..

>> they toss out generalizations and witticisms about the military, particularly that conventional forces. but very few actually have any real expertise of military analysis with military issues. respectable is an exception. his background provided him an inherent knowledge of military dispositions and as an intelligence officer, he worked and really worked the north korean military issues as the way only an intelligence analyst can. he is one of the very few in the intelligence community that knows where the neck or alr is, that knows where it is armored artillery or mechanized as well as with the capabilities of the long range artillery system is.

in recent years that have become true that we didn't need to worry about north korea's conventional forces. that we only really needed to focus on the nuclear issue. and then the long-range missile issue. experts were very dismissive of this caricature of this crazy little guy and commack. this guy from we have to take this from the asymmetric capabilities. pyongyang was the place where this took place. serve as a deadly reminder on

the wide spectrum of north koreas military threat. and the amount of threats that we all experienced in pyongyang, particularly military movements in very specific threats against south korean targets in the west see show that that threat remains. the title of the book is the last days of kim jong-il. i don't think that i'm giving away too much when i say that the last days were very similar to the first days and that not much has changed between father and son. again, the book is "the last days of kim jong-il." meaning that he is no less dangerous than his father and grandfather. some of the questions that pose in the book that we will address today, what kind of threat the north korean military post in the region. why has north korea stepped up its violent military

provocations, and how have pyongyang's dealings affected stability. for those of you who know bruce, he is very soft-spoken, very timid in arriving at his conclusions and very hesitant to let you know that he disagrees with your analysis. without further ado, please join me in welcoming my friend, bruce bechtel. [applause] >> as bruce klinger said, we have been friends and i have a great deal of respect for his analysis. in fact, i can tell you that bruce klinger's analysis of this missile division in north korea is actually quoted in my book, which is an analysis here at the heritage. i would like to thank bruce and the heritage foundation for having me and allowing me to get my research out there. i am grateful to bruce and the

heritage foundation for that. this is dedicated to my wife and daughter. i had a quadruple heart bypass on october 29 at once i got past that, my wife and daughter push me to finish writing this book. why, i don't know come except maybe it got me out of the living room and into my office. but it is dedicated to them. next-to-last, i would like to thank the state university where i came from, which made for the fourth year in a row, the best of three public universities to be named one of the best universities. we are justifiably proud of what we give the students out there. and i would like to thank all of you for coming. hopefully he won't consider my rantings, but i'm happy to talk to you about north korea and i

look forward to it answering your questions when i am done. excuse me, i have a cold. please allow me to get into the meat of it. i really started writing this book one kim jong-il was still alive. a great deal of discussion ensued about what it means for the region and for us. i'm sure many of you read these pieces. perhaps because his death is so recent that specifically discusses what he had on the future of north korea and the impact it had. the objective of the book, the last days of of his life, as described in "the last days of kim jong-il", it is about how he used foreign and domestic policies to pose a threat to national security of the united states and its key allies. just as importantly, to maintain

the power of the family regime. once the dear leader passed. so this book analyzes how the final years exacerbated the threats that north korea had and continued to pose to the region and to the nationstates with an interest in it. i didn't check all issues of a few key issues several of you would agree with me. what we are watching kim jong-il do today, what we have been watching kim jong-un do today, i'm sorry -- a script that was written for him before he took over. a script probably crafted by his father and his father sadr. we are not seeing anything

surprising to those of you who understand. i'm sure you agree with me on that. so the key things that i picked in my mind were north korea's evolving conventional military threat. i have a whole chapter that talks about this and how this revolves. the capabilities that they maintain and what they brought that they had not had before. that chapter is one on this subject where they take these capabilities and attacked the south. i also have a chapter on how the nuclear capabilities evolve during the last days of kim jong-il. love you here are probably

political scientists. this chapter doesn't hardly focus on the politics of north korea's nuclear program. instead, it focuses on what does north korea have. order the capabilities. how will north korea attack us if they decide to attack us. another chapter was the nonstate actors who engage in terrorism. that is to say terrorist activities. this was picked up in the kim jong-il regime particularly in the last few years or so.

