argues choice. is bad for american democracy. this program is a little over an hour. [applause] >> thank you. not just for hosting this event put for having it here where so much great stuff happened. and i want to thank those who made this book possible. our former global watch, and our

current research director ben, and a bunch of friends who did peer reviews and edits. so, fast track. as a practical matter it's a legislative procedure, kind of arcane and boring. so, why should people who are not trade wonks care? why does it merit a whole book? two big reasons. one, fast track is how the united states got into trade agreements, trade agreements, like the world trade organization, wto, and nafta, the north american free trade agreement. and the dirty little secret about those agreements is, they're not mainly about trade. rather, they impose constraints on a wide array of policies and gives numerous new rights and powers to foreign investors.

that undermine those in practice and principle of democracy but many of our most important nontrade law, food safety, regulation, the environment and more. this is intimately connected to fast track. number two, fast track has totally upended the balance of power, and it basically shredded a vital check and balance built into the constitution by the founders, dangerously concentrating what turns out to be vast power to unilaterally impose policies in a process that is heavily influenced by large corporations. fast track, among other things, officially empowered over 600 official corporate advisers who have access to taxes so secret congress doesn't see them, and

to have direct input, and even to the public citizen, the organization where i work, is very focused, for 40 years on good process, good policy, fast track is even worse than the usual bad process, in that what it has basically allowed is a formalization of the use of trade agreements to, in a slow motion coup d'etat, quiet lie take over -- quietly take over democratic policies that vital to meet the challenges of 21st 21st century. some of husband started think, all right, this is outdated technology, and you're going to hear it was cooked up along the time of eight track tape, 1973 technology of richard nixon so we thought, shoot replace it?

it doesn't make sense anymore, and we realize thread wasn't any really good source of information about the different ways that trade questions have been dealt with. so, thanks to grant from the sloan foundation, we were able to send researchers into the musty bowels of the library of congress, where they went through hundreds of volumes of 18th and 19th century congress recall -- congressional record, and we have the original picture, which is actually a fun read and i'm not saying that because i'm the author, is told largely in the voice of the people who are participating in the debates in those days, and not to give away too much, because it's definitely worth reading, it's remarkable how through the decades, some of the exact same warnings, words, fears, messages came out. n there were in each -- 50 years

of congress, ignoring, the upset, this could upset the whole constitution crowd. the story starts at the very beginning with the boston tea matter. yes, ladies and gentlemen, our country was started with a trade war. a fact that is not largely known but but the whole thing was over tariffs on tea. so it was nat shocker when the founders put together the constitution they were a little sensitive about how that trade would get dealt with. they had just seen what happened when the king literally, could unilaterally declare a trade policy that was always about something else. his foreign entanglement in europe. so the u.s. constitution had a fairly intentional check and balance in article 1.8 where the legislative branch0s exclusive

authority over the content office trade authority. so over the history of the country there had to be some mechanism for sharing. and what our research found was that for 200 years, congress was the body that made trade policy and wrote our laws. until fast track. fast track, in a way that was able to slide under the radar, dramatically changed both roles. it undermined both roles of congress. not just making trade policy but writing nontrade laws. over the last few decades, presidents, democrats and republicans alike, have used fast track to effectively diplomatically legislate, pushing through congress policies that congress would otherwise resist. but that's not jump to the head

of our story. the first hundred years of the country, congress kept very tight control on our trade policy. we found in fact there were five distinct eras of how congress -- it was congress' to do -- delegate or didn't its authority on trade. five distinct periods, and congress, holding control of the substance, makes fast track a striking anomaly given in fact fast track, as we will learn, gave it all up. we're going to skip the five eras, though it's interesting what was going on that led to some of the different fights. i'll ujump to 1890, the first time when congress started experimenting with delegating some authority. the theme would be congress would start to delegate a little authority to the executive. the executive branch would grab it all and haul it away. then congress would say, we're

not doing that. take it back. it went back and forth seesaw like so in the 1890s, congress delegated some authority, the executive branch got cared away, got taken back. 1934 the reciprocal tariff act. it let the executive branch negotiate agreements to do tariff cuts and congress set the banned for products or how much could be cut for a teche product. but congress didn't have to vote as long as the cuts were in that set band, they could be declared in place. it was -- it was supposed to be an emergency measure that, you know, such a crisis, global depression, would go away in three years. the executive branch kept coming back, just one more year, two more you'res, and slowly started

delegating chunks of it. i it was under this authority that trade was negotiated and four other rounds -- sessions of negotiations. however, here comes congress pulling it back in, because by 1958, as the importance of trade in the economy was encriesing, and the number of countries and issues being more complicate. come realized the trade negotiations were having a lot of impact so they established a legislative veto at that point in their delegation authority. then the johnson administration comes to grab it back, and congress is -- the kennedy round it was the -- the johnson administration said you can do trevors and nothing else. johnson said, show me. he ignored congress, signed an agreement that actually rewrote some u.s. antidumping laws, and

