both a combination of assumptions and preliminary conclusions as we went into the beginning of the study. and then they held as insights largely because they were confirmed in the course of the study. we do think the united states will maintain its military advantages but those advantages will erode and it's consistent, will it go to overtime and that's very consistent with current policy and thought in this area.

however having said that in spite of the erosion we do also think that given a commitment to deterrent major, major conventional traditional conflict between the united states and other great powers is largely preventable. in an area where we are probably the least capability prevented is the area of spontaneous civil conflict inside states, especially states importance to the united states, as well as proxy to the united states by another great power. we do think the you aors with concern to this report are particularly troublesome with respect to the generation of consequential threats to core interests. we also came to the conclusion, perhaps in spite of current directions in policy that wars between nations and between peoples and the conflicts that they actually generate will continue to be important to you strategy and policy going forward, and will be the subject of contingency plan for sometime

to come. we do think the threats to access our real and the states and nonstate actors will continue to generate threats to access, and, frankly, threats to our freedom of maneuvering specific operational areas, and that that threat is becoming more prolific in the capabilities are actually month -- migrating down. cbrn will be a problem in the future. chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their control, proliferation and development will be a problem to the united states and will be a primary concern in u.s. strategy for the next two decades. one key finding i think that's the important is that this idea of what ever way you want to call, access to information, et cetera, this is almost on a viral effect on the ability of conflict to sort of spread. not only is it a challenge to operational security but it allows a greater diversity, a greater more diverse universe factors to interact with one

another, organize at distance and at range, and conduct somewhat coordinated action that complicate u.s. interests. a host of accelerants will be a problem going forward over the next two decades include challenge, governments, capacities, climate change, environmental degradation also the increase, increased competition for strategic resources. we will, the united states love, continue to have a number of strong bilateral multilateral partnerships going forward. but, frankly, in the same way american defense resources are declining, the resources of many of our partners are declining as well which will leave us in a position where we will remain sort of the most capable and able to respond to the many instances of common concern between our allies and us. and then finally i would just like to say that we think strategic warning for the most traditional military challenges

will remain stable and significant, where strategic warning for those instances that spring from some kind of disorder will be much more in question and in doubt. actually sort of compressed the decision-making space afforded to u.s. decision-makers. next slide. very quickly let me talk about the trends we identify in uscentcom. you can see on the right hand side of this chart we talk about these trends in particular and the take away, but the trends themselves are most important to this report. the bottom line is we think there's three basic trends in sin, that would be the focus of u.s. defense strategy and planning going forward for the next, for the foreseeable future. first is a prolific challenge to the authority and civility of regional government. second is behavior and its impact on stability of the region and finally the uncertain control, chemical, biological

radiological and nuclear capability. i can talk about any one of those in great detail. you can see sort of some of the reasoning behind our thoughts in that regard on the right but in the interest of time i want to move on and talk about the next region and then we will punt to q&a for the detailed discussion. next slide, please, take him. so pacom has four or five basic trends from our perspective. the most dominant is an increasing competition for regional promises, territorial resources and freedom of action within the region, and into the region. there are some alternative china futures that we think are probably under considered. currently, when you look at pay, the most common thought is atomic sort of rice in china that stays on a linear path upward. we also think that there is some discussion of a different path for china in a week at china or a failing china is just probably

as troublesome to the region as is a strong china. in addition to that there is also this idea that if you see china as a principal focus of, you know, u.s. strategy in the asia-pacific region, the chinese themselves adopt for a competitive strategy that basically occurs largely outside of the military domain and, therefore, sort of undercuts any military buildup that is associated with countering them. we do think that the uncertain trajectory in north korea will remain a dominant concern, particularly for u.s. ground forces for sometime to come. north korea has three paths. it can either come at some point unify with south korea. it can collapse in and on top of itself or it can actually continue to engage in provocative or aggressive behavior that somehow leads to war between north and south. so we do think north korea remains important. perhaps a, most dominant daily trend is natural capacity and

climate change. it was a dominant theme when we went out to pacom and talk to them. probably their most frequently requirement for contingency response, so we do think it is want to consider and that the pacom realm. finally, there is ideological disputes in the pacom region where we found them to be probably not to the level that would require the large-scale employment of the u.s. forces. so next slide. we came up with 10, 20 vignettes. i can talk to anyone of these in detail during q. and a. here are the 20 vignettes listed side-by-side. uscentcom they really range in likelihood from a series problem we're seeing unfold as we speak all the way to a future syria turkey conflict and a post-assad environment and you can see we have eight other vignettes between those that we consider. and uspacom again ranging from

the likeliest demand all the way up to sort of the most speculative demands. we range from a pan pacific tsunami which larger requires the homeland defense response on the part of the mistakes all the way down to it taiwan -- we're fighting physically in taiwan. next slide. some of the major implications for ground forces that we came to that of want to just highlight. first, i really want to highlight the fact that future operating environment will be just ordered a -- asymmetric distributed. we think the more, a number of constraints that are emerging at the policy level coming out of, coming out of the wars in iraq and afghanistan. there will be a natural aversion associate with future contingency operations, objectives of pursue will be more limited and, therefore, the operations themselves are likely

to be less decisive. uscentcom and u.s.a., very different in their demands, excepting the lower probability possibility of a major conventional or operation in the region. we think uscentcom is really defined by security and peace operations and uspacom really by the enabling and supportive actions of humanitarian response. again, ripping at this idea of warning, there may be limited warning forth like what we saw in the war fighting demand, again following the distribute security category. and that's really largely stemming from this idea that they're most likely to emerge from challenges of this order. and then finally let me just again emphasized the point of risk in all six categories that we identified as either increasing or static. if you could go forward to slides. let me just make a couple of points on a risk assessment and then i'm going to turn it over to my colleagues.

the overarching challenge in the risk assessment problem we think is twofold. first, there is a general sort of prioritization away from consideration of large-scale ground operations now going on inside the pentagon for a variety of reasons. there's war weariness. there's resource challenges, et cetera, et cetera, in the place that you can go to mine sometimes those resources and the most manpower. that is competing really with this idea that we have become accustomed to one contingency focus of the last 12 years. and it actually dispense with a number of capabilities and competencies the more relevant we think going forward. now we will have to capture

those. on the issue of projecting forces, also i think that is a key area are increasing there are fewer forward deployed forces which will require the united states to have unemployed, or a deployed equal employment mentality with all of its complex. it will be increasingly challenging with the forces based in the training and with the challenges we have on the logistics left. we think across the board forces will be more vulnerable to negative threats from a wider variety of actors but and as a result of that protecting those forces will be increasingly important and giving forces across the spectrum of response more ability to both protect themselves and conduct offenses operations to be more important. then finally one interesting point we came to on terminating military operations is that we think that given this idea that operations will be left, the forces themselves will have to

become more attuned to the idea of actually disengaging from environments that are not necessarily fixed. where the conflict, the conflict or crisis is still very much in trained at the time that we disengaged but we have pushed it to a level that is manageable to the view of u.s. policymakers and, therefore, it's time for u.s. forces security to disengage. a very different mindset than that we have had in the future, or in the past but as we go forward it is one we are likely to require more attention on the part of the forces. i'm going to turn it over at this point. we have some more charge. i don't want to bore you anymore, and we'll kind of punch everything to question and answer after that. but thank you very much. we're very grateful for you being here and look forward to the q&a portion after my colleagues have an opportunity to talk. >> thanks very much and thanks for inviting me to this session. i'll be very provocative and very brief in the interest of

having a conversation and also because there's a lot of rich knowledge to mine among my fellow panelists. first and foremost i think this is a really excellent and rich study, and i think it avoids the most common error that i see in strategy and force planning, and that is obviously emphasizing the contingencies that have dominated our thinking over the last decade or so. and so i think it has imagination and conceptual innovation. and i certainly applaud it. it also happens to some the same issues that i've been very concerned about, including when i was helping the white house sort of oversee the last keep your. i'll get into a little bit but i'm just going to make four basic points and then again i will be very brief and hopefully i will stimulate some conversation. i think i will. number one, we are just terrible at predicting future contingencies. there's no other way to say it is the only thing is certain is

that we will be surprised again by major future contingencies. i'm doing a lot of work of atlantic council with the national intelligence council and with other governments on global trends and disruptive technologies. and it's pretty clear to me after three trips to silicon valley over the last eight months that the world in five to 10 years is going to be, i'll have some great different dimensions than it has today. and we think the iphone and the democratization of communication technology has changed things, wait until you see the rest of the technology revolution, to play in terms of biotech and the democratization of production that is represented in 3-d printing, and a range of other technologies that are coming on top of each other. we don't know how it's going to play out but we do know it will be disrupted. in some ways that destruction will be very beneficial to the united states, but there's always a dark side to each of these technologies that can be

applied. so the key trend i think is that of individual empowerment, and this is enabled by the large massive shift of resources to asia that is currently, or back to asia i should say, that is currently ongoing that will bring about a very significant rise in the global middle class. but there's also this technology out of it that could play at will -- as well. let's start with the baseline of the strategy that the united states currently has in play. i think we need a strategy and a portfolio of capabilities that hedges against this very uncertain environment inappropriate ways. -- in appropriate ways. it's important to keep in mind i was part of bureaucracy before by the bureaucracies strong inclination is to resist change, and to strive to focus on accountable. and in this case, the comfort zone is one where we love to

deal with militaries that look like this. and so in this case i think the department's national -- natural inclination to focus 80% of its effort and strategy and planning on dealing with the chinese contingency is understandable. make some strategic sense but i think it is overplayed to the degree and as i said i worry very much that the uncomfortable but extremely plausible scenario, some of which nate covered in the study very well, i think you're going to come back to bite us and, unfortunately, very damaging ways. and so the summit of my first point is the current culture of sort of automaticity of autonomy, of the department of components in the defense department and of the drift towards the symmetrix is probably the single greatest strategic challenge that we face. i think it's much more significant, but we can talk about that. so we can't wish waste and there's that we would prefer not

to engage in, it certainly would be nice if the world would let us have it towards asia in focus our efforts there, but we do know that when we're surprised and when we are attacked come when our interests are dealt a very severe blow, we will deploy ground forces in very messy snatch again. i have not doubt. my second major point is we have a very -- related to the first point. and there's a lot of scenarios that could play very significant demands on our military forces in particular, our ground forces. and the current dod strategic conjecture implies a much greater degree of precision about the future operations than it is really warranted. it strikes me the best way to prepare for being surprised which we should do is to ensure that we ingrain strategic foresight into our planning processes through a much greater degree than is currently the case. i think the likelihood of

