he talked about the real change on the peninsula will occur someday when china realizes that its security interests are better served with its relationship with seoul than it is with pyongyang. and i wonder if, what you think about that. because as i look at that, you know, we know that china is south korea's largest trading

partner, and certainly the relationship with seoul is a much more productive one than the one with north korea, but, of course, everything that you laid out, why it's in china's interest to support north korea, you know, thosee incommensurable relationship with seoul and relationship with north korea. but i wonder if you envision that there would ever be a time when china would feel that seoul is more important than pyongyang, and what would be the implications of that? >> thank you, dave. those are really excellent questions. on the bank of china as i mentioned we will see whether it's sustain. we've had iterations in the past of china preparing to crack down, appearing to get tough with then as time went by suddenly people forgot about and china withdrew its pressure on north korea. we will see whether that happens this time.

on the caisson thing, i guess it is now clear that all the south koreans have gotten out of there, so completely dead zone now. i hadn't heard that new, china rebuffing the overture to take the workers, south korean and north korean workers, both? >> yes. it was in the japanese press this week, and said that north korea wanted them, asked china to take those workers, and i assume that they don't really want those workers going back into north korean society there because of long contact with south koreans. >> get contaminated. >> yes. and, of course, we read reports, some of them have been sent to reeducation camps and things like that. but i thought rebuffing that request from north korea, i thought, i mean really there's no goodness that would come out of that for china but i just, you know, two things. there's not a pattern but i just

wonder if china is at least given the perceptions that they're going to act stronger against the north's behavior, try to temper the north's behavior? >> i think the answer to that is clearly yes, that they're giving that impression. there's no doubt that's the line that has been sent to all the western media, that china has had it now, it is putting its foot down, north korea has crossed the red line. time will tell, we will see whether that is a serious change in policy. if it is, i think it's encouraging, that this is what we've been asking for for 20 years. if they have finally had it, that would be a good thing. that would tie in with your second question about whether china would develop a more healthy relations with south korea. and i think, again, that would be a very useful development. but i didn't mention when i talked about the buffer issue that china sees north korea this strategic buffer against this

imaginary invasion from south korea and the u.s. to me that is absurd. i think more profound probably is china's concern about the contamination issue, it doesn't want a vibrant democracy on its border. prefer to have the authoritarian north korean regime. but from our perspective there's no doubt that we think it would be better not only for south korea and the west, and for china, if it developed a healthy relationship with south korea and try to steer north korea in that direction. whether it will reach that conclusion of course there's always a debate within chinese leadership. we don't know exactly what the pla is saying and what other civilian leaders are saying. we can hold out hope, but short answer is i think that would be a very helpful development. >> larry?

grou >> i agree with much of what joe said. for example, i have thought for a long time that it was questionable whether china really opposed north korea's nuclear weapons program. my sense has been for a long time that china not only did thing -- things to enable the program to progress, but that china's real attitude or message to north korea was, keep it quiet. don't reveal what you were doing. and the problem, it seems to me, china has with north korea in recent years is that north korea has been unwilling to keep it quiet with nuclear tests, with statements about progress in uranium enrichment, these kinds of things. and, of course, the longer range missile test.

suret on the chinese government. there is, as i think joe has alluded to, still a lot of resistance in the chinese government to making a break with north korea. but the first point i would like to make, and ask joe a specific question has to do with a new factor, which i think has entered the picture of china's north korean policy, and that is what you might call public opinion. in china. and since the december missile test, going into the february nuclear test we have been reading about a lot of public criticism in china of north korea. internet traffic filled with

criticisms and denunciations of north korea, and even criticisms of chinese support for north korea. several academics have spoken out more forcefully. there has even been some on the street protests outside of north korean diplomatic missions. the question i have is that with regard to u.s. diplomacy and rok diplomacy, what tactics or strategies could we employ in our diplomacy that would enhance our influence on this growing body of north korean critics in china, to increase the attractiveness of our policies and diplomatic positions to them, to strengthen them in their arguments that the chinese government should change policy?

are there things that we are not doing now in our policies towards north korea, that we perhaps could start doing that would have a greater appeal to these growing numbers of chinese critics in north korea? now, joe went over sanctions, and banks were mentioned. the action of the bank of china as reported in recent days. but to me, and i have talked about this before at the icas seminars here, the big hole in china's non-enforcement of u.s. sanctions has been its unwillingness to do anything to block or stop the air traffic between tehran and pyongyang. we know, for example, from

wikileaks that the bush administration made quiet overtures to beijing about this, in 2006 and 2007. but to no avail. nothing was done. we have the new reports of iran sending missile scientists, missile technicians, and probably also nuclear experts, to not only observe the recent missile and nuclear tests, but now to permanently station them in north korea. undoubtedly, they went to north korea from tehran. they probably refueled in the beijing airport, as the wikileaks documents talked about as having drawn the bush administration's overtures. can we do anything to put more

pressure on china to stop -- this would be my second question to joe -- or is this simply a bridge too far, given china's, not only close relationship to north korea, but also its close ties to iran? is this really a bridge too far, or are there things we could do to put more pressure on china to cut off this traffic? and money is part of the traffic, by the way. >> thank you, larry. >> excellent question and a very astute observation by larry about the growing role of chinese public opinion through the internet and all these things that i don't understand. the latest one i just read about is that they are gaining access to the white house website, which has now been deluged with messages from people in china

who have gotten access to the west, public available. so far china has not blocked it, but these people are using website as a way to protest against their own government policies, and asking the u.s. to support them. that's a very useful device. there's another one, its long-standing in existence, but, unfortunately, seems to be, seems to be cut back by this administration, and that is voice of america and the kinds of programs that we have channeling information. just the facts, just what is available, the kind of things just described made probably unknown to most chinese citizens. if they were to become known through our own media and the voice of america and china's like that, i think it could help increase the pressure. it's a dictatorship, it's authoritarian but there's a role for public opinion and we ought to exploit it to the extent we can. i don't see any great change in u.s. policy to north korea.

we've tried everything. we have run the gamut from appeasement to threats, and so far we haven't achieved a lot. but we haven't achieved a lot because china hasn't played its part in those policies. so i think we can do more to let the chinese people know just how far the u.s. has gone, the west have gone, in trying to accommodate north korea's legitimate interests, but their own government has not been cooperative. and i think that's a way of encouraging pressure on beijing itself. >> larry, follow-up? dave? >> i do have two important questions, then i will turn it over to you. from president park's visit this week, very successful visit-by all accounts, two things that struck me from her speeches and statements at first the joint statement, president obama and

president park reiterated the 2009 joint vision, you know, that the ultimate in state is reinstatement of the financial. -- peninsula. i think that is most important long-term goal for the peninsula. and so my first question is, how does china really envision unification? you mentioned that they don't want a vibrant democracy for contamination, but i think, i think we'd all agree that maybe this isn't a good statement, but someday the regime is going to no longer exist. and although it's proven proved resilient over the last 60 years, but when the regime no longer does exist, what do you think that china will do in terms of the unification of the peninsula? my second question is that president park unveiled her

northeast asia initiative in her statement to congress, in talking about taking a lead in other issues, climate change and economic issues. and this goes back to my first question about the relationship with seoul and beijing, but do you have any idea, any comments on how you think that china will view that initiative? and if, in fact, they might participate in that? because i think that's a real change in the dynamics of the peninsula if seoul takes the lead in some of those issues there, and it might, it might change the diplomatic atmosphere with seoul. but china would have to play a role. so i would like to hear your comments on those. >> thank you, dave. absolutely again, and as you have implied in your question,

china is key in so much of this. on the reunification, obviously china would likely be mentioned, the resilience of the north korean regime. it's resilient because china has kept it on life-support. if china were to change that policy it wouldn't be so resilient, and china has leverage to encourage change there. the dilemma for china, it seems to me, when you talk about reunification you are talking about a democratic korea. and a nondemocratic china is not particularly infatuated with that idea of having such a neighbor on its border but it's not just a contamination thing that you have a successful democracy as an example of why we don't have those freedoms in north korea, or china. we saw some of that during the taiwan election. a lot of folks in taiwan and china said, gee, these are chinese people on the island doing that, is there not some reason we can do that here?