congress basically exercised their prog at the and -- prerogative and said, we're not going approve that part of the agreement. so john john was mortified, declared the tariff cut and there was no trade authority after that. congress had had it in comes richard nixon. the next mechanism. so, nixon saw that crisis that had been caused by johnson as an argument for why he ought to come back with an even bigger grab of power. what he basically said is no countries would negotiate on the next round, unless the u.s. had some incredible congressional handcuff mechanism in play. now, that got a little complicated because then the next round started and everyone came to the table. so, nixon got also grandiose -- shocking -- and came up with an idea he said would speed up the

negotiations, and he should be able to negotiate, sign agreements, before congress votes and row claim changes not just to the tariff but to u.s. federal law. this of course would be unconstitutional very clearly. thankfully, the senate put an into that. it's a sad story of what happened in the house. the ways and means committee chairman, where these policies are discussed, is wilbur mills had fallen into severe alcoholism. the period of the whole tidal basin hysteria, about to get thrown into rehab situation. he actually let nixon's lunatic fast track go through ways and means committee. the senate peeled that back. but here are the two features that lasted. for the first time ever a president could negotiate nontrade issues, specifically

procurement standards, which meant technical understands which we know as a product safety standard, food safety standard -- and they could sign agreements before congress voted that had those kind of rules in. the unprecedented. that went through with a lot of controversy, and pledges, amongst pledges was the nixon administration said they would only use that related to trade, like dumping. in fact, what ended up happening was from the construct of what was then created, fast track has expanded and expanded. so what is the actual mechanism? congress is given notice, and after a simple notice of intend to start negotiations, the executive branch has the following right. pitch the country to negotiate with -- pick the country negotiate with unilaterally. thus the content. negotiate the deal. sign the deal.

congress still has not voted. exclusive constitutional authority to trade. write legislation, write legislation, which cannot be marked up, amended in committee, or on the floor of the house. this is the only bill the executive branch actually writes, with no congressional tweaking, submit it for vote and automatic vote in 60 days. up our down, limited debate, including in the senate. a vert veritable legislative luge run. congress could say, yes, or no, on an agreement that has been signed with a country they may or may not have wanted to have negotiations with, with assistance they may or may not have approved. now, fast track authority with the noro scope of what it was covered, was granted again in 1979, and in comes reagan. reagan then transforms what was

nixon's really enormous power grab on these congressional authorities, into an instrument that allowed dictation through trade negotiation of a huge array of nontrade policies that affects our day-to-day lie lives, from energy to food safety to how expensive medicines are, how safe or roads are, to our jobs and investment policy, and land use policy in our domestic local communities. this form of domestic diplomatic legislating by the executive branch, and really international preemption of state rights, eye chronically happened to a very conservative -- under a very conservative president, who was very nervous about international agencies and the preemption of states rights. now, congress did in 1988 try to take back some of the turf, but it didn't change underlying structure of fast track. they added some new negotiating

objectives but didn't take back any of the power, and a sort of trick to all this that has come out, whenever congress writes as objectives are totally ignored every time. so it turns out the fast track of nixon -- i'm sorry -- of '88 that was used for nafta and wto, required labor standards. people have been in the fights recently, know this is a controversial issue that was required in the 1988 agreement. tote ignored in nafta and wto. and bush nor bid collusion in trade and labor agreements and those are not great temp broadest set of labor rules -- labor standards, and members of congress, as this was starting to play out with the wto

organizations learn reagan what going to join the multilateral trade organization, an agency that had not been contemplated, much less congress authorized to have started. now, the fight with bush one, with reagan, over fast track, came to a head when bush one announced he was going to use fast track to negotiate a free trade guilty with mexico. at the time -- for the first timin' 18991, congress actually stepped up and tried to vote down the fast track, and unlike all of those past votes which had been almost unanimous insuring 1991, 172 members of the house said no. we're taking it back. now, the problem was that does not the majority make so there were numerous attempts after that to roll back the power, all which or detailes -- detailed in

the book, but none of them worked. the bottom line was that by the time clinton had used that fast track, that bush one had gotten and had not had taken away, to push through congress wto and nafta, he had no authority. very -- infrequently known detail. clinton only had fast tracks to or two of his eight years. 130 trade agreements done under his era without fast track. busting the myth it's necessary for passing trade negotiations. now, people wonder why i know this. there are always the delicious quotes and one of my favorites is one of the clinton trade representatives. if you look at our record oregon trade i don't think the lack of

fast track ever impeded our ability to achieve our major trade goals. prom 1995 to 2002 there was no delegation again. congress had had it the fallout from nafta was starting to come in, whole string of u.s. domestickicses from our tune la law, clean air act rules have been challenged under the wto. the public was getting upset, polling was turning and in comes bush. a long and ugly two year battle to get fast track. took enormous political capital for bush, ultimately only passed in the middle of the night after the clock was stopped for an hour and a half by one vote. members of congress were screaming, regular order, regular order, because it had been defeated on the floor. and the republican leadership actually got several members of congress to flip their votes. those two actually lost the election over it.

