>> thank you, senator. i'm showing now the explosion hazard from that epa issued in which he warns that a fire involving ammonium nitrate in an enclosed space could lead to an explosion. >> wendy did you that? >> december 1997. >> okay.

you haven't issued an alert since 1997. don't you think would be a good thing since we have now seen what has happened? this adds even more impact to the fact that you have done nothing in terms of your risk management plan. if you knew way back then even before 2002. so you're reading to me and taking credit for something that happened in the last century? we are in this century. i would like to see a new alert, a new guidance. is that something you look at, mr. breen, and report back to me on? >> senator, naturally we would like to keep you up-to-date on all -- >> no, no. i'm not asking up to date. would you consider issuing an updated alerts, since that one is from the last century, and we've had many accidents since then, a new alert and a new guidance? a guidance. and then potentially a rule?

>> so, senator, i don't want to leave you with a mission impression. this alert was posted on a website, and continues to be vital -- >> and you think it's adequate after what is all these years? my status is inadequate. >> what we would like to do is to understand the ways it's inadequate. and as part of a panoply of making sure events like west, texas, geismar, louisiana don't happen again. >> and alert the goes back to 1996. one would think technologies have changed just a bit since then, and there are other ways that we can guide people on how best to avert disasters before there's a rules change. so i'm going to stop now but i want to just say, express with my clear disappointment in your defense of testimony, you are looking back, not looking forward. you are defending nonaction and

some alert that was put up in 1996. and i feel that epa has to step up to the plate here and do a lot more. and i will talk to my ranking member after this hearing. he may not agree with me on this, he may, but i do plan to oversee what you're going to do. and that means a large, guidance, rulemaking. and i would turn to my code. >> thank you, madam chair. mr. chairman, following the tragic incident in geismar, we talked on the phone and you were very richest to act very, very quickly, and that that folks on the scene. can you give me a quick update on that particular investigation? >> yes, senator. we have deployed with an investigating team there. we have engaged a number of

consultants, especially structural engineers. we have concern about the safety of the people that have to enter that has to look at the specific site of the explosion. we customarily don't enter until the structural engineer tells us it is safe because there is still hanging debris in the place. in the meantime, we are taking views with common you know, by taking photographs, aerial photographs of the site. we have interview close to 14 people that have been witness, direct witnesses of what happened. and we are preparing to enter the place in immediately that our safety engineer tell will be safe to do it. but we are at this time mostly engaged in on into thing people on the site. >> okay. thank you, mr. chairman. it's also come to my attention

that epa has recently tried to subpoena information from csv -- csb and even csb investigators themselves in order to help epa in their enforcement actions. now, i'm concerned about this because congress from the get-go have separated those two roles, and i'm concerned about it because you basically, csb basically relies on cooperation with the site in question, the company in question. and if epa is going to subpoena everything you get, i'm guessing you're going to get less cooperation, you're going to get less documents and information and that's going to hamper you're doing your job. can you elaborate on your concerns about this attempt by epa? >> yes, senator. we, known in these catastrophes,

we conduct part of investigation with our sister agencies in the federal government and local government. for the issue of our witnesses we base our work mostly in what he witness will tell us in good faith, that was their experience before the accident. but we believe very strongly that workers and managers should be allowed to tell the truth to the csb on these accidents without fear of retaliation or persecution. we are focusing on conducting a safety investigation that is to find out the house and the wise to have something happen. and we want that to be, a study will reconsider yours as important as the other focus that other agencies are investigating. i mean, their goals are different than articles, but we

believe that both goals of finding out law enforcement, and our goal of finding the root causes of the accidents are just as important, and we should be able to work together i think this information. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and mr. breen, let me turn to you with the same question. this really does concern me because i think it fundamentally threatens csb's ability to do its job and thereby prevent future accidents. in its february letter, chairman barrasso road quote it is our belief that epa should use its own staff resources and authorities in conducting civil and criminal investigations, rather than to seek the wholesale repurchasing of the csb investigative record. and he went on to cite that epa has more than 100 times as many employees and more than 750 times the budget of the chemical

safety board. can you respond to these concerns? >> only partially, senator. the department of justice would have an important role in in response, and i cannot represent what the criminal division or other parts of the department of justice would say to these issues. figure of uncle tobacco and firearms is part of the department of justice as well. i can share with you, senator, that -- >> if i could just interrupt and i will certainly let you finish however you want, but the department of justice would not be trying to subpoena csb stuff on behalf of the epa and the epa were asking him to do that. so sort of pointing to your lawyer as -- is an efficient their why is it epa's policy to subpoena cs these documents and investigators when that is a

different type of investigation fundamentally? and also when it depends on cooperation, which in my opinion these actions are going to shut down. >> senator, cooperation is important in this regard, and there are important simple as was important criminal needs to be met in the investigation. perhaps more than ought to be said in an open hearing, and if you would like we could ask representatives of the criminal program to come brief you or your staff. >> well, i would like that, number one but never do, i see no reason why we can't talk about it in public. and number three, i'm not trying to prevent you from slowing down any come in terms of any enforcement action, or justice, including a criminal action, if it's appropriate. but that has to be separate. and once you start sateen csb's -- subpoenaing sees these documents and witnesses, they

depend on cooperation. that's 95% of their ability to do their job. you're going to shut it down. >> thank you, senator. again, cooperation until approach is important and will be happy to fill you in more fully when we are able to. >> i will certainly follow up on the. i don't understand what you're not able to this morning. that's all i have. >> thank you, senator boxer. mr. chairman, in your testimony you mentioned the recent investigations have quote further taxed the csb's already overstretched staffing and resources, and that you're facing a backlog of cases to investigate. can you tell me how you prioritize your work, and what can be done to ensure that the use of csb's limited resources result in maximum safety improvements? >> thank you, senator.

when i started my job at csb, as chair in 2010, i was faced with a backlog of 20 to investigations that were already in the pipeline. we have added at least five major ones during my stay, and we're finished nine, and currently our backlog is 15 investigations. congress frequently calls on the csb to investigate root causes, some of the most complex tragedy and social actions in u.s. for example, the water horizon is in the pipeline. chevron, we finished our report, and you know, in the last two months we have the request to deploy out west and that williams. that this is a really ripple effect on all investigation. we have to move the teams that

are curly working, on finishing a report, to deploy infield to start a new one. we believe that the situation is that i must tell this committee that when the next a serious accident comes along in the near future, and believe me, they are coming, we will not be able to have the resources to deploy. >> can you tell me how you prioritize? do you take it by the dates that they occur, by the chemicals that are involved, by the number of fatalities, the destruction that takes place? how do you prioritize which accidents you are going to move to the? >> yes. we have a department that takes care of evaluating the incidents that are constantly being

monitored in in the databases. they have developed an algorithm by which you determine based on the consequences of the accident if we can classify them as major, medium, or minor. what concerns us is basically whether a statute is called us to do, that is to look at accidents that cause fatalities, that caused people to go to hospitals, that cause destruction in the environment and in the communities. and that will be applicable and could be able to generalize to a sector so we can learn something out of them so we can develop recommendations for prevention of further accidents to happen this way. so once we gather all this

information in a particular incident, we meet in our headquarters with all the department heads and we get all the inputs, look at the algorithm, look at how it's been classified, and they would make a decision of deployment. >> on all of the investigations, do you make recommendations on safety improvements? >> yes. we make recommendations to a number of stakeholders. we make recommendations to the company itself, to the sector with the company belongs to. we make recommendations also deregulatory agencies when we feel that the particular regulations have not been enough to prevent what has happened. we make recommendations especially to osha and epa. we also made recommendations to the private organizations that establish guidelines for safety, like the national fire protection association, the

american petroleum institute and other institutions like that. >> and these are just recommendations and guidelines. are the any teeth in the? >> we believe they do have some teeth. we have established in our organization a recommendations department, and their job is not going to formulate this recommendations, but to follow up with a very specific system that we have to find out what is the action that is being taken. we send 180 days of letter in which we ask the estate -- the stakeholders, that we make the recommendations, say what is the recommendation am asking them what specific actions are going to be taking in the period. and these are public letters, public information, and we use that information basically to be sure that our recommendations is also answered in public by the

receivers of our recommendations. and as you can see, we have a very good, or tracking record tell us that over 70% of what we have recommended has been acted upon in a way that we are have declared the recommendations closed and acceptable. >> also, mr. chairman, in your written testimony you state that quote the csb has had a number of discussions with the fertilizer industry representatives since april 17, including officials from the fertilizer institute and the agriculture retailers association. we believe the industry has a strong and sincere interest in learning from the tragedy in west, and taken steps to prevent future incidents involving ammonium nitrate, including the development of new audit tools and product stewardship programs, end quote. can you please elaborate on this part of your statement? and what role do you see

industry led initiatives have in advancing chemical safety? >> we have conversations with the fertilizer institute and the agricultural association on this issue. normally these are the ones are going to determine for the affiliates what is the state-of-the-art for issues of safety. we have learned that for the prevention of future actions is very useful that they be, that they understand and embrace the issue of safety. and we find out the the fertilizer institute and agricultural associations to programs and, of course, they are similarly interested on the particular situation to prevent this from happening. i would like to add this complement, the effort that should be done at the level of the federal government and the state organizations.