i keep hearing people say that north korea should not be put back on the list because they know it is supporting terrorism, which is simply not true. in this chapter, i lay out the evidence for you all to see and i hope you will enjoy reading now. tied into all of that, including in the end, is the north korea in succession process and its chance for success. by analyzing these five factors, we will be able to understand how the government was able to function and present a threat to its neighbors and an attempt to guarantee the succession process. the plan that is conducted for this with current events.

this is part of the kim jong-il regime, moving into the first year and a half will help us to understand the reasons for what has been happening. more importantly, it will give us evidence to predict what what will happen in two to five years alone get into the meat of three. the freaky cat questions than it answered is how did the last year's effect after his death? how stable is north korea right now well, why did i pick 2009? happened in 2009? well, in 2008 kim jong-il had a stroke. he was pretty much out of it until january or february.

at the time he had a stroke, he also suffered from high blood pressure, kidney problems, and her problems. but other than that, he was okay. [laughter] despite all of this, he did not begin to receive succession process until 2009. so he just had joke. and i guess any talk about this session. it was very obvious to everyone thinks and there are a lot of you here that kim jong-il was not long for this world. so how did the military above? what did he do you that you'll probably see in the press. what of the things that bruce mentioned before i started.

for example, long-range artillery. ballistic missiles that are not long-range likes guns and special operations forces. we saw a lot of training going on. we saw an increase in the number of special operations forces and they actually, in 2006 converted a bunch of standard divisions to special operations forces. they took all the artillery and spread it out and made these guys unqualified and the whole bit. that is an example of north korea realizing what they had to do to make their military more capable in fighting today's warfare. the nuclear capabilities were pursued with high intensity. we saw this in december of 2012 when they launched a ballistic

missile platform so, that is just not true anymore. they have the platform and went through all three stages. and they did something that some of you may have friends that do. they wrapped this up during the cyberwarfare capabilities. so anyone who have friends who has tape on their glasses and etc., they stepped out. thousands of guys in very serious cyberwarfare attacks. on south korean government and business and press. and his website was actually attacked. very interesting stuff. it remained a key focus and i talked about that. artillery upgrades continue. because of all of us who study north korea, one of the key

things about a war between north and south korea is that a lot of people truly believe that seoul is held hostage by that. well, they are now developing even longer-range artillery in the areas south of there. spending continued to be focused on military capabilities of north korea. a lot of people. a lot of processed that it is more like 50%. this was massive throughout everything else that was going on.

what were the choices for success in 2009? why did he pick this guy was three years younger than my oldest daughter to run a country of 22.5 million people? now, why did he do that? well, he looks at north korea like he did at his first son. he was trying to get into tokyo, japan, on a fake passport. he has basically been living all

over places like europe and switzerland and hong kong and etc. the second song, according to kim jong-il's japanese chef, his second son was too much of a girlie man, his words, not mine, to be a leader in north korea. he is not much older than kim jong-un anyway. he has never served in the military, although he did have a poster of michael jordan up in his room and switzerland at school. then we saw those purges during the spring and summer of 2011. this was designed to build a power base.

so you conduct violent provocations, ready? well, in 2009, after we saw a lot of stuff we then saw in 2010 the sinking of the vote. and then we saw the special capabilities and pyongyang built up here twice asymmetric or not

it operates in shallow muddy waters off the coast of iran. ironically, it is a special operations force type of submarine. why would i call on artillery to attack this? well, most people, we have some former military guys here in the audience that would acknowledge that it is as good as american artillery. so why is this old soviet artillery able to attack this if they are not able to strike back as quickly as they want to. because the north koreans plan to take away for this and they were able to overwhelm them by

putting artillery right across the shore. both of this was related to kim jong-un with propaganda. somebody will have to explain to me how a guy who has never been in the military plans this summer in attack when they ran around and went off the coast of north and south korea. well, the i actually knew what he was doing. this is part of the propaganda

process that is what is needed to maintain his power in the nations. what else did he do to lay the groundwork for his son? i would also assert that he kept up the nuclear program that we saw a test of in february of this year. it seems like this test could have been a highly important uranium tests. we just don't know because this has been unclassified.