and create another delegation of fast track. ultimately bush's use of the actual fast track power ended up really ruining its legitimacy. so, that fight was in a way the setup for this fight that could happen now. many democrats who had supported fast track in the past now were very upset about what it had been used for. most of. the thought because fast track kept them out of paying attention. that huge swath of their nontrade domestic policy agenda was being undone. financial services, access to pat tent, copyright limits. they realize now as the cases were coming in, how this authority was encroaching on their domestic legislating. many republicans did not so much criticize all of the policies

but they sure didn't like the idea of having more trade authority for clinton, or any authority for clinton. they wanted him to have a slip to go to the bathroom even inside the white house. so, ultimately fast track is voted down on the house floor in 1997 and 1998. now you come to 2002 and bush is back at it. some of the democrats who had been the strongest for fast track in the past now were on the house floor and one of the most poignant comment tear comes from a long-time free trade supporter. i stand here before you as a free trader but this vote is about more than that. it's about the fact that the very nature of international trade has radically trade. trade is not about tariffs and quotas. a bit changing domestic laws. the constitutional authority to make laws at the heart of our

roll of the congress and as our sovereignty as a nation. when international trade negotiators sit down to hammer out agreements, they're talking about harmonizing nontariff barriers to trade a that new clue herring from antitrust laws to food safety. i believe the president negotiate trade deals as efficiently as possible. but that does not mean that congress must ex-eat seed to the suingtive branch authority over domestic laws without adequate assurances congress would be a participant. congress must be a partner, not a spectator or occasional consultant. think what we might be bargaining away, environmental protection, food safety laws, competition policies. the air we breathe, the food our children eat, the way americans do business. the nature of trade has changed and fast track must change with it. believe in principles of free trade but i will not put my

constitutional authority over domestic laws laws and my responsibility to my own con sit students on a fast track to the executive branch to put that in perspectivety. that's a guy who was the leader in passing nafta. a guy who never voted no on any trade agreements ever. the outcome, the actual balance of power issues-had really started to shift the entire congress. right now the current ranking member, the democratic, most senior member in waynes and means, sandy loven of the same moment says this fast track maintains a minimal, meaningless, and last minute role for congress at a tame when trade policy is inter2009ed will off intertwined with all area0s domestic policy and congress needs a larger role. ironically, though, bush got his fast track, how fast track got a very bad reputation, though preview of coming attractions,

since all of what aim going to describe occurred, half the congress changed out so warning label, a lot of the members of congress were there actually have no idea there was ever any way to do trade besides the executive branch dictating and it them being handcuffed. they think fast track is synonymous with trade authority. they're not sure they have that constitutional authority. they think that's actual something the president has and if he is nice gives them a little bit of it, and moreover they weren't here when bush actually fully used fast track for the first time, he forced a vote of the columbia free trade agreement elm dedemandded a vote go to the house floor despite the congressional leaders saying it wasn't time to put it in the schedule. that ability of the president to take over the congressional floor scheduled resulted in a bipartisan backlash. now, that whole lesson that whole history, that resulted in

no more fast tracks for bush two. each time there was a huge abuse, there is a swing back. in comes obama. witness to what bush had tried to do. obama criticized fast track and promised to replace it. i will replace fast track with a process that has appropriate negotiating objectives and and be sure congress plays an informed role and in my efforts to amend existing agreements. still waiting on that one. he also then went on to criticize three free trade agreements bush negotiate width the fast track. sad to say the obama administration has not yet come forward with something new. in fact just recently they started to ask for more of the old archaic moldering, outdated

nixon era fast track. tantalizing for a president to have that incredible power, which one trade wag once called a legislative laxative that is extremely bad for the u.s. constitution. so what is obama asking for fast track for? the transpacific partnership, tpp, free trade agreements, 11 country agreements and a to go tafta. the translatic free trade agreement. they're unprecedented in the scope of the behind the border reach. 2pp, 29 chapters, five having anything to do with trade. these agreements would literally rewrite domestic laws with respect to land use, the environment, food safety, banking stability, the price of medicine, internet freedom. if you leak sopa piracy act

theft copright chapter has a back door softa. congress said no to that. tpp could become a mechanism to pre-empt public point and the congress to and force into play all of these rules. now, tpp has been under negotiation for three years and 16 rounds and there's not been any fast track. it shows you don't need fast track to negotiate on trade agreement. the other thing it show is what is now the natural course of how al of these years of congress ceding is authority since 1973 has led to a psychologist of presumption where the obama administration is negotiating the biggest trade agreement since the wto with enormous domestic and political implications and policy imreplying indications as if article one added u.s. constitution did not and