because even though we applaud their programs, volunteer programs by themselves are not substitute for eventually having regulations. >> do you feel you have a good working relationship though with the private industry and trying to reach better safety requirements? >> i believe we do. i believe we do. we have discussion with the fertilizer institute in which they have described to us to programs that they have, and we are encouraging them, they want very much to see the results of our investigation and they are very positive about supporting the work that we are doing. so yes with a very good relationship with him. >> thank you. also in your testimony regarding west fertilizer, you state that no manufacturing a guard at the site, only blending of fertilizers for retail customers. can you tell us, maybe better

explain what the difference is between manufacturing and blending of fertilizer and? >> yes. manufacturing of a chemical is done in a chemical plant in which you have reactors and you have a system by which he used raw materials to come out with their prototype, chemical product like in the state would be ammonium nitrate. you have to use ammonia as raw material. judges nitrd acid and if so, it's a chemical process. that is not what was happening in west. the finalized product that was already being classified as a fertilizer. they received it by train and they will storage in a storage place and from that storage place in both form it was storage, it was sold to farmers from the region that come to get

the amounts they need for planting. so basic with the operation was is a disillusioned center of a already finalized product. >> i would assume you would have different recommendations for regulations on the chemical process and the storage process, is that correct a? >> yeah, it is correct. when you store substantial amount of a chemical, and oxidizer like ammonium nitrate, that are specific recommendations about a should be done safely. the key issue is that you have to avoid a fire hazard by all possible means. because fire is one of the components that could make a chemical detonate. not by fire itself. >> sorry, i'm sorry but because we're running out of time we don't want to short the other

panel. spit thank you so much. >> i would have to stop the questioning of this bill. we're going to move forward. senator barrasso, we run out of time here, took on a heavy lead off the questions of the next panel, is that all right with you? unless you like to make a five minute statement now. >> madam chairman, i could limit myself to the five limits. limits. >> go right ahead. >> thank you, madam chair. i'm pleased you're having this hearing. i would like to say my home state of wyoming is a large consume and use of ammonium nitrate, a chemical oxidizer that was a care in west, texas, accident, my income is in wyoming is one and a half billion pounds of ammonium nitrate each year in places like powder river beijing to extract coal. at these money sites ammonium nitrate is mixed with fuel oil, pumpkin poured into the blessed hope which is fitted with an initiation system. this is what explosion rocked

out of the way something difficult through this process. wyoming and other mining states can provide essential building materials and afford what energy for families can small businesses across the country. ammonium nitrate was not always the chemical used to do this work. in the past nitroglycerin-based explosives were used which were less safe and lead to accidents and cost lives. madam chair, i would recommend your book, we go to the mansfield room for our leadership lunches but usually it into democrat in the senate and had a history as a money. money. you go to this committee talk to working with nitroglycerin through his entire career they would always say to mike, tap it lie because you don't want to tap into art and cause the significant trees. the transition to ammonium nitrate from niger glsen has produced a nearly safer products. today, ammonium nitrate comprises at least 90% of all commercial explosive material in the use of ammonium nitrate is

so pervasive that there is no viable substitute for the chemical explosives industry. sight of a couple of questions but i said have some time left. and the first two, mr. moure-eraso, you referenced a series of past events were ammonium nitrate was involved in the explosions in texas as was in france in 2001. isn't it true that the type of ammonium nitrate involved in the 1947 texas city tragedy to talk about is vastly different than the type manufactured today? simply yes or no? >> [inaudible] >> about was exactly the chemical composition of the texas city. and we are waiting for the data on west. we still don't have -- >> with regard to the one in france isn't true the ammonium nitrate involved in the explosion was contaminated? >> i couldn't tell you, sorry. >> in the 1974 ruling osha ruled

to ensure a safe family and storage of ammonium nitrate, auditing examples of accidental destinations of ammonium nitrate were ammonium nitrate was handled and stored in compliance with the rules? rules? if they didn't properly within the rules? >> i am not aware of the answer. >> thank you. mr. breen, does the epa have enough personnel and inspectors to police the facilities like the west fertilizer company if ammonium nitrate was included under risk management plan as some have advocated? we take look at some of these reports it sounds like there's about 12,800 different facilities which might then be covered if we went and expanded this? right now you're looking at about 500 a year. i don't how many more facilities you would have to inspect each year, and do you have the personnel to do that, what would the cost be? >> the president fy '14 budget asks for additional funding for this program, and that would allow additional inspectors as

well. >> how many more do you think would have to go from 500 a year to -- >> the number of inspections? i don't have an answer. >> thank you, madam chair. >> thank you. what we're talking that is the way to safety store ammonium nitrate. that's my perspective. we want to thank the panel. i just want to say to the epa, i'm going to be working with you much more than you would like. we need to do better than point to an alert that was written in 1997. i've looked up, many states have moved beyond that type of an alert. many states have guidance, many other countries have guidance. and would like to put in the record at june 2013 editorial in the nebraska the journal star that cause on epa to update your risk management plans to ensure that this type of potential explosive is stored safely.

this is not seem to me, you know, an unsolvable problem. we've seen what happens when it's not stored correctly. let's fix it, and you have the tools, sir, and we're going to work with you. and if we have to, against you. coming, i don't want you but if we can't work with you we will have to, you know, make sure this happens. we are going to make sure that this alert is updated, that this guidance is updated, and that you look at perhaps a rules change so that what, what senator barrasso says is accurate, that this is used but this is used but it is used safely. thank you very much. we will call of our next panel. we are sorry it took so long to get you up here, but we're going to give you each five minutes and then i'll turn to senator vitter first to question, because he had the tragedy most recently in his state. so mr. randall sawyer, mr. rick

webre, mr. paul our room, dr. sam mannan, mr. kim lybarger. excuse me if i have not pronounced your name correctly. i think are going to do, if you cut down for minutes, that would be far better because then we'll have some time to question. so let's get started as you are seeing ongoing have to just move forward. so mr. randall sawyer, i am so honored you're here. you are the chief environmental health and hazmat officer in contra costa county, a large county in california, and one that has some of these countries in the. so very pleased you're here. please go ahead. >> thank you, chairman boxer, ranking member vitter. thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing. as know, my name is randy sawyer

and i am the contra costa county chicken farm and to help and has just materials officer. contra costa county is a safer place to work and live because of the actions taken by the citizens of the county, the counties with supervisors, the united steelworkers local you know, as the two programs debt and the regulated industry. the safety culture of the between refunds and chemical the sulleys after medical over the last 15 years. contra costa county is located and the san francisco bay estuary. is home to forfeit from refineries and so small to medium chemical facilities. in the 1990s there were many chemical accidents and releases. some of which cause of death and injury of workers and impacted commuters, causing the public to seek medical attention. as a result, to accidents were taken to does the accidents and concerns raised by the community and the county's board of supervisors. first, the most integrated -- and second was an implementation of the most encompassing

accidental release prevented program in the country. industrial safety ordinance was adopted by the county and the city of richmond. international safety ordinance requirements go beyond those required by the risk management and federal osha process safety management programs. international safety ordinance requires regulated -- to consider a nearly safer alternatives, perform root cause noses as part of their accident incident investigation programs, perform human factors analysis and performance safety culture assessment at least once every five years. the contra costa health services hazards mrs. programs engineers have expressed in performing audits of the relay performances at least once every three years. these audits may take five engineers for weeks to perform and maybe the most thorough audits in the country. the results of the change, the result of these actions as a change in what and history does business in contra costa county. in addition to putting safeguards in place they're also looking at how to avoid hazards altogether.

as result from a 1999 to august 2012 was not an accidental release from regular source that had a major impact in the surrounding community or cause serious injury or death of the rated sources work appeared on october 6, 22, the chevron richmond had a major corporate more than 15,000 people sought medical attention. five different investigations were formed, issue 25 citations with 11 be willful, 12 being serious and find someone $963,200. chevron issued their investigation report on april 12. investigations are ongoing to the chemical safety and hazard investigation board issued an interim report on april 9 teamed -- april 19. the state of california, and the u.s. cpa. contra costa county and the city of richmond are working together to address these recommendations

and is a process of modifying international safety ordinance. the chemical safety and hazard investigation board plants have a final report issued by the end of this year with additional recommendation. the selection of third party will occur next week and is expected to work will begin in august. governor bredesen established a task force to look at the refinery safety and the task force up and a report in july. the committee system has been a dramatic positive impact on refinery and the chemical the sulleys safety and contra costa county that has resulted in reduced accidents. last year's incident at chevron richmond underscores the need for continued vigilance around these efforts to prevent such occurrence and continue the overall trend towards a safer, work environment of employers at the from refineries and chemical plants and secretaries for our citizens to live. thank you. >> thank you so much. and thank you for taking action to protect my constituents.

