a lot of groups, many. i just mentioned the one i work with most came together and got a lot done. a short amount of time. i'm going to say a decade is a long time. and some of the element, it's a public-sector example, although the example i gave from siberia is pretty shocking to people. go into a prison and a 26% case fatality rate for the disease we're looking at. that means a quarter of all the people on treatment died within about a year of going in there and working together with the ministry of justice officials,

mortality went to zero. that would be number two. and, you know, in a prison. there were a captive audience. [laughter] so the private sector example that i have already said, you know, build a construction company up in boston, sold it, you know, what is he going to do? dies 50 years old. he's going to go work in haiti in the earthquake happens. he needs a protege of my former student, dr. from harvard medical school. they meet. we all get together and say we're going to build this hospital. tech companies that came in to help us to it, the skills that they had, you know, i don't know how to build an eye to the backbone, set up a manufacturing

plant for the stuff that you need to treat. i call it can better. everyone else cars it -- calls it are you t f. peter pan. i don't know how to manufacture the stuff. abbott came in. a lot of companies came in to help with something to watch other did there work as we could move into this broader context. i was in tears practically last week, joy, by the way, saying of the system together to build this terrific project in central haiti. >> thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you all so much. [applause]

>> visit book tv to watch any of the programs you see your online . type the author or book title in the search bar and the upper left side of the page and click search. you can also share anything you see on booktv.org easily by clicking share on the upper left-hand side of the page and select in the format. book tv streams live online for 48 hours every weekend with top nonfiction books and authors. book tv. >> you're watching book tv, 48 hours of nonfiction authors and books every weekend on c-span2. next, bruce bechtol takes a look at the prospects for north korea following the death of kim jong-il and assesses the competency of his son, kim jong-un. [applause] >> thank you very much. and thank you for coming for this event. it is truly a pleasure for me to

welcome my colleague and friend, bruce bechtol, take care -- to a heritage. we met when he was a dia and i was as cia more years ago that either one of us would like to read it, and short. many experts in washington this test or three and military issues and toss out generalizations and criticisms about the status and particularly the capabilities of the north korean military. very few have any real expertise or military analysis. spend the bruce bechtol is an expansion. a u.s. marine and that provided him and knowledge. as an intelligence officer at the defense intelligence agency and later senior analyst for northeast asia, a joint staff j to intelligence director he worked, really really worked north korean military issues as i would argue only an

intelligence analyst rican. since he is actually one of the very few outside of the intelligence community who, for example, knows where the north korean a o are is, knows whether the a 20th corps is armor, artillery, more mechanized as well as what the capabilities of a long-range artillery systems that number three has. and in recent years it seemed to become an analytic truism that we did not need to worry about north korea's conventional forces and only really need to focus about the nuclear issue and then the long-range missile issue. and, you know, analysts and experts were very dismissive of this character of the crazy lodi in pyongyang who was supporting nukes, and that was all we have to worry about. like a voice in the wilderness he was one of the few that was warning washington that we had to take north korea's military capabilities and conventional

capabilities particularly the asymmetric capabilities. we could not take this for granted. we had to focus on that. and the unfortunate and tragic hacks of war by north korea in 2010 served as a deadly reminder that we had to focus on and had to maintain defenses against a wide spectrum of north korea's conventional military threat. and the rash of threats this year, the six to eight weeks of threats that we all experience, particularly military movements and very specific threats against south korean targets and the lessee show that that threat remains. so the title of bruces book is the last days -- "the last days of kim jong-il." fadel began giving away too much of the buck if i say that the last days of kim jong-il were very similar to the first days of kim jong-un in that not much has changed between father and

son. and kim jong-un, certainly since his ascension to power is then inserted he is no less belligerent and dangerous than his father and grandfather. some of the questions posed in his book and perhaps we will address today our what kind of threat the north korean military poses to the region, why north korea has stepped up its violent military provocations, and how the dealings with non state actors that engage in terrorism affect stability. for those of you who know bruce as it is typical of marines, very soft-spoken, very timid in arriving at his conclusions, and he's very hesitant to let you know if you disagree with the analysis. without further ado, please welcome me -- please join me in welcoming my friend, bruce bechtol. [applause] >> well, we have been friends for a very long time and i have a great deal of respect for his analysis. in fact, i can tell you that his

