use the appropriations committee or sequester or other things to derail a policy that has now been passed into law. and that's what i'm concerned about. we have now passed the affordable care act. we have voted 39 times to repeal it, and i would hope as we go to our regular order we don't use the very appropriations subcommittee to go after the affordable care act why proxy. so mr. miller has a big job, and also he's still a very complex hand, one of which is the certainty of his appropriations request through the president and then also the impact of sequester on implementing common not only that, but other laws. i'm going to be clear on the request. as i understand it the president has requested for the treasury

department $13,177,000,000, for the whole department of treasury. and within that, there's a request for irs. and mr. miller, that request is for 12,000,861,000,000, is that correct? and then, however, when we enacted fiscal '13 finally on march 27 with incredible bipartisan support, we were able to pass the continuing funding resolution. that was 11,793,000,000, i believe, is that correct? but you had a sequester of 594 million, and then because you are a big agency, another 2%. so don't we have across-the-board cuts of 618 million?

>> that sounds biggest is that what you're living with? >> 620 sounds right. >> $620 million coming out of the irs with its technological challenges. one, cybersecurity, the other technological and modernization in order for you to receive data and to do the job we ask you to do. then you have personnel. and from what i gather your personnel is a highly touted one, because it requires people with business, accounting, and other pretty technical skills, and my correct in that? >> the passenger of our folks are very professional in terms of knowing the tax law and getting with different aspects of it, yes? >> first of all, the person answering the phone has to know

everything about everything because in those but they get. and turbotax is sometimes not as turbo as we would like it. and then to the people who actually have to do all the back-office work. do you say -- so how is the morale with sequester? these are people, very talented business sector. and i would say highly desirable in the private sector. >> i would, i'm quite sure morale would not want any of us would like to be, as a federal employee generally, and as an irs employee that has taken some time off who will not be getting coming in, the promotional opportunities that might have expected. but we have an incredibly highly dedicated workforce. i would like to think they're dedicated to public service. that's why they are there, as

was mentioned. so why morale is not what i would like it to be, we are a dedicated batch of folks and we will get the job done. >> well, suppose you were given so-called flexibility, given where you are already cut below the 2008 level, cutgo 2008, if you have flexibly would that solve your problem? >> i'm not quite sure what flexibility we're talking about whether it is the integrity gap or -- i'm not, i'm not sure what we are speaking of, madam chairwoman. >> well, what i'm saying is, is there's believe that you that giving management flex builder is a substitute for money. is management to build a substitute for money? >> i think management lacks ability will help, but it will

only go so far. we have trimmed so much in so many areas that i would think while being clever managers and efficient people will get as part of the way, it won't get us all of the way. >> mr. miller, i want to get to a couple of other issues, but i do know your employees. i am so honored that irs is headquartered in maryland. and if i go around prince george's county, i don't exactly join the dance party on friday night, but i'm out there or whether i am at a worship service or some of the others in our community. i meet that irs employees, and they're apprehensive because they signed up for a government career and they really want to implement the tax code, go after the fraud, but make sure if you filed a return and you deserve it, you getting educated in a timely way. if you call, you get an answer. and by the way, let's go after

those crooks in prison that are even trying to concoct even more complicated schemes, or how to apply with the mandate. sigh think this is not about you, sir, this is about us. and i think we need to really, to this issue of wester. and i know -- issue of indian sequester. which i'm for our federal employees having certain that if they work hard and they have a job, with the government and their doing jobs and meeting performance standards, they should get a pay. and when they're going after fraud are doing the job which they should, we should be shaking the hand and not handing them a pink slip. so i'm pretty firm about this. now, let me go to, standing up for the little guy, small business.

and a problem that i've come across in maryland but i come from a family of small business. my father was a small business grocery. my grandmother ran a great big osha. now when you go to businesses like that, it could be home-improvement agency, the person who made the use of force. they often turn to what they call a payroll service provider. in order to me compliance. and they are not like a big business. so they get them the money to pay their taxes and they think they are signing up for all rules and regulations to be met but and if their taxes would be paid. well, we have a company whose name i will not mention because of ongoing investigations, that just disappeared. and do you know what disappeared? they disappeared and the money that these businesses, paid-in

thinking that they had paid their taxes, also disappeared. what is now happening, sir, is irs is coming to them walking the taxes. so they feel they will double play and then they're getting penalties and fees and so on. so let me tell you where i'm heading. not to talk about this individual case. i was pretty jazzed when i heard about this situation of this really hard-working, profits and businesses, so here's my question. irs has seen these types of problems before. there was one in silver spring and so on. could you tell me what reforms that you would be making at irs to deal with this type of fraud? i'm working on legislation, but

i want to look at prevention and also make sure that the small businesses don't have to double pay. could you tell me kind of how you see this problem and what you see to correct this problem? >> so again, we will be talking about specific cases because of course we can't, but in general, it's a horrible situation. i do the people that don't necessarily know that they're being taken advantage of. and you do have a tax liability on pay. so in these cases, and we need to get better. there's no question about it. we need to ensure that there somewhere that people receive the notices we send out because not receiving taxes, we will try to contact people. there are occasions when things happen at that notice doesn't go to the right place and we need to get better about that. we have -- >> it's got to be solved.

in other words, well, i'm going to be pretty firm about this. they didn't get these notices. they wrote a check to the company who is supposed to send the money to you. now, that company didn't tell you what gave him the wrong address, so they never got a notice that they were delinquent. there was no flashing yellow lights. it's not that we've got to get better, it has to be pretty near perfect. >> again, we will be talking about the individual is but i will agree with you that that is a problem that we need to solve, and we will work on that with you as well. >> but what will what resources would you need? is this a lack -- why hasn't this been dealt with? isn't a lack of resources, a lack of -- >> part of this, chairwoman mikulski, it's a little bit close to the individual case and i more than what to come up and talk to you about it.

some of our -- >> silver spring company called, they still millions of dollars. this has been, and your own tax the advocate has said this is come up at other times. >> and has spent so if it has come up at other times, aren't their yellow flashing lights to dealt with the senate? >> i think all the cases are a little different, and so not quite sure, i'm not a smoker with the individual case and i don't think i could speak to in any event. but all the cases are a little bit different. it does happen. there are times when taxpayers are absolutely unknowingly involved and there are times when there are more, more part of this then not. all of these things are different the one i would tell you is we will, in these cases, work with the taxpayer to try to live as much stress and that's much liability as we can. with respect to penalties that

is not difficult. with respect interest, it's a little more difficult. frankly with respect to taxes it's very difficult. as we have to sort of bucket these things in our discussion. >> right now does the irs -- when a payroll service provider tries to change its clients business address the? >> don't believe so, but let me come back to you on the. >> would you take a look at that and see that would constitute a reform? >> it's one of the are areas i e with you we've got to do. >> does the irs notify taxpayers when the payroll service is delinquent? >> that when i do not know. >> see, these go to systemic reform, not every case is different. i know every case is different, then we would never have reform. there are patterns and practices. numbers, and the prosecution of these cases, do you ever seek, not only payment, but doesn't seek restitution?

>> i have to defer to, the criminal side of this would be handled by the department of justice. i do believe there's some restitution aspects of it but i'm not the money with. i would have to come back to you on this. >> does it go by irs or just a? >> the irs will investigate, make a recommendation to the department of justice and the department of justice will prosecute. >> i see. >> i don't disagree with most of what mr. miller stated. i would just elaborate on the following. we at tigta have some responsibly investigating those types of incidents, especially when it involves their party prepares. they play such an integral role in the overall system of tax administration, that you are exactly right, madam chairwoman, that the irs has to get a closer, you know, control over come and propriety committed by

them. we have done work that has shown, one, that many irs employees have, where multiple hats. so sometimes they are answering phone calls for the average taxpayer about their tax return, then the state individual or sometimes assigned to individuals who have been victims of tax fraud. and that system needs a little more clarification, a little more clarity, both for the victim as well as for the internal revenue service itself. there are just some aspects of this overall issue that are troubling to us, not come one, thank you for raising it. it's again not limited solely attacks prepares cost such as the one you referred to earlier in your statement, center. but also again to individual taxpayers in terms of there is some complicity as to mr. miller

alluded to. if people know they're under investigation for alleged tax impropriety, they will immediately claim -- >> i've got to stick to this point right now. and i would like to come out, mr. malcolm what troubles me about your answer is that you are treating this as a cluster of individual cases rather than a nationwide problem. so we go i think we will come we're seeing this deadly. i see this as a nationwide problem. i want to acknowledge that most of these federal agencies are honest people and small to medium-sized business must rely upon them in order to meet all rules and requirements that they could never learn, here, working all by themselves. but do you see this as a nationwide problem or do you see this as well, each case is different? >> no, it is a recurring

problem, whether it's a nationwide problem is a different question. i don't know that it recurs quickly enough to consider it a nationwide problem. what we would agree with you on is that are systemic ways to solve it. >> well, one, as we move forward, because i know my time is up, that i would really like you to take a look at this potentially identify over the last five years how many complaints you've gotten like this. you actually know what you got. and i invite the ig for any thoughts, analysis and recommendations that he would have. and then legislation that would go through the process, want recommendations for reform that you would have. and one of which is when does the taxpayer have to pay? again, remember, so they can show they have written you, that they to every to monster will step with every intent to meet

their tax obligation or and you come back and want the same amount of money from them. when do they pay? i believe they should pay when the case has been concluded, not during the case. and it's another area, this whole address thing and notification and so. i think notification is important. from what i understand from mr. miller, the multiple ways and multiple, different sources that can change addresses. so let's work on reform, but this is something that's been going on for 10 years. acknowledging the good people, but i'm telling you i've got a real problem. it's not that i have a problem, but you are who have people really work hard. >> agreed. >> and how we can help them. senator udall. >> thank you, madam chair. that was a very good line of

questioning there, and very much appreciate having you both here. mr. miller, as you note in your comments the work of the irs is critically important, though often thankless to the function of our government. my first question to you is, in your testimony you spoke about identity theft refund fraud, prevention. i know these issues or problems in my state. examples i've heard range from constituents whose refunds claimed by someone who has stolen her identity. cases were refunds are sent directly to another account and the pfizer never sees a penny of it. these problems are prevalent in rural areas, targeted limited english speakers and native american committee. can you share more with the irs is going to stop identity theft refund fraud in these communities? >> so, i think we're doing a much better job on identity theft generally, and that would include rural communities as

well. we have quite a few new filters to stop a bad return from coming through. we are not where we need to be yet, but that $20,000,000,000.5 million returns stopped last year we are so much better than we were. but we're not done, there's no question about that. in a perfect world what would happen is the individual, but when they file their return, would have to authenticate that they are who they say they are. whether it's through and out of wallets set of questions or something like that, that steve miller shows that yes, he knows where he lived in 1995, or something like that it is in the return would come into his. and that in of itself would cut down on a tremendous amount of this work. then it would go through our filters at the second piece of this is we need to get so much better at what happens to the second individual who comes in,

the real taxpayer often. because that person gets a wall right now and has to file in favor with an affidavit and then we have to sort through what is often five steve miller's, not just two, but five we are digging our way out. we had a high of something close to 400,000 of these cases. we are now well under 200,000 of these cases. we are getting past it, and we're stopping or up front which is really where we need to be. and we do need to get the technology to set the second return and have improved who they are at that time and let it go through. we're starting to do that now and -- >> senator udall -- >> police. >> i need to excuse myself. i'm going to ask you to take over the hearing and go as long as you want and as long as miller and george will take it. and then close it out. i want to thank both of you for

your participation. we're going to heed your advice on an ongoing basis for what we really see some very difficult challenges around protecting people as they try to comply. >> thank you, madam chair. >> commissioner miller, my next question to you is about an issue that affects native american communities, the general welfare exception. as you know, the general welfare exemption, as you know this exemption allows indian tribal governments, among other local government entities, to provide social benefit programs to promote general welfare without counting as personal income. there've been some instances where field examiners have not have the proper training and guidance to understand how this provision should be applied to native american communities. i understand that the irs is currently accepting comments on proposed guidance. i please you're taking steps to

ensure proper application of the exemption to can you give us an update on that process? >> sure, senator. so, in december of 2012 would actually put out a draft revenue procedure setting out a whole series of safe harbors on the general welfare doctrine with respect to tribal payments. covering housing, covering eldercare, covering a batch of different areas. we did that after extensive consultation with tribes. and we are now, we are adhering to that even during its -- the time for comment i think in his sometime in june, and we will then consult again with the tribes to see where we are. but i think so far we've heard that it's going rather well. we have a limited number of examinations in the area continuing that are outside of the safe harbors. we sort of centralized management of this cases.

