then had a reputation for larger than life. and with a very forceful actor on the scene, watching someone like that, and i think his influence. it reminds me that, you know, when you watch a policy is made, i don't mean to talk too much on this but it just want to start here, that the diplomatic corps, you don't have generals who are professionals, diplomats and to operate in that environment. and you like to think that the goal is conflict resolution and peace without war. how to negotiate. and it's not. there's so much in terms of personal satisfaction, the ethos of the players involved in their vision and their view is the most important. sometimes it's where -- that's

the dark side i think a lot of this. i think there's also the problem insiders which can be defined in many different ways, the insiders that around the president or around the secretary of state, secretary clinton certainly had her insiders. every secretary of state has. every president has. and sometimes they consult with the professionals and sometimes they don't. and sometimes the principles that operate on don't upset anything. think about the election, there is an election coming. think about interest groups that you don't want to aggravate. it makes that later which is very difficult to deal with. so let's start with some of the very basic questions, if we can. you talk a lot about the different influences, military,

and the professional diplomatic corps, and the friends of the president, his advisers. and you have the intelligence community and certainly the cia. i will come back. there is a question there. and vice president who also, especially this administration, and alas, the bush administration insisted on playing a larger role, whether that's always good or not, it's not the point. the point is it's another base to do with. so tell me, who decides the options? how are these options played? and who should be? who really should have more of the input if you would? >> guest: very good questions of u.s. when we came to afghanistan and pakistan which was really the big war the obama administration said before itself, has to manage, it was there were.

were as iraq was really president bush's war. afghanistan was president obama's were. one of the main issues, it's still there, is really the overhang of iraq. so we started actually looking at afghanistan, not really on the basis of its own merits in terms of what does it mean, what our interests are, how do we come to do some kind of conclusion and closure that is good for the region ever texas? we started from the premise of iraq. so in iraq, bush did ask, therefore we should do y. but we cannot do x. because bush had done y. and as i think was a problem to begin with. and i don't think the administration ever was even going back to the campaign able to craft for the president and national security image which was not constantly measured against iraq.

so he was a good president because he would do exactly the opposite of bush your when you look at it right up to now, the claim to fame is that bush took us into the region and we are taking it out. every time you talk about afghanistan policy, inevitably end up comparing it. i think that's a big problem. the second is that iraq did produce the u.s. military as a two-time foreign policy element. because they're not the ones who caused the war. the war was the decision of the civilian in the pentagon, and the white house, some in the state department. and the way that the war played out, but in the end the military became a savior. and general petraeus ended up being the hero of the iraq war with the search, the search ended up being the military's solution to a catastrophe caused by -- the military also as the

expression goes to rank its own kool-aid too much on iraq. so we came up thinking that it deserved all the resources it can get. it has a solution to the problem. it really doesn't need civilians but it definitely doesn't need diplomats. and it doesn't need diplomacy. and it's thought that it has reinvented the ending of the war. so you know, in world war ii you go to vietnam, you go to balkans, you go to a private of force around the world. the warfighter a fight the war. the diplomats in the negotiating the end. and when you look at the balkans or in vietnam, you know, kissinger or holbrooke was in charge. the military was providing them with muscle. they could go to negotiations in paris with the backing of the military. and iraq there was no negotiated settlement. so general petraeus and his team and the military came to say

that the savior of the world was this one strategy. and not only was a savior of the war, claiming counterinsurgency, which he was the architect of. not on what would in the war but actually to be america's global strategy in dealing with terrorism and failed states, and the pentagon if you would came up sort of each of america's middle east and south asia policies. so you're right about afghanistan, with iraq's overhang the military has an enormous amount of influence on the strategy for afghanistan big i think very early on the president succumbed to that and, therefore, the strategic review, according to which he decided to put troops into afghanistan versus the smaller number in january 2009, then and larger number in the fall of 2009. but essentially he ended up

accepting the solution to afghanistan was to export the coin strategy from iraq. at that point general petraeus was head of said, but larger this was the united states vision of afghanistan. and then general petraeus a put on the ground to literally run the coin operation. so ended up going to afghanistan essentially taking the military as a forefront strategy. that by the civilians, the state department, the civilians at the white house essentially i would say on a marginal role. and i think within the white house the sensibility of the domestic political advisers of this president was that this is a sensible way to go because it's too difficult for a democratic president to argue with success, which was the way we are defined iraq, and it was too difficult for democratic president, the basically tell

this sort of triumphant military coming out of iraq, you know, it may not be appropriate for afghanistan and, therefore, we sort of sick, to embracing iraq for afghanistan. >> host: he's not the first president to be afraid to be dealing with mr. director but if i remember correctly, clinton had similar problems. both of them lacking military experience, careers dealing with military. if you think of the old image of the democrats soft on war, not really good at this, there have been some difficulties in the democratic presidents approaching military. most of it's been give them what they want which clinton asserted it, and i think that obama is reluctant to take them on. but when you're in the middle of a war, you really not going to argue. editing the other part of the problem, and you know, full disclosure having spent the past

almost 16 years and national defense university i've seen a lot of the military. petraeus had a reputation that almost like a star. >> guest: yes, he was to accuse a superstar than. >> host: several of our generals acquire this or other superstar and he had a successful strategy. and i was interested in your description. i don't think we really, when we look at the surge in iraq, we look at it at our search. it was our success. and yet that's not the whole truth. that's not what really made it successful. and i think this apart because much of my life has been looking at things on iraq site as well that really iraq was ready to make that strategy work. in ways that i'm not sure if that's right. >> guest: but here, and i do agree with you, president obama is not unique in being pushed by the search of military popularity and to be fair, it

was quite difficult after iraq and after general petraeus emerged as he wrote that the present what sort of argue them. but the devil is in the details. the president could have unleashed the state department and the civilians in ways that could have complemented or provided an additional layer. in particular, you know, secretary clinton was much more powerful than the president i think. i mean, in situation room then, she was probably often the strongest character in the room. and the toughest character. as it was. the only civilian in the middle of a number of intelligence and security officials dominate the national security. she held her own. she was out of respect. she was extremely tough, but i think the way it works out is

that the state department, and the particular holbrooke who also played an important role in balancing military given his experience in the non-and in the balkans, were put in a position to say, your job is not to make -- you're not equal partners. basically you are there to implement the civilian part of coin strategy. you are not really, it's not about global diplomacy. the job of the state department is to look out for afghanistan's agricultural because that's what coin means. or your job is to go around the world and make sure many more countries send troops or money. but your input into america's strategy is not welcomed. so it's a period which is not just about war strategy, i think with the balance is lost is the warfighters became america's chief strategists.