congress had to row. not only has congress not delegated the authority but this time obama is not letting congress see the negotiating text. doesn't assign it with congress not seeing it in the past they could see it but cooperate do anything to change it. this time they're actually going to try to sign the massive agreement with without congress seeing it, and the level of outrage about this is very high. question. will it translate to no fast track? take for instance, ron wide widen, the chairman of the subcommittee on trade in the senate finances committee. he guy who actually has legal authority over the trade agreements. he had to go to the senate floor last year say right know the obama administration is in the process of negotiating what might prove to be the most far reaching economic agreement

since the world trade organization was established. the goal of the agreement is to economically bind together the economies of the asia page -- asia pacific. and could include japan, korea, and half of canada and mexico. if successful, the agreement will set norms for trades and goods and services including'm access medicine, government procurement, worker rights and environmental standards. if agreed to and set the tone for our nation's future for years to come and passing the way congress acts on ball of the american people. it may be the u.s. trade representative's current job to negotiate trade -- agreements on behalf of the u.s., but -- the responsibility of regulating foreign commerce. it was our founders' intention to ensure the laws and policies that govern the american people take into account the interests of all the american people, not

just privileged few. yes, the majority of congress is being kept in the dark as to the substance of the tpp, while representatives of the u.s. corporations, like halliburton, chevron, comcast, and the motion picture association of america, are being consulted and made privy to the detail. the president is given broad power to keep trade policies secret and is making full use of this authority. at the same time, republicans, free trade supporters, like issa, the oversite committee chairman, has been locked out of observer status, something that was also allowed in the past by congress. this is congress' authority. they're being locked out of seeing it or observing, munch having a say. the administration has chosen to block congress in negotiating vital trade agreement. this should not be a back room

negotiation. it will impact multiple sections of the american economy, especially our ability -- preserve an open internet. congress has a constitutional duty to oversea trade negotiations and not act as a rubber stamp for deals of which they war kept in the dark. i hope the tpp will permit me to observe this process,-under efforts to open the tpp process will continue. now, this all lays out a picture of now. in 2007 the last delegation of fast track ended and shockingly some members of congress currently are thinking about reviving it. others are thinking there should be no delegation of any authority given the way congress has been treated until the negotiating texts are open and there's a renegotiation of the content, and yet a third camp thinks we should have a new way of trade authority that keeps a steering wheel and an emergency

brake for congress if negotiators are not following mandatory negotiating objectives from congress. either way, where we are now and where the become concludes and where i will conclude is we have a structural fix, structural problem there is no 21st 21st century mechanism for dealing with this vital check and balance where trade negotiations are being hijacked, toking in way that severely undermine the public interest and the principle and practice of democracy. so, the last chapter of the book actually lays out some interesting proposals. one made bay corporate association. one that actually has some overlap with the proposals made by the progressive groups and the unions, which does -- is an indication that fast track is in some trouble. the real question is not the different ideas that can be laid out about how to do it.

the question is, will congress actually act to reassert its rights? and on that question, i can't get an answer yet. i can give you some ideas what is going decide it. the book reviewed five different eras of how the congress figured out to coordinate the congressional and executive roles and all but the last one had the congress calling the shots and the executive branch negotiating, and when there was no delegation at all trade expand so the notion fast attraction need ford trade expansion is simply a myth. proved with numerous notes in the book. afairmontly fast track and the

image of congress being tied on the tracks and railroaded over is not popular, given that's how it worked so trade promotion authority -- of the free trade agreements negotiated using fast track, our expert growth to those countries over the last ten years is 38% lower than our expert growth to the countries would do not have trait -- trade agreements with. this is not good when it undermines or growth but that is haas what we have gotten from fast track. one over the things the book shows, which is where congress is now, about every two decades since 1789, congress has come up with a new way to delegate trade authority, to come up with a new sharing mechanism, and did that according to what was going on in the economy in congress, and also to some degree how much political tolerance they had

from being railroaded by the executive branch, trying to grab all their power. so, in the pendulum of back and forth we now have fast track way up here up the tree. except it ran out in 2007. with all of these rather seismic shift elections we have had there are a lot of members of congress who are not around to see how it was abused by democrats or republicans. therefore the big question is, will this congress get bamboozled with the usual arguments into doing another delegation of the old authority or will it get replaced. much overdue, given, up until now, well, oh years of fast track, 20 years overdue for change. interesting description by president kennedy in 1961 of what he thought needed to happen with trade authority, which was when the old delegation mechanism does not meet the needs of the current era it must

not be renewed but replaced. and that wisdom from kennedy is where the book ends, by laying out actually what a replacement could look like. now, again, this may sound like a wonk. this is the difference between your kids having safe food or having to import food that doesn't meet u.s. standards, the difference between being able to attack the place -- the pharmaceutical price savings in obamacare, those being implemented. the difference about whether we have the whole country fracked smither evens and pipelines every and export natural gas, whether we have buy local, buy green, by sweat free, and buy america procurements, which is being trailedded away, and congress gets to decide, or it gets done in a trade agreement and it's done and imposed. all of these decisions, including literally whether the

