of course the session three, which most people recognize as the civil war had calculated the value, which thought carolinians began to do in the 1820s, but also the question of how you do with the majority of the population who are enslaved. south carolina had the largest in state population in of the nation united states. 1860 or 60% of the population and if slavery were abolished as many of the north are calling for, which he took the population is all of a sudden. so there are a lot of issues involved in south carolina made a decision in 1860 that abraham lincoln on the republican party came to power in november 8260 election fairly at the union.

i was not a constitutional issue. there was a political issue. south carolina and our way of life cannot endure union by the republican party and abraham lincoln in 1860. he tried to close the substitution down. he let a political revolution to overthrow the old south carolina by civil war heroes liquid hand in. his goal was to establish an agricultural college and to shut down the other institution of higher education, which are the said adel college of south carolina in the south carolina college primarily because the political enemies were strong homes. who is the first state-supported black school, which became south carolina state university. the idea being if we had a separate school, there is no way they are going to be able --

that african-americans would enter clemson are south carolina college at the women's college in south carolina. he was no longer governor, both via senator and as the power of the state. south carolina since world war ii has undergone a complete transformation from one of the solid weight democratics date in the south to a predominantly, overwhelmingly republican red state in the 21st century. it first began to occur the old democratic hegemony or domination when strom thurmond ran on the states rights ticket in 1948 because for the first time in almost a century, is acceptable. you have democrats for eisenhower and the transformation began in the 1960s switches parties. albert watson switched parties.

the republican party begins to grow by leaps and bounds. the voting rights act certainly helped spur the growth of the democratic party, allowing african-americans to be registered and initially for 10 or 15 years, the democratic that he was black and white legislators and party officials, but gradually the republican party is overwhelmingly white. although there are white democrats in the state. i guess the biggest change other than party is from the early 1900s until about 10 years ago, south carolina politicians of the best thing they could do is bring home the bacon. military bases, federal funding, what have you. now we've had numbers of congress oppose projects south carolina with the support of deep mean the part of charles

and in highway named what it then unheard of a generation ago. when i wrote the history, i wanted to tell the story of everyone from the low country are at the mill hill inspired by her. i didn't include people or events just to be politically correct. those who find contradictions in south carolina is a wonderful place. it's who we are full of independence. a lot of it has to do with my whole theme and that his community. >> now, abraham sofaer talked about tv about taking on iran. in his book connie argues the u.s. should stand up to ira by

confronting the country's revolutionary guard were surrogate when she says have attacked the u.s. and israel would unity the past 30 years. this is about 30 minutes. >> taking on -- "taking on iran" is the name of the book. the author is abraham sofaer, a senior fellow at the hoover institution. dr. sofaer, is our current strategy of sanctions working against iran? >> guest: we are certainly putting pressure on them economically, but it is hurting the people of iran more than the ukrainian revolutionary guard corps. they are really our enemy, so the answer is no. >> host: in your book you spend time talking about the irgc, revolutionary guard corps. who are they?

>> guest: they were created in 1979 with the assignment of defending the islamic character of the iranian revolution. they have an enormous amount of assets and responsibilities. they are very radical. they control many defense industries. they have their own army, air force and navy. they control the missile program and they are under the ayatollah in charge of the nuclear program. they also heavy crude soars they call it, which does assassination another intervention abroad and right now because force is the group hoping not staying power in syria. >> host: we look at their expectation of that in a minute. so what's the relationship with the president of iran?

who controls whether? >> guest: the president has in some areas of power, but the irgc is answerable to the ayatollah and the president is also. i could not order to do something the ayatollah told them not to do or vice versa. >> host: what should be the goal interview of our policy towards iran? which we look for? >> guest: we should look for an option to the two basic options we are considering now. alternative would be what i advocate we need to consider. the two options now are both highly undesirable. one is to attack the nuclear program and to prevent iran from

nuclear bomb, what the president has promised he will do. of course president clinton promised he would do that with north korea and he didn't do it wisely so because they would not have been visible to allow 10 million south koreans to be killed in exchange for preventing north korea from having a nuclear weapon. anyway, the president has promised to prevent iran from having a nuclear weapon and that suggests an attack. it would be very costly. it could cause civilian deaths, a lot of pollution and it could fail. it would certainly be regarded as illegitimate and illegal by most of the world. it would fail because they ran would leave the et, non-proliferation treaty and proceeded in secret a nuclear

weapon. the other option is to let iran get a bomb and try to contain a nuclear armed iran. that is equally, perhaps even worse than the option of attacking the nuclear program because it is going to lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and is going to destabilize that part of the world. tehran is a threat to israel and has threatened in fact that israel should be wiped off the face of the earth. so you could have a major war between two nuclear powers. so both options are very undesirable and yet as we celtic center a third red mass submit the does. >> host: what is the third way?