and clearly you just can't sit back and wait for epa. that's obvious. so thank you. >> you're welcome. mr. rick webre. would you like to introduce him, david? >> sure. i began to in my opening. rick webre is director of the ascension parish office of homeland security and emergency preparedness. if there's any good news about the two incidents there, it is that the response after the horrible accidents seemed to go really well, be very, very well coordinated. that's not by accident but it's because of a lot of work and practice. and so mr. webre, thanks for your service and welcome. >> thank you. madam chairman, senator vitter, pritchett opportunity to testify. i understand the purpose of this thing is to conduct oversight of federal programs addressing chemical threats. my job is at the local level of government so i will provide

insight from a local emergency management perspective. emergency managers perform the coronation efforts for all hazards within their jurisdiction, better chemical threats are all in one of these hazards. they coordinate and plan to local emergency planning committee, ma mandated by the emergency planning and community right-to-know act of 1986. a well managed le pc is one of the most critical functions teddy kennedy can perform to prevent and mitigate them respond and recover from an industrial incident. i cannot emphasize enough that all disasters are initial local. federal legislation governing chemical threats are unfunded mandates that are written at a strategic level of management that are interpreted operation at the state level of the government. unfortunately, in many cases the tactical court at the local level of government is either overlooked or not well enforced. i believe that these federal laws are not well enforced for the following reasons. one is a lack of formal training

and education for emergency managers in overseeing the lepc is nearly nonexistent. chairing the lepc should be the responsibility of the duly appointed local emergency manager at the county level of government and should never be assigned to any other entity or the chemical industry. there are no consequences of state or local government choose not to enforce our pole in force the mandates when lepc. the federal mandate to plan and courtney with industry at the local level of government is unfunded. funding that is available to local governments the federal grants in many cases working at the state level of government. filing they said could assist in managing and emergency management office and according with industry are at times retained at the state level of government. metrics or standards do not exist in determining the performance level of an lepc or serc. for over a decade and homeland security doctrine has been drafted and cynically changed

emerging management environment in this country. however, none of us who the u.s. department of transportation, coming really and pipeline incidents for any element of the epcra law. i believe because of the new federal doctrine much less emphasis has been place on the epcra and the other pc. i don't believe more legislation is required. i believe that the state and federal legislation regarding chemical facilities, pipeline and really incidents need to be compared, assessed, and the conflicted. instruction to first spot in the chemical incident must be pretty dumb and for sympathy. complexity can result in poor performance on seeing. my staff is a very complex emergency operation plans which are excellent documents for training and planning and resourcing but they're almost useless during an incident or creating one common operating picture between the chemical industry and the 911 center, emergency operation center, and the first responders on seeing is absolutely critical for a

simple two-page site-specific plan can contain the critical data that is needed. i cannot express how important the radio communications layer is are in an incident. there are 33 chemical facilities within our jurisdiction and each of them possess a radio capable of committee director with the 911 center, emergency operation center, and the first responders on the ground. they came into a river into state visit by and i mentioned earlier, ma and this is what i refer to as one, operator in the picture. numbers could have been accomplished without having a strong lepc in place. our local chemical industry has been absently in snow and courtney with the lepc, as well as funding and managing the essential emergency response committee and the association. between these two organizations they fund in making the committee cyber incident come to for the cost of a reverse 911 system, manage public outrage at the nearest, for the new site population, fred mutual aid across a three county jurisdiction and manage the

installation of our emergency radios. i've been in my position for seven years. before june 2013 we expense only to get a emergencies resulting in zero fatalities and injuries. two weeks ago we experience to get a emergencies in today's. resulting in three fatalities. and over 100 injuries to chemical workers. no other injuries were sustained by first responders or the general public, and no damage was reported to adjacent critical infrastructure. i can to reduce a large part to the belly of the first responder community and the chemical industry being able to operate effectively under a unified unid command. isamu time's up and my recommendations, madam chairman come was included in my written testimony. >> tank is a very much, mr. webre. mr. pallone, consultant, coalition to prevent chemical disasters. welcome. >> did more to my name is paul orrin and i think the quickly

opportunity to present views important to a broad coalition of environmental health and labor, and committee or decisions. i've worked 25 years in government information policy on hazardous materials from the community perspective. we all know what happened in texas and the chemical plant incidents are common. i'll depart for my written test matches for three over all points. first, the explosion at west fertilizer was preventable. second, prevention is ultimately always more effective than response. and third, epa should be using existing authorities to do more to prevent these incidents. i hope we can agree on the need for better public protections. returning to the specifics as listed in my written testimony, first, risk management planning should include reactive chemicals like the ammonium nitrate that detonated at west fertilizer with our strict potential harm to the public, reactive chemical should be included in risk management plans which is after all the program designed to cover such

hazards. and has been of the chemical safety board in fact has an open recommendation to epa to do this. second, management systems and controls do fail. this seems monday but we should plan on a. this goes to senator barrasso's point about rules and regulations we should plan on failures. the chemical companies should be held responsible not only to understand their own hazards but also to understand less hazardous alternatives are available in the industry. surveys show that risk management planning props some congress to remove avoidable hazards and there are examples in my written testimony. epa should better incorporate methods that prevent potential consequences into risk management planning. 30/10 explosion in texas illustrates the importance of the clean air ask general duty to operate safely. west fertilizer was subject to an incomplete patchwork of regulations come the general duty holders responsible,

regardless of the completeness or incompleteness of government actions. we would strongly oppose restricting the general duty and ways that could hamper prevention of forthcoming emergency planning notification is incomplete. the ammonium nitrate that exploded in texas was not on the list of substances that require emergency planning notification. this is epcra 302. these notifications are only the starting point for emergency planning and don't guarantee follow-up. nonetheless, epa should make sure that this list is more complete. fifth, epcra inventory reporting, this is section 312, is valuable but insufficient. west fertilizer did report ammonium nitrate to the state of texas in a cute -- in a tier two report. however, subreport on chemical inventory is not sufficient. we need to get from providing information to assuring negation. there should be fee-based programs to support prevention,

pre-fire plan, inspection, drills, and hazmat training for first responders. sixth, independent investigations are important to the chemical safety board provide credible public information and focus recommendations for change. when we hear about barriers to investigations such as site access and preservation, we think they should be resolved. a couple of quick issues beyond epcra and the clean air act. schools and nursing homes shouldn't be in potential blast zones. state and local planners could benefit from federal guidance for safe setbacks. site criteria for federal funded projects should take into account proximity to hazards here and then finally hazardous chemical operations shouldn't be underinsured. in some become sustained improvement is long-term and evolves our range of actions, not any one thing. but among the immediate lessons from the recent explosion of the need for epa to make sure that major recognize hazards first are included in programs

designed to address them, second, are subject to safer alternatives analysis by companies that hold them, and third, that are covered by appropriate list and thresholds, and by the general duty to operate safety. thanks for the opportunity to testify. i would be glad to take any questions. >> think very much. and next we go to dr. sam mannan, regents professor and director, mary kay o'connor process safety center, texas a&m. >> good morning, chairman boxer, ranking member vitter, and other distinction numbers of the committee. my name is sam money and hundred of the mary kay o'connor process safety center and regents professor at texas a&m university. the center seeks to develop safer processes, equipment, procedures and management strategies that would minimize losses in the chemical process industries. the opinions presented during this hearing represent my personal position on these

issues. risk management and emergency planning programs to prevent and address typical threats are of extreme imports for the protection of the workforce, public and environment. these programs are also of great importance for the u.s. national economy and security. so, wish we do in of the incident in west, texas, and geismar, louisiana? i believe that before we start looking at new regulations, revising regulations, we owe it to ourselves to determine if existing regulations in the books are being animated and enforce in a comprehensive and universal manner. as i've elaborate in my written report, i don't think we are currently doing that. that is, enforcing existing regulations to our comprehensive plan of inspections and audits. i had made a total of nine recommendations in my written the port, but i will address a few of those. i sincerely believe that the

establishment of the national chemical incidents surveillance system is essential. there is presently no, we level means for evaluating her formative industry and limiting the number of severity of accidental chemical releases. i strongly urge congress to mandate a risk-based data to determine the hazards and risks and develop a regulatory map of hazardous materials oversight. is there should take into consideration types of facilities, their locations, chemicals involved and the quantities in order to determine what agencies do or do not regulate these facilities. all federal agencies with responsibly to regulate safety and risk, and associated issues, should be required to conduct a comprehensive screening to determine the regulatory landscape. that is, create an exhaustive list of facilities covered by their respective regulations. once the regulatory landscape is

determined, each federal agency should be charged with developing a plan and schedule for ensuring compliance through regular inspections. congress should consider directing federal agencies to create verifiable and certifiable third party auditing and inspection systems. this approach has worked for certifications and other programs. that are market-based approaches through which this regime can be implemented without causing a major burden on the radio to authority or the regulated committee. i urge congress to look into ways to utilize the local emergency planning to make framework and a much were effective may. i urge congress to look into ways -- to improve and enforce risk-based zoning and land-use planning. in summary, i applaud congress for providing leadership in this important area of risk management and emergency planning programs, to prevent and address chemical threats. we have made a lot of progress in moving forward to overcome

