asia to say they're looking at the middle east to gauge how trustworthy and how much damage we have? if we push mubarak off the pedestal and wash our hands what would it say to the allies there or thinking should rigo win against china and connect yourself to the u.s. when we refuse to lay down the red lines with syria and not get involved. . .

>> from iran to afghanistan. i think that we have heard he built the in the process is with the central asian pipeline and they want more. it is true, they are buying up farmland in africa. they need food. the question is -- i find it really hard to see that they want to take over in the friend that you are talking about. it seems to me you're talking about recommendation that are counterintuitive to where i think many americans want to go.

i don't think china is playing that role either. >> no, the chinese do not want to take on that role. they would much rather be free riding off of our backs. if we are going to lose, i am very interested in what will become a bigger voice in a bigger influence. the chinese are massively investing in the middle east. they are massively investing in china as well. the consequences of this decision comes about directly from them. so we are signaling that into the region, if we are abusing them, we are sort of trying to -- what is going to happen in our actions? >> on that note, it is time to

close, thank you so much for coming in today. it has been a very interesting conversation comment thank you again and think it was about. >> thank you. it has been great being with you. [inaudible conversations] >> there tends to be a denigration of the u.s. military by some historians account. whenever a german italian thought an american battalion or regiment fought an american regiment, then the germans had to be practically superior. the mono mono in the military. i think this is just nonsense because it is pointless. it is which system can produce ability to project power. in the atlantic, the pacific come in the indian ocean. southeast asia, which system?

which system can produce the civilian leadership to create the transportation system. the civilian leadership that is able to produce 96,000 plants in 1964. >> on sunday, writ rick atkinson will take your calls and e-mails and tweets at any turn on the tv. >> coming up on c-span2 come a conversation on the political outlook toward egypt and libya and tunisia. and they look at u.s. foreign policy with journalist david rhodes. he discusses his book, the onboard. later in the book, foreign-policy begins at home, richard haas argues that u.s. security comes not from abroad but from within.

>> on the next "washington journal", we will discuss foreign policy with a panel from the brookings institute area then we will have a panel from the lexington institute about the packing by the chinese. we will be joined by matt mcclelland who wrote a book about mental illness in his family. "washington journal" is live c-span everyday at 7:00 a.m. eastern. >> next to my conversation on some of the and political changes in egypt, libya, and nietzsche. it can a look at some of transitions following the arab spring, the direction of recent or measures, and the future of the three. the carnegie endowment for international peace host of this 90 minute event.

[inaudible conversations] >> good evening, welcome again to another event of the middle east program part of the carnegie endowment. i'm vice president of the studies related to this topic at the target in turn carnegie endowment. >> we are largely focused on differences between conservatives and liberals and others. this is important to pay attention to the political changes in these countries. we are fortunate today to have three excellent scholars. people who have studied the region from right sometime.

we have invited them to talk about these institutional changes and three key arab countries that are undergoing transitions today, egypt, tunisia, and the of. i first asked the political professor and also at dear friend. [inaudible] she is also writing a book and co-authoring it with our next speaker. he is the founder of mw consulting.

founded in 2001, it serves as a national ngo project in the middle east, and africa. >> he has just returned from libya where he has spent three weeks -- two weeks? two weeks. he has very fresh information coming back from that country and he and jacob have also conducted survey studies and tunisia and egypt and they will also comment on their research. with that, we will have jacob go first. >> thank you very much.

thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak today. i am jacob come and i will talk about going back to the first elections. the first of the elections in tunisia and egypt, looking for the role of the region -- this is a question that has been posed by many, the victory is something that is sustainable and how it is tied to [inaudible] before that -- i just want to introduce -- i want to introduce him with a larger group of scholars who are part of the government project. we worked together public and state universities, we worked together with -- [inaudible]

>> we work with the university and tunisia. so this is part of a collaborative effort. so i will go down very briefly. first, i would like to sort of -- i would like to briefly discuss -- the key dividing line in the relations of -- of a sort of -- a religion or the role of religion and faith. and how did religion factor in, then we will discuss how you can align the political center along

the dividing line -- and it will allow me to conclude very briefly on the presentation. in egypt and tunisia -- last year in november, we had a study and tunisia and egypt -- you sort of see one part ends -- the freedom and justice party and the newer party.

on both sides you have a smaller and more oriented party. we are not talking about votes, we are not talking about that. we are talking about the seat with public relations so that the parties -- one party got 70% and the other got 45% in tunisia. one of the defining effects for the success of this party in the two nations -- well, if you look at how the party landscape laid out, the first thing is it is

kind of devoid of public policy. there was little said about the key economic problems and this have to do with the social problems in tunisia and egypt as well. the main debate -- the debate in these elections both were about what role should religion play with the state. what is the influence of religion, and so on. so you have both of the parties placed -- the political access a sort of a revolution will -- um -- its local access -- a political access.

voters vote for both parties that are set up, that have -- [inaudible] some parties, the eastern parties -- um, they do not the same kind of separation. and what we have from the depiction of the placement of the parties is the economic dividing line -- it is um, the dividing line is -- the main dividing line is questions about the role of religion in this party. you see that in tunisia. you see that in egypt on the voter positions with the party's position.

in regards to the egyptian and tunisia case -- you see a much more polarized picture in egypt between the parties. it is much greater in egypt and tunisia. this is important information and it shows how this process has proceeded. we have tried to -- we have tried to use this information for both parties. large proportion of these surveys display of religious values and they are kind of devout muslims. how does religion play into this election results. we try to look at this sort of a

-- this great labyrinth on both countries. of course, you have a demographic backgrounds and we have looked at three ways of conceptualizing this. people have religious political values. mainly they feel that religion should play a big part in the choice. and if your first identity is being a muslim or a egyptian lawyer tunisia and and the third way is, okay -- the third part of religion is the behavioral -- um, how often do you go to the mosque and pray. i will give you the main

conclusion after my analysis. so what we see in tunisia is that, um, those who feel that religion plays a role in the state and plays a role in the party. it is sort of religious behavior being -- and going to the mosque very frequently and so on. it has an influence on what part is related to the tunisian case and it is not a significant variable in other cases. in the egyptian case, there were two things applicable in religion. um, again if you feel that religion should play a role of the states, then you tend to look for the muslim brotherhood

party and not be other party. and similarly, if you have -- if your first identity -- if you are a muslim and egyptian kemeny tend to vote for the party rather than a -- a, um -- rather than [inaudible] party. preference. another aspect is one individuals tend to be less educated. okay, so what does this tell us about -- um -- what does it tell us about the political center in egypt and tunisia? well, if you look at the

variables that work across both countries, you see that around 30% this subject oath believed that voting a religious aspect. both countries feel that religion should have influence on the state. in terms of religious identities come easy bats -- you see that there is a much stronger religious identity in tunisia. around 42% of egyptian identify themselves as gratuitously first and

then secondly they identify themselves as religious nations. you see people going to the mosque sometimes and not other kinds are [inaudible] if you combine the fact of having the variables at work across both countries, if you have religious political values and eroded, there is an interesting way of looking at the political landscape and the voters. each event, um.

on one hand each have similar values. in that religion should stay out of it. you get an interest in religion. the thing is in tunisia, you have only 20% of the population that is consistent with this -- with this feeling of voting where religion should play a part. in comparison the only have 24% of religions feeling the same way. you have a significant proportion of what you can call the political center, um, where religion is all about that -- religion is in your face. you see that many parties have

influence on populations of mixed values. they have political values, but at the same time -- more than half of the voters, especially around 35% have these mixed values. you see the strong support combined with secular values. but you also see significant set of -- a significant set of secular part of the population. so what does all this tell us? well, i think that the key is to look at -- look at the nation results with some caution to

predicting the future relations. any good you have 75% [inaudible] >> but you don't have a similar proportion of the population having what you would call religious values. and we are sort of having the religious and political values. and in both cases, we are standing upon the shoulders of social movement and had a much stronger organizational capacity

and we are able to go to rural areas. there is a significant trend in the tunisian case. they still allow them to vote in both countries that tend to go the other way. thank you. >> thank you very much, um. we will let the the next speaker speak and then we will open up for questions. >> okay, thank you. thank you to both of you for coming. thank you for inviting us in being here with us. i want to continue where he left off and discuss some of the different for and the trajectories that we have seen