but we haven't seen any information that has definitively said one way or the other. but that is my great guest. now, collaborations, proliferations with the iranians was ongoing. it is stepped up as it is right now. hundreds of millions of dollars a year for missile programs and nuclear collaboration. conventional weapons is very important and it's important to point out that this was the dream of kim jong-il's son. and believe me, the north koreans see it that way. it is part of the dynastic process in north korea that this by the great leader has now been

carried on so i think that actually i wrote a chapter as i talked about this in my book where a layout capabilities that the north koreans have. it brings us right up to date in february of this year. it was more than what kim jong-il's data set has some out. this was probably the most enjoyable chapter of my book. they have proliferation to state and nonstate actors.

we have not seen a lot in the news about north korea supplying us. things like a chemical weapons facility, artillery. lots of stuff. it originally started in the cold war when north korea was bidding with the ussr. when they cut off their subsidies, they took those networks and they started using

those networks to set up these actors. so we have a lot of data and terrorist organizations that they have supported now, it is one of the best customers right up until this iraqi army drove them into the sea. hezbollah, the counterfeiting -- obviously the uranian republic. according to some sources that i couldn't verify, so i will put it out there, even al qaeda. sales and training and facilities. talking about hezbollah. they sell arms through syria and

they sell arms directly. i want to give you examples of all three of those in this chapter of the book. they also trained this and went back to north korea in 2007 after the world was trained by the recon bureau in north korea. it is one of the elite arms of the special operations forces. and it has to do with constructions of facilities. for example, they have miles long facilities that made it difficult during the 2006 war. this goes on today under kim jong-un. is it about ideology? it certainly doesn't hurt.

but these are highly profitable activities. this puts cash into the coffers of the elite in support of the military. that is what is really going on. so these are the kinds of things that were stepped up towards the end of the regime that we see going on today. so in 2010 we saw kim jong-un within weeks and all of these positions. but how did they set him up for that? well, he was appointed a vice chair of the central military commission and he was also given security services though it is not a senior position. at the same time, the younger members of the elite were in the key positions.

many of these people were no more experienced than kim jong-un. what does kim jong-un mean. by the way, my wife has the same name, jong-un. and she had her license plate with her name on it. and she wanted to know why people were honking at her. [laughter] but anyway. we must have a base just like the father and grandfather. he must have the support of 40 institutions. the security services and the byzantine inner kim jong-il's

family circle. this really is not some kind of weird nebulous. what this is is the sons and grandsons and great-grandsons of the people that came up with kim jong-il and the royalty. the way that the kim family regime works is it is not a hierarchical set up. now it is kim jong-un and it was kim jong-il.

so what are kim jong-un's chances of survival? well, he has all these things against them kim jong-il had 20 years to build a power base that i talked about. so he was in charge of running the army and security services and kim jong-un had none of these positions were experiences when he had the takeover. as my good friend, who i had lunch with today talked about, he said something to me about five years ago that i thought was very important. and that is that he is weaker than his father.

the next son will be weaker than kim jong-il. the question is how much weaker. it points to how long the regime can survive. and that is an issue. currently we have what some have called a caretaker government. we have hand-picked trusted advisors helping those up front as the face of the dprk. as i said on a radio show yesterday, those were institutions feed into kim jong-un. to what he tells them to do is exactly what they tell him to tell you to do. a nation is really the way that he is working right now.