analysis of a new missile division in north korea is actually in my book which is in an analysis he wrote here at heritage, and i would like to think bruce and the heritage foundation for having me here today and allow me to give my research out there. i'm most grateful to bruce and they're is a foundation for that my book is dedicated to my wife and daughter. for those of you who or not people who know me personally as bruce does in some of you others in the audience, had a quadruple heart bypass our coverage tonight. once i got past that, my wife and daughter pushed me to a write this book. why, i don't know. maybe it got me out of the living room and into my office. it is dedicated to them. and next-to-last like to think angelo state university where i came here from, which for the fourth year in a row may princeton review's list of best

colleges and universities in the country, one of only three public universities in texas to be named so. we are pretty justified and proud of what we give our students out there. finally, would like to thank all of you for coming. appreciate your coming in hearing what hopefully you will consider my rantings. i am happy to talk to you about north korea and the court to answer your questions are undone please allow me to a kid -- excuse me. i have a cold. please allow me to get into the meat of it and why i wrote this book. i really started writing this book when kim jong-il was still alive. so with his death in 2011 a great deal of discussion ensued about what it means for the region and for us. i am sure many of you read those pieces. perhaps because his death is so recent, almost no literature has been published that specifically discusses the impact his last years as the leader of the gp rk

had and will have on the future of north korea. the objective of the book, the last -- "the last days of kim jong-il", is to show how the kim jong-il government used foreign and domestic policies to pose a multifaceted threat to national security of the united states and its key allies and just as importantly to maintain the power of the family regime or as my friend calls it, the kfr once the dear leader passed from the scene. so this book analyzes out the final years of the regime exacerbated the threats that north korea has and continues to pose to the region and to the nation status with an interest in it. now, the way i approach this was an epic to few key issues. but did not pick all of them. i picked a few key issues that remain important for us today. before i get into these issues i would like to point out something as several of you will

agree with. what we are watching kim jong-un do for the past eight months is the script that was written for him before he took over. a script probably crafted by his father and his father's car race. we're not seeing anything surprising to those of you to understand it north korea. i'm sure you agree with me on that. the key things that i picked that were key in my mind were number one, the evolving conventional military threat. i have a whole chapter that talks about how that threat evolves. the capabilities that they maintain, the capabilities they brought to the four that they have not have before, and the capabilities they improved. the next chapter i tie actual operations into that. that chapter is, i spend a whole chapter of the northern limit line. number three in strategy where

they take these conventional military capabilities and attack the south using them. largely asymmetric capabilities. i also have a chapter on how north korea's nuclear capabilities evolved during the last year's of kim jong-il. and there is probably a lot of you here who are political scientists. i am. this chapter does not focus hardly at all on the politics of north korea's nuclear program. instead, it focuses on what north korea has spithead, the capabilities, how they will attack as if they decide to attack us. what to they have right now? what are they working out? when will it be ready? and perhaps most importantly, how will we counter a nuclear attack? will we do? will will be our countermeasures if they actually mounts a nuclear attack? and another chapter that i wrote

was north korea's support to a non state actors to engage in terrorism. that is to say, terrorist activities. why did i read a chapter specifically on that? two reasons. support to not state actors to engage in terrorism picked up in that kim jong-il regime, particularly the last five years. number two, i keep hearing people say that north korea should not be put back on the list of nations supporting terrorism because they don't support terrorism, which is simply not true. in this chapter i lay of the evidence for you all to see. i hope you enjoy reading that. finally, tied into all of this and nested throughout the whole book, including in the end, the number three in succession process and its chances for success. so by analyzing these five factors hopefully you will be able to understand how the government of kim jong-il in his final years was able to function, present a threat to its neighbors, and attempts to

guarantee its success and existence through the regime's succession process. everything -- let me stress this again. everything is happening right now and has been happening since december of 2011. it's happening because of the groundwork laid for and the planning that was conducted for current events. thus, an analysis of the events that occurred during the last three years of the kim jong-il regime moving to the first year-and-a-half of the kim jong-un regime will help us understand the reasons for what is happening now, but more importantly will give us evidence to predict what will happen in the next to the five years. that is what my book sets out to accomplish. so if i may please allow me to get into the meat of this brief. the three key questions that seek to answer today and in the book is how did the last years of kim jong-il affect what