but it's also the fact that a self democratic korea would also be an ally of the west, so china either through paranoia or calculations does not want to see that. whether it eventually -- publicly it's not willing to accept concept of a unified korea, you know that, but whether in their private deliberations they see that someday it's going to happen and how we going to make the best of it, as this one of the condition they're going to demand is that there be no u.s. forces there. certainly no nuclear facilities, so they will try to extract the best deal they can from the own security standpoint. on the second question about president park's northeast asia initiative and ways the countries there can collaborate, one of the last assignments i had at the defense department was in the area of humanity assistance and disaster relief. and we work very closely with countries in southeast asia particularly on ways to collaborate, using the military,

having military effort because they usually have the greater resources to handle a crisis. and it was rather ironic because it was right after both secretary colin powell and condoleezza rice had decided that all these meetings in southeast asia was kind of a waste of time, song and dance session, they have some derogatory comments. that was not well received in southeast asia. and people said the u.s. has turned its back on asia. within a year or so that changed, and then last years of the bush administration they started to attend these meetings, and it didn't take long before at a dinner, happened to sit at the table with the head of the chinese delegation, and he said, oh, the asean region form is nothing but a testament out of american foreign policy. we have gone from totally neglecting asia to suddenly co-opting the whole system of the organization. but i think those are the kind of things, the hadr and anti-piracy and proliferation, counter proliferation, the psi

proliferation initiative, certainly ways that south korea can take a lead and will play a collaborative role with its neighbors, hopefully china will get on board. china i think is one of the few countries out of 120 in the world that hasn't joined the psi, probably because taiwan is in it and it won't be part of that. but those are areas where surely there can be cooperation among the countries there, and i'm sure president park's wants to bring china into those if at all possible. >> question, would you please go to the podium, please. >> two questions. >> turn the microphone on, please. push the button on the mic.

>> just yesterday i came upon a very interesting article. i forgot the name of the author but he reviewed this article by someone who served under the clinton administration, very important capacity. what mr. bosco said today, the article i read in mind, these two questions kind of go back and forth. the point is that you put up her will, the pattern of chinese behavior at each time of north korea's provocative behavior was that they resisted to the extent possible united nations. and when they did agree there were always last in enforcement process of it. it lasted for decades and you gave very good reason list of why they did so. now, there's a very famous human habit that american press likes to quote, thank you, one sign of

senility or something is that you apply the same rules solutions to the problems that you could not solve before and to keep on applying them. we have knownhis h beor for so long, and even to this day we seem to continue to rely on it. that somehow china is the only card we have and somehow we have to make them play. this time it may be different because we are having a world if nuclear enterprise and heavy arsenal in a bargaining chips has been offered. that on this view somehow contain north korea we are going to increase our military presence, and you're not going to like it, take a or b. and they have the ultimatum. this time we're hopeful that the solution, the approach that we took last for a decade somehow this time may work. i am optimistic. that's question number one.

the seconquestis out denuclearization and other issues around it. the article in the london book of reviews is more about role of u.s. concerning the peninsula than about china, and it talks about how the eight years of bush administrations sole success, it enable north korea to go nuclear. by starting with statements like axis of evil and stopping communication, north korea never stop enriching uranium, and the rest. so now suppose that our approach this time works, somehow china controls it. and makes north korea to keep up its nuclear weapons. then the u.s. would be happy, reduce its military presence in which north korea is happy and walk away.

is this the only plan we have? is or something else for korean context? the article points out, the article actually starts with the observation -- observation about this caisson complex that -- you heard about th? that according to this article, it's like a marshmallow and chocolate sandwich kind of thing between oreo cookie kind of thing. and south korean workers have every day distributed some 25,000, or 50,000 of these. north korean workers are getting paid through the government which takes the lion share out of it and gives them peanuts. they hold the chocolate pies and went home and sold them in the black market as high as u.s. dollars, $10 apiece. it's a huge fortune, and that might be where the hope is. chocolate pie. we must bomb north korea with chocolate pies.

the emphasis is nothing -- forget the regime, pyongyang regime. forget all political rhetoric. forget even china. korea will not find its way unless north korean people will somehow change. and when will the united states focus on the people who are suffering? >> thank you. >> maybe later we can follow the experience of world war ii with the u.s. gis distributed chewing gum and cigarettes and that seemed to win a lot of friends for us. aside from the liberation itself, of course. who wil on the question of whether or not optimistic or not, i am optimistic when u.s. policy is sustained, consistent, coherent. when it has those characteristics they can produce the right result in both friends and potential adversaries.

it's when we send mixed signals and go back and forth with our policies that we cause confusion, miscalculation, and we do not achieve the desired results. so i will be optimistic when i see more signals from the obama administration that they would have thought this thing through, and they've made some good start. they have had some good initiatives here. i think when obama called president hu and said in effect, i mean president xi and said in effect, you don't like our forward presence in there? do something about it and you won't see so much of our forward presence. that was a good message. now, the danger of it is that xi will say okay, we're putting pressure on north korea. now get the hell out of asia. no, we're only going to stop the things we're doing in response to the latest north korean provocation, u.s. presence in asia is a permanent, nonnegotiable.

so i'm hoping that there's no confusion as to what we're offering on the table here. [inaudible] >> thank you, joe. the concept of chocolate pie bombs, the whole idea is let the market do the work instead of powerful to the work. so this is workshop the pie works. this is a gift from mayor of inchon. >> i don't want to take too much time from the other speakers here. >> i think this entire discussion was very substantively and descriptively informative. i agree with just about everything that i've heard. one thing in particular ingrerdhether we c

i would ask for some views on what pressure china can put on the u.s. in response. if we push, how much can they take that and pull back? specifically, i'm thinking of the intervening variable vis-à-vis the u.s. debt, but also u.s.-china high-tech and industrial commerce. in the private sector in the u.s., particularly in dealing with chinese government, how is it different from chinese government u.s. government interactions? i think there may be some different leverages there. also i would like to hear some

views on the u.s. military and national security related technology procurements, for example, there are chips that we get from china and we depend on them for our aircraft, for communications, for weapon systems and so forth. it goes beyond that, but in order to be brief i will leave it at that, and ask what are your views on this potential for china to come back with pressure on the united states? >> thank you. joe, dave, larry? >> steve, you can chip in. >> the potential is enormous. we are completely dependent on that's. now, our government does have some limited capacity to develop secure chips. we do that for special parts of government.

and it gets proliferated out to other parts of the comment because one uses most of them, but it's not a commercial of a production. it's not something that could replace the chips in everything we have, even in the government, let alone out in the rest of the consumer markets. they could in a heartbeat turn that against us. you don't hear anybody really talking about that because everybody is scared as heck that they will pull the cart out, but it's something that needs to be considered by our folks. i've got my little toy here, and everybody else has probably four or five devices in their pockets or their briefcases. every one of them is loaded with the chinese technology. and without it we are in deep trouble. we could make all this stuff, but you're talking about multiple orders of magnitude in cost differential, and it's not, we can't turn it around like that. >> thank you, steve.