that our foreign policy, and not just in afghanistan, but even in the middle east and we still see this argument in the region, but essentially passed from the hands of the diplomats to the hands of the warfighters. and many ways the state department thought very hard against, i me, hillary clinton and richard holbrooke tried valiantly to argue that it would be a mistake for the united states to put all of its eggs in this region on a military solution that the president actually is hard to believe them. and that they should be given a far broader dearth in terms of think about regional, peace settlement, a global engagement that would provide for a framework for an end to afghanistan that would enable us to live with some kind of a

political solution. i mean, if you look at afghanistan now we didn't win the war, and we didn't arrive at a settlement. so in a way there's a lot of loose ends. we just are basically saying the war continues as before except which is going to let the afghans do it. and the taliban are still in full force. there's still no peace deal. there's no regional or international agreement or consensus on an endgame in afghanistan. we are just sort of going to pass the baton to the afghan army. and if that was the case why did research at all? we could've done the training of afghan army from day one. the state department argues very aggressively and part of this fighting that happened and i described in the book was because the white house was highly resistant to the state department in making any policy influence. it would like them to be -- if

it hadn't been before i think hillary clinton, who continuously remains a very strong influential voice and was able to single-handedly carried the mantle and also have enormous amount of influence at a variety of points, largely the afghanistan issue would have been completely reduced the military strategy and pentagon would've become de facto state department. >> host: if i put this in some kind of a context, the pattern is not original with obama, that much of this for better or for worse was a pattern learned or impose under the bush administration, and in that case leading up to the war in iraq and afterwards the pentagon was the source of everything. you want diplomacy, the pentagon will set it up.

you want strategy, it's the pentagon. you want intelligent, the pentagon will do. you want a a d. or assistance from the pentagon was the source for all knowledge and all progress. and they pretty much, and this is rumsfeld and the people working under him, did not see a need to look to anybody else. it's hard to say this but maybe the pentagon got used to this, maybe this pattern became so -- it's hard to change that. maybe that's part of the problem. it's not the whole problem by think that it raises some series questions in terms of the role you have been conditioned or you taken and you don't want to secede it. >> guest: you're absolutely correct. particularly because we came out of iraq feeling that the pentagon saved the day. very different from vietnam with the military didn't come out with a sense that they had saved the day. the day was saved by civilians

in negotiations in paris the in iraq, they were the ones who solve the problem, in their own mind. and jess, and i think that's actually raises an important question as to whether the obama administration has really actually been able to move away from the bush strategy. and i make this argument when you look at iran as you look at the drones strategy, it often is bush policy improved. and better implemented. but there's not been a real effort to reinvent american foreign policy. one thing that is important is that the domination of the military did impact america's global image. so when president obama came in, there was a sense that our image in the region had been tarnished, our global standing has been affected. and i think there, secretary

clinton did a lot to rebalanced that. a sense that by giving the state department a lot more visibility to national -- but also trying, even influence the decision-making on war in the white house. i think she went along way of writing that problem. under the bush administration during the powell, rumsfeld clashes, the state department lost and they were humiliated. the building was demoralized and they reached a point where the state department literally was not even respected at a level of policymaking. in a major way. i think she decided to rebuild the state department influence within the u.s. government, it was a tactful diplomacy as well. so she spent her time continuously talking to the generals, talking coming in at,

with the white house staff, finding ways to sort of reversed the attitude that, as you mentioned, about the state department. and i think she left the state department in a far better position than she found. i think, you know, even to this day the continuous problem the state department finds is the reluctance in the white house or the pentagon to accept the state department's primacy and setting america's global strategy, and then be the implement of the global strategy in every issue other than war. and i think that's a challenge even today. it was a challenge of income and i think secretary clinton probably was during that period, the keystone of their, did far better than her to previous successors but i think we will see whether her successor can

change this in a significant way. >> host: you have some all important observations and i think what troubles me as i look at this, i think you're right about hillary clinton. she doesn't tolerate foolishness pictures very clear. she knew, she knew what it took, the chaff to be assertive, you have to make yourself heard and she has to rebuild and institution that had really suffered a lot in terms of its role and the profession of ritual but the fact it was not seen as a cheaper but more just and implementer will tell you what the policy is, your job is to carry it out. that's not very helpful in terms of building the institution and supporting the mission. but i think a couple other things. one of the things that bothered me, having, covered several of

these crises including all of the iraq crisis, watching everyone fight over all of this, that we always shatter if there was a hint that the president was going to announce a deadline. deadlines are not a good thing. i never understood why do you need an exit strategy? did we have an exit strategy in what to? i ask myself, what is this great urge? if you announce at the same time for example, with afghanistan you're going to have a surge come you going to send more troops, and you're going to announce the withdrawal begins in 2014 or whatever, isn't that self-defeating? >> guest: it was self-defeating come and i can say that from first hand experience of that time period, that first of all we had a great deal of difficulty even convincing people that the ideal of coin was good for afghanistan.