happened after his death? how stable is number three right now? what does that next leader need to survive? well, how did all this start? why did i pick 2009? what happened in 2008? kim jong-il had a stroke at the end of the summer and was pretty much out of it until january or february of 2009. at the time he also suffered from high blood pressure, diabetes, kidney problems, and our problems. other than that he was okay. [laughter] despite all of this -- think about this. despite all of this kim jong-il did not resist to begin the regime succession process until 2009. he has a stroke. oh, i guess i need to start. it was very obvious to everyone observing north korea, and there are a lot of you and your that my good friends. kim jong-il was not long for this world.

so how did the military -- what did kim jong-il and his generals do? how did they try and affect the military during the last few years of the regime? well, one of the things before i started talking. asymmetric capabilities. they stepped up the asymmetric capabilities of what most people would consider conventional forces. for example, long-range artillery, ballistic missiles that are no long-range like scuds and special operations forces. they have 200,000. we saw a lot of training, an increase in the number of special operations forces. they actually in 2006 which reconverted a bunch of standard divisions to special operations forces divisions. they took all the artillery and armor out, spread out along the dmz and made these guys.

that is an example of north korea realizing what they had to do to make their military more capable of fighting today's warfare. the missile and nuclear capabilities were pursued with high-intensity. now, we saw the metamorphosis of this in december of 2012 when they successfully launched the 3-stage ballistic missile platform. anyone who tells you we don't know if they can hit hawaii or alaska or not, well, that's just not true anymore. they have a platform to do it. and they did something the some of you may have friends that do. they wrapped up -- and this started about three years ago, cyber warfare. anybody who have friends who have taken on their glasses, they step that up. thousands of guys engaged in very serious cyber warfare attacks on south korean business

, government, press. and my good friend, his website was actually attacked. very interesting stuff. and so there remains a key focus. artillery upgrades continued. why is that a big deal? as all of us to study number three a no, one of the key things about the war between north and south korea is a lot of people truly believed they're held hostage by the artillery. guess what? there now developing even more long-range artillery. and spending continues to focus on military capabilities of north korea. a lot of people assess that north korea's bins far more than 30 percent of the gdp and the military. you know, you can imagine that. in south korea the budget is almost 3%.

it's unbelievable. and as i said, this is drop my book. the new leaders focused on supporting kim jong-un command of talk about that later. this was tested throughout everything that was stored on. by the way, if you were wondering how the support of this money, all talk but that and a few minutes. so that was the military. well, what were his choices for a successor? why did he pick this guy who is three years ever the mildest daughter to run the country of 202 and half million people involved in just about every kind of geopolitical shenanigans possible. why? well, everyone knows that a look said north korea, his first son was trying to a kid into tokyo disney in japan on a fake

slovenian passport. as a joke with my friends i wish i could have been a flier on the wall. the shoes me. our use of the team? oh, yes. you know. he lost a lot of street credit, and he has basically been lent in places like europe, as with dillon, macao, hong kong. the second sign of -- this is not my ." according to their japanese jeff kim jong-il, his second son was too much of a girlie man. his words, not mine, to be a leader. they tried and did not go well. but he is not he is not much older than kim jong-un anyway. things did not work go with them left with one son. that was kim jong-un, so that's the guy. twenty-nine years old. in 2009 the regime succession process pretty much formally

began. he started being called the young general even though he never served in the military. he did have a poster of michael jordan up in his room. and then we saw with those of us who watched always see, purges during the spring and summer of 2011. this was designed to help bring a power play for the third sign. he built up the military or maintained it and there building up certain things that are very important to continue to pose a threat. what you do after you bring these to the abilities of the four? you conduct violent provocations. and so 2009 after we saw a lot of stuff like we just saw a few weeks ago, lots of rhetoric and calling the south koreans imperialists lap dogs or whatever they called the in telling us whenever they called us, we then saw in 2010 to march