the challenges we face in using chemicals to improve our lives without hurting the industry employees, the public or the environment. we all can agree that chemicals to improve our lives and also can agree that they can hurt us, too. and as i've often said, if we do not do the right things, they can basis -- make us extinct as will pick this is a servicemen and a please the people at the highest level of government are involved in looking into this matter. thank you for inviting me to present my opinions. i would be happy to add to any questions. >> thank you. and then we call on last but not least mr. kim -- say for me. spent its kim nibarger. >> mr. nibarger s. health and safety specialist at united steelworkers international uni union. >> chairman boxer, ranking member vitter, and members of the committee can think for the opportunity to testify at the hearing. we represent the majority of

organized workers in the patrick chemical industry as well as hundreds of thousands of workers who use chemicals on the job. i worked at a west coast oil refinery for 17 years. first come of it like to point out that the two events under discussion, explosion at the west, texas, fertilizer plant and the williams chemical facility are in no way isolated incidents. and also in april of this year, 12 workers were burned at the exxon mobil refinery, two of whom subsequently died from injuries. later that month, aid workers were sent to the hospital after an explosion and fire at the chevron port arthur refinery and on this past monday an explosion at a fertilizer plant in indiana killed one person. since 2008 the oss reported an average of over 45 fires a year. so far 2013 acres right on track with 22 fires through the 21st of june. these are industries self-reported and do not include many small fires that are members bring to our attention. it also does not include oil

rigs, pipelines or storage terminal five and does not include chemical plants. these sometimes dead and potential catastrophic events take place all too often in this interest you. the first responsibility after tragic is that the safety of their employees is the top rudy. the widowed wives and husbands, children left without a father or mother may feel differently. more must be done to prevent these types of incidents from occurring in the first place. the regulatory process relies on much self reporting which, in essence, allows industry to self regulate. asking in the november 2012 epa risk management inspection at the exxon mobil facility in baton rouge, the company had never done a compliance audit for risk management planning, although is required to be done every three years. in order to assess a compliance, the epa reviewed the audience what they had conducted since they were similar. the epa evaluates found not on whether requirement elements missing but if it were an

element was addressed, the company did not follow the appropriate procedures and practices. one of the problems of the process safety net stand which governs the health and safety of facilities using a specified album of highly hazardous chemicals is that it is performance-based. the standard tells you what to do but how it is done is left up to the company. this is necessary to a degree in that it allows the employer to bring in new technology or what is termed recognize into accepted good engineering practices, or ragagep, to make improvements under the standard. but what we typically see our employers writing on past practices that this was ragagep at the time it was put in place a we don't need to upgrade it now. osha is underfunded and understaffed. the process safety management standard requires considerable technical expertise to enforce and there are not enough adequately trained compliance officers to address the gsm coverage sites as is the case with rmp under epa.

the process safety management standard itself is written to require certain plans but there's a requirement that these plans be good. only that certain items the address. for example, in moc, meets the rate of tory compliance if it is done. to all you need is a check sheet or a checklist. we also hear that workers have stop work authority, that if they identify an unsafe condition they can stop the work until it is, until it is deemed safe to continue. i was not the case for our members at the chevron richmond refinery in california. workers want to take the unit that caught fire off line were overruled. while as workers where the authority, we certainly do not have the power. this is a fallacy and talking about the safety culture. it's based on a harmonized model. without the power, the authority means nothing. while the complete about the lack of regulatory involvement, what about the company's responsibility to act? when the leak was discovered at chevron, the decision should of been made to shut the unit down

based on material and volume. to maintain the idea that it is safer to operate the unit with a hole in the park, which is not going to get better, then shut you down is absurd. if that is the case we need to take a series look at your opera and procedures and parameters. calling this type of operational, operation risk-based management is not managing the risk at all but it is just taking a risk. thank you again for the opportunity to raise some fears workers have about the state of process safety in the petrochemical industry. >> thank you. it was very well said. i'm going to ask senator vitter to lead off with a question, and i will follow and we will finish in time to vote. >> thank you all again for your work and your testimony. mr. webre, based on the recent ascension parish incidents, you all have demonstrated that the emergency preparedness after the fact is first rate. how do you coordinate and integrate your emergency management system with all of

your emergency response organizations and social services and volunteers? and specifically, what has been your expense with the local chemical industry and their engagement with the local emergency planning committee? >> the key to make it successful is to have a robust lep seat. and within its all about purses by the committee, fire, ems, law enforcement to mutations as well as the chemical industry. it's looking at our risk assessments and was the most probable from both risk assessment within -- not just the chemical industry. we look at it from an all-hazards perspective. as far as the reaction from the chemical industry, they have been instrumental in supporting us. i mean, alerting and warning signs, they pay and maintain. the kerry committee help fund, i can go on and on about some the things, hazmat team that supported us on.

i've never met one of the plant managers are one of, any of the chemical workers that wasn't going to support the others but they want to do the right thing. they live in our community and to have support us 100%. >> great, think you. and mr. mindy kim one concern i have -- dr. mannan tim wilkinson i have when something horrible like this happens is it is used and abused quite frankly to advance some pre-existing agenda. that doesn't really relate to what ever happened. so with that in mind i want to ask you about an issue that certainly comes up here, may come up again, currently safer technology. would it have prevented the incidents and explosions in west, texas, or in ascension parish, louisiana? >> just because i'm occupying

the seat that the epa administrator was sitting on doesn't mean that it's still the hot seat. but i appreciate your question, and i think it's a very important question to look at. inherently safer technology, there's no question that that is something that should be looked at, something that should be evaluated. but i am still as i testified before on other committees in congress, i'm still not sure that inherent safety as regulation is a good thing to do because you got to understand this is not a technology that you just take off the shelf and implement. and there are lots of opportunities for unintended consequences to occur, like risk transfers, accumulation, and things like that. having said that, exactly what it would have done in the case of west or geismar, i think we

have to wait and see what the actual root causes and investigations indicate. i know a little bit more about west, because we been looking into that much more closely. i can tell you this, that they recovered by osha 190 if you look at osha 109, a let of those requirements that are in their own if they had followed that, my guess is the probability of this would've been almost none. and if you think about it, what would ist have caused them to do. well, naturally they could've looked for alternate chemicals. that's a possibility come and we should always look at that. they could've looked at the issue of contamination and all of that. but my point is if any of that is put in, the ultimate issue still comes down to enforcement.

and into we come up with a regime where we are doing the enforcement, comprehensively, in a manner that yields good results, we are not accomplishing anything. we just add another legislation that doesn't get enforced. >> right. thank you all very much. >> thank you. the vote started at 11:35. i'm going to do my question and if this timeframe left i will ask senator boozman. does anyone disagree with what i'm about to say? so listen carefully. and if you disagree, please speak up. if you prevent ammonium nitrate from being exposed to fire, wouldn't that be an obvious safety measure? so would you agree that if you just, forget about all the is and's or but's around. if it's isolated from fire, that

would be a safety measure. has anyone disagree with that? no. so to me, what i would like to do in my life is kind of take the big competition issues in see, can we start from somewhere. so it seems to me we know this but it also seems to me we know as a result of this important hearing that the chemical safety board had made that suggestion in 2002. we also know from the epa that they haven't done that, and we also know that there safety alert goes back to 1997, and hasn't been updated. so before my question i want to talk to mr. over him, is looking at the issue over all -- mr. orum. and as i listen to you and i went over your recommendations, you talk about the general duty clause that holds firms

responsible for understanding and managing the chemical hazards, regardless of what the government does or doesn't do. and i think it's worth repeating. that the industry has an obligation. am i stating that correctly, mr. orum? >> yes. we basically don't want to see a situation where government actions are deliberately hide up in delay, and then the government is unable to use prevention strategies or enforcement. and these delays -- >> that's not answering my question. is it your opinion that the general duty clause holds firms responsible for understanding and managing the chemical hazards, regardless of government actions, or lack of actions the? >> yes. >> that's what it want to get at. and do you also believe, i mean, you bring this but i just want,

so clear in your testimony, he wrote that risk management planning should include reactive chemicals like the ammonium nitrate that detonated at west fertilizer. very straightforward recommendation. you stand behind that? >> yes, yes. >> okay. i mean, i do agree with mr. man that you have to enforce. you could put out the others. you can change the regs. but you still need to send out folks to enforce. but i have to say, it's a bad example to use these days, but practically all of us to pay our taxes, regardless of the fact that some people will say that tax is unfair and i don't like the irs. you know, obviously, most of us are not audited and most of us do the right thing. so i some point, i may, we will not go to look at every single thing but let me ask you specifically said you talked

about enforcement, in the case of west. could you point to one particular regulation that, if it wasn't forthcoming could have prevented what happened at west lex since you cite the lack of enforcement of existing regs as a problem. give me an example of what enforcement could have stopped this problem of the existing laws. >> thank you, chairman boxer, for that question. specifically, osha 1910-109, the explosive standard, that has a paragraph that is specific to ammonium nitrate. >> okay. >> in india, i will quote just one partner is as ammonium nitrate shall be in a separate building or shall be separated by a prototype firewalls of not less than one hour fire resistance rating from storage

of organic, and on and on. right there is just one critical element of what you said separate ammonium nitrate from combustible -- >> okay, all using its osha had inspected, they would've caught this problem? ..