larry? >> when christmastime comes this year and you watch our favorite movie, "it's a wonderful life," think about the character jimmy stewart plays, george bailey, as the united states. and think about mean old mr. potter, the banker that george runs to begs for help as china. and in a way that's kind of the financial relationship we have with china. we are in debt to china upwards of $2 trillion. i know you get all of these people writing, it doesn't make a difference, china needs us just as much as we need them. but as this debt to china build up, they do gain more leverage

over u.s. policies, and they know it. that they gain this leverage. and i think it does influence how we deal with china, what u.s. priorities are with china, how willing we are to confront china over certain issues versus a reluctance to do so. this is a factor, and, frankly, it's going to be a big factor in the future than it is now. >> thanks, larry. the floor is open. grace, welcome. thank you. please. good to see you, grace. >> my question has to do with the implications of chinese public opinions.e it's a fascing development, but i would put it

within the context of many complaints that are coming from the public in a range of human rights areas or development construction, et cetera. and the government, thus far, is authoritarian and does not necessarily care. and so i have a question on a sort of realistic assessment on what can really change chinese behavior towards north korea, and that is a change in the chinese regime so that it shifts from authoritarian to open, perhaps a democracy. and that ironically perhaps that's the prerequisite before we can ever hope for a change in

pyongyang. so in that sense, the pyongyang regime could outlast the authoritarian beijing regime. what do you think of that scenario? >> thank you, grace. >> i think that's one of the points i tried, until china changes its worldview of this, its own government system, it will for as long as that goes on, continue to be more of a potential ally to north korea than a friend or a cooperative partner with the west. ultimately, what's needed is regime change in pyongyang and regime change in beijing. that's ultimately, maybe it will take another 20 years or so, and we hear promises from china over the years, you know, one of the promises they made to the olympic committee to get the 2008 olympics was we're on the

path to democratization. we will be liberalizing and we will be done -- conducting have reforms. so the olympic committee said that's terrific progress and terrific quid pro quo. so here's the olympics, though for it. of course, within weeks before the olympics, china started cracking down instead of loosening up. and it's made promises over the years, there were probably 20 or 30 speeches about the need for democracy. and then president hu or someone else would say, well, hold it, we don't mean democracy in the western model. we mean democracy with chinese characteristics, whatever that is. for chinese democracy with democratic characteristics. and taiwan has been an interesting example. i heard someone who was there during the election that a lot of the local bars, they're watching the results, one of the

chinese press was allowed and one of the chinese reporters said well, this just proves that our system, in china, is superior to what taiwan is doing. we know the results before they even count the votes. and others -- that was a joke, but others in the group were muttering things like, you know, why is it that taiwan could pull this off? they had the same kind of system we had 30 years ago, a dictatorship, somehow they've made the transition, it's working. they haven't collapsed. they are economically prosperous. is there any reason china, the people in china are inferior to the people in taiwan? so those pressures are there. i've been on voice of america a lot, and it's terrific because you get actual chinese people calling in and speaking to you on the shortwave radio. and i've always encouraged that because they have many interesting things to say.

they really want a democratic system there. they want to push toward it. i was in shanghai a year ago at a think tank there. first i was surprised they invited me knowing my views, but they did. the chinese government apparently allowed it, but it was very open and a good discussion. they talked about, we really need to have a democracy, before we're going to be the kind of world power that we want to be. no matter how many weapons we have, no matter how good our economy is, until we have the international community's respect as a normal governing system, we will never achieve any kind of status we want. so the push is there from the bottom up. the chair's meeting resistance from some of the folks at the top. >> thank you, joe. follow-up question? we have one minute.

>> [inaudible] >> please step to the mic. >> i tend to believe that china will ultimately become a democracy and it won't take that long, and in that sense, i think it really may be a prerequisite for a major change on the korean peninsula. >> thank you, grace. with that note, let's give now a big round of applause. [applause] >> more from the institute for corean-american studies. coming up, east asia and u.s. foreign policy. this one our discussion looks at the effect of pentagon and state department budget cuts. >> now let me introduce one of my staff, alex kim.

he is a director and vice president for regional affairs. and he will introduce dr. steven bucci. >> thank you for this opportunity. it is my great pleasure to introduce dr. steven bucci. graduated from the u.s. military academy at west point. he served as deputy or a system sector of defense under secretary of defense donald rumsfeld. later director and head of -- of foreign policy studies. he's also been a fellow at the heritage foundation. his bio is on our icas website for those who need more details. now, now, dr. bucci will present

the east asian security environment and u.s. foreign policy. thank you. >> it's all yours. >> okay. it is my great pleasure and honor to be here. i want to thank icas and sang to for inviting me. i have to tell you, my background is as a military officer, i was an army green beret for 29 years, so i did that and i was also a defense attaché, so as a human intelligence collector as well. but then spent my last four years in the military as the military assets into the secretary of defense donald rumsfeld, who i think some of you probably know had very probably displayed in his office that he always showed everybody who came into his office the famous photo of the korean

peninsula at night and the spectacular difference between the republic of korea and north korea, and what the sacrifices of friendly nations could do, giving then an opportunity to move forward and to build the kind of country that the republic of korea had build, and someday your cousins to the north can do as well. i have to tell you, i am not nearly as qualified to talk about these specific issues as the other learned gentlemen up here at this table. i'm kind of used to that. i get all of that like to talk about things. but there is one advantage here is that when i get asked really, really tough question i can always look very gracious and turned to some of my college and say, well, why don't you take that one for me? which may happen before we are over. let's keep in mind come in many

ways asia has always been very important to united states foreign policy. world war ii started in asia. it ended in issue. it was the bigger half of the war, ma if you want to look at it that way. we then had the u.n. enterprises that are on the korean peninsula to keep the people of the republic of korea free. vietnam war, very, very dramatic and important in american history. and then today, you know, we face the issues with taiwan, our relationship with japan, and present a republic of korea. so it's always been a pretty important issue set for the united states. on the other hand, it's also always been taken for granted, to a degree. admittedly, america has for a long time been a very eurocentric nation.

you know, we have worried about that. we faced the soviet union in europe. when i was a young lieutenant that's where everyone was focused. then the middle east, things like 9/11, which we're now totally focused their and still remaining that way. so in a certain way the administration's so-called pivot towards asia is very much overdue. and we should celebrate the concept of doing that. i mean, the portion of the world's population that happens to be in asia is enormous. the markets that are there are tremendous. the potential strengths and capabilities are just beyond calculation, and the potential dangers warrant this kind of change. unfortunately, to an extent the pivot towards asia is also a farce. because right now the united

states really can't do it. even if we cancel everything we're doing everywhere else in the world and put all of our military assets in the direction of asia, we would still, a little short on what we really need to properly address the challenges there. and i can tell you we are not going to do that. i would love to say we're done in the middle east, but you look at things like syria falling apart right now. the whole benghazi episode that occurred. iran definitely on the rise. you know, the wishful thinking folks that are of the opinion that the tides of war are receiving, it's just that, wishful thinking, political receiving, it's just that, wishful thinking, political posturing. it is nonsense. they are not receiving. the world is by more dangers today than it was on 9/11 with regard to those challenges.

europe is going to continue to draw our attention. a lot less than it did before, but, frankly, rush is getting more aggressive. they are not down and out as they were right after, say like during operation desert storm. russia was sitting there going, holy smokes him it's a good thing we didn't fight these guys or we would've been in big trouble. mr. putin doesn't think that way anymore. he thinks russia should be back up as world power equal with anybody else in the world, and by gosh, everybody ought to treat them that way, and he acts that way. and, unfortunately, for everyone here, secretary kerry is a dedicated europhile. he is much more culpable dealing with issues in europe than he is in asia. african and latin american will continue to be what the military calls economy of force theaters, places where we use as low as possible to keep things under

control. but, unfortunately, they both hold the potential to be big problems. won't go into that here but that's out there as well. if, we can't ignore those issues come we can't ignore the middle east and europe and other parts of the world, but what do we do with asia? well, in these kind of tight economic times, frankly we need realistic leadership that sets actual priorities rather than just, gates slogans. just saying we're going to do something does not constitute a policy. -- promulgates slogans. but on a more realistic side, we also need very, very strong and staunch allies. fortunately, for us we have a couple of those, actually with a bunch of them in asia but i want to talk predominated about to them, and that's the republic of korea and japan.

we've got other good friends. we've got asked really, the philippines, taiwan, i know i will leave somebody out. hopefully i will not pull a george patton and insult anybody. i really don't want to do that, but the focus here today is on the republic of korea and japan. without those two in harness with the united states, we're in a lot of trouble. in fact, what i wrote here is we are sunk. we cannot do with the challenges in asia by ourselves. we've got to have those friends that we've had for a long time, and we've got to continue to work with them. we have to do a better job at supporting those two allies than we made in the past. i'm not saying we did a bad job at those, but i think we can do better. those two countries are our friends because of that friendship was forged in wars.

with the japanese it was a war where we were adversaries in a change both our societies and now we are about as close as you can get for having tried to destroy each other. with the republic of korea it was forged different ways. we fought next to each other, and our young men in some cases some women died alongside yours. and that's usually important. that's a bond that is not going to go away. but today we are a team and we need to continue to focus it that way. now, the threats are real. north korea and china must be addressed. joe did a wonderful job in detail. i'm not going to try to repeat all that, but they have to be dealt with. we need to modernize and strengthen our forces, particularly our air and naval forces which would hard for an army guy to say public like this, but that's the nature of that particular theater.