of 2010 the sinking. in november 2010 we saw the artillery shelling. so they built up these special capabilities and then use them. why do i say asymmetric? well, it was not signed by a conventional submarine. it was sunk by a unit class submarine that the north koreans actually developed to sell to the iranians. the submarine is a small submarine that operates well and shallow, muddy waters like off the coast. also the kind of waters that exist in the west sea near the northern limit line between the two koreas. the special operation forces submarine. why would i call an artillery attack asymmetric? well, most people if you have military guys and former military guys in the audience with a knowledge that south korean artillery is as good as american artillery. a lot of it is indigenously

produced. so why is this old soviet artillery -- why is this old soviet artillery able to attack a south korean island and they're not able to strike back as prickly as they wanted? because the number three is planned meticulously and for able to overwhelm the island by putting artillery right across the shore from him that had not been there before. i will tell you, that won't happen again. the south koreans are ready for this kind of attacks. what is really interesting about this, the nesting of the succession process, a few months after this happened both attacks were attributed to the genius of kim jong-un in propaganda releases. now, somebody is going to have to explain how a guy who has never been in the military planned this meticulous special operation for special marine attack when the when around,

second off the coast of north and south korea and rebel to escape. he really think the kim jong-il plan that? and casino. they might have let him sit in the room. this is one of talking about. this is part of the propaganda indoctrination process. the genius of kim jong-il is driving as. what else did kim jong-il do to lay the groundwork for his son? i would also assert that he kept up the nuclear program. in fact, my guess is -- and again, this is a guess, an assessment to another conclusion based on fact. based on the fact that the areas visited the test. based on the fact of the number

three in sexually said it was a smaller, lighter weapon and based on the fact that they went out of their way to make sure no particles escape from the test, as they had before when we were able to determine what the tests for all about. seems that this test could have been a highly enriched uranium test. we don't know because we have not seen any information that can definitively say one where the other. that is my guess. miching the iranian collaboration, proliferation was ongoing during the final days of kim jong-il. why is this important? the iranians paid the north koreans hundreds of millions of dollars a year for the missile program, for the nuclear collaboration to conventional weapons, you for stuff like what i described earlier, the submarine. very important for the cash

flow, the real economy of north korea, and it is important to point out that north korea's nuclear weapons station program was kim jong-il stream. believe me. the north koreans see it that way. it is part of the dynastic process in north korea that this dream by the great leader has now been carried on through the cheerleader and by the young kid if that makes sense to you. so, i actually where wrote a chapter as i talked about in my book where i lay out what the capabilities are the bridges right up today of february of this year, and then i talked about what they could do with the capabilities. then i talk about the kinds of countermeasures a weekend taken talk about recent initiatives of the are okay u.s. alliance. hopefully you will enjoy reading the chapter. there is more that kim jong-il

did to set this up for survival. this was probably the most enjoyable chapter for me to write. i really enjoyed writing this chapter. that is, they have proliferation to state and not state actors. please allow me to point out that many of the state actors that of career proliferates to also support terrorism. syria. and that think it's very interesting that we have not seen a lot in the news about north korea's supplying the syrians. just so you know, north korea's supplies and lot of stuff to north koreans. north korea's supplies a lot of stuff to the syrians, i should say, and has in the past. things such as a chemical weapons facility, artillery, scud missiles. lots and lots of stuff. so very interesting stuff. in the chapter that i write i take a cue from how we all

started to how they got to where there today. it originally started in the cold war. when north korea was doing the bidding of ussr. and what the north koreans did in 1990 when they got cut off -- not cut off, but when the u.s.s.r. cut off the facilities. it took those networks they had built on during the cold war era and started using those networks to set up new networks of nations that they could supply arms to. not state actors. let me give you some examples, and i give you specific examples with lots of notes and data to prove it. terrorist organizations have supported or are supporting no including the tigers, one of north korea's best customers right up until the tree like an army drove them into the sea. as the law, the i.r.a. through counterfeiting. obviously the iranian republican guard corps. al-sabah of and, according to some sources but i was not able

to verify, so i will put it out there, even alkyne that. so support for terrorist groups included and includes an goes on right now arms sales, training, and construction of facilities. an ad like to give you one example of that talking about has blocked. they sell arms to hezbollah through the rtc army, through syria, and they sell arms to them directly. dougie examples of all three of those in the chapter in the book they also train those guys according to some reports. about 100 commanders went back to north korea in 2007 after the war with the israeli defense forces and were trained by the recall on bureau in north korea. for those of you who don't know, the reid, bureau is the lead on -- one of the elite our's of the special operations forces. and they do construction of facilities for these guys. for example.