people in the region were highly suspicious. they would keep telling us iraq is not afghanistan, afghanistan is not iraq. not only for reasons that you mentioned, the mindset of iraqis is different, but the iraqis a flat country. it's much issue to think of coin, the taliban are very different from the insurgency. the taliban also have strategic gaps in pakistan which, yeah, they didn't have it, iraq has a much more educated society. military has more of a -- is to be a real military at some point. to me there was a lot more to work with, and in the region, when he went to pakistan, uintah saudi arabia, you went to uae, you went to church. nobody believed that it was a good idea to take coin. and secondly they didn't leave that it would succeed. they thought that you would end up having another vietnam. that if you actually stayed with it you would end up with a 15-20

years or. to to begin with they didn't believe us and we argued with them, no, no, no. believe us. we are really going to stand under strategy. you should trust in american foreign policy. she should trust in our wisdom. you should trust we know what we're doing, and you should support it. they would look at you like very politely and not say anything. and then it's really we went six months back, by the way, there's a deadline. and then they would say so you mean your policy is only good for one year? no, no, no. we're going to succeed in one year. and then they would say, but that even makes all of your conclusions and your arguments less credible than before because we know this is not a one year again. so how are you going to do? then we ended up going back and saying oh, we are starting to withdrawals and we will be gone by 2015. so what i thought was it's

almost like we're constantly talking to ourselves for our own media, largely american headline driven. it sounded good year. and never convinced anybody. by the end wha of what i saw inl of these countries was that they concluded that we are confused, lacked commitment. it's actually very dangerous for those countries to hitch their wagons to the united states because they don't know where that wagon is going. then we begin saying, okay, all right, we are going to be gone by 2014, why don't we just wait for you to go? in we will begin to think about our policy and what's going to happen. you saw that even among afghan actors. i think actually where we are in this region is everybody is just keeping still until we're gone. because we have announced loud and clear that by 2014 we are going. as i said, we haven't won the war.

we are not interested in changing the political dynamic on the ground by forcing a peace deal and forcing the regional actors to embrace, and accept that peace deal and signed onto it. so we're basically just leaving afghanistan the way it is, and they know nothing has been finished. they know the fight is still there. and so by and large all we did in the region is to tarnish our image, tarnish our standing, and essentially create a situation where everybody has written itself and then we wonder why our influence is declining. >> host: again, looking at this, it's so not about afghanistan in this sense. afghanistan becomes yet another example of a failing policy. in the region's eyes. and the reason argued against a policy on iraq is too dangerous with saddam and then when we did

get, when saddam was removed, it was dangerous to let things drift the way they did. it was dangerous not to insist immediately on a replacement that could be trusted. that could hold things together. what we did in effect, i know you go to the region. i go to the region. and the question is always wide did you get iraq to iran? did you think about that? to to realize what would happen? and the sense that we gave up the shop, we didn't stick within. we have given up on iraq and let the iranians take over. we abandoned mubarak. are we going to comment we announced the withdrawal from afghanistan. and now what are you going to do next? how much to trust the united states. so i think you are right for different reasons, we do see an overall unease with her commitment. all of these assurances in the

world still make it very difficult because the region is at the time, i know we always say this, but this is a real crisis. and they are facing challenges that they haven't had to face this war, both internally and what is going on, isn't just about afghanistan? is it about iran? is it about iran's nuclear? isn't about, and i think one of the things that is tipping the balance, is syria. >> guest: that's right. i think you're absolutely right. i mean, you know, we are often faulted for mistakes. and afghanistan could be chalked up as a mistake, and i think it's important as you say it's not about afghanistan. it's about us. we have to learn from this, that there were systemic problems with afghanistan like the overhang of iraq, the over emphasis on military. i think it was a tactical

mistake made in the white house in terms of announcing a deadline, not subscribing to a political settlement. i think if the president had from the beginning till the military, okay, you're going to get your coin, but at the same time i'm really series about a diplomatic end, that would have had much more of a balancing effect. but i think there's something else also, and that is there is a sense that the united states, it's not just withdrawn from afghanistan and iraq militarily. it actually wants to lead -- to leave the region entirely. and that's it particularly hard for our allies in the gulf and jordan and morocco were basically saying you made mistakes, you know, we stuck by you. now you came in and you literally pushed, not only the shah years ago but you literally pushed mubarak out and then didn't nothing for him after he

left it was about pushing him off but, you know, engagement in democracy building and economic reform. and then you find with fundamentalist to power across the arab world. and yet you still think you are our ally. and maybe self-preservation almost put him in a position to begin to try to protect themselves from us, which is a sort of reversal. and every time the american league of what i hear in the region is, you talk to americans about syria and egypt. they're just not engaged in these conversations. they very openly tell leaders in the region that we are giving to asia. we're going to be gone from this region. and i think that's actually encouraging the sense of gloom and doom in the region, or that leaders are beginning to say, well, we have to look for an option be. it's not that you have a

bungling america. are not going to any american at all. and i think to your point, israel critical because these are the two most important arab country. they're going to decide the future of the region. and somehow attack italy we are completely disinterested and how this plays out. we could be defaulted for making mistakes, but the fact that we don't see any role for us or any sense of urgency as to whether each will sign a critical economic program with the imf or the fact that syria could be stabilize iraq, lebanon, jordan, turkey, be a threat to israel, ultimately a threat to the gulf. that's actually quite baffling, and i think it's, in my opinion, it is a colossus strategic mistake on the part of the

united states. they can blame on the military or on these issues. it's a conscious decision the obama administration has made to downgrade the middle east as a strategic spoke to the president goes to the region and doesn't deal. .. i think that's a new chapter. we may want to point ourselves

on the back. just because you're not there doesn't mean that the problems are solved anymore. >> host: you have a darker view than i do. and i don't mean it as an excuse for the administration, but the problem are incredibly complicated. in a way the failure here, it's not an intelligence failure as such. it's not a military failure. it's a failure to be willing on take on very difficult problems. if you look at egypt as an example, maybe there -- maybe we made a mistake in recognizing, i mean, we have long allergid that the muslim brotherhood, we want the political system. all should be able in a perfect world, in a perfect democracy, if you will be, to be able to participate. nothing wrong with that. do we really understand the circumstance that we're dealing with? in other words, i don't think we