in libya, egypt and tunisia. you think about why it is that we have, in some ways, these important experiences. one could say that we have very different experiences either because of that, you know, libya is very small and a half a fair amount of natural resources and well. so it is not a same problems as egypt. egypt is much larger, they are facing a greater economic set of issues. so part of the reason that we are all witnesses are indeed related to the distribution of the population and natural resources and well. but i want to argue that that is not the only comment i would say it is not even the primary difference that's why we see libya having the kind of struggles that it doesn't constantly making it feel like it is on the brink of a much greater conflict. and it is a never ending

struggle that breaks into the media. we talk about whether or not it should be recalled, the election season so forth. so in other words, there is a striking difference in these experiences. i think the difference we see in terms of size and economic positions is really only a part of the story. i think sometimes we overlooked part of the story and especially to understand the type of conflict is taking place. that is what is at stake and also to understand why that is a date. sites sort of think of the world in two major types of categories. basically you could view it as a universal basis. the question is, are we sort of going to have a more islamic

active in the role of state and society. what is the vision and sold sort of a utopia fence. what is the difference we are looking at. sometimes those kinds of conflicts for an offense kind oo gets what, but they start to take place. it really is a totalizing, all-encompassing mission. that is very different kind of conflict. the groups are relatively defined, so if you're thinking about some place like iraq, there is conflict that takes place over the distribution of resources that results in

conflict. i wanted to use this as a bit of an example because there is a difference between a general class concept and the upper class concept and what we might sort of thing at communist capitalist struggle. which but the notion of becoming entirely different vision of the world that we are trying to put in place. so that is really the crux of the issue. when you think about it, what happens. in the case where the stakes are what are the types of world that we will end up like. i am also concerned that i'm on either type of this debate. i am concerned he would actually be able to persuade others to your site. while the sun it is much more fluid and you can convince someone to be a communist, it may be harder or easier for some cases. but the idea is they have conflict.

i cannot say i know how many people we have and it will stay this way. now, in general when we are thinking about complex and distribution, it is this group or region or group of people that should get more or determined upon class conflict. we sort of need to know how many people are in the to understand how complex it is. we are arguing that there are ways in which you expand on this topic. identities can change and countries can change. i think a lot of what we are going to be talking about it something that really should be understood about the challenges that emerge in these states of transition. in the short-term people don't

think that they will be changing identities of people. it is still sort of a struggle. the result, i would argue is that where you struggle with this broad encompassing struggle and in those cases, things like this can be tied to the association. allowing me to convince someone who would otherwise become very problematic area like the very institution, those become in some ways problematic if you think the other side is part of it. you're going to undermine these institutions in order to establish and maintain what you've got. when partly that is because a part of it is that the states can be seen as higher. they don't have to be, but they

tend to be seen as a much higher state. the second part is where you have these who complex than we have greater threats of conflict emerging into this emerging. in some ways i want point out that the challenges that have been merged tend to be quite different. this tends to be a part of the universalistic struggle. questioning whether or not the military actually has this type of struggles. this is a question we need to

answer.

>> we are seeing how they are viewing practices of change. we are talking about the muslim brotherhood within society, very much part of this period. then it goes into the transition. that is one type of party and a very important part type of the party. and then we have parties that had existed under mubarak. they were parties that never really thought they were going to win because they were able to

convince the masses that they had the right position. they wanted to gain weight in the state for participating as a political process. in the political game. they had not developed strong links particularly outside of urban areas. they tended to not develop these sort of strong positions with the people. now, those parties, when they come into the daylight so this has to do with shifting their positions.

particularly on things they didn't have to begin with. so you can get a wide range of muslim brothers positions with regards to the role of the date and the economy. one was at the heart of the movement and you can't move when you have had people who have given him a great deal to be a part of it. it was sort of a belief of those who have a different. in those ways, they don't

respond very quickly and develop scheduling fees very quickly. they also don't really play a part at the point where they thought the median voter was. again, these parties can be based on a universal thing. i would argue that these are the kind of positions that they have taken. what we realize is that when we asked them on the left-hand side, they talked about the role

of religion in what is your own position with regard to the role of the state in the economy. they are not that widely distributed. you asked them what position do you think the party takes. and there is also a lesser position with regard to the state and the economy than they have taken. so part of this is the dialogue, the positions that the party has taken. and therefore others and the response that they have taken.

it is more part of the egyptian voters who place them of again, what we are seeing is the that is the party that was more extreme, more polarized than the voters. when we look at this in regards to libya, here he we have done a different study and we are at the midst of doing a survey in libya and we are able to look at it in exactly the same way we have looked at it in tunisia and egypt. at the moment we are only able to ask the parties themselves where they place themselves. to ask them the same things, what do you think your position is on with the state of the economy.

we find that while there is a point of variation with regards to the state of the economy a lot of people would agree with that. again, i think that part of his actually comes out of this view itself. you have a set of parties that were illegal and one that was -- a set that was illegal. and there was tension between the social movement and the sort of sectors of the parties. and the same thing had happened in egypt.

obviously the muslim brotherhood existed as a legal charity. it certainly wasn't able to always common. some of this is coming out of historical light. a good example is libya. libya has been set up, regional tensions have been exacerbated in the ways that qaddafi has sort of played the region. so you are looking at again, part of the of the historical experience. it shapes the way in which the party hacks in a very particular way. the results of this is exciting.

and we then see the trajectories of these play out. in libya you look at what the tensions are over and they tend to be older the question of what you do and how do you move this revolution forward. this includes the major issues about the distribution and the constitutional election. so in many ways, the concerns of the transition include whether or not this is the east-west and south way and no one is thinking

that a person from this or that tribe, or a person from this regional and other -- where is in tunisia, they have sort of a lower level of they have sort a lower level of weatherization that is sort of important. and egypt to a larger extent. the ways in which the debate tends to become about these big questions and what kind of role it would play. it is not simply because that comes from rhetoric or traditions of the muslim brotherhood. it is also because that becomes a response to what we think of with the parties. the dialogue and the debate becomes one in which people become much more sensitive and that is why you are the journalist arrested because of

this sort of statement that can be considered anti-islamic or you see the pressures on the parliament, you see pressures in democratic institutions. so finally, this isn't actually about the conduct. it really is about the nature and people think that this is as much a part of distributing resources as we can do for tomorrow the fact is that it can be we to economics and it is not

so much a central issue at this time. >> thank you very much. well, thank you. let me just say that i was very encouraged by this study that we should really focus on institutions rather than trying to characterize this. i think this is especially true in the libya case. having spent time there before the elections of last year. i think it is incredibly important. let me just offer some observations to sort of compliment excellent analysis and that was presented and focused on the case of libya. i think it is important with libya to really appreciate the weight of qaddafi's 42 year rule rule on the transition and to dishonestly well known that there were no civil societies, no political participation. this has really affected the transition and more importantly

with qaddafi's very divisive style of politics. what happened in the latter stage of this regime is that we retried allies society. he elevated certain towns and provided them with favors. what you're seeing in this tradition is really a turning of the tables. you are seeing locales of towns that were suppressed under qaddafi, trying to reassert themselves. it is creating something that was not there before. much of it has to do with a struggle for resources, whether economic resources or political resources. from my visit last week, there is a real sense -- and i have been traveling. i have been there four times since the end of the revolution. there is an among my people. there is a sense that qaddafi is

perpetuating himself. but it is owing to be very difficult to be from his highly centralized and personalize way of governing the country. wide? because there is no institution. the government reverts to what it knows, and that is the sort of backroom sense of politics. and the revolutionaries say, a half, this is just more of the name. all this is taking place in a very dire security vacuum. again, in libya, it is actually accurate that we should not try to impose a liberal divide on this country. because it is very different than what we find.

most important i would argue it is really a chronological timeline. what were you doing under qaddafi? where were you during the revolution. did you join the revolution late night were you an 11th hour joiner in these debates are being sliced out to a very minute degree. there are islamists that are saying that if you are not and then got me on every 17, then you should be excluded from government. the second is how much of it began as a artificial process.

when i talk to libyans, they often surmise or lament that their country is becoming another somalia or iraq. i can tell you that these sorts of existential fighting, the sectarian efforts, we don't see it in libya. the idea of libya exist, certainly there are eastern grievances about political power, but the idea of libya still exists. it is territorial. that being said, there are different power centers emerging and a key center of power includes the city state of the economic powerhouse of the country where the most vicious battle of the war was fought.