we ventured our people are trained to think we're in a much better place than we were, senator. >> thank you. commissioner miller, some people may have a different opinion, but i agree with the testimony we have heard here, and i think are federal employees, federal employees are real important resource. the irs is a large, diverse, tactical workforce. could you share information about irs employers, vacation, ma years of service, but are they provide to the federal government? >> it would probably make sense for us to follow up with more detailed information, but in general we reflect our community. both in terms of diversity and insurance of age and in terms of years of service. but if you look at our years of service, it's fairly flat but it's not really a bell curve to you would expect some holes but generally if you look at zero to five, five to 10 and so on, is roughly the same percentage of our workforce.

now, that becomes a little more problematic when we start seeing donut holes where we don't do hiring over the last couple of years. that's an issue because at some point these people would've moved into management. but what you will see is where a generally reflective of the communities that we are a part of. >> thank you very much. and i would ask mr. george, any of the subjects that i covered with the commission can do you have any comments on those? >> briefly, yes center. as it relates to the id fraud issue, it is very complicated. it is somewhat perverse in ways because it's who files first who really takes and gives advantage, the overall situation. so if a thief, for lack of a better word, files a false tax return, he or she has the advantage, both in terms of the

irs processing that return, paying whatever refund that the thief alleges is owed to him or her, and, but the added competition is the address that the thief gives is put into the irs system. and that is the way the irs communicates with the alleged tax person as opposed to the actual taxpayer who subsequently filed a legitimate tax return, and then and counters, you know, i won't say this maze, but very unusual system. the irs is, again, making progress as acting commissioner miller pointed out, but it is still extraordinary frustrating for the reasons i stated before, in that not a single irs employee is assigned to a case permanently, gets tossed around

for various irs employees. the irs, employees contact the victim repeatedly asking for identification that the victim has already provided. and is just extraordinarily frustrating. and for the system itself coming in, ultimately the irs will, hopefully resolve it for the legitimate taxpayer, but then to collect the money from the fraudster is so problematic that come and i will defer to mr. miller as relates to that, whether they actually go after them. i'm not going to reveal any information here and might encourage that type of behavior, but it's an extraordinary frustrating system. something definitely needs to be done. it's an extremely vastly growing problem. it's not on domestic him is international in nature and with the advent of obviously all the

electronic communications that occurs, you know, technology that is used, this is a major problem that the trend was going to have to address. >> so let me if i could -- >> if you want to say a few words. >> just on that one. i think the inspector general caricature is interesting. characterization of the system. i think that maybe a reflection of the past and not the present to so i would be happy to supply more information for the record that would clarify our processes. >> we would very much appreciated, and i thank you very much. if there are no further questions the saturn, senators may submit additional questions for the subcommittees official anin record by the close of business on friday, may the 10th. we request treasure, irs and tigta's responses within 30 days.

i understand that the subcommittee has been frustrated in the past with unacceptable delay in the receipt of responses from the treasury department. i urge that the response be submitted in a timely manner this year. this subcommittee stands adjourned. thank you. [inaudible conversations] >> this department may be nearing a stage where the frequency of this crime and a

perception that there is tolerance, could very well undermine our ability to effectively carry out the mission and to recruit and retain the good people we need. that is unacceptable to me and others of this institution. and it should be acceptable to everyone soc with the nazis military. we need cultural change where every service member is treated with dignity and respect. where all allegations of inappropriate behavior are treated with seriousness. where victims privacy is protected. where i stand are motivated to intervene. and where offenders know that they will be held accountable by strong and effective systems of justice. >> this weekend as he's been defense secretary hagel outlined initiatives to fight sexual assault in the armed services. saturday at 1:40 p.m. eastern. sunday morning at 1030 tonight, for missing diplomat in libya

before the house oversight committee on the attack in benghazi. on c-span2's booktv this weekend, google's eric schmidt and jared cohen share their vision of world where everyone is digitally connected sunday morning at 10:45 a.m. and a c-span threes american history tv, former cia chiefs of the analyst ray cline on cold war intelligence during the eisenhower administration. sunday at three. >> live now on capitol hill in the rayburn house office building where the center for strategic and budgetary assessment is releasing a report today on the future of u.s. special operations. the vice president jim thomas and research fellow chris doherty will discuss the defiance of this report on how special operations have changed since nine 9/11. also on the and republican congressman max thornberry, the vice chair of the house armed services committee, and michael sheehan, assistant secretary of

defense for special operations of low intensity conflict. the groups president will moderate the event. they should get underway here in just a moment live here on c-span2. >> [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> once again where live in the rayburn house office building on capitol hill. we wait the center for strategic and budgetary assessments report on the future of special operations. it should get underway in just a moment. live a moment. live coverage here on c-span2.

>> a couple of administrative announcements. one is, if you haven't checked her cell phone at the door, please silence it so that we don't have the unexpected interruptions. second is during the question and answer period c-span is here today, and what we're going to do is not only take your questions but also repeat it so that the folks were watching at home can understand the question and put it in context so the response. for those of you who don't know me, i'm andrew, i'm president of the center for strategic and budgetary assessments. and it's a pleasure to have you here this morning. it's to share with those the release of the on ramps, the future of special operations forces. we are honored to have with us this morning congressman max thornberry from texas also

thankful to congressman for sponsoring and hosting this event. i've known congressman thornberry for i guess almost 20 years now am almost since he came to washington. from a personal standpoint i have never found a member of congress who is more dedicated and more knowledgeable about a wide range of defense and security issues than senator thornberry. it's been a great honor for me to have known him during this time. we had the pleasure, or at least i had the pleasure, serving with him on the joint services command advisory board where i learned quite a bit from mac. and also there was once upon a time we co-authored an op-ed with senator mark warner on defense issues. so again, it's been an honor and a pleasure. congressman thornberry has a list of accomplishments and activities that is longer than

my arm, and we take all morning to go through them. i think if you're here today, you're interested in the subject, you pretty much know who years. so without any further delay please join me in welcoming congressman mac thornberry. [applause] >> thank you, andy. and the work of cs ba has been a tremendous help to me since i've been in congress. in fact, i would say i have relied more on the work product of this organization than any other in my years on the armed services committee. so when they come out with a study on special operations, which is a subject very important to me and very important to the country, then obviously i'm going to pay attention. and having read the report, i do believe that this study is an important contribution to the thinking that we all need to do about the future of special

operations forces are in summary i think there are three facts of life that will have to deal with. one is we're going to have tight defense budgets for as far as the eye can see. the second one is the world is not getting any safer and it's not getting any simpler. and just a list of places like molly, nigeria, iran, syria obviously, north korea, or domains, states, cyber, help emphasize that point. but i think the third fact of life is that it's going to play a critical role in our security as far as the eye can see. sometimes in a direct action role, sometimes in an indirect action role. but it is important for us to think about that future. i was struck as a matter of fact, by the very first sentence of the report which says from

the crucible of more than a decade of continuous combat operations, special operations forces have emerged as one of the most cost effective weapons systems, quote, and u.s. military arsenal, and a major source of strategic advantage for the country. i think that's true, but the danger is that we would stick her head in the sand or take for granted that strategic advantage, which transport rings as. so asking these questions about what's the appropriate size, what's the right role for sof. it's attempting to ask everything and get if we do that then it diminishes the special nature of special operations. and what do we expect them to provide for themselves? what we expect them to get? especially the section in the report on r&d needs for sof is particularly helpful i think for our subcommittee.

i'll just conclude with this. i often think about, handed this quote by david which says that the most dangerous enemy to israel's security is the intellectual ownership of those who are responsible for the security. i think we all, whatever our role, have to guard against intellectual inertia. we have to keep looking, prodding, thinking about what sort of future we're going to face and what are the right array of tools to deal with that future. and i think that this report, as well as all the work that they've come up with helps us in that direction. so thanks for doing this and i'm glad you all are here. i think this is important. [applause] >> originally, assistant secretary of defense of special ops low intensity conflicts mike

shaheen was scheduled to be here. unfortunately, he has some medical issues to attend to them and sends his regrets. that said, we're very fortunate to have the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense of special ops of low intensity conflict, gary reed, here in his stead today but you don't know a lot about kerry, he is always been noted about 30 years working in special operations before becoming a senior official in the defense department. not only is he migh mike sheehas right hand man, but he also represents secretary hagel and a lot of interagency groups that are dealing with not only the problem with global terror, but also broader issues related to special ops and low intensity conflict. and very honored and appreciative to have you here today. to offer a few remarks. one thing i would like to mention is that secretary she

can says they've been incredibly supportive to us in terms of during the course of jim thomas and chris dougherty's search. women had requests committee talk to somebody in our to visit a command or something to the extent that it was at all possible. they never closed doors on us. the open doors or us. and again we're very appreciative of that. so without any further delay, please join me in welcoming gary reed. gary? [applause] >> well, thank you very much, andy. and thank you century, congressman, for taking the time to share this with us today. we appreciate your i'm flying support for your -- particularly those who were, especially in the special operations in gaza thank you very much for all that you do, have done and we look forward to continuing doing but

i would also like to just take a minute to recognize tim thomas and chris dougherty for the great work that they have done on this study, as andy indicated. it's been a great partnership, and i certainly have enjoyed worked with both of them as our team has as well. as andy said, the commission to study but it's the idea, grew out of original from my predecessor and was the acting in between the secretaries. it really started this study as you know, michael is back working for the secretary now, in a different capacity. the thought was to go outside the building. i say that knowing that all of us together mak that make up ths committee with a lot of usual suspects. but we didn't influence the outcome, i will say that. we asked them to look at this with a key question of whether we wanted to in the future when going to do with the force we built, a lot of changes in the last 11 years.

i start in special operations in 1977. we've seen this cycle build up and go down. we wanted to do a better job of leveraging all this great capability that has been built since 2001, and has really transformed special operations capabilities, transformed the force come and to a very large degree continue to change and shape the way that the rest of the defense enterprise and our national security enterprise views special operations. you know, from the origins of being an emergency force for only special contingencies to be more of a strategic tool in our nation's arsenal as has been reflected here already. and we think the study did a great job of it. i would also commend to you i think this study does a fantastic job of outlining where the force has been. and you know, if you don't know where you've been, you certainly don't know where you're going.

it has probably the best job i've seen as a reference tool for anyone getting with special operations now it hasn't been working their whole life, to understand how the force got to where it is. but that's really just half the story and it's not the most important part of the story for the purpose of the study. to me it's about what do we do with it now? how do we preserve it, nurtureit, sustained? how do we ensure it's got the right role within the strategy? and again i think they did a fantastic job of putting their finger on some of those key issues and i know they will talk about that so i won't go much further. i just wanted to take this opportunity again to express our appreciation for the teamwork, to commend csba of the continuing outstanding work which i feel like this is a great venture, will benefit our thinking and the department. is already benefiting inner strategic reviews. i'm sure it will play a role in the future assessments and reviews as we wait these are difficult decisions the congressman referred to in terms of budget, spending, getting the

most for the money. and finding that role for special operations going forward will be a key part of that. so i thank you all for coming and showing interest. thanks to the team and look forward to in some good discussion here today. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. now let me introduce jim thomas will give you an overview of the content of the study. he is joined by chris dougherty, who supported the research effort that led to the report your i think congressman thornberry and secretary read made an excellent point that there's an old saying, we're running out of money, we will have to start to think. and that was obviously a central theme of the report. but also as these gentlemen

said, sof represents a strategic asset of the united states, and we think about it, the court developing strategy has to do with identifying, developing and exploiting areas of advantage. lord knows we've been losing a number of advantages that we have had. our gap in terms of defense spending with rivals is diminishing. .. >> i guess four years now at csba. personally, i don't know what i would do without him.

he has been a fantastic director of our studies program and a terrific vice president at csba. a lot of time in the defense department, he's one of the hidden hands behind a number of the quadrennial defense reviews, and jim's, in fact, has been up here recently to testify on that issue. chris doherty, who ably assisted jim in the research, probably one of the most interesting things about chris other than his great attention to detail in terms of capabilities and so on is his service as a ranger in the u.s. army. so we felt very fortunate to be able to bring the talent of these two individuals to bear on this subject. and without any further ado, i'm sure you're not here to hear me talk. let me turn things over to jim thomas who will give you an overview of the study, the findings and recommendations. jim? >> thanks very much, andy.