they built nasa -- massive miles long underground facilities that made it very difficult for the israelis to get at them during the 2006 war. important to note that this goes on today under kim jong-un. why did they do this? is it of an ideology, you know, despising the united states or israel? welcome and certainly does not hurt that we are we are. these are highly profitable like to these that put cash into the coffers of the lead and support the military. that is what is really going on. so these are the same kinds of things that were stepped up toward the end of the kim jong-il regime and that we still see going on today. so what happened in 2010? we know that in 2011 we saw kim jong-un rushed into these positions. added is that important to set him up for that? in 2010 he was appointed the vice chair of the central military commission, and he was also given positions in the

party and the security services, though not senior positions. they young general, as he was called then, at this time was surrounded by a senior level people handpicked by his father to assure his power base. at the same time younger members of the lead loyal to kim jong-un or rushed into key positions throughout the government. unfortunately, many of these people were no more experienced than kim jong-un. you can see what is coming. that is that workout for stability? so what does the young general -- what does kim jong-un need to survive? by the way, he is also the name -- that's also the name of my wife. and we lived in virginia license plate said. people would be walking in there. why? add on a one a hawk. it was interesting stuff. but anyhow, with the leader of

north korea needs to survive, in order to keep the country from imploding he must have a power base, just like his father, just like a grandfather. you must have the support of four key institutions, the party, the military, the security services, and that is insane thing that my good friend david maxwell calls the kfr, the inner family circle, the regime. this really is not some type of nebulous thing. but this is is the sons, grandson's, and the great-grandson is that the people that came up. they're still there. there the royalty. there the young, the nobles, the royal family that is the kim family running north korea. the way that the kim family regime works is, it is not a hierarchal set up like this. it is a guy in the middle of the circle in the institutions he

intend. since 1948, since his son took over as always been no even controls an entire institution. even the institutions a split up. but all the institutions feed into one guy, and that guy was kim jong-il. so if that guy is not a capable leader, you have a problem. so, what are his chances of survival since he is three years and then my oldest daughter? he has all these negatives going in against him. well, i would like to think about this. these are practical, common sense things that are not complicated. kim jong-il at 20 years to build a power base and is 40 institutions that talked about. he died 1994. already a marshal in the army, head of the party, and running the security services.

kim jong-un has none of these positions. and in a much shorter time to build a power base. as my good friend who i had lunch with today at the old and grow, he said something to me about five years ago than i thought was very important. that is to my kim jong-il -- kim jong-un is weaker than his father. an exxon will be weaker than kim jong-un. the question is, how much. how much weaker points to how long the regime will survive. that is key. like to thank you for that. that is an issue. what is a solution? well, currently we have what some have called a caretaker government. you have the hand-picked just divisors of kim jong-un that are currently helping to run the government with kim jong-un up front as the face of the cpr kate. as i said the radio sherry

astray when i was asked how much in charge is kim jong-un. as said, well, those four institutions feet into him. they do exactly what he tells them to do. of course to meet is not really know what he's doing, as a what he tells them to do is is that what they tell and tell them to do. think about that. nation of 22 and a half million people. that is really the way it's working right now. no one man is truly controlling that government right now. that's a problem because that is always the weight is ben. it is never a government of the dp arcade operating this way. that means that the government of the dprk is at its most unstable since 1948. there's just no getting around it. well, since i have given you this depressing set of circumstances, which are also in my book, what can we expect in the next two to five years? well, kim jong-un will need time to build a power base that he did not have as father died.

currently the key institutions are really running a different way than they have in the past, somewhat narrower even though they have a leader. he does not have the background or experience to be making a lot of the judge because they should be. if a crisis occurs, a real crisis, not one that is self generated by north korean sector saw few weeks ago, it could cause the government to implode, explode, or fall into anarchy. so what are the negatives? well, let me talk about those because we have seen some of them. the other stuff was a negative? [laughter] some of these areas that i see talked about in the press averages like to address because i talk about this in the book as well in the last chapter. a military coup. and that is highly unlikely because of the power of the security services. again, one of the key institutions. the security services by and everyone in the country and each other.