and they are using this really a service in the war. that we have exceeded the qaddafi regime and we deserve the political swell. this is creating a tremendous backlash among other libyans. there's a saying that for 42 years, they tried to get qaddafi did she miss product. and then they had better for themselves. everything was so centralizing with qaddafi.

let me talk about the saving graces for this country. it was well conveyed, the ontological that term of the various parties is fairly narrow. you don't have these really struck divide among the parties. in the run-up to the parliamentary elections when you look at the different slogans, the national forces alliances was trying to play this up on the center.

this is true. this party didn't do well. it is because they have a very interesting institutional base. many say that the muslim brotherhood really got lazy and in his campaigning. they sort of have the slogans, they talked about social propriety, they didn't realize that there was a thirst for libyan voters and they sort of assumed that people would vote for these. it doesn't mean that he is going to vote at the polls.

especially this played a huge factor with the party. you look at their fancy campaign ad, they were very well produced. there is a phenomenon in libyan politics that includes residue from the qaddafi area. political parties are upon this very defined this time and time again when you look at the national front. people say that this is a tendency to associate parties with some sort of outside the power we are seeing some exerting themselves, through

personality and for other reasons. this is sort of the last observation on elections. elections are still very much the personality of politics. they have a sort of aura. it was because of the popularity . one individual is well known. he's a wise person. so again, this idea of actually campaigning on a program or an agenda has not really reached maturity in this country yet. it is also based on party lines and personality. i believe that i will leave it at that.

i would like to talk about some of the key institutional hurdles in terms of the political isolation and the constitution. >> thank you very much. i would like to then turn it over and i am very impressed. they are in line with other studies and some are varies accepted in society. having said that, there is a new sphere. some do not want to worry about

ideological ideas. so i would like to comment on the. is it actually a sign that they want to hire people. the other, and i want to make is that again you have a consistent idea in these countries and about 20 to 25% of people who, you know, consistently they identify with the ideology of these movements. and then you have to have a large sense of what is not.

this is actually popular support which is translating into much is this a sign of his lack of organization with executive forces. we will probably see that in time. we do not have this as a result of a lack of experience, but this has not always happen. we are not seeing matt has been translated in this way.

this is a problem of organization. both aaron and jacob in particular have commented on. if they know that they are going to win the election anyway, no one seems to be doing much about it. another in tunisia, some don't seem to be talking about this like they should. this concept.

it includes egypt and tunisia. government isn't always paying attention. over the next 100 years, the specific thing that you are seeing. i'm wondering if all three of you can comment on it. >> in terms of some of the

infamous ideas of being so sure with staying in power, including economic rent resolutions and i think that they do care about these policies. the economic policies and they do provide economic solutions for the country especially when we do the economic reform. and this includes the parties, and it is extremely divided. many parties know that they need

to address this and to do reform and so forth. but they would wait until the next election until they could do something about subsidies and someone. so i do think that they care about how to manage their country. so i do think that in egypt's case, maybe even a bit more. with this is where they are able to reach sort of beyond their or voters. and they have engaged in social networks and someone.

these things can change. some of us can perform much better. but not always in our present state. some of us have a very little platform, sort of in on sufficient platform. and it is very important that the discussion is still a long lines of religion and not along the lines of other problems. we are sort of voting on religion, right? >> at.

>> one is there is sort of a supply across the parties. many people you are asking support that democracy is the best thing. and at the same time, you have to ask what it is. there is a great deal there is a lot about economic welfare but

there is no great debate over how that should happen. i think that some choices can be extremely unpopular. and that can be part of the other debate. so we asked, who did you vote for. if you vote for the same party.

the two parties that worked for this, i think the two reasons are for this. we haven't solved the problems and therefore are responsible and etc. but these are also countries in which people have a very long experience of wanting to be close to the ones who are in government. it is not a surprise that people decide in some way that there is an attraction to voting they

think that there are issues that have to be taken into account. and this is an interesting one. i'm not sure how to beat it. this is something i'm not sure that it is stronger in north africa. versus iran, i mean. >> okay, i just am libya in regard to citizenship the

monarchy had. the italian occupation, and then it is difficult to sort of quantify that. but there is just a sense of collective responsibility that stems from the resolution that this was truly a revolution with everyone participating. perhaps of their own motives. but it was one of the wikipedia of revolutions. everyone contributed. there is not a table is doubtless opposition. i mean, this was truly just on the bottoms up. and you get the sense from people that the sacrifices of

the martyr should not be in vain. people should vote. that we have a very high turnout and voting. and i think this really informs the idea of civic responsibility. and you really see it and a in a lot of the protests that we've be against the militias that are besieging the ministry and the wake of the tragic attack on our outpost in benghazi, this includes civic actions and our civic society. >> let's open it up. >> we will take questions if you can identify yourself, please. where it comes from and ask the question. >> for instance, just as an example, there is a distraction

against these individuals. >> and one of the charts, it shows intervention. this includes and how to work with that. we have any way to get closer to that? >> are there any other questions? would have happened as it

continues to push through the discourses in this transition. it is difficult to predict where this is going. i like the idea of what politics is all about. at the same time, i am thinking that again this is a idea of the political class in which there

is a largely focused vision. i am thinking of the movement in both countries you seem to indicate that people were voting for religion. they voted for the muslim brotherhood we have religion and distribution that are attribute.

>> thank you. i want to basically step back for a second. the question about what happens over time. it is an interesting one. it vastly illustrate this concern. does it change over time? that is the crux of the issue in with these kind of universal transformative debates.

another thing that is universalistic is only distributive it is interesting that there are always people out there. so it is a real kind of source of support for parties that come in.

what happens if the network has the capacity to do this. they are so much more developed with some groups and others are in the voting is actually about that mobilization. i started at the outset saying that some parties i think it is always

interesting. there is something about a programmatic party more importantly, that we have no issues with a problematic party. >> to answer a quick question about the military. it was not about the military voting rights of people.

when it comes to voting on a religious scale, and anyone who has spent some time on this, they need to know that it is a fairly moderate country and moderate type of issue. especially since 2011. there was a tendency for the justice party to move to the center.

and this is something that we can identify. there are the two candidates [inaudible] where was sort of more of a center candidate. the two candidates that represented each extreme.

each secular were the more infamous that went to the second round. >> they were kept suppressed for things so long. obviously the currency plan and for now i think they are united on this issue of the isolation.

they are letting the approach go on. more importantly, i want to speak with the idea of divisions within minutes. in libya there is real debates between what we can call the politicos who are in the election and the rejection is. i think one function of this competition is an act of violence. many of them trace their genealogy back so this is where

these guys became politically active. so i think a key hurdle is the constitution. i heard in benghazi that some of these rejectionist groups, like the anti-sharia, they are waiting to do a count duchenne looks like the order they give up their arms and integrate into the state. i heard that there were delegations coming over from egypt, from the north party, describing some of these rejectionist groups in the vocabulary and saying that it is possible to preserve and yet still participate in elections. these discussions are very fascinating. >> gray, let's take the second round. >> thank you so much.

you mentioned that you were talking about democratic institutions, including the judiciary, the media, but what about civil society? can you speak to the state of civil society and egypt and tunisia and towards the end of civil society works, and that to me for all the parents. >> okay. regarding if you opt this for the egyptian regarding this, do you understand that our democracy will be looking for that. and then jacob gave us an idea of how to run the country and how they do it with the secular

problem. i don't think that the muslim brotherhood has these gains. we have 40% of egyptians who think that they have part of this salted. >> hello, my name is harold and i would like to know if you could shed some light on the revolt of the campaign in egypt.