just let me add my thanks to congressman thorn berry for sponsoring today's events and for his kind words and, secretary reid, we really are grateful to have you here today. and it's been a wonderful collaborative experience over the last year. one of the things that i think really helped us is we started the study a year ago is just people's willingness to open their kimonos and share with us the good, the bad, the ugly. and one of the things that was great is that we didn't come across a unitary voice, but we heard a cacophony of sound coming from the community. and i think that really does credit to the spire community. but thank -- to the entire community. but thanks for sharing ideas and arguing with us and also just providing just incredible access across the community. as congressman thornberry said earlier, we really face, you know, several challenges, and especially when you're sitting on capitol hill, first and

foremost in your minds perhaps these days is our budgetary situation. and be it's bleak. and it's probably going to be getting worse, and we don't really see an end, you know, a light at the end of the tunnel anytime soon. but never the less, we see a multitude of dangers that are out there on the horizon that we're going to have to address ranging from the korean peninsula to thinking about a long-term competition with china that to thinking about -- with china, to thinking about growing resource and territorial disputes in places like southeast asia to thinking about continued instability in central asia and in the persian gulf. and as we've seen most recently, you know, a range of threats stemming from the arab spring and moving towards the arab winter in places like north africa. and at the same time, we can't forget about our own hemisphere. for too long we've really taken

it for granted that we had sanctuary within the western hemisphere and what does that hold in the future. here we are, essentially, 12 years after 9/11 which really was a sea change event for the united states and for the national policy community. and i think it was seen a year ago on the part of folks like gary reid and michael lumpkin and others this need for doing a stock taking, for, essentially, looking from the outside in at where special operations forces have been over the past decade, what some of the challenges are as we look ahead that they're going to have to address and then to try to form some recommendations. as we were crafting our report, we had more of an external view. we were trying to think about special operations forces in the context of broader national security policy and broader national security strategy. so our principal audience was actually not in the special

operations community, but it was exterrible in terms of how -- external in terms of how do people think of special operations forces as an important tool or instrument of state craft looking forward. and then finally we saw that we wanted to provide an input or some inte lek call grist -- intellectual grist. as many of you know, the department of defense is undergoing a management review which is supposed to be wrapping up towards the end of this month. but we wanted to be in a position where we could offer some recommendations and ideas that could feed into the upcoming qdr. so let me walk through three things. i'm going the start by talking about where special operations forces have been over the past, over the past decade or so, and then what i'm going to do is switch over, and i'll discuss some of the strategic challenges we see that play out over the next couple decades and what

their implications are for special operations forces, and ten i'll conclude with some recommendations. -- then i'll conclude with some recommendations. i'd be remiss if i didn't thank my co-of author, chris doherty, who's been a terrific wingman throughout this entire process. we've, i think, complemented each other in terms of strengths and weaknesses that we bring to the table, but it's been a great experience working with him. i also want to acknowledge adam tar si and bill ricks from the cttso office who have also been terrific as interlocutors throughout this entire project. so just looking back to 9/11, there are really two stories that can be, that can be told when it comes to special operations forces. the one that really captures the public's attention in particular tends to be counterterrorism successes. and these are innumerable. there have been tremendous successes here in terms of

surgical strike, and by surgical strike -- this first bullet really gets to the point, which is we've cutted an awful lot of raids. -- conducted an awful lot of raids. but what doesn't make it into the newspapers are the number of raids that are nonkinetic, no shots fired, but highly targeted trying to reduce collateral effects. at the same time, just tremendous innovation in terms of operations and intelligence fusion or integration. the development of high-value target teams including representatives from the intelligence community, from special operations, from conventional forces, from law enforcement as well as from partner nations. moving beyond just finding and fixing and finishing targets in a military context to building in intelligence elements of exploiting, analyzing and disseminating information so we create a virtual circle where one operation is really developing the intelligence

which leads to follow-on operations. and this is, has really helped to increase the effectiveness of special operations over the last decade. the other is just sensitive site exploitation, understanding the best practices from law enforcement and from other agencies that can be applied in raids. and if you think back to the abbottabad raid, for as important as it was in terms of going after osama bin laden, i would say there was equal or greater value in terms of the sensitive site information that was drawn during that raid. and then there's just, of course, much tighter working relationships not only between special be operations forces -- special operations forces in the intelligence community, but between national mission force and special operators and their theater counterparts. and in a much tighter way than we've seen in the past as well as with other government agencies and with our foreign

partners. but i think this tends to overshadow, as many of you may already realize, the so-called indirect approach or the renaissance that's really occurred in special warfare over the past decade. the raids, as admiral mcraven and others say, they can buy time to allow the indirect approach to work. but ultimately, it's special warfare and the indirect approach which help us buy down longer term risks. so this becomes even more important as we look out into the future. from the end of the cold war where for many it was kind of presumed that unconventional warfare might be a thing of past, we were never going to go into eastern europe and stir up partisans again, we were wondering what the future of unconventional war was. in the blink of an eye in the fall of 2001, we saw this extraordinary unconventional warfare campaign working with

the northern alliance in afghanistan. and in a mere 60 days, a very small u.s. force coupled with a partner force in afghanistan was able to depose the taliban and destabilize al-qaeda elements this the country. in the country. more recently, we've started to adopt our national approach from national institution building towards a much greater emphasis on local security and institution building. and village stability operations really have been at the core of that approach. getting back into the, getting into villages, working closely with village elders, helping to establish local security forces that provide a 24/7, continuous security presence in rural areas has, i think, been a major achievement in the last few years. couple with the that -- coupled

with that, special warfare includes disciplines like civil affairs and military operation -- military information support operations. the civil affairs have actually, you know, again, it's one of the tools we have for buying down risk, especially in rural areas. and then being able to translate or amplify that information across distances in various countries to explain what the benefits are of supporting, of supporting a local government has really been key. so this is just to recall just the spectacular growth in special operations forces over the past decade. as you can see, just tremendous growth in budget which has actually outstripped in a lot of respects the map power growth -- manpower growth. the budget has grown faster than manpower, but this is an important point for the future which is it takes a long time to grow special operators.

it's taken really more than a decade just to get to where we are today at roughly 65,000 on our way to 71,000 in terms of total end strength in socom. but that was growth that was planned more or less in the 2006qdr. so this has not happened overnight, but it's happened over a long period of time. and the top growth in terms of the budget, what you see is that a large part of socom's budgetary growth has been in the form of overseas contingency operation funding. and i think this is a real danger as we look ahead, is how much of that funding is going to migrate into the base budget for socom. there are promises that have been made. i think there's a lot of support in congress for the migration and on the part of the administration, but as budgetary pressures grow, this is something that has to be revisited again and again. but it's going to be necessary, i think, to maintain, to

maintain the growth in special operations forces, some of those new capabilities that are out there that need to be integrated. and also heal the force coming out of ten years of almost continuous use so that it's not put away wet. and over on the far side, i'd just point out the growth in terms of force structure. and this is really important in terms of the u.s.' ability to cover down on a larger number of potential contingencies that are out there as well as to conduct far more persistent engagement than we've been able to in the past. so we've had this tremendous growth. staff have been continually deployed over the past decade, but it has come at a thurm of costs. -- at a number of costs. as you can see, the number of sof almost continuously deployed is up by close to a factor of

four. and it's largely been concentrated in the u.s. central command's area of responsibility. so despite the growth in sof, we're treating other theaters outside of u.s. central command largely as economies of force theaters. want to note that sof have seep a disproportionate number of casualties relative to conventional forces. 435 relative to roughly 5,000 killed in action over the past decade. it's about 10%, but it's very disproportionate when you think of the small size of the force coming across the board. and we've had what both admiral olson and admiral mcraven have called the fraying of the force over the past decade. it's not a force that's been broken or belt, but we can see it start to fray in a couple areas. and one in particular is just given the high operation,

operating tempo as well as the unpredictability of deployments that this has had a big impact on stress on the force, spikes in terms of posttraumatic stress syndrome which is for the sof community is roughly twice the ptsd levels in conventional forces that have been deployed. and in certain units it's even, it's far higher than that. and i think there are other opportunity costs as well in terms of less time that's been, that's been available for sof which is a force that by its nature requires even greater training time than conventional forces. that time has been crowded out for other missions besides counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, missions that may be increasingly important in the future. and the last i would just hit on is the atrophy both in language skills, and this is even true for languages indigenous to u.s.

central command's aors. we've relied heavily on translators and other services. folks just haven't had the time at home station to improve their language skills as they have in the past, nor have our seals been at sea in a long time. and other elements of our force. so what i want to do now is just walk through, um, the four central, key challenges that we see as we rook ahead with sof. we started this by looking at, you know, all of the intel studies that have been done recently, global trends produced by the national intelligence council, also work that central command had done -- i'm sorry, u.s. special operations command had undertaken. but we really as we were thinking about it, it really distilled down to these four challenges that are listed on the screen. continuing efforts to the defeat violent extremist networks including al-qaeda, counterrerring weapons of --

countering weapons of mass destruction, disrupting so-called anti-access and area-denial networks where adversaries are able to using missiles and other precision-guided weapons lock out countries that project power under their region as we have traditionally done. and finally, and this really is a category which may be a little more novel is think about waging influence competitions and proxy wars. so what i'd like to do is just kind of walk through how we thought about these categories and what their implications are for sof. when it comes to defeating violent extremist networks, more most of the past decade we really have been focused on al-qaeda and associated moments as well as the taliban in afghanistan. but what we see is that we're really starting to expand in some ways if you think about the this chart, we've been heavily focused on defeating terrorist networks over the past decade.

we're now looking at how do we expand across this entire quad chart. but even within the upper northwest quadrant here, how do we think more broad ri than just the al-qaeda and associated movements in the afghanistan and pakistan area as well as taliban forces to a broader range of threats. franchise movements, spin-offs from al-qaeda as well as movements that are very different in their nature whether it's extremist organizations that are more shiite-based than sunni-based, or salafist organizations that really have no ties to original al-qaeda. as well as thinking about other nonstate actors in a variety of theaters that are emerging whether these are insurgent forces that threaten friendly states, they're narco cartels or they're other terrorist organizations that may be emerging around the world.

what we saw is, you know, these challenges are interrelated. one of the things that we're obviously concerned about as we look at a country like pakistan is the potential for it losing positive control of its nuclear weapons given the extremist pop belation and movements -- population and movements that are resident along its northwest frontier. as we're already seeing in the media today, how do we think about syria and, again, the proliferation of its chemical weapons stocks or its use of chemical weapons in very ambiguous circumstances. so we have a range of ongoing proliferation challenges that we face stretching from the korean peninsula around to the mediterranean. and in particular we saw that countering weapons of mass destruction may, in fact, be a large component of future contingencies or major wars that the united states might undertake to a far greater

extent. and here we think really special operations forces would be central. with iran we're not only worried about where iran's nuclear program could be going, but also if iran were to achieve a nuclear capability, that the cascade effects in terms of how it influences the behavior of other states in the region as well as creates an umbrella under which iran might feel emboldened to use terrorist organizations or special -- it's own surreptitious use of force against allies and friends in the region. we also thought that weapons of mass destruction represented one element for countries to either blackmail or intimidate or think about deterring u.s. interventions in their theaters. but they weren't alone. there were also conventional capabilities that we needed to take into account. so we also thought about the challenges associated with how we would penetrate and get into theaters where there was heavy

anti-access and air-denial networks presence as well as how we might disrupt some of those networks. and we saw here the risk that grows with the proliferation of precision-guided weapons around the world. and this really is not limited to states, but even nonstate actors are increasingly acquiring guided rocketed, artillery, mortars and missile systems which could hold forward operating bases at risk in the future. but we saw these anti-access and area-denial threats most acutely when it came to the western pacific in terms of the buildup of missile forces and sub ma reaps and advanced -- submarines and advanced missile defense systems on part of countries like china as well as the persian gulf in terms of the growth of rocket and missile systems on the part of iran coupled with small boat and swarming tactics and the growth of the moon fleet on the part of the -- the mine fleet on the part of the iranian military. what we saw is that as power projection using by traditional

means and conventional forces is as that becomes more difficult, wrecked end up many situations where, essentially, you have a steal mate. it's -- stalemate. we have far less permissive conditions for conducting flexible deterrent options and conducting forward presence in the ways we've done it in the past. but at the same time, there may also be some opportunities for the united states. when we think about the word proliferation, it has lots of negative connotations, but here with the proliferation of rescission-guided weapons, it's not necessarily a monopoly of countries that are in competition with the united states, but there's also a possibility for friendly anti-access and area-denial capabilities to emerge as well. and this is something as a matter of national policy we might want to consider. in terms of how do we help friendly states to adopt such capabilities to defend their own sovereignty more effectively against the regional power

projection and aggression aspirations of their neighbors. as traditional power projection gets a lot harder, we started thinking about what are the ways in which countries are going to think about how they employ military and other instruments of national power in the future. and what we saw was that it really pushes conflict in a lot of ways to the periphery. whether that periphery's in space or cyberspace, whether it's undersea or whether it's in peripheral theaters where it's not a great power clashing with another great power in their own backyard, but kind of like the seven years' war in the 18th century. britain and france don't go at it across the english channel, but instead they fight a global campaign. and whether it's in sows asia or north america or other theaters, we may be in a similar position today. and so sof, again, may matter a lot more not only for the united states, but for other countries and how they think about

employing their own special operations forces, their own methods of security cooperation to try to gain influence and gain positional advantages in these peripheral theaters. so just like we saw between russia and britain in the 19th century, the so-called great game as it played out in central asia, as political officers and the, you know, essentially the special operations forces of their days, as they vied for influence beyond, essentially, the reach of their conventional power projection forces, we see similar situations emerging in the world today. and this, again, will place a premium on persistent engagement to gain influence, to gain trust and to maintain it over time. so let me just leave you with these three bumper stickers. one of the things we really wanted to point out is it's really hard to break these out.