it's big, it's far away from the united states, there's a lot of water. so we really need our naval and air capabilities to be much stronger than they are today. we do not have enough of either of those capabilities. to properly deal with the challenges there. and we need the best capabilities we have. we cannot afford to have aircraft flown by young officers who in some cases are flying the same tail number aircraft as their fathers flew. literally, i was with lieutenant general ray tired dave last night up in new york city, and his son does not captain in the air force flew the same f-15, literally, not the same kind, the same airplane, same number on it, as the general did when he was a captain. that's ridiculous.

airplanes were out. any of you drive 40 year old cars? airplanes are a little more competition than that, and while we do really good maintenance on those things, they don't last forever. so we do have to modernize those capabilities, and we need to assist our allies in doing the same thanks to their capabilities. now, i want to emphasize something. when i say assist our allies, japan and the republic of korea are not clients of the united states of america. they are not. they are allies and friends. they are not dependent on the united states to have those capabilities. they build their own. they are good and capable. i know. i have thought -- i have thought next to some of the young men from korea. i've thought with military people from the military of japan. they are outstanding military

individuals. their leaders are solid and very, very capable. and i think the visit by president park shows the republic of korea also has a really, really tough lady at the helm right now. all right? my colleagues at heritage wrote an article about her yesterday. and i guess in korea they call for "the iron lady" of korea, and for heritage to say that, because they ferried to the respect and love mrs. thatcher. to compare her is about the highest praise you can get a female leader or any later frankly, in the world. i was conversing before the meeting, and we were talking about that northeast asia initiative and how they were some folks that were upset that our president did not do that quite a to do here. you know, our president talks about this leading from behind

stuff, which frank that i think most of the time is not the appropriate thing to do, but in this case when you have a very capable allies who has a great idea, he should've jumped on that one and said, yeah, we are behind her 110%, we're going to help with that. because that was a missed opportunity, and held our government will rectify that and give that initiative the kind of support that it deserves. so we really can't forget or take for granted this teamwork aspect that we are a team, if we're going to face these issues in defense, and diplomacy, in economics, insider. i do a lot of cyber stuff. this is like a really, really big deal, especially when you start talking about china. and all these things have to be synchronized. they have to be done together. they can't just be the individual nations doing their thing and then sort of occasionally chatting with each other. they've got to land the plane

and they have got to execute it together. china today is trying desperately to continue to expand their influence and economic reach. and i've got to tell you they're doing a heck of a job at it. they are all over the place, all over the world, not just in that seat. they are doing a lot. they are notterribly reluctant to use a little muscle to influence people to get their way. and as they are doing all over the theater right now. and it's pretty intimidating. the only way that all of the united states allies and friends are going to be able to stand firm is if we help them. i've got to chile i'm not really expecting the republic of korea or japan to knuckle into anything the chinese say, but, you know, what? when you're standing in a schoolyard and there's a bully picking on you, it's kind of nice to know that your brothers are standing right behind you. and the united states needs to do that, and do it explicitly

and without any fuzziness in anybody's mind. north korea is as always unpredictable or, i guess you could say, very predictable that they will display a rabbit behavior since they do that all the time -- erratic behavior. they are a wildcard and i get very nervous with any administration here in the united states, because we tend, in american cultural thing, sort of in cute our thinking -- in cute our thinking process in our values to everyone else and think that they will make decisions the same way that we do. that's wrong, and in that we are very, very dependent on our allies in the region to help us understand when something is said or something is done, that it may mean something different and we think it does. so i would hope that the

governments in seoul and in japan will help us to make sure we are reading the signals correctly so that we don't get out of whack with the. we really need that to. so what should the u.s. and its allies do with regard to the region? this is steve bucci's list you. i didn't check this with her asian experts over at heritage, so if i get in trouble, you guys help me out here. one, we reall we will need to ur intelligence efforts in the area. north korea is still very, very dangerous. we have a history of occasional getting surprised by something they have done. we need to minimize that effort, or that possibility as much as we can. for the united states that means predominantly tactical intelligence collection. we are sort of dependent i believe on the republic of korea to work the human intelligence peace. and hopefully, you know, the sharing is complete. we need to beef up our missile

defenses. not something that this particular aon i all that excited about, but we need all of the upgrades to the aged system, the newest missiles. we've got to have a boost phase capability if they miss what comes out of there, and we've got to be able to help protect the republic of korea in japan in that possibility. we need an east coast site that is not just for iran. that's also for korea. we need to expand the ground-based interceptor array we have up in alaska, and we need to do all those things now, not seven years from now. and we've got to also and the foolishness of trading away these kind of capabilities to so we can make some adversary feel good, whether that's mr. putin are whether it's kim jong-un. and we've got to start believing

that arms control trade-offs are really going to convince dictators to behave, because they don't. so we've got to get off of that. we've got to work together to contain north korea. nobody wants to go in and invade north korea right now, change that regime, so we're going to to kind of keep the tight reins on them and hope that the population there filing will raise up. i know the lady's question, i have to tell you, with countries like north korea and china, you know, we've seen the limits in other countries of the popular uprisings. if the regime is willing to take stringent in of actions, as the chinese event in the past, as the iranians have done, you know, social media, it helps but it doesn't really drop tanks -- trump tanks. so when a regime is willing to do that enough, it's going to

take a little longer. and i pray that both those countries get free but we're going to have to keep that pressure on them, and to help those folks who are being persecuted to get free. so we've got to continue to contain north korea. we can't get into the tantrums and the theatrics that occasionally go on there. we hope that we can maintain peace until that day when the two koreas can be united. we saw it happen, and i've got to tell you, i didn't believe it was going to happen when a berlin wall fell, you know, i said, well, communist will stop. they will never let those two countries unite. they did. and it was a tough slog for the germans, but i've been to world wars in east germany now and it's been an amazing

transformation. they have been integrated into the economy and that society, and there's still kind of regional differences you see in germany, that part of germany, it's just that the person those are different but that was before the communists were there. so they sort of returned to the kind of regional differences, that sort of, it's something to celebrate in the country rather than the kind of wall of separation that was there during the cold war. and i firmly believe that i will live to see that happen on the korean peninsula as well. i really hope i'm right about that. with china, i think a little different view. we need to move or work to move china to the place where they start acting like a responsible player on the world stage. the chinese economy is going to continue to grow, whether it will go at the rate it has in

the last few years, i don't know, i think it's already starting to slow down a little bit, but we really, i think china can be, you can see an evolution there. the government in pyongyang, it's not going to evolve. that has to be removed and have. how, i don't know yet, but in china i think there is a possibility to see an evolution. we need to get china weaned off the power plays and the ietf at in the rhetoric, and to get them to the point where instead of being an adversary, they are a competitor. instead of being a rifle, they are a contributor. and i think that can be done. i just hope we don't give away the farm in the process of trying to make it happen. we should do it by applying pressure in the right areas, not by acting so nice that we get

taken advantage of, which i think is very likely to happen if we don't. we need to turn back the cuts in defense in the united states, and telescoping out to our allies. because, frankly, those cuts were foolish and disconnected from any sort of rational strategic thought. it was just totally a budgetary exercise and that's not useful. useful. and just saying, as i've heard many politicians in this town say, that we will just have to depend more on our allies. that's a nice thought except our allies are having some of the same problems we are. so did you say, we're going to get more of the responsibility to everybody else, is just common you know, that's not leadership. that's not a plan. that's an excuse for doing the effect was things you're doing. so we need to continue to have the courage of team, we need to have the solitary of 18.

and -- of the team. was refocusing on asia a timely event? absolutely. in the u.s. do it and deal with those challenges alone? absolutely not. we have got to have the teamwork particularly with the republic of korea and nation of japan. we've got to do it together. we've got to do it in sync, and if we do, i think the outcome can be positive. it's not going to be easy, but they can be positive. if we don't we're going to continue to have problems that are going to spin way out of control. and we can't afford to do that. and with that, i look forward to your questions. >> thank you, steve. ..