big box store, if it those be a foreign one, can be built in your backyard are issues dealt with under this fight over trade authority. so, it's clearly not a battle about protectionism versus free trade. it's a battle about democracy, about governance, and whether the people who are going to live with the results are going to be able to make the decisions. the quest for the next system of trade authority, of sharing, is actually already begun. and it built off of all of the other efforts which have names, according to their sponsors. the again hard richardson, the waxman gephardt, these ideas were then used to create something that became part of the bill, the trade reform -- the trade act which was introduced two conditions ago by senator sherrod brown of ohio

and mike micheaux of main. just before describing what it is, this legislation got over 160 cosponsors, bipartisan, in both chambers. that included in the house 13 committee chairs, 15 sub emptyee chairs chairs and diverse geographic and political province. that model basically restored the checks and balances, and it may be the only thing democrats and republicans can agree on. has to do with the structure and power of the congress. it would require that congress set binding objectives, that congress set criteria for what countries can be negotiated with, and before an agreement can be signed and entered into, come has to vote to approve it. what would that do? congress is focused on what is in the agreement in the time when something can be done. imagine the shock when many

members woke up and saw there were immigration series saturday dd immigration visas, there's a whole chapter on nims the tpp as congress right now is ostensibly making immigration policy. so the politics are perverse, the real question is will the same really conservative republicans, particularly in the house, who attacked president obama as the imperial president, thing he is concentrating power, don't trust him, are they going to actually be responsible for giving president obama a huge delegation of their constitutional authority, very strict constructionist there, that should be worrisome, that tramples fundamental checks and balances and sets off the from do an expansion of space, policy pace. from that perspective that sounds conservative horror show, to say nothing of the provisions in tpp that would submit to the

u.s. to the jurisdiction of the united nations, where tribunals can order the u.s. treasury to play for claims that do not want to meet our lay. that's one of the only chapters tpp that leaked. the investment chapter, and you can see it on our web site, trade watch.org, so from a consecutive's perspective, they're very structural issues. from a progressive perspective, same issues. maybe a different way of talking about it. this is an issue where, the two parties could actually come together to actually restore a policymaking process that might more represent what people in this country need. not just in trade, but allow the fight domestically that need to happen domestically to be done here, because the trade agreements, once negotiated, cannot be changed, unlike our laws. so, i'm going to stop by just saying that one of the reasons

to do the book was try and move from the really tired, incredibly boring debate about fast track. yes or no? that's been going on since 1973. we have 1973 technology outdated and inappropriate being applied to 21st century realities with enormous peril. and so, the real question should be, what trade agreement negotiating and approval system can achieve trade agreements that attain the most prosperity for the most people, and also preserve the fundamental ten nets of our democracy. checks and balances, states becoming the laboratories to improve domestic laws in this era of globalization, the bottom line of what is sort of an arcane, seemingly, discussion is actual --ly will all of us be

part of making decisions that affect our lives in almost eave conceivable way and that's why i was worth writing a book on fast track trade authority. thank you all very much and i look forward to your questions. [applause] >> someone needs to get you a mic maybe. >> hi. a couple quick questions. can you tell us what happened in reeseburg, virginia, with these secret negotiations?

how many corporations' fingers are in the cookie jar and how citizens united, perhaps, has changed the dynamics and the superpacs and i know has having been in 2012 a federal candidate with basically 2500 max per contributor, these corporations can go after the members of congress and defeat them if they don't vote the right way on trade. >> so, the corporate question is at the center of this. what fast track did is two really beg things, concentrated all ol' the control and authority in the executive branch, hard to hold them accountable, and gave a formal role to hundreds, now 600, corporate advisers, so not only are they able to see the text but they're able to use their inside information what they want in the expect threaten

members of congress. that sounds convoluted but there are a lot of thing wes know, for instance, are in the tpp that congress is explicitly rejected. this congress, previous congresses, and it's not hypothetical. who doesn't gripe about our medicine prices here? how many people know, we were forced to go from a 17 year monopoly pat tent to a 20-year monopoly patent because the consumer groups got eaten by the pharmaceutical groups in congress? no, actually we won that fight for decades. bus of the wto the pharmaceutical companies were able to stick that in and once the u.s. sign it we have to conform our domestic laws to trade agreements. so the role of corporate powers through fast track, through these agreements, is enormously amplified. what happened in leesburg and one of the strongest arguments

for why fast track needs to be replaced, is because absent the congress and each of us being able to hold accountable our members of congress, absent a change, that concentrated corporate power is dictating provisionness the agreements that would literally undo almost every progressive achievement that we have managed to claw through the agencies or congress. now, with respect to leesburg, wait as round of partnership negotiations and kristin was running for congress in the area that included leesberg and what happened was 800 folks from 11 countries came under a sort of security state lockdown procedure, and had a private talk where the members of congress asked, very senior members of congress, asked to come as observers, and it was 45 minutes from washington, from the capitol. they were told, no. no, you're not allowed, and you