if you are the general in the north korean people's army command you are planning an exercise on your left shoulder is a guy from the general political bureau. under right shoulder is a guy from the msg, which is the military version of the state security department. how many people here saw hunt for red october? of the old people. i got it. you remember that movie there was a scene where sean connery has to kill his political officer before it can take over the submarine. well, if your number three you have to kill two guys because they have two guys that are overlooking the shoulders. and as bruce knows, within the power structure of the north korean people's army, the real power structure, the general political bureau guy has always been either the most powerful guy or one of the most powerful guys. it is because that is to the kim family is always trusted. so interesting. i do not think that is likely. a palace coup? again, i think this is unlikely

because of the security service, because everyone is watching everyone else. well, what about a civil war? this possible. military sponges because of a lack of control. in other words, it would not be guys decide -- decide to start fighting each other. would simply be kim jong-un and those around and don't have adequate control the military and things start to splinter which could start a civil war. but the scenario that i think is most likely to happen, if it does, is collapsed. this is most likely to happen if kim jong-un or someone does not consolidate power in north korea. we have not seen him completely do that yet. he is still in the bill of face. this is something that we will be watching. think of us in this room will be watching it in the coming months and years. so what if kim jong-un consolidates power over the next 18 months? if he is able to consolidate power, it is possible that the government will stabilize.

if stability is to occur it can only happen -- and this is important. it can only happen if the same model as kim jong-un is used. in other words, he cannot take in the script and said the sole run the country. it will not happen. he cannot do it. it is just not possible under this system. which is why -- and a lot of you read the stuff that gave maxwell writes from georgetown. dave talked about the so-called economic reform that people were talking about kim jong-un was talking about initiating. never happened. why? because kim jong-il come in order to simply survive, must follow the same script as father and his grandfather. he cannot get off of that script with the government will collapse. thus falling the same script means continued provocations. continued nuclear weapons

possession programs, continued proliferation of rogue states and not state actors, continue diaz and activities and massive purges internally. yes, folks, we have seen all that sense kim jong-un took over in december of 2011. and in north korea that five to 50,000 people that are part of that family inner circle, they what kim jong-un to succeed because then of this is a dynastic government we have to have a guy from the kim family running the show. the question is to mckinny. that is still a question as gone unanswered. so it is my assessment that kim jong-un has a 50 / 50 chance of succeeding as the leader of the dp arcade. some of your last me why you say 5050 in the 46 d. my answer is, no. the real answer is, we don't know. we are guessing. that is what it means. i think that is still up in the air.

if kim jong-un fails, the cpr que fails and thus implosion, explosion, or civil war on the most likely scenarios. washington must plan accordingly the collapse of north korea's most likely means a unified korea, perhaps by force, under liberal democracy with a capital in seoul. my mind, and i say this in the book, the worst scenario is if kim jong-un and those who support him are actually able to survive and control the government in the country. this means the misery and instability on the korean peninsula will go on and on. i will stop there. [applause] >> let me take the prerogative of the house and ask the first question. a question that often comes up is, to what degree is the kim jong-un calling the shots?

is he simply following a script by his father? is he pursuing a policy that he wants to pursue? or as some argue, there is factionalism in the north korean regime and that really against his better judgment he is having to do these provocations and tough actions because of the evil hard-liners, the military or securities. >> that's an excellent question. i think you know the answer already, but it is a very good question. you know, you and i have talked about this. people talk about the government's of north korea as if it is the government of the prc, china. it is not. so when people say hardliners in softeners, you are a kim whiner or you are 6 feet under. that is just the way it is. and so if north korea took a softer stance it was because kim jong-il wanted it. if it took a harder stance is