no one has really control that government. that is always the way it has been. the government has never operated this way before. that means that the government is at its most unstable since 1948. well, since i gave you this depressing set of circumstances, what can we expect in the next two to five years? well, he will need time. they are really running in a different way even though they have a leader. they don't always have the judgment calls that they should be. if a crisis occurs, it could

cost the government to implode, explode, or fall into anarchy. so what are the negative scenarios? >> well, we have seen some of those. [laughter] well, some of the scenarios i would like to address because i talk about this in the book as well. and i think that that is highly unlikely because of the power of the security. it is one of the key institutions. security services spy on everyone and they spy on each other. if you are a general in the army, you are planning an exercise, is a guy from the general political bureau. so how many people here saw hunt for red october?

dear member there is a scene where sean connery has to kill his political officer before he can take this over? well, if you are in north korea, you have to kill two guys that are just overlooking their shoulders. and as bruce knows, within the power structure, the general political bureau guy has always been either the most powerful guy or one of the most powerful guys. it is because that is who the kim family has always trusted. so how about this. again, i think that this is unlikely because everyone is watching everyone else. but what about a civil war? well, this is possible because of the lack of control. it could just simply be that those around him don't have adequate control of the military when things start to splinter.

but the scenario that i think is most likely to happen, if it does, it is most likely to happen if kim jong-un does not consolidate power and they have not seen him completely do that yet. he is still in the buildup phase. this is something that we will watch in the coming months and years. so what if he consolidates his power over the next 18 months? well, if he is able to, it is possible that the government will stabilize. if stability is to occur, and this is important, it can only happen in the same model as kim jong-un and kim jong-il, in other words it is not going to happen easily. it's not possible under this

system. which is why a lot of you read the stuff that dave writes from georgetown. dave talked about the so-called economic reform the people were talking about that kim jong-un is talking about. why didn't happen? because in order to simply survive, kim jong-un must follow the same script as his father and great-grandfather. he can get off that script, or the government will collapse. thus following that script means continued provocations and continued nuclear weaponization and proliferation. continuing illicit activities and massive purges internally. and yes, we have seen all of that. all of that sends kim jong-un took over. the five to 50,000 people that are part of that inner circle.

they know that this is a dynastic government. do we have to have a guy from this family running the show. the question is, can he do it? and that is still a question that is unanswered. so that is my personal assessment. that kim jong-il has a 5050 chance of succeeding as leader of the dprk. the real answer is we do not know. we are guessing. and i think that that is still up in the air. if kim jong-un fails, the dprk fails. and i could will in turn result in a problem. the free world must plan accordingly. a collapsed north korea can sometimes mean a unified north korea under a liberal democracy.

in my mind, and i say this in the book, the worst scenario is that those who support him are actually able to survive and control the government and the country. this means the misery will just go on and on. i will stop there. [applause] >> would like to take questions? >> sure. >> a question that often comes up is to what degree is [inaudible] is he pursuing a policy that he wants to pursue? or have some argued that the north korean regime is having to do these publications because of the hard-liners in the military

security services? >> i think you know the answer to it already. but it's a very good question. you know, you and i have talked about this. people talk about the government of north korea as though it is the government of china. but it's not. no, you are this or succeed under and that is just the way it is. and so if north korea took a softer stance, it is because kim jong-il wanted it. did he suggest it? absolutely. will you die that you ended up in this. you know, it is a little bit different now because it has to be. the biggest problem is that he

doesn't know what he doesn't know. he doesn't have the background or experience to make these judgment calls on geopolitical decisions. that the leader of a nation has to make. he doesn't have that experience or background or judgment to deal with that. so i believe that he is taking this the best he can. i think he is taking a lot of advice and doing what a lot of people want besides just himself in running this government. because i think that right now it is a group that is helping him make those decisions. he knows that he is not able to make those decisions. that could change in three to five years when the government stabilizes. things may go back to the way they were. we will have to see. but right now his judgment is weak because of his lack of a

power. and because he just doesn't have the background of experience that his father did where the street credibility when he took over. does that answer your question? >> yes, it does. >> okay. >> there is a report that just came out the other day. it was from one of the japanese newspapers. the report quotes the sources in beijing that the chinese government has developed a contingency plan for bringing down kim jong-un and replacing them with the older brother. whether there is anything to this, i don't know that we can make a judgment.