>> but you talked about our two important allies, korea and japan. but as you know, well know, there's historical friction between the two. two countries. is and the president articulated this very well. the interdependency of the nations in the region, including china as well, economic independence and the like, but

there are, you know, security issues, territorial issues that drive apart. and in particular i think everybody in this room would agree that when we face a common enemy such as north korea, logically the u.s. and its two allies, you know, would present a united front to north korea. we think that that's important. but my question to you is, what can the u.s. do to try to reduce some of the tensions between our two allies? is it possible, and can we, can we help to, help them work through these historical, long-term emotional problems that exist? the second question turning specifically to korea is 2015 we're going to the upcon

for. really it's the dissolution of the combined war-fighting command. we're going to have two separate commands with korea and the in a supporting role. and i'd like to ask your opinion of that event that's going p to take place, how that might be viewed particularly by north korea who i believe has had one of the key pillars of its strategy to split the u.s. alliance. and to me, dissolving the war fighting command gives the impression that there is a split 2349 alliance -- split in the alliance. so i'd like the hear your position on that and any comments you might have. >> thank you, dave. >> okay. well, the first one is the united states ought to take an active role.

it would be a much more useful thing for some of our diplomats to do than some of the other things they do to try and help these two allies work out the areas of friction. you know, the kind of solidarity we need to face these challenges isn't just when, you know, the other side is mobilizing their troops. it's got to be all the time, and it's -- we've got to get past some of those historical issues. now, famously, the united states is real big on, oh, just forget about it, you know? get over that, guys. and i've worked in enough countries outside the united states to know that it isn't that easy. i worked in the balkans for a long time. they don't ever forget anything there. and everything that ever happened in the world happened yesterday. and i know in some asian countries you have the same sort of very, very long memories. but i also think both societyies are mature enough and developed

enough that while something may really ping your heart from something that happened centuries ago, there's a point where the threats of today have to take predominance and have to -- those other things need to be put aside. now, if the united states can broker that kind of talk and those kind of evolutions forward, then that's something that we should spend the diplomatic capital to do. it would be well worth the investment, and i think it would be very, very positive for the relationships. as far as the separate commands, there has been an evolution that's been ongoing for quite a while. i know i was in the pentagon when we made a decision to move the american forces off the dmz and have the army of the republic of korea take over those forward positions, and we had delegations come to the pentagon. and i met with a bunch of them. they were really upset that decision had been made.

they thought it was a diminution of the commitment of the united states to the people of korea. and i assured them, no, it was a recognition of the growing capability of the military of the republic of korea to take over this mission themselves. they had a really, really great military. i mean, it's one of the best in the world. it's definitely one of the toughest in the military man for man. but their operational capability, their logistics capability, it way outstrips almost -- i've worked with a lot of different militaries from all over the world; last reason america, africa -- latin america, africa, the middle east and asia. and i've got to tell you, the republic of korea has a first rate military. this is the next logical step. we have fought in the past with

other countries where we had separate commands, and we fought well. and i think in this case, you know, i don't think you will see any military loss by this change. i understand the, you know, the north koreans can rated into it -- can read into it, and i think there needs to be a lot of steps taken, and we can do that with our exercise program which drives the north koreans anyway to really show that this change doesn't lessen either the commitment of the united states to the korean peninsula or our capabilities in a fight on the korean peninsula. and i think as long as we make that messaging with the actions we take and with the words our leaders use, i don't think you'll see the problems that might otherwise come up. >> thank you, steve. larry, do you have something to

chip in? >> i think steve bucci's references, for example, to the lack of president obama's response to president park's discussion, her comments about a northeast asian initiative, i think reflects a broader timidity, if you will, with regard to our diplomacy throughout the region. and dave raised the japan history issue. and president pak surprised a lot of people by her emphasis on that during this trip. the territorial sea-island

disputes, you look across the board, and you see what i would describe as a real timidity on the part of the united states diplomatically. in terms of diplomacy, i don't think you can really say that there has been a pivot to asia. in terms of our diplomatic certain sis. emphasis. it seems to me attitudes very much ingrained attitudes in the state department is, in large part, responsible, frankly, for a lot of this. so my question to steve is, if we face this kind of reluctance, this kind of timidity in the state department filtering into the broader beem -- obama administration with regard to a more active diplomatic initiative posture in the region, what can congress do, what can groups like the

heritage foundation or my own group, csis, what can we do to try to give some shove, some push to a more active u.s. diplomatic effort to make the pivot to asia have a diplomatic dimension to it and not just a military dimension? now, steve mentioned u.s. air power as being very important, and for those of you who have attended several of the past seminars that icas has put on here, i have talked about this. and you know the emphasis that i have made to thee of u.s. heavy bombers in terms of a

vital instrument of deterrence in the western pacific. and i think we saw the demonstration of this when secretary hagel on the other handed the b-52s and b-2s to come out from their bases in, i think, missouri and north dakota and participate in the u.s./rok military exercises. i'll just reiterate what i've been preaching, and some of you may be a little tired of what i said. but i have always thought that withdrawing the b-52 squadron from guam in 1951 was a bad idea of the first bush administration. and it's an idea that still ought to be reversed. we ought to have a permanent bon

guam that can cost wise, frankly, not cost as much, frankly, as it would to base them in missouri or north dakota, but would have a more clear cut, positive impact on deterrence not only with regard to north korea, but if need be, china as well. now, i hope what secretary hagel authorized will lead to some thinking about bringing back a squadron of heavy bombers to guam. and i'd like to get steve's comment on that as well. i agree with steve, the middle east is not going to go away. i think the chances are very high that iran, if it chooses, will get nuclear weapons. and i think what we are see aing between iran and north korea right now indicates that north

korea probably is iran's back door, iran's track to acquiring nuclear weapons that north korea will produce initially either in the form of highly-enriched uranium or more likely in the very near future be, nuclear warheads for north korea's no-dong missiles that pyongyang has the full technology to do right now which when north korea does it, will lead to this technology and possibly warheads themselves. going to iran for iran's shah has been, 3 missiles, the sheh shehab, 3 being a twin.

that's why these experts are now stationed in north korea. that's a big reason. so the middle east is simply not going to go away, and there's going to have to be a balance in terms of our military prior tees between them -- priorities between them. the op-con controversy, now a question to steve given steve's background in the army. there are proposals in korea including some proposals from, i believe, u.s. military officers there not to separate the commands, but to preserve cfc and perhaps have in terms of the top command position, to have a rotating system in which the commander of the cfc for a certain number of years be the top south korean commander, and

then you have a rotation with the u.s. commander coming in for, say, a three-year period with the top korean commander being his assistant deputy commander and vice vice versa. the army, the u.s. army, however,s -- has had ever since world war i the pershing rule. this is my question to steve. and the pershing rule has been that the u.s. army will never serve directly under a foreign military command per. is the u.s. army or will the u.s. arm be willing to give up the pershing rule in order to accept this kind of rotating commander-in-chief position for the cfc in order to retain what has been a very working organization to ever since the

late 1970s? i'm just going to defend the sequester a little bit here and make the point that not only with regard to spending cuts in the pentagon, but with regard to spending cuts everywhere you never do get a disagreement. in the broader body politic here or in congress about where those cuts should prioritize or be applied. and i think if that's the case, how if you're going to restrain spending -- and the sequester is really about restraining increases -- what else can you do to restrain spending increases and increase the $1.2

trillion budget deficits that we face? is there really an alternative? there are a lot of proposals made to where good cuts could be made in the pentagon. gao has produced two good reports about the pentagon as well as other agencies pointing out a lot of wasteful and duplicate programs. senator coburn issued a report last november on the pentagon pointing out $67 billion of programs that he argued -- and i read his report -- i think quite forcefully that a lot of these programs like breast cancer research in the penalty gone have nothing to do with national defense. nih does breast cancer research which is where it should be. the px system which costs over $2 billion a year for u.s. bases

when you have safeways and cvss right outside of u.s. military bases. where our military personnel could go and shop. a lot of programs like that. but these reports get issued, and nobody in congress talks about them, nobody in congress tries to do anything about them. even the think tanks are relatively silent in terms of endorsing or trying to promote these kinds of reports. so if you're going to put some constraints on spending increases to bring them down from double-digit annual increases down to 3% or 5% increases, what real alternative is there to the sequester? and i'm going to argue that,