we tried it in a prose report as you can read, but in some ways we really want to show that all of these problems really are interrelated, and, you know, it's fear of the nonstate actor acquiring weapons of mass destruction and using them in a terrorist act which probably keeps people awake at night more than any other single scenario. as we've pointed out, some of these challenges and with the notable exception of weapon withs of mass destruction, they may also create some opportunities for the united states in terms of how we think about waging influence competitions and imposing costs on our adversaries or foreclosing these sanctuary opportunities for them as well as how we think about friendly anti-access and area-denial as we look ahead into the future. and we saw that cyber in some ways is almost a layer that you can put on the entire, on the entire picture. it plays in all of these areas whether it's dealing with violent extremist networks, it's dealing with high-end state challenges, thinking about weapons of mass destruction networks or thinking about how

we will conduct military information operations in the future in cyberspace. met me turn now just to some -- let me turn to some of the key challenges. what we saw in particular when it came to defeating violent extremist networks is this continuation of a move that's already afoot, of rebalancing within the special operations community from surgical strike assault force-like capabilities towards special warfare. greater emphasis on foreign internal defense where we're helping to build up the military and the security forces and the security capacity of friends and partners around the world, unconventional warfare where we're actually working with partisans or insurgents in various areas that are opposing

despotic regimes to civil affairs in terms of, um, how we conduct civic action projects and other things to build the legitimacy and increase the legitimacy of the host government and create a peaceful and an orderly environment across countries to military information support operations in terms of how we convey information in a truthful manner on a global basis in support of these operations. some of the big differences we saw, though, as we look ahead is that as we move away from designated war zones, we're going to have fewer conventional force enablers on hand. and these are really absolutely critical. sof can't do any -- it can do very little without conventional forces in support of sof whether it's providing logistics, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance or engineering or other capabilities.

and so as we think about moving beyond these war zones, these enablers just simply aren't going to be as available as they've been in recent years. we're moving towards austere basing, that the main operating basses, the bagrams, the balads and other places, we think this is largely going to be a thing of the past. we're going back to push more remote and austere basing in part out of necessity, but in some ways it also is going to be out of preference. this is, in fact, where we need to move if we're going to be most effective. it's getting away from the large main operating bases. we also see we're going to be operating under more ructive rules of engagement. as congressman thornberry and others have noted, we're now 12 years on from the authorization for the use of military force. what comes next? how do we think about the authorities under which we operate and, inevitably, we think that outside of war zones

we're going to be operating on under much more restrictive rules of engagement. the levels of intelligence that we'll need before we decide to take action and other things. and finally, sof have really been the poster child of how we've thought about finishes for the past decade. but increasingly sof may be far more important in terms of helping to find and fix various targets that are out there while essentially enabling the so-called finishes for law enforcement in terms of arrests or intelligence agencies in terms of finding critical informationing or partner -- information or partner forces, capturing or killing dangerous individuals or groups. when it comes to weapons of mass destruction, we saw that in particular sof has built up this incredible network over the past decade. now there's an opportunity to both enhance the global sof

network, but also to expand or repurpose it a little bit. we're not walking away from defeating violent extremist networks, but we see a much greater role in terms of how we apply this network which fuses intelligence and operations and all of these forces to go after weapons of mass destruction networks as we look ahead. and we saw that special operations forces kind of could play increasing roles all the way across the spectrum of proliferation activity. from the very smart or -- from the very starter notion of someone who's trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction to trying to disrupt production programs to gain eyes-on intelligence of program activities in denied areas all the way through interdiction and elimination, render safe and the reduction of in extreme misthreats as they might emerge. one of the things we looked at is the role of commanders in

extremis force that is the lifeguard 911 capability for that combatant commander. we thought this -- that in some cases along with explosive ordnance units, eod, it could be useful for doing wmd triage in certain theaters, having an on-call capability for the commanders. with respect to disrupting anti-access and area-denial networks, again, we really looked and saw that special operations forces are probably one of the most viable power projection options we're going to have as we look ahead in coming years. low signature, highly-distributed forces capable of inserting or extracting forces in a stealthy manner. and there's been a lot of talk in the building, obviously, about rebalancing to the indo

pacific area as well as thinking about new concepts such as air/sea battle. and here we saw that special operations forces had, there were a number of critical contributions that special operations forces could make as we looked ahead from penetrating into a2a do perimeters and disdisrupting the communications command and control and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance networks. in doing so, they essentially could buy some freedom of maneuver back for conventional or higher signature forces to be able to enter into the theater. we also saw the traditional roles in terms of both ground and sea lines of communication. interdiction would be increasingly important as well as unconventional warfare activities that could be conducted against a country or on the periphery of a country to impose costs on that country and, potentially, even holding out the prospect that we have special operations forces that

could just conduct that type of activity in and of itself may be a deterrent as we look ahead. and last but not least is just the growing importance of air/ground integration. this is not limited just to special operations forces, but thinking about the strategic use of land power how do we maximize or increase the air/ground integration capabilities as we go forward? we have a very small number of joint terminal attack controllers and combat controllers. can we grow that community, or can we technologically enable that community so it can punch with even greater weight in the future. and then, obviously, as we think about these nonpermissive areas in the world, how do we improve our ability to operate in a stealthy manner to insert and extract our special operations forces from those theaters. and then just last moving around in terms of thinking about waging influence and proxy --

influence competitions and proxy war, again, it places far greater emphasis on special or warfare capabilities as we look out into the future as well as their collaboration with the intelligence community. and be this is going to -- we've already seen incredible collaboration over the past decade, but this only grows in thinking about how we're operating in many areas of the world with very small footprints. what we really want to do as we look ahead, how do we grow a global network of local operators. going from thinking in terms of special operations forces organized more along the lines of traditional military units to thinking in terms of very small teams, smaller than an operational detachment alpha for special forces down to sickle operators -- single operators of the lawrence of arabia variety where one man or one woman parked in a strategic location can persistently engage and have

a strategic impact far beyond their single number. and the last was really that we see as an opportunity. i mean, how do we actually get out in front of next 9/11? how do we think about foreclosing the new sanctuary options that are necessary? as we squeeze the balloon away from the afghanistan and pakistan areas, how can we go ahead and foreclose whatever those new opportunities are? as admiral mcraven likes to say, how do you buy up the gates in places? what are the opportunities for essentially shutting out or locking out some of those risks today. so from these implications we start thinking about just some recommendations for the upcoming quadrennial defense review. and we started by saying what's different about this upcoming quadrennial defense review relative to its predecessors, most recently in gwen and 2006? -- 2010 and 2006? so in 2006 you saw the largest planned increase in special

operations forces since the vietnam war. but the thing that was really left out, as i mentioned earlier, was these critical enablers. service-provided capabilities as well as organic enablers within the special operations community in areas such as aviation, logistics and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. so the last two quadrennial defense reviews really have focused on how do we grow the size of the force, either the operators or their enablers. but as we look ahead, we see that, um, one, we've -- not only are the resources probably not going to be there for continuing the growth of force, but arguably that growth may in some ways be counterproductive. you may be hitting a curve in terms of the quality of operators you're able to get in, and there's always a danger that if sof grows it loses some of the key characteristics that makes sof what it is in terms of its specialness. and so how do you maximize and wring as much possible value out of the forces that you actually

either have or that are programmed over the next several years to enter the force. so what we thought for this coming quadrennial defense review what's really key is how do we get the shape of special operations forces right. to do that, we focused on these five initiatives here that the qdr should take forward. the first has been a priority of u.s. special operations command, and we endorse it which is how do we continue enhancing the global sof network. and this really is key, is that we've built up tremendous relationships through the crucible of wars and operations over the past decade. how do we now build on this so we don't lose all this goodness that's come, but also this now has become a magnet where, you know, every addition to that network whether it's other special operations forces from partner countries to other agencies as well as to nongovernmental organizationings. how do we grow that out over time. disaggregating special operations forces for persistent

engagement, how do we think about operating in far more places than we have recently for much deeper engagement whether it's in terms of forward basing a larger percentage of special operations forces than we've done in the past, a permanent change of station assignments and much more this in-depth relationship building in specific countries. tied hand and glove with that, obviously, is how do we improve our language proficiency. and it's not just a question of buying back language proficiency, but i would argue it's going far beyond where we were in the 1990s. and then to do all this, we also need to think about updating or overhauling -- as congressman thornberry has said in the past -- the existing authorities that we have that special operationing forces operate under as well as looking over the horizon or over the next ridgeline to say what are the new capabilities that are necessary to enable sof.

in terms of the global sof network, what we really focused on are three things in particular. the first is how do we think about strengthening the theater special operations commands. these are the subordinate commands within each of the global combatant commands around the world in u.s. pacific command, u.s. central command, u.s. southern command, u.s. european command. these are, these are the folks, the staffs that are providing expertise and advice to the combatant commander for the employment of special operations forces in their theaters. but this has been an area that's really been neglected in the past, in the past 20 years. it's one of those areas that when you look back to the creation of special operations command and mfp11 in 1987, this is one of those areas that it was created, but it was never --

it never really reached its full potential. so that's starting to change now in terms of thinking about placing these commands under the command of u.s. special operations command and then giving operational control of these units to the regional combatant commanders which to do this we have to improve both the qualitative as well as the quantitative commands and make sure we're integrating in the overall combatant commander's planning enterprise. second is thinking about how we deepen ties with partner sof. and there are really two categories of special operations forces that we're concerned with. for most countries it's how do we help special operations forces deal with internal problems in their own countries. but there is a small beer set of countries -- smaller set of countries which is really interesting, and those are

countries like the united states that actually project their special operations forces. our nato allies, some of our allies in east asia such as south korea, the australians as well as some newcomers to that club like colombia in south america which is thinking about how it can work with foreign internal defense and helping with counternarcotics assistance, other countries in the region even to countries in the middle east such as the united arab emirates as it think abouts how it can grow security capacity beyond its borders. to do this, there's a great model out there which is the nato sof headquarters. and this is something that's been in existence, and it's really kind of taken on a life of its own as, you know, in a build it, they will come sort of way where it's become kind of a rallying point for nato's sof for thinking about future operations and their doctrine

and their training. we want to think about how we grow regional sof coordination centers along these lines in other theaters. they're going to all have to be tailored, differentiated to the various environments in which they operate, but we see a lot of value there as well. as well as in training centers like the one in jordan, the king abdullah special operations training center, which is, again, it's a place where multi-national special operations forces can come together on a frequent basis. and last is just in terms of collaboration with interagency partners. how do we not lose all that we've gained over the past decade. and in particular it's probably even greater emphasis on liaisons being assigned to various interagency organizations as well as one of the things -- this actually came up from someone in the national clandestine service. they suggested we need to be holding routine exercises. we've had a lot of interaction

over the past decade. as we move away from designated war zones, how do we, how do we, in fact, think about codifying some of that in a more frequent exercise? on disaggregating sof for persistent engagement, you know, here a couple key recommendations is, one, when we talk about a new breed of sof, it's not, it's not someone with a different haircut or coming from a different school or off the street, but in some ways it's taking people who are already in the force as well as new accessions in the future. but coming up with, essentially, a new career plan for them where the goal may not -- may, in fact, not be a group command or in either the seal or the special forces commitment, but it could, in fact, be running what's called a special operations command forward. it could be spending most of their military career devoted to a single country going back and

forth to the same country again and again over the course of their career. today this really would be seen as a career killer, or until recently it would have been seen as a career killer. that's starting to change. as we see going forward in the future, this is another area for improvement. in a lot of ways special operations forces, in the way they organize, may end up looking more like the national clandestine service in terms of having stations. you can have big stations, little stations, but you have people who may be returning to the same country, the same region over and over again throughout their career. and to do that, obviously, you're going to have to think in terms of a much more difficult command and control ski ma. so just on the language point, if you're going to have people in this new breed of sof, people returning to the same countries over and over again, they've got to be maxing out their proficiency in languages. and, unfortunately, one of the things that i think really continues for all the acclaim that special operations forces get in terms of their cultural

finesse and their language skills is, as you can see, i mean, it's only really a small fraction of the force that really has that language proficiency. how do we grow this over time? and, again, part of it is sof need a lot of time to train, and it includes language training. you've got to be at home station, you've got to -- and it also has to be a priority in terms of advancement incentives as we go ahead. one thing the cia, the senior intelligence service has done is they've made this a requirement for entering into the senior intelligence service. can we think about other requirements for special operations officers and ncos as we look ahead, as well as giving them tools when they're away from their home stations, things like row setted that stone -- rosetta stone where they can train on their own and make it easier to test for the languages remotely without having to return to a particular base. and last but not least, we still have a force which is overwhelmingly caucasian, and it's largely all-male. how do we think about greater

diversity in the force? is one of the greatest strategic strengths of the united states is our ethnic diversity, but we really have failed to capitalize on that to date. how do we grow programs like mavni, the military accessions vital for national interests, how do we increase these both to gain entry and cultural competence in various areas of the world? please pay no attention to the eye chart on the far right side. but this is really just to say, um, we've gotten a lot of new authorities over the past decade, and i think there's a lot of appreciation for those authorities. but the reality is that they tend to be very reactive in nature. we have a problem, and then later we'll come up with the authority to address it. we've got to be a lot more anticipatory, and we really need congress' help in this area more than any other. how do we think about new sets of authorities for dealing with problems that are going to go beyond counterterrorism? if you think back to that quad

chart and the range of strategic challenges, how do we increase the authorities for persistent engagement, for preventive action and for, also, conducting counter-wmd operations? and, you know, one of the sof truths is that humans are more important than hardware, but just as important under mfp11, special operations forces have by necessity have got to constantly be thinking about the changes that lie over the -- challenges that lie over the horizon. they're becoming far less per permissive for special operators as well. whether it's biometrics and information technologies that make it very hard to get through traditional customs and border patrol stations to how we think about inserting forces into denied areas. all of these challenges are getting hard for special operations forces as well.