are prepared to deal with the aftermath. look at egypt, it's a republic, the -- islamist never had a tight hold. it will easy to see it flow to the transsuggestion and -- transition and the first day of the they rear demonstration. that didn't last long. the people who came out in the street disappeared. and it did. so the same story. so in the other country. i don't think we -- we thought

we were so far ahead and saying to new bar wrack, you have got to go. i think we were on the right side of the history. the egyptians haven't helped us to help them either. >> host: that's so true. no, i agree with you. going to funning problems and we shouldn't assume that we could fix egypt. if we compare america's reaction to global transformation of this kind, even intellectually engage with trying to having an influence on the outcome at the highest level of government, we cannot influence egypt's decision making on the constitution, but we could have an influence on their economic decision making. we could coordinate better with qua tar and saudi arabia weeks before they are supposed to be signing a critical deal with the

imf. winning hearts and minds. >> guest: no, but the point is that, you know, we have a lot at stake here. >> host: yeah. >> guest: and the oh part is expect that the region really, you know, worries about what we do too much and we mess up. but it's also equally worrying that when we are not engaged. and they were downsizing. when we leave to another regional actors to fend for themselves. we don't have an opinion, money goes to wrong places in syria.

money goes to groups in egypt. the united states has no opinion. it's following a less affair policies. >> host: and no ability to control our friend, the sue i i saudi arabias and others who are giving money to the brotherhood who aren't getting along with either. >> guest: require. it requires us to be in the piddle. it requires us to be talking to them about egypts. it requires us talking to them telling them we have a strategy. it tell us if it's wrong, this is our vision where we want egypt to end up. we believe economic reform should come at this level, at this stage. therefore we would like your backing. we would like your support. with a we want to do out of israel seriously. the secretary of state would go to cairo 22 times and jeer

jerusalem 23 times. we unyou have a plan in your head. you want to talk to the leaders. you keep embellishing it. you create a regional consensus around a particular idea. you shop with the main protagonist, and you try to move the region forward. it will be possible for the united states to have had serious conversation with regional actors around economic reform in the region. around job creation. around constitutional reform. >> host: i think we tend to forget that every time we talk about economic reform, and imf loans, certainly these countries, especially egypt and especially jordan get very worried because those things come with conditions. you're going have to institute reform, you have to end subsidizes. how can you end subsidize for bread or any other necessity? of it tried in the past it triggered major rites in the country. it's probably a cause for

concern and egypt they have an election coming up. the party and power is worried they won't be in power anymore. it is a complicated. >> guest: it is. i don't think these countries are going to do these tough decisions for five months a billion dollars without a promise of a road map forward. and the public has to believe this. so, you know, that's not on the table. it's easier to take $5 billion from qatar and libya and im. it. >> we have such good issues. one thing i want to come back again. what i think you describe and others described in your book, the wholist government approach involving big problems many see that what -- [inaudible] in the state the president was to create in effect, what the pentagon has been so successful in doing before them. government as a slope from state

department and person in charge. one of the -- in pursuing this that the holbrooke and the people working for him got carried away. they were so busy in thinking about the problems down to the -- down to the -- they lost crosslet problem. perhaps we're not able to push on the bigger issues as hard as they should. what i'm thinking about, it almost look like what happened iraq. could the one office with the state department -- was it intended to be the sole source of our afghan policy, or thinking about the, you know, what could be -- needed to be done. was that office trying take on

more than it could handle? >> guest: it's a very good point. i think the reason people got in the weeds it's the way they were pushed through. i think the state department would much rather have focused on a peace process. and not worry abouting a agriculture. but it demanded granularity. everything is about village-level cooperation between a civilian team and a military team. the so called trt. right. of it a vision that was obviously -- you it was accommodating the coin vision. the other -- >> host: the tissuing rt were the team. they were military, they were civilian, they were on agriculture. had worked very effectively in iraq. didn't work as effectively, i think, in afghanistan. in part because it was so few. >> guest: so few.

there was security issues. and also, as you mention, the nature of the two countries was quite different. and also i don't think that the clearing of the taliban was ever as effective as the clearing of the insurgency. >> host: true. >> guest: the problem was that the office was created was put in the state department immediately undercut by rivals in the white house, and the military. and the president was reluctant to give hole holbrooke the authority he needed to run. the problem was not focused in too many things. when you came up with anything effective, you ran again the wall and it always took holbrooke's personal charm and way of doing things to call up the secretary offing agriculture and ask him. he couldn't order -- and the white house was on -- if you went to the white house and said

can you call the department or that department. they won't do it. and in a way, almost created a bizarre potion. position. and you try to handicap it proactively. everyone around the white house unthat the d -- it worked really well. there are times when in pakistan you had a tragedy of massive floods. this office, because it connected the different part of the government, a lowed for more rapid response. that connected u.s. aid to the vai navy, to the embassy, and you showed that -- >> host: it's critical. >> guest: but i think the problem -- it is good to think about whether these kinds of offices work. i think we shouldn't render judgment based on structure. we should look at whether it makes sense to create them.