strategic shock that nate mention is very high over the next five to 10 years. just look back over the last five to 10 years of the near misses, at the things that actually did happen and you have a sense that the next five years certainly will include some of those. and so the department's process needs to change more than one that is systematically stands the horizon in key areas, and then a privately hedges our strategy, capability and military posture accordingly. let me mention two scenarios i spend a little bit of time talking to people a lot smarter than i am about. so i would not same expert in these but these are two that i worry about. number one, is that the scenario of failed states with wmd, we have seen that play out a little bit in syria but i promise you i wrote before we heard about the red lines being blurred to a pink line. and it strikes me that for the scenarios that i think there is some good work going on the

department. i don't want to be too much of a blunt instrument but the current approach to this set up scenarios, in particular that of pakistan, the department undertakes is to highly compartmentalized activities that are underway, very sensitive and so we have to be very careful, et cetera, et cetera. and so i think this has a way of limiting the need of strategies and investments and capabilities because it's so sort of off on one side. we need open disappear we need to talk about this in the way a healthy democracy helps to ensure there's a fully informed defense policy debate. and i worry, when i look around the world and see what is the greatest gap between supply of capabilities and demand on our forces, to me it is the scenario set that is extreme and comfortable. we don't have the strategy. we don't have the capabilities in some cases but we don't have the technologies. in some cases we do have capabilities we don't have

enough of them so there's a capacity question. we don't have the alliance relationship it would probably don't have the necessary resources. besides that we are all set for these scenarios. and i think they should be central for sizing and shaping element in this qdr that is about to kick off. the second set is a little fuzzier but i'm worried about bio and i think by the enabled attacks, the chances of those are going to increase as the biotech revolution accelerates and as it proliferates centers of excellence across the world, the chances of a nonstate actor using these technologies could greatly damage u.s. interests is unfortunately rising very dramatically, and we can certainly talk about some of those things in the q&a. and i don't think the department is close to being prepared for such contingencies. when the atlantic council at a conference on global trends last december and there was a panel on the future of war with michele flournoy and tom, this

was the one question i asked michelle, you can check out the video of this panel on our website. i said how fair it is the department was set sinners? she said nowhere near being prepared to these, which is very concerning to me. .3, although more on these scenarios. these were interest, number five on nate's list of u.s. interests, and i look at the defensive strategic guidance from last january of 2012. illicit wmd is one of the missions but i would argue it isn't a priority, unfortunately for at least as much as it should be. there's a gap between a mission list i in this case and the capabilities of force posture that would be needed to carry it out with confidence. there's sort of an over a dozen different units or organizations that have pieces of this nation in the department, but there's little synergy from what i can tell and there's not very strong integration nor unity of

command. if you can name one officer and even the three-star level that has this mission as his or her singular priority, i'm willing to listen. i'm not sure if i found the person you. if you can of the number of wmd professionals and the combatant command staff, i think you'd have an interesting indicator of the degree to which this priority mission which was listed in the president's guidance is actually being resourced, even in terms of personnel allocation but let alone in terms of other aspect of how one underwrites strategy. so my own view is we should reverse this, overcome the scope and do a little more balancing of our limited resources to get us to the level of national attention that it warrants before it too late. my fourth point is very basic and very short. resources, i think we've all been to enough of these fans that talk about the resource constraints -- these events, that we're working through the i think they have a way of

beneficial way of kenya to focus the mind a little bit on what strategy really is to the art of connecting your resources to your strategic and using various, various means. so i think anyone who says we should develop the strategy and have the capabilities in a resource and constrained environment, strategy without a sense of resources is a hallucination. and so strategy actually demands a sense of the resources that we think we will have available. that doesn't mean you can't marshal more resources, and that's the president's job, the congresses job, but we can't resource everything to the fullest extent. that's just doing everything will want to do. so i think a heavy dose of resources, is useful in this discussion but i don't think that we are anywhere near the point where we can't resource the most important priority mission in a cost effective way. that does assume that the

pentagon actually comes to realize what the private sector has realized, this thing called 21st century business practices, headquarters operations. i could give you a list of the redundancies in the headquarters, of the department right now that would probably squeeze out another 10% of the budget, but probably for another seminar. >> general? >> thanks, nate. thanks for the introduction. thanks for inviting me, not just here but to participate in the thinking process. i'm going to pick up where the study actually ended, and that's with denial, which, of course, is not just a river in egypt. it's a climate very much alive here within the beltway. we just would like not to have to have large numbers of ground forces. we would like to believe they are not really necessary. we would like to think that we can anticipate the kind of war that the future will hold for us, and shape the strategic

environment and our military force structure in a future. one wonders if we could do this. we would also like to think that we can prevent future threats to american interests because of our advanced intelligence forecasting capacity. again, one wonders if we could actually do it, why haven't we? we believe that should we fail in the forecast, some rapid decisive operations or remote use of force will resolve the issue, or will have enough time to raise the forces that are necessary to meet whatever the challenge we are facing. and, finally, we like to think that the destructive power of our military forces, which is pretty significant, will resolve whatever conflict of the day the nation faces. in the destruction equals i in e fighting equals and for equals

in the problem. though history and, of course, the last 12 years the war would teach us the exact opposite. this is a story we tell ourselves, the story isn't true, fiction. it's not been true for a while. and we've covered the fiction in the past because we had sufficient size. we build a sufficiently large military force with balance capabilities and naval power and air power, ground power, special operations power to cover the fact that we really don't know what the future will hold. although we didn't want to admit it, size and balance, capacity offsets uncertainty and inability to predict the past but as a matter fact the study that nation colleagues authored, secretary gates at west point said, and ago, when it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagement, at least since vietnam, our record has been perfect.

we have not gotten it right once. what remains unstated or is that a lesser included contingencies of the past, that is all of our actual operations, were possible because we decide against large conventional threats. even with noriega in panama required large number of ground forces, so did receiving the government in haiti, so did enforcing a dayton accords, so deliberating kuwait. all this while the berlin wall was falling, the soviet union was collapsing, and we paid ourselves a peace dividend by shrinking the very forces that were now more often being used. fewer ground forces were certainly necessary for the destructive days of regime changes in iraq and afghanistan. but we seem to have already forgotten because we are tired that the post-regime operations

require the nation to transform the army reserve components to 200,000 more operation reserves and higher almost 200,000 contractors. the stress on the military is not the result of having -- it's the result of having too few. and now we tell ourselves never again, which, of course, we told ourselves before. up with the csis study and the national intelligence council study, global trends 23 and cns study driving in the dark, and a bunch of others, we have several data points that tell us that uncertainty is the norm and our strategic environment. the potential for conflict is increasing and the types of conflicts are most likely the kind that can't be resolved with new destructive power. the global trends study comes right down to say that potential for multiple forms of war comes

at a time of rising uncertainty as to the united states willingness or ability to be the guarantor of security. and at a time of increased ambiguity as to the stability of international assistance. in times of such uncertainty and ambiguity, with increased likelihood of conflict, we need to tell ourselves the truth, not to hold onto our fiction. a, strategic leaders need more options, not less and the options associate with the kind of complex contingencies that are in the csis study or the kind of hybrid work, interstate warfare, war amongst the people, whatever else you want to call these things will require more ground force capacity, not less. and, of course, we prefer at least a relatively clearly defined semi-conventional state-based threat that the u.s. military must deter and defeat upon which we can size our

forces. unfortunately, this is not the reality that we face. we have, we do have some potential threats like this and we have to have the military forces necessary to deal with them, but these now have become unlike the past a lesser included contingencies. the real issue is having a large enough and balance in a force to do with the areas of increasing risk outlined in this study, the area of the likely, our typical mission sets in this study and others similar to them. the problem is doing so doesn't get our story. because making these adjustments may require more ground forces, not less, changes, not stability. unfortunately, reality has a way to forcing itself on a nation with global responsibility and global interest. certainly the johnson administration didn't want to get bogged down in the non. the bush 41 administration

didn't want to invade panama. the clinton administration didn't want to do bosnia. the bush 43 administration didn't want to fight terrorists and nation building. and some future administration may well find itself having to do just what it does not want to do. and when they find themselves in this position and turned to the military for options, decision space will not be on the side. forces in being provided to previous administration put options, forces count much less. so the csis study we're talking about today as was others is very clear. the varieties of confrontations and conflict that have seen parts of our collective strategic future cannot be resolved by destruction alone. or solely by light, lethal, fast and remote military action, or by small special forces operations. the real threat, my view anyway,

real threat that we face is ourselves and our ability to deny what we need and choose instead what we prefer. thank you. >> thank you for letting me both be a part of this study. i make a rare think tanker and this is unfortunately an all too rare example of a useful think tank product that i think provide intellectual scaffolding that osd i think the ultimate appreciate, even though they might not recognize it immediately. you know, the art of strategy is all about thinking about possible futures to inform decisions you make today in the present, and that's a challenge the department is facing. uncertainty, friction, and constrained resources are the unwanted but constant companions of defense strategists. and we've all faced this in our time in the building.

and as defense spending gets quite constrained, which unfortunately it appears it's going to the next two years, defense planners are going to have to come to some fundamental assumptions, open up some biases and think through creatively the ways and means logix that we've used in the past. there's a lot of pressure on the way, on means i think will have to be more creative on the ways. formulating a balanced strategy will require thinking and you about scenarios which i think this is the most commendable aspect of this particular approach or. we have to make tough trade-offs which this study peace up for conversation. and will have to face new threats and omissions as barry and this report suggest, more than we're doing right now. i would talk about risk today. the point i like about, it's a component of strategic planning. we often talk about the logic but the fourth component is exploring, understanding and not denying risk. as the general pointed out.

we do face limited information and we have to admit that there are some limitations both in her decision-making ability and our processes. it's not about our intelligence, it's just the nature of department. in fact, one criticism about a slide, there's a phrase for the foreseeable future. there's no such animal as the foreseeable future. so a prudent strategist has to ask the right questions and that what this particular product is all about, it's about questions and exploring issues that we are not accountable with. were coming to grips with a deep underlying trends that will reshape the securing prime and the landscape in the years ahead. my boss general dempsey has been doing this with a speech on the security paradox. peace is breaking out or we can control the world and influence events with a smaller and cheaper force, with a range of changes going on in the out years create a huge paradox. there's many people very comfortable that we live in a third prosperous world in which

the number of forces going down and that's not the trend i'm seeing for the next 10 or 20 years. the evidence just that our future is not going to be linear continuation the last few years or the next couple of months but it's not going to be as benign since the fall of the cold war and we need to anticipate that with a little more intellectual rigor. i like again this risk aspect. u..