how they communicate in denied areas. and related to that is, um, how we operate with a little less weight than we've had recently logistically. so how do we think about new tools whether it's for power generation or it's for water generation and other things to operate more remote and austere environments. just to close, three real points. as we look ahead, the defense strategic guidance from 2012 really kind of hits on what is at core all about special operations; low footprint, low cost, greater emphasis on advising and a more indirect approach of building up the security capacity and the governing whats the city of others. we -- governance of others. the future defense strategy and the quadrennial defense review. and as we said, we think the sof provide one of the most cost

effective options available to decision makers, but it's not an e elixir. it can't solve all problems. the s of socom doesn't stand for superman. we have to husband it and think about how and where we will apply it. and the last really is that we now have an opportunity to look or expand the aperture beyond thinking about the middle east and thinking about counterthere counterterrorism to a much broader application of special operations forces against a much broader range of challenges as we go ahead. so with that, thank you. [applause] >> we have time for a few questions. and i would ask again if you could, if you have a question, please raise your hand for recognition. when you ask your question, please give your name and your affiliation. and as i mentioned, since we're on c-span, i'll repeat the question for jim and chris.

so, otto? >> otto -- [inaudible] the conventional forces looking ahead seeing more challenges -- [inaudible] they want to play a role in the -- [inaudible] how does that plug into what you see as the role of sof? >> can people hear it using the hand mic there or not? people don't know. [laughter] i guess the'sceps of the question is what's the role -- the essence of the question is what's the role of conventional forces in some of these new sof missions or extended sof missions? >> [inaudible] >> particularly mil-to-mil. >> i think that's a laudable goal for the conventional forces, but there will be inherent limitations to their ability to conduct those

missions going forward. and in particular in areas of political sensitivity or denied environments, sof are really going to remain the preferred capability to do those mil-to-mil interaction. and another question is what kind of capabilities do you want to build on the other side. so if you're building an exquisite counterterrorism or counter-wmd capability on your partners, the people you need to build that capability are the ones with the expertise in that field. so i think, you know, in that respect sof are still going to have a major role to play in the mil-to-mil. now, are there some environments and scenarios in which conventional forces could build, you know, conventional partner military capacity? absolutely. but i think sof will remain the sort of premier partnership capacity-building force for the united states. >> yes, sir.

>> john doyle, freelance journalist and editor of the 4g world blog. what role do you see for special operations forces in the battle against transnational organized crime which has had lunges with terror -- links with terrorism? and as a follow up on that, how do you avoid having an increasing number of roles being laid on special operations forces the way homeland security have laid more and more things on the coast guard to the point where they really don't have enough people and enough equipment to do their job? >> i think that, first, the first question about -- [inaudible] between violent extremist networks and transnational -- [inaudible] we see that today, i mean, in

sharp focus when it comes to -- [inaudible] so you have narco cartels from latin america which are now using knot africa as one -- north africa as one of their major supply routes -- major supply routes into europe in particular linking up with groups like al-qaeda in the maghreb. and so there's, it's really hard to parse these problems out and i think one of the things that we're looking at in terms of the decades ahead is it's probably a much more title 50 sort of world where it's going to be heavy on special operations providing boots on the ground for either understanding those environments or able to take rapid action in a number of cases. that all becomes a lot more important. and i think in terms of, you know, the multitude of missions, yeah, we're asking an awful lot. and to my mind as i think about

the future tsoc commander, in some ways it's like watching a kid working a rubik's cube. he's having to think about a whole bunch of prop problems simultaneously. he's having to think about the network, he's having to think about the great power that's trying to move in and expand security cooperation efforts perhaps at our expense in that theater. and a range of other things. and part of what we're trying to do with special operations forces is not just about countering the existing threat or dealing with the damage that's before us today, but it's trying to anticipate what do we think is next and how do we, essentially, head off or preempt threats from emerging, you know, 10 to 20 years out in terms of the security capacity and the relationships we build up. >> yes. gentleman in the green shirt.

>> you'd mentioned different nations growing their sof forces. can you comment on russia's decision to essentially create a socom and specifically syria, how that would work out in syria. i mean, if they did have sof forces entering syria kind of on assad's sides and we have u.s. forces entering there, it seems like that could be trouble. thank you. >> i think a lot of observers have kind of thought that the formation of what they're calling russocom is a little bit behind the times. surprised it didn't happen earlier. and, you know, to the extent that it's part of an ongoing military modernization program in russia, it makes sense. they're looking at what the united states has been able to achieve with our sof forces and say, wow, that's a really great thing, we'd like to mimic that. the concern about syria, i think, is probably a little bit misplace inside that russocom is

a very recent thing it just happened. and as we've seen, it takes a long time to build up a command, to build ip combat -- up combat facilities. longerer term a bigger concern is that the near broad of russian, you know, the former soviet republic's in places like central asia, i think that's a longer-term place for where you're going to see them operating. but who knows. >> i would just add, i mean, the united states is probably the only country in the world that can conduct multiple special operations at global ranges over time. but we certainly don't have a monopoly on effective special operations forces. and we're not the only people who are thinking about the indirect approach. and so i think as other countries think about how they project power beyond their borders, special operations

forces are going to be attractive for a large number of countries. and as they think about how they will try to gain influence in areas, this will also be the case. >> the gentleman sitting in the chairman's chair. >> i took the liberty of the chair. kevin baer is with foreign policy magazine. i wrote about the pentagon wanting to do more of this and especially more training of sof abroad a few years ago, and at the time that of the 10,000 more trainers ready to do in this war, did can you guys look into the capacity depending on to do the training necessary? do we have enough people in our forces that are able to spread the love like you're asking for? >> right. you know, i think the question's always it depends. i mean, as we look out, we've had roughly 10-12,000 special operators deployed over, in recent years. roughly that, it was the demand we see as we look globally

across all of the combatant commands placing a lot more emphasis on those kinds of training missions that you're talking about not only for special operations forces, but for conventional forces as well. but i think it will, you know, as we look ahead, it will always be something you got to come back, and we've bot to constantly reevaluate that and see what those numbers, what those numbers should be. but there's certainly an opportunity looking post-afghanistan, whenever that post-afghanistan emerges, to think about how we could reapply a lot of that capacity around the world. the other is that i just want to note is that, you know, we tend to focus a lot on deployed special operators, but, you know, only about 5% or so of the force is forward based. and so thinking about how we increase forward basing or permanent change of station assignments outside of the continue innocental united states, i think -- continental united states, i think, is another area. not just for episodic training

like jsets like we've done in past years, but how do we continue those training relationships on a more persistent basis. >> just as a follow up, we used to have a voc when i was in the rangers, how many rangers can you fit on that truck. the answer's always one more. and i think the same thing goes with sof capacity. how much sof capacity? i'd always like a bit more. so when it comes to this training capacity, you end up hitting finite limits of the number of people you can draw in and the affordability constraints. what i would say about the regional sof coordination centers and training partner sof what you can do is you can build a global network of not just u.s. sof, but partner sof, and you can start to do, start to train the trainers. so u.s. sof trains polish grom, they go on and train other units in eastern europe, and the same thing goes in south america with

our partners in colombia or chile or various other places. east asia we train the republic of korean sof. as you build these coordination centers, this global sof network, i think we need to stop thinking in terms of just the number of u.s. sof and think about how can we leverage our partners to help with that mission. >> two of the interesting things about the report, you know, one is the, you know, the need to anticipate as opposed to react to suckers. to circumstances. and the other is this issue of the finite limits of sof. and they always give you -- in fact, jim sort of had it up there, a set of metrics to say here are some of the boxes we need to check if we're really going to be anticipatory about where things are headed. and be it's encouraging, for example, i'm not sure about the other services, to see how many things are being anticipated right now. and be so, for example, general odierno has directed general

cleveland who's the rsoc commander to start looking at this issue of, you know, where do we put that slider in terms of what conventional forces can do as the stress continues on so,f. and these are some of the encouraging things that we see. and, again, looking at that checklist that comes out of this report. other questions. yes, sir, you in the back. >> yes, adam -- [inaudible] from congressman bishop's office. we saw during the wars in iraq and afghanistan, you know, a lot of really good collaboration between conventional forces, the battle space owners in the sof community whether it was counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, how do you continue that training wise so conventionals aren't going back to their side of the base, sof aren't going back to their side of the base? is there an emphasis to continue that collaboration between the two in preparation for, you

know, what could be the next, you know, contingency or conflict in the future? >> that's an excellent question and one of the big concerns we had in the report was how do we institutionalize and sustain the good practices that have emerged, um, the kind of collaboration you're talking about didn't happen overnight. it did not, certainly did not exist when those wars started. it was earned, and it was developed over time. and i think what would probably behoove both sof and the general purpose forces would be to establish regular training exercises, you know, both in conis and outside. you say that's remarkably broad thing to say, but it's not as though sof operates with every single part of the gpf. the gpf enablers the sof relies on regularly, surveillance and reconnaissance, air platforms or

precision air power or -- and i think this is probably the biggest one -- rotary wing aircraft, the kind of units that sof interact with in wartime are the units that they need to be training with in peacetime. but i think that needs to be made regularly so that sof, like you said, that they don't just end up on their other sides of the fences and don't talk to each other. >> yes, ma'am. >> hi, thank you very much. that was very interesting. my name is anne bodine, i'm not afail created -- affiliated with anyone. one is just in terms of sheer size and overseas deployments, special forces, i believe, is about 11,000 people overseas. state department in its spirity has 13,000 -- entirety has 13,000 foreign and civil service officers. so in my experience, we just can't keep up with the sort of

competing or even coordinating mechanisms that are required in these environmentsing. particularly in the centcom area. the second issue is coordination on the security cooperation. i know there were efforts to overhaul security cooperation writ large. in my estimation these 1206 and 1207 and 1208 authorities that have been now redone e in the global security contingency fund are sort of temporary, makeshift and urgent requirements. but i'm concerned that some of your discussion is implying that we should make these authorities permanent. the foreign assistance act of 1961 gives oversight of security cooperation to secretary of state, and least in iraq and afghanistan i think we lost a lot of that as well as with these 1206 and 1207 authorities. there's no assessment of how are we doing in these countries and how are we coordinating. and finally, i also think living overseas -- i spent ten years in

the middle east -- people are now seeing our main tool as one of blunt force. iraq and afghanistan aside, i think those deployments were effective especially with sf engagements. but foreign countries and special democracies especially in the middle east with the arab spring don't want to see us as a primary military force, and that goes back to the training issue. so what about those issues? thanks. >> [inaudible] that the militarization of our national security policy. and i think it really is a valid concern which is, um, you know, if you think about the resources that we apply, the department of defense relative to other government with agencies and, you know, whether it's the agency for international development or it's the foreign service, um, it really tends to skew things heavily towards the military. so i think there is a need both for increasing the resources that are available nor those other national instruments --