from day one put your shoulder to making them fail. because of the personal clashes and -- >> host: let me ask you one more question before the big question. it's my last one, i promise on the holbrooke. there's another aspect here. it has to do with iran policy or coming up in the dugs -- discussion of iran policy. he was quite a bit of a freelancer. he. ed to -- he wanted do his own initiative with iran. i'm thinking back to 2009. he wants to act on his own. wants to meet with the iranian officials. but what if it happens? i happen to talk to -- who is to stop me? who is to say i'm not going to take it somewhere. typically of the gyre rule will

tactic and the non-holbrooke side of the government he would take a initiative and take them someplace they didn't want go. there was a certain amount of unwilling pes to let him out of the buildings. >> guest: yes. there was definitely that caution particularly among, i would say, the president domestic advisers who didn't want to do too much either on afghanistan or iran or iraq. they wanted to tight ship which of goldly lock for the re-election. and risk and diplomacy was -- [inaudible] their objective was not solve, problems. the objective was re-election. in that sense, yes, holbrooke was dangerous in that sense. because he might actually put the united states in a place where he would have to risk diplomacy and he would have to

president would have spend political capital. it wasn't just iran. the administration was worried he would push the issue of negotiations with the taliban or a political settlement too far ahead and they would end up in a circumstance where they would have to defnld it. -- defend it. i think that's the foreign policy. even though we were in a big war and spending $100 billion a month on this war, in the end, our strategy was not governed or directed by the logic of winning or finishing the war. but the logic of domestic politics. which said, you know, do what the military wants because then that's popular and possibility with them. we don't want to do anything risky where the president have to risk political capital. that's why you need to cage holbrooke or basically shoot down his idea of the political.

>> host: they weren't sure they -- it's not easy to control. >> guest: eventually, they know no to this and say no to that. he continued to believe that, you know, this war, this strategy is wrong. he thought if we search, we'll exit faster. when we exit, we're going leave the region without anything to show for the war. it was going hurt us more. and five years down the road you have another 9/11 that come exactly from the region and we'll with back to everything we talked about in 2001, 2002. >> host: we took at love criticizing, president obama and his -- what he's done and his vision or lack trough. is there anything he's done right? >> guest: look, the purpose of my book of the not to necessarily criticize. i think there is vital things

the americans have to think about and look at, because i think particularly when he comes to middle east and south asia, we come to a point where we decided foreign policy doesn't matter. it wasn't part of the 2012 elections. we're sort of adopting an attitude that doing less in this region is better, and we don't need to sort of get to solving messy problem. we can focus on issues at home. and i think, you know, my was problemtize this. we ought to sort of debate this much more openly, coherently, and, you know, -- i think the president has done well in many areas of foreign policy with asia, latin america, and say, you know, their success. there are two things i want to raise. one, how do we make the foreign

policy -- the point you raised at first. how do we plan between civil began and military. how do we set forth strategy interest and pursue it? are we at the right place? my sense is that even if we're not at the wrong place, it's time for us to get out and take gauge. and secondly, is that, you know, we have tangled with the middle east quite a bit other decades. for the better part of 2001 to 2009, we really put it at the center of our global policy. and then we're also making some very radical decisionings about that region -- decisions about the region. about the departing with doings things, and not doing things. these are big decisions which we are doing almost sleepwalking right now. my way was to put it on the substantial. do we want to be disengaged with arab spring? maybe the answer is yes. let really look at it. do we really want to go to zero

truce in iraq and think we are done. zero truce in afghanistan and say we are done. do we want realliment to take our relationship with pakistan for granted? i think these are going to decide our global standing. and also security issues. we have been preoccupied with for more than a decade. >> host: the conclusion of your book took me by surprise. i think it's taken many people. in the end you say, gathering storm and you identified at love problem issues, but in the end what do you see as the bigst issue that we have to prepare ourselves for? because i think -- people who have not read your book yet are going to be a little bit surprised at what you identify as our greatest problem to come. >> guest: well, you know, our biggest problem with is china.

the administration has argued this is completely separate from the middle east. we have a choice of either middle east or china. the term pivot to asia was interpreted in the middle east to pivot toward asia and pivot away from the middle east. if you ask middle east -- they think about it from ruler to public intellectual and they will tell you they want to wash their hands. my argument is not so fast. the middle east is strategically important and right to us. we have a lot at stake there. it's not separate from the china issue. it's a mistake. it's another big mistake to think that our rivalry with china is in the asia-pacific. and middle east is completely irrelevant to it. but rather i think the middle east would be an arena of american-chinese rivalry. the chinese are moving west. they look at the arc from

central asia to pakistan as their set of countries that are a vital interest to civility of western china. they are looking for markets. they are building pipelines, rail ways, roads to the region. for the chinese, middle east is a rising strategic concern, an interest. we think they have nothing to do with each other. it's a binary choice between the middle east and china. my way is to say your focus in china is well played. you shouldn't think of asia only as east asia. you could consider that your presence in the middle east, decades in the middle east ultimately is relevant to your rivalry with china. and i think also at another level it's important. i think people in asia sin i've

written the book i heard from many asia say they are looking at us in the middle east to garage how trust worthy we are. and how much stamina we have. if we push mubarak off the pedestal and wash our hand of egypt. what will it say to allies there who are thinking, you know, should we go against china and connect ourselves to the u.s.? when we refuse to lay redlines on syria and get involved when we show ours to be conflict adverse in the middle east. what signal does it send to china or north korea? so, i think, you know, in america strategic thinking we come to not see the world as the world. we come to think we can have discreet policies and gis here that have no relationship to policies other there. where as the war is integrated. it's becoming more integrated. the chinese are -- they are

coming out of asia. they are going global. one of the places they are going to is the middle east. >> host: that's true. they certainly escaped especially for the oil energy. they importing more than 50% through the region. they want to build more pipeline through iran and afghanistan. i think they already built -- the process of central asia pipeline. they want more. it's true they are buying up farmland in africa. do they really want to take over? your recommendationings are counter intuitive to where americans want to go. they want to do free riding off

or back. we provide security. they get the economic benefits if we are going to leave and their interests are growing, they inevitably will become a bigger force. and bigger and bigger influence. the france sit in -- transit in that direction is not pipelines. they are chinese-funded well invested in the middle east. and the middle east sovereign funds are investing in china. the consequence of short run decisions come about decades from now. if we're saying rear leaving. we're sort of trying to do less in the middle east what is going to happen? >> host: on that note. the camera said it's time to close. thank you so much for coming in today. it's been a very, very