a did a little bit of alerting with osha. that would be the minimum they ought to do this afternoon. do we know what year that -- do you know what year that osha regulation went into place? >> no, madam chairman, i don't, but if i could just take a few seconds to say something -- >> please, go ahead. >> while epa issued the guidance and should as you suggested update that guidance, we also should be careful that we shouldn't have overlapping regulations. so if osha think 109 can accomplish the objectives, that's what we should do. i think, ultimately -- >> well, see, i don't agree with that at all. if this can cause multiple deaths, then it doesn't bother me if a couple of safety agencies have similar laws on the books. let me just stop you there

because i want to give some time to the senator because the vote has how many minutes left? four minutes left. can i just say thank you, all of you? i mean, i'm so happy you are here. this was very important. i'm going to be following up with a very important letter to, which will include to the white house about what needs to be done, and you've all really helped me. >> i also want to thank you for being here. i apologize for just being here at the end. i had a conflict with a markup in another committee. but in the interest of time, madam chair, i think what i'd like to do is just submit my questions for the record and see if we can get it done that way. thank you. what i was saying was in the interest of time, i apologize for not being here, we had another markup. but what i'd like to do is just submit my questions for the record. >> of course. senator, absolutely, and i have other questions as well that i

was unable to do because we have these very big votes on immigration. so we're going to head out. thank you to all. if our -- tim is still here, i think he is. again, i want to saw thank -- sy thank you so very much for being here. i want you to know, and you tell the family, that we are not stopping until we make positive reforms that will make the likelihood of this far less than it is today. and to the chemical safety board, if i could just say something to you, in this particular case and, you know, i don't know what you're going to do tomorrow, i just -- you're my heroes in this. and, please, do exactly what you're doing. get to the bottom of this, and don't be afraid to say what you believe, and it's critically important, and i'm very proud of the work you've done. thank you very much, we stand adjourned.

[inaudible conversations] >> last month irs official lois lerner invoked her fifth amendment right not to testify on the irs targeting of conservative groups. members of the committee questioned the legality of that action. and tomorrow they'll vote to decide if she can be compelled to testify. we'll have live coverage of that committee meeting beginning at 9 a.m. eastern here on c-span2. >> i was also looking for things that were completely pessimistic. i think we could have won without patton. i think we could have won without lemay, perhaps, but i don't think -- you take away do midwest close who burned out athens, the greeks would have even fought or without belisarius, the emperor would not have recovered much of the western part of the

byzantine/roman empire. i don't think there's a union general alive who could have taken atlanta at the cost that we took it, very small cost compared to what was going on in virginia, and i don't know anybody who could have done what matthew rimmingway -- and i wish i could say there were american generals, not very many that could have done what david petraeus did. >> victor davis hanson talks about five generals that he says single-handedly reversed the war to their country's favor. part of booktv this weekend on c-span2. >> you're watching c-span2 with politics and public affairs. weekdays featuring live coverage of the u.s. senate. on weeknights watch key public policy events and every weekend the latest nonfiction authors and books on booktv. you can see past programs and get our schedules at our web site, and you can join in the conversation on social media sites. >> the broadcasting board of

governors is a federal agency that oversees international tv and radio broadcasters such as voice of america and radio free asia. former secretary of state hillary clinton recently called the agency defunk. on wednesday the house foreign affairs committee heard from form members of the bbg. this part of the hearing is 45 minutes. >> this committee will come to order. the committee is pleased to see that we have representatives of the bbg including seated governors like victor ash with us today, and we work forward to working together and continuing our dialogue as we move forward with legislative reforms. the title of this hearing is broadcasting board of governors, an agency defunct. and today we meet to discuss how best to reform the broadcasting board of governors, the agency

which oversees u.s. international broadcasters such as the voice of america and such as radio free asia. our international broadcasting hats a very rich history. eastern europeans have told us how critical radio free asia was, radio free europe was at the time in clipping away at the iron curtain in the ability to get information out to operate as a free, surrogate radio, to give the people the facts about what was actually happening on the ground in eastern europe that otherwise they would not have been able to obtain. and what's interesting in listening to the dialogue, the can conversations about those at the time who were privy to listening to those broadcasts is to hear their explanations about their own thought process as they began to question the totalitarian regimes that were

controlling information. it, indeed, had a profound impact on the course of human events. it was quite an achievement with the end of the cold war. and while the voice of america aims to provide listeners with objective news and information about united states foreign policy, the purpose of the surrogate broadcast such as radio free europe, radio free asia is very different. and that is to beam this information into closed societies giving those citizens the information that otherwise they would never be able to access. each broadcasting service is full of enterprising reporters who literally risk their lives for what they do. they risk life and limb, and i think all of us have followed stories about individual reporters who were killed in the line of getting the story in

totalitarian regimes or reporting on human rights abuses. reporters from these services really deserve to work under an organization that makes the most out of their talents. unfortunately, more and more it seems that the structure of international broadcasting clips their wings. legislation in the 1990s established the broadcasting board of governors as an independent federal agency responsible for all u.s. nonmilitary international broadcasting. today the bbg exercises authority over five distinct broadcasting services managed by a bipartisan and a part-time presidentially-appointed board of nine individuals. the board is supposed to set the priorities and overall strategic

direction of the u.s. international broadcasting. it's supposed to do to allocate the resources and safeguard journalistic integrity. but plagued by vacancies and infighting, the bbg has trouble accomplishing any of that. in january the state department inspector general depicted an agency with a dedicated staff attempting to serve, in their words, a dysfunctional structure. the bbbg's, quote: dysfunction stems from a flawed legislative structure and stems from acute internal dissension. the report concludes noting that a part-time board cannot, cannot effectively supervise operations. indeed, secretary of state hillary clinton testified before the committee, and we recall her

words that the bbg is, quote: practically a defunct agency in terms of its capacity to be able to tell a message around the world, unquote. she went on to regret that, in her words, we are abdicating the ideological arena. i agree with her assessment. the stakes are very high. as we speak, governments around the world have stepped up efforts to influence opinion abroad and to stifle dissent back at home. in pakistan small local radio stations broadcast messages that promote extremism and incite violence against every other minority group in pakistan. the fight against terrorism and other threats to our national

security must include a fight against bad ideas. if done well, the payoff of broadcasting is tremendous. with an information war underway, u.s. international broadcasting must be as sharp as ever. we must relearn some of the techniques, and this includes the broadcast entities themselves. the former head of radio free europe once summed up their mission this way. quote: irritate authoritarian regimes, inspire democrats and create greater space for civil society, unquote. our goal here is to figure out how to do more of just that, and i'll now turn to ranking member engel for his opening remarks. >> chairman royce, thank you for calling this very timely hearing on an issue that impacts millions of people around the

world which is u.s./international broadcasting. last month i had the opportunity to speak at the 70th anniversary of the voice of america's albanian service, a reminder that providing unbiased news remains as relevant today as it was when voa began broadcasting during world war ii. u.s. interinternational broadcasting endures because it has maintained a commitment to journalistic integrity. first principle is to provide news that is, quote: consistently reliable and authoritative, accurate, objective and comprehensive, end of quote. in the years since the dawn of u.s./international broadcasting, the structures and technologies to deliver the news have changed dramatically. what began as voa radio has evolved into five distinct organizations housed within the broadcasting board of governors or bbg. today these entities reach over