can't see the text, and article 18? hmm. members of congress at this point hat gotten soup set, they said, we've had it. secrecy has to stop. tpp is going wrong way, but if the obama administration were able to get fast track they can do what other administrations have done, which is basically steam roller the normal function both for the public and of congress. >> hello. can you please -- how was the resumption of fast track authorities -- [inaudible] proposed trade agreements? >> so, the administration is under a lot of pressure right now from congress, both about the tpp, whether where they're

tote -- come totally ignored. barney frank was ignored on financial rest racing, henry racks boundary ignored on medicine, and food safety you name it, someone is getting ignored on issues they have won in congress that would be undone by this agreement. so what would happen if fast track war in effect is congress would lose its leverage. right now the administration can't sign this agreement until come authorize him to. that's the big thing with fast track. if there's no fast track, congress has to prove the agreement which means congress has some leverage over the content of the agreement. but the administration had recently started nosing around about having fast track, and i suspect the reason they haven't asked for it to date is because they don't want to actually have any spotlight focuses on what they have been up to on the assistance and maybe some congress people would ask exactly what it is they're delegating all their constitutional authority about. there's no new agreement that

has been launched that definitely bears watching, tafta, the transatlantic free trait trade agreement. that agreement is behind the border deregulation. there are only 3% of its tariffs between the u.s. -- there's nothing to cut so the entire agreement is bat corporate agenda. for instance, rolling back europe's food rules from labeling and segregation of gmos to their better meat safety rules to rolling back chem kale regulation to rolling back better insurance regulations to undermine the voelker rule which a european official said we have to review that in these negotiations. who elected that guy? that is what fast track can doom right now the european guy guy can say anything he wants about the voelker rule but can't do anything about it unless he gets a majority of congress. if fast track were in place that negotiation could rewrite that

piece of huge financial regulation that took years to achieve. >> i have a question. i think it's -- [inaudible] fast track isn't helping trade -- [inaudible] a nation involved in u.s. free trade agreementing logs behind -- [inaudible] it sounds bad for business and why would they negotiate something -- i -- i haven't read your book but sounds like money

interests that benefit from that -- [inaudible] >> that's a very, very good question. so, the point is, it's literally the trade agreements being negotiated under fast track is slowing down our export growth, who likes you can be upset at environmentalists given basically the wto and other agreements of dolphins and clean air, maybe as a consumer activist you're worrying about jacked up medicine prices but if you're a business you should like it. so why are they pushing for this? the answer is the export growth actually presumes you have an interest in making it here and selling it there. so export growth measures how big the amount of things made here and sold someplace else

are. this is a different measure. if you're boeing and you're making it here and selling overseas, and some of our machinists are here, that's great. the question is, is boeing going to also be very interested in having a trade agreement that lets it move its business, its manufacturing, someplace else? it's no longer exporting anything but its capital and jobs. so these agreements include investor protections that actually make it easier to offshore jobs. they literally take away most of the risk office leaving. not the least of which is starting up a whole set of guaranteed rights and standards and compensation of the regulatory cost and the right to not have to rely on domestic courts, to sue whole governments as if an individual company was a sovereign nation. so those provisions make it easier to offshore and now they're not experting.

in fact they become part of the trade deficit because things that used to be made here, are now made there, and then being sent back here. so since fast track went into effect we have seen five million manufacturing jobs lost. that was one out of four of every u.s. manufacturing job that existed in our country. and we have seen a real median wages, set in 1972 levels, stuck, even though worker productivity has soared. that kind of break between worker productivity and wages i is not what happened before fast track and before the trade agreements. not fast track alone. it's the agreements that fast track enabled. your question points out one of the most interesting factoids, which is though trade has expanded, including experts, under these agreements, imports have expanded a lot faster, and, worse, growth in exports has a

penalty for doing these agreements. we cannot prove this empirically. there's a lot of different factors. which is one of the reasons that finding is truce us because so many of the big u.s. companies that used to be the big exporters are now relocating to offshoring and are no longer experting. so once we have agreements that makes it easier to export, ore o exports drop because they make it there and send it here. >> in that same vein, i wander if you could talk about the -- what you think that will immediate regarding conversations between the administration or congress -- given that some of the senate democrats have been very outspoken on japan sergeant entering the tpp. >> the latest country that mayer

in the tpp is japan and that has caused a lot of tension in congress. prior to that the tpp included countries -- of all the countries we already had free trade agreements with big economies. so japan changes the story. but japan also involves being one of the biggest equal partners the u.s., whole new tack in the tpp. so the u.s. is not in a position to dictate. they have to negotiate once japan there is, and the interest commercially that japan has are not necessarily the same ones as the u.s. so, for instance, one of the things that both business and unions and members of congress have been advocating for in tpp is to have disciplines on currency, so that countries lower their currency to try to get an advantage, manipulate