interesting conversation. thank you, again, thank you for the book. >> guest: thank you. great meeting with you. >> host: no, it's great. thursday, a panel of authors will discuss their upcoming books. we'll hear from doris god win author of the "bully pulpit" the golden age of journalism. and wally lamb "we are water ." it starts at 8:00 a.m. eastern on c-span2. next the conversation on some of the recent political changes in egypt, libya and tunisia. a panel said some of the transitions following the arab

spring. the direction of recent reform measures. and the future of the three nations. the carnegie endowment for international peace hosted this ninety minute event. [inaudible conversations] good everyoning. welcome, again, to another event of the middle east program at carnegie endowment. i'm the vice president for -- [inaudible] endowment. a lot of political transsuggestions stumble in the direction of reform. they are largely focused on differences between political actors. islamists, liberals and others. and implication for the development. but critics argue that this attention from -- critical

institution of changes underway in the countries. we're fortunate today to have three scholars. and people who have studied the region for quite some time. jakob wichmann, and frederick wehrey to talk about it. and talk about the countries undergoing the transitions today, egypt, too knewsha, and libya. -- tunisia and libya. she's a dear friend. she's also authoring a book -- coauthoring a book with our next speaker, jakob wichmann who is

the founder of jmw consulting. a management consulting that specializes in countries in transition. post conflict environments, and social and political research. founded in 2011, it serves a as national ngo company and political parties in the emerging democracy in the middle east and north africa. and fred we're his research focus on political reform and security issues and aaron gulf states, libya, and u.s. policy in the middle east more broadly. rereturned from libya where he has spent three week -- two weeks. and so he has very fresh information coming back from that country. and him and jakob have conducted survey studies in tunisia and egypt and also comment on the

result of their work. so with that, we'll have jakob go first. >> yes, sir. >> the floor is yours. >> thank you very much. it's for getting the opportunity to speak today. i'm jakob,ly talk about sort of going back to the first elections, the post revolutionary relations in tunisia and egypt looking at the role of religion there. this is a question that has been posed by many so the picture of the islamist party. it's something sustainable. how is it tied to religion and so on. before that i want to introduce, we worked together in a larger project with a larger group of scholars. we call it the sensational

govern mans project. we worked together we worked together -- from the university in tunisia and the american university of cairo. so what we will present here today is emphasize this is part of collaborative effort and not solely our own work. so let's very -- i'll go with this briefly. and so first i would like to sort of just briefly discuss the key dividing line in relations of sort of religion or the role of religion in the state.

then what -- how did religion factor in support for the islamist party? we will sort of discuss how can you operationalize a political center along the dividing line of religious and secular parties? and lastly, conclude very briefly on the presentation. so the in egypt and tunisia, these are two places where we have done post-election studies. both of the studies were conducted last year, and in november. in libya, we have a post-election study at the moment. no results yet. so in the -- in tunisia and egypt, you see -- you see sort of in tunisia you see one party that -- [inaudible] and in egypt we have three major

parties, or two major party. the trio of justice party and the newer party. and this is -- and then on both sides you have a more secular, smaller oriented party. in the election just to establish this, you see that? egypt -- in egypt we are talking the proportion of seats in egypt. the parliament election. you saw the islamist party almost got 75% in egypt while they got 45% in tunisia. so what we sort of one of the defining factors for the success of the islamist party in these two elections.

if you look at sort of how the party landscape played out in the. they were devoid of public policy. there was little said about what are the solution to the key economic problem, for example, of tunisia and egypt and social problem and so on. the whole -- the debate both were about what role should religion play in the states. what should be the influence of religion and so on? it's very well shown on these two. you have sort of the party placed on a horizontal and vertical axis. the horizontal axe six is sort of political axis.

you see to the left more socialists policies. to the right more captain lie policies. the vertical axis you see the parties placed on parties that -- or voters that vote for parties that have sort of have a more sort of secular party. mean separation of religion and state. and parties that are -- do not see the separation. and what is sort of very obvious from this depiction of the placement of the parties is that the economic dividing line left/right economic policy dividing line is collapsed, and the main sort of dividing line in the elections is the question about the role of religion or secular versus islamist

parties. you see that in -- you see that in tunisia, you see it on egypt on the voter's position. but you also see it on the party's position. one key difference between the tunisia and the egyptian case is that in egypt you sigh a more polarized picture. you see the polarization between islamist and nonislammists party. it's greater in egypt than tunisia. if e with look at -- we tied three of the two surveys -- what is the role of religion in the vote for the islamist party? is it because that large proportion of the population have very religious political values? or because they are very sort of devote muslims making them vote

for the islamist party. or how does religion play to the election results? so we try to look at sort of regression annalist on both countries where we have, of course, you have the demographic background variable, axe, gender, communication so on. you look at ways to conceptualize religion. people have religious, quote, unquote religious value. to the extent they feel that religion should play a part in the state. another way of over rationalizing religion is do you have a religious identity. the first identity being a muslim or an gips or tunisia? and the third way of the rationizing religion is

behavior. do you -- off do you go to the mosque and how often do you pray? and to the extend of -- i will give you the main conclusion. so what we see in from the results in tunisia is that the people who voted -- who feel that religion should play a role in the state clearly voted for islamist parties and also in the tunisia case. but not in the egyptian case. the religious behavior of going to the mosque veectly and -- frequently and so on influence part of the -- in the tunisia case. but not in the egyptian case. it wasn't a significant variable in the egyptian case. in the egyptian case there was two factors that played a role

in term of religion. again, if you feel that you that religion should play a role on the state, then you tend to vote islamist. vote for the muslim brotherhood party and the party. if your first identity when you -- you are muslim before egyptian you tend to vote for islamist parties rather than non-islamist parties. these are the key things. in the egyptian case, you have sort of another distinction that is important to make. mainly between the muslim brotherhood, the freedom justice party, and the voters tended to be younger, less educate, and. what does tell us about the