for those other national instruments of power as well as also trying to increase their capability. so, you know, we need a much more expeditionary-oriented foreign service and agency for international development. in some ways we need to get pack to kind of the cords model that we had in vietnam in terms of how we think about the integration of these instruments in various areas of the world rather than massive contracting projects. and i also couldn't agree -- it sounds like, one, i think it's really important that we actually move towards permanent authorities as opposed to ad hoc, you know, multiyear authorities that are here one day and not the next because it makes it really difficult to plan. if you want to do persistent engagement, you are going to need authorities, but i think it's going to go far beyond 1206, 1208 types of authorities. >> [inaudible] like our other sf -- [inaudible] already have -- [inaudible] >> i think, you know, the

biggest -- one, i mean, i have no problem with foreign security assistance remaining with the state department remaining in the lead and the ambassadors, the head of a country team in that country kind of running, running foreign assistance. i think there's a need for greater overhaul in terms of the foreign assistance act. so, you know, i think all of this is intertwined. i guess in some ways it kind of comes down to, you know, it's an oversight issue. maybe it's appropriate that we're talking about this here today because it's the committee oversight structure. how do you get tighter integration between the international relations or foreign relations committees and the armed services committees to address a lot of these issues? so i'm not sure how much of the problem is in the executive branch versus how much of it is trying to sort this out up on capitol hill. >> yes. >> george knuckleson, a policy consultant. you alluded to platforms to get

you in there. we go back to the late 1990s and air force visions when they talked about special operations and the need for a stealthy platform. back in the late 1990s when mike vickers was at csba, he did that report for andy marshall and said, yep, we need that, it's too expensive. you look right now at general hawk carlisle, before he went over, he said the problem is we're not going to be going directly against the chinese, but we're going to be going against the weapons that they're producing. terrain-following, terrain-avoidance radars. the key is our holy grail of getting our platforms in there. with the proliferation of sas capabilities and -- asa exaiptions and everything else, when they did the aoa down at socom, bill sayers in his final report said by the year 2015, 2030, we're not going to be able to get into a lot of these areas because we don't have that kind of capability in sof aviation platforms. comments? >> i think you're right. i think, um, there's going to be

a point in the future where against a wider set of potential scenarios the c-130 based insertion and extraction platforms probably respect going to cut it. as you said, the signature's going to be too high, and there's only so far that electronic warfare and ttps and all sorts of various other meds to mitigate that -- methods to mitigate that can take you. i think what for sof is probably a bigger near-term concern is the proliferation of things like guided rockets artillery, mortars and missiles. and in particular, advanced man portable air defense systems. you know, there's been a discussion about, you know, sending some of those weapons to various syrian rebel groups, and, you know, i can understand maybe why some people would want to do that, but there's another side of me that thinks, boy, that's a bad idea in case those get in the hands of the wrong

people. and from a sof perspective, when you're flying around an aircraft with a cross-section the size of a small building having those capabilities out there is concerning. the problem that you bring up, though, is that we, as you mentioned, the report by mike vickers in 1999 suggesting we need a stealthy insertion platform, we did a report in 2008, we need a tell think insertion -- stealthy insertion platform yet again in 2013. you can see how that pass progressed since 1999, and the problem is cost. it's remarkably expensive to build a stealthy platform of that size that has the whole shaping of the fuselage that you'd need to hold a sof team inside it. so the question is, is there an emerging platform, could there be a variant of the long range strike bomber which has a pay hold module in which you plug sof into it? certainly, the requirement is

there. the question is will the funding be there when it's time to actually, you know, build the requirement. >> okay. well, final question we'll give otto a second shot here. >> [inaudible] you talk about building up the theater for sof commanders' capability. admiral olson got shot down in congress, admiral mcraven is making the same proposal again. you know, do you think there's going to be any better reception here on the hill or in congress to beefing up the theater sof commanders? be you know, they seem to think it's an intrusion on the cocom's authority and the service chiefs. >> well, i mean, there's already been some agreement in the form of the revised unified command

plan in terms of the moving in this, exactly in this direction. and i think it's kind of in the enlikenned self-interests of the regional combatant commanders ultimately. i mean, i think, one, ultimately, the proof is going to be in in the pudding. can you produce a more effective theater special operations command, and is this seen as something that really is an asset from the regional combatant commander's perspective? i think that certainly is u.s. special operations command intent, is how do you provide, you know, essentially a more capable tool to the regional combatant commanders? but, you know, the jury's out. we'll have to come back and take a look in the future. >> okay. i'll take advantage of the fact that i've got the microphone to offer at least one sort of summary observation. as jim thomas mentioned, there is this strategic challenge management review effort going on inside the pentagon right now. a big part of this report was to

identify, do a good diagnosis, to use a medical analogy, where are these big, strategic challenges coming. and how do special -- how can we leverage the strategic asset, the special operations forces represent in order to help us meet these challenges. and while the report is necessarily bounded, i think, number one, jim's point about the need to anticipate as opposed to react, we're not going to have, as senator nunn once said, no matter how many times we try, we we can only spd a dollar once. we're not necessarily going to have money again to fix it if we don't anticipate. the other thing is aside from just the diagnosis of the international environment and where that's going -- and i think, again, we already have iran and the quds force in terms

of special operations forces let alone the russians. and if you talk to people in the middle east, the great concern is if they get nuclear weapons, we're going to see even more proxy warfare being led by the iranians, and how are we going to respond to that. so aside from the international environment, there's also a political dimension to this. as one army general said to me recently, you know, the american people have had their hand on this stove for the last ten years. they're not going to be anxious to put it back on again anytime soon. so there's going to be a high barrier to conducting the size, the kind of large-scale deployments we had in iraq and afghanistan. and second, economically. you know, jim talked about shrinking budgets. if we had to raise compensation in real terms over 50% since 9/11 in order to field and sustain a large force in the field. that's a huge economic barrier that we're looking at in the future to doing that sort of thing when as a society, as a country we have made the choice for a volunteer force.

and so, you know, you begin to look at these factors, and more and more they drive you in the direction of how can we leverage the strategic assets that are our special operations forces. so, again, i thank jim, i thank chris for their fine effort for not only doing the diagnosis, but also giving us a sense of the road ahead and even kind of a metrics checklist for how we're doing. so that wraps things up for this session. if you will, please join me in thanking jim and chris for their report and their effort. [applause] ..

[inaudible conversations] looking at the white house now president obama this afternoon will be making remarks about the affordable care act. the "associated press" writing during a mothers day themed event the president will propose the benefits of the law for women including free cancer screenings and contraceptives and asked moms to sign up for the exchange is a will open this fall. this is ahead of next week's bill in the house sponsored by

representative michele bachmann calling for full repeal of the 2010 health care law. you can see the president's remarks live beginning at 2:40 eastern on c-span2.

>> i am considered a traitor by people in my community and there is patrick smith on salon.com. he chases me around to basically harass me about trying to put the commercial pilot out of work. the fact of the matter is the heyday is over. the heyday of the fighter pilot is gone. israel announced a couple of weeks ago that in 40 years all fighters will be uav in israel. that's a pretty bold claim when one country comes out and says we are going to replace everything with uab but i'm here to tell you it's really fun, it's really cool and what makes me better than everyone in this room is i flew a fighter and i can land a plane on an aircraft carrier by myself but it doesn't make me better than the computer. the computer always land the aircraft that are on a carrier by itself. the computer doesn't get tired in the computer does not have a strike at the end of the carrier at 3:00 a.m.. the computer puts the bomb or the weapon on the target it is

supposed to end it doesn't make mistakes in terms of trying to get the official target. i know there has been a lot of concern in this room about weaponizing uavs and i definitely am in agreement that we need to revisit our policies in terms of how we are weaponizing anything but i'm here to tell u.s. a fighter pilot humans make so many more mistakes at the tip of the spear in the cockpit trying to drop arms. conducting warfare from uavs where you actually have a group of people along with the lawyer sitting next to you with the radio next you trying to make these hard decisions is a much better form of warfare than the kind i fought in. even though we here we are scared of uavs in terms of weaponizing them i will tell you in doing so we have actually saved a lot of lives.

>> air force officials yesterday said they are concerned about recent sexual assaults in the military but they haven't yet found a solution to correct this problem. air force secretary michael donley in chief of staff general mark welsh africa, mark welsh africa, to the subcommittee on defense hearing on the president's air force 2014 budget request. republican congressman bill young chairs the hearing. >> good morning. secretary of the air force and the chief of the air force. of course the topic is the fiscal year 2014 budget and your -- the air force is the only service to receive a the base budget increase in the fy 2014 but much of this increase is devoted to an attempt to maintain readiness with the threat of continuing

sequestration. in the meantime the air force's aging, shrinking and is modernizing needs across the fleet. we are anxious to hear how the air force will meet this challenge. this will be secretary donley's final appearance before the subcommittee and mr. secretary since you announced you would be stepping down from this important post in june, i would say on behalf of the committee we have appreciated your service and your years of testimony before the committee and thank you for being here today and thank you for all of your service. 35 years working in one part of the national defense is a pretty important challenge and a pretty important accomplishments so thank you for that, sir. general welsh is make in his second appearance before the subcommittee. this is his first budget and posture hearing. general welsh becomes -- comes

before us as a air force academy graduate with over 36 years of military service. he became the chief of staff of the air force last august having previously served as commander of u.s. air forces in europe. thank you for appearing before us today. your statements will be entered into the record and if you will present those statements anyway that you wish. before i turn to mr. this kloske i must inform the witnesses there will be a series of votes about 10:30 so we are trying to structure the hearing so that part of us will be able to make the votes while the others remained to continue the hearing and then when does return the rest of us will go. having said that, i will turn

any opening statement over. >> chairman thank you very much and as in the past i appreciate you having the hearing and gentlemen for your service particularly mr. secretary, anticipating your retirement for your office and i look forward to your testimony. thank you very much. >> there are several concerns that we have. one of the major issues is some of the unfortunate stories that we are getting on sexual harassment and sexual abuse in the air force and we will be pursuing that today, this morning. something that caught my attention was a story in "the washington post" and the headline said they air force sidelines 17 icbm launched officers. commander sites quote rot

unquote within the system. that headline alone is really worrisome so i'm hoping that you will discuss in some detail to tell us just what's going on here and i know the chairman of the energy committee has some very serious interest in this issue as well. so i think what we'll do is at this point mr. secretary we are anxious to hear your statement. your entire statement will be placed in the record. you may present it to us anyway you like. >> thank you mr. chairman and if i could indulge the committee, i will read the statement and both general welsh and i are prepared to address the two issues that you raised among others this morning. mr. chairman mr. viskloski and members of the committee it's a pleasure to be here representing

our active duty guard, reserve and civilian airmen and i am honored to be here with my teammate and partner in this work, our chief of staff and the great air force leader general mark welsh. for fiscal year 2014 the air force is requesting $114.1 billion in a baseline budget. as with all budgets are fy14 request represents a snapshot in time, our best analysis of air force needs based on available information. and especially given the budget turmoil over the past year, if i could indulge the committee. this morning's discussion on the fy14 budget needs to begin with where we stand this year in fy fy13. first i would like to highlight that throughout the current budget turmoil are air force priorities remain aligned with january 2012 defense strategic guidance. this includes supporting combatant commanders in the

current fight in afghanistan, maintaining a strong and stable presence in the pacific and korea, supporting nuclear and regional deterrence, counterterror and other operations. there is demand for airpower and the airmen are busy around the world. today more than 35,000 airmen are deployed, more than 50,000 airmen are stationed overseas and more than 132,000 are providing support to combatant commanders every day. as the fiscal constraints get tighter we need to tighten our alignment with the new strategy and strengthen our commitment to joint and interdependent solutions to the nation's military challenges. you have heard many times the duplication of sequestration are dire and they are. that is why the president has put forward a balanced deficit reduction proposal that would allow congress to repeal sequestration in fy13 and beyond. while the department is working

full out to adapt to these new realities, it was not possible given the necessary timelines to turnaround a new fy14 budget based on new assumptions derived from march 1 sequestration and from the final defense appropriations act which is also approved in march, nearly six months into the fiscal year. we need to stipulate up front that are fy14 budget request does not provide funding to recover from the damage done by even a partial year of fy13 sequestration, much less the full impact that would hit the air force if the president's proposal to replace sequestration for fy14 is not enacted. this morning i will summarize the state of our air force in three broad categories. first, force structure that is the size and composition of the force, readiness, training and preparednpreparedn ess of our airmen and their equipment and modernization.