frankly, there may not be an alternative. if somebody can argue that there is politically, realistically, i'd like to hear it, but i don't see that argument that anybody really is making. but if steve has something to say about that, i'd lo to hear it. >> thank you -- i'd love to hear it. >> thank you. >> okay. unfortunately, i don't have another three hours to talk, but just real quickly on the diplomatic piece of the pivot, i think, absolutely, that's a critical piece. it's not merely a military exercise. i love the comment because i've done several tours with the state department in different capacities, and everybody always thinks the military are these conservative, little c conservative. we don't like change, we're old-fashioned. but, boy, the state department would be thrilled, most of them, if they were still back in the 1800s and everything just went -- the diplomatic pouch really was a bag that somebody carried on a boat with sails on

it to bring instructions back and forth. they really like tradition always of doing buzz, and this is different -- of doing business, and this is different. we're talking about changing the way the united states approaches these very critical allies and, in some case, adversaries. and we need to do it differently. diplomacy's a big piece of it. you don't really want to do it with the military alone. the military alone is insufficient to address this problem. they're a big piece of it, but if we don't have the diplomats aligned, it's going to be a problem. in getting, you know, the think tank community and the citizens all play a role in getting that change to occur. we have to speak, we have to make the case, and all of you as individuals have to do the same thing to your legislators. that's the only way stuff gets changed. you know, washington has always been a fairly insular town, and it's probably more so today

despite all of the communications means we have at our december posal. they're just -- disposal. they're just as inclined to ignore everybody else running around the country as they ever were unless they start making some noise. so we all need to do that. the bombers, absolutely a deterrent. you know, nobody ever really wants to go drop bombs on people. but when the other side knows that we can if we need to, it changes their behavior. and, you know, those bombers that got over there for the exercise were a wonderful, wonderful message to everybody to stop acting foolishly. and it did. it brought the level of the crisis down. i think some closer basing than missouri would be real helpful. i mean, just because our aircraft can make that trip and

do their thing and fly back, it doesn't mean we want them to do it. it's a long ride. t not that timely -- it's not that timely. it still takes a long time to get there. i think a much closer basing would make all the sense in the world, and i think we would support that in a heartbeat. the nuclear cooperation between north korea and iran scares the heck out of me. i mean, they're -- yeah, we're put, tightening down the screws in those two countries, and they're going to turn to each other. and they both have very different value systems than all the rest of our countries. and we need to be very, very cautious and vigilant at trying to keep them from being able to trade those kind of devices or materials that would aid them in doing that. the pershing rule, it actually goes a little further than that. i think there's actually law that keeps united states' troops from serving under other

commanders. and the reason i know that is because we had to deal with it domestically that we could not assign federal troops under the command of governors in our country. because they're a separate executive. and the governors were ticked because they thought that would make all the sense in the world, we just send them troops and let them command them, because they do it with their national guard troops. but there's a prohibition against doing it. i personally would not have any problem if congress and then the president approved an exemption to that law to allow that to happen in the case of a rotating congressmanner in korea. commander in korea. i think there's enough water under the bridge in experience and cooperation together that i think it would work. so i would be in support of whatever steps needed to be taken whether it was legislative or just a policy decision of making an exemption to that rule.

and then on the sequester, i agree with you there's lots of ways we could save the money other than doing this goofy haircut thing across the way. the department of defense is very inefficient with the money it spends. i have to tell you, i've seen other departments and, frankly, they're even worse. it's just that department of defense has more money to play with than some of the other departments. giving them, just giving them less money to spend inefficiently while in some perverse mathematical formula is more efficient than not is not sufficient to address the problem. we've got to fix some of the systems. the acquisition system needs to be changed, the kind of redundancies that larry's referring to need to be addressed and dealt with. we have to have the political leadership and courage the break the rice bowls and change the rules. because it's in laws and regulations and policies, you

know, that we're all -- that were all promulgated with good intent when they did it. they all addressed some problem along the way. some of them are historical artifacts. things like we have three different medical systems in our military when, last time i checked, all of our bodies worked the same way. the air force guys, maybe it's a little different. i don't know.laugh the, you know, we can fix this problem. now, the other part of it is just fixing the department of defense doesn't fix our economic issues which is really what the biggest problem is. we've got to fix our economy. you could zero out the department of defense, take all the money and put it into other programs, and it wouldn't fix the economic woes we have. as one of my colleagues said the other day, the united states is not like the soviet union in the 1980s. our economic woes are not caused by our weird military spending, all right?

the military's not the problem. they can help fix it, but i'll be honest with you, if we save that money, you know, if we change those laws in the acquisition system, we can garner back some more money from the defense budget through more efficient spending, you really need to take that money and plow it back into modernization, not siphon it off and try to use it to do domestic entitlement spending. that's just not going to work. so i'm more on the to mystic than you. i think -- optimistic than you. i think there are things that can be done besides this total abrogation of responsibility that we call a sequester. okay, if we're not, you know, leadership strong enough to make a decision to fix our problem, then we'll make ourselves do it by doing -- i mean, come on. we're better than that. but it's going to take some political capital, and, you know, actually like talking to each other in the different parties which they're not

terribly good at right now. and we need to fix it. they need to stop pointing fingers. this is, you know, a pox on both houses. rather than spending all their time trying to blame the other guys for what's going on on, sit down and try to figure out how to fix it. that's called political leadership. we used to have that in the united states, and can we seem to have less of it now than we did before, and i think that's unfortunately. >> thank you, steve. now, re -- leonard, do you have a question? please. >> i'd like to ask you, steve, you spent considerable time with the korean military in several places. and you said the rok military s and i would agree with that.

it sounded like you're talking about combat situations and in military affairs. i'd like to ask you if that, perhaps, was even somewhat of an understatement. because if you consider civil affairs and civic action and what the korean military has done in that regard, they have built friendships with and support for the host countries in which they have served both with american troops and otherwise. they have always developed a greater security with the local populations in those areas where they have served. some examples are in vietnam in dealing with viet cong where they not only fought the way you describe, but they also brought

part of the positive aspects of the korean culture to those areas and used them very effectively in teaching people how to engage in tae kwon do -- that's japanese. but in the korean forums. and in northern iraq, in kurdistan they have also been very effective. and they've shown extraordinary stability and democratic progress with the people in those areas where they have served. i just have one more thing i'd like to ask you, because i have heard -- i've been informed about the things i have just mentioned. i haven't fought alongside and

observed it as you have. there has been from time to time mention in dealing with these issues of lessons learned. and usually the lessons learned are those lessons that our troops have learned in combat from vietnam and in iraq, but i never, hardly ever hear anything about lessons learned from our experience with the rok army in the 1950s and 1960s -- particularly in the '60 and the recovery of korea after the civil war -- in civil affairs, military action and development. and i'd like to hear some of your views on these things that very seldom come up. thanks. >> well, i used to teach at fort bragg in the regional studies

course which is one of the core courses for our civil affairs and sigh-ops officers that are part of the special operations community, and these are all american captains and some majors that have gone into the civil affairs or psychological operations fields, and we spent a lot of time going over the lessons learned from the civil affairs type actions that the army and the republic of korea learned. the american military isn't always really good at learning lessons. we learn 'em, and we write 'em down, and then we never look at 'em again. [laughter] it's a horrible problem. so we have to relearn them. but we tried in that educational context to bring those out and let people see that, you know, this is a doable thing. it's not an impossible task if people put their minds to it, if you find the right folks with the right skills and the right

attitude. because that's sometimes the most important aspect of it. you can do incredible things, and korea's one of the examples we used. and the actions that those military folks took. so you're right to point that out. it isn't always about the shooting and, you know, all the wild combat-type things. flagly, you end up -- frankly, you end up doing a lot less of that than you do the other stuff. and, you know, the korean people had to learn a lot of that because they had a pretty bad situation that they had to then fix themselves, and they did one whale of a job. and their military was a big part of that. >> thank you very much. okay. michael, just quickly. okay. >> dr. bucci, i concur with you on the korean army greatly after spending several tours in korea with them as well as most recently in 2011 as the koreans