political center in egypt and the political in egypt and solution? well, if you look at sort of the variables that that is -- both countries mainly -- have influence in the state. you see that around 30% both egypt and tunisia disagree to the statement that it should nt have an influence on the state. we have 30 percent of the population in both cub that feel that religion should influence on the state. and in term of religious identity, you see that there's a much stronger religious identity in egypt than in tunisia. the -- they identify themselves

religion. first and zek second as egyptians 21% of too knee if you look at worship, you see in tunisia, you see a very big center. people go to the mosque sometimes and not other times. in egypt you see a more solid -- a much -- yeah. a much distributed -- and if you combine sort of the effect of having the variable at work across both countries. having what you can call religious political values with the fact you voted did not vote

islamist. you get an interesting way of looking at the political landscape of the voters in egypt. you see that if you are on the one hand, say, either the voter has secular value, meaning religion should stay out of states, and or religious political values. or and -- or you have voters that vote for the islamist parties and non-islamist party. you get an interesting picture. you see that in -- you see that in tunisia, you have only 20% of the population of what we called consistent islamists. in egypt by comparison you have 2% of the egyptians feeling the same way. in both countries you have a

significant proportion what you can call the political center in the country where the election was all about the religious role in the state. you see in egypt there's a political capital portion of the population that has a mixed value. they have secular political values. both which is more than half of the voters. and tunisia you see around 35% of the voters have a a mixed value. you see secular, -- [inaudible] you see in tunisia stronger secular friends, stronger support for the secular party, and combined with secular values. you see secular part of the population.

so what does all of this tell us? i think the key here is to look at the election results in both tunisia and egypt with some caution as to predicting the future and the future elections. in egypt you have 75% going to the islamist parties. you have 75% going to have islamist parties in tunisia. but you don't see sort of a similar in proportion of the population having what you would call a religious values. hence there's a big proportion of both the population in tunisia but especially egypt that voted for the islamist party for a reason other than having the religious political values. what we saw in both cases, were that sort of the the islamist party in egypt both the salafi

and the muslim brotherhood standing on the shoulder of social movement had a stronger capacity, were able to go to the rural areas or more spread in the rural area. and you saw a similar list. a significant trend in the tunisia case. so just to -- this means basically that it's still a large center vote in both countrieses that can be persuaded to walk or this or the other way. i would conclude in the countries. thank you. >> thank you very much, jakob. i'll ask ellen to go on and we'll open it up for questions. >> thank you. thank you all for both for coming to the discussion, but

also thank you for inviting us and being here today. i want to continue a bit where jacob lift off discuss soft differences across the trajectory we are seen in libya, tunisia, and egypt. and think about why we have, in some way such varied experience. one could say, okay, we have difference experiences because of the the fact that libya is small and it has a fair amount of natural resource and wealthy and face the same problem with egypt. which is a larger, you know, it faces economic much sort of greater economic issues, et. cetera. so part of the part of the reason for the differences we're witnessing are indeed related to size. population, the distribution population and natural resources and wealth. i want to argue it's not only, not even the primary difference where we see libya having the

struggling it does that constantly make it feel it's on a brink of greater conflict. we see egypt with the never-ended struggle with the freedom of the media, the association of wonder morsi should be, you know, basically sort of recalled or new election should be held or not. so in other words, there's very -- obviously some striking differences in these experiences, and i think that sort of the difference that we see in term of this, you know, size, economic position, et. cetera is really only a part of the story. i think a bigger and sometimes overlooked part of the story is to understand the type of that is taking place. what is at stake? and also understand why it's at stake. and so i sort of think the world in two main types of pieces. one, you can have basically when

sort of a condensation on the universalist basis. on the bay cyst we are all gipses and -- egyptians and the question is are we going have a islamist or secularist state. what is the nature of society? what the role of state in society. what is the vision in almost you taupic sense. what is the vision we are looking a the. sometimes those are conflict take in a sen of grand term. i would argue part behalf is taking place in egypt these are when the terms not simply about what who gets what. are the lower classes going get more than the lower. they start to i take place -- should we have a green movement or not a green movement. it's a sort of moreet to losing all em compassing vision. that's a very different kind of conflict. what i'm calling particularistic conflict. these are identity conflict. the group are relatively

defined. if you're thinking about someplace like iraq. it's clear who is shy ya and sunni. and distribution of the resource. same thing when we think of class conflict. i want to use classes of bit an example. there's a very big difference between a general class conflict. lower from the upper and the communist capitalist struggle which fits in the notion we have a different vision of the world we're trying to put in place. that's really what the issue. and when we think about it, what happens in the case where the stakes are, with a is the world we're going live in. the islamist or secularist, then first of all, i'm concerned if i'm on either side of the debate. i'm concerned you could persuade others to your side. all the sudden, it's much more

game. you can convince somebody to be a communist. you can convince somebody to be an islam i guess. it may be harder or easy your for some cases. they are not fixed groups or fixed conflict. i can't say i know how many people we have and it's going stay within the bounds. in general when we think about particularist conflict and one over distribution is that the group or the region or this set of people should get more or less whether we're talking in term of class conflict, lower classes should they get more from the upper classes or not? we're talk about in term of ethnic conflict or regional distributions. there is a sense of how many people we have in the east versus how many we have in the west. we pretty much know how many people are the kurdish versus sunni. you can argue there's some ways in which you try to expand that. i try don convinced people with reone or another. we know group size and identity can change.