because kim jong-il wanted it. this is general suggesting? absolutely. you agreed with the do leader we died for you ended up in camp 942 or whatever, 913. it is of little different now because it has to be under kim jong-un because the biggest problem that kim jong-un has is he doesn't know what he doesn't know. he is just -- it is not have the background or experience to make these judgment calls on major geopolitical decisions within northeast asia that the leader of the nation is to make. he just does not have that experience or background or judgment to do. so i believe he is taking a lot. mean, they're not ordering him to do anything, i don't think, but think he is taking a lot of advice and doing what a lot of people want decides just and self in running this government because i think that right now it is really a group that is helping kim jong-un make the

decisions. he knows he is not able to make those decisions on his own net. that may change in three to five years in the government's stabilizes, which i think would be a bad thing. you know, things may go back to the way they were under kim jong-il. you will have to see. right now his judgment is weak because of his lack of a power base. he was not able to build the way his father did, and because he just does not have the background or experience his father did for this tree credibility for lack of better term. does that answer questions? >> it does. >> thanks. >> thank you. there is a new report that just came out the other day. i think it is from one of the japanese newspapers. my memory is fading already from it. the report quotes sources in beijing that the chinese government is developing a

contingency plan for bringing down kim jong-un and replacing him with the older brother who is, i think, in macau right now. whether there is anything to this, i don't think we can make a judgment, when you talk about this kim family circle of 5,000 or 50,000 military aides, in your research did you pick up any sense of how much of an inroad the chinese have made into this? what kind of contacts to the chinese have with these people? other kinds of influence with this family circle, this power. a lot of them to go to china. i know. they go to buy their luxury goods and shopping and other

things. so they are more exposed to the chinese to some degree, more than the masses of north koreans >> you know, that's a great point. and by the way, you are in my panels and the book. certainly tons of tac is noted for the very close to the chinese. they're said to be -- i mean, another is for naught. they're said to along well with the chinese officials. and as you said, there are lots of officials and the elite who the kim family contrast to go back and forth across the border , purchasing luxury items in china. i don't think that means -- at least that i can see it means they have inroads into the government of infrastructure of north korea. i just had not seen that. that may happen more so now that the government is weaker, which it obviously is. much less stable than it was

under kim jong-il, except during bastrop timeframe. they may be able to make inroads but as you know they're both very standoffish with the chinese. although they both went up to beijing and did things with the chinese, it will be interesting to see how kim jong-un works with the chinese. i did read that report the you're talking about in the japanese press, and i think it is very interesting. since you and i both know all about kim jong-un, gosh, it seems very -- it seems kind of out there that the north korean leaders would accept him as the next guy. he just -- he has this -- way to put it in these words, but he is such a reputation everywhere, including north. he has gone in the open press, as we all know and said horrible

things about his father and his brothers. you just have to wonder, is that really the kind of guy that would be able to run those key institutions? i would think not. nevertheless, never say never. uni had been drinking beer five or six years ago and said you'd see a 29 year-old leader of north korea i was a year gnats. here we are. never say never. it does not seem likely. does that make sense? >> yes, sir. >> how -- was curious. support from the russians? came out and said.

the united states. >> yes. i mean, i'm sure you've seen a lot of the rhetoric that has been ongoing. stopped about a month ago. heavy rhetoric. begin in washington. no, they can't. the three stage missile with adjusted can probably hit at least -- and it went through all three stages, so we can now says it has been a successful test properly at least in alaska and hawaii. at best the west coast of the united states. tell me if i'm wrong that's what most does agree on. so they don't have anything that can hit washington. as far as i know putting s new got an icbm, they're just not there yet. as my friends know, i always say to my no make assessments based on a lack of evidence. i am a former intel officer. and make assessments based on evidence. right now is says is a real good

chance that they put a new, and i know don is a which has a range of 1500 kilometers which means it could it tokyo. but that is about as far as i can see based on the evidence as they have come. so if they have suntan that's with a tested, and that's a big if. if they could put it on a missile the most likely nestle, the pakistans in already do it. so if they can and the north koreans are working with them right up until 2003, the chances are very good that they can. that is where they are right now, i think. now, they may have some technology capability that we have not seen in open sources said. if that is so then there are further along, with everything that i have seen shows right now they probably have the capability to put a new on a missile in japan. that is where they're at right