served in afghanistan as a prt where they definitely calm down the province they were assigned to and did great things there. two questions i have, though, is one, you mentioned you could see unification in our lifetime. what are your indications of that? and hopefully be, you mean with an rok-led unification. second question is, what can the rok government and the u.s. government do as far as its foreign policies diplomatically, militarily wise and economically to influence north korea and china to influence north korea as well as take the proactive measures with north korea versus being the reactions mode to the provocations of kim jong un and his new, basically, provocation campaign versus cycle? thank you. >> thank mike. >> well, the first one i have to tell you i'm undyingly

optimistic, and i also because the progress that the republic of korea's made, i mean, just such a phenomenal place now that, you know, it's one of the economic leaders in the world. their capability, frankly, far outstrips the, just the natural resources and other things of the country. that comes from the people. i know that the people of north korea have lived under an incredible dictatorship for a heck of a long time. people that are genetically exactly the same as the south korean people, but now they're through malnourishment and things like that are fundamentally different. but i think that that seed of potential is there. so i don't have a hard, statistical data as to why i

think it's going to happen in our lifetime, i'm just being kind of optimistic, and maybe there's a little hope there. but i think it's doable. and if we then, and this is to segway into your second question, the united states and the republic of korea and our other allies need to really stop doing this, you know, one step forward, two step back thing with north korea. you know, this is like kids with parents who, you know, they go and once they complain long enough, the parents say, well, okay, i'll buy it for you. i mean, that's -- it's actually a juvenile kind of exercise that he goes through there. you know, his daddied it, now he's doing it because it works. they do all these theatrics and tantrums, and eventually everybody says, okay, well, you just calm down, and we'll give you in this. he says, well, okay, i'll take this. and the whole time he's probably snickering because he got what he wanted in the first place.

it doesn't work raising kids that way. it darn sure doesn't work in international relations. and we need to stop doing it. and, again, i'm not just beating up this administration. it's happened for a bunch of administrations, and it needs to stop. and i think, you know, i mean, is it risky? you know, he might actually start doing more stuff than just the kind of demonstrations he's done. he's killed people in the republic of korea, so i'm not denigrating that aspect. you know, some of the stuff that's happened is not just demonstrations, it's been actual damage. would that potentially push him to do more of that? maybe, but i think if you ever want to see the people of north korea free and see that country united, yes, absolutely, with the republic of korea lead, i want it to be like west germany uniting with east germany, and they drag them over into their way of doing business.

i think the republic of korea need to do the same thing with north korea. but if we don't do that, it's never going to happen. we'll just allow this craziness to continue, and those people will stay in those gulags. i mean, they've got concentration camps that are the size of cities. that's -- to let that stand in this day and time is wrong. i mean, it's incomprehensible to me that we continue to do that. now, i'm not advocating we invade north korea and stop it, but we need to take what steps we can short of provoking a war. but we should not doing conciliatory gestures towards him no matter how much he stomps his feet or rattles his missiles. >> well, with that note -- [laughter] steve, thank you very much.

joe and michael, larry. let's give steve a big round of applause. >> thank you. [applause] >> president obama announced the resignation of acting internal revenue service wednesday steve miller after a government report said the irs targeted conservative groups. the president made the announcement at the white house. >> good afternoon, everybody. proper hi-screened conservative groups apply for tax-exempt be status, and i look forward to taking some questions at tomorrow's press conference, but today i wanted to make sure to get out to allyou doing about this and where we go from here. i've reviewed the treasury

department watchdog's report, and the misconduct that it uncovered is inexcusable. it's inexcuse be bl, and americans are right to be angry about it, and i am angry about it. i will not tolerate in this kind of behavior in any agency, but especially in the irs given the power that it has and the reach that it has in all of our lives. and as i said earlier, it should not matter what political stripe you're from. the fact of the matter is that the irs has to operate with absolute integrity. the government generally has to conduct itself in a way that is true to the public trust. that's especially true for the irs. so here's what we're going to do. first, we're going to hold the responsible parties accountable. yesterday i directed secretary lew to follow up on the ig audit to see how this happened and who

was responsible and to make sure that we understand all the facts. today secretary lew took the first step by requesting and accepting the resignation of the acting commissioner of the irs. because given the controversy surrounding this audit, it's important to institute new leadership that can help restore confidence going forward. second, we're going to put in place new safeguards to make sure this kind of behavior cannot happen again, and i've directed secretary lew to insure the irs begins implementing the ig's recommendations right away. third, we will work with congress as it performs its oversight role. and our administration has to make sure that we are working hand in hand with congress to get this thing fixed. congress, democrats and republicans, owe it to the american people to treat that authority with responsibility it deserves and in way that doesn't smack of politics or partisan

agendas, because i think one thing that you've seen is across the board everybody believes what happened in, as reported in the ig's report is an outrage. the good news is it's fixable, and it's in everyone's best interests to work together to fix it. i'll do everything in my power to make sure nothing like this happens again. by holding the responsible parties accountable, by putting in place new checks and new safeguards and going forward, by making sure that the law's applied as it should be, in a fair and impartial way. and we're going to have to make sure that the laws are clear so that we can have confidence that they are enforced in a fair and impartial way and that there's not too much ambiguity surrounding these laws. so that's what i expect. that's what the american people deserve. and that's what we're going to do. thank you very much.

>> the house ways and means committee will hold a hearing on friday about the internal revenue service targeting conservative group that is applied for tax-exempt be status. members will hear from the treasury the president's inspector general for tax administration. steve miller, the former acting irs commissioner, was scheduled to testify. he resigned wednesday afternoon. our live coverage of the hearing is on c-span3 at 9 a.m. eastern. and if you'd like to read the inspector general's report on the irs, you can find it online at c-span.org. >> this weekend booktv is live from maryland at the gaithersburg book festival. live coverage starts saturday morning at 10 eastern including author scott berg on the dakota warriors and their august 1862 last stand. at 1:15, kitty kelley on iconic

images of the white house. and at 3:15, neil irwin on the global financial crisis, recession and aftermath followed at 4:15 by a panel on the publishing industry. the gaithersburg book festival live all day saturday on c-span2's booktv. >> now, a memorial ceremony honored journalists who died or were killed during news services. the newseum hosted this 30 minute event. >> good morning. i'm jim duff, ceo here at the newseum. welcome to the newseum today for our rededication of the journalists' memorial. since the newseum opened in

2008, more than three million visitors have seen this soaring memorial which pays tribute to 2,244 journalists worldwide who have died covering the news. around the world journalists place themselves in danger every day. some are deliberately targeted while others get too close to danger. while some may be in the wrong place at the wrong time, most are professionals taking calculated risks. they pay with their lives for doing their jobs. be the journalists' memorial bears the names of reporters, photographers, editors, broadcasters and others who have died in the line of duty. and each year this dedication renews the newseum's commitment to make sure that these brave journalists are remembered.

this year we have the regrettable task of adding 88 new names to the memorial. 82 of those journalists were killed in 2012. an additional six died in previous years, and they are also being added to the memorial this morning. we welcome families, friends and colleagues who have traveled thousands of miles to join us this morning for this remembrance of their loved ones. we also welcome back the families and friends of journal journalists who were added to the memorial in previous years. we thank all of you for helping us pay tribute to these journal itselfs. they are truly among -- journalists. they are truly among democracy's heroes. i would now like to introduce our vice chairman of the board, shelby coffey, who will

introduce our very special guest speaker this morning. shelby? >> tom brokaw, the great sage of nbc news, came here two weeks ago for a program about our new jfk exhibit, "creating camelot." tom took the time to talk about two things. the first was to salute the career of his friend be al new hart, the creator of "usa today," who just passed away and whose memorial we will also celebrate this week here at the newseum which is in very large part his creation. ..