in the short term, at love what i'm talking about should be understood as the tensions and challenges that emerge in the first phase of transition. in the short term people think they don't going to the change the identity. they think they are in a fixed struggle. the result, i would argue, is that where your where the struggle is with broad, you know, em compassing struggle at the universalist level. in those cases freedom like speech and the association, the kind of freedom that allow somebody else or convince otherwise away from me become problematic. that is if you are interested. in democracy those are the same kind of region that help to underpin democracy. the various institution, the parliament, they become problematic. you are willing to undermine the

institutions in order to establish and maintain what you've got. partly that's because of it. second, the stakes tend to be seen as higher. they don't have to be. they tend to be seen as more zero-sum. t a hotter battle. the second part, of course, where you have the group conflicts then of course we have greater threat. greater threat of group conflict emerging and armed con flingt emerging. in some way i want to point out that the challenges that tend to be different. right. the challenge, if you're talking about these universalistic struggling is that i can undermine you and therefore have an interest in undermining the institutions that are out there. that's why we hear actually people who otherwise think of themselves as good democrats questioning whether or not maybe the military should step in if you're in egypt. that kind of struggle, that kind of tension.

where arizona --s i want to think about why we get there. so i'm laying out a vision of two dpircht type of conflict that i hope resonate with the way you see the progress and the transition period of libya versus egypt and tee knewsha. the other question is why is it we get the different conflict. you can say, okay, in some places like iraq you can say there's a major ethnic and sec -- that helps to explain it. somebody would look at what is happening in syria i i think would say these are the concerns you expect in the future. if we look at libya, egypt, and too anyway -- tunisia there's a higher percentage of more sectarian in egypt. in general we're looking at

fairly uniform in the country. it's not simply about the makeup. and this is what exists. rather you have to pay attention to what the parties do. take party of the seriously and think about the way in which they are effecting what kind of struggles are taking place and how people are seeing the struggle, and therefore, viewing the possible institutional change. i want to draw our attention to two kinds of parties. these are not the only party that worship on the scene. the two main parties emerge of what we think of social movement. right. muslim brotherhood is a great example. it emerges from a social movement. it taken place and gathered roots in fairly deep roots within society during the authoritarian period. it's able to form a party in the transition party. it's one type of party. it's an important type of party. the other is -- these are office

parties that were had existed under the sort of, you know, mubarak. they were parties that never really thought they were going win because they were able to convince the masses they had the right position. they were actually in a sense, to gain rent from the state and sort of in return for participating as with citizens or the political gains. they are very different. those tend not to have developed very strongly particular outside of urban area. something we see in the election. and they tend not to have develop these sort of strong positions and ties with the people. now both parties, when they come in to the sort of daylight; right of the transitional period have certain challenges they face. so the social movement-base parties. here again, sort of the best

example of the muslim brotherhood and the fjp and egypt. they did obviously shift their position, and some people argue they have. they can take their position and particularly on things they didn't have a very clear position to begin with. you can get a wide range of muslim brother's position with regard to the role of state and economy. there's a fairly broad range. with regard to the -- you have people that essentially given up a great deal under the authoritarian people can be a part of you. the essentially core the constituency matter. it hold their position to some extend. at the position that didn't -- it wasn't necessarily the median voter position. if you are in to account politics. it was a position that they believed in.

they have a different issue or sort of the old authoritarian parties have a different problem. they don't have strong ties; right. they have not really -- they don't have strong ties and don't respond very quickly with constituents very clearly. they never really play fair positions either at the point where they thought the median voter was. they aren't necessarily parties that reflect the position. some are old communist party. they are not going out and thinking about with the population sits. again, just to recap. these parties can be based either on more controversial or more sort of particular cleavages. i would argue that those cleavages that emerge are in part reflecting these kinds of positions that they have taken. that's pushing them. so what we think of it, i want to go back to the diagram said

that the opportunity at the beginning. i think it's very delling. with a we realize when we ask on the left-hand side saying to voters what is your own position with regard to the role of religion in the state. what is your own position with regard to the role of the stay and the economy. this is the voter's position. right. you see they are actually fairly centered. they are not that widely distributed. when you ask them what position do you think the party takes; right. then a sen of -- the voters are now recognizing or see the party as getting more extreme positions with regard to religion and the state than they themselves. and actually, interestingly enough. holding slightly less varied position with regard to the state and the economy. then they themselves hold. part of this is that the, you know, that the dialogue, the position that the parties --

especially already taken and other parties took in response to them. is partly being driven by where the party themselves, their own history, their own background, their own position. i think for more clear when we look at the egyptian case. here what we look at on the left-hand side is where the egyptian voters place themselves. those who support the different parties. right. on the scale of 1-9. if we look at the right-hand side, you look at where they place the party themselves. again, this is what we're seeing is that the parties were in many ways were were more extreme, more polarized than the voters themselves were. importantly, when we look at this with regards to libya and here we have done a slightly different study. like i said, we are in the midst of doing the survey in libya. we'll be able to look at it in the same way we have looked at it knew -- tunisia and egypt.

we are only able to ask the parties where they place themselves. we ask the parties the same thing. what do you think your position is on the state of the economy. what can you think your position is on with regard to the religion in the state. we find there a variation in term where they see themselves with regards in the stay and economy. they see themselves center of the line with regard to the state. they don't think they vary much on the measures. a lot of people, i think, essentially agree with that. i have no idea what i just -- [inaudible] [laughter] so why is this? again, i think part of it comes out of the authoritarian strategy itself. what is interesting that, you know, in egypt and in tunisia, you had a set of parties that were legal and set of parties that were illegal. it set up exactly these kinds of debate, and the tensions between, you know, sort of the social movement party, if you

think about it, and the sort of secular legal party that then come out and attempt to mobilize. and the same thing has really happened in egypt; right. so, you know, while obviously the muslim brotherhood existed a a legal charity, it was able to run and elect some of the time. when it wanted to. it wasn't able to always. there were some paid by the mother brotherhood members. you try to stay close to the core constituency. of course, there's also a sense -- some is coming out of historical. the great example is libya; right? the very history of libya has set up regional tensions and exacerbated by the way gadhafi had played regions against each other.

.. know, the exclusion law on the question of what to do with those and how much do you move the revolution forward. but it's also over redistribution. the elections, major issues about the elections were over questions about what would we do with redistribution of seats, constitutional elections, exactly the same idea this interest and make sure it was 2020, 20.