and i'm wondering why as we talk about this problem with egypt and how things are declining so far. thank you. >> okay, who wants to go first declining popularity of the muslim brotherhood. so we have consistently talked about the opinion of the council of armed forces and also what is the public opinion of the muslim

brotherhood that you see and there is a certain discourse of critique and the ruling party and you see a more consistent support. so egypt is facing a tremendous problem and this needs to be solved and we need to always be careful in taking this main discourse and seeing this as affecting the public opinion of egypt i think in the short term, and i'm speaking on a short-term, i bet they are -- they are way that they have

tremendous problems with subsidies in egypt and so on and so forth. problems that any government have to address in a three or four year period. in the short term it has to do with the lower house of parliament. they are playing a waiting game right now there are very

unpopular >> obviously each turning around in the short term, there is almost no way to do it without having a lot of it to become very involved. how do you do it like you do. nothing with the modification and using some of the same techniques that you have seen before. with regards to civil society, what is interesting is that in some ways, both with civil society and well believe institutions, this is exactly what i am talking about. people think that you elect the president, you let the president carried out everything. a lot of people fundamentally

believe institutions. but at the same time, in democratic elections, they allow them to talk about the stakes. it seems like the stakes are too high and the problems are too much. so recently we talked about laws and egypt. of course it is being heavily criticized. and it is the same kind of question about those sites trying to make sure that the other side doesn't get neglected. it is a little bit like this. that is my summation. >> okay just to add into the libyan context, a civil society has, you know, has really stepped into a certain degree to fill the vacuum of the official

state. but up to a point. again, i think that we have to be very careful about how we define civil society, especially when we go there attempting to help. civil society representative in the hotel lobby and chablis are very informal and much of this is still very traditional forms of authority. i think that we sort of need to reconceptualize what we mean by militias in this country and look at the revolutionary armed groups that continue to provide funding and a sense of identity and medical care and a number of these armed fighters.

i think it was broken precisely because of this mobilization of power in particular, a recent poll showed that on one hand, if the elections were held now, with a vote again for this president. 47% said yes. 45% said no. on the other hand of the people

who said no, two thirds of them said that they could not name a president. you know, that they would elect and that is 1%. it is a situation that is not unique to that approach. in every outer region of the law. imagine this took time to organize. that is not part of the data. i hope that nobody misunderstands these situations. you know, it is true that maybe the people make this a priority.

most of them would grant the economy's conditions as the number one priority. it is also true that they center on corruption very highly. they need to have equitable treatment. and i think that may be part of this question is that more people still equate democracy with their properties. i believe that equate a sort of addressing these issues that they care about. ..

reporter kenichi. my question is for marwan's last point, that is the definition of democracy are definition of that day civil society or institutional reforms. my observation is last year's this year, we are asking the same question to trying to understand the same people in the same way.

is this something reasonable? is this the nature of the town are the decision-makers are the professors were the scholars to rest the same question and try to find the same answers or try to justify burrs sometimes even in the name of appealing or whatever you call it to try to say this is on a tape time, but people are not using communication. so it's not a matter of taking the telephone in order to understand democracy because they see there is a growing that the standards of democracy for civil society are voting for transparency in today's discussion, which is institutional reform. thank you.

>> steve winters, local researcher. it seems that i heard that president morrissey was on a trip to moscow not too long ago many with food and the idea has been floated that egypt major bricks group. as such the idea that grand realignment received the popular than egyptian economic implications? >> one final question. okay, jake a. >> in terms of democracy and institutions, one of the key issues in the process in egypt has been the development in terms of the institutional

develop. i think it was a big mess geek for the process that the parliament has brought a number of discussions that could have taken place with the institutional framework onto the streets. so i think it is a key focus instead of focusing on the political actors and so on, also focused on the processes and institutions that are going to deliver democratic outcomes. and this may also be one of the differences between tunisia and egypt is into me show you cut a constituent assembly where you had a debate on the constitutions. you've elected a parliament that

has not been solved and so on is aged to you had an assembly with the liberal parties did not participate, didn't have a parliament satellite. sauternes that provided democratization that the institutions has played a major role that disparate treasure areas. >> of professor sector same question over and over again. we've got an answer and frank that we are quite far from understanding democratization, which is one reason why my approach and may take a seat think it's actually useful to think about institutional reform and packages have it and when do we get it, when institutions are

under stress, what are the pressures and challenges and how the sticker. it's important to realize part of what i'm saying today is obviously what i think is taking place in libya and egypt and tunisia. they bicker partisan if we were to see a change in syria are transitioning and then that's more than i've seen so far or jordan or elsewhere, what kind of questions that we want to ask? my argument is the first thing we want to understand is what are the actors and what are the positions and how much do they or don't they have an answer to the base. like libya where you didn't have an open playing field. it is capital punishment not only fewer inland, but if somebody wasn't didn't say it. that's a very different

institutional environment that creates very different expectations of what kind of implications that has or whether there's a lot of a lot of struggle everything take the media and speech or whether or not those are the main focus is of conflict but other things are. so hopefully make it a bit further. with the same questions over and over. >> just to read briefly, in the case of libya, it's very appropriate to define democratization in terms of institutional turns because libya in themselves do this is absolutely crucial to the success of their bierman. i mean, they did have -- they're looking at the dnc right now they cannot get anything done. the gmc? basic capacity in terms of taking minute.

government isn't working because this larger institutional framework. you have while many individuals that are completely new from people or demand a institutions and processes and people are really defining democracy in terms of the constitution. we talked a lot about libya's lack of experience in this area, but libyans themselves remember they had a constitution in 1951 and people are revisiting that entering the the lessons from that and that's a very encouraging sign. >> just one comment on the question of democratization, which is our work is democratize democratize -- we have not had a culture democracy for a long time.

one key issue we need to press again and again is the issue of have the right to be different. i think that is the principle of democracy that is not yet been totally in added. when you ask if they agree to women's rights or fellow citizens being ethnically or religiously or culturally different. you do get the majorities, but not a nice to have and 55% say i believe in women's rights. it's enough enough to say i can live next to unless the fundamental right to be different is not just agreed to, but in fact celebrated as a sign of strength.

that is something that is going to take a very long time. it's going to involve an educational system and it's not something that because you have the revolution, it's still a zero-sum battle with the islamists are trying to dominate and sometimes linked to go through undemocratic means to dominate as well. in egypt, governments behave as if it means every day and the others behave as if that means. it's still something that needs a lot of work. >> attack on the thank you very much. i truly appreciate your coming. please join me in thanking the panelists for an excellent

presentation. [applause] and she was a icon it was an emulated or harassed well, her clothing. she popularized everything she had ended. this is a dress from the site administration and in a way that most prized piece about because this is the inaugural gown. this is for her not grow grown from 1893 estate in her family and became the family wedding dress and this was used by her

granddaughters. even frances cleveland everyday closer stylish. a lot of them looked like something you could wear now. here's a jacket. black with this beautiful purple blue velvet. this is a more even inappropriate piece. this is a bodice with a matching skirt. see the beautiful laces sequence, net income of beating, slightly more ornate daytime fast. this would have a matching collar. he could wear this is a sheer waste and skirt.

if >> thank you for this bookstore. i appreciate everyone coming here tonight. is such a great institution in great thing for the city and country and i'm honored to be here to make us really appreciate it. want to ask you to be patient with me. this is only the second time i've talked about this book. picking on speaks, so this might be wrote hopefully will get get through this together. there's also many good friends here so that makes me extra nervous. can you hear me? [inaudible] how about this? fairytale. all right.

okay, i want repeat anything i said because there wasn't any point to it at all. i do feel it is not worth the terrible event in boston. one of the people you're tonight is my brother, eric. we grew up or spend part of her youth outside of boston in a town called wellesley. where's my brother? derrières. eric and i went to junior high dare. after high school and later on became a police officer in massachusetts. he had friends sent down into boston to help out with security down there. he now lives in northern virginia and helps manage a helicopter ambulance service, still a form of public service, but i think him and all the people mom forsman did an incredible job last week and i appreciate them for everything they do. a couple other friends i want to

recognize tonight for a different type of service, for their journalistic service. one is missy ryan right here in front. she's a colleague from workers at the last decade she covered conflicts in iraq from afghanistan, pakistan and libya. incredible bravery in a credible journalism. warren strobel, an editor at reuters was one of the team look at the weapons of mass destruction right before the u.s. invasion in 2003. they kept warning everyone there is no proof of wmd and unfortunately tarcher outlived didn't pick it out. lastly a friend of fine has been working since she and i made us to 20 years ago, training local journalists around the world and doing an incredible job of creating local media and

hopefully counter some of the corruption and other issues that haunt these countries i'm going to talk about in just a bit. in terms of the book i want to scale back your expectations, but i'm not going to offer terrorist in our country. my goal tonight is to think about these challenges we face and i hope to provoke discussion to try to keep this short and i'm eager to take your questions. this should be a conversation and i want to hear what you think, criticize what i have to say and drive this thing. the general view of the middle east is the center of chaos and syrup spring of street battles in egypt and i agree it's an

area that's sad what happened there. none of us know what to make of the arab springs is a positive spring. one i want to give you tonight is the way look at the region and you can question me once i get to that part of the conversation is that it is chaos, but there's a larger dynamic going on in an historic across the middle east between hardline islamists. some of them are violent as we know in more moderate muslims who are our secular and i'm not an expert of islam by any stretch, but with these moderate forces in individuals, they talk about how they are proud of being muslims and they want to be a song, but they also want to be monitored and they don't see those two in conflict at all and

i want to talk about the group tonight and the focus of my book is what was our track record in helping more moderate moslem and is the more we can do in the arab spring to back those groups are back those people who don't want to be dictated to by american soldiers at gunpoint and forced to carry out democracy, but they also don't want to be ruled to live in a strange sort of 12th century caliphate. this again may be somewhat simplistic, read a couple passages from the book prostatic examples this tape these two groups. i have a bias because of my experiences, the kidnapping mentioned and the negative group that i'm biased against what it then that person is kidnapped during the seven months have been kept to be a guide to know these guys fairly well.