200 million people per week if 61 languages, radio, tv, the internet and even mobile phones. while the bbg and its various subentities continue to play an important role in u.s. foreign policy, some questions have been raised about the management of the agency. an inspector general report issued earlier this year found that the bbg was, and i quote again, failing in its mandated duties, unquote. and it attributed that failure to a flawed structure and strong internal dissension. one problem highlighted by the report is that the bbg board, originally intended to operate on a part-time basis, has in practice assumed full-time responsibilities of supervising a mass e media organization with broadcasts to more than a hundred countries. this problem has been compounded by the large number of board vacancies which has left the bbg without a quorum necessary to make official decisions. currently, only four of the nine

board slots are filled. these vacancies increase the pressure and responsibilities of a sitting governor -- of the sitting governors to supervise the bbg. i hope the senate will soon take action on the nominees being considered and that the president will nominate additional board members. in addition, questions have been raised about the lines of authority at the bbg. voice of america, which is a federal entity, reports to the head of the international broadcasting bureau while radio free europe, radio liberty, a private grantee, reports directory to the board of governors. this can create confusion about who's in charge resulting in unnecessary duplication and undermining accountability. finally, many of us are concerned about the consistently low to real among -- morale among employees at the bbg. year after year federal surveys show that the bbg ranks among the bottom of all federal agencies in terms of job satisfaction. in response to these and other

issues, the administration has proposed the creation of a chief executive officer. the ceo would be selected by the board and be delegated some of the -- and will be delegated some of the board's responsibilities including the day-to-day management of the agency. this approach is supported by the inspector general. as we examine ways to improve the governance of international broadcasting. it's vital that any reforms maintain the journalistic integrity that's been built over the last 70 years. this means maintaining the strong firewall between journalism and politics. i look forward to hearing a frank assessment from our witnesses on the challenges facing the bbg and on the board's roam to create a ceo -- proposal to create a ceo as well as other recommendations they might have for improving u.s./international broadcasting. i'm a big supporter of voa, of u.s. broadcasting. congresswoman ros-lehtinen and i many years ago had to fight for

radio marty. i really thinks this make it change. i've done a lot of work in albania, and when albania first opened up when i was here in the early 1990s and i went there, i asked them what happened during the cold war when you had the most repressive dictatorship, how did you know what was going on? and they said that the voice of america was important. they all listened to it. they listened to some television from italy. but voice of america was instrumental, and i believe it was trumpettal then, it was instrumental during the cold war, and it was instrumental now. so as the voa adage goes, tell the truth and let the world decide. i believe that. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i thank you, mr. engel. we're going to go now to our witnesses. we've within joined by -- been joined by three who all previously served on the broadcasting board of governors. the honorable james glassman served as undersecretary of

state for public diplomacy and public affairs before he became chairman of the broadcasting board of governors from 2007 to 2008. mr. wimbush, honorable enders wimbush, is the executive director for strategy and development at the national bureau of asian research. he was a member of the board from 2010 to 2012, but he was also director of radio free liberty from 1987 to 1993 as the iron curtain fell. the honorable d. jeff hirschberg, his eight-year tenure on the broadcasting board of governors began in 2002. before that he worked at the department of justice where he was special attorney to the deputy attorney general. so we welcome all three of you. and i'm going to ask you to summarize your opening statements. and without objection, the

witnesses will have their full prepared statements made part of the record. members have five days to submit be your statements or additional questions. and, mr. glassman, we'll begin with you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. engel, members of the committee, congratulations on this hearing. now is the time to think big about reforming not just the bbg, but the entire public diplomacy effort of the u.s. government. today i want to make four points. first, this hearing's title refers to former secretary clinton's statement that the bbg is defunct. it is not. the bbg is one of the largest news-gathering operations in the world. last week it announced a total audience of more than 203 million, a new record. the inspector general said in january u.s. government broadcasting is characterized by journalism of the highest caliber. second, while the bbg is alive and well, its mission is contradictory and confused.

the law asks it both to be a tool of u.s. foreign policy and an undependent, unbiased journalistic organization protected from government interference. in fact, the bbg's mission should be the same as that of the state department itself; to achieve the specific strategic goals of u.s. national security and foreign policy. good journalism is not the end, but the means. this is my most important message to you. you need to resolve the contradiction by law and clarify the mission. it's simply unfair to call the bbg defunct or even dysfunctional when congress and the executive branch have not provided the bbg with a clear sense of what they want it to be and what they want it to do. third, structure. the bbg must be fully integrated into the foreign policy apparatus of the u.s. government. the modern bbg was created in

1999 after the functions of the information agency were mostly folded into the state department and international broadcasting was consolidated as a separate body, the bbg. the best way to -- the best way to remove any confusion about the bbg's mission is to put it back into the state department under an assistant secretary playing close to the ceo role that the current board and the administration envision. or as part of a resurrected usia. it should have an advisory board composed of members with expertise in media technology and in disseminating ideas in general. high journalistic standards must be maintained for this new bbg. propaganda simply does not work. all current broadcasting functions should be subassumed within the state department including those of the so-called grantees such as radio free europe. the distinctions and functions

among bbg entities has largely evaporated. at any rate, as a 201 hudson institute report says, it should be made clear to the various broadcasting services that they are in the public sector and are part of the u.s. foreign policy team. this does not simply mean performing in a manner consistent with a broad foreign policy objective of the united states as the law states, but instead following actual strategic directives. for example, to convince the pakistanis that they face an exist ten cial threat from al-qaeda. fourth, in examining the bbg, this committee should broaden its sights and encompass the government's soft power function as a whole. in her statement to this committee in january, secretary clinton focused on the bbg in describing her frustration, as you noted, mr. chairman, with america's failure to tell a message around the world. she said we're letting the jihadist narrative fill a void.

we need to get in there and compete. that's true. but it is wrong to single out the bbg which is only ambiguously part of the public policy -- public diplomacy apparatus for this failure. it's also disingenuous to point outward in assigning the blame when the responsibility to get in there and compete should lie within the state department and the white house. when i was at state, we had a clear mandate from the white house backed by support from the national security council to wage a war of ideas and informational and ideological struggle against the jihadist narrative to which secretary clinton refers. now the term "war of ideas" has become anathema. the fact is we will never thwart our enemies and win the world's respect if we don't stand up for our values and oppose the ideology of violent extremist, just as we addressed communism during the cold war. what we need is what i call a

strategic public diplomacy; that is, soft power directed to strategic national security aims with a full commitment of a president and congress that understand that these nonviolent efforts are as important as warfare. by own interest -- my own interest in this area began in 2003 when i was appoint today the advisory group for the arab and muslim world, a -- thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. glassman. mr. wimbush. >> mr. chairman, thank you very much. mr. engel, thank you for this opportunity. i also want to applaud the effort of this committee to take a good look at the bbg and its relationship to international -- >> mr. wimbush? push the button on your microphone and pull it a little closer. >> that better? we got it? >> there you go. >> i've spent a long time on both the front lines and back lines of international broadcasting, so let me give you my assessment clearly and succinctly. the bbg was a bad ideas when it was created, and it's dysfunctional today.

with five of its eight governors including three of its four republican members and both its chairman and a replacement as well as the alternate presiding governor having to resign in frustration or disgust. the bbg cannot now function legally as intended because it now lacks an operating quorum. the bbg, in my estimate, has failed to provide u.s./international broadcasting wefective strategic guidance, with good governance or any credible link to u.s. foreign be policy goals and strategies. and these are built into the bbg system. the bbg is dysfunctional in three overlapping and interrelated ways. first, it is, as mr. engel pointed out, a melange of different organizations. three federal agencies and three 501(c)(3)s. they operate on totally different sets of laws, conventions and practices.

they cannot be made to work. the only thing they have in common is that they do media. second, the bbg's governance model could hardly be worse or more debilitating. it has no real leadership. the chairman's role is more honorary than functional, and his powers are nowhere spelled out. congress originally intended the board of governors to oversee but not to manage, but this has morphed into the bbg becoming a collective ceo which has resulted in confused lines of responsibility and authority, oversight and management. and the bbg is dysfunctional strategically. and this is the most importantpart -- point. our competitors have multiplied while our allies have retreated. one would think that american strategists would begin to sharpen their spears to compete in this world, yet the opposite seems to be happening. again, due in large part to the incoherence of the bbg.

how -- let me illustrate with an example. nearly every year the bbg receives requests from concerned nigerians to inaugurator a broadcast service in their language. it's spoken by 18-20% of the nigerian population of 175 million which means a media audience of somewhere between 30-35 million in an energy-rich, demographically-young, geographically-salient country. this would seem to be a no-brainer. but every year it's refused, and why is this? because rampant duplication of effort across the five networks vastly reduces the funding opportunities for new ventures, however strategic. i'm confident that members of this board know that the voice of america has a russian broadcasting service, and you probably even know that radio free europe and radio liberty also have a russian broadcasting service. but the voice also has a burmese broadcasting service as does radio free asia. now, if this were the end of the

list, we might find a reasonable explanation, but it's just the beginning. u.s./international broadcasting now operating two language services on different networks in each of the following languages: albanian, bosnian, macedonian, serbian, azerbaijani, ukrainian, uzbek, par few, persian, cantonese, korean, lao, mandarin, tibetan, vietnamese, and the voa and the office of cuba broadcasting both broad in spanish too. if you're counting, that's 23 duplications. now, advocates of duplication say it's necessary because they do different things. i've been hearing that ca 2345rd since i ran radio liberty. there is no location for surrogate or nonsurrogate broadcasting these days. think about the new technologies. think about crowd sourcing. crowd sourcing, which is the gathering of information through mobile devices. it is the classic surrogate instrument. are we going to tell the voice

of america that it can't be doing this? it uses it everywhere. we need to get rid of this distinction between surrogate and nonsurrogate. my four conclusions. one, get rid of the bbg as the organizing organization for u.s./international broadcasting. two, separate oversight from management. three, put one unified, full-time professional management in place with jurisdiction over all u.s. international broadcasting. four, create conditions for strategic decision making and, five, abandon the simplistic distinction between telling america's story and surrogate broadcasting. there are ways to get there, i'd be happy to expand on those if asked. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. wimbush. we go now to mr. are hirsh brg. >> mr. chairman, mr. engel, members of the committee, thank you for holding the hearing. i share some of the things that my colleagues have said up here,

and a lot of i just flat don't. my experience on the broadcasting board, i think, is a little bit different. i served there for roughly eight and a half years, and during that period of time we served for two years without a chairman because we were basically down to the final four, as we called ourselves. and before that the board actually did work collegially to really address major strategic issues and initiate certain services such as -- [inaudible] television which were much needed. there were no votes on that sort of thing. it was done by consensus. democrats and republicans agreed that it was needed, created a promotional video, took it into the white house. the president of the united states bought it, and we were up and running within five months of funding through the appropriations process. and we went on the air february 14th, valentine's present, 2004.