>> the contest going on in washington, d.c. that studies like this kind of expose a little bit is there's always, you know, a war going on between the past and the present, folks that are holding on to their comfort zones, areas they understand and are comfortable with the most, but the more you do that, the more you set yourself up for greater risk with for greater impact than we recognize there. i like barry's comments about the future changes and multiple sciences and combination of the sciences suggest we have to take more work about the future. i think dod recognizes the risk, maybe not to the degree we did, but i think in the last gdp and in the strategic guidance, i think we tried to come to grips with many of the things to the degree that we a complex range

of scenarios, combination of those to test the force, shape, and size, and the guidance is more explicit than some would like. at pecks are hedges, mitigating, the reverseibility language. the guidance has critic, and i get critical of aspects of it, but things like the shift and pivot to the pacific, the things like air, sea, battle con cement, whether you like it or not, attempts by the strategy community to move forward, look at the future, and to deal with future challenges risks, and this upcoming gdr, i hope language like this influences that a bit so we can continue to push forward into the future. again, minimizing future risk. unfortunately, there's a number of con textual factors that influences risk more than mentioned today, and in addition

to the disruptive resolutions barry identified, five contextual factors presented to this particular group and one to concern us is just the scale, scope, and viability of the industrial base. i believe that manufacturing and some areas of the force, the industrial base is pretty fragile, if not thin. dave and others here are experlgts in that area, but in my time in the building, the amount of effort we had to do to sustain naval aviation, naval shipbuilding, and missile production capacity is a level in some areas, and i think it's going to get thinner in the near future. we also face a rising manpower cost problem, the percentage of the budget available to pay for the force is what is another factor driving the foresight down. if every soldier and marine is 60% more expensive today than when the war start, we'll cut the size of force to keep the pay and benefits up, crowding

out investment and pushing down the force size. same is true with modernization costs replacing $50,000 vehicles, replaces $1 million vehicles with $15 million vehicles, $20 million hell cometters, and that, too, kinds of replacement costs, on the wrong side of the strategy, and we need to get our hands around that, but it's hard, and, again, that pushes down the force structure size and pulls up investment levels for a smaller force. clark has done a study here about the erosion of inflation factors eating the inside of the budget statement repressing down a double whammy. that's really going to affect the capacity and size of the force. the ability to respond, amount of time it takes to get to places and assist people is going to be longer, more risk, more costs, over time. in addition to the double whammy, there's a triple whammy. we'll have fewer friends,

allies, and partners in the future that are viable. there's a few in the room today, but in general, either through demographics, politics, deem graffing decline and economic disstress and in some areas in europe, we're not going to have the assistance and the friends and allies we had in the past, at least in quantity. hopefully they are there with us producing a triple whammy, and all this affects the size of the force and affects demands put on the force to do many, many things. it's not a specialized force, but a special purpose force to adapt to other scenarios overtime, and that is a training risk and force management risk we are not dealing with. on top of the con contextual factor is is the idea there's wars that are short, clean, and easy rather than brutish, hard,

ambiguous, and long. we have to get past that. the last decade is noted. it's ugly. it's expensive. it has not been successful, but this scenario development exercise indicates, unfortunatelily, it's going to be more frequent in our future. we can ignore it, be unprepared, react unprepared, but the burden on soldiers and marines to respond, but that's not a proper strategic approach. wrapping up a little bit here. risk can be self-inflighted. it can be self-inflictedded by denial, our own unwillingness to challenge biases and unexamined assumptions, self-inflicted by bureaucratic inferences, and we have some of those. we cannot eliminate risk avoiding all surprises. there's no such thing as a risk-free security environment. scenarios and studies like this are critical and all too rare, unfortunatelily, to avoid

inflicted spriz and for that, it's a commendable activity. in closing, you know, i think we have to come to grips with the frequency and consequence, the time lines, importance to the scenarios. there's another level of analysis that needs to go on that hopefully someone else wants done, and hopefully they'll give it to me to do or you to do, but we have to rethink. some of the scenarios are outside and should be thought of as the fore sizing, fore shapes thought process and probably would have to be resourced. some could be inside the scenario and thought of as a limited, you know, less incomed offense to which we're not as prepared, not trained to, not willing to have the unique doctrine, opportunities, and the correct equipment in every single case.

that ultimately is the risk money money that we have to do. we can't do it from the outside. wrapping up, i always like to quote my good friend and colleague in the u.k., colin gray, colin says force planners, folks like myself and barry, have two cardinal virtues, principles to follow, prudence and adaptability. now, prudence is all about risk and being honest about risk, understanding risk, not just closing your eyes to it saying you accepted it, but truly understand the risk that is in it. studies are prudent. adaptability, we need, not the ones we want to have, but need, making them adaptive enough to react to multiple self-inflictedded scenarios that probably are the kind on the force size, and the range of adopt bt -- adaptability and now the big question is capacity.

with that, i'll close, thank you. >> great, thank you, thanks to all the panelists, actually did a great job, and what i'll do is open it to questions. microphones back there. there's a hand upright away. you first. >> thanks for the comments. i'd like to expand the aperture of the study three ways. first, as frank mentioned, it's a good study by the end of the decade,no procurement or cutting the force in half. how do you take into account resource realities? second, seems the failure is not military over 12 years, but the civilian side of the effort, ten it's difficult to see engaging by the military without civil yap backup. how do you deal with that, and, third, this report, obviously, has been isolated to look at ground forces, but can you say what you need to terms of the supporting maritime and nature

forces that go along with the package? >> great. okay. i'll take a crack at all three from the perspective of the report, and i'll open it up. clearly, the resource realities, i mean, my view op resource reality's is this. first, get the capability right. like, what is it that you're going to ask the force to do, and then you need to worry about the capacity. now, unfortunately, those are both -- those questions are trying to be answered at the same time under extreme amount of pressure. we've suggested the capability's probably different than what you wanted pre-9/11. you know, pre-9/11, focused on the north korea-iraq problem, 2011, focused on extinguishing terrorism and counterinsurgency. we are answering for the ground forces different that requires

different capabilities. the question or point frapping brought up on what's been the capacity, that's the next step. you got to test it. i'm a bit, you know, concerned that we're not going to get to that next step. we're just going to make reductions first and them figure out if we can do something with it later. i think that's what -- getting the capability right is important. now, on your plan on the civilian, i was at the army war college, talked about a similar topic on the civilian military balance with respect to complex contingencies. i mean, i think that if you think the defense budget's going down, don't expect the civilian capacity to suddenly expand. i mean, it's going to go down as well. unfortunately, the military's always, as of late anyway, filled the capacity gap in that regard and will likely be asked to continue to do so, which is another reason you have to maintain an adaptable force with the ability to do multiple missions, mull. role, and take on things that

are not purely military responsibilities all the time. i'm not confident there's going to be a sudden revolution in civilian contingency capacity, and then finally, joint forces. i mean, i say the one thing that comes out clearly in this, and this will be, again, a question of assessing the balance between what you believe is the most important threat is with a force base, including both the army and marine core, to have to get there. the places that we're currently assuming the most risk is in the area of strategic mobility. the likelihood that that's going to continue to be an area of risk based on current policy priorities is increasing. i mean, and we found that to be the longest pole in the tent with respect to projecting the forces. forces forward, more back, and you take more risk in deployability and power projection. somehow, you have to determine you don't want to project the

force in the numbers that might be suggested, or that you have to take some remediation to change that imbalance right now. anybody else? >> yeah, i'll take a little crackment i think in terms of resources, the easy way out is to cut the number of marines and soldiers, the personnel costs. they are going up. we have to figure out a way to reduce personnel costs, no doubt about it, but the issues of modernization costs frank talked about, the bureaucratic overhead costs barry talked about, the shrinking of the industrial base that drive costs up, these are all really hard, in my opinion, less likely to address, and, therefore get to the scenario you described where we just keep cutting the personnel size because it has the least lobby, but that drives us to a position

where you don't have an adaptable force because you don't have a force. right. >> if you don't have a force, you can't adapt anything. right. >> one thing that as a trainer and a commander, many of the skills and the disciplines and competencies used in haiti in 19844, forcing peace accords in bosnia, and training the iraqi security forces are derivatives from the skills that you get from a general purpose force. >> uh-huh. >> they have to be modified, no doubt about that, but that's the adaptability from the core skills and core equipment, so i see the ease of personnel cost driving us to a position where we are incurring the most strategic risk.

>> is this on? >> yep. >> i want to go back to the comment frank made on cognitive challenges of getting over the clean and easy wars explaning we're going to have nasty wars. that was addressed too in a speech given at the, and they give the sons and daughters -- summarizing it, and trust us, how do we go to the american people and how do we go to congress, and form that narrative because we're wrestling with that in the navy too, and how do we form a narrative that says, hey, we know we are not getting the message across that things are not going spiffily, and you don't have to send everyone home

because everyone's final. we don't know how to get that message across to the middle america or folks in congress who are increasingly isolated from the military. >> the process of the study, we think that, in general, there's a greater degree of -- and you see it now with respect to syria -- there's going to be greater degree of self-deterrence; right? that's going to -- there's a couple of impacts that is going to have on operations. first impact it's going to have is likely to go late. you're going to wait so long that you're likely going to enter under very, you know, imperfect circumstances, and, therefore, the art of the possible is actually limited from the beginning. by the same token, i think the missions will be chartered, but

there's a tendency that the missions, themselves are chartered under a more limited map date and open ended, and i think a limited mandate in accepting all professionals on the stage here and extend a limited mandate, but bottom line a limited mandate is more easily explapble; right? rather than revolutionary transformation of a society or raising a democracy in a foreign country or something like that a much more limited mandate suggested in the report falls many times to the distributed security mission where you literally stand with your back to something important in your rifle pointed out that the risk and important to you, that risk is more explainable to the american people. i'll open it up. >> some of the missions are more human humanitarian, easy to sell. we have to explain to the american people the treaty requirements established.

we have friends, partners, allies, and commitments to, and i don't hear too many people, particularly even monk the political civilian class, recognizing that. we have obligations to people, we have to live up to the agreements as well, and i hope some the other friends both in asia and europe can sustain their obligations as well. >> [inaudible] >> on the civilian side and military side people do recognize it. we wrestle with this in the build l all the time, and it's hard. you know, there's priorities to set, not an easy job, not that people are, you know, pulling something over the american people or pulling wool over their eyes, but it is a hard task, and we have to adapt from the past, this cop test between the future and the past, we have

to unleash ourselves a little bit. there's new challenges, and it's hard to get rid of the new challenges to make investments, cyber, bio, and i agree with barry that a decade ago, several of us thought would come with much more furry and much more violence and fallly than we have seen, thank god, up to this point, but these revolutions intersect material sciences, nano, cyber, and bio, and they are going to impact us. i think we can continue to educate the american people, but, you know, reinvestments, alterations, getting rid of the -- going to a lean operation, less headquarters, taking out positions of government that i've been in, you know, the middle management level, and, you know, get to the points to invest in the capability at the point where people really have more risk than getting a paper cut like i had in my time in the pentagon.