>> guest: to change our policy relating to the irgc and one of intelligence capacity. we've allowed the irgc twos on through the killing of american soldiers, marines of lebanon, airmen in saudi arabia, soldiers in iraq and soldiers now at the nato soldiers in afghanistan. we've allowed the irgc to work with hezbollah and work with other anorak to iron them to kill americans for that purpose and that is truly illegal in cavity. we should have set up a long time ago with the reagan administration, where we didn't stand up to the soviet union animated big difference because you're able to negotiate effectively as a result. we should stand up, defend ourselves from the sponsored

attacks and then through that shows strength, make a serious negotiation possible. >> host: years experience negotiating jurkovic irani, correct? in my capacity? >> guest: as legal advisor under george shultz and jim baker and i conducted the negotiations with iran. they were negotiations over claims, the claims included a lot of military things and as we developed relationship, myself and the person i negotiated with who was a rare at the time person controlling naughty in the rainy government. we were able to tackle some other issues as well and i think we can negotiate effectively with iran, but we must do so with a back strain and

negotiating policies that are more analogous to what we did with the soviet union than they are too uppity now with the rain. >> host: abraham sofaer company you work here at the national security at the hoover dictation. we entered the shows a little while ago and one of his rules of him was if you point a gun at somebody, be prepared to use it. >> guest: that's absolutely right. we've escalated a verbal war to a ridiculous point, but we have not used the gun at all virtually. we set a nuclear armed iran would be unacceptable. we have the option, the military option on the table. the president said he would

prevent a nuclear armed iran in the base price that said the press to bluffing. there's a lot of words express, the way the latter ran to kill about a thousand american soldiers in the last 30 years and we have not pushed back adequately. the only timely pushback was in 1987 and the goals. when we did push back and think a bunch of iranian speed boats and want iranian ship, the iranians got the message. they stopped putting mines in the golf and they stopped firing missiles to you is vessels. so we made our point and iran if any pain was more eager to negotiate with us as a result of that strain and before that exercises straight to it other

than that which nothing. when they tried to kill the saudi acid or a year and a half, two years ago, all we did was indict the irgc officials renew her response to both and we indicted osama bin laden twice in didn't do any good. he went on killing americans, blowing up american ships and so we took out. as such you have to do with radicals who want to kill americans. who up until americans, they will kill more. >> host: at the beginning of the discussion he said we should not attack. attack would be the wrong policy. how do you negotiate or operate a position of strength if you're not willing to use military force is? >> guest: is different to attack nuclear facilities in iran and exercise self-defense.

nuclear facilities are about 10 of them all of the country. they're highly defended, and they could cause all the damage including alienation of the american people where is attacking any form of self-defense would be regarded widely as targeted. we could pick the targets we want. there's an entire gc target, convoys carrying arms right now into afghanistan to help kill nato troops. we could take out a column by on the rainy inside of the border at gunpoint. this is a much more limited, targeted at committee and yet it shows the ukrainian government we are not going to use the strategy of the irgc to attack us then make it more difficult if not impossible to achieve our

strategic purposes in places like iraq and afghanistan. >> host: in her book, "taking on iran" you have 30 years. it starts at jimmy carter, but it is striking for me is the number of the reagan administration, where we were standing to the soviet union. we set out the raid they, but what did we end up doing? nothing. we allowed them to kill marines in lebanon and then we said we were not going to negotiate with terrorists and we aged in the iran contra affair. we absolutely did the right thing for the soviet union and we negotiated from strength and negotiated a meaningful way. besides negotiating principles

we use we don't applyny of those principles vis-à-vis iran. it just doesn't make any tense. it makes sense then and i frequently mention not. when we came out of the government, i told secretary shultz, we should apply to rebrand the policies of the soviet union and he agreed with me and i'm honored he wrote the forward to this book. >> host: what are those that negotiating print the bulls? >> guest: the first is you have to have rhetorical strength. don't make a fool of the person you're negotiating went and make it more difficult to make concessions by pounding on your chest and claiming you've achieve some thing. make it easier by not growing as ronald reagan that he would not grow when he did things they want them do.

the second thing is that doesn't mean you have to accept them our respect them for that matter, but you have to engage them diplomatically the way diplomacy works with sovereign states. the soviets were concerned about that. they wanted to be treated as a sovereign state. ronald reagan said. that he still treated them with respect and the one he engaged. maybe the most thing is linkage. we link their willingness to their behavior. the behavior of the soviet union with equally bad if not worse and what happened there was secretary shows decided instead of linking our willingness to talk, we have to say that these guys have me they do something wrong in refusing to talk did

not deter an enemy. standing up to an enemy does potentially intermixed hakim are possible. i believe that we sat link in their willingness to to conduct, seductive and, we would be more effect are they talking to them and they would be more willing to talk to a sincerely. then the fourth thing is a broad agenda. we know the iranians are interested in talking about a lot of things that we care about a lot of things, particularly human rights. always talk about is what we want, the nuclear concession. they feel i am sure they are right that we don't want to give them anything until they give us what we want and that's not the way we negotiate. we negotiated including nuclear arms, but also a commercial materials, human rights and