the replacement of aging aircraft and infrastructure in our future capabilities. first force structure. last year in our efforts to meet the requiremerequireme nts of the first half of the budget control act amounting to $487 billion in reductions over 10 years, the air force fy13 budget proposed a number of force structure changes including aircraft transfers retirement and changes in admissions. it was the subject of much controversy in our reserve components with the state adjutant general and delegations. thanks to the work of this committee and others we were able to fashion a compromise which was approved in the national defense authorization act. this year i can report that the fy14 budget proposal has no major changes in force structure. as compared to force levels enacted in the fy13 nbaa our 14

budget proposal would reduce active duty end strength by 1860, reduce air force reserve and strength by 480 and the air national guard by 300. we retain c-130s and global hawk block 30 force structure is directed through fy14 our nuclear forces remain at current levels and future decisions on the implementation of the new start agreement and while trying to achieve 65 medium altitude combat air patrols with our remotely piloted aircraft's. we will focus in fy14 on implementing the retiremenretiremen ts, transfers and mission changes outlined in the fy13 ndaa and we have provided two reports to congress outlining implementation plans for each affected unit and location. looking ahead has never been more important for air force to maximize the strength of our total force, our active guard and reserve components are

increasingly integrated training supplying and conducting a full range of missions together as a total force. we must continue to insure that our active reserve component correctly balances the strengths of each component and meets meats or should you take requirements and fiscal demands. we have made progress over the past year in our intergovernmental relationships working with dod and the council of governors to formalize the consultative process between dod and the states to provide more transparency and planning in programs. within the air force the guard and reserve leaders general welsh and i have established a total task force to provide strategic options on the appropriate mix of total force capability to inform our strategic planning for fiscal year 15 and beyond. this task force will also serve as a resource to the congressionally correct did national mission on the force

structure the air force which held its first meeting last week. in summary our propellers for structure is relatively stable for now but beyond fy14 it's dependent on decisions yet to be made and especially on achieving a balanced approach to deficit reduction to avoid further sequestration. turning to readiness while the air force has met the demands of a high operational support of today's funding it has taken a toll on our weapon systems. unit readiness has declined significantly from 2003 onward but despite significant investments in the past few years only half of our combat air forces have met acceptable standards for readiness. with the rebound to the asia-pacific in our continued presence in middle east and africa we expect demand for air force capabilities will remain constant, perhaps even increase over the next decade. we must improve the air force

readiness to prevent a hollow force. with respect to fy13 the joint chiefs of staff and air force leaders have already recounted the readiness affects we anticipate this year as a result of sequestration. passage of the final fy13 and continuing resolutions which include defense appropriations was helpful to dod overall but did not improve the active air force's operation and maintenance budget. it left shortages and overseas contingency operations accounts and did not mitigate the impacts of sequestration which required approximately $10 billion in reductions to be taken in the last seven months of fy13. anticipating this challenge we took steps to cut back normal operations including civilian hiring freeze for permanent temporary and turned agencies, canceling on mission-critical official travel and reducing major command and combatant

command o&m budgets by 10% and deferring nonemergency facilities as damon and modernization projects. however these steps alone are not sufficient to absorb the full impact of the sequestration without affecting readiness. collectively the sequestration reductions and readiness impacts are now being felt across the air force. currently nine combat fighter jets and three compat bombers are stiff down and have ceased flying operations. seven combat coded units are flying at capable levels and will only return to combat mission ready status if funding becomes available. reductions will haul training for the rest of the year in and many units and will take up to six months to restore pilot proficiency. other impacts include reductions in weapon systems system sustainment that will delay

necessary payments, increase costs and cost and take two to three years to recover from repair backlogs. and there's the potential furlough of our valued civilian workforce significantly reducing civilian pay and potentially devastating morale and slowing productivity. our main objective in the fy14 budget near as our objective for three years running, too slow and reverse the erosion of air force readiness. to that end are fy14 budget request is aimed at setting the air force back on course for full spectrum readiness. the budget request prioritizes funding for 1.2 million flying hours, an increase of 40,000 hours over last year, to ensure pilot proficiency in continued pilot production. the funds training ranges to enhance readiness effectiveness. it has 1.5 billion across

defense plan to weapon system sustainment to keep our aircraft and systems ready. unfortunately fy13 sequestration now jeopardizes the gains we had hoped to achieve next year. even assuming this budget is approved as proposed and even if the congress back sometime this summer to repeal and replace sequestration are fy13 week would almost certainly begin fy14 carrying forward the significantly degraded posture. the air force is working with omb on in fy13 reprogramming request to cover shortfalls and to address some of the worst effects of sequestration. however the transfer authority available to dod is not sufficient to address all of our shortfalls. even if such transfer authority were available we do not have sufficient internal resources to pay for the shortfalls without

digging far too deeply into modernization programs and there may not be sufficient time left in fy132 prepaid -- repair the damage that lay ahead. to sum up the readiness situation we have been consuming air force readiness for several years. we continue to focus our resources available to meet combatant commander requirements but with a steep fy13 budget reduction brought on by sequestration the readiness we have been trying to climb out of just got deeper. the full readiness and budgetary implications of this situation could not be accounted for in the fy14 budget request and are still under review. we'll continue to work with their dod leadership in congress to fashion a practical way forward. finally modernization. as i previously testified, this challenge facing the air force if unaddressed will seriously

undermine our ability to accomplish the missions this nation asks us to undertake. the average age of our fighter force structure is now 23 years. rescue holocaust or's 22 years, training aircraft 25 years, bombers 36 years and tankers nearly 50 years. satellites for missile warnings navigation, secure communication of their needs are also aging and replacements must be launched on a schedule consistent with the life expectancy of the current constellation. our most significant priorities remain on track for fy14. this generation f-35 joint strike fighter's, the long-range strike systems including the bomber. continued modernization of existing planes like the b-2 and the f-22, the f-15, f-16 nc-17

to keep them operationally effective and extend their service lives is also -- we request funding for referred munitions as well as critical satellite assets such as the global system aea jeff and satellite programs. and we intend to maintain her science and technology funding in order to stay on the cutting-edge of technological innovation to sustain our airpower advantage. we often face nature challenges with major acquisition programs that have recently achieved some success using block buys and more efficient procurement strategies to drive down the cost of our three largest space programs. by over $2.5 billion in the fy14 request includes the first year of a multiyear procuremeprocureme nt for the c-130j which is expected to save over $500 million over the next five years. we will need more successes like

these in the future because there are still significant pressures on our modernization programs. last year programming the air force of $487 billion in defense reductions, the cancellation or delay of modernization programs accounted for 65% of the total air force reductions. this year, each program was reduced by more than 7% in sequestration. in the immediate years ahead major programs like the f-35, the ac 46 in the bomber are scheduled to grow as the overall dod budget declines and some long-standing need such as the trainer aircraft and replacement for the ea jstars remain unfunded. looking ahead if there continues to be resistant to force structure changes for constraining growth in compensation and given our focus on improving readiness it's very

likely that out your reductions in the budget control act will require further disproportionate cuts to our modernization programs. the advance technologies continue to proliferate around the world these cut backs and modernization would put at risk the air force capabilities this nation will need in the decade ahead. decisions ahead of us are extraordinarily difficult that congress has the power to help the air force and the department of defense maneuver through these unparalleled budget challenges. in recent years congress has placed limits on the air force's efforts to take cuts and urgently needed modernization and force structure and has rejected some of dod's proposals to help slow the growth in military compensation. as their dod leaders have testified these congressional actions if sustainable add aliens to our costs over the

next five years. we hope that in view of the serious economic problems facing the nation congress will allow us to implement these and other important changes. mr. chairman it is now more critical than ever that we get your support on reductions in force structure. the air force executed brac 2005 on time and under budget. those adjustments today are generating savings estimated at $1 billion per year. we are looking at european basing requirements with their dod partners who are ready to begin next steps in the continental u.s.. we estimate more than 20% of our basing infrastructure is access. brac authority as a tool that we urgently need to allow dod to invest excess infrastructure to refocus resources for critical needs including readiness, modernization and taking care of our people. the area of compensation we are

committed as you were to work to taking care of our airmen. the impact of increasing personnel continues to be a serious concern and can no longer be ignored. therefore we support dod's efforts to slow the growth in personnel costs and we support the modest 1% pay raise in the tricare feed and pharmacy co-pay changes included in the fy14 budget proposal. while these are some of the broad outlines of our fy14 budget there is clearly more work to do as we assess the role and implications of sequestration in fy13 and beyond. we will need your help to make necessary adjustments in our force structure, to keep is ready and to avoid a hollow force and to equip this air force with the modern capabilities it needs for the future. perhaps one of the most helpful things congress can do is to return to regular order and

approved the appropriation measures in a timely way. throughout history or nation has effectively dealt with both strategic and fiscal challenges that our recent track record of repeated delay and uncertainty continuing resolutions to disrupt programs and budget planning and midyear cuts that impair readiness and threaten civilian furloughs must not be -- we sincerely appreciate the ongoing commitment of this committee and its professional staff to return to regular order. today's world is a dangerous place and it's counterproductive to generate problems of our own making while so many other serious threats beyond our control demand attention. together we must do better for our men and women in uniform and their families and our civilian workforce and our national security. mr. chairman the american people have the worlds best airmen and

the world's finest air force. the air force leadership team remains committed to getting the most capability possible from whatever level resources you provide. we remain grateful for the support this committee unfailingly provides to our air force into the men and women of our armed forces. we are prepared to address the two issues that you raise mr. chairman. i will turn it over to mike colleague and started in that direction. we stand ready to assist in any way we can and we look forward to addressing your questions. steam is. >> tercek or trade thank you very much and now general welsh we will be very happy to take your statement at this time. >> thank you chairman, chairman young ranking member viskloski and members of the committee it is truly a privilege. mr. chairman i will enter most of my comments in the record if that is okay with you, sir. there are two things i would like to address at the front end if i may. it won't take long but it's important. the first is the those secretary

donley and i were appalled i believe is the right word at the sexual battery allegations and our response branch that were -- this weekend. this office is responsible for program policies and procedures in this area. the charges if true our incomprehensible. as the secretary and i have said over and over again sexual assault prevention and response efforts are critically important to the united states air force into our people and this is another shocking reminder that we have a long way to go and we have a lot of work to do in the he happy to answer any specific questions you have about that during this session. we remain committed to supporting victims consistent with the due process holding those that commit this horrible crime accountable for their actions. we will strive to foster work environments that are safe and respectful and develop leaders with characters who demonstrated the effectiveness innovation and selfless caring approach

required to lead americans sons and daughters. we will continue to do everything in our power while balancing the resources required to do that with the understanding that her primary job is to fight and win the nation's wars. no part of that primary job is more important than nuclear enterprise. in march of this year the 91st missile wing at minot air force base wonder when did an inspection and he referred to in the article from "the washington post" this morning. that inspection was conducted by air force strike command inspectors and encompass 22 areas of performance. of those 22 hours my not was rated excellent and 14 and rated marginal in one. that one area rated marginal was a missile crew operation. it is unusual for a missile went to be graded marginal in the area and it does not happen very often. to be clear marginalist passing. it meets the minimum standards for getting the job done but it is not the level we would expect from that group. the wing commander and the group

commander in my not as immediately started an investigation into what caused the lower than expected performance. they expanded and during the inspections the entire crew force of the wing and they conducted a comprehensive top to bottom assessment of training performance testing simulations etc. etc. and when they were complete they found 17 members not from one unit that spread across spread across the wing could they felt were not demonstrating the proper attitude and effort to stay completely up to speed on everything necessary to be perfect in the nuclear operations. they took the 17 crewmembers and put them into a training program which will take 60 days to complete. the 17 crewmembers constitute 10% of the missile wing. so in my view here is what happened. we had inspection process that is robust, and it's it is very

difficult and an indication for the inspection was it was something for the wing commander to pay attention to. with great diligence we try to figure what the problem was and what the solution would be. my view he did exactly what i would expect from a commander. he did it before there was a mission -- met all standards of the inspection conducted trade he did it even though he knew it would draw negative attention to his commands and command and in doing so he reinforced the pride of the great missile crews who came through that microscope for reinspection with flying colors and he set clear expectations for the 17 who did not and are now in a retraining program and must re-earn the privilege of serving the missile combat crewmember. i'm confident they will do exactly that. i'm proud of the wing commander at sub 10 and i think he did the right thing. mr. chairman my job is to help secretary donley feel the most capable -- it does improve

readiness and helps to limit for structure costs and protects vital authorization and finally i'm privileged to be here sitting next to secretary donley who for five years has led our air force with respect for all airmen and he and i would be happy to answer questions. >> general i think we share that. the last comment you just made i think we all share that. thank you very much for the statement you just presented to the committee and one of the issues that i michigan might opening comments i will yield to mr. freylinghuysen because he has serious follow-ups on that issue psp first of all i joined the committee members in thanking you for your service and the men and women you represent on duty each and every day.