so the board actually can work if you have a first rate chairman and seven other people of goodwill who are willing to work together to accomplish the strategic goals of the bbg. now, having said that, i understand that it looks like to me, at least, things have changed over the course of time, and now there's a push for reform. the current board and my successor board put out a strategic plan, and the president has accepted part of that strategic plan, omb has supported it, and they have offered up a ceo of u.s. international broadcasting. while i may not believe it's necessary, i can support it. and i can support it as long as the ceo of u.s./international broadcasting is beyond and behind a firewall with the res of the bbg board. -- with the

rest of the bbg board must remain behind the firewall. the most important thing that u.s./international broadcasting has in its favor around the world is its credibility. so my suggestion to you, and i urge you that when you are considering making certain changes, keep in mind that the most thing that we have going for us is our credibility. i don't think you get that by destroying the broadcast entities in any way, shape or form. i don't believe you get that by putting va and the rest of the -- v, a and the rest of the entities in the state department. i'm not in favor of that. my, while there's so much to talk about it's hard to know where to stop, i want to leave you with just one more thing before we go, before we answer questions. assuming you get this 100% right in the structure -- and the structure is 100% correct and everybody's satisfied with

whatever structure you come up with, it still only addresses half of the problem. the other half of the problem after structure and whatever reforms you want to put into place is that u.s./international broadcasting is substantially underfunded to do what it needs to do. just one example, if you look at al-jazeera in the united states today, they're welcome here because we have a first amendment. they are spending roughly $750 or $800 million to stand up a network in the united states alone. that's over 100% of u.s./international broadcasting's worldwide budget. so my last thing that i want to share with you is that while there may be some need for reform in the broadcasting board of governors itself which i can support, the broadcast entities themselves are performing their jobs as well or better than they

ever have and, quite frankly, voice of america, mbn on one side, the surrogates on the other are just two sides of the same copy. and what you're talking about in mission statements is merely matters of degree. thank you. >> thank you, mr. hirschberg. i do think it's, as we look at this issue, there isn't any question but that during the cold war we were particularly effective during a period of time. i remember i was in east germany for a while and saw the impact of these broadcasts. and saw how you did them wrong and how you did them right. the old bombastic west german broadcasts, people weren't interested in that. but when we recruited east german stringers and began to put those young reporters on the line, people were fixated on those, on what they had to hear. over the years we, i think, learned certain lessons. the state department wanted us out of yugoslavia on the

broadcasting. i remember a young croatian with tears in his eyes telling me that the hate radio dominated all over the former yugoslavia, and it was one of the reasons the fact that we had never really had effective broadcasting in there. i had legislation to try to do that, and i believe we finally got that through, and it got it up and running the day before we started bombing. i think it's, it's very clear over the years that also the concept of a mission of trying to offset the totalitarian and especially the hate broadcasts that are done in these societies, we tried to prior, far prior to 9/11, and we tried to get broadcasting up and running, the right type of broadcasting in afghanistan. i remember that struggle. i carried that legislation. again, we didn't get that through until after, after the

attack and after the death of the leader of the northern alliance. and i think that as we go forward, clearly we have to learn from what we did right. and that's why mr. wimbush's testimony is of tremendous interest to me. because during his tenure we did something right, and it wasn't, it wasn't partisan. it was a nonpartisan effort to try to disseminate the facts about what was actually happening in that part of the world. mr. wimbush, would you like to extrapolate a little more? because when you finished your testimony, you said if we wanted to hear more from you about specifics, you'd be happy to give us those specifics. >> yes, thank you, mr. chairman. i, like jeff hirschberg, i am not a big fan of putting it all within the state department. it's one model, and i think you need to look at a number of

different models. but i really think that this committee needs to hit for the fence. i think it needs to entertain a number of pathways to the goal you want. but for me, the one that stands out as far and away the most logical and be, coincidentally, the one that will lead inevitably to the fewest instances of backsliding into the current bbg dilemma is to create one stand-alone media organization incorporating all of these existing media enterprises. now, it puts a big load on your plate because that means defederallizing the voice of america and the office of cuba broadcasting. frankly, this, to me, is far and away the best, the best outcome that you could come up with. there are, other models that you could look at that might put the voice of america off by itself, and maybe it goes into state or

stands alone, and the radio freeze, the grantees go in something else. what i would not do is organize in a way that enhances this distinction between telling america's story and doing surrogate broadcasting. when i was the director of radio liberty, one of the most important programs we put on the air -- and i resisted it because a member of the bib at that time told me we had to, he wanted something that told america's story -- we put on a program from our new york office called broadway 1776. it followed new emigres from russia around the streets of new york into the pta, into the stores, into the intellectual institutions, into the museums. it was the most fantastic piece of surrogate broadcasting, because it was about them, and it was one of the finest and most wonderful examples of telling america's story because

it told how the whole thing worked. but listen -- but, look in contrast. here is a announcement from the voice of america which is not supposed to be a surrogate station, although it's been practicing surrogacy for a long time, this is how they describe their new offering to south sudan just three or four weeks ago, and i quote: with south sudan in focus as its flagship program, the english-language service will offer news for south sudan, about south sudan and by south sudan reporters. that is for the country, about the country, by the country people. it's simply impossible to get more surrogate than that. so the objective, your objective, i think, should be to create as many possible synergies as you can without creating these firewalls, these barriers for the sharing of information, the creating of new images and messages and the

healthy functioning of the whole media organization as a single entity. >> any further suggestions as long as you're here as a witness? [laughter] >> whether i will, i -- in my written testimony you'll see that i make a number of suggestions, but i would defer to my colleagues at this point. >> mr. hirschberg. >> um, i believe in taking on fights that you can have a chance of winning -- >> mr. hirschberg, take the -- >> sorry. is it there? there you are. for the eight and a half years that i was on the board, we sort of took on fights we thought we could win. defederalizing voa and ocb had been considered by the previous board for a number of years, and at this point in time we decided we could not do it so, therefore, we chose to do other things in our discretion. i'm not for a single, necessarily, broadcast entity. i think that the surrogates and vo a&m bn on the other hand do a

very good job the way they are. i think there's a lot of things that can be done with respect to sinner eyeing what they do -- ginner eyeing what they do. i think there's a lot of things that can be done vis-a-vis a management structure, and you could actually consolidate back office operations, consolidate i.t., consolidate other things. that certainly can be done. now, if you want to do that and create an entire be broadcast or a single broadcast entity, that's your privilege. you can change the legislation to do that if that's what you want to do. i just don't see a need for it. >> well, you did speak about resources. >> be i certainly did. >> and our resources aren't infinite. >> correct. >> so the concept of merging the two, as mr. wimbush articulates, might not only lead to the added efficiencies, but might lead to

the ability to do more programming effectively. as he ticks off the different dialects and languages that we do the broadcasting in and there's probably 170 i would guess or so at least around the world, the reality is that there are, there's a certain duplication there. so, clearly, if you can consolidate that, you might -- especially given the fact that you do have a lot of information around the world in terms of straight news. this is a little different mission. and consolidating that with the personnel that have those abilities in that niche to speak to those audiences and having them in the same operation might be tremendously more efficient. i don't know. >> it may be more efficient, mr. chairman. but in the meantime, the gao report on this did not go far be

enough to analyze duplicated versus unduplicated audiences who listens to which of those services, what the effect of those services is, how they, what their audience reach is, what their credibility is. if you want to go to that step and then make the judgment as to whether or not the language services ought to be eliminated one way or another, that's just fine. >> well, i'm out of time. i'm -- i'll go to mr. ending l. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'd like to ask all three of you broad-based questions based on your written testimony, which i've read, and what you've said. all three of you had different views on what the fundamental mission on u.s./international broadcasting should or should not be. and correct me if i'm wrong, mr. hirschberg, you said that our broadcasters don't do advocacy work.