they rotated the seven months, but they all have several things in common. this he the more conservative, more radical side in the middle east that by no means represents the majority, but the one you see and hear about the most. when i was in captivity, most prized draft and then all have limited education from government or religious schools. some didn't make it past high school. one card in particular was preparing to be a suicide aware. at many conversations on why he was preparing for this mission. he wrestled with brown hair and said he studied engineering. years later for preparing

suicide bombing. he was better educated. other cars could barely read, but it dawned and plan to go to college at one point. i finally asked him after a few days why did he want to be a suicide bomber? pm said that the minister of the state or furniture meson -underscore mike was to die and go to heaven. his parents and siblings didn't matter to him. he was so well educated he was able to speak in english and was puzzled by me and someone by the west and he like many of my other cards was convinced the 9/11 attacks were staged and there is a worldwide conspiracy by christians and hindus and to obliterate islam from the face of the earth and they absolutely

believe that the starters should have been a period return i would have been in boston, but this work is done then further into. they really felt helpless to resist worldwide. they were defending their culture and way of life from this foreign assault and he asked me questions one of his questions as he wanted to know if it is through and as we saw afghan sun tv stations officials and western clothes they were forced to dress that way in with some saying they were part of the christian conspiracy. he also believes we westerners are weak and only cared about the pleasures of this world.

i said i miss my family and he seemed amused by it. he had been brainwashed systematically to not miss his family. his relationship with his family did not matter. it takes a long time to become suicide bombers, but in keeping with severing ties to his family and i was treated well throughout my captivity to one of the things about him was i brought newspapers to read. a private english-language pakistani newspapers. these newspapers have bad for companies on pakistan and shampoo. it showed their hair and after i'd read the papers and get rid of them come in a suicide bomber training with her and i'm because having needs in the living area was safe and to burn them and get them out of our

house, he himself was going to go to. that's the level of despair and fear these young guys feel if they don't pray properly, i'll go to and this is the thing they read all the time and it was really dark and depressing. another side of this is the second house -- it's not the second half of my book, but i want to talk about characters in the boat. they represent a different side and i apologize because it is somewhat simplistic. i want to talk about a pakistani-american named bernice rockman, a graduate of university of wisconsin who work in silicon valley, that decided he wanted to test himself, so they got the cab drove from the

embers of different companies and went back to pakistan and started the version of monster.com and started the first dating website, not the most popular website in pakistan and the son of the most successful business men in pakistan. another turkish engineer worked in silicon valley for a few years when palm act to turkey a notice the wi-fi systems made the united states by cisco to work well because they are that while some turkish homes. it would work through the walls and turkey so he started a company called air ties in to some of the largest has expanded

the system across the middle east beating cisco at his own game and is an example of the new more forward-looking business class emerged in the region. the last person is a two nation. i was shocked i was in tunis last year. tunis is a safe country, i did not go to a war zone. there is this brand-new sparkling tower there and the manager of a come on a called sungard. they are an american software company. they specialize in back-office things. i went to a joint tower built by sungard and hewlett-packard. on the sungard fighter 502 nations when you call for help,

you operators that frustrate you. two nations speak french particularly well-educated ones and what they are doing is back-office work for french consumers and are doing well. if you call a helper a helper in france a good operator in tunisia will help you with whatever your concerns are. they also write software they are. the tunis tunisia will be an outsourcing hub in the middle east. they are closer to france in terms of time zone and feels like they can compete with india in terms of their wages much lower. this is the other side, decrying modern side of the middle east that i hope is representative of a different side of the region. to me what is happening, the biggest issue is about jobs.

the world bank estimates that 50 million new jobs, 50 million new jobs are not created by 2020, already high unemployment levels will explode and i was surprised and doing research for the book and even the spokes who were, former bomb administrations were honest about what a porch of the u.s. is doing on an economic front. a former secretary of state for hillary clinton is now left the administration. he summoned the united states government has been a terrible job of focusing on economic issues in the middle east. we need to be thinned after or will wake up and ask what happened. you have huge unemployment and no hope from the frustration expressed a similar to what i heard through hundreds of americans, republicans and democrats, civilians and soldiers over the years.

people agree security is vital. you can't have economic growth if you don't have security, but in the long run the best way to counter militant sea was creating economic growth. that consensus in the field never seem to arrive in washington. altogether we spent $1.2 trillion in iraq and afghanistan end of that 1.2 trillion, 95% was spent on military efforts. but we did make civilian efforts, there were two dynamics the doomed the u.s. effort. one must be anemic state and yet there was kleptocratic local governments and i can talk more about that later on, but it is clear some places we did not have the partners in a matter how well they carried out programs that wasn't going to

work. i found hundreds of american civilians, engineers, keep old to go to iraq and afghanistan found themselves trapped in this dysfunctional american-made system. it was dominated metrics numbers, schools built, students enrolled, it would impress members of congress. as is mentioned, they dominated the effort and the rest of contractors is a reflection is much easier to vote for a larger military but not a larger state department. the same dynamics continue. each nation american with a 48-year-old ebay executive

thomas asked of the delegation of north africa. it is a cheap sms speech in cairo, which is popular in the region and race a lot of folks there. what he did was went to tunisia, morocco and algeria with a group of high-tech executives and investors and they start where young people came up with ideas and there were dozens of people that would apply to meet these americans. i was told it was an exciting day and people were pitching ideas and the winner was a woman with a startup in the only problem was the other members of the delegation realized and

choosing a winner with this program is so poorly found that there was no prize so bad from donnie and the others of delegation have some kind of award for this and for the winners in morocco with a three-month fellowship in the incubator in detroit, michigan. i think better track records in the region has its flaws in terms of democracy and has done some outrageous things. economically the european process in many years turkish leaders as a positive model in terms of creating economic growth. the turks don't really care about it.

turkey has a faster growing economy than any p.e. on trade nation. in terms of other positive examples. it's a sad statement, that the outgoing was known and credited by people in the region for focusing on viable palestinian institutions and i sat in as an example of the leaders that exists out there. obviously if they denounce this is not a great example. there's also a president obama mentioned there's now 100 high-tech firms in the west bank and i interviewed an venture capitalist who cisco is investing and it's an area that can and should grow. what do we do about this? in terms of u.s. policy, you

know, i first about the greatest scale back or trying to do. i think this huge impediment. there will be a new president and afghanistan in the next couple years and hopefully will not be one of the others. if we don't feel we have a local movement, one thing we can do is create more incentives. two years ago secretary clinton used the term economic statecraft. and if you heard that at all? this is that journalists often don't write about these things. she declared in 2011 in a speech in new york that economic street crowd was at the heart of american policy and to find is creating jobs at home and abroad. they integrate the region's

economies. he posed an incentive fund fourposter of spring countries of $509 m. for comparison gives 3 billion a year which is 500 million in the region. it was essentially dead on arrival. last week john kerry proposed the exact same thing, roughly $500 million fund to try to create incentives for countries to enact reforms. if you enact reforms come you get basic rakes in terms of aid is so and eventually terrorists are reduced and other things that hopefully help economic ms to do this. i'm not suggesting literal tens of billions of dollars at the middle east. we tried that in iraq and afghanistan and network

terribly. different people talk about the former state department. we should use money from persian gulf states to fund a regional bank that would focus on small and medium-sized businesses. ryan crocker, the foreign minister says they need to listen more, but there are moderates in these countries. we've got a good time last week another state department official gave the title of the great diplomacy and austerity. that's a reality we have to face. he talked about american come in is to sell in the middle east. in 2011 chinese companies sold $150 billion across the middle east. that's twice the amount american companies sold in the region.