[laughter] >> next question. yes, sir? right here in the front. >> a policy consultant. you eluded to it go back to the district, the air force base, and my constituents don't want to hear about problems in withdrawalling down the military, but they want to talk about social security, talk about medicare, medicaid, losing their 401(k)s, and, you know, we just don't get the message across. the other piece of that is we saw on tuesday, the paper on the defense mechanism, cutting defense budget, our huge supporters like the british had to cut back on their military. how are the american people looking and think we want to spend all money on our military,

our key allies out there, the other economies cutting back, why should we be doing, being the worldwide policemen? >> well, first, we didn't take a position to b a worldwide policemen. in fact, i think one of the -- one of the things we really endeavored to do in the report is actually talk about the real need for appetite suppression to contingency operations, endeavor at the beginning, again, back to the point over here, endeavor at the beginning to really set, you know, minimum acceptable and achievable objectives, set out to achieve them, and when you do, them you reevaluate when you disend gauge, but setting objective, and the other thing is the whole reason that the study was chartered on the idea of core interest was to get down to, you know, brass tax and say let's talk about what's really

important to use our ground forces for. it may be, freeing, you're talking about a once in 20 years sort of employment of the force. i'm not suggesting that, just saying, but then at least you've defined what the left and right limits of that are, and, frankly, then the sizing argument comes, and, that's why it's the second step, and determine what it is you want your force to do and really focus and target it in an era we all know the resources are declining, and, therefore, you're going to have to be more pennywise of what you invest in, and get to the force. >> i'm a steady member of the force, and you do need to impress the american people, but you are more discriminate, deliberate, and concerning about the situations we get into and how we get in and accomplish what needs to be done. you just pointed out basically

the sixth factor to incorporate in this, and i worked with adam smith the last couping years, and, you know, this is a problem. you know, if we're over investing in things overseas that people don't see any value in, you're going to lose the support of the american people, and we need to maintain that, and unemployment up in fort louis 12-14%, worried about keeping a brigade in germany and some village, you know,? >> i talk to the family, and it's the same issues, but, you know, gaining access is not just fighting your way in. that's one way to gain access

and having allies and relationships require investment in time. no relationship is built on the virtual basis. you can use virtual means to maintain a relationship, but it's people that are related, and you have to be there with people. we're in a position where, for good reasons, we're drawing into the united states and becoming a base force, have been for a number of years, but the tradeoffs and blanszs have to be real, and that has to be part of the thinking into the basing strategy and access strategy, not just bombing our way in.

>> there's a discussion of going too far, bringing everybody back, making everyone's congressmen happy, and not having the benefit of what general duvik talked bowel, but i think, currently, we're too far at the other end of the spectrum. in terms of engagement activity, i don't see any sense of discipline or focus in our sort of far flung, you know, co-com driven engagement and security operations and strategy. when the defense department focused it, and made it sort of lived within the resources that we have the message, and if you said how many countries are you engauged in in 2013? sequester aside, which may have changed things in the last couple months, i imagine you won't get a very sort of -- a very tight answer to that.

it needs to change. >> strategic targeting is, like, really important. we ran into this in the report as well. it's just focusing on your shaping activities, you know, first start with the interests and work back on the things most important, and if you find at the end of the day, you know, you have more in the check checkbook than you thought, you add on to it. this idea of actually demonstrating the american people responsibility and the use of resources is the first step in that regard. we have time for one more question. it's this gentleman back here. >> the easy option if other things aren't done, if the army were a company, and, of course, secretary hagel addressed this

the other day about some analogies appropriate and some not, but if it were a company, first we do is consolidate facilities so we'd adjust thing like brack in the army. second thing is the compensation reform. if we overpay some employees and underpaying others, let's say if we had a transition in technology and market conditions or whatever, we have to partner with capabilities that we don't have effectively by ourselves. you point to the importance of the relationships with partners and things like that, but if you look at the two options of, if you will, on the one side, improving the detail ratio, the way a company would do, the army has greater obstacles, things

like that, and versus strength, is there potential to improve the truth to tell ratio so strength doesn't have to be brought down so much, or is strength going to bear all the hits because politics make it too hard to reform military compensation or consolidate facilities or modernize i.t. and business processes and things like that? >> well, i mean, first off, if you're understanding detail rash yore as reduction of overhead infrastructure, and we should get at that. in terms of compensation reform, we have to get at that. in terms of modernization, acquisition costs, you know, all those things, we have to get at, but there's another dimension in the rare owe that we have to be careful about, and that is in the theater setting circumstance that the csis study did a good

job in describing. you can have a low ratio in some services because the army has detail, and it's the tail for everybody, so as we analyze this, we have to be accurate in the way we do it, and i think go after for the political support necessary for those mechanisms that we know are real hard. how many times -- if we add up the number of times we heard "acquisition reform," we'd run out of paper running it. [laughter] we got to get the political support necessary to take on some of these really necessary and would be very helpful ratios without destroying the ratio that we do need. another example of my opinion of misanalysis is herb lop.

why don't we cut out echelons in between? the military force is not walmart. the environment to fight wars in which you restock your shelf, and, further, the psychological benefits that jupe your commanders get from senior commanders and information benefit that seniors get from junior commanders is very much embedded in the echelon that is our force. again, i'm all for the ratio reduction in those areas there that are separate to do so, but keep our eyes open for things that are false savings. >> i second that. frank? >> real quick, a shameless self-advertisement, but in the corporate world, raid all the training and education accounts and under value human capital, education, research and development and things, and i work at national defense

university, and i would strofngly suggest, although, educational reform and technology are also part and parcel of overhead reduction in thinking both the future differently, but we have to maintain the human capital to the degree we can on the qualitative and educational side. >> well, with that, we'll have to wrap up. i would like to, actually, thank the panelists with a round of applause. actually, i think they did a wonderful job helping us talk about this. [applause] the report, itself, is available online as well as the critical question that we handed out at the beginning, a video of this event will be available online. we're extremely grateful for your attendance today, and on behalf of csis and our president, ceo, john, i am very grateful for your attendance today, and i look forward to engaging on this very important issue going forward. thank you very much. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations]

>> president obama is planning to announce cabinet nominees this afternoon nominating congressman mel watts to head the federal house and finance agency that overseas fannie mae and freddie mack and no , ma'am in this case tom wheeler as head of the communications commission. wheeler is a venture capitalist and former head of the national cable television association and communications of internet association. we'll have live coverage of the announcement on c-span at 2:15 p.m. eastern. also live this evening on booktv.org, authors talk about recent research on autism and shares experience living with autism. she's an animal science professor at colorado state university and has written books on the topic including "the autistic brain" live at 7

eastern on booktv.org. tonight at eight eastern here on c-span 2, booktv in prime time with focus on the books in the 60 #s and 70s discussing the personal accounts of the civil rights movement, vietnam, and the legal system. we go on a walking tour of the newly opened george w. bush library in texas. it begins at eight eastern. here's part of the interview. >> as you well know, your husband had a lot of critics. will this change people's view of the presidency? >> i don't know it's going to change the way. it's not meant to do that, but explain what happened in those eight years of history, to talk about all the different thicks we faced as a country and his choices, and decisions to respond to whatever the challenges were. i think people will learn a lot,

a lot of things people don't know like about aids related programs that people of the generosity of the american people funded. i think there's a lot of interesting things that people will learn about that they didn't know before. i also think it will give them an idea of what it's like to be president. their successes and failures, and just like in anyone's life, we all have that, and, certainly, our presidents are human and have, you know, the same sort of records. >> has it met your expectations? >> it has. i think people will find it very, very interesting. we tried to include everything, and, of course, yo can't include every single thing. you and i have not talked about the support for disdance movement part of this wall i'm looking at. >> mrs. bush, thank you very much. >> thank you very much, thank you so much for being here.

>> see the interinterview with laura bush tonight at eight eastern on c-span and guides us on a walking tour of the george w. bush library. >> there are two infamous prisons in the western u.s.. one is the territorial prison, and the other one is alcatraz. there's something in our culture, in our consciousness of what would have it have. like to be in a prison like this? the yuma territorial prison was considered to be ad -- a model and humane institution in its day, and this was the solitary confinement cell, any major infraction, talking back to a guard, not giving your respect to, you know, the authorities, it was really, if they couldn't deal with you, the

dark cell could deal with you. of all the treatment, this was the place you didn't want to come because you did not have a la treen. you got bread and water once a day, occasionally there's more than one person in here, and one great big prison break out, there were 12 people in here. now, folklore, we have no proof of this, that said a mean guard would in the pitch black k you'd feel something coming down the air shaft, and it could have been a scorpion or snake. now, that is just something that's not documented. >> from 1876 to 1909, the yuma territorial prison home to more than 3,000 prisoners including 29 women. this weekend, discover i history and literary life of yuma sunday at 5 p.m. on american history tv on c-span3.