but when you talk about this family circle of 50,000 north koreans, in your research, did you pick up any sense of how much of an inroad had the chinese made into this, and what kind of contacts that the chinese have with these people were other kinds of influence that they had with this family circle? a lot of them do go to china to buy their luxury goods and other things. they are more exposed to the chinese to some degree. >> you know, that is a great point. but certainly it is noted for being very close to china and

who knows if it is true or not. but they are sent it along with chinese officials. as you said, there are lots of others in the elite who they trust to go back and forth across the border and purchase luxury items in china and etc. i think that means inroads into the governmental infrastructure of north korea. i just haven't seen that. that could happen more so now that the government is weaker. it is much less stable than it was before. so they may be able to make some inroads. but as you know, both of them were very standoffish with the chinese. although they both went to beijing and did things. it will be interesting to see

how kim jong-un works with the chinese. i did read the report and the japanese press and i think it's very interesting. you and i both know about this. seems kind of out there that the north korean leaders are putting him as the next guy. i mean, i hate to put it in these words, but he has such a reputation as being a goofball, you know? and he has gone in the open presses and said horrible things about his father and his brothers. you just have to wonder if he's really the kind of guy that would be able to run those key institutions. i would think not. but nevertheless, never say never. if you and i had said that we would see a 29-year-old leader

in north korea drinking beer, i would've said that you were not. but look, here we are. it just doesn't seem very likely for now. does that make sense? >> yes, sir. >> we were talking about this with the russians in china. sometimes we think they are going to support the united states as well. >> i am sure you have seen a lot of the rhetoric that has been ongoing since about a month ago. the we can hit washington and no, they can't. the three stage missile that they tested can probably hit at

least, and it went through all three stages, it probably could at least hit alaska and hawaii and at best, the west coast of the united states. i think that is the range that most individuals agree upon. so they don't have anything to hit washington. as far as i know, putting a new comments, and they are just not there yet as far as i know. as my friends know, i always say that i don't make assessments based on a lack of evidence. i'm a former intel officer. the evidence right now says that there is a really good chance the north koreans could put a nuke on a missile. and that has a range of 1500 climbers, which means it could hit tokyo. that's about as far as i can see based on the evidence. so if they have a warhead, and that is what they tested, if

they can put it on a missile, the pakistanis already can do it. if the pakistanis can do that, they will work on that right up until the end. that is where they are at right now, i think. now, they may have some technology capabilities that we haven't seen in open sources yet. and if that is so, they are farther along. but everything else shows that they probably have the capability to put a nuke on a missile and hit japan. now, that is where they are at right now. and there is no hard proof of that either. it is just playing connect the dots and it looks where they are at. does that make sense to you? >> yes. >> and i actually walked the leader through that. here is the programs that they have with the pakistanis. here is where they are now. you can actually see why i

assessed how it is likely to have that capability. >> okay. thank you. >> a lot of times people are trying to downplay the threat. last time i checked, it was part of the united states. and also the west coast and the south koreans, when they dredged up parts of the missile, the minister of defense said that it could be assessed to hit the united states. and if we assessed today how they could do that, well, there is no indication that that is where it stops. you know, that they want to have that capability and it can threaten the entire united states. north korea's statements have been that we have miniaturize

and diversified warheads. so where they are today and where they will be next week or next month or next year can be very different. we know what path they are on. if hitting washington with a nuke is a-z, maybe with they want to get to this. >> okay. in the book i take that quote where he actually describes this. they found this and then they ran a simulation on it. they saw was, okay, one stage was essentially the north koreans that took technology that we said was too primitive to successfully launch this three stage missile.

i mean, they did it. we can't deny it anymore. but i would tell you, and again this was in the book, if north korea doesn't have a missile that can hit the washington dc area, doesn't mean that they couldn't do something like put a primitive plutonium bomb in a merchant ship, changing this and then failing that into more folk harbor and killing 80,000 people. that is a capability that they have right now, today, and that is a fact. that is not an assessment. i lay out that scenario and in the book as well. the north koreans are very good at doing asymmetric things like that. sometimes we are saying, gee, whiz, i never thought of that. something i thought about. are there other comments?