one bright spot was united arab amorites were dubai is located to leave it or not according to the state department official of the united states than to all of india. is a huge market for infrastructure. we could be more aggressive competing with chinese firms and other firms. i mentioned natural partnership delegation. that could be expanded. i feel the overall engagement with the region strengthens american security and doesn't threaten us. what was the worst thing the u.s. could do and and a set of was to launch another ground invasion. i said, what should we do?

what helps the most? they said private investment. they didn't want big debt programs. they said educational opportunity for young people can study here given what's happening in boston is difficult and they also said they would love it if they would come to these countries. i'm not asking you to go to egypt today. that is an example of a country that's handled the transition poorly. in other ways we can interact economically that produce positive results. if we engage in a fortress mentality, that's what the extremists want us to do. they want us to discriminate against muslims in this country and it's very difficult to do. we have to be vigilant. we have to fund our law enforcement and telogen suffers

absolutely. it's a mistake to overreact and play into their hands by becoming a fortress and allowing bigotry to dominate the way we respond to these things. over time, i think prosperity american muslim moderates, not american soldiers and drone strikes are the best ways to eradicate militancy i thank you all for listening tonight. i'm eager to your questions and this is all a complicated topic. thank you. [applause] >> hello. i know we disagree with your economic press, but it was just reading earlier today on the internet an article by a woman every before, an egyptian woman

flame from islam, no need to know which pretty very, i thought, logical and critical attack on relying on moderate. i hope this doesn't and polite, but if you know in the middle east if it gets penalty off in two permit blasphemy defined or apostasy. what are your moderates have to say about that? imagistic nor that for an endless period of time? or is it a problem? speed i think we've made a mistake over the years. they had this very conservative waterice interpretation of

islam. i don't know of anyone in turkey is in prosecuted or executed for blasphemy. jordan i don't know that happening. >> the minister -- i agree. so what do we do? are people like him, the governor was assassinated. his son was subsequently came out. i'm trying to argue there's two groups here. he was a brave man who is a moderate muslim trying to lose his life in the struggle going on for control of his faith. how can we help people help them in benazir bhutto was killed, but she was the person that the

vision and interpretation of islam that we should be working with. if we give up on the religion, that's what they want us to do. they want the extreme right wing in islam. it covers a billion people across the world. so you can disagree with me, but that's my interpretation. thank you, though. >> added very simple question. what kind of impact was good and basically was still worry about what's going on --

[inaudible] >> shoutfest revolution, fraction and energy supply will change american foreign policy. we will be less dependent on oil from the middle east. i concern is china gave 70% of energy supplies in europe as well. the global economy so interlinked. the instability in the region will hurt the chinese economy and european economy. we should step back, do i. turbulence there will impact the worldwide oil prices. we see in the european debt crisis economic problems in europe with here.

>> going back -- >> sorry. >> going back to its elements question, if you think about are ran, it's not the middle east, but you have the same moderate, we hope, some moderate muslims and many have the rolling, who are very radical mouth homes. how can we support the moderates without tainting them in the eyes of their own people. it's a problem in iran. it could be a problem in egypt. it's certainly a problem in pakistan that association with americans is toxic. they lose all their credibility with their own people. that was the reason obama was

caught in a rice. the moderates during the uprising after the election. how could we support them without damaging non-in their own country? >> i think that we -- you're right, we do undermine overtly. there's an internet in suitcase with the u.s. state department effort was trying to get technology in the country to get and come even in noranda had a hard time watching the internet. not a great answer, but i go back to ryan crocker. we should ask moderates what they want us to do a midnight mass on us to publicly stated that because it hurts. i cite an example of the struggle going on across the region. there were hundreds of thousands of iranians who want to change

and they says. as i said in beginning, advances to complex questions. i credit with backing off because it is a problem. it's an issue of pakistan. i believe there are times when drone strikes should be used as a last resort to get to attend, but we need to minimize them, make them public. there's a very clear process in you can off about american literary processes, and that would kill civilians can't explain who were targeting them why they make all of this public. we are absolutely shooting ourselves in the foot with the secret drone strike approach.

>> i think that will work out a little bit. i guess i will take issue with the weapon of mass destruction. the bomber is the weapon of mass destruction. the real issue was stability in boston rotella takes these two creatures to create havoc among hundreds of thousands of people. one part of stability involves proper security and that involves all places in the world, especially the middle east conflict takes down a lot of people is anarchy. the other parties how to do affect diddley at all levels. he talked about the top but not

the bottom. the other impetus that goes on their drugs that becomes another added that there due to polygamy. the question is how do you rate order to disorder when you have a tremendous number of illiterate people in high-tech companies are out of their league dealing with the literacy. you allow people to sort out these issues. they try to improve education, the economy is ms mac friend kathleen has expose corruption locally. believe it and not, they're independent tv stations and afghanistan and pakistan that attack to corruption.

they are not perfect, but afghans are as outraged as americans. i apologize, but the stereotype -- their problems of illiteracy, but they're much more complicated than simply mass of illiteracy and polygamy. they want better government. they want less corruption and i think we have to trust them and give them the opportunity to solve these problems themselves. i don't see the problems are talked about. >> kaibito with the c++ time fund front of him as straight quick >> i first think it's wrong to call them preachers. they are human beings. whatever they've done, it is important that we try these people. there is a general sense and

people talk about cultural differences i don't miss everything is the same. one of the strongest things he saw the air of spring i'm not trying them actually hurts their cause. they think we are hypocrites. the rule and democracy advocate the soup on hold them for 12 years without trial. believe me, it doesn't intimidate these would-be bombers at a place like guantánamo. they have no expectation of fair treatment from officials. they are delusional. i looked at them for a while. it's not going to have any in type and we hurt ourselves by holding them there without trial. >> to be honest, they've been

lied to. i feel sorry for them. they delusions doing these things. [inaudible] i have a question. i see the radio column and i come from india. india has space for 50 years independently and millions of years before i'm mighty americans i tell you one things. we don't have problems with those funds. more than in pakistan, the plane is most of the countries including iran.

it becomes a political issue. so that's the difference. the difference is it's not religious -- you're talking about. so my question would be, let's take an example and say i would ask you two questions. there is a country with a large army and its neighboring countries and the neighbor countries like u.s. and india would come to the country and said what was you do? so you do with them, not us. blame them. >> you're talking about the pakistani army? >> you're talking about the pakistani army.

they do bad things now, but she have to live with the pakistani army. >> would you say okay, your country is good, but it's all right will die. or you to take care of them obligate them? >> without assumptions of what you talk about, the u.s. had a failed policy of too much even support to the pakistani military. many of their generals had fun in bed with the pakistani taliban. her senior generals who continue to believe they can use militants as tools to confront india. the use and support the taliban that they still maintain control of afghanistan and the sole american presence and effort by

india and the u.s. to create a pro-indian machine and afghanistan would essentially cut a proxy war in the i.t. of pakistani generals of television, pro-pakistan which receives pro-india. we should be working to back civilian in pakistan they would help stabilize the whole region. >> the next day it doesn't really appreciate, but it happened and then what are the day were 16 people were killed. their book says okay, the muslim studies do not have any opinion

about peer from a religion is as religion is as good as its followers. is sure for anything. i would agree to dangerous use of religion to gain political power. radical islam or any other matter. >> i would say that while this extreme interpretation of islam gives women no right and should create a toe century caliphate. they also disagree with that interpretation. anybody who doesn't know, when it supported northern ireland's by hamid karzai technology, but

the thing that happened was in 1990 we got hijacked if you don't know the kandahar hijacking. >> the taliban carried out the hijacking. how much or as they had nothing to do -- >> that's what we get. >> sorry, it's a lively evening at least we can look at it that way. >> the other questions here seem to ignore our history in the region for decades was supported readerships are the resources supporting iraq commenced on the weapons of mass distraction used against iran and by the way they used them against iran, but we sold them that gas in the past.