>> now, the former direct i have north african affairs under president george w. bush on the situation in syria participated in a panel discussion on intelligence and counterterrorism at this year's antidefamation league continual summit in washington, d.c.. >> my involvement with adl dates back to the early 1980s when i was exposed to the league and its mission who was then adl's national chair. for me, adl's appeal has been two-fold. people and its mission. i have the utmost respect and affection for adl's professional staff and for my fellow lay leader. they're a group of quality people steply committed to bettering our jewish community

and our society as a whole. time and again over the years, i've witnessed the adl taking smart, proactive action, at times controversial, which made a difference and have been prove -- improved the lives of so many individuals. i'm proud to have played a role and to be a part of the adl family. the general gave us considerable food for thought. now, we have the good fortune to hear additional insightings -- insights from a distinguished pam of experts on the nature of the terrorist threat, the american and global response, and how well law enforcement authorities are equipped today to prevent terrorism and extremism.

jew dit miller, investigative prize winner journalist writing on the middle east, counterterrorism; and the appropriate balance between national security and individual likes in the 9/11 world. the manhattan institute and frequent congressmen taiter on these issues, author of books on bilogical weapons and on the spread of islamic extremism. elliot abrams, senior fellow for middle eastern studies on the council of foreign relations, held a number of senior white house and state department posts and served as the national security adviser covering the middle east for president george w. bush.

mr. abram's new book tested by the bush administration and the israeli palestinian cop flight was just published. kathy -- chief of police for the washington, d.c. metropolitan police department, appointed to this position in january 2007, a nationally known leader in the law enforcement community, she's establish the agency's first homeland security counterterrorism branch. adl is proud of our long relationships the graduate of the league's advanced training school course on extremists and terrorist threats. in 2009, the police department received adl's shield award in

recognition of their response to the shooting at the united states holocaust memorial museum one of the nation's most thoughtful writers on the national security choices facing america. he is the seep your fellow at the brookings institution where he co-directs the harvard law school brookings project on law and security. he's the cofounder and editor in chief of the popular law fair blog, an online forum for discussions about the implications of national security policy, a former reporter and for nine years, an editorial writer for the "washington post," author of two

books on counterterrorism issues. before i turn the floor over to ben, please join me in a warm welcome for our panel. [applause] >> how about now? [laughter] >> yes. >> so i want to save as much time as panel for the panelist to be guided by your questions which i will cop veigh. before we do that, we're each going to give about five minutes of thought in geographical order from left to right. every time, you know, just to set it up, every time, you know,

like what happened in boston in the last couple week happens, there is a reimmediate reversion in the political system, and probably inevitably so in a series of questions actually that this organization as a draft have taken positions on questions, like, under what circumstances can you or should you hold a terrorist suspect in the criminal justice system, what circumstances should you treat that perp as a military detainee, what are due process rights that we should and shouldn't regard as essential in the up folding terrorist emergency? you know, these inevitably imp kate important foreign policy issues, too, particularly as one is not necessarily sure in the unfolding situation whether, in fact, the attack is the domestic

matter or whether it, you know, imp kates foreign policy issues, or, in fact, part of an op going military conflict. all the issues are very much in play as you think about prevention and as you think about as well as, you know, questions of what, where lines are between what we want to respect between free speech, including the free speech of radical and unpleasant individuals and things we want to intervene to prevent and stop. all of those issues are inevidentbly in play thinking about the fall out of what happened in boston, and the panel here, fortunately, has, you know, remarkably diverse expertise on a range of issues, and so, as i say, we're going to talk for five minutes and them open it up, engage a little with

each other, and hopefully you guys will be sending in questions so that we can engage with you. judy? >> thank you, ben, thank you, all, for being here today. i want to congratulate the adl as everyone has, but abe was instrumental in my first book, which was not about terrorism. it was kind of a golden era we thought in the early 80s of aperiod in which i was thinking about evil and the holocaust and how different countries reinvented their history, and abe and the adl provided some really invaluable insights and information so thank you, and congratulations. i'm focused -- i've been focused on boston, like as have most reporters since that terrible event, and i'm specifically focused coming from new york on the issue of how we prevent them, and i wrote a somewhat

controversial piece this week for the "wall street journal" asserting that had the brothers lived in new york, they probably would have been flagged and followed by the nypd as opposed to the boston police. that takes nothing away from boston's magnificent response, the boston pd, to a hoer rep douse situation. you all saw it. you saw the amazing effectiveness of the response, the great luck of having hospitals nearby, first class facilities, but my question was would we have stopped it in new york? i believe we might have. this is not to say we can stop all such incidents as was said, something's going to slip through a than when resilience becomes important, but this terms of prevention, because new york has repeatedly been target, the number one al-qaeda, jihad

target in the united states, it has had to fend for itself, and as a result, we have a police force of 34,000 uniformed policemen, 50,000 overall, a thousand of whom, analysts and uniformed people, devoted day in, day out to combating terror and preventing terrorism. extraordinary intelligence division with a lot of people, with more language capability than the fbi. it's not just a question of numbers. it's not just a question of a p 320 million dollar budget just for counterterrorism and intelligence opposed to boston's 280 # dollars, the entire boston pd budget versus nypd just for terror. it's a question of priority. do you feel it's important for your police force, whether you have ten cops like in long

island village, not had any terrorism, or do you have a thousands people devoted in new york who are the entire block pd is 2,000, but do you think that this is a mission that's important enough to devote resources to because in new york, we said, obviously, yes, you cannot count on the fbi because they are not local. they local cops know the community, know what to look for, know what is not normal, and as a result, the brothers and the mosque they attended would have been a place of interest for the new york police department. there is no way that a file on someone would have been closed in new york. the file would have been

openedded. the flag to moscow would have been flagged. someone, an informant, a tip steer, a member of the congregation of the temple congregation, the mosque where they were would have, might have come forth, and either in response to financial incentives or public spirit would have told the fbi that this guy was problematic. i think that everything i've seen from the 16 thwarted attempts in new york tells me this is the the incident that would have been of concern of the nypd. once the file was open, the cyber unites would have looked at his online postings. they would have followedded his interest in chechnya terrorists, freedom fighters, been in closer contact with the moscow police who may have a liaison relation. there's a great many instances

in which this kind of tragedy might not have happened, so i salute the boston police for its extraordinary effective spooms, but the name of the game in communities across the country is going to have to be mobilizing local police to who know the community the best to prevent these incidents from happening. thank you. [applause] >> thanks, ben, judy, chief, general, it's a pleasure to be here, and i start by congratulating you all on adl's 100. let me step back to the local to the international, and what's jihady today? where are the threats of tomorrow now visible? i think the answer is in large

part. there are about 5,000 real jihads in syria, not rebels against the regime, but foreign links, this is one of the reasons i think it's been a mistake to let the syria crisis roll and grow for two years. it's been a mistake from the human tearon point of view, 80,000 dead, 4 million displaced, but from the gee dad -- jihadi point of view, it's looked like a shia and shia backed regime backedded by iran and hezbollah killing sunni, and so they gather for this fight. where do they go next? that's the question around the corner. what are the options? well, for most of them, one option they talked about is going west into lebanon to fight

his blah, the hard target, very capable group. some talk about going south, israel and other very hard targets, and another possibility is iraq where you already got, of course, a long history of she she -- shia-sunni bloody fighting, which we, americans, are all too floor, and given the grievances of the government, that's another possibility. there's something else to say that's planning more direct threat to us. of those 5,000, about a thousand are european. they are young men born in europe, citizens of france, germany, the netherlands, denmark, sweden, and so on. where will they go?

the police chiefs of those countries and the intelligence chiefs have already started talking publicly about the threat that they will go home, and you can find comments by the belgium police, danish police, the dutch police, the numbers are not great for each of the countries, you know, it's only 50-125 guys brings u -- guys, but think about that for a minute, take a middle number, 75 highly trained jihadiring's s coming from the war in syria to pick a city, copenhagen, brussels, a significant population into which they can return because they were born there, and, of course, speak the language as natives. there's another definition of home, if you take the the dutch, for example, the dutch muslim

population, heavily modernization -- moroccan, they go, quote, home to morocco, and you find the security, police, and officials woond r wondering what's next for those people? the attitude in the region is mixed. it's a strange thing. if you were a young jihad linked to al-qaeda shows up in qatar, say, or saudi arabia, you'd be arrested immediately. if you show up in syria, they'll probably arm you and pay you immediately. because they want you to take on the army in syria,less concerned where you are six months. come back in six months, see how concerned they are. this is bun of the places where they are gathering, and one of the reasons is the conflict be ended, there's 5,000 jihadis

there now. there was not a year ago. this goes on for another year, there's not going to be 5,000. there's going to be thousands and thousands more, and there are many places in the middle east that they can go. think of sinai for a minute, substantially ungoverned territory. the government of egypt, when i say the military of egypt, is very corned -- concerned about the relations with hamas, and doing a good job on the tunnels between gaza and sinai, the rest of sinai, though, lamplegly ungoverned, and the military doesn't want a confrontation with the bed bedouwins. you see the threat, and the problem with israel because if the people gather in the sinai and start attacking, what does the israelis do?

ignore it? quote, violate egyptian sovereignty, close quote, by going across the border in hot pursuit, by shooting into egypt to prevent them or detour them or to punish them afterwards? whatever israel does creates a crisis with egypt that neither israel nor the egyptian military and security people. , so we are from the point of view of the united states, western europe, and israel, at a moment of quiet and the general pointed out, for example, when you look at the northern border, how quiet it really has been, but as things fester in syria and jihad jis gather there, we have to think hoping will the quiet continue? thank you.

[applause] >> i'll try not to overlap there, but talk about the law enforcement, not being the nypd, but being in the nation's capitol. we have about 4,000 special events here in the city every year, and, in fact, just this past weekend on sunday, we hosted a half marathon in the holocaust museum event, and in a single day, with thousands and thousands of participants, and following boston as everyone imagines, with the extensive security planning that we do here, each and every event anywhere in the world takes us all back to the security plans, anywhere to be re-examined or looked at. i think not having the luxury of not having 40,000 to 50,000 police officers or a thousand officer assigned to intelligence like the nypd, you hit on the most important point of what law enforcement does, and that is

they know their community, and they know what is the anomalies. we are extremely sensitive to the smallest of outliers in the communities, and since 9/11ings there's been some 50 plots against the united states, within the united states, 42 of which described as home grown or domestic plots by people from our own communities, so who is best positioned to detect those plots or actors? that's your local police, and a lot of the cases, that is what happened, local police or intelligence from the federal agency. so for me, all though there's a lot of law enforcement agencies and federal agencies here in the city, we have to leverage those partnerships to get way we need to be consistent with a thousand officers assigned in the nypd through intelligence by lev ramming partnerships. i have often reserved 19 different federal agencies on various different task forces. we have some 30 other law

enforcement agencies in the city, most of which are relegated to very sensitive sites like the capitol, like the secret service, so we have those partners, but the real key is out in the community. washington, d.c., not that long ago was considered the murder capitol of the world, 500 murders a year when i started here, and in four years reduced homicide by 66%, and i can tell you how to do it, intelligence. [applause] ..

things that local enforcement are in the best position to detect. i would argue as we challenge ourselves calling boston that the models need to continue to be revised. i think people in communities that have good working relationships with local law enforcement understand how important it is to report suspicious activity, anomalies through partnerships with local law enforcement. the last half marathon we had on sunday, not only did we receive tips but officer stopped a gentleman walking down the 13-mile route with two backpacks because it looked a little bit out of place. happened to be a member of the press. [laughter] he was very happy we stopped him. and reported such.