mr. wimbush, you believe the differentiation in missions between surrogates in telling america's story is no longer relevant. mr. glassman, you testified that the entity should be brought in line with u.s. strategic directives. so these all seem to be quite different opinions. so let me just throw it out and say amongst the three of you is there any common ground on the overarching mission of u.s./international broadcasting? is it possible for broadcasters to provide authoritative, accurate and objective news while at the same time advancing u.s. interests? any one of you care to -- >> well, i'll be a happy to take the first, the first crack at that. the mission, many engel, the mission -- many engel, the mission is to support u.s. foreign policy. i mean, i don't think anybody disagrees with that. today the connective tissue between what the bbg does and the programs that its networks create and the overall aims of

u.s. foreign policy is almost nonexistent. i think jim glassman mentioned that in his testimony. somehow that has to be, that has to be revivified. it has to be, it has to be made a clearer, more concise connection. the -- and jeff hirschberg is also right that this has to be done within the context of good journalism. i think of it as journalism with an edge. but it's journalism. we have, we have of a reason for doing it. it's to support u.s. foreign policy and u.s. foreign policy objectives, to sport human rights -- to support human rights, to advance freedom and enterprise. all of those things. but it has to be done within the context of good journalism. without that, and we learned at radio liberty during the cold war, without the credibility that comes with good journalistic practice, you're

blown out of the water almost immediately. everyone can smell a bad story. and today when, if you drive through any village in the middle east or turkey or asia and you look up at an apartment building and you see the satellite dishes sometimes two or three to a balcony, you understand that these people are not suffering from the regime's to knoply on information -- monopoly on information. they're receiving 2-400 channels of something. so credibility and context for u.s. international broadcasting is utter hi critical in this explosion of media. people are asking more and more and more. all right? we got the facts or what we think are the facts, but what does it mean? that's u.s. broadcasting's niche. >> mr. engel, as i said in my testimony, the mission of the

bbg should be to achieve, to help achieve the specific strategic goals of u.s. foreign policy. that's just not true today. it is true that the bbg in many instances -- most recently, for example, in the sahel where tear working -- where they're working with dod and state to increase broadcasting or in somalia -- in many cases they are working toward these strategic aims. but that is not the main function or the main mission of the bbg today. and that's why i worry when mr. wimbush, with whom i agree on a lot of the things he said, talks about the bbg standing alone. it shouldn't stand alone. it should be part of the foreign be policy apparatus. the reason that things worked during the cold war was the entire u.s. government was mobilized in its soft power

elements to fight communism. and we did a great job. that's not true with our soft power today at a time when, i believe, the problem is as urgent as it was then. >> mr. engel, let me answer it this way. it's not that the bbg is devoid of conversations with the state department. that's not true. the bbg constantly sets its broadcast priorities in conjunction with the formal cop suggestation with the state department -- consultation with the state department once a year during the language process, and, indeed, it is more iterative than that over the course of years. so, yes, we talk to the state department, yes, we have a mandate to coordinate how and where we broadcast with strategic goals. and the bbg actually does just that.

>> could i just add, jeff -- >> yeah. >> -- i'll never forget the, when i joined the bbg as chairman, our first consultation with the state department. we go to the state department, and there's the deputy. and we sit down with him, and he talks to us for a after an hour. and he said, well, okay, iran is a priority this year, turkey's not a priority, just kind of listed things. that was the level of consultation we had with the state department. i'm proud to say that because i later became undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs, we had more of a tie. but really the, these conversations are not a kind of serious, strategic coordination with the state department or the defense department or otherwise. although more of it is now going on. >> it is criminal, to me, that i had to authorize few budget people, my financial people to write a check for $454 million, a little bit more than a month ago, to extend our contract with

the russians to continue to carry our crews to the international space station on soyuz for 2016 and 2017 because we have not yet brought about the american capability that's coming with our commercial crew program. the president's budget called for $821 million for commercial crew, we are not halfway there. the congress has just -- we have not -- my job is to try to persuade the congress that the plan is good and that we're going to be efficient users of the taxpayers' money, and i've not been successful in that yet, but i'm working on it. we're up to 525, and -- but as i have told every member of congress with whom i've talked, $821 million in the 2014 budget is vital if we're to make the 2017 date so that americans are transported to space again on american spacecraft. >> more with nasa administrator and retired marine corps general charles bolden sunday night at 8 on c-span's "q&a." >> you're watching c-span2 with

politics and public affairs. weekdays featuring live coverage of the u.s. senate. on weeknights watch key public policy events. and every weekend the latest nonfiction authors and books on booktv. you can see past programs and get our schedules at our web sites, and you can join in the conversation on social media sites. >> at another hearing on the irs last month, the irs official in charge of the tax-exempt division refused to testify, invoking her fifth amendment rights. this was after making an opening statement where she insisted she did nothing wrong and broke no laws. here's her statement from that hearing. >> good morning, mr. chairman, and members of the committee. is lois lerner, and i'm the director of exemptlo organizations at the internalis revenue service. i have been a government employee for over 34 years. i initially practiced law at the department of justice and later at thera federal election

commission. in 2001 i became a, i moved to the irs to work in the exempt organizations office, and inempt 2006 i was promoted to be the director of that office. exempt organizations oversees about 1.6 million tax-exempt organizations and processes over 60,000 applications for tax exemptioner -- exemption every year.9 i'm responsible for about 900 employees nationwide and administer a budgetf of almost $100 million. my professional career has beena devoted to fulfilling to responsibilities of the agencies for which i have worked, and iia am very proud of the work that have done in government. on may 14th the treasury t inspector genre leased a report finding that the exempt organizations' field office in i cincinnati, ohio, used u inappropriate criteria to identify for further review applications from organizations that planned to engage in political activity which may

mean that they did not qualify for tax exemption. on that same day, the department of justice launched an investigation into the mattersuh described in the inspector general's report.ctor in addition, members of thision, committee have accused me of providing false information when i responded to questions about the irs processing of applications for tax exemption. i have not done anything wrong. i have not broken any laws, i have not violated any irs rules or regulations. i have not provided false information to this or any othei congressional committee. and while i would very much like to answer the committee's questions today, i've been advise by my counsel to assert m my institutional right not to to testify or answer questions related to the subject matter ot this hearing. of this hearing. after very careful consideration, i've decided to

follow my counsel's advice and not testify or answer any of the questions today. because i'm asserting my right not to testify, i know some people will assume i've done something wrong. i have not. one of the basic functions of the fifth amendment is to protect innocent individuals and that is the protection i'm invoking today. thank you. >> thank you for your testimony. miss lerner, earlier the ranking member made me aware of a response we have that is purp t purported to come from you in regards to questions that the ig asked during his investigation. can we have you authenticate the questions and answers previously given to the inspector general. >> i don't know what that is. i'd have to look at it. >> would you please make it available to the witness?

[background sounds] >> this appears to be my response. >> it's your testimony that as far as your recollection, that is your response?

>> that's correct. >> miss lerner the topic is additional scrutiny regarding the application for tax exempt status. as director of the division of the irs, you were uniquely positioned to provide testimony to help this committee better understand how and why the irs targeted these groups to that end, i must ask you to reconsider, particularly in light of the fact that you have given not once, but twice, testimony before this court this morning, you have made an opening statement in which you made assertions of your innocence, assertions you did nothing wrong and assertions you broke no laws or rules. additionally you have authenticated earlier answers to the ig. at this point, i believe you have not asserted your rights

but in fact have effectively waived your rights. would you please seek counsel for further guidance on this matter while we wait. >> i will not answer any questions or testify about the subject matter of this committee's meeting. >> we will take your refusal as a refusal to testify. the witness and counsel are dismissed. >> the gentlemen will state -- please wait. >> mr. issa, mr. cummings just said we should run this like a courtroom and i agree with him. she just testified or waived her fifth amendment right to privilege. you don't get to tell your side of the story and not be subjected to cross-examination. that's not the way it works. she waived her right by issuing

an opening state and ought to stand here and answer our questions. [ applause ] . >> mr. chairman. >> mr. chairman? >>fi mr. cummings. >> first of all, i said i'd likt to see it run like a federal court. unfortunately, this is not a federal court, and she does have a right, and i think -- and we have to adhere to that. adhere that. >> thank you. >> we'll pause for a moment. i'll ask you additional

questions, is it possible we could narrow the scope of questions and there are some areas that you would be able to answer any questions here today. >> i will not answer any questions or testify today. >> miss lerner, would you be willing to answer questions specifically related to the earlier statements made under oath before this committee? >> i decline to answer that question for the reasons i've already given. >> for this reason, i have no choice but to excuse the witness subject to rerecall after we seek specific counsel on the questions of whether or not the constitutional right of the fifth amendment has been properly waived. notwithstanding that and consultation with the department of justice as to whether or not limited or use immunity could be negotiated, the witness and counsel are dismissed. the clerk will please rearrange

the seating. [inaudible conversations] >> and since that hearing last month lois lerner has been placed on administrative leave with the irs. we're live this morning on capitol hill as the house oversight committee is meeting on whether lois lerner waived her right to remain silent at that hearing a month ago. ms. lerner was in charge of the irs' tax-exempt organizations office. she claimed she had done nothing wrong in regards to irs targeting of conservative groups. the committee this morning will discuss whether that decision to give a statement invalidated ms. lerner's fifth amendment rights which she asserted following the statement.