coverage of the iraq war. all of the iraq war. and with the arab spring of the tumultuous scenes in egypt, libya and syria. he has won seven news and documentary emmys, and is the winner of a special citation for his personal video diary of the iraq war. but even these laurels do not give the full story of the extraordinary self-made correspondent we see today. he is truly one for the history books. another famous young correspondent, winston churchill, said history would be kind to him because he intended to write it. richard did the same, not that he needed any extra kindness. he wrote his first book, a fish

in the hoarseness, about his life before, during and after the iraq war. the book drew praise from msnbc, saying of his descriptions of combat, this is hemingway country. but even more remarkable am a mr. engel's own story, that of a young man who struggle with dyslexia, while growing up in new york city. he went to stanford, and then in a burst of bravado and intuition, he decided to become a foreign correspondent by moving to cairo without, get this, really knowing a lick of arabic. he settled in a poor neighborhood to learn the street from the ground up. instead of enjoying the lap of luxury beloved by some foreign correspondents, richard taught himself the culture and the language bit by bit.

in his book he renders the common people of cairo that he met with amazement and compassion. you see him struggle with early newspaper gigs and freelance pieces like some latter-day benjamin franklin. finally, winding up in jerusalem for abc news before going to nbc in 2003. richard engel's reporting from baghdad set the standard. he was the only american to cover it all from the early days of victory, into the civil chaos, the ultimate successes of the surge. he tells that story in another brilliant book, war journal, my five years in iraq, which will be studied by historians decades from now. at one point in war journal he notes the poor psychological stages of all reporters go through, while covering war zones. and on this day, commemoration of these four stages seem

particularly relevant and particularly when you. stage one, i am invincible. nothing can hurt me. i'm superman. stage two, what i'm doing is dangerous. i might get hurt over here. i better be careful. stage three, what i'm doing is really dangerous. i'm probably going to get hurt over here, no matter how careful i am. math and probability and time are working against me. stage four, i have been here too long. i'm going to die over here. it's just a matter of time. i have played the game too long. last december, the journalistic world held its breath worried that maybe richard engel had reached stage four, and beyond. in syria, richard and his crew were taken captive.

after five days they were freed, relatively unharmed. exhale. it is a rare thing when a war correspondent's assignment the new story in the "washington post." but when richard engel went back to syria in may for the first time since those grim days in december, it was a story in the nation's capital and beyond. richard and i both once worked for network abc for the rainy patron, legendary superproducer. at a famous news conference long ago, he introduced david brent reduce network saying ladies and gentlemen, we are in the presence of a great man. and i submit to you today, ladies and gentlemen, that we are also in the presence of greatness. our signal lot it is to richard engel at the annual commemoration of the newseum's journalist memorial.

thank you. [applause] >> group i am truly without words. thank you. that was too much. today, we are not focusing on me. i am very lucky. i am still here. instead we're talking of the people who are on this list and think about it and thinking about their lives and what they did and why they did it. so good morning. it is an honor to have been asked to speak your today. this, of course, is a somber cast, one that is a very importance of me because our little band, our roving tribe, the takes notes and pictures along the way is getting smaller. we are being killed off. great correspondent mike marie colvin are no longer with us. i miss marie. i never qul. smart and really good at what she did. and i remember marie from

baghdad, from lebanon, from libya. i remember, from everywhere really. and while it may seem that there are many foreign correspondents running around the world bringing the news, there aren't. the real ones, the ones who last and stick it out are actually quite a small group. and i remember marie as ripley was falling, and the dog he was on the run and the city wasn't functioning at all. we have found a hotel right in the city of tripoli with a beautiful arab mentioned with the courtyard in the center of it, right next to the famous -- we decided to rent out the entire thing, and there were shortages in the city, and phones didn't work. there was very little food and water. gunmen everywhere. you can imagine it was an exciting but chaotic time. we at nbc news had taken this hotel and we've stockpiled it full of supplies, food and

gasoline and generators. we even have fresh fruit. tv people tend to know how to take care of ourselves. we had hooked up the internet. and one day marie and some of the print report came knocking on the door is theoretically to come see how we're doing but, of course, they wanted a new. so we all let them in and we even have beer. we had a big dinner that night, and everyone had a lot of laughs, everyone was smiling. and this is the most important thing. we were all in our element. we were there. we were among friends. we were among probably the most important family that we've got when you live on the road. anthony shadid was also there that night. it was about a year later that marie was killed in syria. and i would like to acknowledge maria's family -- murray's family who's here tonight, and i

also like to acknowledge the father of a journalist who i understand it's also here tonight. so thank you very much. is our other relatives here, i'm sorry i didn't know you come and please forgive me for not recognizing you personally. so marie died about a year after that iconic dinner at the hotel in tripoli. and to give you an idea of how small this community was i was actually on my way to the same safe house that it just been attacked when i got the call, the safe house has been bombed, don't go there. marie has been killed. our french photographer was also in that safe house and was also killed. we got the notice don't go, they are dead. and syria has just been a horrible experience for the country, for our community, for the world. it is a war that took my friend

anthony shadid, another person who is at that dinner. anthony i think is probably the greatest or was the greatest arabist of our times. he was not just a reporter, he was a national asset. and what upsets me the most, at the top of his game when he died. he had a new job, he had a new wife, he had a book that was coming out, a book that still sits on my shelf. i can't bring myself to read it. his work was finally being recognized and having an impact, and syria took them, too. these are greedy wars that take and they really give nothing back. i mentioned marie and anthony in detail because i knew them personally. but most of the journalists who were killed and 2012 don't work for big news organizations like "the new york times." these were journalists the worked and lost their lives, many of them in places like somalia and syria.

if you look at what's happening in this country you can understand why. somalia hasn't had a functioning government that has been able to dominate all of its territories, authority over all of its territory for decades and is now trying to build one and syria is just the opposite. it is a country that had a very strong central government, dictatorship that is now collapsing into anarchy. so i commend the people are still trying to import from his places and i understand why walking around trying to get stories can sometimes cost you your lives. as was mentioned earlier, i will was also held hostage in syria last december. and as i sat there i thought i was going to be added to this list, but i was lucky. after five unpleasant days i got out and there was gunfire, gunbattle and rescue and i managed to escape, was rescued and escaped. i returned to syria last week

for the first time since been kidnapped. and instead having my name added to this list, i have the honor of paying respect to my colleagues who didn't make it. and i would like to thank them newseum for the privilege. so the question is, why do we do it? why take the risks? is it for fun or adventure? no. is it for the money? there are certain easy ways making a living been doing this. we do it to understand the world and how it changes. the world tends to move like the earth's plate, tension builds and then suddenly they snap with violent political change. we go to where the cracks are to see how the place -- plates are fitting together but we do this so innocents have a voice. we do to show tv pundits, stated it because we decided this is what we want to do with our

slice of time on this planet. many of you may know there has been some controversy surrounding events. if you don't mind i would like to address the. specifically there been some critics who opposed the inclusion of several people were killed while working for a hamas run television station and state television that broadcast propaganda. i found a great there is a distinction, and that several of the people on this list are not strictly journalists but political activists who work in the media. and just because you carry a camera and a notebook doesn't make you a journalist to a journalist has the responsibly to seek the truth no matter what it is, even if the story hurts your cause. journalist shouldn't have causes. they should of principles and beliefs, but this is where it gets tricky because who gets to draw the line? have reported on this year's list were civilians who work for media outlets that were actively tryingt topple bashar al-assad's regime.

who were pure journalists? no. but they wanted to bring down a dictator with words and images, and the tatar silence of them. they certainly died tried to do something noble. of speaking out against oppression. they died trying to quench a thirst for freedom. every year i look at the number of journalists killed around the world and it always seems to go up. i think it's because the media landscape is becoming so much more confusing. in world war i and were only a handful of journalists documented the front lines. they wore uniforms at the time, and more often than not they were military officers who were specifically past to document a military campaign. the british army sometimes call them official eyewitnesses. now, in most conflicts, the front lines are gone, the uniforms are gone, it's hard to know who's fighting and for what. and every camera is a cell phone. but while today, change to do

that, is no doubt somber. and there's really no other way of getting around that. there is a way, another way of looking at all of this. that isn't quite so sad. i know a lot of journalists. i spent all my time basically with foreign correspondents in the field living and breathing the act of newsgathering. and none of them could think of doing anything else. they don't know how to do anything else. they don't want to do anything else, and the people we are talking about today died doing what they loved. anthony loves the middle east. marie loved reporting to she lit up whenever she was on the story, and they died in their element. not at a desk behind a computer. they died in the line of duty with their boots on, their pencils in hand, and they should be remembered and