[laughter] but i think the same holds true for a lot of the copts in washington, d.c. to include one just a few years ago that was state-sponsored, carried out an assassination of a saudi ambassador in washington, d.c. it is again a network that is so larger on local connections that help to detect these things. and with the challenges we face following boston you can't ignore the mental health consumer who is potentially ratified, maybe not, extremes, maybe not, great example, for 70 some years was an extremist. i remember the day after we responded to a shooting, all of the criticism on the fbi, here's this radical website, all this radical extremist behavior and speech are so many years, why isn't the fbi doing something? it does its protected speech.

the fbi couldn't do anything. surely they were unaware of him. the key for us is knowing where they crossed the line from radicalization to extremism the action. just like boston. just like with the mental health consumer who cross the line to action with the mass shootings. so that's the key the law enforcement has to focus. we do that through extensive training and education of our police officers like what we do with the adl in our programs in making sure that we keep our folks engaged, but also about the committee. we spend an extensive amount of time educating our service workers, educating other government entities that are out in the communities. public works employees. there's 1000 public works employees picking up trash. you would be surprised how many odd things that we have had turned over to us by our public works employees were picking up

trash in alleys they could've been a significant force. so it is the extent that education and extended network and having as many eyes and ears that you have. that's what the keys but if you don't have a thousand people, like the nypd, you better find a way to have a force that is at least that powerful and his waits to do that. that's why we tried to do it more. i would love the $320 million budget though. [laughter] [applause] >> i have a pile of questions here and then going to keep my remarks very brief. i want to say two things. one, both about this sort of structure of our counterterrorism debate in our prevention debate as it is kind of the fall. the first picks up on the point that chief lanier just made about the line between where radicalism turns from speech into action, and specifically

into a legal action is the point at which one can intervene as a law-enforcement matter but, of course, this creates a bit of a puzzle, right, which is you don't want to wait until something goes boom before, as your evidence of action. you don't want to wait until there's a disaster that you are responding to. you want to respond, have the capacity to respond somewhere to the left of boom, you might say. and this is why the material support laws at the federal level and conspiracy law are so important. that it is, you know, that you have the ability to prosecute and intervene at the point of action that is the support for the organization, the material intervention by the person and,

in support of terrorist activity or designated foreign terrorist organizations, or the point of action eating the point at which it agreed with somebody to commit an illegal act and you have taken some significant steps in pursuit of that. that's a sort of first point when we say, when we draw that line it's not the line defined by the explosion or the shooting of the holocaust museum. it's the line of it can be well and is seeking steps to a terrible thing before you have capacity to intervene. -- antecedent. the second point every time we have an event like what happened in boston, we immediately revert to an almost pre-scripted debate, and just to characterize a free moment, it took about 24

hours to have members of the senate on television saying that the remaining brother should be held as an enemy combatant. we immediately had a discussion about whether and when he should be read his miranda rights, whether and when he should be presented before a magistrate. a lot of this conversation was blissfully ill-informed by facts and law. [laughter] not to -- them ago through in this very earnest way, and one of the issues that we are really debating here? we are really debating detention, interrogation, and criminal prosecution, right, are we at war or is this a law-enforcement operation? and what i want to plan to seed in your mind with is the idea that this is actually a stale and old debate that doesn't really describe modern american

counterterrorism anymore. this is a sort of debate that was made a lot of sense to be having from about 2002-2004, 2005. but at this point the structure of american counterterrorism has officially changed that we should just kind of weight and actually think about the countertecounterte rrorism operations that we are actually conducting, have a debate based on them rather than the sort of pre-scripted text that we have written for ourselves. so what do i mean by that? the first point is that, you know, we are not capturing large numbers of people anymore in overseas counterterrorism operations. there are two reasons for that. one is that, you do, we not in iraq anymore and we're significantly disengaging from afghanistan. and so the environment in which we were capturing tens of thousands, an iraqi was

literally tens of thousands of people who were in american custody, doesn't exist anymore. and the residual american detention operations involved a facility in afghanistan, which is being transferred to afghan control, with a lot of pickups. and 166 people at guantánamo bay, right? so this is a significantly waning part of the american counterterrorism arsenal. the second thing is that to the extent we are still militarizing counterterrorism, it has a very, the military side has a very particular flavor, which is, and elliott alluded to this earlier, which is military operations in ungoverned spaces in the world, where we cannot engage law enforcement in those countries

effectively to resolve the issues that those, that are emanating from those regions. so we're talking about certain part of yemen. we're talking about the for taught in pakistan. we're talking about -- fatah -- certain parts of north africa. and what we have in the rest of the world is a very sharp reversion to law enforcement authority. so we have sort of dramatically bifurcated counterterrorism structure now in which domestically, and in most of the world, counterterrorism means working with, you know, law enforcement domestically. that means reading people the rights. it means people get lawyers but it means all kinds of things that lindsey graham and john

mccain are not thrilled about. but as a functional matter that's what it means. it also means liaison with foreign law enforcement and foreign militaries and most of the rest of the world, and then in these particular places, it means very aggressive standoff military and covert intelligence operation. generally but not exclusively involving unmanned aerial vehicles or drones. but also involving special forces operations as we saw most prominently in the bin laden rate. so want to stop there and i want to leave you with the idea that it is worth having debate about our counterterrorism that reflects the reality today rather than the reality that existed in 2002, 2003 when we are really invading countries as a principal feature of our

operations. thank you. i'm going to turn to this pile of questions, and i'm going to attach a name to each one among who seems like the right person to address it. how quickly does policy and law enforcement techniques a captain you terrorist methods? chief lanier? >> like most governments would'vwouldare some agile applo things very quickly. [laughter] [applause] >> the vernacular brings me to an argument that i started when i first started and homeland security counterterrorism world in 2001, and the arguments we had with the intelligence community about getting information to local law enforcement. there were several heated debates about why local police chiefs were not getting classified briefings along legitimate credible threats pertaining to their jurisdiction.

i won't name the agency's, but i remember being told on a very serious plot, that didn't turn out to be both legitimate and credible, two weeks before her large event which had responsibility for security planning that involved 8000 world delegates coming to washington, and the threat was to the venue, that they withheld information they had for seven months before briefing us because they were due to brief us on a need to know when it became imminent. what a threat becomes imminent, for me to turn a 5000 man police force and changes security plan, and that started probably a to your debate with the intelligence community on exactly that question. i don't care if it's been deemed credible or not. you give me everything and let me sort it out.

it gets you off the hook and it allows me to continue to doubt my strategy, but then, my training and my posts so if it does become credible at some point an imminent, i have a police force that is ready to deal with it. so that's the best answer i can give you. [applause] >> elliott, where is the next terrorist threat geographically and ideologically coming from? >> i think we're out of time. [laughter] the next terrorist threat, well, geographically as i said i think there is a gathering in syria. 5000 jihadi's is a lot of armed young men to worry about. the other thing we need to worry about is, i would say something we saw in mali. this is the undercover space question but it's also that kind of scene line between north

africa and, meaning morocco, algeria and so forth, and sub-saharan africa. and on that scene line which is also the scene line the court -- the board of islam we are seeing a good deal of trouble. you see inside country sometimes nigeria and on that you see trouble. to geographically i would point to syria and i would point to some of those spaces in north africa. we are just very lucky in the case of mali that the french decided to dive in. and try to prevent that from becoming completely ungoverned space. ideologically, i think we see what we see. there is a problem from an islamic extremism, part of the problem is the unwillingness to say islamists or in islamic extremism. you know, it isn't a kind of

morphed the threat out there. it comes from a particular place and it doesn't help us to deal with it if we are unable to talk about it. we're not going to be able to deal with it from a police point of you. we're not going to be able to do with a from a religious or ideological point of view. if we can't accurately describe it. that part of the threat i think we need to address. [applause] >> do you have any thoughts on that? >> i do. i'm thinking, still thinking back to the description of what hassan dead at fort hood as workplace violence i think is the best example of the problem. and the hesitation, it took 24 hours for the president to call what happened in boston terrorism. everyone with a television as to pretty quickly it was a second bomb what was going on. i don't have very much patience with a semantic debate about what we're going to call it.

i'm with cathy and everyone on this panel say what we're going to do about and how are we going to prevent it? [applause] spent chief lanier, i have a certain sympathy with what's been said i'm also aware that people like you have community relations needs to develop relationships and communities, and it doesn't necessarily help matters to be especially explicit all long the lines that elliott and judy are proposing. i'm curious, you know, you've also dealt in washington of course with what happened at the holocaust museum, which was emanating from a completely different ideological and worldview, point of view. i'm just interested for your thoughts on how good or bad an idea it is to be, to be very open about the ideological and

religious orientation of both certain but not all perpetrators of major terrorist event's? >> it's only important if you want have any effect in his with your community. you have to be honest. [applause] you have to be honest and people are going to be offended, and some will, you know, that's the price of doing business but you have to be honest and just get people engaged at a level where they understand what it is that you need the community engaged in doing. and sometimes those debates get a little heated with theirs communities but always in the same way, with people thank you for taking the beating to bring the message they need at the end of the day. with situations we don't hear, even with the frc shooting, even internally as soon as i heard the location when the shooting took place, the taliban walked into the family research council

here and opened fire on a security guard -- a gentleman walked in. i knew this was from very likely be a domestic terrorist act. as i was watching my responders commend i call the washington field office of the fbi and said let's work this joy. i think this is going to be yours. of course, my people were all up in the arms. we don't know if this is terrorism or not. we have a guy in custody and my guys are taking off in the wagon. we just need to stop and realize that let's just be honest about motivations, and judges say that publicly otherwise people not going to trust you and they will not help you. >> i just want to add one thing. another piece of this that nobody likes to talk about, except adl frankly, hatred of jews. and is a phrase we don't like to use because it's so ugly, but as we read so much of what is being

written, not just in parts of the islamic world, ma but in europe, there's no other way to describe it. and it's something we're never going to be able to deal with unless we all do actually what adl does, which is face up to it. there is an enormous amount of sheer hate, not just israel, hatred of jews that is in textbooks and in broadcasting, that's just got to be confronted. [applause] >> next question is one that is near and dear to my hearts i suppose i will take it myself. should congress pass a new authorization for use of military force? this is a question i've written about quite a bit, and the authorization for use of military force is an act of congress passed in 2001 that is the principle authorizing law for overseas military counterterrorism operations. it is very closely tied to 9/11.