sorry history with the region is pretty bad. decisions regarding the region are bad. support its own people the longest time and i send this one of the reasons that are conspiracies, where people think for the last 30, 40 years they've been doing harm for us. why should we expect something good from the u.s. or europe under being countries like france have their own history. my question is that that type of behavior, it's almost like a visa parent coming back and saying check-in about the past. let's do something. i now think that's going to work. we after the use can go back and tell them how to live their lives, it just doesn't make sense to my head. >> i don't think we should tell

them. we should admit this policy of backing the family because they give us oil to fight the soviet and allowed them to spread wahhabi sun has backfired on us. we should step back and not be so public. in egypt in particular were hugely mistrusted because we forgot 40 years. more people -- more people oppose accepting aid from the united states and egyptian who oppose the peace treaty with israel. his egyptians who don't want peace to do with israel. i agree with you there is a catch 22, were the u.s. is still

seen as this all powerful force in the region that were behind everything going on and i agree with you. my concern is so completely separate from the region and think it's not our problem. it's fine on our own. maybe kerry had thrown strikes here. it's not a great answer, or ryan crocker and listening to these groups. his admiration and democracy and accountability. as american myth of doing business and i'm sorry to be a tech utopian, but when i meet young people, they are excited about that. they go work for google, but many want to do that. i apologize if it's a cliché, but it's a muslim thing.

globalization is happening. the most popular is about the soul tom harriman that 12th century and i want to say it's very racy clerks have criticized it. there's this desire to be part of the world something between american puppet and world by jihads is. >> are u.s. army reserve, national guard are overstretched. they are tired in the united states navy and air force played the role over there. where the europeans. to create employment, the

european, the greeks, the germans. where is their army? everything going on in their front yard. he doesn't know diddly squat about islam. i'm just tired of all this intervention. but the europeans set the area's >> i agree we shouldn't have any military intervention. we spent a trillion dollars of that sending an troops and that's final calling for more civilian affairs. ..would fall, and these soldiers would she up and the colonel would say, okay, corporal jones, you're going to get the schools running again.

okay, lieutenant smith, you do garbage collection. you know, okay, captain johnson, you fix the electricity. and all of the soldiers were like, where are the civilians? why -- and that we had this overly lopsided focus on military efforts. it's the only thing that we adequately resource in our government, is the military, and let me say the military is spectacular. they train their soldiers. they have great planning for what they're trying to do to get in and out of a country and they execute well, and i'm not a saying other government agencies can be as good as the military, but when we criticize government and say it's a mess and can't do anything, we don't criticize our military. which in the end is a government institution. and -- anyway, i agree with you about less intervention. the french. did go into mali but generally speaking we're better off working and training and funding local forces in these countries that want to fight militants. most malians supported the

french intervention. the key now i is training malians and it will take a long time push back against these jihaddist which most hoff the population do not support. it's more effective if local force does it than americans. >> we have time for one more question and i also neglected to say that you're all here on somewhat of an historic night for the store. we are selling wine and beer. and you can purchase it over on the side. we have it set up over there. one more question. >> what is your opinion of how the western countries should deal with the problem in syria right now? >> simply put, i think the u.s. should allow -- there has been process where the u.s. isn't blocking -- asking turkey to not allow certain weapons to go into

syria, to the rebels, particularly antitank weapons and antiaircraft weapons. i don't think any aircraft weapons weapons should go in but we should allow the rebels to be armed by saudi arabia and cat qatar. it's a stalemate, an ugly civil war. there was a un arms embargo and that process the military advantage of the boss in than serbs. we armed them and that's what ended the war in boss knea. the gains on the ground by boss in the ya forces, not emergency calman air strikes that ended the war, and i know it will lead to more bloodshed in the short term but i think that arming the rebels will end the stalemate there. >> qatar and saudi arabia are arming -- >> the rebels have claimed -- it's been lifted now but the americans were limiting the type of weapons that could go in. they did not want sophisticated

weapons going in. there's a new american effort vets who is getty weapons but we weren't limiting what kind of weapon is going in, and they have had lot office small arms and rpgs but need more sophisticated stuff to deal with syrian armor and those things. if you arm, then arm fully or not arm. not half and half. >> thank you all very much. again, i -- [applause] >> i appreciate all the questions and it's good to have this conversation. thank you.

>> it tends to be a denigration that whenever one battalion fought with

the american and italian or one regiment fought that the germans tend to be tactically superior. that they were the better it military. i think it is nonsense because global war is a clash of systems, which system can produce the wherewithal to project power , the mantic, pacific, in the notion, southeast asia asia, which system can produce the civilian leadership to create the transportation system the civilian leadership to produce 96,000 airplanes in 1944. is is from earlier this mo.

>> very honored to be here with my >> i am honored to be here with my friend.richard haass.rd i am here for a couple of auasons.hereec first, richard and i go backk. far back i don't want toar tell you how far that we met any when we were 21 years old. do te you do the math. so i've been rs friend and have followed his thinking, agreeing with some, disagreeing with some over the years but always been my friend. but i'm here because i was very excited about this book, foreign policy begins at home, from the very moment i heard the title and then from the first

conversation i had with richard about it. richard and i were colleagues together at the brookings institution and the first question i'm going to did of you, rich, given this title, i would don't you just merge the council on foreign relations with the brookings institution? that would be a very logical thing to do. in light of the title. but i think this become makes it an argument that i believe we need to hear and that i think a lot of americans will resonate to it. i read the book, richard, and i wondered, this your manifesto to run for president? so i can ask him that question, too. and enwhen he is at all equivocal we can know he is running for president. >> i am president. >> i was going to get to that. [laughter] >> i just want to read a couple of lines from the book which i think summarizes it.

americans will not enjoy the standard of living or quality of life they aspire to at home amid chaos abroad. and the united states will not be in a position to limit chaos abroad unless it rebuilds the foundations of its strength at home. and then later on he said, the objective must be to take advantage of the opportunity we have now, which richard calls a strategic respite, to restore the foundations of american power, including the economy, the schools, infrastructure, and i think that we should be grateful that richard that joined the debate in this way. as you know, richmond is -- richard is the president of the council on foreign real estates and worked in almost every administration in our lifetime. he is the author and editor of 12 books. and i will start by asking you,

why not merge with brookings? and what i really want to do is ask you, what pushed you in this direction? there are those who say this is an isolationist book. i have read it and it nose. i want you to explain, how did you come to this? >> well, let me sea at the beginning. it's not a book i ever imagined i would write. here i amen, lucky enough to be president of the couple on foreign relations. i spent four decades toil fog what you might call the foreign policy national security veinar. like many others in the room i grew up during the cold war and yet i got to this point --...

i want to apply those lessons. i buried the united states is seriously overreach and it's allowed its foreign policy to get distorted with the emphasis in particular on the middle east, particularly remaking the middle east. it's neither possible nor strategically wise given the other things we have to do in asia and is part of the world and north america. almost every devout lover doing and not doing at home.

if one looks at what we haven't done dealing with the deficit, the fact we grow at a rate roughly half the post-world war ii historical average, if anyone's landed at laguardia or kennedy airport, i rest my case on infrastructure. i know that it can lie not to get in hartford company, princeton or stanford. i've noticed long lines of children's trying to come into the united states to attend elementary schools are public schools. i'm worried our politics are simply not up to sorting them out. so i wrote the book is actually to make the case for what we need to do abroad and at home and stopped doing abroad and at home, but also how people sorted out. it's a complicated world. it's far more complicated than

that world a second ago, the cold war. i've tried to write blueprints, better guide for citizens as well as policy makers for sorting the challenges of the 21st century. >> one of the things this 10 years ago we were in infrastructure and our 24th in the world, which goes to richard's point. let's go straight to the middle east. when i read those where you need to readjust, dislike the word of the, i was thinking we may no longer be as interested as we used to be the middle east, but the middle east seems not. a lot of the administration clearly wants to make a move towards asia, is trying to make that move and issues in the middle east keep coming back.