for my part and mr. viskloski and ms. cantor is not here yet we are interested in the reliability of our nuclear stop pile and that is what we do on the energy and water committee. you two gentlemen are responsible for delivering so when we hear it and read this article in "the washington post" and i respect the fact that you addressed it, this is the first time there have been inspection problems at minot, isn't that true? i have served on this committee with mr. young and several members and there were several issues related to minot back in 2007. were these some of the same issues that were occurring back then? >> there were and i would say the inspection process as described for you has gotten more difficult and much more focused over the last five

years. see with all due respect, someone is being cashiered out so i understand 10%, is a 10% of the officers assigned to these missile launch sites? what has happened to them? and are they certified or how did they get into this position to begin with? >> they went through all the necessary training to become qualified but as new commanders they needed to go back for additional refresher training so they were decertified and taken off-line. see what does that mean exactly? >> it means that the commander know longer has confidence. >> wouldn't the commander had known this last year? i mean isn't this reviewed on an annual basis at these missile sites? >> sir, they have multiple inspections that recur on three cycles.

minot has been through many inspections. >> have have all of those inspections passed with flying colors? >> yes, sir. >> it has passed but you must have some degree of unhappiness if you stripped 17 people who were responsible for this work and where they stripped of their authorities are not? >> they are not allowed to surface missile combat crewmembers. >> there must be some reason for it. >> the commanders concerned that they are not taking their job seriously enough. the missile force at minot is a very young force. a missile force in general air force as a young force. he was concerned mostly about an attitude or an unwillingness or active understanding of how hard you need to work. >> respectfully general that is what we heard in 2000 before this committee. in herron does the job here is a young workforce and we obviously

love the air force but in reality they are obviously other jobs in the air force that are perhaps more attractive than being down underground and taking on this responsibility 24 hours a day. isn't that true? isn't that one of the issues hear? >> i don't know what the issue is for the 17 individuals. all i can tell you is it's exactly what the wing commander is trying to prevent. >> there are few we addressed a couple of years ago and these are somewhat, these are critical because you are the critical part of the nuclear deterrence. some of of these jobs and air force are viewed as a dead-end job and not as attractive as other jobs in the air force. do you argue with that point? >> i do, because i think the pride that goes with this work, the level of national importance that goes with this work, the

high standards that are set for this work reflects a real commitment to the best standards of excellence and performance in our air force. >> i understand that but this didn't happen overnight. is there something inherently in this workforce, but there hasn't been enough from above as to how important this mission is? god forbid we should ever have to use an icbm or use the bombers might deliver a nuclear weapon but is there something inherent in the workforce there where now we are going to get a substantial wake-up call? >> sir, as the chief outlined the unit has gone through a number of inspections in the last five years and it has passed at much higher levels but

it's not being generated in the most recent inspections. they are being tested and retested on a recurring basis and not only in this job in the nuclear enterprise but across our air force. our airmen are held to high standards and they are tasked with inspections to ensure the quality of their work meets our expectation. >> i'm sure the quality of work is excellent across the air force but in this particular area there are inherent problems which haven't -- which have resurfaced from 2007. we have the same conversation back in this committee several years ago. >> i think it was a very different conversation back in that period. i think there has been substantial progress made in the last five years. as the chief outlined this is exactly what we want commanders to be doing.

>> perhaps it happens in the first place but we are glad that somebody noticed it and they did not match your expectations. i appreciate the responses and quite honestly mr. chairman i think this is an area where the ig needs to take a look. i yield back. thank you. >> mr. freylinghuysen if i might follow up on that. it the question in my mind right now in this conversation, the so-called rot is strictly a people issue orders to go to the state of the weapons, the state of the delivery capabilities or is that all intact 100% or does the rot extend? it's important that we know exactly, besides the people problem what about the technology? what about the hardware? >> mr. chairman birotte referred

to in the e-mail was a deputy commander term that i think he and everyone else regrets. he was talking about this attitude among a few of the crewmembers that he had heard about. he didn't think they were committed enough to stay fully aware of the responsibilities of their job all the time and getting better continuously in the performance of their mission. they do the job but they didn't have the attitude in the drive he expected to see from his missile crewmembers and that is what he was referring to, nothing else. congressman by the way we share a concern about the crew force feeling that they are important. my first visit in this job was to the missile fields, the missile wings to talk about how important important is this in the value they should feel. anything we can do to continue that and make sure we don't see issues like this arise is something we should be doing every day. >> will the gentleman yield? i understand these young crews are down there basically alone. do they have adult supervision

down there or does the supervision come from a commander up of? are they really down there alone are not? >> the crewmembers are alone. i would not say that they are not adults. >> they are adults but i'm just saying is there a command or? you made a point in your statement about command and control. it appears there is not as much of a command in oversight is there should be. >> the interconnectivity provides an awful lot of checks. >> obviously not in those underground locations. in some of those underground locations. thank you mr. chairman read. >> thank you mr. freylinghuysen. just one comment on that. this deterrent capability that we have had basically since the end of world war ii has been important to the security of this country and if there are any flaws we have got to ferret them out and make sure they are

face. anyway thank you for your responses on that important subject and i yield to mr. moran. >> thank you mr. chairman. the topic of mr. freylinghuysen appropriately raised, the personnel and the one that you raise mr. chairman rightfully on sexual assault we have revisited. ms. mccollum rightfully so on those issues so i'm going to address another couple of issues. i have to explain that my staff person who was a graduate of usc has respectfully requested that since secretary donley is a u.s. trojan that i only direct my questions at general welsh, so what's not the way things are done and are supposed to be done but that is what we will do.

general welsh, in fy12, this committee provided funds to purchase the three remaining global aircraft at the air force never obligated those dollars. it ignored the intent of the subcommittee and so this current fiscal year, the subcommittee directed you to purchase the three aircraft and yet you decided to shrug your shoulders and not to do so. we just got a report that required you to -- on this program and despite repeated claims whether you have come before the sub committee, the report shows the committee was right and you were wrong

frankly. you too piloted aircraft that is more expensive to operate than the global. the cost per hour is approximately the same but the global is much cheaper overall because you need fewer aircraft and as a pilot and i suspect that is the real issue here, the pilot versus the piloted craft even though do you too has been around longer than some of the members of the subcommittee have been alive. even when you reduce the range that you required by two-thirds, we still find that there is an advantage to the global hawk and now i am going to anticipate whether you tell us that do you

too has more -- than the global hawk. i will also put on the table here that the fact is the sensors could be while you say it would cost a half a billion dollars the contractor has offered to do it for the air force for a price of $75 billion to put the you too optical camera onto the global hawk and get the air force has not responded. i have got pages of data here comparing the two programs and they are pretty conclusive that the committee was right and that the air force continues to insist on an aircraft that is largely outdated. but i suspect it's because by the pilot there is an understandable bias but this

committee not only wants to do what it's did but to take advantage of the progress of technology so that we have the largest range of isf possible and we can most effectively present this information to the people in the field, so a few minutes to construct your response general. do you want to do so? >> i'm trying to keep this in order. the cost is based on the concept of operations by the platform. i believe the cost is about the same. the difference is how we use the and the is a great example. we put the closer to where the isr track is going to be located. if you use that model the cost less than the global hawk which typically is more centrally located and has a longer way to travel. the strength of the global hawk cost more money but cost is a

trade in my mind. the sensors, the company's proposal -- my proposal we are looking at 18. it takes the sensors off of the which means you cannot use the 's anymore. product quality is is an issue for our combatant command. some of the collection arenas are not as good on the global hawk as the u2 in every commander will tell you that. we have talked to them in the past and they understand the concern. they would rip prefer a u2 product. the center ranges are longer on the u2 this u2 as well which is beneficial particularly indications near a border that you can't cross. those were the big things that drove our assessment. pilots being in airplanes that have absolutelabsolutel y nothing to do with it. i couldn't care less. we want a platform that will do

the best job in accomplishing the mission assigned, manned or unmanned and we have said that all along. on the language in the the lovely understand with the losses and we will do with the law tells us to do. we requested relief for buying three additional global hawks because we think the requirement established by the joint staff. if we are unable to get that to obligate those funds in the ways direct by the law, the issue is not that we don't want both. we would love to have both to meet isr requirements around the globe. we just don't have the resources. >> well, okay. i hear your response and i don't want to take any issue with the sincerity and the objectivity of your response but we have data that shows that this global hawk

has a much larger range. it operates 365 days a year, 24 hours a day, 1200 nautical mile range and its operational costs are 19% lower than this u2. the global hawk operational costs are declining while the u2 are increasing. i'm not going to get competitive in the hearing here but i do think it is an issue that needs to continue to be addressed because the committee has a consensus and it's consistent with the authorizing committee i might also say. just one other area. the al is system with the f-35, i am told that we need to pay

for seven contractors for per squadron and that's not affordable. can you share with us why you feel that is absolutely necessary to have the seven contractors with each f-35 squadron for this system? >> sir, i don't have the specific data on contractor support for alis but i would be happy to get that for you. alis is very important part as logistics management system and support system for this aircraft and it will be use with international partners as well. it is a big program and has lots of management potential and we are trying to get the cost down

on that program. by itself it would be a program that is quite significant so we are working to get the cost down on alis and work out smart support strategies with our dod and international partners. >> okay, thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you and i'm sorry i was late and you may have covered some of what i'm going to ask you about in your opening remarks. if you have mr. chairman you can tell me that. of course the concern of sexual assault in the report this at 26,004 sexually assaulted in one year and the head of your department has been arrested. what you are doing is not working, no doubt about it. it isn't working so what are you going to do? what is your plan?

i don't want another study or another report. are you just going to let the congress change the rules which we are certainly willing to do? the maam, this is a concern to all of us. all the services including the air force has been very focused on improving both the climate and the m. bar meant in which our airmen live and work. >> may i interrupt to? but it's not working. >> maam, we understanding. >> are you going to do more of the same? >> we need to find as the chief describes that we need to find the game changers. we are working the client and working the deterrence in the prevention and we are training investigators. we are training lawyers to be more effective in uncovering this problem and working with victims so they will come forward so they will get support through prosecutorial process and illegal process which can be lengthy and frustrating and even

traumatic to the victims. we have established a victims counsel program to help support victims. >> that is all after they have been assaulted. >> it is but we are working every part of this and we just have not yet found the game changers. >> the assault on women, do most of the assaults have to do with lemon? >> most of the victims are women, yes but not all. >> are. >> are they all in the air force? i would start out maybe by putting a woman in charge of it. >> right now the officer responsible for sexual assault prevention is not the lieutenant colonel who is being characterized that way. he is in charge of the four-person branch in that office. a one star female is the officer who will lead this effort going forward. >> i'm just saying the congress will take action and it may or

may not work but we are so fed up with this and while we talk about protecting our military, and we are not protecting those women serving in the military and stopping this from happening. that is all i have to say but what you are doing is more of the same and it will get the same results. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you all for being here today. i wanted to ask you a little bit about our space launch capabilities. when you represent a state like florida like mr. young and i do, you learn the impact of space has on everyday life and you serve on the subcommittee and you learn about space having impact on every impact on international security. right now most of the space launch capabilities are provided by one particular alliance and they do that in an excellent way

and almost perfect record but it's very expensive. one of the reasons it is expensive is because you have demanded a zero risk situation which is i think appropriate. but if we do a costa knossos we always find if you want zero risk exponentially the cost will increase. i think it would be important for that subcommittee to understand about that, about why we have that zero risk and therefore the expensive part and then also my understanding is you tend to open up those launch capabilities to certified entrance and i think that is a good idea as long as you have liability. maybe you could talk a little bit about your plans to do that and how you are going to make sure that they are as reliable as who is doing it now and how are you going to decide that you have more than one that is

capable how would you go about deciding who is going to provide what launch capabilities? >> sir, i'm happy to address that. this is i think a good new story news story for our space operators and taxpayers and it's really a product of about three years of work. first let me address what you describe as our primary source verse the sludge. this is a big deal because space launch is about 40% of the cost of our space enterprise. we have high standards here because we are putting million-dollar satellites into orbit and 100 million-dollar plus satellites in the most dangerous part of the mission is access and launch to space. that is why it is so important to us. on the eeld side we have done extensive cost work and we have entered into deep discussions

with you well a and we have arrived at a block by decision that allows us to buy 36 cores over five years at a reduced cost so using the block by up approach we are reducing the cost of eeld. at the same time, working with the national reconnaissance office in nassau we have put together a program for certifying new companies that want to get certified for national security space launch and working with nasa we have published the new criteria i think it was in november of 2011 which outlines what companies need to do to demonstrate proficiency and reliability in space launch. we have also to support that work we have isolated i think two payloads, maybe more and i

can correct that for the record. we have identified payloads that would be available to those new entrants to help them demonstrate their proficiency and reliability for space. .. i think for the re