>> thank you for the presentation. we talked about the playbook that must've been followed. in the last few months, i think the alliance has not followed the playbook. and i think that we know the agreement has been signed to respond to provocations. and i think when a kinetic publication is assigned, i think south korea is going to respond precisely at the time you responded. at that point, we are really going to be off script with north korea. i think that the strength of the alliance is about as strong as it is right now. and that takes him off script. how do you think that is, when

we respond the way that we have the last 60 years, how is that in regards to the kim family decision making? >> very good stuff. let me get to some of the things that we talk about. we talk about the northern limit line. my good friend and mentor, bob collins, he said something at a conference three years ago it was very important. he said that since 1953, the u.s. alliance has been good at deterring force on force conflict on the korean pencil and we have not been very good at deterring provocations. that is something that our south korean allies said that enough is enough. we have been done with this. we are taking concrete measures. they changed the rule of engagement and they formed a new command. the northwest highlands command to give a two star general the

authority to instantly respond however he needs to respond. in other words, if he were to happen. he wouldn't have to call back at headquarters to get permission to send f-15s wherever they need to go north korea. he now has that authority and the rules of engagement have changed. so this is something that we know that he likes. the south koreans and the u.s. now have a counter provocation command plan, which honestly i don't have to look at since i don't have a clearance anymore. but they actually have a plan in supporting our allies in iraq. so i think you know what is happening right now, and one of the things i talk about is the fact that they are always taking in changing the tactics and procedures.

but the south korean imperialists and the american dogs are getting around these procedures. you know, as we have seen in the past, in 1999 south korea and north korea get involved in naval battles and they started off with two ships ramming each other and the next thing you know a north korean guy fires at us and they just went crazy. essentially they sink the ship and the north koreans waited three years and they sink a south korean ship just for revenge. that is the way the north korean government operates. in 2009, there was another incident where a north korean ship cargo after a south korean ship only they were ready this

time for about 4500 rounds. 4500 rounds into the north koreans ship and they had its hadn't sink on the way back. 2010 they attacked a south korean ship. so if everything goes according to our plan and they try something, you can bet. there will be payback later. that is what i think. i think as long as there is a north korea and the dprk, we will see this constant boom. it is never going to stop. does that make sense? >> just. >> are there any other questions? okay. thank you for coming. >> booktv is on facebook.

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states is a world power today at 7:00 p.m. eastern, part of booktv this weekend. >> were you reading this summer? booktv would like to know. >> two books. the first is by hedrick smith. and it is entitled who stole america. and it is a real eye opener. anyone who really wants to understand america and how we got where we are today, why the average american is struggling the way they are, i think that this is one of the most thoughtful, and as i said, eye-opening reads that i have read in a long time.

i have listened to it before and i would highly recommend the book. obviously what policies can be drawn from this, what have we learned in the last 30 to 40 years that may have contributed to this and where do we go from here. so it is highly relevant as well. the second book that i've read is a rather small one. but i think it's wonderfully inquisitive and instructive. it is called ever ancient, ever new and it is written by john quinn with the great american intellectuals and it studies the structures of the catholic church and how best to reform

them. it is a very large bureaucracy and we very often ask why is it the way that it is and how can we do this better. i think that all institutions can and should go through the reforms. this is a very thoughtful book. it is an addition to many other books that we have written and published. and this has to do with the former archbishop emeritus of san francisco. >> let us know what you are reading this summer. we us at booktv and post on our facebook page or send us an e-mail at booktv@c-span.org. >> you're watching booktv on c-span2. here is our lineup for prime

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