how do we actually managed to make that move given the problems the number of excess? >> those who do you like to stay up watching films is michael and "the godfather iii." he says every time they try to leave they pull me back. i wasn't just him at the mafia. that's us at the middle east. we want to pay that are rebalanced towards asia or other parts of the world and they make up in the headlines with libya, sharia, iran, what have you. if foreign policy that all public policy is about choosing and priorities to barf in the business literature and sometimes not fighting the urge to crowd out the import. what we have to do is not look at the middle east or use the cliché. you got to look at the entire chessboard. they've got to look at the middle east compared to

everything else in other parts of the world, but also know something about the middle east. one of the things we had to learn from iraq and afghanistan as we can sit around and about way and debate generalization of foreign policy, but at some point it comes up against local reality is, geographical, historical, political, economic and there's real realities in the middle east. we may say we want. the next six months a year to be peaceful thriving democracy. i wish you well. ain't going to happen. as a result we got to adjust for an parlous he accordingly. if we had this a decade ago or 15 years ago, inconceivable we would agree to did that u.s. foreign policy in the post-cold war era would involve iraq and

then afghanistan and parts of the greater middle east but essentially this would be where the united states reduce its discretionary power. this is how we use the peace dividend. we would try to remake this part of the world. it's a brigade. this seems to me to be totally inconsistent with any notion of strategy. >> this goes back to your other boat here during the administration that the war in iraq. while this is so difficult to stop the war in iraq in the direction of the administration. even colin powell and richard armitage had engraved what we did before we did it. but that is they they are? like a bat not stopped? >> something i've written a lot about any previous book. the three people happen to be the state department. they're some of their billions in making that our foreign

policy beginning with the white house and after 9/11, those around the president of the president sign onto this as well that he wanted to do some thing that would send a message that world that we were not a pitiful helpless giant to use mr. nixon's phrase. there is also the view argued by some that that was preposterous that iraq was ripe for democracy and easily instituted they are and establish a model that the rest of the region would be able to resist. essentially if you had -- if people come in the oval office or in executive office and say i can accomplish great things at very low cost, people say where do they sign up? to be fair, i guess that was the belief were wrong subsequently but we didn't know iraqis had weapons -- we thought they had weapons of mass destruction.

people's tolerance for risk was low. i argued against it at the time, but i don't think if you will it is a totally foolish thing. i think there were arguments for doing it again based on the assumption the iraqi city of weapons of mass destruction. but i don't think it was a close call. what worried me and we didn't go about it right at the time the cia warned of people such as myself warned to do this right would take considerable planning given local realities. a lot of what happened after the united states when analysts predict will. whatever you thought of that wisdom is war with iraq or afghanistan, but that aside. there is no reason we couldn't know more and prepared for what it is going to entail given what we were walking into. there's no excuse for not

getting it right. again, there's no substitute at times for local knowledge and we forget that in peril. one other thing that concerns me about the debate about syria is the lack of local knowledge brought to bear. >> one of the things i like about the book is that it's not a decline this book. its sole purpose is to fight the possibility. lost in the emotionally laden territory between we are number one and we've lost it is a country that still matters far more than any other. you note that our gdp 16 trillion, a fourth to economic output to china 6 billion for japan from a gdp nine times that of china. can you talk about the decline in some and the alternatives and

how it is in that debate? >> it's funny to determine yourselves into what you're not. i forced in some ways because it's predictable and charged with being an isolationist and aquinas on the other. and neither is it all true. not to turn our backs on the world, but over time are in a better position to shape the war. if we not shape it, no one else will. it is not a world that's wonderful. adam smith doesn't run the world. it will be chaotic and will not be a china led world where your blood were other japan. it will be an un- led world of for not able to do it. it's not for unilateralism, but it's for american leadership. we are only going to be in a position to exert the leadership if we fix ourselves at home.

that's why the book is not isolationist. we can't become a gated community. what happens out there is going to affect quality of life, physical security, economic wealth, like it or not. we are not declining in absolute terms. we are growing. we may be growing slowly up one and three quarters rate, half of what we should be, but we are growing. other parts of the world have real challenges even though in some cases relatively they do better than expected because they start at a much lower rate. what worries me is here underperforming. it's not a question of whether were declining. the problems we talk about before, the crumbling infrastructure to schools and are beginning to prepare people for living in a global world. we know we don't have the resources set aside to deal with the baby boomers as their health

care needs. we all know that. so what if they cannot take to deal its obligations? public take to double the rate of growth of the american economy. that is the debate. it's not abstract debate about whether were in decline. the real question as, are we on a jury that we need to be on in order to have a society and economy we won at home and in a position to shape the world we want to shape in the 21st century. the answer is no. but somehow this silly debate. the series to be decided we get it right? had with about her potential? >> for the record he never did answer the question about running for president of the united states. i am catholic, so i particularly enjoyed the emphasis on the importance of doctrine and i found that part of the book

particularly interesting because you talk about the utility of having the doctor and penny tossed out several possibilities and reject them. one is democracy promotion timesaving lines and you end up with another doctrine that tries to pull in some of those. can you talk about your doctrine -- rabbi. >> when i first make the case for doctrine. he wants some kind of a framework because when you sit in these jobs or as a citizen, stuff is coming at you fast and serious. when you have congressional exploration, it's obvious that you should pay attention to. normally, things don't come in with blinking red lights as they pay attention to me. i am what matters most. they doctrine helps you sort.

it gives you first-order direction or guidance about what matters most or what to do or not to do. to try to commit policy is a policy maker or be an informed citizenry wake up every day without a doctrine is like groundhog day. it's tough. there's no way to determine priority. there's lots of things you could choose in all sorts of ideas out there. mine is this idea of restoration and it basically says in the form policy world, we had to put less emphasis on the middle east and more in asia, which matters the most because that's what the great powers are collating them with the tools to bring to bear tend to have the greatest amount of ability. that's where the energy is and that's where the economic road for the world is going to come. when it comes to our tools, we have to look at all of them and

not just focus on the military. we had not to be looking for things to do abroad. we have to be wary of wars of choice in particular family out to be preserving our resources to fix what needs fixing here at home. again, which will position us in the long run so we can do more if we so choose. i want to discourage the emergence of any 21st century equivalent to germany or the soviet union in the 20th century. but now the united states has this respite. i'd like to keep it that way. i want to be other cope with it. the only way we discourage the emergence of a real rival until the fun if it happens all the famous by being strong at home. again, that argues for restoring the balance of american national security, somewhat away from foreign policy, war and what we have to do at home.

>> one of the things about reading the book is your short portraits of different countries in different parts of the world. i was on one hand a little bit of blue reading your section on europe. i was actually hired reading your section on china. not because i don't want china to succeed as a nation, but because you talk clearly about the problems they face in this and make a decline this argument and say china will dominate. you are quite clear about the problems that face us. talk particularly. >> the good news about europe as it's not going to be nearly as exciting in the 21st century as it was in the 20th century. [laughter] >> good news. as i used to say, my goal is to make the middle east boring and i failed miserably.

we had to try to keep it that way. it's not going to be the locale of the 21st century and that's a wonderful thing. your post way too exciting. the dark side is europe is not going to be the partner for the united states moving forward but it was nevertheless for decades. it's largely coming to an end and i'll say fairness to celebrate it. i simply pointed out. europe is not the capacity given the limits of economic growth to pick a set of gears on crisis, europe is now growing. don gaetz undersecretary of defense talk publicly about the change in political culture. europe is just not willing and able to be the partner we've come to know. the good news in some cases five other partners and so forth, but that is some anti-european argument. it's a fact of life observation.

am struck by how much debate is about china's inevitable adherence. i'm not so sure china emerges as a great power. just because its gdp grows considerably, never forget you've got a big denominator. that is such a real sponge. china faces massive domestic problems from environmental degradation on an enormous scale to a political system that's not nearly as dynamic. to an economy that's not as dynamic as that was. how will china fare against the backdrop of 6% or 7% as opposed to 10% or 11%? the cheney strength strength exaggerated. people who simply expand in a linear fashion chinese torture very for the last three decades

have realities in addition to the low-hanging fruit has argument taken. i'll think the second half of the prediction is necessarily a declared rifle in every issue. it ought to be the goal and it's not. it's different century the united states and china find some way to cooperate. north korea and iran or syria look at the range of outcomes depending what china does to dealing with economic issues or climate change issues there any issue you can think of. china will become more significant. shaping how china uses the back trip is also a growing internal challenge and an big diplomatic foreign policy challenge for the united states. >> one area i suspect people on both sides will have different

faces for you talk about democracy promotion in humanitarian intervention. you try to rate carefully to make sure your in favor of democracy, but you talk about danger of promotion as a central goal and you have an interesting switch of doctrine, where the idea of humanitarian intervention has been enshrined as the responsibility to protect a "star wars" character rtp and he proposed that it be changed to the responsibility to respond our two hour. can you talk about all of that? >> a democracy promotion is a worthy thing. it is to obviously treat their citizens better as well as neighbors better. the problem is mature democracies are hard to bring about.