i think most people agree that it is quite out of date. some people are joyful about that in the sense that they believe it is -- it's lapsing will trigger a return to a more purely law enforcement approach to counterterrorism. i am not joyful about it. i think that there's a lot of stuff that we're doing in parts of the world that is very important, that is also very tenuously connected in a direct sense to 9/11, and not clearly authorized by the aumf, that will grow worse, not better as time goes on there and i think it will be well worth congresses time and energy to think about what aspects of overseas conflict it does and doesn't want to authorize prospectively, and to do that sooner rather than later. question for probably chief

lanier and judy principally. how important is it to put security cameras to monitor public spaces, and how far would you go with this sort of monitoring? >> i'm a huge supporter of using the technologies that are available. in fact, i just came back from a trip with 24 other countries to talk about the use of technology and analytical software that can be a tremendous or small suppliers for local law enforcement and security. you name the scenario, i think that technologists are there. here in washington, d.c. we have probably the most technologically advanced police department and the country. where the largest deployment of license plate readers and automatic traffic enforcement cameras. all you washingtonians know about cctv. we have technology that we've integrated into our cctv so when a shot is fired somewhere the cameras turn and the direction

of the gunshot. there's analytical software that can help with anything that you can imagine in terms of leaving a package unattended, sending alerts for calls that come in pics on the huge proponent of using technology, including cameras from public space everywhere that you can. quite frankly i've watched this debate in washington, d.c. of all places one of most liberal cities in the world evolve from 1999-2000 when i first cameras went out and were heavily regulated, to i cannot go to a committee meeting today, and i've got one tomorrow and i can tell you what people are going to ask me, why don't i have the camera in my neighborhood? where is my camera? [laughter] increasingly, i say more and more private residence. we have businesses who are donating their camera feeds to speak with private residence. which had a guy the other day as the $300 on cameras for his home at sam's club and motion activated and sent an alert to

its own. we saw a guy walking around his house, he called the police. so this is the world we are in. i think people want to feel a sense of security that is reasonable, where there's no expectation of privacy. they want transcendent have access to that and they want to feel safer with commonsense use of technology. i think cctv is one of those things. >> elliott, how does one deal with groups like hamas and hezbollah are terrorists, but gain legitimacy because they have public support of local legitimacy emanating from charitable and public welfare work? >> i don't, i think the answer to that is, it doesn't matter if a terrace also runs a school. he is still a terrorist. and in the case of olmos and hezbollah, they are still killing innocent civilians. in the case of hezbollah right now today in syria, and the case of hamas, they have been deterred right now but how many

innocent israelis have a killed overtime? and they refuse, absolutely, to say they won't do it again. and they will do it again. so you know, legitimacy, i think the position of the united states must continue to be. it doesn't matter if you have unrelated activities that are actually even beneficial if you are feeding people. and has but does that. hamas does that. a terrorist is a terrace. these are organizations that have been designated by the united states and rightly so that we should have nothing to do with them until they abandon those terrorist activities spent also yet to river that's part of what they used to get support. that is part of how to get support. >> judy is itching to intervene. >> well, i'm with you in spirit but i think it becomes much harder when a group like hezbollah becomes a de facto lebanese government. or the muslim brotherhood

becomes the de facto of the elected government of egypt. you know, at that point you to say what do we do when these groups are legitimized not just by good work, but by popular vote. that's when you read subtle sophisticated foreign policy, which i hope we will have one day. thank you. [laughter] >> judy, this is a very confrontational question directed at you. >> good. i'm used to it as i am. >> as a bostonian and a victim of the bombings, i find it counterproductive and insensitive to finger point at the boston police department at this time. more productive would be suggestions on improving local law enforcement procedures and willingness to share best practices. [applause] >> feel free to respond stack i think, you know, i hope i wasn't

insulting those boston police. i talked about their magnificent response. but i think i police department has to do more than that. i think they have to do with the d.c. police are doing, what the new york police are doing, what the l.a. police are doing. and that is, set aside a group of your own local copts whose mission is preventing the boston marathon from happening. and at the moment the boston police department did not have that kind of capability. they were working with the jttf, the fbi. their guidelines are very different. their approach is very different, and i think, yeah, our hearts go out to everyone in boston and every, all of the victims, but we must concentrate very coolly now on figuring out it how to prevent the next attack. i'm sure that the boston police department is doing that right now, and i salute that effort. >> i want to add one comment to

that. the reality is, 24 years in law enforcement and six as chief of police in washington, i can tell you that even post-9/11 when i created homeland security characters and bureau for our agency, the average local law enforcement budget has created through a political process and the average citizen of the united states is more afraid of being a victim of a robbery in a victim of a terrorist attack still today. and that money allocated in a local enforcement budget dedicated solely to the counterterrorism homeland security prevention and response is almost unheard of in any law enforcement agency in the united states. and so, the challenge for local law enforcement is to find ways where you can to convince your constituents, because the people who are elected through your budget i put in office by the people in your communities. your community. but also if that money is not

allocated, you've got to find ways to do it. and i can tell you it is not easy. when i run homeland security characters and goes i do them in most violent areas of the city at 10:00 on a saturday night tot guess what? people bother because it's very visible. i get my training and. so in boston's defense, i would say that it's not easy because it takes a lot of money to build capability and assign people specifically to home and secured or counterterrorism and get the support and your budget. it's very difficult. >> agreed. [applause] >> so that actually brings us their naturally to the next question which is regarding both the nypd and the boston police department. do we have the correct balance between security and civil liberties as terrorism continues to evolve, or do we need new strategies? anybody who wants to take a crack at that. >> i will take a crack, if want

to take yet another swipe at "the associated press" stories that were done on the quote blanket muslim service program of new york. this was a series of stories there were over 35 of them in the year about the gross violation of civil rights of muslims in new york. is a 650,000-750,000 people for muslim-americans, 40% of whom are born overseas. this series of articles alleged that their rights were being violated largely by a community mapping project at the very beginning post 9/11 when the nypd tried to figure out who was where and how to respond to that, and who were friends likely to be supportive of law enforcement, of counterterrorism efforts, and who are likely to be hostile. and yet this series not only wanted to surprise, it went on to win a very prestigious award

from boston, harvard university told smith prize. $50,000. but it made the job of the nypd 10 times more difficult than it is. it sowed fear within the muslim community that actually hadn't been there because within this entire series, the ap was never able to show harm to a single muslim-american living in new york. and i think it's journalism like that that really complicated the mission rather than try and find creative ways of knowing that you're going to be watching places of concern. whether or not they happen to be in a mosque or in a coffee shop or a garage, that these places must be watched and it doesn't mean that people are being profiled or targeted because of their religion or their race.

it's a very hard balance. i think the nypd has done well, but that's just my view. the court are looking at this issue and we will have some resolution to every commune has to make this trade off and it's not an easy one. i could be wrong. >> what should be done about the remaining guantánamo bay prisoners? this is another one that is for directed at me i suppose. so the remaining population at guantánamo, there's a variety of issues that relate to that. the most exigent of them is that a large number of them are refusing to eat right now, and so you have the very real possibility that absent force-feeding, which is, in fact, taking place, some of them will starve themselves to death. the larger question is a very difficult one, in large measure because, for two reasons.

one is about half, little more than half of the residual population at guantánamo are from yemen, and the administration is very low, rightly in my view, to repatriate people to yemen right now because the conditions in the country are very unstable. pretty hard to keep track of people once you send them back to yemen. and the second reason is that for a larger group of people, sorry, not a large group. an additional group of people, which the administration and principle would like to transfer out of guantánamo, congress has slapped very severe restrictions on your ability to remove people from guantánamo either to bring them to the united states for trial, or for a larger group of people to resettle them in some other third country. and so you have a group of people who it's very, very

difficult to get rid of who in principle the administration would like not to be holding. that is, become somewhat and an intractable problem, and i think the only answer to it is either for the administration and congress to bite the bullet and assume more risk and release people who, in fact, to pose some risk of doing awful things are core take the political heat to continue to detain them and admittedly illegal status that gives a lot of people a lot of discomfort. i'm not sure there's really a third alternative there. the final component of that question, just very briefly, involves a group of people including the 9/11 conspirators in the cole bombing can spirit toward the you actually do want to bring to trial period congress has made it impossible to bring them to trial in the

united states, in federal court and so you are inevitably the with a military commission system in that regard. and that system has had a lot of tough problems getting off the ground. and so there's a lot of different challenges that are wrapped up in that question. none of which has easy answers. how does policy and law enforcement protect against lone wolf terrorists inspired by terrorist ideology via the internet, social media, but let's just add to that, presumably not tied specifically or at the direction of any individual overseas terrorist group? >> i i should think we're in better shape and local law enforcement with the lone wolf, homegrown violent extremist driven academic are the mental health system when someone can

pick up a firearm ago into a school. i think that's because our communities are prepared to report to police when they see a rabbit behavior as our business committees because with educating over the but if someone is making an auto purchase that seems out of place or behavior while making a purchase, there a lot more couple having to strip wires. homegrown violent extremism and domestic terrorists motivated lone wolf, there's some trip wires there that archimedes are now -- nowhere near like an issue but here when we have communities that were report some of those things that will give us an advantage, on the other hand with the mental health consumers because there is no, and i would recommend a national 911 like system for people to call when they have a loved one, a family member or a neighbor causing mental health problem, they don't want to call

the police because when the dow 911 and we come, the confrontation with the mental health consumer in crisis can turn bad very quickly. in every case when we see the mental health consumer who goes on a shooting spree, you of all of these anecdotal stories from family members and friends who say, you know, he was slipping into a darker place, he was untreated force mental-health crisis, and they don't want to call 911. so there's no national system. there's no relationship. there's no network to call and say i need help for my son, for my next-door neighbor. so those are the ones that we find out about after the tragedy takes place. so i think that we're in a lot better place. [applause] >> just add one point on that. the lone wolf is in some ways one of the scariest components of the discussion because you have so few avenues.

you don't have the overseas communications to monitor. you don't have financial transactions with known terrorists or the people, they won't necessarily show up in the normal interactions that you have that your monitoring, that give rise to information. on the other hand, this is actually i think comforting. this is not a new problem. i mean, there have always been people who, on their own and for reasons of their own, be they ideological, the very things they read can be they mental-health issues, turn around and do terrible things within their communities. and so this is actually in some ways the least novel component that we think of when we think of counterterrorism prevention. i think we have time for one or two more questions.