their currency, there's discipline. that's not something that japan would ever agree to under any circumstances, and the u.s. to date has not really pushed it that hard but now if it did, would come up against serious problems. as well, there are a whole set of issues where the u.s. is pushing for things that are very damaging for japan, and that dynamic is something that has led to a huge fight back in japan where there are major protests, not the least of which is perversely giving obamacare, one of the big tarts of the u.s. pharmaceutical and, he, he, he industry has toes privatize the healthcare systems and japan and figure out a way have higher method sin prices. japan has mandatory form larrys the government hasboards that set prices on medicine, and that's the reimbursement and their prices are lower. their healthcare levels are like

ours but their medicine prices are lower, same things in new zealand and australia which have mandatory -- so this allow this pharmaceutical companies -- what has happened since japan has been announced as a likely partner? a lot of members of congress who weren't so involved before, start teed talk about it to a point where i think it actually changes the prospects, the dynamics of trade authority. so i would say they're sort of three categories of members of congress when it comes to these agreements. there are the wholly owned subsidiaries of very big countries and that comes with a democratic and republican flavor. they do whatever the big guys want. some of them may or may not believe in these theories free trade, these grandmas have nothing to do with free trade, but free trade fill assters are rolling in their graves to see these agreements called free trade, but aside from that,

you've got those folks. doesn't matter what it is. they loaf the fact that it's a legislative ill illusion. you have some people who have a very progressive analysis of the use of these grandmas to undermine progressive domestic policies and they're on it to. some came to it late. some voted against nafta and wto, other ones had to see their favorite law get killed and now they're with the program. on that side are some very conservative members who cannot bear the idea of these agreements basically stepping all over the u.s. constitution, of pre-empting states -- which day do, they become federal law -- of the notion of submitting the u.s. to foreign tribunals can raid our treasurery, undermining our sovereignty and sov veins si, and the notion they'd rather have it out in congress, win some, lose some, but you can change them. so when the progressive things

happens, they can undo it when they win the authority as opposed to trade agreements who have one set of policies. some of which they may like or not. so in the middle is a category of swing voters and they themselves are in twoblock blocs. polks who pay attention to the issues and have their hair on fire in the japan issue. this dismiss industry they care about is going to get stomped, and then the other half actually really sort of look at the specific agreements and decide, there's something in here that really makes me mad. typically it's the stuff that shouldn't be in a trade agreement that gets those folks to vote against them. so it was when, for instance, one of the agreements included visas. in the middle of a debate on immigration. people who were for more series saturday voted against the agreement because they were just outraged that while congress is over here doing their

constitutional business and making a national policy, through the back door, the a trade agreement was doing unilaterally a deal that had nothing to do with the congressional process. so the people who are in the commercial category are very wound up and adding them to the conservative republicans and the progressive democrats at this point almost all of the democrats have had it -- a very sizable block of votes in the house, and if you care about how this plays out, there is what to be done to actually educate members of congress about not just what thea these agreements are but also how, if this process is not restoring, renewed, and, rather, congress holds on to its constitutional authority, congress and the public can do something about it, again, want to mention trade watch.org. we can loren more about the agreement, japan's entry and what folks can do to get involved.

>> thank you for your presentation. so, most of this book i believe -- the content is about process, and i'm not an expert, but i think what you said is interesting to everyone here, if it's riding roughshod over checks and balances it's bad. butt it's extremely tempting to get into the implication office that, and we have gone in discussions evolved into the outcome so the one outcome that we discussed is this free trade agreement reducing exports, just -- the first one -- i think the answer you have given doesn't quite add up. the thing about offshoring, it's a simple reason that data, even if what you're saying is taking

place, the data is so re -- reflects the total value of the product sold, even if a very low portion was made the u.s., so that cannot be an estimation. an alternative explanation, which could will dismiss in the book, one that the countries have no -- the united states has not a signed agreements with are the countries that have grown -- so very good natural economic reasons why you'll be setting more -- the experts are going more to these countries. ...

with agreement signed not with this contract but whether these alleged under linings of what we hope we think our space were in fact under contract. you can tell malae and an agent. behind taking away the power in congress is the kind of legislation that we think about to recapture the earmarks.

we don't understand why it would be a prayer ready outcome, again to go back to the first point in terms of process. >> where the process and the substance connect and how you actually compare the usurpation of paulson space, this is a level of those that read the book pleased by yet here of busboys and poets. there is a thing called proclamation of four eddy which is for the president to be able to negotiate tariffs and where congress gives extra authority is for the montara of issues, the domestic policy issue so the process is tied to the substance. so there are the investment rules that are not about tariffs

that promote of shoring. you have to have some additional delegation of authority and not being condorcet's the branch to go with that and the domestic procurement law or the state level zoning or food safety immigration. those are additional delegations that don't exist in this great space so you can look at some of the other 130 agreements the clinton administration did a and those are trade agreements. those are about getting rid of tariffs or about removing quote does and limits on how much you can bring in or facilitating the cuts and expectations etc.. the traditional trade agreement doesn't meet fast track. what nixon did that was the anomaly was get that territory that has nothing to do with trade under the jurisdiction of

a trade authority where the executive branch could decree policy. as far as the data we wondered about china, too and brazil and other countries so we actually controlled the data. we don't export that much as it comes to pass and we control the data and we ran the data without both of them and the percentage of the increase of the export penalty is reduced in part because of the countries but the phenomenon doesn't change. it is still sizable if you take up the big guys that are growing really fast and that is fundamentally troubling because the point of your trade agreement should at least partially be to extend your own manufacturing base exports and send your best product overseas.