regional issues. lets another names. every time our leaders met, they had a few things to title. agreements to sign, momentum created as a result of a broad agenda that we absolutely do not have the terrain. there's no momentum and that leads me to the fifth and final point and that is the context in which you negotiate, the form. we have detected the reigning infiniti form secret meeting, private meetings come even the meetings of commercial leaders. the way we did with the soviets. what we do is have the p5 plus one and we sit down at a high level. we could have been saved before we go in there, will demand

this, not, stop enrichment and they could have been saved before they talk to us, we're not going to close a mocha within top, sure. but we're not going to do any of the things they say they want or not. and then they come out of their, talk and reassure the public they have done anything. that is not the way to achieve progress in a negotiation. you've got to have sophistication, expertise, commitment to change things and changing things means you have to figure a solution and we have managed to do that. so those are the negotiating principles we use at their principal enemy in the world. there's no reason we should use the same principles negotiating with iran.

>> host: if iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, would they be willing to negotiate? when they feel stronger at that point? >> guest: it would be a new ballgame. we might well negotiate with them. eisenhower and truman both reject it preventive attack before nuclear weapons for other reasons i mention. prevent them from having a nuclear weapon. you have to have the whole population virtually parroting the population of the soviet union or china. as an untenable idea and similarly might be in tumble to remain as well. we may be forced to negotiate with them after they acquire nuclear weapons, but it is going to be a terrible, much more difficult problem.

henry kissinger says you think about the complexity of keeping the world safe in the cold war with two nuclear powers facing a multiply that many times over and start getting an idea of what we have to save if we let iran have a nuclear weapon because they're going to cause nuclear weapons and on the saudi's, turks, egyptian armed with nuclear weapons and that is just going to make any kind of arrangement to stabilize that area of the world and the militant world itself that much more difficult. so let's hope we don't have to get to that point. that's what my book is about is trying to have another way, another path where he exercised limited, discrete streams

through force within iran, but discrete limited voice again the highly unpopular entity within the state. an entity that is juridical for the people and corrupt and everyone in iran knows it. if we attack them, it's not going to be anywhere near as damaging to our standing with the iranian people as if we attack a nuclear program. that would give us the leverage we need other externally and internally to be able to talk to remain in a meaningful way. we need that political leverage and i would advocate we do talk to them in an epithet of manner and we know how to do it. we've done it. >> host: abraham sofaer, what do you think the rationale was after the marine bombing in

beirut not retaliating? >> guest: well, there were several reasons at the time. one was the pretense and that is a notion that hezbollah was not supported by iran and the higher gc. we knew then that was not a viable idea, but cap weinberger said there was some doubt about it. he did not want to attack the bases -- has olivier says, but the president did. the president did want to attack and somehow between one meeting and another, the president cited not to attack and incidentally after we told the french we would attack, it is a big disappointment to the french, two lebanese and secretary shows. he was absolutely various

regulus situation. it did set a tone of weakness that we were never able to respond when our soldiers were attacked in saudi arabia and we did not respond when soldiers are killed in iraq. our military repeatedly said publicly iranians were supplying weapons and an american armored vehicles and tanks and killing americans in the course that enabled or ran not only to kill americans increase their influence within iraq, which now is probably greater than ours. it was not a good strategy to just takeo a chance because

that enables iran to walk away from that engagement with the united states. victorious we left. they are there. whenever struck back and i look very strong both domestically and within iran as well. now they do the same thing in afghanistan and we let them do it. although this is is damaging our effort ultimately to convince them that we are credibly going to prevent them from having a nuclear weapon. i don't see how they could be convinced that we honestly would follow through and prevent them given the history of weakness. that's why he laid it out in 30 years of weakness because 30 years of terror, 30 years of weakness you've got to overcome with deeds, not words.

a secretary shows that he got two-point.and pull trigger. >> host: what should be our response if israel were to attack iran? >> guest: well, i hope it doesn't come to that obviously. the book is written that the united states. i'm not an israeli. i'm jewish and i know what israel has to face in what the prime minister of israel has to face every day. the thought that iran gets a nuclear weapon. there's only 15 million left in the world that germans killed 6 million the second world war. so if you could have another holocaust coming in now, we keep track of her history and if someone is the prime minister of israel at the time of a nuclear attack on israel, however unlikely it may be, that is

something you don't want to be written down in history for, that you were there and did nothing about it. the pressure on israel is is to do something. i still believe iran does not want, war. i believe having so much to do with the iranians i talked to, members of the cabinet, people who were ambassador to the u.n. but they are elements within iran that i most want to create a sense of desperation and anxiety. it helps them domestically, made them look like they were really radical and terrify associate the day the country who are

worried something will happen. so what should we do? first of all, we do the right thing by trying to convince israel not to attack iran at this point. but we need to really get something going back to some alternative to a major attack. here it is. the best i can get a secretary shows approved of it. henry kissinger has a blurb on the back. he approves of the idea. i'd like to see the united states try it. in the meantime you for going do that, i really hope israel does not attack iran because that is going to lead to an ongoing dynamic of entity between these two countries. ..