what about access to nonconventional weapons i terrorists? how big a threat is this? how can you prevent it? elliott? >> well, we see this in syria where one of the questions is, dealing with chemical weapons, is not just as the assad regime using but what if there is a complete breakdown order, and the jihad is get hold of them? you know, so far this has not happened. so far governments that control nuclear weapons or chemical and biological weapons have been good about maintaining control of them, and we've never seen an incident of this kind of i would say, you know, i'm frankly more concerned about the use of nonconventional weapons, chemical or nuclear by governments. there may be a threat around the corner but if we're talking about syria today, the british, the french, history and of the

american government has said there's been some use of serine gas. and the past where gas has been used in iraq, for example, in syria. it's been by government. and, of course, the greatest threat we're all looking at now is one that really the whole international community has identified, which is the search for nuclear weapon by the government of iran. possession of a nuclear weapon by the government of north korea. so this is something to worry about what i think the greatest threat now is governments that are evil and have these weapons or are on the threshold of giving them. >> just a special play or not to forget about a weapon of mass destruction. i spent a lot of time in the former soviet union looking at, and that's biological weapons. dead is dead, and the generals

had 70,000 in series should be enough to warrant some kind of action, whether you use a chemical or a conventional gun. but bono is something that continues to be -- bio is something that continues to be, very hard to detect, very hard to attribute act or its use. please remember the anthrax letters. we have a small case of ricin, the biological weaponry is something that is still about 10 countries are believed to be pursuing in earnest, and the biggest thing that we're going for us with the collapse of the soviet union with that dreadful dreadful technology, a country actually weaponize ebola and busted out how to put it -- >> the '70s, a long time ago. >> no. actually i visited places in the

'90s that still had the scientist who knew how to do that. so we can't forget about that as a threat, because germs are contagious. but other than that i agree, we should focus on nukes. >> one question to wrap up with. to what extent has the international community made progress in courtney lee on issues of terrorism since 9/11? let's just go down the line and give whatever ramp up thoughts you may have. have. >> i just think we're a whole lot safer in america than we were before 9/11. because you have an educated population, number one, that worries about this. you have groups like the adl which call attention to hatred and the kind of hatred that prompts violent activity. are we safe enough? no. will we ever become can we ever be? probably not. but we have made a lot of progress. and which is on boston was the result of hundreds of hours of

drill, drill, drill in urgency first responders, people who knew what they were doing. so to me the glass, as tragic as that event was commissioned more than half-full. >> i agree. i think we are much safer. go back to 9/11. think back 12 years ago. there was a country in the world, israel, that had this problem of duty with terrorism. we were concerned about it. we thought terrible thing, but it was one country. after 9/11 and then remember the attacks in london at the attacks in madrid. more and more national police and local police began to be involved in this and to coordinate. i think the amount of work, i think it's clear the amount of work being done has gone from the focus of one country, israel, to being an enormous international activity that's done a great deal to make us safer. >> even on a local level i can tell you post 9/11 we're in a

significant better place in terms of international relationships with other local law enforcement around the world. on a regular basis we now hold large group conferences together. we exchange information. we do exchanges with the personal. i think it's significantly better and if it took 9/11 to make that happen, it has happened. >> i am entirely in agreement with that. you know, one of the amazing things about the american counterterrorism from the military side to the law enforcement side to the sides that nobody ever things about, like the tracking of finance, financial stuff that goes on in the treasury department, is how international it all is and how much it depends on a day-to-day basis, hour to hour basis.

on liaison relationships with foreign governments and foreign law enforcement, intelligence and military's and that those relationships by and large actually do work on an hour to hour, day to day basis. and sometimes even work with regard to countries that very publicly object very vigorously to american policy. i think the american -- there are gaps, but i think by and large the international cooperation is extraordinary and a much better than one would expect, given the ferocity of anti-american sentiment in a lot of places in the world. [applause] >> we are hearing about the news from "the associated press" that three more suspects have been taken into custody in the marathon bombings. the police department made the announcement in a tweet this morning. saying more details would fall.

more than 260 injured on april 15, when two bombs exploded near the finish line at the marathon. meanwhile, a committee has announced it will hold a hearing thursday next week to examine the bombings and the implications for homeland security. that committee chairman michael mccaul says this will be the first in a series of hearings on the bombing. now we will hear more from the anti-defamation league summit with the former israel defense achieve on the international community's reaction to the assad regime in syria. >> pan am flight 103, the munich olympics, the twin towers and the pentagon, mumbai, the chili laurel, tokyo subway, the london underground, the saguaro restaurant in jerusalem, the images of those terrorist

attacks are seared in our minds, and the mere mention of those words and those places fill us with anger and with sorrow. and now, unfortunately, boston is added to that list. our hearts go out to the families and friends of those who were killed, and our prayers for healing go to the wounded. boston is strong indeed. we gather here this morning knowing full well that no country, no city is immune from terrorist and extremist attacks. the same can be said to the jewish community. adl staff works behind bulletproof glass with steel reinforced doors for a reason. we need to have the benefit, the best strategies and practices, to prevent terrorist attacks. the state of israel, sadly, has

had to deal with more than its share of terrorism for decades here and so it is only natural that many policy makers and law enforcement officials turned to israel, and to israeli officials, for guidance, learning and inspiration on this issue. to help us understand the trends in global terrorism and extremism and what the international community can and should be doing to counter it, we are privileged to have with us one of israel's leading military strategists, major general amos yadlin. major general amos yadlin is the director of israel's foremost think tank, tel aviv university's institute for national security studies, the ins have. he spent more than 40 years in the israel defense forces, serving as the attaché to the united states and the chief of defense intelligence.

before his 2011 appointment as director of the ins as, general yadlin was the fellow on is ready national security of the washington institute for near east policy. he has written brought it on national security and spoken widely on counterterrorism issues. when i was talking to major general yadlin, he said forget all the credentials, just name one fact. he's the only person in the world was played a leading role in stopping to nuclear programs. he was the pilot on the plane that took out the iraqi nuclear reactor in the early 1980s, and he was the chief decision-maker to take out the syrian nuclear program that was three or four years ago. those are pretty extraordinary credentials. [applause]

>> so please join me in welcoming major general amos yadlin. [applause] >> and good morning. my good friend, i am really happy to be with you this morning, and i was asked to speak about the war on terror. i must admit that last year when i addressed you on iran nuclear issue, i spoke about the only existential threat to israel, which is the combination of a very radical regime that wants

to wipe israel off the map, and the very radical weapon, the nuclear weapons. when we speak about terror, i want everybody to understand that as tough as terror is, it is not an existential threat. it is a strategic threat. sometimes very severe strategic threat, but only when -- [inaudible] weapon of mass destruction, then it become an existential threat. let's go a decade ago and looked at a memo that defense secretary rumsfeld had sent to his literature. and he asked them, are we winning or losing? and he said -- the farther we go, the farther we get behind that this is exactly the

characteristic of the war on terrorism. you never eliminate the last terrorist. it's very much like -- [inaudible]. but how you define the winning or losing, and i think the best definition is whether terror affecting the strategic care, that's really important to your country. whether terror by fear and intimidation is able to change the course of economic growth, the sense of security, the fact that mothers and fathers may not let their kids go out in the street. and i think if you take this definition for whether we're winning or losing, you will

understand better where we stand. and we may say that at least in israel, and i think also in the united states, we are winning. we are winning. doesn't say that terror will disappear. terror is both methods, it's away, it's a means to achieve the goal, a strategic goal. but once again fear and intimidation. let's check whether terror change our strategic behavior, change the way we are living, change our values or not. and when a judge of whether terror changes, once again i say kerry is not winning. when i go back to israel, i may say that even though we vote

three campaigns against terror, i can sum up that all the three of them will a victory. it's not the conventional wisdom, but it is the tool. we defeated the terror of assad launched a terrible campaign in 2000, to change the course of history. to change the way the israelis will live, to change the peace and political arrangement we want to achieve with the palestinians. it hasn't taken us six hours, and not six days. it was a long war. not even six months. it took six years, and the tear from the west bank was defeated. both the capability of the palestinians from the lunch bank

-- the west bank to launch care, and the intention. we were able to basically arrest or kill most of the terrorists. we were able to stop them, even if the motivation is in disguise. but the motivation was not in the sky. the palestinians understood that terror will play against them. and the leadership took a strategic decision to stop terror. the victory vis-à-vis hezbollah and hamas was not the same decisiveness. because we haven't put out the capability. if they will decide tonight to launch a terror campaign against israel, they can do it. but we were able to do something that in a textbook of political

science, nobody say that this is possible, to deter terror organizations. and hezbollah is deterred. in 2006 until today, seven years, they haven't fired one bullet towards israel. and this is -- [applause] this is a terror organization that used to attack israel every month. snipers, ieds, kidnappings, everything. and his terror organization is now busy with killing syrian civilians. and hamas is the same story, is the same story. so this is to say that everybody who, in the last decade, told us that you cannot win campaign over terror, was wrong. if you are determined enough, if you develop a comprehensive

strategy which, based on very good intelligence, very good operational forces that can stop the terrorists, a security fence, and yes, some political steps that will take the motivation down, the concept of how -- [inaudible] vis-à-vis a very extreme movement that we see all over the place. we have more kind of terrorism. we have she a terrorist like hezbollah. we have palestinian terrorists like hamas. we have softies. we have al qaeda. and not all of them are the same. and one should learn and study what kind of movement is doing

terror and iraq, and syria, and israel, in sinai, and each one of them is different. but all of them are basically how to change their mind about their strategic goal, and the strategic goal is to eliminate israel, strategic goal is to change the course of history. because they look at the western world, the christian, jewish values. our culture and your culture, and they think that this culture and this story should be changed by a different value it and they think history is going up for

them, and we are going down. because we are spoiled, because we are not willing to sacrifice anymore, because we are not moral. and this is not propaganda. this is the real thinking of the terrorists. so the concept of winning the hearts and minds hardly work something. but as i say first of all you have to stop the capabilities, and then try to deal with their motivation. in the short run, i think the fact that since the timber 11th, al qaeda was enable -- september 11, al qaeda, terror needs to escalate all the time. if they have killed 3000 americans in september 11, the only real achievement for them is not an attack here and there. it's an extravagant and other

event. and i think the fact that they were unable, they were unable to change the american way of life, they were unable to change the strategic goal of america is saying that in the short run and in the medal run, they are not winning. -- middle run. we still have to look at the very long run. because there is here a learning competition. don't under estimate the terrorists. they are smart. they are studying our self, your society, our society. they are adapt to our countermeasures. they'rthey are using the web iny impressive way, both for recruiting, propaganda and