now. there is no hard proof of that either. it is plain connect the dots. it looks like where they're at. does that make sense? in the nuclear chapter, i actually watched the reader through that. here is where they developed a program. here is where they developed. here are the programs that they have the pakistan needs. here is where they are now. you can see why i assess that is likely to have that capability. >> just jump in. people of trying to downplay the north korean threat. improbably only had alaska and hawaii. last summer checked their part of the united states. and also the west coast. south koreans, the dress up the parts of the missile, the minister defensive we assess it could hit the united states. and then the other thing is if we assess today that they could

do that, well, there is no indication that is where the quest stops. they want to have that capability to threaten the entire united states. in notorious statement over the last six months, we can hit the united states today. we have miniature rise diversified warheads. buy diversified they have plutonium. so where they are today and were there will be next week, month, year. so we know what path they are on hitting washington with the newt is the on a to z. we know they want to get there. >> and in the book i take that "worry actually describes. they found the first stage in the west see.

then they ran a simulation of a. what they saw was this stage, one of them was for engines. then another was a scud. essentially the north koreans to a technology that we said was too primitive to successfully launch a two-stage missile and successfully launched a three states muzzle. they did it. we can't deny 80 more. i will tell you -- this is in the book. if north korea just because they don't have a missile that can hit the washington d.c. area does not mean that they could not do something like putting a permit a plutonium bomb on a merchant ship, changing flags in several parts before they get to the united states and then sailing that is a into norfolk harbor and killing a thousand people. that's the capability they have right now today. that is something the -- ballet at the scenario in the book.

the number three as a very good at doing asymmetric things like that i never thought of that. just very get that. it's something that think about. >> a great presentation. >> thank you. >> he talked about the playbook which i think is important. the regime has been following the playbook. i think in this -- the last few months since the alliance does not solve the playbook. i think that we know the agreement that has been signed, responding to provocations. i think when north korea does conduct a kinetic provocation, i think south korea is going to respond decisively at the time

in point of the provocation. and at that point we're really going to be of scripps. and i think the strength of the alliance, in recent years that all the good as been a strong as it is now. that takes them off script. how do you think -- obviously this is pure speculation, but when we don't respond the way we have come hell is that going to impact the regime decisionmaking? >> very good stuff. let me get to some of the things he talked about because they're in the book and the chapter were talk about it. our good friend and my mentor says simply in conference three years ago the was very important since 1953 the are okay u.s. alliance has been very good at deterring for some force conflict. we have not. that is something that in 2010,

the south korean allies said enough is enough. we are done. we are taking concrete measures and change the rules of engagement. they formed a new command, northwest islands command out there to give a two star general the authority to instantly respond however he needs to respond. in other words, if it were to happen tomorrow he would not have to call back to headquarters to get permission to send it f-15 or they need to go into north. he just does it. he now has that authority. the rules of engagement changed, and this is something and know he likes, the south koreans and the u.s. now have a plan, a counter provocation command plan which obviously and don't have to look at.

the role the americans will play in supporting our allies. that think it started off with two ships ran each other. next thing you know, north korean guy fires at the south koreans, and they just let them out. i mean, sank them -- to sicily sank the ship. north koreans waited three years.

in 2002 they sank a south korean ship just for revenge. that is the way the north korean government operates. in 2009 -- and 2009 there was another incidence where north korean ships tried to go after a south korean ship. the south koreans were ready this time and surrounded the north korean ship and poured about 4500 rounds -- let me repeat that. 4500 rounds into that ship, and sank on the way back to port. 2010 attack the south korean ship. so if everything goes according to our planned and they try something and they're able to counter you can bet there will be paid back later. austrians will be planning for it. as well think is let it happen. as long as there is a north korea, as long as they're is a deep fear kate will see the constant about this that makes

sense? any other questions? well, thank you for coming. appreciate it. >> you're watching book tv on c-span2, 48 hours of nonfiction authors and books every weekend. >> in fact, going as far back as abigail adams and martha washington, you find that first ladies played an active role in the white house and in the campaigns that they took to get there. ..

>> kathleen frydl is next on booktv. she reports that contrary to common perception, the war on drugs did not begin with president nixon's pronouncement in 1971 but was a further development of pre-existing initiatives. it's about an hour. [applause] >> thank you. thanks, michelle. i want to begin by thanking michelle sellers, mlk library and the staff especially. i want