that would be a better system to not have all this power concentrated in the branch on the am not so naive to think they are a paradigm of the territory but as a practical practitioner of democratic policies based, there is something you can do about it. it's very hard to hold an unelected executive branch trade negotiator so many steps down the road of the president that stands for reelection every four years accountable. it's hard to hold the head of the agency, the u.s. trade representative for the secretary of commerce accountable for something specific in policy. but they have to stand in selection and face up to the folks at home and it is a level of accountability that an individual member that is elected faces that if you look

back at some of the literature around how the institution got framed including one of the federalist papers if you ever wondered why you had to read the federalist papers thank you mr. peterson my teacher i've actually finding it useful because one of the federalist papers actually did talk about the importance for this reason on the body the would be held accountable and related directly -- >> [inaudible] >> and what happened to those that voted against what the constituents wanted in the next election is something the people in the district can have a say about them and are going -- when

you have seen what's happened since. these are people that stand in the elections and i think it's important. i am not i need to think there's corporate mechanism. we have it in congress as citizens but we don't have in the unaccountable negotiators. we need the congress to set standards for what these agreements should and shouldn't include and by people we can hold accountable directly if it doesn't go the way that suits the public interest. >> thank you very much pivoted this was informative to listen to a trade agreement and find it so interesting to give thank you for making it interesting. [applause] [inaudible]

>> in high school they were very serious as many public-school teachers are about making sure we knew our civics and constitutional rights. and i think you for posting this. there was the year i got run out of greed for circulating a petition because i learned about my right to petition. [laughter] it was at that point my father started putting aside money knowing i would need a lawyer or i would be a lawyer. thank you. >> programming from arizona continues with an interview on the process of government procurement and its effects on taxpayers. we sat down with the author of purchasing wars during our recent visit to the area. >> government procurement is the broad name that we give to everything that's purchased with

public funds. public funds are essentially tax payer money. so as soon as tax payer money becomes involved in any kind of purchase, that entire activity becomes subject to a series of rules and regulations, which i certainly won't go deeply into, but enough to make life difficult for many of the people participating in net so many cases you have private agencies for example, agencies that assist the homeless or agencies that maybe making senior centers and so forth and apply for grants. as soon as public funds are granted to that agency, everything changes and everything they purchase becomes governmental public procurement and then of course there are the regular ones that are 100% financed with tax payers' money

like cities and counties and police departments and the home and the aging and every kind of public service you can think of that are also entirely public funds, and then because of that, subject to all these government procurement regulations. invariably they stem from one of two sources. the federal government, which has a number of very stringent rules depending on which partner you are dealing with and state governments and almost all state governments have very specific statutes to what you may do and may not be permitted to do when you are buying stock from public

funds. if the nigp has put out numerous papers on why it's improper and poor government policy to have what's called preferences. preferences are the process of awarding a contract. it's not the top scorer or the top price that you are looking for. many states do that. new york has done and saying you must award a contract to a resident company in certain areas. the entire state of kentucky says if you're going to award a contract for the purchase of coal you must award it to a

kentucky company. i will give you the short version on why. we would stop all commerce in america. each arguing for its own a little position and excluding everybody else. and furthermore, you don't get good competition. your prices go down the toilet as soon as you start having preferences. nevertheless, they want preferences and some places have those demands and others don't. oregon gives a 5% preference to companies that recycle a certain amount of things and they have a

recycling preference. so, if you are purchasing office supply or paper the use paper every year. they will get a 5% preference. that means -- a state within a state. what that means is that a company from california bigot let's say $10 million for a project and an oregon company billed $10 million or even $10.1 million. the oregon company would still win because you add 5% either to the california bid or person to the contract and they come out with a lower number.

there was considerable consternation here in the city of yuma over preferences for the local bid not just for one commodity that is far more common. new york wants it to be in all of new york and kentucky wants coal to be bought in kentucky and oregon actually has another preference for the government printing of all things. a government printing has to be done by an oregon based company. so they had no preferences and as far as i know there are no preferences in the arizona statute until last year when there was almost a year's worth of arguments in the city council about having preferences. and i was tempted to stand up

and tell them what a bunch of idiots and they really are. io's afraid to do that because i was afraid i'd lose my temper and i would say something really stupid. at my age it is easier to let things go and see where they come out. after a considerable argument for providing what are called local preferences, that is a preference of some kind for all commodities whatever is being purchased for people within a certain boundary of companies we have a certain boundary they decided to award a preference of 5% for all of the bidders of commodities only. that's my understanding for example not construction and what